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It would be idle to assert that there is nothing of selfishness in the pursuit of a profession. But its 
ideal is not one of individual success in competitive acquisitive activity. And because ideals 
operate powerfully to shape action, professional activity, even at its worst, is restrained and 
guided by something better than the desire for money rewards.1 
 
The function of the lawyer is to preserve a sceptical relativism in a society hell-bent for 
absolutes. The worse the society, the more law there will be. In Hell there will be nothing but law 
and due process will be meticulously observed.2 
 
About half the practice of a decent lawyer consists of telling would-be clients that they are 
damned fools and should stop.3 
 
We will not at present inquire whether the doctrine which is held on this subject by English 
lawyers be or be not agreeable to reason and morality; whether it be right that a man should, 
with a wig on his head, and a band round his neck, do for a guinea what, without those 
appendages, he would think it wicked and infamous to do for an empire; whether it be right that, 
not merely believing but knowing a statement to be true, he should do all that can be done by 
sophistry, by rhetoric, by solemn asseveration, by indignant exclamation, by gesture, by play of 
features, by terrifying one honest witness, by perplexing another, to cause a jury to think that 
statement false.4 
 
Justice says ye? I tell ye Hogan’s r-right whin he says: ‘Justice is blind.’ Blind she is, an’ deef 
an’ dumb an’ has a wooden leg! Niver again will they dhraw me to a coort. I’ll take th’ rude 
justice iv a piece iv lead pipe without costs or th’ r-right iv appeal.5 
 
Lawyer — One who protects us against robbers by taking away the temptation.6 
 
LAWYER, n. One skilled in circumvention of the law.7 
 
The sad thing about lawyers is not that so many of them are stupid, but that so many of them 
are intelligent. The craft is a great devourer of good men; it sucks in and wastes almost as many 
as the monastic life consumed in the Middle Ages. There is something about it that is 
extraordinarily attractive to bright youngsters, especially in the United States. It not only offers 
the chance of very substantial rewards in money; it also holds out the temptation of a sort of 
public dignity, with political preferment thrown in for good measure.8 
																																																								
1 Roscoe Pound, What is a Profession - the Rise of the Legal Profession in Antiquity, 19 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 203 (1944). 
2 Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 110 (1977). 
3 Philip C. Jessup, 1 Elihu Root 133 (1964). 
4 Thomas Babington Macaulay, Essay on Francis Bacon (1874). 
5 Finley Peter Dunne, Mr. Dooley’s Opinions 118 (1901). 
6 H.L. Mencken, A Mencken Chrestomathy (1949). 
7 Ambrose Bierce, The Cynic's Dictionary (1906). 
8 H.L. Mencken, Stewards of Nonsense, American Mercury 35 (Jan. 1928). 
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Preface 
 
Thank you for your interest in Professional Responsibility: An Open-Source Casebook. We hope 
that you find it useful and informative. 
 
This is a free casebook. We believe that law students and others interested in the law should 
not have to pay the high prices that commercial publishers charge for casebooks. Many others 
agree, and have created free or low-cost casebooks covering many different areas of the law. 
Here are some examples: 
 
● Barton Beebe, Trademark Law: An Open-Source Casebook 
● James Boyle & Jennifer Jenkins, Open Intellectual Property Casebook 
● Stephen Clowney, James Grimmelmann, Michael Grynberg, Jeremy Sheff & Rebecca 
Tushnet, Open Source Property: A Free Casebook 
● James Grimmelmann, Internet Law: Cases and Problems 
● James Grimmelmann, Patterns of Information Law: Intellectual Property Done Right 
● Steve Semeraro, An Introduction to Property Law in the U.S. 
● Jeffrey Litwak, Interstate Compact Law: Cases & Materials 
● Lydia Pallas Loren & Joseph Scott Miller, Intellectual Property Law: Cases & Materials 
● John T. Parry, Cases and Problems in Civil Rights Litigation: State, Federal and 
International Perspectives 
● Eric Goldman & Rebecca Tushnet, Advertising & Marketing Law: Cases & Materials 
 
In addition, the Center for Computer-Assisted Legal Instruction (CALI) offers free casebooks in 
many different subjects, including: 
 
● Bankruptcy Law and Practice 
● Basic Income Tax 
● Contract Doctrine, Theory & Practice 
● Corporate Income Tax 
● The Ethics of Tax Lawyering 
● First Amendment: Cases, Controversies, and Contexts 
● Land Use 
● The Law of Trusts 
● Law of Wills 
● Property 
● Sales and Leases: A Problem-based Approach 
● Selected Materials on the Law of Evidence 
● Sources of American Law: An Introduction to Legal Research 
● The Story of Contract Law 
● Torts: Cases and Contexts 
● U.S. Federal Income Taxation of Individuals 
● Wetlands Law: A Course Source 
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We noticed that there was no free and open-source casebook available for a professional 
responsibility class, so we decided to create one. 
 
We wanted this casebook to be as easy to use and understand as possible. Accordingly, we 
included not only cases, but also the text of the rules and restatements, as well as concise 
explanations of the relevant law. Each chapter of the book addresses a different issue, in the 
following format. First, it clearly and concisely explains the relevant law governing that issue. 
Then provides the relevant text of any statutes, Model Rules, sections of the Restatement of the 
Law Governing Lawyers, or other sources, with a link to an open-source versions of the full text, 
when available. It provides one or more heavily edited cases intended to illustrate the 
application of the law at issue, with a link to an open-source version of the full text of the case. 
Each case is preceded by a brief summary of its facts, reasoning, and holding, and followed by 
questions intended to indicate subjects for further investigation or discussion. And finally, it 
includes citations to law review articles and other materials relevant to the law at issue, with 
links to open-source versions of those materials, when available. 
 
This casebook covers a wide range of different subjects related to the professional responsibility 
of attorneys. While it is possible to cover all of this material in a three credit-hour course, you 
may wish to omit some subjects. You may also wish to supplement the materials in this 
casebook with additional materials. We encourage you to use this casebook in any way that you 
like. 
 
This casebook is licensed “Creative Commons 0 / No Rights Reserved.” That means that we 
explicitly disclaim any copyright claim in all of the original elements that we created in writing 
this casebook and have intentionally placed the casebook in the public domain. Because this 
casebook is in the public domain, you can use the materials in it in any way that you like, with or 
without attribution. Of course, the casebook contains many copyrighted elements that belong to 
other people and that we used pursuant to fair use. Those elements are still protected by 
copyright. 
 
We hope that this free casebook helps show that it is possible to create teaching materials for 
legal education in an open-source format. And we hope it makes access to the law governing 
legal practice more accessible to law students, attorneys, and anyone interested in the 
regulation of the legal profession. 
 
In closing, we would like to thank our research assistants Nicole Pottinger, Justin Cloyd, Mark 
Blankenship, Barrett Block, and Renee Wilson. We would also like to thank Cornelius Kearns, 
Brandon Magner, and Guy Hamilton-Smith for helpful comments. 
 
● Brian L. Frye & Elizabeth Schiller 
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
1.1: Introduction to Professional Responsibility 
 
Our band could be your life. Real names’d be proof.9 
 
Welcome to professional responsibility. Contrary to conventional wisdom among law students, 
this is one of the most important classes you will take in law school. It is not only the only class 
explicitly required by the American Bar Association (“ABA”), but also the subject of the 
Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (“MPRE”), a test that the overwhelming 
majority of law school graduates must pass in order to become a member of their state bar 
association.10 
 
But that is the least of it. This class on professional responsibility will enable you to practice law 
consistent with the law governing lawyers and other professional obligations. And it will help you 
ensure that you are never the subject of a disciplinary action or sanction from the bar or the 
courts. In other words, this class could be your life, or at least your livelihood. Take it seriously, 
because the rules, principles, and obligations you learn about in this class will govern everything 
you do as an attorney. 
 
What is “Professional Responsibility”? 
 
Professional responsibility is the only class that the ABA explicitly requires law schools to 
provide in order to qualify for accreditation. Under the ABA’s 2018-2019 Standards and Rules of 
Procedure for Approval of Law Schools, “A law school shall maintain a rigorous program of legal 
education that prepares its students, upon graduation, for admission to the bar and for effective, 
ethical, and responsible participation as members of the legal profession.” Standard 301(a). 
Accordingly, “A law school shall establish learning outcomes that shall, at a minimum, include 
competency in the exercise of proper professional and ethical responsibilities to clients and the 
legal system, and other professional skills needed for competent and ethical participation as a 
member of the legal profession.” Standard 302(c)&(d). And in order to satisfy that requirement, 
“A law school shall offer a curriculum that requires each student to satisfactorily complete at 
least one course of at least two credit hours in professional responsibility that includes 
substantial instruction in rules of professional conduct, and the values and responsibilities of the 
legal profession and its members.” Standard 303(a)(1). 
 
However, law schools and law professors retain considerable discretion in how they teach 
professional responsibility. While the ABA accreditation standards provide that law schools must 
require a professional responsibility class, they do not specify what subjects the class must 
cover or how it should be taught. Unsurprisingly, law schools typically delegate those decisions 
																																																								
9 Minutemen, History Lesson – Part II, Double Nickels on the Dime (1984). 
10 Wisconsin and Puerto Rico currently do not require the MPRE for bar membership. Connecticut and 
New Jersey currently accept successful completion of a law school course on professional responsibility 
in lieu of the MPRE. 
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to law professors, who have adopted a wide range of different approaches. Some classes focus 
on the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct and how courts use them to regulate 
attorneys. Other classes focus on the concept of legal ethics and the justification of the legal 
profession. And still other classes focus on how attorneys actually comply with rules of 
professional conduct in practice. 
 
This casebook is designed for a class focused on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and 
their practical application. Each chapter of the book addresses a different issue, in the following 
format. First, it clearly and concisely explains the relevant law governing that issue. Then 
provides the relevant text of any statutes, Model Rules, sections of the Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers, or other sources, with a link to an open-source versions of the full text, 
when available. It provides one or more heavily edited cases intended to illustrate the 
application of the law at issue, with a link to an open-source version of the full text of the case. 
Each case is preceded by a brief summary of its facts, reasoning, and holding, and followed by 
questions intended to indicate subjects for further investigation or discussion. And finally, it 
includes citations to law review articles and other materials relevant to the law at issue, with 
links to open-source versions of those materials, when available. 
 
Legal Ethics v. The Regulation of Legal Practice 
 
Different lawyers think about professional responsibility in different ways, different law 
professors teach professional responsibility in different ways, and different legal scholars 
conceptualize professional responsibility in different ways. Some attorneys, professors, and 
scholars see professional responsibility as the practice of legal ethics. In other words, they 
believe that the rules of professional responsibility are expressions of ethical principles, and the 
legitimacy of those rules depends on the legitimacy of the ethical principles they express. But 
other attorneys, professors, and scholars see professional responsibility as merely the 
regulation of legal practice. In other words, they believe that the rules of professional 
responsibility are just the positive law governing attorneys. 
 
Legal Ethics 
 
Legal ethics can be either descriptive or normative. While both descriptive and normative legal 
ethics investigate the ethical values motivating the law of professional responsibility, they do so 
in very different ways, with fundamentally different goals. Descriptive legal ethics asks what the 
ethical values of law of professional responsibility are; normative legal ethics asks what they 
should be. 
 
Descriptive legal ethics assumes that the statutes and rules governing the practice of law, as 
well as the cases interpreting and applying those statutes and rules, effectively express the 
ethical values of the legal profession. Accordingly, by studying the law of professional 
responsibility in action, one can identify the ethical values inherent in the law that motivate its 
articulation, interpretation, and application. 
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Normative legal ethics asks whether the law of professional responsibility expresses a true 
moral theory. In other words, it starts with a moral theory, and asks whether the law of 
professional responsibility produces results consistent with that theory. Of course, different 
normative theories of legal ethics may adopt different moral theories. But they all assume that 
the purpose of the law of professional responsibility is to produce moral outcomes. Accordingly, 
the law of professional responsibility is justified if it expresses a true moral theory, and 
unjustified if it does not. 
 
The Regulation of Legal Practice 
 
This casebook focuses on the regulation of legal practice, not legal ethics. The primary purpose 
of this casebook is to help you better understand how the bar and the courts actually apply the 
statutes and rules governing the practice of law. While this casebook is not a study guide for the 
MPRE, it should help you better understand the questions on the MPRE and how to answer 
them correctly. 
 
The various bar associations, often in conjunction with the courts, adopt disciplinary rules 
regulating legal practice. Some of those rules are mandatory, and define what attorneys must 
and must not do. Other rules are discretionary, and describe what attorneys may and may not 
do. And still other rules are aspirational, and explain what attorneys should and should not do. 
 
When the courts consider a complaint against an attorney, they typically apply the disciplinary 
rules adopted by the bar association, in light of generally applicable legal principles. In other 
words, they ask not only whether the attorney violated the letter or spirit of the disciplinary rules, 
but also whether the rules at issue are valid and enforceable. However, a court may find that an 
attorney who has not violated the disciplinary rules has still violated some other legal duty. 
 
Accordingly, this casebook focuses on describing the law of professional responsibility, 
explaining how it has been applied, and asking whether it was applied correctly. However, the 
law of professional responsibility differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Sometimes those 
differences are minor, but other times they are fundamental. This casebook focuses of 
describing, explaining, and reflecting on the application of the most paradigmatic rules, as 
exemplified by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers. 
 
Of course, studying an area of law inevitably provokes reflections on its purpose and 
justification. Even a casebook devoted to the study of the regulation of legal practice cannot 
avoid implicating questions of legal ethics. What values does the law of professional 
responsibility express? Are those values justified? What makes a rule of professional conduct 
justified or unjustified? What is the purpose of the law of professional responsibility? All of these 
ethical issues are implicit in the subject matter of this class. But they are not the subject matter 
of this casebook. Or at the very least, while this casebook may directly or indirectly raise those 
questions, it does not purport to answer them or take a position on how they should be 
answered. 
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Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Preamble & Scope 
 
Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities 
 
1. A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of 
the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of 
justice. 
2. As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a lawyer 
provides a client with an informed understanding of the client’s legal rights and 
obligations and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously 
asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a 
lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of 
honest dealings with others. As an evaluator, a lawyer acts by examining a client’s legal 
affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others. 
3. In addition to these representational functions, a lawyer may serve as a third-party 
neutral, a nonrepresentational role helping the parties to resolve a dispute or other 
matter. Some of these Rules apply directly to lawyers who are or have served as third-
party neutrals. In addition, there are Rules that apply to lawyers who are not active in the 
practice of law or to practicing lawyers even when they are acting in a nonprofessional 
capacity. For example, a lawyer who commits fraud in the conduct of a business is 
subject to discipline for engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation. 
4. In all professional functions a lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent. A lawyer 
should maintain communication with a client concerning the representation. A lawyer 
should keep in confidence information relating to representation of a client except so far 
as disclosure is required or permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 
5. A lawyer’s conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional 
service to clients and in the lawyer's business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use 
the law’s procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. 
A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, 
including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer’s duty, when 
necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold 
legal process. 
6. As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal 
system, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal 
profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of 
the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law and work 
to strengthen legal education. In addition, a lawyer should further the public’s 
understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal 
institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to 
maintain their authority. A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration 
of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot 
afford adequate legal assistance. Therefore, all lawyers should devote professional time 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 12	
and resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access to our system of justice for 
all those who because of economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate 
legal counsel. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and 
should help the bar regulate itself in the public interest. 
7. Many of a lawyer’s professional responsibilities are prescribed in the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, as well as substantive and procedural law. However, a lawyer is 
also guided by personal conscience and the approbation of professional peers. A lawyer 
should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the law and the legal 
profession and to exemplify the legal profession’s ideals of public service. 
8. A lawyer’s responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system 
and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an opposing party is well 
represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same 
time assume that justice is being done. So also, a lawyer can be sure that preserving 
client confidences ordinarily serves the public interest because people are more likely to 
seek legal advice, and thereby heed their legal obligations, when they know their 
communications will be private. 
9. In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are encountered. 
Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer’s 
responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer’s own interest in 
remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory living. The Rules of Professional 
Conduct often prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the framework of these 
Rules, however, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues 
must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment 
guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules. These principles include the 
lawyer’s obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests, within 
the bounds of the law, while maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude 
toward all persons involved in the legal system. 
10. The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions also have 
been granted powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique in this respect 
because of the close relationship between the profession and the processes of 
government and law enforcement. This connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate 
authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the courts. 
11. To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occasion 
for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal 
profession's independence from government domination. An independent legal 
profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal 
authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent 
on government for the right to practice. 
12. The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-
government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are 
conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested 
concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other 
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lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the 
profession and the public interest which it serves. 
13. Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires 
an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our legal system. The Rules of 
Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve to define that relationship. 
 
Scope 
 
14. The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be interpreted with 
reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law itself. Some of the Rules 
are imperatives, cast in the terms “shall” or “shall not.” These define proper conduct for 
purposes of professional discipline. Others, generally cast in the term “may,” are 
permissive and define areas under the Rules in which the lawyer has discretion to 
exercise professional judgment. No disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer 
chooses not to act or acts within the bounds of such discretion. Other Rules define the 
nature of relationships between the lawyer and others. The Rules are thus partly 
obligatory and disciplinary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define a 
lawyer's professional role. Many of the Comments use the term “should.” Comments do 
not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with 
the Rules. 
15. The Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer’s role. That context 
includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific 
obligations of lawyers and substantive and procedural law in general. The Comments 
are sometimes used to alert lawyers to their responsibilities under such other law. 
16. Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon 
understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and 
public opinion and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary 
proceedings. The Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations 
that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined 
by legal rules. The Rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law. 
17. Furthermore, for purposes of determining the lawyer’s authority and responsibility, 
principles of substantive law external to these Rules determine whether a client-lawyer 
relationship exists. Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach 
only after the client has requested the lawyer to render legal services and the lawyer has 
agreed to do so. But there are some duties, such as that of confidentiality, that attach 
when the lawyer agrees to consider whether a client-lawyer relationship shall be 
established. Whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for any specific purpose can 
depend on the circumstances and may be a question of fact. 
18. Under various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory and common law, the 
responsibilities of government lawyers may include authority concerning legal matters 
that ordinarily reposes in the client in private client-lawyer relationships. For example, a 
lawyer for a government agency may have authority on behalf of the government to 
decide upon settlement or whether to appeal from an adverse judgment. Such authority 
in various respects is generally vested in the attorney general and the state's attorney in 
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state government, and their federal counterparts, and the same may be true of other 
government law officers. Also, lawyers under the supervision of these officers may be 
authorized to represent several government agencies in intragovernmental legal 
controversies in circumstances where a private lawyer could not represent multiple 
private clients. These Rules do not abrogate any such authority. 
19. Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a basis for 
invoking the disciplinary process. The Rules presuppose that disciplinary assessment of 
a lawyer’s conduct will be made on the basis of the facts and circumstances as they 
existed at the time of the conduct in question and in recognition of the fact that a lawyer 
often has to act upon uncertain or incomplete evidence of the situation. Moreover, the 
Rules presuppose that whether or not discipline should be imposed for a violation, and 
the severity of a sanction, depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and 
seriousness of the violation, extenuating factors and whether there have been previous 
violations. 
20. Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor 
should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached. In 
addition, violation of a Rule does not necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary 
remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation. The Rules are 
designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating 
conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil 
liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked 
by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a 
lawyer’s self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a 
disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or 
transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule. Nevertheless, since the Rules 
do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer’s violation of a Rule may be 
evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct. 
21. The Comment accompanying each Rule explains and illustrates the meaning and 
purpose of the Rule. The Preamble and this note on Scope provide general orientation. 
The Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each Rule is 
authoritative. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. What are these two sections of the Model Rules intended to accomplish? 
2. Does the Preamble seem to describe disciplinary rules, ethical rules, or both? What 
about the section on the scope of the Model Rules? 
3. Does the Preamble suggest that the Model Rules provide ethical guidance for attorneys? 
What about the section on scope? 
 
The Duty of Zealous Representation 
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The client never wants to be told he can’t do what he wants to do; he wants to be told how to do 
it, and it is the lawyer’s business to tell him how.11 
 
If I had a million dollars, would you work for me? Well, I don't know my friend, I guess we'll have 
to wait and see. Would you do anything that I asked you to do? Yes, I would, if the money came 
through.12 
 
Perhaps the most fundamental duty of an attorney is the duty of “zealous representation.” 
Attorneys must represent the interests of their clients to the best of their ability and to the extent 
permitted by the law. And attorneys must always advocate for their client’s interests, to the 
exclusion of anyone else’s interests, including their own. Specifically, attorneys must zealously 
represent their client’s interests, even at their own expense. 
 
But the duty of zealous representation can conflict with an attorney’s other duties, especially an 
attorney’s duties to the court. As members of the bar, attorneys are also officers of the court. 
Among other things, they owe the court a duty of candor. But sometimes an attorney’s duty of 
zealous representation can conflict with the duty of candor. For example, the duty of zealous 
representation may require attorneys to avoid or minimize evidence that is detrimental to their 
clients. But the duty of candor may require attorneys to disclose that same evidence to the 
court. 
 
Canon 7 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1980) stated that “a lawyer 
should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law.” Ethical Consideration 7-1 
provided, “The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his 
client zealously within the bounds of the law, which includes Disciplinary Rules and enforceable 
professional regulations.” Among other things, Disciplinary Rule 7-101(A) provided, “A lawyer 
shall not intentionally fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available 
means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules.” 
 
When the ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983, it did not use the 
term “zealous representation.” Instead, Model Rule 1.3 provided, “A lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” However, Comment [1] 
observed: 
 
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or 
personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures 
are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with 
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon 
the client's behalf. A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that 
might be realized for a client. For example, a lawyer may have authority to exercise 
professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. 
																																																								
11 Robert T. Swaine, The Cravath Firm and Its Predecessors, 1819-1947, at 667 (1946) (quoting Elihu 
Root). 
12 Charles Manson, If I Had a Million Dollars, The Family Jams (1970/1997). 
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The lawyer’s duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive 
tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy 
and respect. 
 
Today, courts and scholars continue to refer to an attorney’s “duty of zealous representation.” 
What is the scope of that duty? What should it be? How should attorneys and courts balance 
the duty of zealous representation against an attorney’s duties to the court and to society as a 
whole? 
 
Questions: 
 
1. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush asked the Office of 
Legal Counsel for its opinion on the legality of certain interrogation techniques. OLC 
produced several memoranda arguing that the techniques were legal under domestic 
and international law, which ultimately became known as the “torture memos.” The 
torture memos were almost universally condemned by policymakers and legal scholars 
as both immoral and incorrect statements of the governing law. Should OLC have 
produced the memos? Was it a violation of the rules of professional conduct for OLC to 
make arguments based on inaccurate interpretations of the law. Was it a violation of 
legal ethics for OLC to make arguments in favor of the interrogation techniques? Would 
it have been a violation of legal ethics if those techniques were in fact legal? Would it 
have been a violation of the rules of professional conduct for OLC to produce memos 
presenting arguments both for and against the legality of the interrogation techniques?  
 
Torres v. Donnelly, 554 F. 3d 322 (2d Cir. 2009) 
 
Summary: Torres was charged with armed robbery. Anna Rodriguez, one of the victims, 
identified Torres when the police showed her a photo array and again when Torres’s 
attorney Keefe showed her a photo array. In her trial testimony, Rodriguez stated that 
she did not identify Torres the “second time” the police showed her a photo array. Keefe 
realized that she was referring to the photo array he showed her, and informed the court 
that she had identified Torres. Torres was convicted, and filed a habeas petition, alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to provide zealous representation. The court 
denied the petition, holding that Keefe’s duty to correct false testimony did not conflict 
with his duty to provide zealous representation. 
 
HALL, Circuit Judge: 
 
Petitioner-Appellant Jesus Torres appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court 
for the Western District of New York denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Following a 
jury trial, Torres was convicted of two counts of robbery in the first degree. On direct appeal, 
Torres raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Appellate Division dismissed his 
claim and unanimously affirmed his conviction. Here, Torres argues that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel. 
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The basis of Torres’s habeas claim stems from his defense counsel’s line of questioning during 
cross-examination of an identification witness, Anna Rodriguez, which inadvertently elicited 
testimony counsel personally knew to be inaccurate. Subsequently, to avoid becoming a 
witness himself and to comply with his ethical obligations to the court to correct false testimony, 
counsel agreed to stipulate that, contrary to Anna’s testimony during cross-examination, Anna 
had identified Torres when counsel had shown her a photographic array prior to trial. Torres 
asserts that defense counsel Thomas Keefe’s actions gave rise to an actual conflict of interest 
that so adversely affected his performance that it was unnecessary to demonstrate resulting 
prejudice. Torres also asserts that there is a reasonable possibility that, but for the errors of 
defense counsel, the outcome of his trial would have been different. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Torres was tried for the November 6, 1997 robberies of two grocery stores in Buffalo, New York. 
Torres does not contest his conviction for the first robbery of a store on Vermont Street. His 
habeas claim extends only to his conviction on the second robbery, which occurred on 
Hampshire Avenue. The robbery on Hampshire Avenue was witnessed by Olga Rodriguez, who 
was behind the counter, Olga’s sister, Anna, and her niece, Lisalotte Rodriguez. Lisalotte was 
not called to testify as a trial witness. 
 
At trial, Olga identified Torres as the robber and testified that she saw him clearly during the 
robbery. Olga also testified that her sister Anna had been unable to identify the defendant when 
shown a photo array by detectives. Defense counsel asked Olga, “In your presence, while you 
were in the store, did a detective with the Buffalo Police Department show a photo to your sister 
at any time?” Olga responded, “She did not identify. She was not paying too much attention that 
night of the robbery.” 
 
On cross-examination of Anna, defense counsel sought to build on Olga’s testimony and elicit 
from Anna that she had been unable to identify the defendant in at least one photo array shown 
to her by police. In response to questioning from defense counsel and the trial court, Anna 
testified that she had identified the robber in the first photo array she was shown, but that she 
“couldn't identify the robber the second time around.” Defense counsel then sought to determine 
the dates that the police had shown Anna the two photo arrays. Although Anna initially stated 
that the second photo array had been shown to her in January 1998, upon further questioning 
she indicated that it had occurred in June 1998, a fact which was clarified and confirmed by the 
trial court. According to Anna, she did not identify the robber when presented with this second 
array because she was “so nervous.” When the date of the second photo array was confirmed 
by the court's questioning, however, Attorney Keefe realized that the photo array to which Anna 
was referring was the one that he had shown her in June or July 1998 as part of his preparation 
for trial and not one shown to her by police. He interjected and clarified to the court that he in 
fact had been in the store in June or July 1998 and presented a photo array to Anna. On 
redirect examination, Anna repeated that she did not identify Torres when Attorney Keefe 
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showed her an array because she was nervous. Contrary to Anna’s testimony, however, 
Attorney Keefe knew that Anna had identified Torres when he had shown her the photo array. 
 
Later, in a colloquy outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor argued that it was important 
to clarify to the jurors what Anna had told Attorney Keefe about the photo array. He asserted 
that by showing her the photo array, Keefe had essentially made himself a witness in the case. 
Upon questioning by the trial court, and because of Attorney Keefe's ethical obligation not to 
“knowingly use false evidence,” Keefe ultimately informed the court that Anna had identified 
Torres when Keefe showed her the photo array in June or July 1998. Keefe explained that he 
had pursued his line of questioning under the mistaken belief that the police had shown Anna 
two sets of photo arrays on separate occasions. 
 
To avoid the complications of defense counsel being called to the stand and possibly obtaining 
different counsel for Torres, the trial court suggested, and Attorney Keefe agreed to, the 
following stipulation, which the court then read to the jury: 
 
Both parties are concerned that there may be confusion over Anna Rodriguez’s 
testimony with regard to photo arrays. To clarify this issue over what photo array was 
shown to her, we, the attorneys, stipulate that on or about June or July of 1998, attorney 
Thomas Keefe showed her a photocopy of one of the arrays, and asked her if she could 
identify the robber. The witness did identify the robber as number 3. 
 
After deliberations, the jury convicted Torres on both counts of robbery. 
 
On direct appeal from the conviction, the Appellate Division affirmed Torres's conviction. As to 
counsel’s cross-examination of Anna and resulting stipulation, it found that: 
 
Defense counsel’s stipulation advising the jury that a witness identified defendant in a 
photo array shown to her by defense counsel was not an egregious error that denied 
defendant effective assistance of counsel. Defense counsel reasonably believed that the 
witness had been shown two photo arrays by police; during cross examination the 
witness testified that she identified defendant in the first photo array but not in the 
second photo array. During the course of the witness's testimony, defense counsel 
realized the “second” photo array to which the witness referred was the photo array that 
he had shown the witness, and therefore the testimony of the witness that she did not 
identify defendant in that photo array was not true. Defense counsel could not 
“knowingly use false evidence” and thus was required to report the incorrect testimony to 
the court. Defense counsel’s alternative to the stipulation was to testify as a witness, 
which would have required new counsel for defendant. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
To establish that counsel’s performance was constitutionally defective, a defendant must show 
that “the lawyer's performance ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ and that 
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‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceedings would have been different.’” Even if counsel’s performance is found professionally 
unreasonable, “any deficiencies in counsel's performance must be prejudicial to the defense in 
order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution.” Therefore, the question 
becomes “whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would 
have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” In certain circumstances, however, prejudice 
may be presumed, and an individual inquiry regarding this factor is unnecessary. Similarly, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that when a criminal defendant claims that defense counsel was 
“burdened by an actual conflict of interest,” this warrants a “limited presumption of prejudice.” In 
these instances, the presumption of prejudice attaches “only if the defendant demonstrates that 
counsel ‘actively represented conflicting interests’ and that ‘an actual conflict of interest 
adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.’” 
 
Torres argues that the limited presumption is applicable to his case such that he is not required 
to demonstrate he was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance. We disagree. Although Keefe 
had parallel duties to zealously represent his client and not to use false evidence, this did not 
create an actual conflict of interest. Though the presumption has been “unblinkingly” applied to 
“all kinds of alleged attorney ethical conflicts,” it does not support this expansive application. 
The presumption was created to account for the “high probability of prejudice arising from 
multiple concurrent representation, and the difficulty of proving that prejudice.” However, “not all 
attorney conflicts present comparable difficulties. Here, defense counsel’s ethical obligation to 
correct the testimony he knew to be inaccurate does not present the difficulties and high 
probability of prejudice engendered by joint representation. At most, in this case defense 
counsel’s earnest representation of his client was constrained by ethical guidelines applicable to 
every attorney appearing as trial counsel, to wit, that “in the representation of a client, a lawyer 
shall not knowingly use perjured or false evidence.” 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the tension between Keefe’s parallel duties of (1) zealous 
representation and (2) candor to the court, which gives rise to his obligation to correct the 
record, did not create a conflict of interest of the sort identified in Sullivan. This holding “is 
consistent with the governance of trial conduct in what we have long called ‘a search for truth.’” 
Indeed, “an attorney’s ethical duty to advance the interests of his client is limited by an equally 
solemn duty to comply with the law and standards of professional conduct; it specifically 
ensures that the client may not use false evidence.” 
 
We further find no actual conflict of interest inherent in counsel’s decision to enter into the 
stipulation to correct the record. It is clear that several methods, such as calling as a witness the 
interpreter who was present when Attorney Keefe showed Anna the photo array, were available 
to accomplish this necessary task. Each of them, in order to correct the misstatement, would 
have yielded the same result. 
 
Questions: 
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1. Could Keefe have relied on Rodriguez’s testimony without violating his duty of candor to 
the court? What if the prosecutor did not notice the mistake? Would Keefe have a duty to 
disclose? Would it be a violation of the Model Rules if he did not disclose? 
2. What are Keefe’s ethical obligations under the circumstances? How should he balance 
his duty to Torres against his duty to the court? 
 
Further Reading: 
 
● David Luban & W. Bradley Wendel, Philosophical Legal Ethics: An Affectionate History, 
30 Geo. J.L. Ethics (2017). 
● Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (1988). 
● Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Human Rights 1 
(1975). 
● William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional 
Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 29 (1978). 
● Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 63 
(1980). 
● Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589 (1985). 
● Thomas L. Shaffer, On Being a Christian and a Lawyer: Law for the Innocent (1981).  
● Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client 
Relation, 85 Yale L.J. 1060 (1976). 
● Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The 
Three Hardest Questions, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1469 (1966).  
● Judith Andre, Role Morality as a Complex Instance of Ordinary Morality, 28 Am. Phil. Q. 
73 (1991). 
● Monroe H. Freedman, A Critique of Philosophizing About Lawyers’ Ethics, 25 Geo. J. 
Legal Ethics 91 (2012). 
● Alice Woolley, The Lawyer as Advisor and the Practice of the Rule of Law, 47 UBC L. 
Rev. 743 (2014). 
● Rebecca Roiphe, The Decline of Professionalism, 29 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 649 (2016). 
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1.2: A Brief History of the American Legal Profession  
 
The Profession before the 1908 Ethics Rules 
 
The American legal profession was significantly unregulated for most of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. In fact, applying contemporary definitions in which a profession is self-
regulating, it is not clear lawyers’ work during this time was part of a unified legal profession at 
all. That’s not to say lawyers did not play an important role in American society. Lawyers fulfilled 
not just one, but two equally important roles: as advocates for their clients and agents of the 
court. Before the organized American legal profession with formal rules, this dual-role model of 
lawyering shaped how lawyers thought about their professional responsibilities and standards 
for their conduct.  
 
Many lawyers’ everyday work primarily concerned advocating for the private interests of clients. 
Eighteenth and nineteenth century clients sought out lawyers for many of the same reasons 
people obtain lawyers today, including settling disputes over personal property, navigating 
commercial matters, and resolving all sorts of other conflicts between people. Although some of 
the events leading people to seek lawyer’s assistance may seem familiar, the social, economic, 
and political conditions of the nineteenth century meant even this familiar role was anything but 
routine.  
  
The time period between the American Revolution and the twentieth century was full of dramatic 
changes in the law, the work of lawyering, and the legal profession. The law itself became more 
voluminous and complex, beginning with post-Revolution efforts to create orderly state and 
federal governments. Industrialization sped up and increased the scope of economic of 
  
Lawrence Friedman’s A History of American Law summarizes: 
  
What happened to American law in the nineteenth century, basically, was that it changed 
dramatically, fundamentally, to conform to the needs, wants, and pressures coming from 
the vast increase in the numbers of consumers of law. It is dangerous to sum up long 
periods and great movements in a sentence. But if colonial law had been, in the first 
place, colonial, and in the second place, paternal, emphasizing community, order, and 
the struggle against sin, then, gradually, a new set of attitudes developed, in which the 
primary function of law was not suppression and uniformity, but economic growth and 
services to its users. 
 
Instrumentalist theories about law combined with a rapidly changing industrial society 
contributed to the idea that practicing judges, lawyers, and scholars could actively shape the 
world they worked in. Often this was in response to their work for the private interests of clients, 
although records of conversations among lawyers show continued concern for and attention to 
their public responsibilities as well. 
 
Question: 
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● Is the dual-role model of lawyers’ responsibilities useful for navigating professional 
ethical dilemmas? Based on what you know about lawyers’ work, try to think of at least 
one scenario in which it would be helpful and one in which it might not be.  
 
American Bar Association’s Ethics Rules 
 
The American Bar Association, founded in 1878, advanced its first attempt at a uniform 
standard of conduct for lawyers in 1908. The Canons of Professional Ethics were intended to be 
a general guide for lawyers, based on existing professional norms expressed in legal ethics 
scholarship and some state bar association literature. The ABA acknowledged the idealistic 
nature of the Canons, and did not intend for them to be enforceable. For an overview of the 
Canons, see the Preamble and the list of Canons, below, from the Final Committee Report on 
1908 ABA Ethics Rules. 
 
Canons of Ethics 
Preamble 
 
In America, where the stability of Courts and of all departments of government rests upon the 
approval of the people, it is peculiarly essential that the system for establishing and dispensing 
justice be developed to a high point of efficiency and so maintained that the public shall have 
absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of its administration. The future of the 
republic, to a great extent, depends upon our maintenance of justice pure and unsullied. It 
cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and the motives of the members of our profession 
are such as to merit the approval of all just men.  
 
The Canons of Ethics 
 
No code or set of rules can be framed, which will particularize all the duties of the lawyer in the 
varying phases of litigation or in all the relations of professional life. The following canons of 
ethics are adopted by the American Bar Association as a general guide, yet the enumeration of 
particular duties should not be construed as a denial of the existence of others equally 
imperative, though not specifically mentioned: 
1. The Duty of the Lawyer to the Courts. 
2. The Selection of Judges 
3. Attempts to Exert Personal Influence on the Courts 
4. When Counsel for an Indigent Prisoner. 
5. The Defense or Prosecution of Those Accused of Crime. 
6. Adverse Influences and Conflicting Interests.  
7. Professional Colleagues and Conflicts of Opinion. 
8. Advising Upon the Merits of a Client’s Cause. 
9. Negotiations with Opposite Party. 
10. Acquiring Interest in Litigation. 
11. Dealing with Trust Property. 
12. Fixing the Amount of the Fee. 
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13. Contingent Fees. 
14. Suing a Client for a Fee. 
15. How Far a Lawyer May Go in Supporting a Client’s Cause. 
16. Restraining Clients from Improprieties.  
17. Ill Feeling and Personalities Between Advocates. 
18. Treatment of Witnesses and Litigants. 
19. Appearance of Lawyer as Witness for His Client. 
20. Newspaper Discussion of Pending Litigation. 
21. Punctuality and Expedition. 
22. Candor and Fairness. 
23. Attitude Toward Jury. 
24. Right of Lawyers to Control the Incidents of the Trial. 
25. Taking  Technical Advantage of Opposite Counsel; Agreements with Him. 
26. Professional Advocacy Other Than Before Courts. 
27. Advertising, Direct or Indirect. 
28. Stirring Up Litigation, Directly or Through Agents. 
29. Upholding the Honor of the Profession. 
30. Justifiable and Unjustifiable Litigations. 
31. Responsibility for Litigation. 
32. The Lawyer’s Duty in Its Last Analysis.  
 
Questions: 
● Do you see evidence of dual-role model of lawyers’ responsibilities in the Canons? 
Where?  
● What does the adoption of the Canons tell us about the state of the profession in 1908? 
●  
 
Although the Canons were general statements of profession norms, they included some 
explanatory content. For example, see Canons 4, 17, and 29.  
 
Canon 4 - When Counsel for an Indigent Prisoner. A lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent 
prisoner ought not to ask to be excused for any trivial reason, and should always exert his best 
efforts in his behalf. 
 
Canon 17- Ill Feeling and Personalities Between Advocates. Clients, not lawyers, are the 
litigants. Whatever may be the ill feeling existing between clients, it should not be allowed to 
influence counsel in their conduct and demeanor toward each other or toward suitors in the 
case. All personalities between counsel should be scrupulously avoided. In the trial of a cause it 
is indecent to allude to the personal history or the personal peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of 
counsel on the other side. Personal colloquies between counsel which cause delay and promote 
unseemly wrangling should also be carefully avoided.  
 
Canon 29 - Upholding the Honor of the Profession. Lawyers should expose without fear or favor 
before the proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession, and should accept 
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without hesitation employment against a member of the Bar who has wronged his client. The 
counsel upon the trial of a cause in which perjury has been committed owe it to the profession 
and citing authorities. The lawyer should aid in guarding the Bar against admission to the 
profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or 
education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the 
profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice. 
 
Questions: 
● Are the Canons useful for navigating professional ethical dilemmas? 
● How helpful is the explanatory content? Does it answer all your questions about how to 
apply the Canons? Can you think of a situation in which lawyers might reasonably 
disagree about what conforming professional conduct might look like? 
 
The ABA Canons of Professional Ethics were an important step towards professionalizing 
lawyers’ work. While no longer in force, the Canons guided lawyers’ professional standards for a 
sixty year period in which the modern profession emerged. Judicial opinions and state bars 
often referred to the text of and principles in the Canons. Attempts to apply the Canons revealed 
some challenges with moving from generalized principles to enforceable boundaries, prompting 
the ABA to work towards the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 
 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility 
 
The ABA House of Delegates approved the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, a 
comprehensively revised set of rules, on August 12, 1969. The Model Code marked a significant 
shift from the Canons in its organization and scope. Where the Canons were idealistic and 
relied on external judgments to clarify conflicting priorities and refine broad goals, the Model 
Code contained three distinct but interrelated parts: canons, ethical considerations, and 
disciplinary rules. The canons stated the general rules which led to the ethical considerations 
and disciplinary rules. The ethical considerations were the aspirational principles. The 
disciplinary rules were mandatory statements about the minimum standards of conduct lawyers 
must adhere to in order to not face disciplinary action. Each canon might contain a dozen (or 
more!) ethical considerations and disciplinary rules. 
         For Example, explanatory content for Canon 6 includes six ethical considerations and 
two disciplinary rules. 
  
CANON 6: A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Competently 
  
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
  
EC 6-1 
Because of his vital role in the legal process, a lawyer should act with competence and proper 
care in representing clients. He should strive to become and remain proficient in his practice 
and should accept employment only in matters which he 
is or intends to become competent to handle. 
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EC 6-2 
A lawyer is aided in attaining and maintaining his competence by keeping abreast of 
current legal literature and developments, participating in continuing legal education programs, 
concentrating in particular areas of the law, and by utilizing other available means. He has the 
additional ethical obligation to assist in improving the legal profession, and he may do so by 
participating in bar activities intended to advance the quality and standards of members of the 
profession. Of particular importance is the careful training of his younger associates and the 
giving of sound guidance to all lawyers who consult him. In short, a lawyer should strive at all 
levels to aid the legal profession in advancing the highest possible standards of integrity and 
competence and to meet those standards himself. 
  
EC 6-3 
While the licensing of a lawyer is evidence that he has met the standards then prevailing 
for admission to the bar, a lawyer generally should not accept employment in any area of the 
law in which he is not qualified. However, he may accept such employment if in good faith he 
expects to become qualified through study and investigation, as long as such preparation would 
not result in unreasonable delay or expense to his client. Proper preparation and representation 
may require the association by the lawyer of professionals in other disciplines. A lawyer offered 
employment in a matter in which he is not and does not expect to become so qualified 
should either decline the employment or, with the consent of his client, accept the employment 
and associate a lawyer who is competent in the matter. 
  
EC 6-4 
Having undertaken representation, a lawyer should use proper care to safeguard the 
Interests of his client. If a lawyer has accepted employment in a matter beyond his competence 
but in which he expected to become competent, he should diligently undertake the work and 
study necessary to qualify himself. In addition to being qualified to handle a particular matter, his 
obligation to his client requires him to prepare adequately for and give appropriate attention 
to his legal work. 
  
EC 6-5 
A lawyer should have pride in his professional endeavors. His obligation to act competently calls 
for higher motivation than that arising from fear of civil liability or disciplinary penalty. 
  
EC 6-6 
A lawyer should not seek, by contract or other means, to limit his individual liability to 
his client for his malpractice. A lawyer who handles the affairs of his client properly has no need 
to attempt to limit his liability for his professional activities and one who does not handle the 
affairs of his client properly should not be permitted to do so. A lawyer who is a stockholder in or 
is associated with a professional legal corporation may, however, limit his liability for malpractice 
of his associates in the corporation, but only to the extent permitted by law. 
  
DISCIPLINARY RULES 
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DR 6-101-Failing to Act Competently. 
A. A lawyer shall not: 
1. Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent 
to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it. 
         2. Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances. 
         3. Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. 
  
DR 6-102-Limiting Liability to Client. 
A. A lawyer shall not attempt to exonerate himself from or limit his liability to his client for 
his personal malpractice. 
 
Questions: 
● How useful is the Model Code for making decisions about professional conduct? Is the 
clarification between canons, ethical considerations, and disciplinary rules an 
improvement on the 1908 Canons? 
● Is it necessary to have canons, ethical considerations, and disciplinary rules? Consider 
each statement’s or rule’s usefulness in lawyers’ various roles and practice settings.  
 
The Model Code, in various forms and versions, was the ABA’s central document on 
professional responsibility from 1970 through 1981. While no longer in use, it’s important to 
know about the Model Code. Many important cases decided during this time and some states’ 
rules still contain references to and evidence of the influence of the Model Code. 
 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
 
The shift from idealistic Canons to boundary rules in the Model Code created the need for 
specificity the Model Code did not always address. To deal with this challenge, the ABA tasked 
a lawyer named Robert Kutak with chairing a commission to study the problem. The Kutak 
Commission focused on developing the minimum standards of conduct for lawyers into a series 
of black-letter rules. The resulting Model Rules, adopted in 1983, are the basis of the current 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The Model Rules have a regulatory structure, with a 
statement of minimum conduct and explanatory comments. The official comments are similar to 
other regulatory comments, in that they might content information about the reasoning behind a 
rule or examples to guide application. Like other model rules, the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct are not themselves binding. They are designed to be examples a state may choose to 
adopt into law. For an example from the Model Rules, see the Rule 1:1 on Competence, below. 
 
Rule 1.1: Competence 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation 
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary 
for the representation. 
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Comment: 
 
Legal Knowledge and Skill 
 
[1]  In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a 
particular matter, relevant factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature 
of the matter, the lawyer's general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in 
the field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and 
whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of 
established competence in the field in question. In many instances, the required 
proficiency is that of a general practitioner. Expertise in a particular field of law may be 
required in some circumstances. 
[2]  A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle 
legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can 
be as competent as a practitioner with long experience. Some important legal skills, 
such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evidence and legal drafting, are 
required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of 
determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily 
transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate 
representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study. Competent 
representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established 
competence in the field in question. 
[3]  In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in which the 
lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily required where referral to or consultation or 
association with another lawyer would be impractical. Even in an emergency, however, 
assistance should be limited to that reasonably necessary in the circumstances, for ill-
considered action under emergency conditions can jeopardize the client's interest. 
[4]  A lawyer may accept representation where the requisite level of competence can be 
achieved by reasonable preparation. This applies as well to a lawyer who is appointed 
as counsel for an unrepresented person. See also Rule 6.2. 
Thoroughness and Preparation 
[5]  Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the 
factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting 
the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation. The 
required attention and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake; major 
litigation and complex transactions ordinarily require more extensive treatment than 
matters of lesser complexity and consequence. An agreement between the lawyer and 
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the client regarding the scope of the representation may limit the matters for which the 
lawyer is responsible. See Rule 1.2(c). 
Retaining or Contracting With Other Lawyers 
[6]  Before a lawyer retains or contracts with other lawyers outside the lawyer’s own firm 
to provide or assist in the provision of legal services to a client, the lawyer should 
ordinarily obtain informed consent from the client and must reasonably believe that the 
other lawyers’ services will contribute to the competent and ethical representation of the 
client.  See also Rules 1.2 (allocation of authority), 1.4 (communication with client), 
1.5(e) (fee sharing), 1.6 (confidentiality), and 5.5(a) (unauthorized practice of law).  The 
reasonableness of the decision to retain or contract with other lawyers outside the 
lawyer’s own firm will depend upon the circumstances, including the education, 
experience and reputation of the nonfirm lawyers; the nature of the services assigned to 
the nonfirm lawyers; and the legal protections, professional conduct rules, and ethical 
environments of the jurisdictions in which the services will be performed, particularly 
relating to confidential information. 
[7]  When lawyers from more than one law firm are providing legal services to the client 
on a particular matter, the lawyers ordinarily should consult with each other and the 
client about the scope of their respective representations and the allocation of 
responsibility among them. See Rule 1.2.  When making allocations of responsibility in a 
matter pending before a tribunal, lawyers and parties may have additional obligations 
that are a matter of law beyond the scope of these Rules. 
 
Maintaining Competence 
 
[8]  To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of 
changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with 
relevant technology, engage in continuing study and education and comply with all 
continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject. 
 
Adoption of the Model Rules 
 
States adopted the structure of the model rules fairly quickly. Today, almost all states’ 
disciplinary rules follow the numbering system of the Model Rules. The content of state rules 
varies, so it’s important to follow the law of your jurisdiction. Since the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct have been so influential, lawyers can look to these Model Rules just like 
they might look to other uniform laws or model acts.  
 
Questions: 
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● In Rule 1.1 above, do the comments change your understanding of the rule? How? Do 
you have remaining questions about what the rule means or how it might work in 
application? 
● Compare the usefulness of the Model Rules to the Model Code and the Canons. 
Consider the regulatory structure of the Model Rules, the distinction between ideals and 
boundaries, and the content in the examples above. 
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Section 2: The Attorney-Client Relationship 
 
2.1: Creating an Attorney-Client Relationship 
  
The rest of life pales in significance, I'm looking for somebody with whom to dance. With whom 
to dance? With whom to dance? I'm looking for somebody with whom to dance.13 
 
Clients & “Quasi-Clients” 
 
Ideally, the formation of an attorney-client relationship involves formalities like an engagement 
letter, a retainer agreement, and the payment of attorney’s fees. But none of those formalities 
are necessary. An attorney-client relationship may be formed whenever a person asks an 
attorney for legal advice and the attorney provides it, so long as a reasonable person could 
believe that an attorney-client relationship existed. 
 
I will refer to people an attorney intends to represent as “clients,” and people an attorney does 
not intend to represent as “quasi-clients.” An attorney has an “express attorney-client 
relationship” with clients and an “implied attorney-client relationship” with quasi-clients. But 
express and implied attorney-client relationships impose many of the same duties on an 
attorney. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 14 (2000) 
 
A relationship of client and lawyer arises when: 
 
1. a person manifests to a lawyer the person's intent that the lawyer provide legal 
services for the person; and either 
a.  the lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; or 
b. the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, and the lawyer 
knows or reasonably should know that the person reasonably relies on 
the lawyer to provide the services; or 
2. a tribunal with power to do so appoints the lawyer to provide the services. 
 
The Duties of an Attorney 
 
Attorneys owe certain legal duties to their clients and quasi-clients, whether they have an 
express attorney-client relationship or an implied attorney-client relationship. Those duties are 
reflected in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
 
● Duty of Care: Attorneys have a duty to act with due diligence in pursuit of their client’s 
interests. Model Rule 1.1. 
																																																								
13 Stephin Merritt, The Magnetic Fields, With Whom to Dance?, Get Lost (1995). 
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● Duty of Loyalty: Attorneys may not represent any party with an interest adverse to any 
of their clients, and must refrain from self-dealing. Model Rules 1.7 & 1.8. 
● Duty of Impartiality: Attorneys must provide their clients with all of the information their 
clients need in order to make informed decisions. Model Rule 1.4. Attorneys must also 
“exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.” Model Rule 
2.1. 
● Duty of Confidentiality: Attorneys must maintain in confidence all information obtained 
while representing their clients, and may not use any confidential client information in a 
way that could harm that client. Model Rule 1.6. 
 
Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980) 
 
Summary: John Togstad was paralyzed after surgery. His wife Joan Togstad met with 
attorney Jere Miller and asked him whether they had a viable medical malpractice 
action. Miller stated that he did not think his firm was interested, but he would consult 
with his partners. He did not charge Togstad or agree to represent her. He also did not 
inform her that he lacked experience in the area, encourage her to consult with another 
attorney, or warn her about the statute of limitations on medical malpractice actions. 
After the statute of limitations expired, the Togstads filed a legal malpractice action. The 
jury found that an attorney-client relationship existed and that Miller was negligent, and 
awarded damages to the Togstads. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that 
an attorney-client relationship existed because Miller provided legal advice and his 
advice was negligent. 
 
This is an appeal by the defendants from a judgment of the Hennepin County District Court 
involving an action for legal malpractice. The jury found that the defendant attorney Jerre Miller 
was negligent and that, as a direct result of such negligence, plaintiff John Togstad sustained 
damages in the amount of $610,500 and his wife, plaintiff Joan Togstad, in the amount of 
$39,000. Defendants (Miller and his law firm) appeal to this court from the denial of their motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial. We affirm. 
 
In August 1971, John Togstad began to experience severe headaches and on August 16, 1971, 
was admitted to Methodist Hospital where tests disclosed that the headaches were caused by a 
large aneurysm on the left internal carotid artery. The attending physician, Dr. Paul Blake, a 
neurological surgeon, treated the problem by applying a Selverstone clamp to the left common 
carotid artery. The clamp was surgically implanted on August 27, 1971, in Togstad's neck to 
allow the gradual closure of the artery over a period of days. 
 
The treatment was designed to eventually cut off the blood supply through the artery and thus 
relieve the pressure on the aneurism, allowing the aneurism to heal. It was anticipated that other 
arteries, as well as the brain's collateral or cross-arterial system would supply the required blood 
to the portion of the brain which would ordinarily have been provided by the left carotid artery. 
The greatest risk associated with this procedure is that the patient may become paralyzed if the 
brain does not receive an adequate flow of blood. In the event the supply of blood becomes so 
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low as to endanger the health of the patient, the adjustable clamp can be opened to establish 
the proper blood circulation. 
 
In the early morning hours of August 29, 1971, a nurse observed that Togstad was unable to 
speak or move. At the time, the clamp was one-half (50%) closed. Upon discovering Togstad's 
condition, the nurse called a resident physician, who did not adjust the clamp. Dr. Blake was 
also immediately informed of Togstad's condition and arrived about an hour later, at which time 
he opened the clamp. Togstad is now severely paralyzed in his right arm and leg, and is unable 
to speak. 
 
Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Ward Woods, testified that Togstad's paralysis and loss of speech was due 
to a lack of blood supply to his brain. Dr. Woods stated that the inadequate blood flow resulted 
from the clamp being 50% closed and that the negligence of Dr. Blake and the hospital 
precluded the clamp's being opened in time to avoid permanent brain damage. Specifically, Dr. 
Woods claimed that Dr. Blake and the hospital were negligent for (1) failing to place the patient 
in the intensive care unit or to have a special nurse conduct certain neurological tests every 
half-hour; (2) failing to write adequate orders; (3) failing to open the clamp immediately upon 
discovering that the patient was unable to speak; and (4) the absence of personnel capable of 
opening the clamp. 
 
Dr. Blake and defendants' expert witness, Dr. Shelly Chou, testified that Togstad's condition 
was caused by blood clots going up the carotid artery to the brain. They both alleged that the 
blood clots were not a result of the Selverstone clamp procedure. In addition, they stated that 
the clamp must be about 90% closed before there will be a slowing of the blood supply through 
the carotid artery to the brain. Thus, according to Drs. Blake and Chou, when the clamp is 50% 
closed there is no effect on the blood flow to the brain. 
 
About 14 months after her husband's hospitalization began, plaintiff Joan Togstad met with 
attorney Jerre Miller regarding her husband's condition. Neither she nor her husband was 
personally acquainted with Miller or his law firm prior to that time. John Togstad's former work 
supervisor, Ted Bucholz, made the appointment and accompanied Mrs. Togstad to Miller's 
office. Bucholz was present when Mrs. Togstad and Miller discussed the case. 
 
Mrs. Togstad had become suspicious of the circumstances surrounding her husband's tragic 
condition due to the conduct and statements of the hospital nurses shortly after the paralysis 
occurred. One nurse told Mrs. Togstad that she had checked Mr. Togstad at 2 a. m. and he was 
fine; that when she returned at 3 a. m., by mistake, to give him someone else's medication, he 
was unable to move or speak; and that if she hadn't accidentally entered the room no one would 
have discovered his condition until morning. Mrs. Togstad also noticed that the other nurses 
were upset and crying, and that Mr. Togstad's condition was a topic of conversation. 
 
Mrs. Togstad testified that she told Miller "everything that happened at the hospital," including 
the nurses' statements and conduct which had raised a question in her mind. She stated that 
she "believed" she had told Miller "about the procedure and what was undertaken, what was 
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done, and what happened." She brought no records with her. Miller took notes and asked 
questions during the meeting, which lasted 45 minutes to an hour. At its conclusion, according 
to Mrs. Togstad, Miller said that "he did not think we had a legal case, however, he was going to 
discuss this with his partner." She understood that if Miller changed his mind after talking to his 
partner, he would call her. Mrs. Togstad "gave it" a few days and, since she did not hear from 
Miller, decided "that they had come to the conclusion that there wasn't a case." No fee 
arrangements were discussed, no medical authorizations were requested, nor was Mrs. 
Togstad billed for the interview. 
 
Mrs. Togstad denied that Miller had told her his firm did not have expertise in the medical 
malpractice field, urged her to see another attorney, or related to her that the statute of 
limitations for medical malpractice actions was two years. She did not consult another attorney 
until one year after she talked to Miller. Mrs. Togstad indicated that she did not confer with 
another attorney earlier because of her reliance on Miller's "legal advice" that they "did not have 
a case." 
 
On cross-examination, Mrs. Togstad was asked whether she went to Miller's office "to see if he 
would take the case of her husband." She replied, "Well, I guess it was to go for legal advice, 
what to do, where shall we go from here? That is what we went for." Again in response to 
defense counsel's questions, Mrs. Togstad testified as follows: 
 
Q And it was clear to you, was it not, that what was taking place was a preliminary 
discussion between a prospective client and lawyer as to whether or not they wanted to 
enter into an attorney-client relationship? 
A I am not sure how to answer that. It was for legal advice as to what to do. 
Q And Mr. Miller was discussing with you your problem and indicating whether he, as a 
lawyer, wished to take the case, isn't that true? 
A Yes. 
 
On re-direct examination, Mrs. Togstad acknowledged that when she left Miller's office she 
understood that she had been given a "qualified, quality legal opinion that she and her husband 
did not have a malpractice case." 
 
Miller's testimony was different in some respects from that of Mrs. Togstad. Like Mrs. Togstad, 
Miller testified that Mr. Bucholz arranged and was present at the meeting, which lasted about 45 
minutes. According to Miller, Mrs. Togstad described the hospital incident, including the conduct 
of the nurses. He asked her questions, to which she responded. Miller testified that "the only 
thing I told her after we had pretty much finished the conversation was that there was nothing 
related in her factual circumstances that told me that she had a case that our firm would be 
interested in undertaking." 
 
Miller also claimed he related to Mrs. Togstad "that because of the grievous nature of the 
injuries sustained by her husband, that this was only my opinion and she was encouraged to 
ask another attorney if she wished for another opinion" and "she ought to do so promptly." He 
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testified that he informed Mrs. Togstad that his firm "was not engaged as experts" in the area of 
medical malpractice, and that they associated with the Charles Hvass firm in cases of that 
nature. Miller stated that at the end of the conference he told Mrs. Togstad that he would consult 
with Charles Hvass and if Hvass's opinion differed from his, Miller would so inform her. Miller 
recollected that he called Hvass a "couple days" later and discussed the case with him. It was 
Miller's impression that Hvass thought there was no liability for malpractice in the case. 
Consequently, Miller did not communicate with Mrs. Togstad further. 
 
On cross-examination, Miller testified as follows: 
 
Q Now, so there is no misunderstanding, and I am reading from your deposition, you 
understood that she was consulting with you as a lawyer, isn't that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q That she was seeking legal advice from a professional attorney licensed to practice in 
this state and in this community? 
A I think you and I did have another interpretation or use of the term "Advice." She was 
there to see whether or not she had a case and whether the firm would accept it. 
Q We have two aspects; number one, your legal opinion concerning liability of a case for 
malpractice; number two, whether there was or wasn't liability, whether you would accept 
it, your firm, two separate elements, right? 
A I would say so. 
Q Were you asked on page 6 in the deposition, folio 14, "And you understood that she 
was seeking legal advice at the time that she was in your office, that is correct also, isn't 
it?" And did you give this answer, "I don't want to engage in semantics with you, but my 
impression was that she and Mr. Bucholz were asking my opinion after having related 
the incident that I referred to." The next question, "Your legal opinion?" Your answer, 
"Yes." Were those questions asked and were they given? 
MR. COLLINS: Objection to this, Your Honor. It is not impeachment. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I gave those answers. Certainly, she was seeking my opinion as 
an attorney in the sense of whether or not there was a case that the firm would be 
interested in undertaking. 
 
Kenneth Green, a Minneapolis attorney, was called as an expert by plaintiffs. He stated that in 
rendering legal advice regarding a claim of medical malpractice, the "minimum" an attorney 
should do would be to request medical authorizations from the client, review the hospital 
records, and consult with an expert in the field. John McNulty, a Minneapolis attorney, and 
Charles Hvass testified as experts on behalf of the defendants. McNulty stated that when an 
attorney is consulted as to whether he will take a case, the lawyer's only responsibility in 
refusing it is to so inform the party. He testified, however, that when a lawyer is asked his legal 
opinion on the merits of a medical malpractice claim, community standards require that the 
attorney check hospital records and consult with an expert before rendering his opinion. 
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Hvass stated that he had no recollection of Miller's calling him in October 1972 relative to the 
Togstad matter. He testified that: 
 
A When a person comes in to me about a medical malpractice action, based upon what 
the individual has told me, I have to make a decision as to whether or not there probably 
is or probably is not, based upon that information, medical malpractice. And if, in my 
judgment, based upon what the client has told me, there is not medical malpractice, I will 
so inform the client. 
 
Hvass stated, however, that he would never render a "categorical" opinion. In addition, Hvass 
acknowledged that if he were consulted for a "legal opinion" regarding medical malpractice and 
14 months had expired since the incident in question, "ordinary care and diligence" would 
require him to inform the party of the two-year statute of limitations applicable to that type of 
action. 
 
This case was submitted to the jury by way of a special verdict form. The jury found that Dr. 
Blake and the hospital were negligent and that Dr. Blake's negligence (but not the hospital's) 
was a direct cause of the injuries sustained by John Togstad; that there was an attorney-client 
contractual relationship between Mrs. Togstad and Miller; that Miller was negligent in rendering 
advice regarding the possible claims of Mr. and Mrs. Togstad; that, but for Miller's negligence, 
plaintiffs would have been successful in the prosecution of a legal action against Dr. Blake; and 
that neither Mr. nor Mrs. Togstad was negligent in pursuing their claims against Dr. Blake. The 
jury awarded damages to Mr. Togstad of $610,500 and to Mrs. Togstad of $39,000. 
 
In a legal malpractice action of the type involved here, four elements must be shown: (1) that an 
attorney-client relationship existed; (2) that defendant acted negligently or in breach of contract; 
(3) that such acts were the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' damages; (4) that but for 
defendant's conduct the plaintiffs would have been successful in the prosecution of their 
medical malpractice claim. 
 
We believe it is unnecessary to decide whether a tort or contract theory is preferable for 
resolving the attorney-client relationship question raised by this appeal. The tort and contract 
analyses are very similar in a case such as the instant one, and we conclude that under either 
theory the evidence shows that a lawyer-client relationship is present here. The thrust of Mrs. 
Togstad's testimony is that she went to Miller for legal advice, was told there wasn't a case, and 
relied upon this advice in failing to pursue the claim for medical malpractice. In addition, 
according to Mrs. Togstad, Miller did not qualify his legal opinion by urging her to seek advice 
from another attorney, nor did Miller inform her that he lacked expertise in the medical 
malpractice area. Assuming this testimony is true, we believe a jury could properly find that Mrs. 
Togstad sought and received legal advice from Miller under circumstances which made it 
reasonably foreseeable to Miller that Mrs. Togstad would be injured if the advice were 
negligently given. Thus, under either a tort or contract analysis, there is sufficient evidence in 
the record to support the existence of an attorney-client relationship. 
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Defendants argue that even if an attorney-client relationship was established the evidence fails 
to show that Miller acted negligently in assessing the merits of the Togstads' case. They appear 
to contend that, at most, Miller was guilty of an error in judgment which does not give rise to 
legal malpractice. However, this case does not involve a mere error of judgment. The gist of 
plaintiffs' claim is that Miller failed to perform the minimal research that an ordinarily prudent 
attorney would do before rendering legal advice in a case of this nature. 
 
There is also sufficient evidence in the record establishing that, but for Miller's negligence, 
plaintiffs would have been successful in prosecuting their medical malpractice claim. Dr. Woods, 
in no uncertain terms, concluded that Mr. Togstad's injuries were caused by the medical 
malpractice of Dr. Blake. Defendants' expert testimony to the contrary was obviously not 
believed by the jury. Thus, the jury reasonably found that had plaintiff's medical malpractice 
action been properly brought, plaintiffs would have recovered. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the jury's findings are adequately supported by the record. 
Accordingly we uphold the trial court's denial of defendants' motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the jury verdict. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. What was the basis for the Togstads’ claim that Miller’s actions formed an attorney-client 
relationship? How did Miller respond? 
2. Why did the court hold that an attorney-client relationship existed between Miller and the 
Togstads? Do you think it was right? 
3. How should Miller have responded in order to avoid creating an attorney-client 
relationship? 
4. Why did the court hold that Miller was liable for negligence? Do you think it was right? 
5. How should Miller have responded in order to avoid liability for negligence? 
 
Representation of an Organization 
 
When an attorney represents an entity, the attorney’s client is the entity, not the entity’s agents. 
In other words, when an attorney represents a corporation, limited liability company, 
partnership, or unincorporated association, the attorney’s client is the organization, not the 
employees of the organization. Or to put it another way, the attorney has an attorney-client 
relationship with the organization, but does not necessarily have an attorney-client relationship 
with the employees of the organization. Specifically, the attorney has a duty to represent the 
organization, even when its interests diverge from the interests of its employees. 
 
However, an attorney representing an organization must ensure that the employees of the 
organization understand that the attorney only represents the organization, and not its 
employees. In other words, the employees must understand that the organization’s attorney is 
not their attorney, and that the organization’s attorney has professional duties only to the 
organization. This can be difficult to explain, especially when employees identify their interests 
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with those of the organization. But attorneys for organizations must clarify their legal relationship 
to the employees of those organizations, in order to avoid creating an attorney-client 
relationship. 
 
Model Rule 1.13: Organization as Client 
 
a. A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting 
through its duly authorized constituents. 
b. If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person 
associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a 
matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the 
organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, 
and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall 
proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the 
lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization 
to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, 
including, if warranted by the circumstances to the highest authority that can act on 
behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law. 
c. Except as provided in paragraph (d), if 
1. despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority 
that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a 
timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a 
violation of law, and 
2. the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in 
substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information 
relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, 
but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent 
substantial injury to the organization. 
d. Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's 
representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend 
the organization or an officer, employee or other constituent associated with the 
organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. 
e. A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the 
lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c), or who withdraws under 
circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those 
paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that 
the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal. 
f. In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders 
or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer 
knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those 
of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing. 
g. A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, 
employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of 
Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, 
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the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the 
individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders. 
 
Ferranti Intern. PLC v. Clark, 767 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Pa. 1991) 
 
Summary: William Clark was general counsel of Ferranti and hired Hogan & Hartson to 
represent the company in relation to a federal investigation. Hogan & Hartson informed 
Ferranti’s employees that they should consider retaining an attorney. During the 
investigation, Clark provided confidential information to Hogan & Hartson. Eventually, 
Ferranti filed an action against Clark for breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice. 
Clark objected to Hogan & Hartson’s representation of Ferranti. The court dismissed 
Clark’s objections, on the ground that he knew Hogan & Hartson never represented him 
personally. 
 
LUDWIG, District Judge. 
 
Plaintiff sues for breach of fiduciary duty and professional malpractice and to rescind a $2.75 
million employee "settlement and release" agreement, which the complaint alleges was 
obtained by extortion. Defendant William A. Clark's motion to disqualify the firm of Hogan & 
Hartson from representing plaintiff Ferranti International PLC in this action will be denied for the 
following reasons: 
 
An attorney-client relationship, express or implied, did not exist between Hogan & Hartson and 
William A. Clark when he was Ferranti International, Inc.'s vice president and general counsel. 
 
In July, 1986 defendant Clark, himself an attorney, retained Hogan & Hartson to represent 
plaintiff Ferranti International plc and its subsidiaries in regard to a government investigation of 
alleged wrongdoing on the part of their employees. He did so in his capacity as Ferranti 
International, Inc.'s vice president and general counsel. The need for representation was 
triggered by a federal grand jury subpoena served on plaintiff's subsidiary, the Marquardt 
Company. Thereafter, the investigation was widened with target letters and follow-up 
subpoenas to corporate employees of plaintiff and plaintiff's other subsidiaries. 
 
Hogan & Hartson did not represent the corporations' employees. Hogan & Hartson attorneys 
repeatedly stated to the corporations' employees in defendant's presence that they should 
obtain separate counsel because of the potential conflict of interest between employer and 
employee. Defendant helped arrange for employees to be separately represented. 
 
Any perception by defendant that he became a client or was a prospective client of Hogan & 
Hartson as to his personal legal matters was unreasonable and without foundation. Defendant's 
position as general counsel and corporate officer excluded this law firm from acting as his 
personal attorney because of the self-evident interest conflict. Given the circumstances, the 
personal matters discussed did not involve an attorney-client relationship. 
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The information given Hogan & Hartson by defendant regarding plaintiff, its subsidiaries and 
employees was communicated by him in his capacity as Ferranti International, Inc.'s vice 
president and general counsel. Proof of defendant's knowledge of such information does not 
appear to require that a Hogan & Hartson attorney testify as a witness. 
 
Until shortly before the present disqualification motion was filed, February 28, 1991, defendant's 
sole objection to Hogan & Hartson's representation of plaintiff in this action involved the possible 
calling of Hogan & Hartson attorneys as plaintiff's witnesses. That was first noted by defendant's 
counsel as a potential problem in September, 1990. If either party intends to call a Hogan & 
Hartson attorney as a witness, the court should be notified at least 60 days in advance of trial, 
and any issue thereby raised can be considered at that time. 
 
Defendant's status as an attorney has contradictory facets. He selected Hogan & Hartson to be 
plaintiff's counsel and subsequently worked with several of its attorneys in a confidential and 
apparently close relationship on behalf of plaintiff, the parent of his then employer. Having done 
so and formed such associations, he may understandably resent and find objectionable the turn 
of events in which he is now being sued not only by the same law firm but also on behalf of the 
client that he brought to that firm. However, these personal and business considerations do not 
necessitate disqualification on legal-ethical grounds. 
 
This is not a case in which a layperson might have perceived or reasonably misperceived that 
his corporate employer's attorney was also representing him. As a general counsel, defendant 
must have keenly appreciated the distinction between the corporation and its employees as well 
as the employees' need for separate counsel. Defendant's assertion that the personal 
comments and observations exchanged between him and Hogan & Hartson attorneys were in 
contemplation of, or resulted in, a personal attorney-client relationship is factitious and 
unconvincing. 
 
Although it became a Hogan & Hartson client through defendant, plaintiff has a cognizable 
interest in being permitted to continue to be represented by this firm. Moreover, 
disqualification—which is an increasingly frequent issue in the courts— may be the subject of 
tactical abuse. A party's choice of counsel should be set aside only where the circumstances 
legally require doing so. 
 
Under the Rules of Professional Conduct and the cases, there is no legal basis on which to 
disqualify Hogan & Hartson. An evidentiary hearing is unnecessary. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did Clark object to Hogan & Hartson representing Ferranti in its action action 
against him? Why did the court dismiss Clark’s objections? 
2. Clark was an attorney and general counsel for Ferranti. Would the court have reached 
the same conclusion if Clark were not an attorney? 
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3. Should Ferranti be able to use confidential information provided to Hogan & Hartson by 
Clark? 
4. What should Clark have done differently?  
 
Prospective Clients 
 
People and organizations do not always choose to form an attorney-client relationship 
immediately. Sometimes, they consider forming an attorney-client relationship with multiple 
attorneys or firms before choosing one. 
 
A “prospective client” is a person or organization that discusses the possibility of forming an 
attorney-client relationship with an attorney or firm. If an attorney or firm learns confidential 
information from a prospective client, the attorney or firm may be precluded from representing 
other parties in the same matter, if their interests are adverse to those of the prospective client.  
 
Accordingly, attorneys should try to prevent prospective clients from disclosing confidential 
information, in order to avoid disqualification from representing adverse parties. And attorneys 
must determine whether potential clients have disclosed any confidential information, because it 
creates a duty of confidentiality.  
 
Model Rule 1.18: Client-Lawyer Relationship 
 
a. A person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer 
relationship with respect to a matter is a prospective client. 
b. Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a lawyer who has learned information 
from a prospective client shall not use or reveal that information, except as Rule 1.9 
would permit with respect to information of a former client. 
c. A lawyer subject to paragraph (b) shall not represent a client with interests materially 
adverse to those of a prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter if 
the lawyer received information from the prospective client that could be significantly 
harmful to that person in the matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). If a lawyer is 
disqualified from representation under this paragraph, no lawyer in a firm with which that 
lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a 
matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). 
d. When the lawyer has received disqualifying information as defined in paragraph (c), 
representation is permissible if: 
1. both the affected client and the prospective client have given informed consent, 
confirmed in writing, or: 
2. the lawyer who received the information took reasonable measures to avoid 
exposure to more disqualifying information than was reasonably necessary to 
determine whether to represent the prospective client; and 
i. the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the 
matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and 
ii. written notice is promptly given to the prospective client. 
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Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 15 (2000) 
 
1. When a person discusses with a lawyer the possibility of their forming a client-
lawyer relationship for a matter and no such relationship ensues, the lawyer 
must: 
a. not subsequently use or disclose confidential information learned in the 
consultation, except to the extent permitted with respect to confidential 
information of a client or former client as stated in §§ 61- 67; 
b. protect the person's property in the lawyer's custody as stated in §§ 44- 
46; and 
c. use reasonable care to the extent the lawyer provides the person legal 
services. 
2. A lawyer subject to Subsection (1) may not represent a client whose interests are 
materially adverse to those of a former prospective client in the same or a 
substantially related matter when the lawyer or another lawyer whose 
disqualification is imputed to the lawyer under §§ 123 and 124 has received from 
the prospective client confidential information that could be significantly harmful 
to the prospective client in the matter, except that such a representation is 
permissible if: 
a. (i) any personally prohibited lawyer takes reasonable steps to avoid 
exposure to confidential information other than information appropriate to 
determine whether to represent the prospective client, and (ii) such 
lawyer is screened as stated in § 124(2)(b) and (c); or 
b. both the affected client and the prospective client give informed consent 
to the representation under the limitations and conditions provided in § 
122. 
 
Clark Capital Management Group, Inc. v. Annuity Investors Life Ins. Co., 149 F.Supp.2d 
193 (E.D. Pa. 2001) 
 
Summary: Clark filed a trademark infringement action against Annuity. Clark was 
represented by Woodcock Washburn Kurtz Mackiewicz & Norris LLP and Annuity was 
represented by Donald E. Frechette of Edwards & Angell LLP. Frechette contacted 
Thomas S. Biemer of Dilworth Paxson LLP as potential co-counsel. Frechette provided 
information about the action, and Biemer told Frechette that he would have to run a 
conflicts check. Frechette never formally retained Biemer. Eventually, Clark retained 
Stephen L. Friedman of Dilworth, and Annuity objected, on the ground that it was a 
former client of Dilworth in the same matter. The court held that Dilworth was not 
disqualified from representing Clark, but required it to screen Biemer from the action. 
 
ANITA B. BRODY, District Judge. 
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Defendant Annuity Investors Life Insurance Co. moves for the disqualification of Stephen L. 
Friedman and the firm Dilworth Paxson LLP as co-counsel for plaintiff Clark Capital 
Management Group. Friedman has submitted an opposition to this motion. I will deny the motion 
for disqualification. 
 
I. Factual Background 
 
On April 14, 2000, Clark Capital filed a complaint against Annuity alleging trademark 
infringement. Attorneys with the firm of Woodcock Washburn Kurtz Mackiewicz & Norris LLP 
have represented Clark Capital from day one of this case. In the fall of 2000, Annuity retained 
Donald E. Frechette with the firm of Edwards & Angell LLP. 
 
Acting on Annuity's behalf, in the Fall of 2000, Frechette contacted by telephone Thomas S. 
Biemer, a partner at Dilworth, to inquire into Biemer's interest and availability to be retained as 
co-counsel for Annuity in the present action. Frechette submitted two sworn affidavits describing 
this communication. Frechette asserts in his first sworn affidavit that he spoke with Biemer by 
telephone on three occasions. He states that they first spoke on October 26, 2000 for 
approximately ten minutes. Frechette asserts that, during this conversation, he discussed with 
Biemer "the background facts of this case, the capabilities of opposing counsel, Mr. Biemer's 
firm's experience and familiarity with opposing counsel and the trial judge, the nature of 
Annuity's defenses, the relative merits of each party's case, and potential weaknesses in 
plaintiff's case." Frechette further states that he described how the case had been handled to 
date. 
 
According to Frechette, he again spoke with Biemer by telephone on November 6, 2000, for 
approximately ten to fifteen minutes. He states that, in this conversation, Frechette provided 
Biemer with additional information relating to specific aspects of the case and Annuity's view of 
the strengths and weaknesses of these aspects. Frechette also recalls that they discussed one 
legal theory that might be employed in Annuity's defense. Frechette asserts that he spoke with 
Biemer for a third time on November 6, 2000, for three to four minutes about a matter of 
procedure and timing. Finally, Frechette asserts that he believed that any confidential 
information about the case, disclosed to Biemer during these several conversations, would be 
kept confidential. 
 
Biemer submitted a sworn affidavit in response to Frechette's affidavit. Biemer states that he 
recalls the first two conversations described in Frechette's affidavit, but not the third 
conversation. Biemer agrees that the two attorneys discussed the nature of the case, plaintiff's 
counsel, and the court. He asserts, however, that he has no recollection that any confidential 
information was disclosed by Frechette. Biemer recalls only that Frechette informed him that 
Annuity was claiming the "usual affirmative defenses," which had already been pled and of 
public record. Biemer states in his affidavit that he has no recollection of any discussion of 
Annuity's perception of strengths and weaknesses in the case or of possible defense strategy. 
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On June 12, 2001, when contacted by the court during a conference in this case in which 
Annuity first raised an objection to Friedman's participation in the case, Biemer stated over the 
telephone: 
 
I don't recall, specifically, discussing the merits of the case, other than that it involved 
something that was named Navigator, it was a trademark case. I don't remember 
specifically discussing any affirmative defenses, but it's possible we did, I just don't 
recall, it was a while ago. 
 
In addition, Biemer's affidavit states that he told Frechette during the first conversation that, 
before Dilworth could agree to represent Annuity, he would have to run a conflict check. Biemer 
avers that it was not until the second conversation that Frechette asked Biemer to run a conflict 
check, "if Dilworth was interested in serving as local counsel." Biemer also states that Frechette 
asked him to send Frechette any relevant information materials about Dilworth. Following the 
November 6, 2000 telephone conversation, Biemer had no further communications with 
Frechette about this case, and an offer of retention was never made. 
 
Frechette's second affidavit was submitted in response to Biemer's affidavit. In this affidavit, 
Frechette asserts that the issue of a conflict search was not discussed during the telephone 
conversations. He states that Biemer mentioned a conflict check for the first time in a letter 
dated November 7, 2000. Frechette further states: 
 
I certainly assumed that Attorney Biemer would not undertake a matter without 
performing a conflict check and, accordingly, felt no need to specifically inquire as to the 
matter further. 
 
Annuity never retained Dilworth. On June 11, 2001, Friedman, a Dilworth attorney, entered an 
appearance on behalf of Clark Capital. 
 
II. Discussion 
 
Annuity asserts that these several telephone conversations between Frechette and Biemer rose 
to the level of an attorney-client relationship between Annuity and Biemer, such that Friedman is 
in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. This District has adopted the Pennsylvania 
Rules of Professional Conduct. These Rules provide that: 
 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: 
 
(a) Represent another person in the same or substantially related matter in which that 
person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the 
former client consents after a full disclosure of the circumstances and consultation. 
 
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 44	
This prohibition disqualifies the lawyer's entire firm. 
 
While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when 
any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so. Annuity argues that, 
because Frechette's telephone conversations with Biemer rose to the level of an attorney-client 
relationship, Annuity is a "former client" of Dilworth and, therefore, Friedman may not now 
represent the opposing party in this same matter. 
 
To determine whether Friedman is in violation of these ethical rules, I must decide whether 
Annuity is a "former client" of Dilworth. In other words, did there previously exist an attorney-
client relationship between Annuity and Dilworth. "An attorney-client relationship is one of 
agency and arises only when the parties have given their consent, either express or implied, to 
its formation." Both parties agree that no formal attorney-client relationship existed between 
Annuity and Dilworth. "Where no express relationship exists, the intent to create an attorney-
client relationship can be implied from the conduct of the parties." The issue is whether an 
implied attorney-client relationship arose during the course of the several telephone 
conversations between Frechette and Biemer. Annuity asserts that an implied attorney-client 
relationship between Annuity and Biemer arose because, acting on Annuity's behalf, Frechette: 
(1) disclosed confidential information to Biemer, (2) with a reasonable belief that Biemer was 
acting in the capacity of attorney for Annuity throughout the course of the communication. 
 
Based on the facts presented, I find that the several brief telephone conversations between 
Frechette and Biemer did not give rise to an implied attorney-client relationship between Annuity 
and Dilworth. Frechette asserts in his first sworn affidavit that he disclosed to Biemer 
confidential information related to Annuity's defenses and legal theories of the case. Biemer 
admits that it is possible such disclosures were made. However, Biemer contends that he has 
no recollection of disclosure of any confidential information. 
 
Setting aside for the moment the question of whether confidential information was in fact 
disclosed, it is clear from the facts presented that Frechette could not have held a reasonable 
belief that Biemer was acting as an attorney for Annuity during the course of the communication. 
Frechette initiated the communication with Biemer to inquire into Biemer's interest and 
availability to be retained as co-counsel for Annuity in the present action. At no time during the 
communication did Frechette offer to retain Biemer as co-counsel and at no time during the 
communication did Biemer consent to representation of Annuity. To the contrary, it was evident 
from Frechette's request that Biemer send informational materials about the firm, that Frechette 
had not yet decided whether to retain Biemer as co-counsel. Frechette was reserving the right 
to make a decision after learning more about the firm. 
 
Furthermore, it is evident that Frechette never conceived that Biemer was acting as Annuity's 
attorney during the communication, because Biemer had not yet run a conflict check. Frechette 
contests Biemer's assertion that Biemer raised the need to run a conflict check before 
consenting to representation during the telephone conversations. However, even if Biemer did 
not raise the need to run a conflict check, Frechette, equally knowledgeable of the ethical rules, 
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was well aware that Biemer would not consent to representation of Annuity before running a 
conflict check. Frechette explicitly stated in his second sworn affidavit: 
 
I certainly assumed that Attorney Biemer would not undertake a matter without 
performing a conflict check and, accordingly, felt no need to specifically inquire as to the 
matter further. 
 
When Frechette first contacted Biemer on October 26, 2000, the telephone conversation during 
which Frechette asserts that he first disclosed confidential information to Biemer, Frechette 
could not have reasonably assumed that Biemer had already run a conflict check. By 
Frechette's own admission, therefore, it was unreasonable for Frechette to assume during that 
conversation that Biemer had consented to representation of Annuity. The duty to maintain 
confidences does not arise absent an attorney-client relationship. It follows that Frechette 
unreasonably assumed that Biemer would maintain the confidentiality of any information 
Frechette disclosed, despite Frechette's awareness that no attorney-client relationship had been 
established. Annuity is not a former client of Biemer and neither Friedman nor Dilworth are in 
violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9. 
 
I must still address the concern that confidential information about the case may have been 
disclosed by Frechette, which potentially could be used to the detriment of Annuity if Friedman 
is permitted to serve as counsel to Clark Capital. "One of the inherent powers of the federal 
court is the admission and discipline of attorneys practicing before it." Therefore, when there is a 
risk that the underlying litigation may be tainted by participation of counsel, the court has the 
power to fashion an appropriate remedy. 
 
In the event that confidential information was disclosed, I find that disqualification of Dilworth is 
an inappropriate remedy under the facts of this case, but rather that screening Biemer from the 
case will appropriately balance the interests of all parties. Biemer asserts that he has no 
recollection that any confidential information was disclosed to him about this case. Therefore, 
even if he did receive confidential information about the case, Biemer is not capable of relaying 
anything of substance to other Dilworth attorneys. Biemer also asserts in his affidavit that he 
has been screened from the matter from the moment Clark Capital contacted the firm. He 
states: 
 
On approximately June 7, 2001, I learned that Dilworth was contacted by Clark Capital 
and asked to enter its appearance as counsel for Clark Capital. When I learned this, I 
relayed to one of the heads of Dilworth's litigation department, James Rogers, Esquire, 
the substance of my conversations with Mr. Frechette as outlined in this Affidavit. While 
we agreed that there was no conflict given the limited nature of these conversations, in 
an abundance of caution, it was decided that I would not be involved in any respect with 
this case and would not have any contact regarding the substance of the case with 
anyone working on the case for Dilworth. With the exception of my participation in the 
Conference Call before the Court on June 11, 2001 and the preparation of this Affidavit, I 
have not had any involvement in this case. Friedman substantiated Biemer's assertion 
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on the record at the June 12, 2001 conference in this matter, stating that Biemer will 
have nothing to do with this case and that Friedman has had no conversations with 
Biemer about the case other than to inform Friedman of the brief communication 
between Biemer and Frechette. 
 
I am not persuaded by Annuity's argument that disqualification of Dilworth is necessary to 
protect against the "mere appearance of an impropriety" and to maintain the integrity of the legal 
profession. While the ethical rules are designed, in part, to encourage attorney-client candor, 
attorneys that have already been retained in a matter and who are well versed in the perimeters 
of the attorney-client relationship, should be encouraged to take care with their client's 
confidences in the course of preliminary inquiries with potential co-counsel in another firm. Such 
inquiries should not form the basis for disqualification of an entire firm in situations, such as this, 
where it was clear to both parties that an attorney-client relationship was never established. 
Allowing Friedman to be retained by Clark Capital in this matter requires effective screening of 
only a single attorney out of approximately 100 attorneys at Dilworth. In light of this, the fact that 
Annuity is not a former client of Dilworth, and the minimal likelihood that Dilworth's involvement 
in this case would taint the pending litigation, I will deny Annuity's motion to disqualify Friedman 
and Dilworth. I will require that Dilworth continue to screen Biemer from any involvement in this 
case. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. What was the basis for Annuity’s objection to Dilworth’s representation of Clark? 
2. If Frechette provided confidential information to Biemer, is screening him from the action 
a sufficient remedy? 
3. Why shouldn’t the court disqualify Dilworth from representing Clark in this action? 
 
Further Reading: 
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2.2: Ending an Attorney-Client Relationship 
 
This is the end, beautiful friend. This is the end, my only friend, the end.14 
 
Take Me Baby, or Leave Me: Ending the Attorney-Client Relationship 
 
Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.15 
 
It is surprisingly easy to create an attorney-client relationship, and it can be surprisingly hard for 
an attorney to end one. In general, a client can end an attorney-client relationship at any time, 
for any reason, or for no reason at all. But attorneys cannot end an attorney-client relationship 
without good reason. Sometimes, attorneys must end an attorney-client relationship, and other 
times the rules of professional conduct prevent attorneys from ending an attorney-client 
relationship. In any case, attorneys may have duties to their clients that survive the attorney-
client relationship, especially the duty of confidentiality. 
 
Sometimes, an attorney must end an attorney-client relationship. For example, an attorney 
cannot represent a client if the client fires the attorney, the attorney cannot effectively represent 
the client, the attorney has a conflict of interest, or representation would violate the rules of 
professional conduct. 
 
Under certain circumstances, attorneys may choose to end an attorney-client relationship. But 
the ability of an attorney to end an attorney-client relationship is limited by the rules of 
professional conduct. Attorneys can end an attorney-client relationship only if they are permitted 
or required to end the relationship by the rules of professional conduct. They may be subject to 
discipline for ending an attorney-client relationship, even if it is permitted or required by the rules 
of professional conduct. And they may have duties to former clients that survive the attorney-
client relationship. 
 
Before ending an attorney-client relationship, an attorney should determine whether good cause 
exists to end the relationship. If an attorney ends an attorney-client relationship without good 
cause, the attorney may be subject to discipline and liable to the client for malpractice or breach 
of fiduciary duty. 
 
Model Rule 1.16: Declining or Terminating Representation 
 
a. Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where 
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: 
1. the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or 
other law; 
																																																								
14 The Doors, The End (1967). 
15 Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina (1878). 
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2. the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to 
represent the client; or 
3. the lawyer is discharged. 
b. Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if: 
1. withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests 
of the client; 
2. the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the 
lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent; 
3. the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud; 
4. the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with 
which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement; 
5. the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the 
lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will 
withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled; 
6. the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or 
has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or 
7. other good cause for withdrawal exists. 
c. A lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal 
when terminating a representation. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall 
continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation. 
d. Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably 
practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, 
allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to 
which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that 
has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to 
the extent permitted by other law. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 31 (2000): Termination of a Lawyer's 
Authority 
 
1. A lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal 
when terminating a representation and with an order of a tribunal requiring the 
representation to continue. 
2. Subject to Subsection (1) and § 33, a lawyer's actual authority to represent a client ends 
when: 
a. the client discharges the lawyer; 
b. the client dies or, in the case of a corporation or similar organization, loses its 
capacity to function as such; 
c. the lawyer withdraws; 
d. the lawyer dies or becomes physically or mentally incapable of providing 
representation, is disbarred or suspended from practicing law, or is ordered by a 
tribunal to cease representing a client; or 
e. the representation ends as provided by contract or because the lawyer has 
completed the contemplated services. 
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3. A lawyer's apparent authority to act for a client with respect to another person ends 
when the other person knows or should know of facts from which it can be reasonably 
inferred that the lawyer lacks actual authority, including knowledge of any event 
described in Subsection (2). 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 32 (2000): Discharge by a Client and 
Withdrawal by a Lawyer 
 
1. Subject to Subsection (5), a client may discharge a lawyer at any time. 
2. Subject to Subsection (5), a lawyer may not represent a client or, where representation 
has commenced, must withdraw from the representation of a client if: 
a. the representation will result in the lawyer's violating rules of professional conduct 
or other law; 
b. the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to 
represent the client; or 
c. the client discharges the lawyer. 
3. Subject to Subsections (4) and (5), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if: 
a. withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests 
of the client; 
b. the lawyer reasonably believes withdrawal is required in circumstances stated in 
Subsection (2); 
c. the client gives informed consent; 
d. the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the 
lawyer reasonably believes is criminal, fraudulent, or in breach of the client's 
fiduciary duty; 
e. the lawyer reasonably believes the client has used or threatens to use the 
lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud; 
f. the client insists on taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or 
imprudent; 
g. the client fails to fulfill a substantial financial or other obligation to the lawyer 
regarding the lawyer's services and the lawyer has given the client reasonable 
warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the client fulfills the obligation; 
h. the representation has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client or by 
the irreparable breakdown of the client-lawyer relationship; or 
i. other good cause for withdrawal exists. 
4. In the case of permissive withdrawal under Subsections (3)(f)-(i), a lawyer may not 
withdraw if the harm that withdrawal would cause significantly exceeds the harm to the 
lawyer or others in not withdrawing. 
5. Notwithstanding Subsections (1)-(4), a lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring 
notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation and with a valid 
order of a tribunal requiring the representation to continue. 
 
You’re Fired!: Discharge 
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It's a sad situation, I must say, when someone wants to leave as bad as you want them to 
stay.16 
 
I don't feel bad about letting you go, I just feel sad about letting you know.17 
 
Typically, clients can end the attorney-client relationship simply by firing their attorney. Under 
Model Rule 1.16(a)(3), “a lawyer shall not represent a client or . . . shall withdraw from the 
representation of a client if . . . the lawyer is discharged.” And as Section 32(1) of the 
Restatement observes, “a client may discharge a lawyer at any time.” 
 
However, a client’s ability to fire an attorney and end the attorney-client relationship is not 
absolute. Under some circumstances, a court may prohibit a client from firing an attorney, and 
order the attorney to continue representing the client. For example, a client typically cannot fire 
an attorney immediately before trial, because it could enable clients to improperly delay the 
proceedings. 
 
Criminal defendants have a limited right to fire appointed counsel and receive alternative 
counsel. Criminal defendants also have a limited right to fire appointed counsel and represent 
themselves. Among other things, criminal defendant must express an “unequivocal” desire to 
represent themselves. In theory, this means that criminal defendants cannot fire appointed 
counsel only because they believe appointed counsel is bad. 
 
When a client fires an attorney and hires a new attorney, the former attorney may have a claim 
against the former client. In a civil claim, the former attorney may recover the value of the 
services rendered. 
 
Demov, Morris, Levine & Shein v. Glantz, 53 N.Y.2d 553 (N.Y. 1981) 
 
Summary: Respondent HGV Associates retained attorneys to retain possession of the 
premises of an amusement park to secure an advantageous condemnation award. HGV 
Associates signed a retainer agreement which provided that appellants (individual 
attorneys and a law firm) would prepare an application for a stay of eviction permitting 
the amusement park to reopen and would represent HVG in the condemnation 
proceeding. Appellants made clear they would not work unless they could also represent 
HGV in the condemnation proceeding. A representative of HGV fired appellant lawyers 
and law firm against the retainer agreement. Appellants argue fraud and breach of 
retainer agreement. The Appellate Division held the cause of action to be insufficient as 
a matter of law. The court noted that a cause of action will not be cognizable in the 
courts of this State when it is violative of strong public policy. The public policy of New 
York permits a client to terminate the attorney-client relationship freely at any time. The 
court held that when an attorney-client relationship deteriorates to the point where the 
																																																								
16 Dolly Parton, When Someone Wants to Leave, Jolene (1974). 
17 Billy Bragg, A New England (1983). 
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client loses faith in the attorney, the client should have the unbridled prerogative of 
termination.  
 
WACHTLER, J. 
 
The question on this appeal is whether an attorney may recover upon a cause of action against 
a former client for fraudulently inducing the attorney to enter into a retainer agreement. The 
Appellate Division held the cause of action is insufficient as a matter of law and we agree. 
 
In 1972, the City of New York condemned a parcel of land in Queens owned by respondent 
HGV Associates upon which an amusement park was operated by respondent MHG 
Enterprises, Inc. Between 1972 and 1976, respondents retained several attorneys to undertake 
efforts to retain possession of the premises and secure the most advantageous condemnation 
award. Respondents remained in possession until May 28, 1976, when a Federal court ordered 
them to vacate the premises. 
 
In June, 1976, respondent Glantz, the vice-president of MHG Enterprises, Inc., and a partner in 
HGV Associates, signed a retainer agreement which provided that appellants, individual 
attorneys, and a law firm, would prepare an application for a temporary stay of eviction 
permitting the amusement park to reopen and would represent respondents in the 
condemnation proceeding. Appellants were to be paid a fixed sum if the application to reopen 
was successful and their fee in the condemnation proceeding was dependent upon the amount 
eventually awarded to respondents. Appellants testified that they made it clear to Glantz that 
they would not work on the application to reopen unless they could also represent respondents 
in the condemnation proceeding. Glantz agreed to arrange to have appellants substituted as 
attorneys of record in the condemnation proceeding. 
 
Appellants submitted the application to restore respondents to possession of the amusement 
park, which was denied. Thereafter, appellants were informed by respondents' attorney of 
record in the condemnation proceeding that Glantz had issued instructions not to forward the 
stipulation of substitution to appellants. Glantz then formally discharged appellants in writing and 
requested a bill for services rendered. 
 
In October, 1976 appellants commenced an action against respondents for fraud, breach of the 
retainer agreement, and the reasonable value of legal services rendered. The cause of action 
for fraud was grounded upon the allegation that appellants were induced to enter the retainer 
agreement by respondents' promise to permit them to litigate the condemnation proceeding. 
Appellants also alleged that from the outset, respondents never intended to substitute 
appellants as attorneys of record in the condemnation proceedings unless and until the 
application to reopen was granted. 
 
The trial court dismissed the claim for breach of contract, but upheld the cause of action for 
fraud. After trial a jury awarded appellants $34,000 as the reasonable value of their services and 
$310,000 as damages for fraud. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, on the law, by 
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dismissing the cause of action sounding in fraud and otherwise affirmed the judgment insofar as 
is pertinent here. 
 
The unique relationship between an attorney and client, founded in principle upon the elements 
of trust and confidence on the part of the client and of undivided loyalty and devotion on the part 
of the attorney, remains one of the most sensitive and confidential relationships in our society. A 
relationship built upon a high degree of trust and confidence is obviously more susceptible to 
destructive forces than are other less sensitive ones. It follows, then, that an attorney cannot 
represent a client effectively and to the full extent of his or her professional capability unless the 
client maintains the utmost trust and confidence in the attorney. 
 
This philosophy engendered the development of the rule, now well rooted in our jurisprudence, 
that a client may at anytime, with or without cause, discharge an attorney in spite of a 
particularized retainer agreement between the parties. Moreover, we have held that since the 
client has the absolute right on public policy grounds to terminate the attorney-client relationship 
at any time without cause, it follows as a corollary that the client cannot be compelled to pay 
damages for exercising a right which is an implied condition of the contract, and the attorney 
discharged without cause is limited to recovering in quantum meruit the reasonable value of 
services rendered. In Martin v. Camp, we stated that the rule "is well calculated to promote 
public confidence in the members of an honorable profession whose relation to their clients is 
personal and confidential". 
 
To be sure, a deliberate misrepresentation of present intent made for the purpose of inducing 
another to enter a contract will normally constitute actionable fraud if there is a reliance by the 
party to whom the misrepresentation was made. It is equally well established, however, that a 
cause of action will not be cognizable in the courts of this State when it is violative of strong 
public policy. 
 
The public policy of New York which permits a client to terminate the attorney-client relationship 
freely at any time, notwithstanding the existence of a particularized retainer agreement between 
the parties, would be easily undermined if an attorney could hold a client liable for fraud on the 
theory that the client misrepresented his or her true intent when the retainer was executed. 
When an attorney-client relationship deteriorates to the point where the client loses faith in the 
attorney, the client should have the unbridled prerogative of termination. Any result which 
inhibits the exercise of this essential right is patently unsupportable. 
 
Additionally, as a matter of law, the element of reliance essential to a cause of action for 
fraudulent misrepresentation of present intent cannot be established in this case. Given the rule 
that a client may discharge an attorney without cause at any time, it is evident that appellants 
could not rely upon Glantz's promise to substitute them as attorneys of record in the 
condemnation proceeding any more than they could rely upon continued representation in the 
event they had actually been substituted. Thus, an essential element of a claim of fraudulent 
misrepresentation is conspicuously absent. 
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Appellants argue that the result reached today enables unscrupulous clients to defraud their 
attorneys with impunity. We do not agree. We have said that "the law does not permit the client 
to cheat his attorney." Permitting an attorney improperly discharged to recover the reasonable 
value of services rendered in quantum meruit, a principle inherently designed to prevent unjust 
enrichment, strikes the delicate balance between the need to deter clients from taking undue 
advantage of attorneys, on the one hand, and the public policy favoring the right of a client to 
terminate the attorney-client relationship without inhibition on the other. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. If a client fires an attorney for actual or perceived incompetence, should the attorney be 
able to recover in quantum meruit? 
2. Many courts have held that a fired attorney may also recover a percentage of a 
contingent fee. “The outgoing attorney may elect to take compensation on the basis of a 
presently fixed dollar amount based upon quantum meruit for the reasonable value of 
services or, in lieu thereof, the outgoing attorney has the right to elect a contingent 
percentage fee based on the proportionate share of the work performed on the whole 
case.” Lai Ling Cheng v. Modansky, 73 N.Y.2d 454 (1989). Do you agree with this 
conclusion? 
 
Woke Up New: Permissive Withdrawal 
 
I wish there was something you would do or say, to try and make me change my mind and stay. 
But we never did too much talking anyway. But don't think twice, it's all right.18 
 
You can't open your mouth without telling a lie, but baby, you know how to say goodbye.19 
 
On the morning when I woke up without you for the first time, I felt free and I felt lonely and I felt 
scared.20 
 
While it is easy for clients to end an attorney-client relationship, it can be harder for attorneys. 
Model Rule 1.16(b) identifies several circumstances under which an attorney may end an 
attorney-client relationship. 
 
Of course, attorneys can end attorney-client relationships at will, when it will not harm their 
clients. Model Rule 1.16(b)(1). But this exception is largely irrelevant, because clients typically 
abhor reluctant attorneys, and clients who suffer no harm rarely file malpractice actions. Clients 
who can afford another attorney say good riddance, and clients who cannot are harmed. 
 
Attorneys can also end an attorney-client relationship if their client misbehaves. For example, 
attorneys can end an attorney-client relationship if their client uses their legal advice to break 
																																																								
18 Bob Dylan, Don’t Think Twice, It’s Alright (1963).  
19 Stephin Merritt, How to Say Goodbye, 69 Love Songs (1999). 
20 The Mountain Goats, Woke Up New, Get Lonely (2006). 
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the law. Attorneys can also end an attorney-client relationship based on irreconcilable 
differences of opinion. And attorneys can end an attorney-client relationship if their client cannot 
or will not pay for representation, or for any other “good reason.” Model Rule 1.16(b)(2-7). 
 
However, attorneys cannot simply end an attorney-client relationship and walk away. They must 
seek permission from the court, and cannot end an attorney-client relationship without the 
court’s approval. If the court orders an attorney to continue representing a client, the attorney 
must comply, even if the attorney has good cause to withdraw. Model Rule 1.16(c). Typically, 
courts permit attorneys to withdraw only if they show that their client has retained other counsel 
or refuses representation. If the court permits withdrawal, the attorney must make a reasonable 
effort to protect the client’s interests. Among other things, the attorney must provide reasonable 
notice of withdrawal to the client, transfer documents and property to the client, and refund any 
unearned payments or fees. However, the attorney may retain documents relating to the client, 
to the extent permitted by law. 
 
It’s Not You, It’s Me: Mandatory Withdrawal 
 
Are you out of love with me? Are you longing to be free? Do I drive you up a tree? Yeah! Oh, 
yeah! Do I drive you up the wall? Do you dread every phone call? Can you not stand me at all? 
Yeah! Oh, yeah!21 
 
Under certain circumstances, attorneys must end an attorney-client relationship. Model Rule 
1.16(a) provides that attorneys must withdraw if continued representation would cause a 
violation of the rules of professional conduct or some other law, their physical or mental 
condition materially impairs their ability to represent the client, or the client terminates 
representation. 
 
Obviously, attorneys cannot represent clients seeking legal advice in furtherance of a criminal 
enterprise. For example, attorneys cannot provide legal advice that enables a client to commit 
or perpetuate fraud. However, attorneys are not required to withdraw from representation simply 
because their client suggests an improper or illegal action. Model Rule 1.16, Comment 2. On 
the contrary, they should counsel their client against such action, and withdraw only if their client 
insists on proceeding. 
 
Attorneys also cannot represent a client if it would create a conflict of interest. If an attorney has 
previously represented a client with interests adverse to those of a potential or current client, the 
attorney must decline or withdraw from representation, unless the client can and does provide 
informed consent to representation. In some cases, a conflict of interest may preclude informed 
consent. 
 
Attorneys must also withdraw from representation if their physical or mental state will materially 
impair their ability to represent their client. Obviously, attorneys who incur serious physical or 
																																																								
21 Stephin Merritt, The Magnetic Fields, Yeah! Oh Yeah!, 69 Love Songs (1999). 
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mental injuries may not be able to continue representing their clients. However, in some cases, 
they may be subject to discipline. 
 
Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F. 3d 317 (2d Cir. 1999) 
 
Summary: Lacara appeals from two orders denying Lacara’s motion to withdraw as 
counsel for Whiting. Lacara asserted that appellee had failed to follow legal advice, was 
not focused on his legal rights, and demanded publicity against legal advice. Whiting 
said he would not be opposed to a court order relieving counsel. Lacara asserts 
permissive withdrawal. The court noted there are some instances in which an attorney 
representing a plaintiff in a civil case might have to withdraw even at the cost of 
significant interference with the trial court's management of its calendar. In reversing the 
decision of the lower court, this court noted that Whiting intends to dictate how his action 
is to be pursued. Whiting did not believe Lacara was the correct attorney for him. Based 
on the oral argument, the court determined Lacara’s motion should be granted. 
 
Garrett R. Lacara appeals from two orders of Judge Spatt denying Lacara's motions to withdraw 
as counsel for plaintiff-appellee Joseph M. Whiting. Although the record before Judge Spatt 
justified denial of the motions, amplification of Whiting's position at oral argument persuades us 
to reverse. 
 
In July 1996, appellee, a former police officer, filed a civil rights action against Nassau County, 
the Incorporated Village of Old Brooksville, the Old Brooksville Police Department, other 
villages, and various individual defendants. The action was based on the termination of his 
employment as an officer. He sought $9,999,000 in damages. 
 
Appellee's initial counsel was Jeffrey T. Schwartz. In October 1996, Robert P. Biancavilla 
replaced Schwartz. A jury was selected in October 1997 but was discharged when Biancavilla 
withdrew from the case with appellee's consent. 
 
Whiting retained Lacara in December 1997. In June 1998, the district court partially granted 
defendants' summary judgment motion and dismissed plaintiff's due process claims. The court 
scheduled the remaining claims, one free speech claim and two equal protection claims, for a 
jury trial on August 18, 1998. On July 20, 1998, the district court denied appellee's motion to 
amend his complaint to add a breach of contract claim and another due process claim. 
 
On August 6, 1998, Lacara moved to be relieved as counsel. In support, he offered an affidavit 
asserting that appellee "had failed to follow legal advice," that appellee "was not focused on his 
legal rights," and that appellee "demanded publicity against legal advice." Lacara also asserted 
that appellee had failed to keep adequate contact with his office, was "not sufficiently thinking 
clearly to be of assistance at the time of trial," and would "be of little or no help during trial." 
Furthermore, Lacara stated that appellee had "demanded that Lacara argue collateral issues 
which would not be allowed in evidence," demanded that Lacara continue to argue a due 
process claim already dismissed by the court, and drafted a Rule 68 Offer without Lacara's 
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consent and demanded that he serve it on defendants. Finally, Lacara asserted that on July 30, 
1998, Whiting had entered his office and, without permission, had “commenced to riffle Lacara's 
‘in box.’” Lacara stated that he had to call 911 when Whiting had refused to leave the office. 
Lacara offered to provide further information to the court in camera. Whiting's responsive 
affidavit essentially denied Lacara's allegations. Whiting stated that he would not be opposed to 
an order relieving counsel upon the condition that Lacara's firm refund the legal fees paid by 
Whiting. 
 
On August 13, Judge Spatt denied Lacara's motion to withdraw as counsel. Judge Spatt 
subsequently issued a written order giving the reasons for denying appellant's motion. 
 
On August 13, 1998, Lacara filed a notice of appeal and moved for an emergency stay of the 
district court's order and to be relieved as appellee's attorney. We granted Lacara's motion for 
an emergency stay pending appeal but denied his request for relief on the merits at that time. At 
a status conference on September 23, 1998, the district court entertained another motion from 
Lacara to withdraw as counsel, which Judge Spatt again denied. Lacara filed a timely appeal, 
which was consolidated with the earlier appeal. 
 
Judge Spatt denied Lacara's motion pursuant to Rule 1.4 of the Civil Rules of the United States 
District Court for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, which provides that: 
 
an attorney who has appeared as attorney of record for a party may be relieved or 
displaced only by order of the court and may not withdraw from a case without leave of 
the court granted by order. Such an order may be granted only upon a showing by 
affidavit or otherwise of satisfactory reasons for withdrawal or displacement and the 
posture of the case, including its position, if any, on the calendar. 
 
In addressing motions to withdraw as counsel, district courts have typically considered whether 
“the prosecution of the suit is likely to be disrupted by the withdrawal of counsel.” 
 
Considerations of judicial economy weigh heavily in favor of our giving district judges wide 
latitude in these situations, but there are some instances in which an attorney representing a 
plaintiff in a civil case might have to withdraw even at the cost of significant interference with the 
trial court's management of its calendar. For example, the Code of Professional Responsibility 
might mandate withdrawal where "the client is bringing the legal action merely for the purpose of 
harassing or maliciously injuring" the defendant. In such a situation, by denying a counsel's 
motion to withdraw, even on the eve of trial, a court would be forcing an attorney to violate 
ethical duties and possibly to be subject to sanctions. 
 
Lacara does not claim that he faces mandatory withdrawal. Rather, he asserts three bases for 
"permissive withdrawal" under the Model Code: (i) Whiting "insists upon presenting a claim or 
defense that is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by good faith 
argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law"; (ii) Whiting's "conduct has 
rendered it unreasonably difficult for Lacara to carry out employment effectively"; and (iii) 
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Whiting has "deliberately disregarded an agreement or obligation to Lacara as to expenses or 
fees." Although the Model Code "was drafted solely for its use in disciplinary proceedings and 
cannot by itself serve as a basis for granting a motion to withdraw as counsel," we continue to 
believe that "the Model Code provides guidance for the court as to what constitutes ‘good 
cause' to grant leave to withdraw as counsel." However, a district court has wide latitude to deny 
a counsel's motion to withdraw, as here, on the eve of trial, where the Model Code merely 
permits withdrawal. 
 
In the instant matter, we would be prepared to affirm if the papers alone were our only guide. 
Although Lacara has alleged a nonpayment of certain disputed fees, he has not done so with 
sufficient particularity to satisfy us that withdrawal was justified on the eve of trial. Moreover, 
there is nothing in the district court record to suggest error in that court's finding that "Whiting 
has been very cooperative and desirous of assisting his attorney in this litigation." To be sure, 
we are concerned by Lacara's allegation that appellee trespassed in his office and that 
appellant had to call 911 to get Whiting to leave. However, Whiting disputes Lacara's 
description of these events. Moreover, we strongly agree with the district court that, as the third 
attorney in this case, Lacara had ample notice that appellee was a difficult client. 
 
Nevertheless, we reverse the denial of appellant's motion for withdrawal. Among Lacara's 
allegations are that Whiting insisted upon pressing claims already dismissed by the district court 
and calling witnesses Lacara deemed detrimental to his case. At oral argument, Whiting 
confirmed Lacara's contention that Whiting intends to dictate how his action is to be pursued. 
Whiting was asked by a member of the panel: 
 
Are you under the impression that if we affirm Judge Spatt's ruling, you will be able to tell 
Mr. Lacara to make the arguments you want made in this case? That, if Mr. Lacara says, 
"That witness doesn't support your case," and you don't agree with that, are you under 
the impression that if we affirm Judge Spatt's ruling you'll be able to force him to call that 
witness? 
 
To which Whiting replied, "Yes I am." 
 
Moreover, in his statements at oral argument, Whiting made it clear that he was as interested in 
using the litigation to make public his allegations of corruption within the Brookville police 
department as in advancing his specific legal claims. For example, Whiting thought it relevant to 
inform us at oral argument that police officers in the department were guilty of "illegal drug use, 
acceptance of gratuities, and ongoing extramarital affairs while they were on duty." Appellee 
stated that he wanted to call an officer to testify that the officer could not "bring up anything 
criminal about the lieutenant, the two lieutenants, or the chief, which could get them in trouble or 
make the department look bad." Finally, Whiting made clear that he disagreed with Lacara 
about the handling of his case partly because Whiting suspects that Lacara wants to cover up 
corruption. Appellee stated: "For some strange reason, Mr. Lacara states that he doesn't want 
to put certain witnesses on the stand. The bottom line is he does not want to make waves and 
expose all of the corruption that's going on within this community." 
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Also, at oral argument, appellee continued to bring up the already-dismissed due process 
claims. He asserted: "They found me guilty of something which was investigated by their 
department on two separate occasions and closed as unfounded on two separate occasions." 
We thus have good reason to conclude that Whiting will insist that Lacara pursue the already 
dismissed claims at trial. 
 
Finally, appellee indicated that he might sue Lacara if not satisfied that Lacara provided 
representation as Whiting dictated. After admitting that he did not consider Lacara to be the 
"right attorney" for him in this case, Whiting asserted that he deemed Lacara "ineffective." The 
following exchange also occurred: 
 
Question from Panel: If you think that Mr. Lacara is ineffective in representing you as 
you stand here now, doesn't Mr. Lacara face the prospect of a malpractice suit, by you, 
against him, if he continues in the case? 
Appellee's Reply: Yes, I believe he absolutely does. 
Question from Panel: Then, isn't that all the more reason to relieve him? So that what 
you say is ineffective and is in effect a distortion of the attorney-client relationship, 
doesn't continue? 
Appellee's Reply: I believe I do have grounds to sue Mr. Lacara for misrepresentation .... 
 
We believe that appellee's desire both to dictate legal strategies to his counsel and to sue 
counsel if those strategies are not followed places Lacara in so impossible a situation that he 
must be permitted to withdraw. 
 
Attorneys have a duty to the court not to make "legal contentions unwarranted by existing law or 
by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." We have 
determined that "an attorney who continues to represent a client despite the inherent conflict of 
interest in his so doing due to possible Rule 11 sanctions risks an ethical violation." In this case, 
appellee's belief that he can dictate to Lacara how to handle his case and sue him if Lacara 
declines to follow those dictates leaves Lacara in a position amounting to a functional conflict of 
interest. If required to continue to represent Whiting, Lacara will have to choose between 
exposure to a malpractice action or to potential Rule 11 or other sanctions. To be sure, such a 
malpractice action would have no merit. However, we have no doubt it would be actively 
pursued, and even frivolous malpractice claims can have substantial collateral consequences. 
 
As previously noted, the interest of the district court in preventing counsel from withdrawing on 
the eve of trial is substantial. Moreover, we would normally be loath to allow an attorney to 
withdraw on the eve of trial when the attorney had as much notice as did Lacara that he was 
taking on a difficult client. However, the functional conflict of interest developed at oral argument 
causes us to conclude that the motion to withdraw should be granted. 
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We therefore reverse and order the district court to grant appellant's motion to withdraw as 
counsel. We note that Lacara agreed in this court to waive all outstanding fees and to turn over 
all pertinent files to Whiting. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did Lacara claim permissive withdrawal, rather than mandatory withdrawal? 
2. Why did the district court deny Lacara’s motion to withdraw? Why did the circuit court 
reverse? 
3. How serious is the risk of Rule 11 sanctions? Is there a real conflict of interest? 
4. Will Whiting be able to retain new counsel? If not, will he have to proceed pro se? 
 
Both Sides Now: Effective Withdrawal 
 
Sometimes an attorney-client relationship doesn’t really end, but just fades away. Often, an 
attorney represents a client in a matter and the client has no need for further representation. For 
example, an attorney may represent a client in relation to a particular transaction or dispute, like 
the purchase of a home or an automobile accident. Ideally, the attorney and client will have 
formed an agreement, specifying the scope of representation, in which case the attorney-client 
relationship typically ends when the matter is concluded. But occasionally they may not, by 
accident or design. In that case, the attorney-client relationship still typically ends when the 
matter is concluded, although it may be less certain. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers § 31(2)(e) (2000). 
 
In other cases, an attorney may have a long-term relationship with a client that gradually peters 
out over time. In that case, it may be hard to know whether and when the attorney-client 
relationship has ended. Worse, the attorney and client may disagree. An attorney may believe 
the relationship continues, only to be surprised when the client returns bills unpaid. And a client 
may believe the relationship continues, only to be surprised when the attorney ignores the 
client’s affairs. 
 
Generally, an attorney-client relationship continues to exist so long as a reasonable client would 
believe that it continues to exist. If an attorney wants to end an attorney-client relationship, the 
attorney should explicitly inform the client in writing that it has ended, and return any documents 
or property that belongs to the client. But attorneys are often reluctant to end long-term attorney-
client relationships, in the hope that the client will eventually return and provide more business. 
In that case, courts will ask whether a reasonable client would believe that an attorney-client 
relationship continued to exist under the circumstances. 
 
Forever & a Day: Duties After Withdrawal 
 
Under Model Rule 1.16(d), an attorney who withdraws from representing a client has a duty to 
minimize any potential harm to the client.  Among other things, the attorney must provide 
reasonable notice of withdrawal, return any documents or other property that belongs to the 
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client, and refund any unearned fees or payments. However, some attorney work product may 
belong to the attorney, and some states permit attorneys to retain the client’s property until the 
client pays any outstanding fees. 
 
However, the attorney also has a permanent duty of confidentiality to former clients. 
 
Further Reading: 
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2.3: The Attorney as Agent 
 
The attorney-client relationship is a principal-agent relationship. The client is the principal and 
the attorney is the client’s agent. But it is a unique form of principal-agent relationship, because 
the client’s ability to control the attorney’s exercise of agency is limited, and because the 
attorney has duties not only to the client, but also to the court and the public. 
 
Professional Relationships 
 
In this respect, the attorney-client relationship resembles other professional relations. In the 
doctor-patient relationship, patients decide whether to seek treatment, but doctors decide how 
to provide treatment. In the professor-student relationship, students decide whether to attend 
school, but professors decide what to teach. And in the priest-penitent relationship, priests have 
duties not only to the penitent, but also to God. 
 
In an attorney-client relationship, the client decides the objectives, but the attorney decides the 
means. The client decides how much authority to delegate to the attorney, and retains the right 
to make all major decisions, but cannot dictate all of the attorney’s actions. The attorney is 
entitled and required to exercise independent judgment about how to achieve the client’s goals.  
 
For example, in a contract negotiation, the client is entitled to decide the key terms, but the 
attorney must decide how to achieve them. In civil litigation, the client is entitled to decide 
whether to settle, but the attorney must decide whether to assert a particular claim or defense. 
And in criminal litigation, the client is entitled to decide whether to plead guilty, but the attorney 
must decide which witnesses to call and how to conduct cross-examination. 
 
Moreover, in an attorney-client relationship, the attorney not only has a duty to protect the 
interests of the client, but also has a duty to protect the interests of the court and the public. An 
attorney is an agent of both the client and the court. In theory, while attorneys must pursue the 
interests of their clients, they also must not mislead the court, or allow their clients to lie to the 
court. Of course, in practice, this is often easier said than done. 
 
Attorneys as Agents 
 
As agents of their clients, attorneys often have the authority to act on behalf of their clients, but 
it may take the form of express, implied, or apparent authority.  
 
● Express Authority: When an attorney acts pursuant to authority explicitly granted by 
the client. For example, clients can grant express authority to an attorney in an 
engagement letter or later instructions. 
● Implied Authority: When an attorney acts pursuant to authority necessarily granted by 
the attorney-client relationship. For example, attorneys have implied authority to exercise 
discretion in implementing the instructions of their clients. 
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● Apparent Authority: When an attorney acts pursuant to authority delegated by the 
client and an opposing party relies on the delegation, especially when the authority is 
normally reserved to the client. For example, if a client delegates the authority to 
approve a final settlement, and an opposing party relies on the delegation, the attorney 
may have apparent authority, even though the decision to approve a final settlement is 
normally reserved to the client. 
 
When attorneys act pursuant to express, implied, or apparent authority, their actions bind their 
clients. But when attorneys act without authority, their actions are ultra vires, and may not be 
binding. Of course, when attorneys act without authority, they may also be liable for malpractice. 
 
Attorneys as Fiduciaries 
 
A friendship founded on business is better than a business founded on friendship.22 
 
The attorney-client relationship is unusual because attorneys are fiduciaries of their clients. A 
fiduciary is a person who holds a legal duty of trust with another party, or “principal.” A fiduciary 
duty is the highest standard of care. As Cardozo famously explained, a fiduciary “is held to 
something stricter than the morals of the marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an 
honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.” Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458 
(1928). Accordingly, fiduciaries must act only for the sole benefit and interest of the principal, 
and must put the interests of the principal above their own interests. 
 
As fiduciaries, attorneys have a legal duty to act only in the interests of their clients, and to put 
the interests of their clients above their own interests. Accordingly, attorneys may never form a 
relationship that would create a conflict of interest with a current or former client, without the 
client’s informed consent. 
 
Model Rule 1.2: Scope of Representation & Allocation of Authority Between Client & 
Lawyer 
 
a. Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning 
the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client 
as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on 
behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer 
shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer 
shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be 
entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify. 
b. A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not 
constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or 
activities. 
																																																								
22 John D. Rockefeller. 
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c. A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under 
the circumstances and the client gives informed consent. 
d. A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the 
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences 
of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to 
make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the 
law. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, Introductory Note (2000) 
 
Traditionally, some lawyers considered that a client put affairs in the lawyer's hands, who then 
managed them as the lawyer thought would best advance the client's interests. So conducting 
the relationship can subordinate the client to the lawyer. The lawyer might not fully understand 
the client's best interests or might consciously or unconsciously pursue the lawyer's own 
interests. An opposite view of the client-lawyer relationship treats the lawyer as a servant of the 
client, who must do whatever the client wants limited only by the requirements of law. That view 
ignores the interest of the lawyer and of society that a lawyer practice responsibly and 
independently. 
 
A middle view is that the client defines the goals of the representation and the lawyer 
implements them, but that each consults with the other. Except for certain matters reserved for 
client or lawyer to decide, the scope of the lawyer's authority is itself one of the subjects for 
consultation, with room for the client's wishes and the parties' contracts to modify the 
traditionally broad delegation of authority to the lawyer. This approach, accepted in this 
Restatement, permits a variety of allocations of authority. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 20 (2000) 
 
1. A lawyer must keep a client reasonably informed about the matter and must consult with 
a client to a reasonable extent concerning decisions to be made by the lawyer under §§ 
21- 23. 
2. A lawyer must promptly comply with a client's reasonable requests for information. 
3. A lawyer must notify a client of decisions to be made by the client under §§ 21- 23 and 
must explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make 
informed decisions regarding the representation. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 21 (2000) 
 
As between client and lawyer: 
1. A client and lawyer may agree which of them will make specified decisions, subject to 
the requirements stated in §§ 18, 19, 22, 23, and other provisions of this Restatement. 
The agreement may be superseded by another valid agreement. 
2. A client may instruct a lawyer during the representation, subject to the requirements 
stated in §§ 22, 23, and other provisions of this Restatement. 
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3. Subject to Subsections (1) and (2) a lawyer may take any lawful measure within the 
scope of representation that is reasonably calculated to advance a client's objectives as 
defined by the client, consulting with the client as required by § 20. 
4. A client may ratify an act of a lawyer that was not previously authorized. 
 
L.F.S. Corp. v. Kennedy, 337 S.E.2d 209 (S.C. 1985) 
 
Summary: Kennedy represented L.F.S. in an action against the Town of Kershaw. 
Kennedy settled the action and L.F.S. accepted the settlement, but later objected to 
Kennedy settling without its consent. The court held that L.F.S. ratified Kennedy’s 
actions by accepting the settlement. 
 
GREGORY, Justice: 
 
In this legal malpractice action, appellant L.F.S. Corporation appeals from the grant of 
respondents’ motion for non-suit. We affirm. 
 
Appellant raises numerous issues by twenty-four exceptions; however, we need only reach one 
issue which moots those remaining. 
 
L.F.S. began planning a subdivision called Havenwood in 1964. In the early 1970's, a dispute 
arose with the Town of Kershaw concerning the town's obligation to supply water to the 
subdivision under an alleged oral contract. Respondents were retained to represent the 
Corporation. 
 
The gravamen of appellant’s complaint is that respondents failed to follow instructions 
concerning settlement negotiations, and permitted summary judgment to be entered based on 
an unauthorized agreement. Notwithstanding respondents' alleged failure to follow instructions, 
the record clearly demonstrates L.F.S. subsequently ratified respondents’ actions. 
 
After entry of the disputed 1976 order, the town remitted $900.00 in tap fees to the Corporation 
pursuant to the order. The check was accepted by the Corporation, and endorsed over to 
respondents to be applied against legal fees owned by the Corporation. Thereafter, one of the 
Corporation's directors wrote a letter to respondents seeking advice concerning enforcement of 
the order. 
 
The events subsequent to the 1976 order clearly demonstrate L.F.S. ratified respondents’ 
actions concerning entry of the order. The Corporation accepted financial benefit under the 
order, and sought to take advantage of the order. Acceptance of both benefits are clear, 
unequivocal acts of ratification. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Did Kennedy have authority to agree to the settlement? 
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2. If not, why did the court affirm the settlement? 
 
Morris v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St. 3d 45 (Ohio 1988) 
 
Summary: James Whitney represented an estate insured by Ohio Casualty Insurance, 
which issued settlement checks to Whitney, payable to the estate. Someone 
typographically endorsed the checks and deposited them in Whitney’s office account. 
The court held that the endorsements were invalid, because Whitney lacked any 
authority to endorse the checks. 
 
DOUGLAS, J. 
 
The sole question posed for our consideration is whether an insurance carrier may be liable for 
conversion when the carrier authorizes its bank to pay a draft over a forged endorsement. We 
answer the question in the affirmative and, accordingly, uphold the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
 
Initially, appellant asks this court to find that its payment to James Whitney, the attorney for the 
estate and guardianship, constituted payment to the estate and guardianship. Accordingly, 
appellant would have us hold that appellant's obligation to the estate and guardianship was 
discharged when appellant both delivered the drafts in question to the agent of the estate and 
the guardianship, and then authorized payment of such drafts to the same party. We decline to 
make such a finding in this case. 
 
In essence, appellant asks this court to determine whether an attorney has the inherent power 
to endorse a settlement check on behalf of his client. If so, appellant would be discharged from 
its obligation to the estate and guardianship; if not, appellant's obligation remains unpaid and 
owing. We find both that an attorney has no inherent authority to endorse a settlement check in 
the name of his client, and that, on the basis of the record before us, attorney Whitney made no 
such endorsement in this case. 
 
In Ohio, as elsewhere, "an attorney who is without special authorization has no implied or 
apparent authority, solely by virtue of his general retainer, to compromise and settle his client's 
claim or cause of action." Similarly, an attorney has no inherent authority to enter into a contract 
for the sale of real estate for his client. While this court has not previously addressed whether an 
attorney may endorse his client's name on a check or draft tendered to effect a settlement, 
numerous other courts have done so. The clear majority of these courts find that no such 
authority exists. Therefore, while we recognize that the decisions on this question are in conflict, 
we believe that the better rule is that an attorney possesses no inherent authority, arising solely 
from the attorney-client relationship, to endorse his client's name on a settlement check or draft. 
The authority to receive a negotiable instrument on behalf of a client does not imply the power 
to endorse it. 
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Accordingly, we hold that an attorney, absent any express authority from his client, has no 
authority to endorse the client's name on a check or draft tendered to effect a settlement. 
 
Further, contrary to appellant’s contention that attorney Whitney properly endorsed and 
deposited the drafts into his escrow account, the only admissible evidence in the record, 
Whitney’s affidavit, reflects that Whitney endorsed neither draft and that the drafts were 
deposited into one of Whitney's general office accounts. Further, even assuming that Whitney 
endorsed the drafts, an “unauthorized signature” includes both a forgery and a signature made 
by an agent exceeding his actual or apparent authority. Thus, given our finding that attorneys 
have no inherent authority to endorse their client’s name to a settlement draft, and the 
undisputed fact that there was no apparent or actual authority vested in Whitney to endorse the 
drafts herein, Whitney’s endorsements, had he made any, would be unauthorized and 
appellant's obligation to the estate and guardianship would remain in effect. 
 
The endorsements at issue herein were typewritten and restrictive in character. While such 
endorsements may, at times, be valid, we find that the endorsements at issue herein were 
unauthorized and thus not valid to operate as the signature of either the administrator or the 
guardian, the payees thereon. 
 
An “‘unauthorized’ signature or indorsement is one made without actual, implied, or apparent 
authority and includes a forgery.” Further, an "unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as 
that of the person whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded from denying it; but 
it operates as the signature of the unauthorized signer in favor of any person who in good faith 
pays the instrument or takes it for value.” Thus, an unauthorized signature does not operate as 
the signature of the named payee and, accordingly, may not act to pass title to an instrument or 
relieve the drawer of his obligation to pay the payee. 
 
In the instant case, appellees presented the sworn affidavits of attorney Whitney, Orin Morris 
and Tom Swope. These affidavits established that Whitney did not endorse the drafts at issue, 
and that Morris and Swope neither signed nor authorized anyone else to sign these drafts. 
Further, Morris and Swope are the only parties who possessed the authority to authorize an 
agent to sign on their behalf. Moreover, appellant has failed, through the use of any admissible 
evidence, to refute the statements contained in the affidavits. Accordingly, the endorsements 
appearing on the second and third drafts, No. X559281 and No. X559280, were unauthorized 
and the payment of the drafts, as endorsed, constituted a conversion. 
 
Appellant authorized the payment of the drafts. Even though the appellant was the original 
drawer, appellant was also the drawee for purposes of liability. 
 
We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the trial 
court for determination of the currently pending claims. 
 
Questions: 
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● Why did the insurance company pay the checks? 
● Why did the court hold that payment was improper? 
● What should the insurance company have done? 
 
Makins v. District of Columbia, 861 A. 2d 590 (D.C. 2004) 
 
Summary: John Harrison represented Brenda Makins in a discrimination action against 
the District of Columbia. Harrison attended a settlement conference, reached an 
agreement, left the room to call Makins, and finalized the agreement when he returned. 
But Makins later refused to sign the agreement, claiming that she had refused to settle 
without reinstatement. The District of Columbia tried to enforce the settlement 
agreement, but the court refused, holding that Harrison lacked apparent authority to 
accept the settlement offer.  
 
NEBEKER, Senior Judge: 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has certified the following 
question to this court: 
 
Under District of Columbia law, is a client bound by a settlement agreement negotiated 
by her attorney when the client has not given the attorney actual authority to settle the 
case on those terms but has authorized the attorney to attend a settlement conference 
before a magistrate judge and to negotiate on her behalf and when the attorney leads 
the opposing party to believe that the client has agreed to those terms. 
 
For reasons set forth below, we answer the question in the negative. In so doing, we confine our 
analysis to the undisputed facts and those recited in the certified question. 
 
In November 1998, Brenda Makins, represented by John Harrison, Esquire, brought an action 
against the District of Columbia in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
claiming sex discrimination and retaliatory firing. Makins had been employed in the District's 
Department of Corrections from 1995 until her discharge in 1997. Her complaint sought 
reinstatement, compensatory damages, and attorney's fees. 
 
In the summer of 2000, at a pre-trial conference, the district judge referred Makins' case to a 
magistrate judge “for settlement purposes only” and ordered the District to “have present at all 
settlement meetings an individual with full settlement authority.” A similar admonition was 
absent as to Ms. Makins. A few days later, the magistrate ordered the “lead attorney(s) for the 
parties” to appear before him for a settlement conference; the order required that the “parties 
shall either attend the settlement conference or be available by telephone for the duration of the 
settlement conference.” 
 
When the conference took place, Makins was not present. After two and a half hours of 
negotiations, Harrison and the attorneys for the District reached an agreement. Makins would 
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receive $99,000 and have her personnel records amended from “discharged” to “resigned” (to 
preserve her retirement benefits if she were able to obtain other creditable employment). In 
return, Makins would dismiss her claims against the District. Mr. Harrison left the hearing room 
with cell phone in hand, apparently to call Ms. Makins. When he returned, the attorneys “shook 
hands” on the deal and later reduced it to writing. A few days later, when Harrison presented 
Makins with a copy for her signature, she refused to sign it. The District then filed a Motion to 
Enforce Settlement. Makins retained another attorney, and the court held an evidentiary hearing 
in which Harrison, Makins, and the lead attorney for the District testified. 
 
The testimony of Makins and Harrison was at odds respecting whether Harrison had been given 
authority to settle absent a provision for her reinstatement to her job. The District Court, 
observing this “sharp conflict” in testimony, declined to resolve it. Instead, the court assumed 
arguendo that Harrison did not have actual authority to settle the case short of reinstatement. 
The court granted the District's motion to enforce the settlement on the alternative ground that 
Harrison had apparent authority to bind Makins to the agreement. The court saw “no justification 
for the District of Columbia not to reasonably believe that Mr. Harrison had the full confidence 
and authority of his client.” 
 
There is arguably some inconsistency as to the extent of authority required of an attorney in 
settlement negotiations. Indeed, a review of relevant case law and principles enunciated by the 
American Bar Association and the American Law Institute demonstrate some differences not 
only over the extent of authority, but also the appropriate definitions of authority. To the extent 
that there tends to be this inconsistency among the cases, it reflects, in part, a difference in the 
application or integration of agency law with legal ethics principles, the attorney-client 
relationship and policy considerations. 
 
This dissonance may in part be seen as a result of the intersection of ethical guidelines and 
rules governing the client-lawyer relationship and the relationship of a principal to her agent in 
the context of settlement agreements. On the one hand, the District of Columbia Code of 
Professional Responsibility Ethical Consideration 7-7 provides that it is the exclusive authority of 
“the client to decide whether [s]he will accept a settlement offer." Similarly, District of Columbia 
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a) provides that a “lawyer shall abide by a client's decision 
whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter.” On the other hand, “it is well established 
that settlement agreements are entitled to enforcement under general principles of contract 
law.” Agency principles are applied to determine whether the attorney or agent had authority to 
bind his principal to the settlement contract. Of course, an attorney can settle his client's case if 
he or she has actual authority to do so. Agency principles also recognize the authority of the 
agent to bind the client based on the doctrine of apparent authority. 
 
The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 8 defines apparent authority as “the power to affect the 
legal relations of another person by transactions with third persons, professedly as an agent for 
the other, arising from and in accordance with the other's manifestations to such third persons.” 
Thus, unlike actual authority, apparent authority does not depend upon any manifestation from 
the principal to her agent, but rather from the principal to the third party. This court has stated 
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that apparent authority arises when a principal places an agent “in a position which causes a 
third person to reasonably believe the principal had consented to the exercise of authority the 
agent purports to hold. This falls short of an overt, affirmative representation by a principal.” In 
such circumstances, an agent's representations need not expressly be authorized by his 
principal. The apparent authority of an agent arises when the principal places the agent in such 
a position as to mislead third persons into believing that the agent is clothed with the authority 
which in fact he does not possess. Apparent authority depends upon “the third-party's 
perception of the agent's authority.” The third party's perception may be based upon “written or 
spoken words or any other conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the 
third person to believe that the principal consents to have the act done on her behalf by the 
person purporting to act for her." 
 
We reiterate that apparent authority is an established doctrine in this court's jurisprudence, and 
that settlement agreements are enforceable under general contract principles. But because 
apparent authority depends upon the principal's manifestations to the third party, the issue 
before us is what conduct by a client in the settlement context is sufficient reasonably to cause a 
third person to believe that the attorney representing the client has full, final settlement 
authority, rather than something short of that. Whether an agent had apparent authority is a 
question of fact and the party asserting the existence of apparent authority must prove it. In 
determining whether the agent had apparent authority to bind the principal, "consideration 
should be given, inter alia, to the actual authority of the agent, the usual or normal conduct of 
the agent in the performance of his or her duties, previous dealings between the agent and the 
party asserting apparent authority, any declarations or representations allegedly made by the 
agent, and lastly, the customary practice of other agents similarly situated." We take as a given 
that a third party in the shoes of the District of Columbia would reasonably assume that Makins 
had authorized attorney Harrison (1) to attend the settlement conference, and (2) to negotiate 
on her behalf; neither Makins nor amicus contends otherwise. We hold, however, that absent 
further manifestations by Makins — not Harrison — which are not contained in the certified 
question, there was insufficient conduct by the client to support a reasonable belief by the 
District that Harrison had full and final authority to agree to the settlement terms. 
 
As pointed out, in the District of Columbia the decision to settle belongs to the client, a fact 
confirmed by our decisions. 
 
The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) further confirms the generally accepted distinction between the 
power to conduct negotiations and the power to end the dispute. Conducting settlement 
negotiations is properly in the attorney's domain: "in the absence of a contrary agreement or 
instruction, a lawyer normally has authority to initiate or engage in settlement discussions, 
although not to conclude them." Concluding those settlement negotiations, however, is strictly 
the client's prerogative: "the decision to settle is reserved to the client because a settlement 
definitively disposes of client rights." 
 
These ethical principles are key to the issue before us, because they not only govern the 
attorney-client relationship, they inform the reasonable beliefs of any opposing party involved in 
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litigation in the District of Columbia, as well as the reasonable beliefs of the opposing party's 
counsel, whose practice is itself subject to those ethical constraints. It is the knowledge of these 
ethical precepts that makes it unreasonable for the opposing party and its counsel to believe 
that, absent some further client manifestation, the client has delegated final settlement authority 
as a necessary condition of giving the attorney authority to conduct negotiations. And it is for 
this reason that opposing parties — especially when represented by counsel, as here — must 
bear the risk of unreasonable expectations about an attorney's ability to settle a case on the 
client's behalf. “When a lawyer purports to enter a settlement binding on the client but lacks 
authority to do so, the burden of inconvenience resulting if the client repudiates the 
unauthorized settlement is properly left with the opposing party, who should know that 
settlements are normally subject to approval by the client and who has received no manifested 
contrary indication from the client.” 
 
Applying these principles, we conclude that the two client manifestations contained in the 
certified question — sending the attorney to the court-ordered settlement conference and 
permitting the attorney to negotiate on the client's behalf — were insufficient to permit a 
reasonable belief by the District that Harrison had been delegated authority to conclude the 
settlement. Some additional manifestation by Makins was necessary to establish that she had 
given her attorney final settlement authority, a power that goes beyond the authority an attorney 
is generally understood to have. The District, in its briefs, points only to actions and 
representation of record by Harrison, not Makins, as support for the reasonableness of its belief. 
Thus, it asserts that “Mr. Harrison represented that Ms. Makins was available by telephone and 
that he would consult with her when appropriate”; that “Mr. Harrison spoke on his cell phone 
with plaintiff at least three times during the conference”; and that “at one point, Mr. Harrison left 
the room to phone plaintiff about the defendant's latest settlement proposal, and returned, 
phone in hand, to accept the proposal with one new condition regarding amendment of 
personnel forms.” All of this information (including information purportedly about the client, 
Makins) was known to the District of Columbia only through representations made by Harrison, 
the attorney. As the Circuit Court stated in certifying the question to us: “Neither the District nor 
the magistrate ever heard from Makins, in person or by telephone. What the District derives 
from the telephone calls between Makins and Harrison amounts to nothing more than Harrison's 
representations of — and the District's educated guesses about — what was said in private 
between them, a disputed factual question the district court did not resolve.” Harrison's conduct 
and representations about his own authority, in short, are not dispositive to whether Makins 
herself furnished the basis for a reasonable belief that he was authorized to conclude the 
settlement. 
 
At the en banc argument, counsel for the District characterized the record as showing that 
Makins “sent” Harrison to the settlement conference, thus manifesting to the court and the 
District his apparent authority to settle her claim. But Makins had little choice, short of 
discharging Harrison, except to allow him to continue to represent her in the negotiations at the 
ordered conference. To execute a settlement agreement then and there is quite another matter. 
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Since Ms. Makins, as principal, did not make any manifestation of authority to the District's 
attorneys, other than retaining Harrison, under the facts as certified in the question, a finding of 
apparent authority is precluded under the law of this jurisdiction. The District also presents 
several policy arguments supporting enforcement of settlement agreements on apparent 
authority grounds, none of which we find compelling. To be sure, settlement of disputes, both in 
trial courts and on appeal, is to be encouraged as sound public policy. However, we are not 
persuaded that the settlement process will be impeded simply by requiring some manifestation 
of the client's authorization to support a claim of apparent authority in these cases where the 
client challenges the authority of his attorney to settle the claim. In addition, “apparent authority 
is an equitable doctrine that places the loss on one whose manifestations to another have 
misled the latter." Our holding is consistent with this principle. Since Makins manifested nothing 
by words or conduct on which reliance could be placed (she merely continued to retain 
Harrison), our answer to the certified question is not erosive to that policy. 
 
We answer the certified question in the negative. 
 
Question: 
 
● What kind of authority did the District of Columbia claim the attorney had? Why was it 
insufficient? 
● What if Makins actually agreed to the settlement, but then had second thoughts 
● What is the purpose of “apparent authority”? Under the standard adopted by the court, is 
it possible for an attorney to exercise apparent authority? 
 
Further Reading: 
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2.4: Client as Principal 
 
I planned each charted course, each careful step along the byway. And more, much more than 
this, I did it my way.23 
 
Decisions Reserved to Clients 
 
As the principal, the client has the sole authority to make certain important decisions about their 
legal representation. Model Rule 1.2(a) provides that an attorney must respect a client’s 
decisions about the goals of representation and consult with the client about the means of 
achieving those goals. It also identifies particular decisions that are reserved to the client, 
specifically the decision whether to settle in a civil case, and the decisions how to plead, 
whether to waive jury trial, and whether to testify in a criminal case. 
 
However, attorneys retain considerable discretion to make decisions about how to pursue 
representation, so long as those decisions are consistent with the client’s decisions, and 
implicitly authorized by the client as necessary to representation. In other words, the client is 
entitled to specify the goals of representation, but not to control the attorney’s every decision in 
pursuit of those goals. 
 
Rule 1.2: Scope of Representation & Allocation of Authority Between Client & Lawyer 
 
a. A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation 
and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A 
lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out 
the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter. 
In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with 
the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client 
will testify. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 22 (2000) 
 
1. As between client and lawyer, subject to Subsection (2) and § 23, the following and 
comparable decisions are reserved to the client except when the client has validly 
authorized the lawyer to make the particular decision: whether and on what terms to 
settle a claim; how a criminal defendant should plead; whether a criminal defendant 
should waive jury trial; whether a criminal defendant should testify; and whether to 
appeal in a civil proceeding or criminal prosecution. 
2. A client may not validly authorize a lawyer to make the decisions described in 
Subsection (1) when other law (such as criminal-procedure rules governing pleas, jury-
trial waiver, and defendant testimony) requires the client's personal participation or 
approval. 
																																																								
23 Paul Anka, My Way (1967). 
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3. Regardless of any contrary contract with a lawyer, a client may revoke a lawyer's 
authority to make the decisions described in Subsection (1). 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 23 (2000) 
 
As between client and lawyer, a lawyer retains authority that may not be overridden by a 
contract with or an instruction from the client: 
1. to refuse to perform, counsel, or assist future or ongoing acts in the representation that 
the lawyer reasonably believes to be unlawful; 
2. to make decisions or take actions in the representation that the lawyer reasonably 
believes to be required by law or an order of a tribunal. 
 
Bronson v. Borst, 404 A. 2d 960 (D.C. App. 1979) 
 
Summary: Bronson hired Borst to be his attorney to help him recover money from a car 
accident.  Borst negotiated a $6,000 settlement, but Bronson clearly told him not to 
accept it.  After multiple failed attempts at communication, including a letter suggesting 
that Bronson find a new attorney if he does not accept the settlement, Borst accepted 
the settlement a day before the statute of limitations ran without Bronson’s permission.  
The Superior Court enforced the settlement through a declaratory judgment, agreeing 
with Borst’s reasoning that if he did not accept the settlement Bronson would have lost 
all chance of recovery, and accepting the settlement was a reasonable and justified step 
in representing his client well. The Appellate Court reversed, stating that regardless of 
the good faith of the attorney, absent specific authority, an attorney cannot accept a 
settlement offer on behalf of a client, and a client is not bound by settlements accepted 
without his express consent.  
 
KELLY, Associate Judge: 
 
Eugene C. Bronson here appeals from an adverse decision in a declaratory judgment action 
filed against him to enforce a settlement agreement and for the payment of attorney's fees and 
costs, arguing that the trial court erred in holding that an attorney does not need specific 
authority to accept a settlement on behalf of his client. We reverse. 
 
I 
 
The material facts are largely undisputed. On May 1, 1972, appellant’s automobile was struck 
by an automobile owned by Mattos, Inc. In order to pursue a claim for personal injuries caused 
by the accident, appellant retained appellee Borst under a general retainer agreement which 
provided only for the usual contingency basis of payment, i.e., Borst was to receive one-third of 
any judgment recovered. 
 
Borst was able to negotiate a $6,000 settlement of appellant's claim with Mattos’ insurer, but 
when he informed appellant of the proposed agreement, appellant made it clear to Borst that he 
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would not accept the offer of settlement. From then on relations between Borst and his client 
became strained. Bronson, who at the time resided outside the District, failed to respond to 
Borst’s communications, which included a letter in which Borst suggested that if Bronson was 
unable to accept the settlement, he might wish to retain new counsel. On April 30, 1975, the day 
before the statute of limitations ran, Borst, on behalf of his client Bronson, accepted the 
settlement offer. 
 
Borst thereafter filed suit in Superior Court for a declaratory judgment to enforce the settlement 
he had accepted and for payment therefrom of attorney’s fees and costs. Under oath, at trial, 
Borst testified to the above facts and to his reasons for accepting the compromise. He said he 
felt that if he did not accept the settlement, Bronson would have lost all chance for recovery. 
Since he had received no direction from Bronson after the letter explaining why settlement was 
necessary and suggesting new counsel should Bronson wish to pursue the claim, Borst 
maintained that he had no alternative to the reasonable and justified step of accepting the 
settlement. Borst testified he felt that the claim was without merit since Bronson claimed a 100% 
disability resulting from a previous accident and therefore he could not hope to receive a jury 
award larger than the settlement offer. Borst also stated that Bronson was unwilling or unable to 
assume the responsibility of paying for expert witnesses and other court costs. The parties 
agreed that there existed no specific and explicit authority in Borst to accept a settlement offer 
to compromise appellant's claim. 
 
Bronson conducted a vigorous, but inartful, cross-examination. Frequently the trial judge 
admonished Bronson that his questioning was argumentative and advised that he would have 
an opportunity later to take the stand and present his case. After Borst left the stand, however, 
the trial judge asked Bronson to present support in the law for his case. When Bronson 
completed his statement, the judge ruled for Borst without giving Bronson the opportunity to 
take the stand and testify under oath. 
 
II 
 
Appellant’s first argument is that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in holding that the 
settlement agreement at issue was binding on him. His analysis is that an attorney without 
express authority cannot accept for his client any settlement regardless of the merits of the 
client's case or the attractiveness of the settlement offer. That conclusion was stated succinctly 
in Ashley v. Atlas Mfg. Co. In Ashley, the court confronted a courtroom settlement to which 
counsel for both parties assented in open court. Although the court judged from the tenor of the 
agreement and the manner in which the attorney for defendant announced the agreement in the 
presence of the defendant that the attorney had specific authority to settle the case, the court 
noted that 
 
as a matter of law it is true, strictly speaking, an attorney has no right, without special 
authority, to make a compromise for his client. 
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Appellee argues that given the circumstances, his action in accepting the settlement in the face 
of his client's objections was reasonable and justified. He maintains that had he not so accepted 
the compromise offer, his client’s claim would have been barred by the statute of limitations and 
his chances for recompense could have been lost forever. To file the suit as his client 
demanded, appellee contends, would have been a wholly futile and costly endeavor. Finally, 
appellee argues that his client was either ignorant of the high cost of litigation or was unwilling to 
bear the responsibility of making the expenditures; presumably the client expected his attorney 
to bear the expense of litigation. 
 
In his brief to this court, appellee offers no support in the law for the above proposition. At trial, 
he relied on Mullen v. People's Drug Stores, for the proposition that “one who is represented by 
counsel is bound by his actions.” Both Turner and Mullen, however, are inapposite to the issue 
here. In Turner, the court saddled the client with his attorney’s negligence in not appearing to 
answer a complaint. In upholding a default judgment, the court noted that “one who comes into 
court through counsel of his own choice is bound by the actions of his counsel.” In Mullen, the 
issue was whether a client is bound by the trial tactics of his attorney; specifically, the decision 
not to call a witness whose testimony would have gone to stipulated facts. 
 
Whether to penalize a party for his counsel’s failure to appear in court and whether to bind a 
client to his attorney’s trial tactics present issues distinct from the issues here. In the two former 
situations, the inquiry concerns the execution by the attorney of the services that, by contract, 
he must perform for his client. In the instant case, we must analyze actions which counsel was 
neither duty bound nor authorized to perform. 
 
We agree with appellant that regardless of the good faith of the attorney, absent specific 
authority, an attorney cannot accept a settlement offer on behalf of a client. Mr. Borst felt that he 
had no option but to accept the settlement offer for fear that the cause of action would be 
barred. Such a fear was unfounded. Mr. Bronson had made his stand clear; he wanted to 
pursue his claim. If Mr. Borst had ethical or financial reservations about continued 
representation of Mr. Bronson, he could have terminated the relationship well before the statute 
ran or he could have filed the suit and requested leave of the court to withdraw early in the 
litigation. Regardless of the options available to him, appellee chose one route that was, or 
should have been, foreclosed to him. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court 
which purports to enforce the settlement agreement. 
 
Finding that the trial court erred in its application of the law, we reverse the decision of the trial 
court and remand the cause for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
Questions: 
 
Impaired Clients 
 
Attorneys often represent clients who have an impaired ability to make or express decisions. For 
example, attorneys often represent minors, who cannot make legally binding decisions. 
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Attorneys may also represent people with physical impairments that affect their ability to 
express their decisions, or mental impairments that affect their ability to make decisions that are 
in their own best interests. 
 
When an attorney represents a legally, physically, or mentally impaired client, the client remains 
the principal and is entitled to dignity and respect. Accordingly, the attorney must provide 
relevant information to the client, consult with the client, and pursue the client’s wishes, 
whenever it is possible and in the client’s best interests. 
 
Sometimes, impaired clients have legal representatives empowered to make decisions on their 
behalf. In that case, the attorney must ordinarily obey the decisions of the legal representative. 
But the attorney must also inform the client about those decisions, and consult with the client 
whenever possible. 
 
Regardless, the attorney must always put the client’s interests first. If the attorney represents 
the impaired client directly, then the attorney has a fiduciary duty to the client, and must ensure 
that the legal representative’s actions are in the client’s best interests. If the attorney represents 
the legal representative, then the attorney has a fiduciary duty to the legal representative, but 
still must ensure that the legal representative respects its own fiduciary duty to the client. For 
example, if an attorney represents a client who is a minor, the attorney must obey the decisions 
of the client’s guardian, but must also consult with the client, in order to determine the client’s 
wishes, and ensure that the client’s guardian does not violate its fiduciary duties. Likewise, if an 
attorney represents a comatose client, the attorney must obey the decisions of the client’s 
guardian, but must also ensure that the guardian does not violate its fiduciary duties. 
 
Sometimes, it is unclear whether a client is impaired. The client may be unable to communicate 
with the attorney, unable to make consistent decisions, unable to make good decisions, or 
unwilling to conform to social expectations. These are hard cases. If a direct attorney-client 
relationship is untenable, the attorney should seek the appointment of a legal representative. 
But if the attorney can represent the client directly, then the attorney must act in the client’s best 
interests. This can create a conflict, if the attorney believes that the client’s instructions are 
inconsistent with the client’s best interests. Should the attorney obey the client? 
 
Rule 1.14: Client with Diminished Capacity 
 
a. When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a 
representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or for 
some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal 
client-lawyer relationship with the client. 
b. When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of 
substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot 
adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary 
protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to 
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take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a 
guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian. 
c. Information relating to the representation of a client with diminished capacity is protected 
by Rule 1.6. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is 
impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the client, but only to 
the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's interests. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 24 (2000): A Client with Diminished 
Capacity 
 
1. When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the 
representation is diminished, whether because of minority, physical illness, mental 
disability, or other cause, the lawyer must, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a 
normal client-lawyer relationship with the client and act in the best interests of the client 
as stated in Subsection (2). 
2. A lawyer representing a client with diminished capacity as described in Subsection (1) 
and for whom no guardian or other representative is available to act, must, with respect 
to a matter within the scope of the representation, pursue the lawyer's reasonable view 
of the client's objectives or interests as the client would define them if able to make 
adequately considered decisions on the matter, even if the client expresses no wishes or 
gives contrary instructions. 
3. If a client with diminished capacity as described in Subsection (1) has a guardian or 
other person legally entitled to act for the client, the client's lawyer must treat that person 
as entitled to act with respect to the client's interests in the matter, unless: 
a. the lawyer represents the client in a matter against the interests of that person; or 
b. that person instructs the lawyer to act in a manner that the lawyer knows will 
violate the person's legal duties toward the client. 
4. A lawyer representing a client with diminished capacity as described in Subsection (1) 
may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other protective action within the scope 
of the representation when doing so is practical and will advance the client's objectives 
or interests, determined as stated in Subsection (2). 
 
People v. Bolden, 99 Cal. App. 3d 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) 
 
Summary: Bolden was denied effective assistance of counsel when his counsel offered 
evidence of Bolden’s incompetence although Bolden desired to be found competent. 
Two psychiatrists testified for the People saying Bolden wasn’t competent because he 
was suffering delusions (thought the people he assaulted—his father and brother—were 
aliens from outer space). Bolden argues a section of the Penal Code that lets a judge 
who doubts the mental competence of the defendant ask the attorney’s opinion of the 
defendant’s competence violates the attorney-client privilege. The court found that an 
attorney’s opinion about his client’s competence does not reveal confidential information. 
The court held that Bolden’s attorney provided effective assistance to his client.  
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Samuel Othello Bolden, Jr., appeals the order finding him mentally incompetent to stand trial 
based upon a jury verdict of incompetence. Bolden contends he was denied due process by 
Penal Code section 1368 which requires his attorney to give an opinion of his client's 
competence, and was denied effective assistance of counsel when his counsel offered evidence 
of his incompetence although Bolden desired to be found competent. 
 
Bolden was charged with robbery, two counts of assault with intent to murder, and two counts of 
assault with a deadly weapon. Criminal proceedings were suspended to determine if Bolden 
was competent to stand trial. The first jury trial on the issue of competence was declared a 
mistrial after the jury was unable to reach a verdict. New counsel was appointed for the retrial. 
Two psychiatrists testifying for the People said Bolden was not competent to stand trial, as he 
was suffering delusions. He believed the people he was charged with assaulting, his father and 
brother, were actually aliens from outer space who were inhabiting the bodies of his father and 
brother. 
 
Out of the jury's presence Bolden’s counsel explained to the court his client wanted to testify in 
his own behalf and wanted to be found competent to stand trial. While counsel felt he had a duty 
to pursue his client’s desires, he also felt he had a duty to represent his client’s best interests. 
He had been told by professional people a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity defense was 
available for his client. He felt he needed his client’s cooperation to pursue this defense. 
Bolden’s current mental state interfered with such cooperation. Counsel’s solution to this 
dilemma was to place Bolden on the witness stand to testify to his competence, and then to 
offer his own psychiatric witness who testified Bolden was not competent to stand trial. 
 
After 10 minutes of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of not competent to stand trial. 
Bolden was committed to Patton State Hospital for treatment. 
 
Penal Code section 1368 requires a judge who doubts the mental competence of the defendant 
to “inquire of the attorney for the defendant whether, in the opinion of the attorney, the 
defendant is mentally competent.” Bolden contends this section violates the attorney-client 
privilege by requiring the attorney to reveal knowledge gained in the course of his relationship 
with his client. 
 
This statute does not, however, require the disclosure of a confidential communication. “What 
the attorney observes of or hears from his client is not always privileged. It is apparent that 
some ingredient of disclosure or revelation is essential to the element of communication.” 
Although an attorney's opinion of his client's competence may be principally drawn from 
confidential communications he has had with that client, merely giving the opinion does not 
reveal any protected information. 
 
A “confidential communication” is defined as “information transmitted between a client and his 
lawyer in the course of that relationship and includes a legal opinion formed and the advice 
given by the lawyer.” Bolden latches onto the words “legal opinion” and argues the opinion of 
competence is a legal opinion which is protected. The statute, however, uses “legal opinion" to 
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specify one type of information protected. Substituting "legal opinion” for “information” in the 
statutory language, we see the type of legal opinion protected by the privilege is one 
“transmitted between a client and his lawyer,” not one, as here, initially transmitted between the 
lawyer and the court. 
 
Bolden contends even if the attorney’s opinion of mental competence does not always reveal a 
confidential communication, in this case the psychiatrists who examined him based their 
opinions in part upon specific communications occurring between Bolden and his first counsel. 
Bolden cites us to only one place in the record where such communication is mentioned. There 
the psychiatrist testified Bolden's former attorney said Bolden believed the aliens inhabiting his 
father's body were from outer space. However, even assuming Bolden's former attorney 
improperly revealed privileged information to the psychiatrists, there was no prejudice to Bolden 
from the revelation as Bolden himself also told the psychiatrists, and testified in court, alien 
imposters had taken over the bodies of his family and others. 
 
Bolden contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel, since he did not receive “the 
kind of legal assistance to be expected of a reasonably competent attorney acting as a 
conscientious, diligent advocate.” No complaint is made about the skill of his attorney or the 
attorney’s dedication to his client. Bolden’s contention is the attorney was acting in what he felt 
was the best interest of his client rather than as an advocate of his client's position. By his 
attorney “siding” with the People in offering evidence of incompetence, Bolden contends, his 
desire to be found competent went unrepresented. 
 
Diligent advocacy does not require an attorney to blindly follow every desire of his client. An 
attorney can ordinarily make binding waivers of many of his client's rights as to matters of trial 
tactics. When the attorney doubts the present sanity of his client, he may assume his client 
cannot act in his own best interests and may act even contrary to the express desires of his 
client. To do otherwise may cause prejudicial error. 
 
Bolden’s attorney provided effective assistance to his client. 
 
Questions: 
 
Further Reading: 
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2.5: Ex Parte Communications 
 
I got something to say that might cause you pain. If I catch you talking to that boy again, I'm 
gonna let you down, and leave you flat, because I told you before, oh, you can't do that.24 
 
Model Rule 4.2 prohibits attorneys from engaging in “ex parte” communications, or 
communications with a represented person without the consent of that person’s attorney or the 
permission of the court. 
 
In theory, the purpose of the prohibition on ex parte communications with represented persons 
is to help protect clients and ensure they receive the advice of counsel. As Model Rule 4.2, 
Comment [1] explains: 
 
This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system by protecting a person 
who has chosen to be represented by a lawyer in a matter against possible overreaching 
by other lawyers who are participating in the matter, interference by those lawyers with 
the client-lawyer relationship and the uncounselled disclosure of information relating to 
the representation. 
 
The prohibition on ex parte communications applies to all represented persons involved in a 
matter. Accordingly, it prohibits ex parte communications with not only represented persons who 
are adverse parties, but also represented persons who are co-parties or non-parties. And it 
applies to directed communications. In other words, an attorney cannot avoid the prohibition by 
instructing or advising a non-attorney to contact a represented person. Furthermore, the 
prohibition on ex parte communications is not waivable by the client, and it applies even if the 
client initiates the communication, requiring the attorney to immediately end the communication. 
Model Rule 4.2, Comment [2] & [3]. 
 
The prohibition on ex parte communications with represented persons may also apply to the 
employees of represented organizations. Most courts have held that attorneys cannot engage in 
ex parte communications with employees of a represented organization who control the 
organization, acted on behalf of the organization in the matter, or make legal decisions for the 
organization. In other words, upper management and people directly involved in the matter are 
off-limits, but other employees are not. In particular, former employees are generally fair game. 
 
Notably, Model Rule 4.2 does incorporate a mens rea requirement. Attorneys cannot be 
disciplined for engaging in an ex parte communication with a represented person unless they 
knew or should have known that the person was represented in relation to the matter. Model 
Rule 4.2, Comment [8]. 
 
And Model Rule 4.2 does not prohibit all ex parte communications. Nothing prevents an attorney 
from engaging in ex parte communications with a represented person about subjects unrelated 
																																																								
24 The Beatles, You Can’t Do That, A Hard Day’s Night (1964). 
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to the matter in which they are represented. And nothing prevents an attorney who is not 
representing anyone in relation to matter from engaging in ex parte communications with a 
represented party. In other words, attorneys may continue to pursue unrelated business, and 
clients may consult with outside counsel. Model Rule 4.2, Comment [4]. 
 
In addition, Model Rule 4.2 only applies to attorneys. Nothing prevents represented persons 
from engaging in ex parte communications with each other. And if represented persons choose 
to communicate with each other, their attorneys may provide them with advice. “Parties to a 
matter may communicate directly with each other, and a lawyer is not prohibited from advising a 
client concerning a communication that the client is legally entitled to make.” Model Rule 4.2, 
Comment [4]. Indeed, attorneys can probably even advise their clients to engage in ex parte 
communications with represented parties. 
 
Rule 4.2: Communication with Person Represented by Counsel 
 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the 
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in 
the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do 
so by law or a court order. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99: A Represented Nonclient—The 
General Anti-Contact Rule 
 
1. A lawyer representing a client in a matter may not communicate about the subject of the 
representation with a nonclient whom the lawyer knows to be represented in the matter 
by another lawyer or with a representative of an organizational nonclient so represented 
as defined in § 100, unless: 
a. the communication is with a public officer or agency to the extent stated in § 101; 
b. the lawyer is a party and represents no other client in the matter; 
c. the communication is authorized by law; 
d. the communication reasonably responds to an emergency; or 
e. the other lawyer consents. 
2. Subsection (1) does not prohibit the lawyer from assisting the client in otherwise proper 
communication by the lawyer’s client with a represented nonclient. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 100: Definition of a Represented 
Nonclient 
 
Within the meaning of § 99, a represented nonclient includes: 
1. a natural person represented by a lawyer; and: 
2. a current employee or other agent of an organization represented by a lawyer: 
a. if the employee or other agent supervises, directs, or regularly consults with the 
lawyer concerning the matter or if the agent has power to compromise or settle 
the matter; 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 82	
b. if the acts or omissions of the employee or other agent may be imputed to the 
organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability in the matter; or 
c. if a statement of the employee or other agent, under applicable rules of evidence, 
would have the effect of binding the organization with respect to proof of the 
matter. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 101: A Represented Governmental 
Agency or Officer 
 
1. Unless otherwise provided by law (see § 99(1)(c)) and except as provided in Subsection 
(2), the prohibition stated in § 99 against contact with a represented nonclient does not 
apply to communications with employees of a represented governmental agency or with 
a governmental officer being represented in the officer's official capacity. 
2. In negotiation or litigation by a lawyer of a specific claim of a client against a 
governmental agency or against a governmental officer in the officer's official capacity, 
the prohibition stated in § 99 applies, except that the lawyer may contact any officer of 
the government if permitted by the agency or with respect to an issue of general policy. 
 
In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Haley, 126 P. 3d 1262 (Wash. 2006) 
 
Summary: Haley is appealing the recommendation of a Disciplinary Board proceeding 
that Haley be subject to a 6 month suspension for violating Rule 4.2(a). Haley filed a 
lawsuit against a CEO of his former employer, Highland, acting pro se. Highland was 
represented by various attorneys. Haley sent a letter to Highland proposing a settlement. 
Highland’s lawyer said the letter was a violation of Rule 4.2 and told Haley to not talk to 
Highland directly. Haley called Highland, appearing to tell him the legal status of his case 
and once again proposing settlement. This was an issue of first impression for the court 
and a split of among authorities. Haley argued that pro se lawyers should not be 
included in the scope of the rule because the lawyer has no client. The court held that a 
lawyer acting pro se is prohibited from contacting a party represented by counsel in the 
matter and applied the rule prospectively.  
 
OWENS, J. 
 
Attorney Jeffrey T. Haley appeals the recommendation of the Disciplinary Board of the 
Washington State Bar Association that Haley was subject to a six-month suspension for 
knowingly violating RPC 4.2(a), which provides that, “in representing a client, a lawyer shall not 
communicate with a party represented by another lawyer.” 
 
Although we hold that, under RPC 4.2(a), a lawyer acting pro se is prohibited from contacting a 
party represented by counsel in the matter, we apply our interpretation of RPC 4.2(a) 
prospectively only and dismiss the violation. 
 
FACTS 
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In 1994, Haley filed a lawsuit against Carl Highland, the former chief executive officer of a 
defunct closely held corporation, Coresoft, of which Haley was formerly a shareholder and 
board member. Initially, Haley acted pro se in the matter but hired counsel when the case went 
to trial in November 1995. After the trial ended, Haley’s counsel filed notice of withdrawal and 
Haley reverted to pro se status as to appeal and collection issues. Highland was represented by 
various attorneys at all times during this matter, and Haley knew that Highland was consistently 
represented by counsel. 
 
The hearing officer and Board concluded that Haley's improper contact with a represented party 
arose out of two incidents. First, while Haley was acting pro se after the trial, he sent a letter to 
Highland and his wife proposing settlement. The letter was dated September 9, 1996, and 
stated in full as follows: 
 
I am about to spend approximately $25,000 on costs and attorneys fees for the appeal. If 
the appeal is successful, the personal earnings of both Ronda Hull and Carl Highland 
will be subject to garnishment to satisfy my judgment and the judgment now held by Carl 
Highland will be overruled. Also, the amount I am about the [sic] spend on costs and 
attorneys fees will be added to the judgment. 
 
This is the last opportunity to settle the case before I spend the money on the appeal. 
This settlement offer will not be open after this week and may be withdrawn at any time if 
it is not promptly accepted. I am offering that all claims and judgments between the 
parties be releases [sic] with no payments. Please respond directly to me. 
 
Highland forwarded the letter to his attorney who, in turn, suggested to Haley that the letter 
constituted a violation of RPC 4.2(a) and warned him not to have any further contact with 
Highland. Second, on January 31, 1997, Haley again contacted Highland, this time by 
telephone. Haley left the following voice message on Highland’s phone: 
 
Carl, this is Jeff Haley. I hope your attorneys have told you Jim Bates decided that your 
judgment against me is collectable only from my separate assets and I have none; 
they're all community assets. And, therefore, your judgment is uncollectable [sic]. And 
the chance for appeal of that determination by Jim Bates has run so you can't appeal it 
so that if the appeal proceeds my position can only improve and yours can only get 
worse and if you have nothing collectable there’s no chance of ever getting anything 
collectable. It seems to me that we ought to settle this case and if we do so Monday 
there’ll be an opportunity on Monday to do so if you’re interested. Give me a call." 
 
In his "Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," the hearing officer stated that 
Haley’s letter and phone message were “clearly prohibited” by RPC 4.2(a), but he 
acknowledged that there was some authority supporting Haley's position that attorneys acting 
pro se are not subject to the prohibition. Ultimately, in his “Additional Findings of Fact, 
Application of Standards, and Recommendation,” the hearing officer determined that, “because 
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of the specific language of RPC 4.2 (i.e., ‘In representing a client’) and because of the apparent 
absence of authority within the state of Washington on this specific issue, Mr. Haley could have 
harbored a sincere belief that contacts with a represented opposing party were not prohibited.” 
Consequently, the hearing officer concluded that the violation was “negligent” and that the 
presumptive sanction was thus a reprimand. 
 
Deleting the hearing officer’s conclusion that Haley's violation was negligent, the Board 
substituted its contrary determination that “Haley's mental state was knowledge” and that the 
presumptive sanction was therefore a suspension. In doing so, the Board took note that Haley 
knew Highland was represented by counsel at all times and stated that a “reasonable reading of 
RPC 4.2 prohibits a lawyer, while representing himself or herself, from contacting a represented 
party.” The Board also faulted Haley for not “taking time to determine whether his conduct was 
an ethical violation.” 
 
The hearing officer recommended that Haley be reprimanded for the violation. The Board 
recommended a six-month suspension. 
 
Does RPC 4.2(a) prohibit a lawyer who is acting pro se from contacting a party who is 
represented by counsel? If so, should the rule be applied in the present case? 
 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability of RPC 4.2(a) to Lawyer Acting Pro Se. RPC 4.2(a) reads in full as follows: 
 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the 
representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the 
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to 
do so. 
 
The rule is virtually identical to model rule 4.2. While we have not formally adopted the 
commentary to the ABA Annotated Model Rules, we have noted that it “may be ‘instructive in 
exploring the underlying policy of the rules.’” As the comment to model rule 4.2 explains, the 
rule aims to protect those represented by counsel “against possible overreaching by other 
lawyers who are participating in the matter, interference by those lawyers with the client-lawyer 
relationship and the uncounselled disclosure of information relating to the representation.” In 
Carmick, we acknowledged that “the rule's purpose is to prevent situations in which a 
represented party is taken advantage of by adverse counsel.” 
 
At issue in the present case is whether RPC 4.2(a) applies to lawyers acting pro se — or, more 
precisely, whether a lawyer who is representing himself or herself is, in the words of RPC 4.2(a), 
“representing a client.” This court has not previously addressed this issue; nor has the WSBA 
issued an ethics opinion, formal or informal, on the question. Other jurisdictions that have 
considered the rule's applicability to lawyers acting pro se have generally concluded that the 
policies underlying the rule are better served by extending the restriction to lawyers acting pro 
se. 
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Haley asks this court to take the contrary view and hold that the plain meaning of the word 
“client” in RPC 4.2(a) precludes application of the rule to a lawyer acting pro se. The word 
“client” is variously defined as “a person or entity that employs a professional for advice or help 
in that professional’s line of work,” and “a person who engages the professional advice or 
services of another.” Thus, for the rule to apply to lawyers acting pro se, such lawyers would, in 
effect, be employing or engaging themselves for advice, help, or services. This, as Haley 
contends, suggests that lawyers who are acting pro se are excluded from the scope of the rule 
because such lawyers have no client. 
 
In the alternative, Haley maintains that, even if RPC 4.2(a) were construed to restrict pro se 
lawyers from contacting represented parties, we should conclude that the rule as applied to him, 
a lawyer proceeding pro se, was unconstitutionally vague, violating his constitutional due 
process rights. Such a resolution finds support in Schaefer. There, the Nevada State Supreme 
Court relied on the principle that “a statute or rule is impermissibly vague if it ‘either forbids or 
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’” The Schaefer court based its 
determination that Nevada’s Supreme Court Rule 182, a rule identical to RPC 4.2(a), was 
unconstitutionally vague on “the absence of clear guidance” from the Nevada State Supreme 
Court and on “the existence of conflicting authority from other jurisdictions.” 
 
Both factors relied on in Schaefer are present here. First, as noted above, no prior opinion of 
this court has addressed the application of RPC 4.2(a) to lawyers proceeding pro se. Second, in 
late 1996 and early 1997 when Haley contacted Highland, authority permitting such contacts 
counterbalanced the prohibitions then existing from four jurisdictions. The comment to rule 2-
100 of the California RPCs, a rule identical to RPC 4.2(a) in all material respects, explicitly 
permits a lawyer proceeding pro se to contact a represented party: 
 
The rule does not prohibit a lawyer who is also a party to a legal matter from directly or 
indirectly communicating on his or her own behalf with a represented party. Such a 
member has independent rights as a party which should not be abrogated because of 
his or her professional status. To prevent any possible abuse in such situations, the 
counsel for the opposing party may advise that party (1) about the risks and benefits of 
communications with a lawyer-party, and (2) not to accept or engage in communications 
with the lawyer-party. 
 
Likewise, a comment to the restatement specifically provides that “a lawyer representing his or 
her own interests pro se may communicate with an opposing represented nonclient on the same 
basis as other principals.” 
 
Alongside these explicit statements permitting the questioned contact, other authorities 
supported a reasonable inference that our RPC 4.2(a) did not foreclose a pro se lawyer’s 
communication with a represented opposing party. For example, the comparable rule in Oregon, 
DR 7-104(A)(1), put lawyers acting pro se squarely within the rule's ambit: 
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(A) During the course of the lawyer's representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: 
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate with a person the lawyer knows to 
be represented by a lawyer. This prohibition includes a lawyer representing the lawyer's 
own interests. 
 
The absence of an explicit prohibition in RPC 4.2(a) could have suggested that Washington’s 
rule was narrower in scope than Oregon’s and did not apply to lawyers acting pro se. 
Additionally, the commentary to model rule 4.2 includes the statement that “parties to a matter 
may communicate directly with each other.” Unlike the commentary to the restatement and to 
California's RPC 2-100, this comment does not pointedly refer to a lawyer-party acting pro se; 
consequently, the breadth of the statement permits an inference that all parties may 
communicate unreservedly with each other. Finally, the holding in Pinsky v. Statewide 
Grievance Committee, appears to call into question the policy concerns supporting the 
application of RPC 4.2(a) to lawyers acting pro se. In Pinsky, the Connecticut State Supreme 
Court concluded that a represented lawyer-party had not violated an identical version of RPC 
4.2(a) when he directly contacted his landlord, who was also represented by counsel, during an 
eviction matter. The Pinsky court took note that “contact between litigants is specifically 
authorized by the comments under rule 4.2” and concluded that Pinsky was not “representing a 
client” as stated in the rule. The Pinsky court thus determined that communication between a 
represented lawyer-party and a represented nonlawyer party did not conflict with a key purpose 
of RPC 4.2(a) — the protection of a represented nonlawyer party from “possible overreaching 
by other lawyers who are participating in the matter.” Because the Pinsky decision did not 
address why contacts from a lawyer acting pro se would pose a greater threat of overreaching 
than would contacts from a represented lawyer-party, Pinsky provides further equivocal 
authority on the application of RPC 4.2(a) to lawyers acting pro se. 
 
In sum, consistent with the resolution of the same issue in Schaefer, we hold that a lawyer 
acting pro se is “representing a client” for purposes of RPC 4.2(a), but given the absence of a 
prior decision from this court, along with the presence of conflicting or equivocal authority from 
other jurisdictions and legal commentaries, we find the rule impermissibly vague as to its 
applicability to pro se attorneys and thus apply our interpretation of the rule prospectively only. 
We therefore dismiss the violation alleged in count 2. We need not reach Haley’s alternative 
contention that the application of RPC 4.2(a) to his communications with Highland violated his 
free speech rights. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We hold that RPC 4.2(a) prohibits a lawyer who is representing his own interests in a matter 
from contacting another party whom he knows to be represented by counsel. However, because 
we conclude that RPC 4.2(a) was impermissibly vague as applied to Haley, we apply our 
interpretation of RPC 4.2(a) prospectively only and thus dismiss. 
 
C.JOHNSON, BRIDGE, CHAMBERS, and J.M. JOHNSON, JJ, concur. 
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MADSEN, J. (concurring). 
 
I agree with part one of Justice Sanders’ concurrence. This court currently has a new set of 
RPCs pending before it. Because I agree with the majority that the better policy is to include 
self-represented lawyers within the prohibition of RPC 4.2(a), I would revise that rule in 
conjunction with the review of the RPCs and avoid the issue of prospectivity. 
 
SANDERS, J. (concurring). 
 
The majority holds that self-represented lawyers are “representing a client” under RPC 4.2(a) 
and therefore may not contact a represented party. But it refrains from sanctioning Haley, 
implicitly holding that the scope of RPC 4.2(a) is ambiguous. I concur only in the result, because 
the majority incorrectly construes RPC 4.2(a). The plain language of RPC 4.2(a) exempts self-
represented lawyers. And the rule of lenity requires strict and narrow construction of an 
ambiguous penal statute. We must apply RPC 4.2(a) prospectively just as we apply it today. 
 
I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF RPC 4.2(A) PERMITS SELF-REPRESENTED LAWYERS TO 
CONTACT REPRESENTED PARTIES 
 
Court rules like the Code of Professional Responsibility “are subject to the same principles of 
construction as are statutes.” Thus, when interpreting a rule we give “the words their ordinary 
meaning, reading the language as a whole and seeking to give effect to all of it.” If the plain 
language of the rule is unambiguous, additional interpretation is unnecessary. 
 
The plain language of RPC 4.2(a) unambiguously exempts self-represented lawyers. “In 
representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation 
with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the 
lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.” A “client” is “a 
person who consults or engages the services of a legal advisor,” or a “person or entity that 
employs a professional for advice or help in that professional's line of work.” In other words, a 
“client” is a third party who engages a lawyer. Because self-represented lawyers have no client, 
under RPC 4.2(a) they may contact a represented party. 
 
The majority concedes that RPC 4.2(a) applies only when a lawyer is “representing a client” but 
nonetheless construes it to cover self-represented lawyers. Apparently, the majority concludes 
that self-represented lawyers are “employing or engaging themselves for advice, help, or 
services.” 
 
This ingenious bit of legal fiction illustrates the wisdom of avoiding interpretations “conceivable 
in the metaphysical sense” when the plain language of a statute “is both necessary and 
sufficient.” Assuming that a self-represented lawyer represents a “client” certainly produces the 
majority’s preferred outcome. Unfortunately, it does so only at the expense of coherence. 
Lawyers cannot retain themselves any more than pro se litigants can claim legal malpractice or 
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ineffective assistance of counsel. Undoubtedly, wise lawyers follow their own counsel. But it is a 
neat trick indeed to advise oneself. 
 
The majority’s claim to follow an emerging majority rule is unavailing. Indeed, it cites decisions 
from six states concluding that self-represented lawyers are their own clients. But none offers 
any more convincing a rationale for this curious conclusion than the majority. Conclusory 
statements cannot substitute for legal reasoning, and another court’s error cannot justify our 
own. 
 
Likewise, the majority’s reliance on the “purpose” of RPC 4.2(a) is misplaced. As the author of 
the court rules, we are “in a position to reveal the actual meaning which was sought to be 
conveyed.” But in the interest of certainty and consistency, we approach them “as though they 
had been drafted by the Legislature.” Whatever the purpose of RPC 4.2(a), it cannot extend to 
persons and actions its plain language excludes. We may not expand the scope of a rule by fiat. 
If we conclude that self-represented lawyers should not contact represented parties, we should 
simply rewrite the rule to clearly prohibit that conduct. Other states have already done so. 
Lawyers should not have to read slip opinions to divine their professional obligations. 
 
II. THE RULE OF LENITY REQUIRES A CONSTRUCTION OF RPC 4.2(A) EXEMPTING 
SELF-REPRESENTED LAWYERS 
 
Even assuming that the plain language of RPC 4.2(a) is somehow ambiguous, the rule of lenity 
requires a strict and narrow construction exempting self-represented lawyers. The rule of lenity 
is a venerable canon of statutory interpretation, requiring courts “to interpret ambiguous criminal 
statutes in the defendant's favor.” While the Rules of Professional Conduct are only “quasi-
criminal,” the rule of lenity applies to both criminal and quasi-criminal statutes. The deciding 
factor is the nature of the sanction imposed. 
 
As a general rule, courts apply the rule of lenity to any statute imposing penal sanctions. "We 
are mindful of the maxim that penal statutes should be strictly construed." A statute is penal if it 
“can be punished by imprisonment and/or a fine” and remedial if it “provides for the remission of 
penalties and affords a remedy for the enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries.” 
 
The Rules of Professional Conduct are penal because they concern punishing an offender, not 
compensating a victim. Professional discipline “is punitive, unavoidably so, despite the fact that 
it is not designed for that purpose.” While the “purpose of disciplining an attorney is not primarily 
to punish the wrongdoer,” punishment is an important purpose — and a necessary 
consequence — of professional discipline. 
 
Courts have long recognized that disbarment is “penal in its nature” and subject to the rule of 
lenity. The same holds for all other sanctions. “Because attorney suspension is a quasi-criminal 
punishment in character, any disciplinary rules used to impose this sanction on attorneys must 
be strictly construed resolving ambiguities in favor of the person charged.” 
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In his dissent, Chief Justice Alexander suggests that the Rules of Professional Conduct can 
tolerate a degree of vagueness. But RPC 4.2(a) is not vague. It is ambiguous. And the Rules of 
Professional Conduct certainly cannot tolerate ambiguity. 
 
A statute is ambiguous if it “refers to P, P can alternatively encompass either a or b, and it is 
beyond dispute that the defendant did a” and vague if it “refers to X, but we cannot tell whether 
the disputed event is an X.” No one disputes what Haley did: While representing himself, he 
contacted a represented party. The only question is whether the term “representing a client” 
encompasses self-represented lawyers, as well as lawyers representing third parties. And if the 
term “representing a client” is “susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning,” it is 
ambiguous. 
 
Courts routinely apply the rule of lenity to ambiguous statutes. And the rule of lenity is peculiarly 
appropriate to the Rules of Professional Conduct. We have recognized that “in a disciplinary 
proceeding, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the attorney.” Because lawyers “are 
subject to professional discipline only for acts that are described as prohibited in an applicable 
lawyer code, statute, or rule of court,” courts “should be circumspect in avoiding overbroad 
readings or resorting to standards other than those fairly encompassed within an applicable 
lawyer code.” Application of the rule of lenity reflects that caution. It demands that we adopt the 
stricter, narrower construction, excluding self-represented lawyers. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
The majority objects to the plain language of RPC 4.2(a) only because it believes that permitting 
self-represented lawyers to contact represented parties would violate the “purpose” of the rule. 
But the putative “spirit and intent” of a rule can trump only a “strained and unlikely” 
interpretation. And the plain language of RPC 4.2(a) is neither strained nor unlikely. It prohibits a 
lawyer representing a client — but not a self-represented lawyer — from contacting a 
represented party. As the majority concedes, several commentators and courts have found the 
plain language of essentially identical rules entirely unambiguous. We must not manufacture 
ambiguity and rely on legal fictions to arrive at a preferred result. Especially when we may 
simply write that result into law. 
 
I therefore concur in result. 
 
ALEXANDER, C.J. (dissenting). 
 
I agree with the majority that RPC 4.2(a) prohibits lawyers who are representing themselves 
from communicating directly with opposing, represented parties unless they first obtain the 
consent of the parties' counsel. I disagree, however, with the majority’s decision to limit 
application of this important rule to future violators. I know of no authority that supports 
imposition of a rule of professional conduct prospectively only. I believe, therefore, that this 
court should suspend Jeffrey Haley from the practice of law for his violation of RPC 4.2(a). The 
violation is especially egregious in light of Haley’s claim that he “studied the rule” before directly 
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contacting his opposing party, and in view of the fact that he contacted the party a second time 
after the party's lawyer warned him that doing so would violate RPC 4.2(a). Because the 
majority concludes that Haley should not be subjected to discipline for a violation of RPC 4.2(a), 
I dissent. 
 
The majority correctly observes that among states considering the question with which we are 
here presented, the prevailing trend has been to apply RPC 4.2(a) to attorneys acting pro se, as 
was Haley, and not just to attorneys representing someone other than themselves. The majority 
acknowledges, additionally, that in late 1996 and early 1997, when Haley twice attempted to 
negotiate a settlement without going through the opposing party's lawyer, at least four 
jurisdictions already had concluded that RPC 4.2(a) prohibited such contacts. Yet none of the 
four jurisdictions mentioned by the majority applied the rule to pro se attorneys on a prospective 
basis only, as the majority does here. Rather, all four jurisdictions applied the rule to the facts 
before them, as this court should do. These four opinions, all cited by the majority, are sound 
and make it clear that at the time Haley engaged in the prohibited conduct, the weight of 
authority supported the disciplining of violators and did not even hint at the prospective-only 
application embraced by the majority in this case. In shielding Haley from application of RPC 
4.2(a), the majority borrows from the reasoning of the Nevada Supreme Court in In re Discipline 
of Schaefer. There, the Nevada court declined to punish an attorney's violation of the Nevada 
equivalent of RPC 4.2(a) because of: (a) the “absence of clear guidance” from the court, and (b) 
“conflicting authority from other jurisdictions” as to whether the rule applied to pro se attorneys. 
In effect, the majority establishes a new test: if there is any doubt about how a rule will be 
construed, a violator will not be punished. That is a dangerous message to send. 
 
Furthermore, whereas the Schaefer court relied on due process principles articulated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Connally in applying the Nevada rule prospectively, it is worth 
noting that this court has never drawn from Connally the proposition that discipline is 
inappropriate just because a rule is being interpreted for the first time. In fact, in Haley v. 
Medical Disciplinary Board, the only discipline case in which this court cited Connally, we 
affirmed sanctions against a physician for violating a statute prohibiting “moral turpitude” 
although we recognized “uncertainties associated with” the statutory language in question. 
Thus, this court has previously declined to interpret Connally in the way the Nevada court did in 
Schaefer and the majority does here — as if professional license holders have a due process 
right to avoid discipline simply because a court is newly construing the rule in question. Such an 
interpretation will have far-reaching impact, as many discipline cases that come before this court 
raise an issue of construction. In declining to sanction Haley for violating RPC 4.2(a), despite 
the fact that Haley had “studied” the rule and should have known that the prevailing construction 
prohibited his conduct, the majority suggests that questionable conduct will be tolerated as long 
as there is no prior Washington court decision exactly on point. 
 
We must remember that our purpose in disciplining attorneys is to “protect the public and to 
preserve confidence in the legal system.” In Curran, an attorney argued that he should not be 
punished for violating RLD 1.1(a) because, in forbidding actions that reflect “disregard for the 
rule of law,” the rule was unconstitutionally vague. This court said, “We choose to give these 
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words a narrowing construction. This law is not so vague as to be unconstitutional, given this 
limiting construction.” We noted that “a statute will not be considered unconstitutionally vague 
just because it is difficult to determine whether certain marginal offenses are within the meaning 
of the language under attack.” This court suspended the attorney, Curran, saying, “Standards 
may be used in lawyer disciplinary cases which would be impermissibly vague in other 
contexts.” Just as we disciplined Curran there, despite uncertainty about the rule in question, so 
should Haley be disciplined for violating RPC 4.2(a) in order to “protect the public and to 
preserve confidence in the legal system.” 
 
Curran also weighs against the position taken by Justice Sanders in his concurring opinion that 
attorney discipline is a punishment scheme and therefore is subject to the rule of lenity — a 
criminal law doctrine. We said in that case, “The purposes of bar discipline do not precisely 
duplicate the purposes of the criminal law.” More notably, we have said numerous times that 
“punishment is not a proper basis for discipline.” In In re Disbarment of Beakley, we said: 
 
Neither disbarment nor suspension is ordered for the purpose of punishment, but wholly 
for the protection of the public. When a matter such as this comes before the court, the 
question presented is not: What punishment should be inflicted on this man? The 
question presented to each of its judges is simply this: Can I, in view of what has been 
clearly shown as to this man's conduct, conscientiously participate in continuing to hold 
him out to the public as worthy of that confidence which a client is compelled to repose 
in his attorney? 
 
Thus, this court has long rejected the notion that attorney discipline is penal, and the 
concurrence cannot point to any discipline case in which we have applied the rule of lenity to 
resolve ambiguity in the attorney's favor. 
 
In sum, because the purpose of attorney discipline is to protect the public, it is our duty to 
enforce RPC 4.2(a) in this case. The majority provides no authority for applying RPC 4.2(a) to 
pro se attorneys prospectively only. I would apply the rule to Haley and suspend him for six 
months. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. What is the purpose of Model Rule 4.2 and its prohibition on attorneys engaging in ex 
parte communications with represented persons? Is it intended to protect clients or their 
attorneys? 
2. Why don’t the model rules prohibit clients from engaging in ex parte communications? 
Should ex parte communications between represented persons be encouraged, 
discouraged, or neither? 
3. Haley retained counsel when the action at issue went to trial. If he had engaged in ex 
parte communications with Highland while represented by an attorney, would it have 
violated Model Rule 4.2? Should attorneys who are parties to an action and represented 
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by counsel be permitted to engage in ex parte communications with represented 
persons? What if both parties are attorneys represented by counsel? 
 
Niesig v. Team, 76 N.Y.2d 363 (N.Y. 1990) 
 
Summary: Plaintiff was injured when he fell from a scaffolding at a building construction 
site, and is now suing his employer DeTrae. Plaintiff moved for his lawyer to be able to 
conduct ex parte interviews with employees of DeTrae that were present at the time of 
the accident. Plaintiff argued the employees were not managing or controlling 
employees and could therefore be interviewed. DeTrae argued the rule applies to all 
employees, citing Upjohn. The court reversed the lower court and held that an employee 
of a corporation is a “party” for the purpose of ex parte communications only if the 
employee’s actions bind the corporation in the matter or the employee implements the 
advice of counsel. 
 
KAYE, J. 
 
Plaintiff in this personal injury litigation, wishing to have his counsel privately interview a 
corporate defendant’s employees who witnessed the accident, puts before us a question that 
has generated wide interest: are the employees of a corporate party also considered “parties” 
under Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits a 
lawyer from communicating directly with a “party” known to have counsel in the matter? The trial 
court and the Appellate Division both answered that an employee of a counseled corporate 
party in litigation is by definition also a “party” within the rule, and prohibited the interviews. For 
reasons of policy, we disagree. 
 
As alleged in the complaint, plaintiff was injured when he fell from scaffolding at a building 
construction site. At the time of the accident he was employed by DeTrae Enterprises, Inc.; 
defendant J.M. Frederick was the general contractor, and defendant Team I the property owner. 
Plaintiff thereafter commenced a damages action against defendants, asserting two causes of 
action, and defendants brought a third-party action against DeTrae. 
 
Plaintiff moved for permission to have his counsel conduct ex parte interviews of all DeTrae 
employees who were on the site at the time of the accident, arguing that these witnesses to the 
event were neither managerial nor controlling employees and could not therefore be considered 
“personal synonyms for DeTrae.” DeTrae opposed the application, asserting that the disciplinary 
rule barred unapproved contact by plaintiff’s lawyer with any of its employees. Supreme Court 
denied plaintiff's request, and the Appellate Division modified by limiting the ban to DeTrae’s 
current employees. 
 
The Appellate Division concluded, for theoretical as well as practical reasons, that current 
employees of a corporate defendant in litigation “are presumptively within the scope of the 
representation afforded by the attorneys who appeared in the litigation on behalf of that 
corporation.” The court held that DeTrae’s attorneys have an attorney-client relationship with 
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every DeTrae employee connected with the subject of the litigation, and that the prohibition is 
necessitated by the practical difficulties of distinguishing between a corporation’s control group 
and its other employees. The court further noted that the information sought from employee 
witnesses could instead be obtained through their depositions. 
 
In the main we disagree with the Appellate Division’s conclusions. However, because we agree 
with the holding that DR 7-104(A)(1) applies only to current employees, not to former 
employees, we modify rather than reverse its order, and grant plaintiff's motion to allow the 
interviews. 
 
We begin our analysis by noting that what is at issue is a disciplinary rule, not a statute. In 
interpreting statutes, which are the enactments of a coequal branch of government and an 
expression of the public policy of this State, we are of course bound to implement the will of the 
Legislature; statutes are to be applied as they are written or interpreted to effectuate the 
legislative intention. The disciplinary rules have a different provenance and purpose. Approved 
by the New York State Bar Association and then enacted by the Appellate Divisions, the Code 
of Professional Responsibility is essentially the legal profession’s document of self-governance, 
embodying principles of ethical conduct for attorneys as well as rules for professional discipline. 
While unquestionably important, and respected by the courts, the code does not have the force 
of law. 
 
That distinction is particularly significant when a disciplinary rule is invoked in litigation, which in 
addition to matters of professional conduct by attorneys, implicates the interests of nonlawyers. 
In such instances, we are not constrained to read the rules literally or effectuate the intent of the 
drafters, but look to the rules as guidelines to be applied with due regard for the broad range of 
interests at stake. “When we agree that the Code applies in an equitable manner to a matter 
before us, we should not hesitate to enforce it with vigor. When we find an area of uncertainty, 
however, we must use our judicial process to make our own decision in the interests of justice to 
all concerned.” 
 
DR 7-104(A)(1), which can be traced to the American Bar Association Canons of 1908, 
fundamentally embodies principles of fairness. “The general thrust of the rule is to prevent 
situations in which a represented party may be taken advantage of by adverse counsel; the 
presence of the party’s attorney theoretically neutralizes the contact.” By preventing lawyers 
from deliberately dodging adversary counsel to reach — and exploit — the client alone, DR 7-
104(A)(1) safeguards against clients making improvident settlements, ill-advised disclosures 
and unwarranted concessions. 
 
There is little problem applying DR 7-104(A)(1) to individuals in civil cases. In that context, the 
meaning of “party” is ordinarily plain enough: it refers to the individuals, not to their agents and 
employees. The question, however, becomes more difficult when the parties are corporations — 
as evidenced by a wealth of commentary, and controversy, on the issue. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 94	
The difficulty is not in whether DR 7-104(A)(1) applies to corporations. It unquestionably covers 
corporate parties, who are as much served by the rule’s fundamental principles of fairness as 
individual parties. But the rule does not define “party,” and its reach in this context is unclear. In 
litigation only the entity, not its employee, is the actual named party; on the other hand, 
corporations act solely through natural persons, and unless some employees are also 
considered parties, corporations are effectively read out of the rule. The issue therefore distills 
to which corporate employees should be deemed parties for purposes of DR 7-104(A)(1), and 
that choice is one of policy. The broader the definition of “party” in the interests of fairness to the 
corporation, the greater the cost in terms of foreclosing vital informal access to facts. 
 
The many courts, bar associations and commentators that have balanced the competing 
considerations have evolved various tests, each claiming some adherents, each with some 
imperfection. At one extreme is the blanket rule adopted by the Appellate Division and urged by 
defendants, and at the other is the “control group” test — both of which we reject. The first is too 
broad and the second too narrow. 
 
Defendants’ principal argument for the blanket rule — correlating the corporate “party” and all of 
its employees — rests on Upjohn v United States. As the Supreme Court recognized, a 
corporation’s attorney-client privilege includes communications with low- and mid-level 
employees; defendants argue that the existence of an attorney-client privilege also signifies an 
attorney-client relationship for purposes of DR 7-104(A)(1). 
 
Upjohn, however, addresses an entirely different subject, with policy objectives that have little 
relation to the question whether a corporate employee should be considered a “party” for 
purposes of the disciplinary rule. First, the privilege applies only to confidential communications 
with counsel, it does not immunize the underlying factual information — which is in issue here 
— from disclosure to an adversary. Second, the attorney-client privilege serves the societal 
objective of encouraging open communication between client and counsel, a benefit not present 
in denying informal access to factual information. Thus, a corporate employee who may be a 
“client” for purposes of the attorney-client privilege is not necessarily a “party” for purposes of 
DR 7-104(A)(1). 
 
The single indisputable advantage of a blanket preclusion — as with every absolute rule — is 
that it is clear. No lawyer need ever risk disqualification or discipline because of uncertainty as 
to which employees are covered by the rule and which not. The problem, however, is that a ban 
of this nature exacts a high price in terms of other values, and is unnecessary to achieve the 
objectives of DR 7-104(A)(1). 
 
Most significantly, the Appellate Division’s blanket rule closes off avenues of informal discovery 
of information that may serve both the litigants and the entire justice system by uncovering 
relevant facts, thus promoting the expeditious resolution of disputes. Foreclosing all direct, 
informal interviews of employees of the corporate party unnecessarily sacrifices the long-
recognized potential value of such sessions. “A lawyer talks to a witness to ascertain what, if 
any, information the witness may have relevant to his theory of the case, and to explore the 
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witness’ knowledge, memory and opinion — frequently in light of information counsel may have 
developed from other sources. This is part of an attorney's so-called work product.” Costly 
formal depositions that may deter litigants with limited resources, or even somewhat less formal 
and costly interviews attended by adversary counsel, are no substitute for such off-the-record 
private efforts to learn and assemble, rather than perpetuate, information. 
 
Nor, in our view, is it necessary to shield all employees from informal interviews in order to 
safeguard the corporation’s interest. Informal encounters between a lawyer and an employee-
witness are not — as a blanket ban assumes — invariably calculated to elicit unwitting 
admissions; they serve long-recognized values in the litigation process. Moreover, the corporate 
party has significant protection at hand. It has possession of its own information and unique 
access to its documents and employees; the corporation's lawyer thus has the earliest and best 
opportunity to gather the facts, to elicit information from employees, and to counsel and prepare 
them so that they will not make the feared improvident disclosures that engendered the rule. 
 
We fully recognize that, as the Appellate Division observed, every rule short of the absolute 
poses practical difficulties as to where to draw the line, and leaves some uncertainty as to which 
employees fall on either side of it. Nonetheless, we conclude that the values served by 
permitting access to relevant information require that an effort be made to strike a balance, and 
that uncertainty can be minimized if not eliminated by a clear test that will become even clearer 
in practice. 
 
We are not persuaded, however, that the “control group” test — defining “party” to include only 
the most senior management exercising substantial control over the corporation — achieves 
that goal. Unquestionably, that narrow (though still uncertain) definition of corporate “party” 
better serves the policy of promoting open access to relevant information. But that test gives 
insufficient regard to the principles motivating DR 7-104(A)(1), and wholly overlooks the fact that 
corporate employees other than senior management also can bind the corporation. The “control 
group” test all but “nullifies the benefits of the disciplinary rule to corporations.” Given the 
practical and theoretical problems posed by the “control group” test, it is hardly surprising that 
few courts or bar associations have ever embraced it. 
 
By the same token, we find unsatisfactory several of the proposed intermediate tests, because 
they give too little guidance, or otherwise seem unworkable. In this category are the case-by-
case balancing test, and a test that defines “party” to mean corporate employees only when 
they are interviewed about matters within the scope of their employment. 
 
The test that best balances the competing interests, and incorporates the most desirable 
elements of the other approaches, is one that defines “party” to include corporate employees 
whose acts or omissions in the matter under inquiry are binding on the corporation (in effect, the 
corporation’s “alter egos”) or imputed to the corporation for purposes of its liability, or employees 
implementing the advice of counsel. All other employees may be interviewed informally. 
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Unlike a blanket ban or a “control group” test, this solution is specifically targeted at the problem 
addressed by DR 7-104(A)(1). The potential unfair advantage of extracting concessions and 
admissions from those who will bind the corporation is negated when employees with “speaking 
authority” for the corporation, and employees who are so closely identified with the interests of 
the corporate party as to be indistinguishable from it, are deemed “parties” for purposes of DR 
7-104(A)(1). Concern for the protection of the attorney-client privilege prompts us also to include 
in the definition of “party” the corporate employees responsible for actually effectuating the 
advice of counsel in the matter. 
 
In practical application, the test we adopt thus would prohibit direct communication by adversary 
counsel “with those officials, but only those, who have the legal power to bind the corporation in 
the matter or who are responsible for implementing the advice of the corporation's lawyer, or 
any member of the organization whose own interests are directly at stake in a representation.” 
This test would permit direct access to all other employees, and specifically — as in the present 
case — it would clearly permit direct access to employees who were merely witnesses to an 
event for which the corporate employer is sued. 
 
Apart from striking the correct balance, this test should also become relatively clear in 
application. It is rooted in developed concepts of the law of evidence and the law of agency, 
thereby minimizing the uncertainty facing lawyers about to embark on employee interviews. A 
similar test, moreover, is the one overwhelmingly adopted by courts and bar associations 
throughout the country, whose long practical experience persuades us that — in day-to-day 
operation — it is workable. 
 
Finally, we note the particular contribution made by the various amici curiae in this case; by 
highlighting the diverse contexts in which the question may arise, their submissions have 
enlarged our comprehension of the broad potential impact of the issue presented. In so doing, 
however, they have also alerted us to the wisdom of flagging what is in any event implicit in our 
decisions — that they are limited by the facts before us and the questions put to us. Today’s 
decision resolves the present controversy by allowing ex parte interviews with nonmanagerial 
witnesses employed by a corporate defendant; even in that limited context, we recognize that 
there are undoubtedly questions not raised by the parties that will yet have to be answered. 
Defendants’ assertions that ex parte interviews should not be permitted because of the dangers 
of overreaching, moreover, impel us to add the cautionary note that, while we have not been 
called upon to consider questions relating to the actual conduct of such interviews, it is of 
course assumed that attorneys would make their identity and interest known to interviewees and 
comport themselves ethically. 
 
Questions: 
 
 
Further Reading: 
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● John Leubsdorf, Communicating with Another Lawyer’s Client: The Lawyer’s Veto and 
the Client’s Interests, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 683 (1979) 
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2.6: Attorney’s Fees 
 
Attorney’s Fees 
 
If you’ve got the money, I’ve got the time. We’ll go honky tonkin’ and we'll have a time … But if 
you run short of money, I’ll run short of time. ‘Cause you with no more money, honey, I’ve no 
more time.25 
 
Attorneys can only charge a reasonable fee for their services. But the reasonableness of an 
attorney’s fee depends on the circumstances. Main Street lawyers and Wall Street lawyers can 
and do charge very different fees for their services. And contingent fees necessarily reflect the 
risk of failure. 
 
In theory, state bar associations are supposed to ensure that attorneys charge reasonable fees. 
But in practice, they are reluctant to question attorney’s fee agreements. In fact, contract law 
may protect clients from excessive fees more effectively than the rules of professional 
responsibility. 
 
Model Rule 1.5: Fees 
 
a. A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an 
unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the 
reasonableness of a fee include the following: 
1. the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, 
and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 
2. the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular 
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
3. the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 
4. the amount involved and the results obtained; 
5. the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 
6. the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
7. the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the 
services; and 
8. whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
b. The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which 
the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, 
before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when 
the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any 
changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the 
client. 
c. A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, 
except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. 
																																																								
25 Lefty Frizzell, If You've Got The Money I've Got The Time (1950). 
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A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client and shall state the 
method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages 
that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal; litigation and 
other expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and whether such expenses are to be 
deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. The agreement must clearly 
notify the client of any expenses for which the client will be liable whether or not the 
client is the prevailing party. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall 
provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there 
is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination. 
d. A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect: 
1. any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is 
contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or 
support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or 
2. a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case. 
e. A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if: 
1. the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each 
lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; 
2. the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will 
receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and 
3. the total fee is reasonable. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 34: Reasonable and Lawful Fees 
 
A lawyer may not charge a fee larger than is reasonable in the circumstances or that is 
prohibited by law. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 35: Contingent-Fee Arrangements 
 
1. A lawyer may contract with a client for a fee the size or payment of which is contingent 
on the outcome of a matter, unless the contract violates § 34 or another provision of this 
Restatement or the size or payment of the fee is: 
a. contingent on success in prosecuting or defending a criminal proceeding; or 
b. contingent on a specified result in a divorce proceeding or a proceeding 
concerning custody of a child. 
2. Unless the contract construed in the circumstances indicates otherwise, when a lawyer 
has contracted for a contingent fee, the lawyer is entitled to receive the specified fee 
only when and to the extent the client receives payment. 
 
Matter of Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1994) 
 
Summary: The Grievance Committee initiated a disciplinary proceeding against 
Cooperman for 15 violations of professional misconduct. Cooperman uses three 
separate agreements: the first is a written fee agreement to represent an individual in a 
criminal matter (a $15,000 minimum fee). The second is a written agreement in 
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connection with a probate proceeding (a $5,000 minimum fee to act as counsel). The 
final agreement also involved a criminal matter (a $10,000 minimum fee). The court 
found that an attorney using special non-refundable retainer fee agreements in advance 
of service and irrespective of whether any professional services are actually rendered 
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility because the agreements were a per se 
violation of New York public policy. 
 
BELLACOSA, J. 
 
The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant attorney violated the Code of Professional 
Responsibility by repeatedly using special nonrefundable retainer fee agreements with his 
clients. Essentially, such arrangements are marked by the payment of a nonrefundable fee for 
specific services, in advance and irrespective of whether any professional services are actually 
rendered. The local Grievance Committee twice warned the lawyer that he should not use these 
agreements. After a third complaint and completion of prescribed grievance proceedings, the 
Appellate Division suspended the lawyer from practice for two years. It held that the particular 
agreements were per se violative of public policy. We affirm the order of the Appellate Division. 
 
I. 
 
In 1990, the petitioner, Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District, initiated a 
disciplinary proceeding charging attorney Cooperman with 15 specifications of professional 
misconduct. They relate to his use of three special nonrefundable retainer fee agreements. 
 
The first five charges derive from a written fee agreement to represent an individual in a criminal 
matter. It states: “My minimum fee for appearing for you in this matter is Fifteen Thousand 
($15,000.00) Dollars. This fee is not refundable for any reason whatsoever once I file a notice of 
appearance on your behalf.” One month after the agreement, the lawyer was discharged by the 
client and refused to refund any portion of the fee. The client filed a formal complaint which the 
Grievance Committee forwarded to Cooperman for a response. Cooperman had already 
received a Letter of Caution not to use nonrefundable retainer agreements, and while this new 
complaint was pending, Cooperman was issued a second Letter of Caution admonishing him 
not to accept the kind of fee arrangement at issue here. He rejected the admonition, claiming 
the fee was nonrefundable. 
 
Charges 6 through 10 refer to a written retainer agreement in connection with a probate 
proceeding. It states in pertinent part: “For the MINIMAL FEE and NON-REFUNDABLE amount 
of Five Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars, I will act as your counsel.” The agreement further 
provided: “This is the minimum fee no matter how much or how little work I do in this 
investigatory stage and will remain the minimum fee and not refundable even if you decide prior 
to my completion of the investigation that you wish to discontinue the use of my services for any 
reason whatsoever.” The client discharged Cooperman, who refused to provide the client with 
an itemized bill of services rendered or refund any portion of the fee, citing the unconditional 
nonrefundable fee agreement. 
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The last five charges relate to a fee agreement involving another criminal matter. It provides: 
“The MINIMUM FEE for Mr. Cooperman's representation to any extent whatsoever is Ten 
Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars. The above amount is the MINIMUM FEE and will remain the 
minimum fee no matter how few court appearances are made. The minimum fee will remain the 
same even if Mr. Cooperman is discharged.” Two days after execution of the fee agreement, the 
client discharged Cooperman and demanded a refund. As with the other clients, he demurred. 
 
Cooperman’s persistent refusals to refund any portion of the fees sparked at least three 
separate client complaints to the Grievance Committee. In each case, Cooperman answered 
the complaint but refused the Grievance Committee’s suggestion for fee arbitration. Thereafter, 
the Grievance Committee sought authorization from the Appellate Division, Second Department, 
to initiate formal disciplinary proceedings against Cooperman. It tendered an array of arguments 
that these retainer agreements are unethical because, first, they violate the lawyer’s obligation 
to “refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned.” Further, the 
agreements create “an impermissible chilling effect upon the client’s inherent right upon public 
policy grounds to discharge the attorney at any time with or without cause.” The petition also 
alleged that the fees charged by Cooperman were excessive, and that he wrongfully refused to 
refund unearned fees. Finally, it notes that denominating the fee payment as nonrefundable 
constitutes misrepresentation. 
 
After an extensive hearing, the Referee made findings supporting violations on all 15 charges. 
On appropriate motion, the Appellate Division confirmed the Referee’s report with respect to 
charges 2 through 5, 7 through 10, and 12 through 15. The Court disaffirmed the report as to 
charges 1, 6 and 11, which alleged that the retainer agreements constituted deceit and 
misrepresentation. In sustaining the remaining charges, the Court held that these retainer 
agreements were unethical and unconscionable and “violative of an attorney’s obligations under 
the Code of Professional Responsibility to refund unearned fees upon his or her discharge.” The 
Court also concluded that Cooperman’s fees were excessive. The Court suspended him from 
the practice of law for a period of two years but did not order restitution. 
 
II. 
 
Whether special nonrefundable retainer fee agreements are against public policy is a question 
we left open in Jacobson v. Sassower, a fee dispute case. We agree with the Appellate Division 
in this disciplinary matter that special nonrefundable retainer fee agreements clash with public 
policy and transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, essentially because 
these fee agreements compromise the client’s absolute right to terminate the unique fiduciary 
attorney-client relationship. 
 
The particular analysis begins with a reflection on the nature of the attorney-client relationship. 
Sir Francis Bacon observed, “the greatest trust between people is the trust of giving counsel.” 
This unique fiduciary reliance, stemming from people hiring attorneys to exercise professional 
judgment on a client’s behalf — “giving counsel” — is imbued with ultimate trust and confidence. 
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The attorney’s obligations, therefore, transcend those prevailing in the commercial marketplace. 
The duty to deal fairly, honestly and with undivided loyalty superimposes onto the attorney-client 
relationship a set of special and unique duties, including maintaining confidentiality, avoiding 
conflicts of interest, operating competently, safeguarding client property and honoring the 
client’s interests over the lawyer’s. To the public and clients, few features could be more 
paramount than the fee — the costs of legal services. The Code of Professional Responsibility 
reflects this central ingredient by specifically mandating, without exception, that an attorney 
“shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or excessive fee,” and upon 
withdrawal from employment “shall refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has 
not been earned.” Accordingly, attorney-client fee agreements are a matter of special concern to 
the courts and are enforceable and affected by lofty principles different from those applicable to 
commonplace commercial contracts. 
 
Because the attorney-client relationship is recognized as so special and so sensitive in our 
society, its effectiveness, actually and perceptually, may be irreparably impaired by conduct 
which undermines the confidence of the particular client or the public in general. In recognition 
of this indispensable desideratum and as a precaution against the corrosive potentiality from 
failing to foster trust, public policy recognizes a client's right to terminate the attorney-client 
relationship at any time with or without cause. This principle was effectively enunciated in Martin 
v. Camp: “The contract under which an attorney is employed by a client has peculiar and 
distinctive features thus notwithstanding the fact that the employment of an attorney by a client 
is governed by the contract which the parties make the client with or without cause may 
terminate the contract at any time.” 
 
The unqualified right to terminate the attorney-client relationship at any time has been 
assiduously protected by the courts. An attorney, however, is not left without recourse for unfair 
terminations lacking cause. If a client exercises the right to discharge an attorney after some 
services are performed but prior to the completion of the services for which the fee was agreed 
upon, the discharged attorney is entitled to recover compensation from the client measured by 
the fair and reasonable value of the completed services. We have recognized that permitting a 
discharged attorney “to recover the reasonable value of services rendered in quantum meruit, a 
principle inherently designed to prevent unjust enrichment, strikes the delicate balance between 
the need to deter clients from taking undue advantage of attorneys, on the one hand, and the 
public policy favoring the right of a client to terminate the attorney-client relationship without 
inhibition on the other.” 
 
Correspondingly and by cogent logic and extension of the governing precepts, we hold that the 
use of a special nonrefundable retainer fee agreement clashes with public policy because it 
inappropriately compromises the right to sever the fiduciary services relationship with the 
lawyer. Special nonrefundable retainer fee agreements diminish the core of the fiduciary 
relationship by substantially altering and economically chilling the client's unbridled prerogative 
to walk away from the lawyer. To answer that the client can technically still terminate misses the 
reality of the economic coercion that pervades such matters. If special nonrefundable retainers 
are allowed to flourish, clients would be relegated to hostage status in an unwanted fiduciary 
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relationship — an utter anomaly. Such circumstance would impose a penalty on a client for 
daring to invoke a hollow right to discharge. The established prerogative which, by operation of 
law and policy, is deemed not a breach of contract is thus weakened. Instead of becoming 
responsible for fair value of actual services rendered, the firing client would lose the entire 
“nonrefundable” fee, no matter what legal services, if any, were rendered. This would be a 
shameful, not honorable, professional denouement. Cooperman even acknowledges that the 
essential purpose of the nonrefundable retainer was to prevent clients from firing the lawyer, a 
purpose which, as demonstrated, directly contravenes the Code and this State’s settled public 
policy in this regard. 
 
Nevertheless, Cooperman contends that special nonrefundable retainer fee agreements should 
not be treated as per se violations unless they are pegged to a “clearly excessive” fee. The 
argument is unavailing because the reasonableness of a particular nonrefundable fee cannot 
rescue an agreement that impedes the client’s absolute right to walk away from the attorney. 
The termination right and the right not to be charged excessive fees are not interdependent in 
this analysis and context. Cooperman’s claim, in any event, reflects a misconception of the 
nature of the legal profession by turning on its head the axiom that the legal profession “is a 
learned profession, not a mere money-getting trade.” 
 
DR 2-110 (A) and (B) of the Code of Professional Responsibility add further instruction to our 
analysis and disposition: 
 
Withdrawal from Employment 
(A) In general. 
(3) A lawyer who withdraws from employment shall refund promptly any part of a fee 
paid in advance that has not been earned. 
(B) Mandatory withdrawal. A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its 
permission if required by its rules, shall withdraw from employment, and a lawyer 
representing a client in other matters shall withdraw from employment, if: 
(4) The lawyer is discharged by the client. 
 
We believe that if an attorney is prohibited from keeping any part of a prepaid fee that has not 
been earned because of discharge by the client, it is reasonable to conclude also that an 
attorney may not negotiate and keep fees such as those at issue here. In each of Cooperman’s 
retainer agreements, the Appellate Division found that the lawyer transgressed professional 
ethical norms. The fee arrangements expressed an absoluteness which deprived his clients of 
entitlement to any refund and, thus, conflicted with DR 2-110(A)(3). 
 
Since we decide the precise issue in this case in a disciplinary context only, we imply no views 
with respect to the wider array of factors by which attorneys and clients may have fee dispute 
controversies resolved. Traditional criteria, including the factor of the actual amount of services 
rendered, will continue to govern those situations. Thus, while the special nonrefundable 
retainer agreement will be unenforceable and may subject an attorney to professional discipline, 
quantum meruit payment for services actually rendered will still be available and appropriate. 
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Notably, too, the record in this case contradicts Cooperman's claim that he acted in “good faith.” 
He urges us to conclude that he “complied with the limited legal precedents at the time.” The 
conduct of attorneys is not measured by how close to the edge of thin ice they skate. The 
measure of an attorney’s conduct is not how much clarity can be squeezed out of the strict letter 
of the law, but how much honor can be poured into the generous spirit of lawyer-client 
relationships. The “punctilio of an honor the most sensitive” must be the prevailing standard. 
Therefore, the review is not the reasonableness of the individual attorney’s belief, but, rather, 
whether a “reasonable attorney, familiar with the Code and its ethical strictures, would have 
notice of what conduct is proscribed.” Cooperman’s level of knowledge, the admonitions to him 
and the course of conduct he audaciously chose do not measure up to this necessarily high 
professional template. He even acknowledged at his disciplinary hearing that he knew that 
“there were problems with the nonrefundability of retainers.” Cooperman’s case, therefore, 
constitutes a daring test of ethical principles, not good faith. He failed the test, and those 
charged with enforcing transcendent professional values, especially the Appellate Divisions, 
ought to be sustained in their efforts. 
 
Our holding today makes the conduct of trading in special nonrefundable retainer fee 
agreements subject to appropriate professional discipline. Moreover, we intend no effect or 
disturbance with respect to other types of appropriate and ethical fee agreements. Minimum fee 
arrangements and general retainers that provide for fees, not laden with the nonrefundability 
impediment irrespective of any services, will continue to be valid and not subject in and of 
themselves to professional discipline. 
 
The Court is also mindful of the arguments of some of the amici curiae concerned about 
sweeping sequelae from this case in the form of disciplinary complaints or investigations that 
may seek to unearth or examine into past conduct and to declare all sorts of unobjectionable, 
settled fee arrangements unethical. We are confident that the Appellate Divisions, in the highest 
tradition of their regulatory and adjudicatory roles, will exercise their unique disciplinary 
responsibility with prudence, so as not to overbroadly brand past individualized attorney fee 
arrangements as unethical, and will, instead, fairly assess the varieties of these practices, if 
presented, on an individualized basis. Therefore, we decline to render our ruling prospectively, 
as requested. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Was the problem with Cooperman’s fees that they were non-refundable, too high, or 
both? What if Cooperman had charged a non-refundable fee of $1000 or $100? What if 
Cooperman required a $10,000 refundable retainer and a $5000 engagement fee, paid 
at the end of representation? 
2. What are “minimum fee arrangements and general retainers that provide for fees”? How 
are they different from Cooperman’s non-refundable retainer fees? 
3. Should attorneys be able to charge a flat fee for a service? What if the flat fee is the 
average fee for that service? What if it is less than the average fee? 
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In the Matter of Fordham, 423 Mass. 481 (Mass. 1996) 
 
Summary: Bar counsel alleges that Fordham charged a clearly excessive fee for 
defending Clark against a OUI and other charges. Hearing committee concluded that 
Fordham’s fee was not substantially in excess of a reasonable fee and recommended 
against bar discipline. The Massachusetts Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
Fordham’s fee was clearly excessive, given the nature of the representation, and issued 
a public reprimand. 
 
O’CONNOR, J. 
 
This is an appeal from the Board of Bar Overseers’ dismissal of a petition for discipline filed by 
bar counsel against attorney Laurence S. Fordham. On March 11, 1992, bar counsel served 
Fordham with a petition for discipline alleging that Fordham had charged a clearly excessive fee 
for defending Timothy Clark in the District Court against a charge that he operated a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI) and against other related charges. 
Fordham moved that the board dismiss the petition and the board chair recommended that that 
be done. Bar counsel appealed from the chair's decision to the full board, and the board 
referred the matter to a hearing committee. 
 
After five days of hearings, and with “serious reservations,” the hearing committee concluded 
that Fordham's fee was not substantially in excess of a reasonable fee and that, therefore, the 
committee recommended against bar discipline. Bar counsel appealed from that determination 
to the board. By a vote of six to five, with one abstention, the board accepted the 
recommendation of the hearing committee and dismissed the petition for discipline. Bar counsel 
then filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County a claim of appeal from the board's 
action. 
 
Fordham moved in the county court for a dismissal of bar counsel’s appeal. A single justice 
denied Fordham's motion and reported the case to the full court. We conclude that the single 
justice correctly denied Fordham’s motion to dismiss bar counsel’s appeal. We conclude, also, 
that the board erred in dismissing bar counsel's petition for discipline. We direct a judgment 
ordering public censure be entered in the county court. 
 
We summarize the hearing committee’s findings. On March 4, 1989, the Acton police 
department arrested Timothy, then twenty-one years old, and charged him with OUI, operating a 
motor vehicle after suspension, speeding, and operating an unregistered motor vehicle. At the 
time of the arrest, the police discovered a partially full quart of vodka in the vehicle. After failing 
a field sobriety test, Timothy was taken to the Acton police station where he submitted to two 
breathalyzer tests which registered .10 and .12 respectively. 
 
Subsequent to Timothy’s arraignment, he and his father, Laurence Clark consulted with three 
lawyers, who offered to represent Timothy for fees between $3,000 and $10,000. Shortly after 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 106	
the arrest, Clark went to Fordham’s home to service an alarm system which he had installed 
several years before. While there, Clark discussed Timothy’s arrest with Fordham’s wife who 
invited Clark to discuss the case with Fordham. Fordham then met with Clark and Timothy. 
 
At this meeting, Timothy described the incidents leading to his arrest and the charges against 
him. Fordham, whom the hearing committee described as a “very experienced senior trial 
attorney with impressive credentials,” told Clark and Timothy that he had never represented a 
client in a driving while under the influence case or in any criminal matter, and he had never 
tried a case in the District Court. The hearing committee found that “Fordham explained that 
although he lacked experience in this area, he was a knowledgeable and hard-working attorney 
and that he believed he could competently represent Timothy. Fordham described himself as 
‘efficient and economic in the use of his time.’” 
 
“Towards the end of the meeting, Fordham told the Clarks that he worked on a time charge 
basis and that he billed monthly. In other words, Fordham would calculate the amount of hours 
he and others in the firm worked on a matter each month and multiply it by the respective hourly 
rates. He also told the Clarks that he would engage others in his firm to prepare the case. Clark 
had indicated that he would pay Timothy’s legal fees.” After the meeting, Clark hired Fordham to 
represent Timothy. 
 
According to the hearing committee’s findings, Fordham filed four pretrial motions on Timothy's 
behalf, two of which were allowed. One motion, entitled “Motion in Limine to Suppress Results 
of Breathalyzer Tests,” was based on the theory that, although two breathalyzer tests were 
exactly .02 apart, they were not “within” .02 of one another as the regulations require. The 
hearing committee characterized the motion and its rationale as “a creative, if not novel, 
approach to suppression of breathalyzer results.” Although the original trial date was June 20, 
1989, the trial, which was before a judge without jury, was held on October 10 and October 19, 
1989. The judge found Timothy not guilty of driving while under the influence. 
 
Fordham sent the following bills to Clark: 
 
1. April 19, 1989, $3,250 for services rendered in March, 1989. 
2. May 15, 1989, $9,850 for services rendered in April, 1989. 
3. June 19, 1989, $3,950 for services rendered in May, 1989. 
4. July 13, 1989, $13,300 for services rendered in June, 1989. 
5. October 13, 1989, $35,022.25 revised bill for services rendered from March 19 to June 
30, 1989. 
6. November 7, 1989, $15,000 for services rendered from July 1, 1989 to October 19, 
1989." 
 
The bills totaled $50,022.25, reflecting 227 hours of billed time, 153 hours of which were 
expended by Fordham and seventy-four of which were his associates’ time. Clark did not pay 
the first two bills when they became due and expressed to Fordham his concern about their 
amount. Clark paid Fordham $10,000 on June 20, 1989. At that time, Fordham assured Clark 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 107	
that most of the work had been completed “other than taking the case to trial.” Clark did not 
make any subsequent payments. Fordham requested Clark to sign a promissory note 
evidencing his debt to Fordham and, on October 7, 1989, Clark did so. In the October 13, 1989, 
bill, Fordham added a charge of $5,000 as a “retroactive increase” in fees. On November 7, 
1989, after the case was completed, Fordham sent Clark a bill for $15,000. 
 
Bar counsel and Fordham have stipulated that all the work billed by Fordham was actually done 
and that Fordham and his associates spent the time they claim to have spent. They also have 
stipulated that Fordham acted conscientiously, diligently, and in good faith in representing 
Timothy and in his billing in this case. 
 
The board dismissed bar counsel’s petition for discipline against Fordham because it 
determined, relying in large part on the findings and recommendations of the hearing 
committee, that Fordham’s fee was not clearly excessive. Pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 3:07, DR 2-
106(B), “a fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary 
prudence, experienced in the area of the law involved, would be left with a definite and firm 
conviction that the fee is substantially in excess of a reasonable fee.” The rule proceeds to list 
eight factors to be considered in ascertaining the reasonableness of the fee: 
 
1. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, 
and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly. 
2. The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular 
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer. 
3. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services. 
4. The amount involved and the results obtained. 
5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances. 
6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. 
7. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the 
services. 
8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
 
In concluding that Fordham did not charge a clearly excessive fee, the board adopted, with 
limited exception, the hearing committee’s report. The board’s and the hearing committee’s 
reasons for dismissing the petition are as follows: Bar counsel and Fordham stipulated that 
Fordham acted conscientiously, diligently, and in good faith in his representation of the client 
and his billing on the case. Although Fordham lacked experience in criminal law, he is a 
“seasoned and well-respected civil lawyer.” The more than 200 hours spent preparing the OUI 
case were necessary, “in part to educate Fordham in the relevant substantive law and court 
procedures,” because he had never tried an OUI case or appeared in the District Court. The 
board noted that “although none of the experts who testified at the disciplinary hearing had ever 
heard of a fee in excess of $15,000 for a first-offense OUI case, the hearing committee found 
that Clark had entered into the transaction with open eyes after interviewing other lawyers with 
more experience in such matters.” The board also thought significant that Clark “later 
acquiesced, despite mild expressions of concern, in Fordham’s billing practices.” Moreover, the 
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Clarks specifically instructed Fordham that they would not consider a guilty plea by Timothy. 
Rather they were interested only in pursuing the case to trial. Finally, Timothy obtained the 
result he sought: an acquittal. 
 
Bar counsel contends that the board's decision to dismiss the petition for discipline is erroneous 
on three grounds: First, “the hearing committee and the Board committed error by analyzing 
only three of the factors set out in DR 2-106 (B) (1)-(8), and their findings with regard to these 
criteria do not support their conclusion that the fee in this case was not clearly excessive”; 
second, the board “misinterpreted DR 2-106’s prohibition against charging a clearly excessive 
fee by reading into the rule a ‘safe harbor’ provision”; and third, “by allowing client acquiescence 
as a complete defense.” 
 
In reviewing the hearing committee’s and the board’s analysis of the various factors, as 
appearing in DR 2-106 (B), which are to be considered for a determination as to whether a fee 
is clearly excessive, we are mindful that, although not binding on this court, the findings and 
recommendations of the board are entitled to great weight. We are empowered, however, to 
review the board’s findings and reach our own conclusion. In the instant case we are persuaded 
that the hearing committee’s and the board's determinations that a clearly excessive fee was 
not charged are not warranted. 
 
The first factor listed in DR 2-106(B) requires examining “the time and labor required, the 
novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly.” Although the hearing committee determined that Fordham “spent a large number of 
hours on the matter, in essence learning from scratch what others already know,” it “did not 
credit Bar Counsel’s argument that Fordham violated DR 2-106 by spending too many hours.” 
The hearing committee reasoned that even if the number of hours Fordham “spent were wholly 
out of proportion” to the number of hours that a lawyer with experience in the trying of OUI 
cases would require, the committee was not required to conclude that the fee based on time 
spent was “clearly excessive.” It was enough, the hearing committee concluded, that Clark 
instructed Fordham to pursue the case to trial, Fordham did so zealously and, as stipulated, 
Fordham spent the hours he billed in good faith and diligence. We disagree. 
 
Four witnesses testified before the hearing committee as experts on OUI cases. One of the 
experts, testifying on behalf of bar counsel, opined that “the amount of time spent in this case is 
clearly excessive.” He testified that there were no unusual circumstances in the OUI charge 
against Timothy and that it was a “standard operating under the influence case.” The witness 
did agree that Fordham’s argument for suppression of the breathalyzer test results, which was 
successful, was novel and would have justified additional time and labor. He also acknowledged 
that the acquittal was a good result; even with the suppression of the breathalyzer tests, he 
testified, the chances of an acquittal would have been “not likely at a bench trial.” The witness 
estimated that it would have been necessary, for thorough preparation of the case including the 
novel breathalyzer suppression argument, to have billed twenty to thirty hours for preparation, 
not including trial time. 
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A second expert, testifying on behalf of bar counsel, expressed his belief that the issues 
presented in this case were not particularly difficult, nor novel, and that “the degree of skill 
required to defend a case such as this was not that high.” He did recognize, however, that the 
theory that Fordham utilized to suppress the breathalyzer tests was impressive and one of 
which he had previously never heard. Nonetheless, the witness concluded that “clearly there is 
no way that he could justify these kind of hours to do this kind of work.” He estimated that an 
OUI case involving these types of issues would require sixteen hours of trial preparation and 
approximately fifteen hours of trial time. He testified that he had once spent ninety hours in 
connection with an OUI charge against a client that had resulted in a plea. The witness 
explained, however, that that case had involved a second offense OUI and that it was a case of 
first impression, in 1987, concerning new breathalyzer equipment and comparative breathalyzer 
tests. 
 
An expert called by Fordham testified that the facts of Timothy’s case presented a challenge 
and that without the suppression of the breathalyzer test results it would have been “an almost 
impossible situation in terms of prevailing on the trier of fact.” He further stated that, based on 
the particulars in Timothy's case, he believed that Fordham’s hours were not excessive and, in 
fact, he, the witness, would have spent a comparable amount of time. The witness later 
admitted, however, that within the past five years, the OUI cases which he had brought to trial 
required no more than a total of forty billed hours, which encompassed all preparation and court 
appearances. He explained that, although he had not charged more than forty hours to prepare 
an OUI case, in comparison to Fordham's more than 200 expended hours, Fordham 
nonetheless had spent a reasonable number of hours on the case in light of the continuance 
and the subsequent need to reprepare, as well as the “very ingenious” breathalyzer suppression 
argument, and the Clarks’ insistence on trial. In addition, the witness testified that, although the 
field sobriety test, breathalyzer tests, and the presence of a half-empty liquor bottle in the car 
placed Fordham at a serious disadvantage in being able to prevail on the OUI charge, those 
circumstances were not unusual and in fact agreed that they were “normal circumstances.” 
 
The fourth expert witness, called by Fordham, testified that she believed the case was 
“extremely tough” and that the breathalyzer suppression theory was novel. She testified that, 
although the time and labor consumed on the case was more than usual in defending an OUI 
charge, the hours were not excessive. They were not excessive, she explained, because the 
case was particularly difficult due to the “stakes and the evidence.” She conceded, however, 
that legal issues in defending OUI charges are “pretty standard” and that the issues presented 
in this case were not unusual. Furthermore, the witness testified that challenging the 
breathalyzer test due to the .02 discrepancy was not unusual, but the theory on which Fordham 
proceeded was novel. Finally, she stated that she thought she may have known of one person 
who might have spent close to one hundred hours on a difficult OUI case; she was not sure; but 
she had never heard of a fee in excess of $10,000 for a bench trial. 
 
In considering whether a fee is “clearly excessive,” the first factor to be considered pursuant to 
that rule is “the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform 
the legal service properly.” That standard is similar to the familiar standard of reasonableness 
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traditionally applied in civil fee disputes. Based on the testimony of the four experts, the number 
of hours devoted to Timothy’s OUI case by Fordham and his associates was substantially in 
excess of the hours that a prudent experienced lawyer would have spent. According to the 
evidence, the number of hours spent was several times the amount of time any of the witnesses 
had ever spent on a similar case. We are not unmindful of the novel and successful motion to 
suppress the breathalyzer test results, but that effort cannot justify a $50,000 fee in a type of 
case in which the usual fee is less than one-third of that amount. 
 
The board determined that “because Fordham had never tried an OUI case or appeared in the 
district court, Fordham spent over 200 hours preparing the case, in part to educate himself in 
the relevant substantive law and court procedures.” Fordham's inexperience in criminal defense 
work and OUI cases in particular cannot justify the extraordinarily high fee. It cannot be that an 
inexperienced lawyer is entitled to charge three or four times as much as an experienced lawyer 
for the same service. A client “should not be expected to pay for the education of a lawyer when 
he spends excessive amounts of time on tasks which, with reasonable experience, become 
matters of routine.” “While the licensing of a lawyer is evidence that he has met the standards 
then prevailing for admission to the bar, a lawyer generally should not accept employment in 
any area of the law in which he is not qualified. However, he may accept such employment if in 
good faith he expects to become qualified through study and investigation, as long as such 
preparation would not result in unreasonable delay or expense to his client.” Although the 
ethical considerations set forth in the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons of 
Judicial Ethics are not binding, they nonetheless serve as a guiding principle. 
 
The third factor to be considered in ascertaining the reasonableness of a fee is its comparability 
to “the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.” The hearing committee 
made no finding as to the comparability of Fordham’s fee with the fees customarily charged in 
the locality for similar services. However, one of bar counsel’s expert witnesses testified that he 
had never heard of a fee in excess of $15,000 to defend a first OUI charge, and the customary 
flat fee in an OUI case, including trial, “runs from $1,000 to $7,500.” Bar counsel’s other expert 
testified that he had never heard of a fee in excess of $10,000 for a bench trial. In his view, the 
customary charge for a case similar to Timothy’s would vary between $1,500 and $5,000. One 
of Fordham’s experts testified that she considered a $40,000 or $50,000 fee for defending an 
OUI charge “unusual and certainly higher by far than any I've ever seen before.” The witness 
had never charged a fee of more than $3,500 for representing a client at a bench trial to defend 
a first offense OUI charge. She further testified that she believed an “average OUI in the bench 
session is two thousand dollars and sometimes less.” Finally, that witness testified that she had 
“heard a rumor” that one attorney charged $10,000 for a bench trial involving an OUI charge; 
this fee represented the highest fee of which she was aware. The other expert witness called by 
Fordham testified that he had heard of a $35,000 fee for defending OUI charges, but he had 
never charged more than $12,000 (less than twenty-five per cent of Fordham’s fee). 
 
Although finding that Fordham’s fee was “much higher than the fee charged by many attorneys 
with more experience litigating driving under the influence cases,” the hearing committee 
nevertheless determined that the fee charged by Fordham was not clearly excessive because 
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Clark “went into the relationship with Fordham with open eyes,” Fordham’s fee fell within a “safe 
harbor,” and Clark acquiesced in Fordham's fee by not strenuously objecting to his bills. The 
board accepted the hearing committee's analysis apart from the committee’s reliance on the 
“safe harbor” rule. 
 
The finding that Clark had entered into the fee agreement “with open eyes” was based on the 
finding that Clark hired Fordham after being fully apprised that he lacked any type of experience 
in defending an OUI charge and after interviewing other lawyers who were experts in defending 
OUI charges. Furthermore, the hearing committee and the board relied on testimony which 
revealed that the fee arrangement had been fully disclosed to Clark including the fact that 
Fordham “would have to become familiar with the law in that area.” It is also significant, 
however, that the hearing committee found that “despite Fordham’s disclaimers concerning his 
experience, Clark did not appear to have understood in any real sense the implications of 
choosing Fordham to represent Timothy. Fordham did not give Clark any estimate of the total 
expected fee or the number of $200 hours that would be required.” The express finding of the 
hearing committee that Clark “did not appear to have understood in any real sense the 
implications of choosing Fordham to represent Timothy” directly militates against the finding that 
Clark entered into the agreement “with open eyes.” 
 
That brings us to the hearing committee's finding that Fordham’s fee fell within a “safe harbor.” 
The hearing committee reasoned that as long as an agreement existed between a client and an 
attorney to bill a reasonable rate multiplied by the number of hours actually worked, the 
attorney’s fee was within a “safe harbor” and thus protected from a challenge that the fee was 
clearly excessive. The board, however, in reviewing the hearing committee’s decision, correctly 
rejected the notion “that a lawyer may always escape discipline with billings based on accurate 
time charges for work honestly performed.” 
 
The “safe harbor” formula would not be an appropriate rationale in this case because the 
amount of time Fordham spent to educate himself and represent Timothy was clearly excessive 
despite his good faith and diligence. Disciplinary Rule 2-106(B)’s mandate that “a fee is clearly 
excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence, experienced in the 
area of the law involved, would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is 
substantially in excess of a reasonable fee,” creates explicitly an objective standard by which 
attorneys’ fees are to be judged. We are not persuaded by Fordham’s argument that “unless it 
can be shown that the ‘excessive’ work for which the attorney has charged goes beyond mere 
matters of professional judgment and can be proven, either directly or by reasonable inference, 
to have involved dishonesty, bad faith or overreaching of the client, no case for discipline has 
been established.” Disciplinary Rule 2-106 plainly does not require an inquiry into whether the 
clearly excessive fee was charged to the client under fraudulent circumstances, and we shall 
not write such a meaning into the disciplinary rule. 
 
Finally, bar counsel challenges the hearing committee’s finding that “if Clark objected to the 
numbers of hours being spent by Fordham, he could have spoken up with some force when he 
began receiving bills.” Bar counsel notes, and we agree, that “the test as stated in the DR 2-
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106(A) is whether the fee ‘charged’ is clearly excessive, not whether the fee is accepted as valid 
or acquiesced in by the client.” Therefore, we conclude that the hearing committee and the 
board erred in not concluding that Fordham’s fee was clearly excessive. 
 
Fordham argues that our imposition of discipline would offend his right to due process. A 
disciplinary sanction constitutes “a punishment or penalty” levied against the respondent, and 
therefore the respondent is entitled to procedural due process. Fordham contends that the bar 
and, therefore, he, have not been given fair notice through prior decisions of this court or the 
express language of DR 2-106 that discipline may be imposed for billing excessive hours that 
were nonetheless spent diligently and in good faith. It is true, as Fordham asserts, that there is a 
dearth of case law in the Commonwealth meting out discipline for an attorney’s billing of a 
clearly excessive fee. There is, however, as we have noted above, case law which specifically 
addresses what constitutes an unreasonable attorney’s fee employing virtually the identical 
factors contained within DR 2-106. More importantly, the general prohibition that “a lawyer shall 
not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee,” is followed 
by eight specific, and clearly expressed, factors, to be evaluated by the standard of “a lawyer of 
ordinary prudence,” in determining the propriety of the fee. In addition, nothing contained within 
the disciplinary rule nor within any pertinent case law indicates in any manner that a clearly 
excessive fee does not warrant discipline whenever the time spent during the representation 
was spent in good faith. The fact that this court has not previously had occasion to discipline an 
attorney in the circumstances of this case does not suggest that the imposition of discipline in 
this case offends due process. We reject Fordham's due process argument. 
 
In charging a clearly excessive fee, Fordham departed substantially from the obligation of 
professional responsibility that he owed to his client. The ABA Model Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions § 7.3 endorses a public reprimand as the appropriate sanction for charging a 
clearly excessive fee. We deem such a sanction appropriate in this case. Accordingly, a 
judgment is to be entered in the county court imposing a public censure. The record in this case 
is to be unimpounded. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Was the problem with Fordham’s fee the rate he charged, the number of hours he billed, 
or both? 
2. Why do other attorneys litigating similar cases bill so much less? Is it because cases of 
this kind should take less work or because their clients cannot spend any additional 
money? 
3. What if Fordham’s acquittal rate were substantially higher than other attorneys in the 
same practice area? Should he be able to charge a higher rate? How much higher? 
4. What if Fordham estimated a fee of $50,000 in advance, and billed only for work actually 
completed? 
 
Contingent Fees 
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You never give me your money, you only give me your funny paper, and in the middle of 
negotiations, you break down.26 
 
Typically, attorneys charge an hourly fee for their services, often billed in some fraction of an 
hour. But some attorneys charge a fixed fee for their services. Historically, the most prestigious 
law firms charged a fixed fee for their services, often refusing to provide an itemized list of the 
services they had provided. Today, detailed billing is the norm, with the exception of attorneys 
providing retail representation in routine matters, and appointed counsel for indigent defendants. 
 
However, in some circumstances, attorneys and their clients will form a contingent fee 
agreement, under which both parties agree that the attorney is entitled to a certain percentage 
of any recovery, often 33%. Contingent fee agreements are typically associated with personal 
injury actions, where the plaintiff often has a strong claim, but lacks the financial resources to 
pursue litigation. Under a contingent fee agreement, the attorney can fund the litigation, in 
exchange for a chance of a much larger recovery. 
 
But contingent fee agreements can also make sense when a client wants to control an 
attorney’s incentives. Under an hourly billing agreement, the attorney has an incentive to bill as 
many hours as possible, even as the additional work produces diminishing returns to the client. 
And under a fixed fee billing agreement, the attorney has an incentive to do as little work as 
possible. But under a contingent fee agreement, the attorney simply has an incentive to win. 
 
Under Model Rule 1.5(c), contingency fee agreements cannot be unreasonable and must be in 
writing. In addition, contingent fees are prohibited in criminal law and family law actions. 
Attorneys cannot form a contingent fee agreement to be paid only if a criminal defendant is 
acquitted or receives some other favorable outcome. And attorneys typically cannot form a 
contingent fee agreement to receive compensation from the resolution of a domestic dispute. 
 
Culpepper & Carroll, PLLC v. Cole, 929 So. 2d 1224 (La. 2006) 
 
Summary: Cole retained attorney Culpepper for a will contest. Cole requested one-third 
contingent fee and Culpepper agreed. Culpepper received a settlement offer and Cole 
refused to settle it. Cole terminated representation when Culpepper refused to file suit as 
a forced heir. Cole recovered nothing challenging the will by himself. Culpepper wanted 
$6,950 plus legal interest as attorney’s fees. Cole argued Culpepper did this on 
contingency basis, and that Culpepper quit the case. Court found that a contingent fee 
contract exists, but found that Culpepper is not entitled to recover attorneys fees 
because Cole did not obtain any recovery. 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
																																																								
26 The Beatles, You Never Give Me Your Money, Abbey Road (1969). 
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Connie Daniel Cole seeks review of a judgment of the court of appeal affirming an award of 
attorney’s fees to his former counsel. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of 
the court of appeal. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Connie Daniel Cole retained attorney Bobby Culpepper of the law firm of Culpepper & Carroll, 
PLLC to represent him in a contest of his mother’s will. Mr. Cole requested that the firm handle 
the matter on a one-third contingent fee basis, and Mr. Culpepper agreed to do so. On 
September 20, 2000, Mr. Culpepper sent Mr. Cole a letter in which he confirmed that he would 
accept the representation on a contingent fee basis of one-third “of whatever additional property 
or money we can get for you.” 
 
After negotiation between Mr. Culpepper and counsel for the estate of Mr. Cole's mother, Mr. 
Cole was offered property worth $21,600.03 over and above what he would have received 
under the terms of the decedent’s will. Mr. Culpepper thought the compromise was reasonable 
and recommended to Mr. Cole that he accept the offer. However, Mr. Cole refused to settle his 
claim for that amount, believing he was entitled to a larger share of his mother’s succession as a 
forced heir. When Mr. Culpepper refused to file suit in the matter, Mr. Cole terminated his 
representation. Mr. Cole then proceeded in proper person to challenge his mother’s will, but he 
was unsuccessful and recovered nothing. 
 
On April 12, 2004, Mr. Culpepper filed a “Petition on Open Account” on behalf of the Culpepper 
law firm. The suit was filed in Ruston City Court against Mr. Cole, seeking the sum of $6,950.01, 
plus legal interest, together with 25% on the principal and interest as additional attorney's fees. 
Attached to the petition were Mr. Culpepper’s invoice for attorney's fees and a demand letter to 
Mr. Cole seeking the payment of “the entire balance of $6,950.01 that you owe Culpepper & 
Carroll, PLLC.” 
 
Mr. Cole, appearing in proper person, answered the law firm’s petition and denied that he owed 
any money. Mr. Cole explained in his answer that “Mr. Culpepper did this on a contingency fee 
basis,” that Mr. Culpepper “quit the case,” and that Mr. Cole paid court costs but Mr. Culpepper 
“would not go to court.” 
 
Following a trial on the merits, at which both parties testified, the city court rendered judgment in 
favor of the law firm, awarding the sum of $6,950.01, plus legal interest from the date of judicial 
demand until paid, together with 25% on the principal and interest as additional attorney's fees, 
and costs. In oral reasons for judgment, the city court judge stated that a “contingency fee was 
present” based on the record, including the testimony in open court and the written admission in 
Mr. Cole’s answer that there was a contingent fee arrangement. The court noted that “work was 
accomplished” by Mr. Culpepper and further noted that, according to the testimony, the 
settlement would have produced a better result than if the case had gone to trial on the issue of 
forced heirship. Thus, the court was satisfied that the law firm met its burden of proof. 
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Mr. Cole appealed the city court's judgment, and in a 2-1 ruling, the court of appeal amended 
the judgment and affirmed. The majority agreed that a valid contingent fee contract existed 
between Mr. Cole and Mr. Culpepper, and found that by refusing to sign the “favorable 
settlement” negotiated by Mr. Culpepper before he was discharged, Mr. Cole was in effect 
depriving Mr. Culpepper of the contingent fee he had already earned. Accordingly, the court of 
appeal affirmed the award to Mr. Culpepper of $6,950.01 in attorney's fees, plus legal interest. 
However, the court of appeal found that the money owing in this case does not derive from an 
open account, but rather from a contractual obligation in the form of a contingent fee agreement. 
Based on this reasoning, the court of appeal amended the trial court's judgment to delete the 
award to the law firm of 25% additional attorney's fees plus costs under the open account 
statute. 
 
Judge Caraway dissented. He recognized that a contingent fee contract existed in this case, but 
found that because there was ultimately no recovery in the case, no fee was due to Mr. 
Culpepper. Judge Caraway further observed that to allow an attorney to collect a fee when the 
client rejects a settlement offer and later recovers nothing “ignores multiple and serious 
concerns embodied in the rules of professional conduct.” 
 
Upon Mr. Cole's application, we granted certiorari to review the correctness of the court of 
appeal's ruling. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
As a threshold matter, we note the trial court made a finding of fact that a contingent fee 
contract existed between Mr. Cole and Mr. Culpepper. Based on our review of the record, we 
find no manifest error in this determination. 
 
Having found a contingent fee contract exists, we now turn to the question of whether Mr. 
Culpepper is entitled to recover any attorney's fees under this contract. Pursuant to the parties’ 
agreement, Mr. Culpepper is entitled to one-third “of whatever additional property or money” he 
obtained on behalf of Mr. Cole. It is undisputed that Mr. Cole recovered no additional property or 
money as a result of the litigation against his mother's estate. Because Mr. Cole obtained no 
recovery, it follows that Mr. Culpepper is not entitled to any contingent fee. 
 
Nonetheless, Mr. Culpepper urges us to find that his contingency should attach to the 
settlement offer he obtained on behalf of his client, even though his client refused to accept that 
offer. According to Mr. Culpepper, he did the work for which Mr. Cole retained him, and he is 
therefore entitled to one-third of the amount offered in settlement, notwithstanding Mr. Cole's 
rejection of the settlement offer. 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, it would have been in Mr. Cole's best interest to accept the 
settlement offer obtained by Mr. Culpepper. However, it is clear that the decision to accept a 
settlement belongs to the client alone. Therefore, regardless of the wisdom of Mr. Cole's 
decision, his refusal to accept the settlement was binding on Mr. Culpepper. 
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To allow Mr. Culpepper to recover a contingent fee under these circumstances would penalize 
Mr. Cole for exercising his right to reject the settlement. We find no statutory or jurisprudential 
support for such a proposition. Indeed, this court has rejected any interpretation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct which would place restrictions on the client’s fundamental right to control 
the case. 
 
In summary, we find that Mr. Culpepper did not obtain any recovery on behalf of Mr. Cole. In the 
absence of a recovery, it follows that Mr. Culpepper cannot collect a contingent fee for his 
services. Accordingly, we must reverse the judgment of the court of appeal awarding a 
contingent fee to Mr. Culpepper. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why wasn’t Culpepper entitled to compensation for the work he actually did for Cole? 
2. Could the contingent fee agreement between Cole and Culpepper have included a 
clause requiring Cole to obtain Culpepper’s consent before accepting or rejecting a 
settlement offer? 
 
It’s a bad business to be in. You don’t get thanked and you don’t get paid. It’s a hard world to be 
in with, and to end with, and to think about leaving behind.27 
	  
																																																								
27 Liz Phair, Elvis, Be True, Girly-Sound (1991). 
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2.7: Financial Relationships with Clients 
 
Client Trust Accounts 
 
Business? It’s quite simple; it’s other people’s money.28 
 
Oh, can somebody explain why things go on this way? I thought they were my friends. I can't 
believe it's me, I can't believe that I'm so green. Eyes down, round and round, let’s all sit and 
watch the moneygoround. Everyone take a little bit here and a little bit there.29 
 
When attorneys hold money or property in trust for their clients they must never commingle it 
with their own funds or property, on pain of sanction, typically suspension or disbarment. In 
other words, if a client deposits funds with an attorney, the attorney must place those funds in a 
trust account, and if a client deposits physical property, the attorney must also hold that property 
separately, typically in a safety deposit box. Commingling funds or property is a per se violation, 
with few exceptions, primarily in order to enable an attorney to pay any banking fees on a 
client’s trust account. 
 
State bar associations carefully monitor attorney trust accounts and punish any commingling of 
funds. Some state bar associations even randomly audit attorney trust accounts, looking for 
violations. State rules of professional conduct typically require attorneys to deposit client funds 
in an interest-bearing trust account. Many states require attorneys to deposit some or all of the 
interest generated by client trust accounts into a common fund. This Interest on Lawyers’ Trust 
Accounts (“IOLTA”) fund is used to provide legal services to indigent clients. 
 
Attorneys may withdraw funds from a client’s trust account in order to pay the client’s attorney 
fees, as they are earned. The rule against commingling prohibits attorneys from using funds 
from a client trust account to pay business or personal expenses, and the attorney must return 
any funds remaining in a client’s trust account to the client when the representation ends. When 
a client receives a settlement or award, the attorney must deposit the funds in the client’s trust 
account, and then withdraw funds to pay the client’s attorney fees and disburse to the client. 
Specifically, if the attorney and the client have a contingent fee agreement, the attorney must 
pay the client’s contingent fee from the client trust account.  
 
Rule 1.15: Safekeeping Property 
 
a. A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in 
connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own property. Funds shall 
be kept in a separate account maintained in the state where the lawyer’s office is 
situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person. Other property shall 
be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account 
																																																								
28 Alexandre Dumas. 
29 The Kinks, Moneygoround, Lola Versus Powerman and the Moneygoround (1970). 
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funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period 
of [five years] after termination of the representation. 
b. A lawyer may deposit the lawyer’s own funds in a client trust account for the sole 
purpose of paying bank service charges on that account, but only in an amount 
necessary for that purpose. 
c. A lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that have been 
paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses 
incurred. 
d. Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a 
lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this rule or 
otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly 
deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third 
person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall 
promptly render a full accounting regarding such property. 
e. When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property in which two 
or more persons (one of whom may be the lawyer) claim interests, the property shall be 
kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly 
distribute all portions of the property as to which the interests are not in dispute. 
 
Neb. State Bar Ass’n v. Statmore, 352 N.W.2d 875 (Neb. 1984). 
 
Summary: Statmore (Attorney) represented Kuzara for a 2nd offense DUI. Kuzara gave 
Statmore $500 for representation. Statmore deposited the check, but it was returned twice by 
the bank due to insufficiency of funds. Without Statmore’s knowledge, the bank deposited $495. 
Statmore requested criminal prosecution to get paid. Kuzara hired a different attorney. Statmore 
got an addition $540. Kuzara contacted Statmore about potential double payment and 
requested a reply, but Statmore did not reply. Statmore realized the double payment in 
February. Statmore acknowledged double payment but didn’t have funds to reimburse. 
Statmore brought a $245 check to pay Kuzara. Mistake did not relieve Statement of his 
professional duty regarding his client’s funds. 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This is an original disciplinary proceeding by the Nebraska State Bar Association against Clay 
B. Statmore, an attorney admitted to practice in Nebraska. After a hearing before the Committee 
on Inquiry of the First Disciplinary District and a review by the Disciplinary Review Board, formal 
charges against Statmore have been filed in this court. 
 
Statmore does not deny the charges. The charges allege violations of the following: 
 
CANON 1. A Lawyer Should Assist in Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal 
Profession. 
 
DR 1-102. Misconduct. 
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A. A lawyer shall not: 
1. Violate a Disciplinary Rule. 
6. Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. 
 
CANON 9. A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety. 
DR 9-102. Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of a Client. 
B. A lawyer shall: 
1. Promptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds, securities, or other properties. 
4. Promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds, securities, or 
other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive. 
We review the evidence de novo to determine if discipline should be imposed and, if 
discipline is warranted, the nature of the discipline which is appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
 
On April 15, 1982, Statmore undertook representation of Deborah A. Kuzara regarding a charge 
of driving while intoxicated, second offense. Kuzara, on June 2, gave Statmore her check for 
$500—the agreed fee for the representation. Statmore deposited Kuzara’s June 2 check, which 
was returned twice by the bank due to insufficiency of Kuzara’s account. Statmore contacted 
Kuzara and her father in New Jersey about the insufficient fund check. 
 
On June 22 Kuzara issued another check (check A) for $500, which Statmore deposited but 
which was returned to Statmore’s Lincoln bank on account of Kuzara’s insufficient funds. On 
June 30 Kuzara sent Statmore still another check (check B) in the amount of $540—$500 for 
Statmore’s fee, plus $40 for the check service charges regarding the other Kuzara checks. 
Check B was returned on account of insufficient funds. Unbeknown to Statmore, his bank had 
held check A and collected that check on July 9, 1982, with credit to Statmore's business 
account in the sum of $495 ($500 less a $5 service charge). Statmore again contacted Kuzara 
about the insufficient fund checks. At this time Statmore was still unaware that the bank had 
credited his account $495 for check A on July 9. 
 
Statmore took check B to the Lancaster County attorney and requested criminal prosecution. 
Notified by the county attorney regarding prosecution on check B, Kuzara hired attorney George 
Thompson of Bellevue, Nebraska. Kuzara later delivered $540 to the county attorney for check 
B. On November 12 the county attorney sent $540 to Statmore regarding check B. 
 
Kuzara contacted Statmore about the possibility of a double payment, that is, check A credited 
to Statmore on July 9 and the funds from the county attorney on November 12 regarding check 
B. Statmore asked for verification from Kuzara that there was in fact a double payment, and felt 
he was getting a “runaround” about the checks. 
 
Attorney Thompson wrote Statmore on January 5, 1983, pointed out the double payment, and 
requested a reply. Statmore did not respond to Thompson's letter. Early in February, Statmore 
checked his deposit slips and saw that there indeed had been the “$495 deposit” (check A) to 
his account on July 9. This was apparently Statmore’s first verification of payment on check A. 
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Thompson again wrote to Statmore on March 2 and demanded Kuzara's $495 by return mail. 
Statmore never responded to that letter. By March 14 Statmore conclusively realized that he 
had received double payment from Kuzara. On March 16 Thompson telephoned Statmore, who 
then acknowledged the double payment and told Thompson he did not have the funds to 
reimburse Kuzara. 
 
On May 23 Kuzara filed a complaint with the Counsel for Discipline of the Nebraska State Bar 
Association. Counsel for Discipline wrote Statmore as soon as Kuzara filed her complaint. 
Statmore paid Kuzara $250 on June 28 and the same day wrote the Counsel for Discipline that 
he had “recently” paid Kuzara $250. In his June 28 letter to the Counsel for Discipline, Statmore 
also mentioned that the “remaining $245 should be repaid within the next fourteen days.” 
Statmore paid nothing further until the day of the hearing before the Committee on Inquiry. 
 
On the day of the hearing before the Committee on Inquiry, September 20, Statmore brought 
the Counsel for Discipline a check for $245 to pay Kuzara, and stated he “didn't know who to 
send it to.” 
 
Statmore says he never reconciles his monthly bank statement and, therefore, had no 
knowledge that check A had cleared and been credited to his account on July 9. Such 
ignorance regarding check A existed at the time Statmore received the money from the 
Lancaster County attorney regarding check B. 
 
Throughout all the time in question, Statmore was having financial problems: failed to pay 
utilities (some of which were disconnected) and did not pay office rent (moved his office after 
delinquency in rent). Statmore implies that the somewhat chaotic office situation explains, if not 
excuses, the sorry state of affairs during his representation of Kuzara. 
 
Implicit in the license to practice law is the requirement that the recipient of the license shall 
demean himself in a proper manner and shall refrain from practices which bring discredit upon 
the lawyer, the profession, and the courts. 
 
Any violation of the ethical standards relating to the practice of law, or any conduct of an 
attorney which tends to bring reproach upon the courts or the legal profession, constitutes 
grounds for suspension or disbarment. 
 
When the double payment occurred, Statmore held Kuzara’s money, which he was not 
authorized to retain. Kuzara’s conduct or mistake concerning payment of her checks did not 
relieve Statmore of his professional duty regarding his client's funds. Accurate accountability of 
a client’s funds is the responsibility of the lawyer, not the client. Statmore’s slipshod office 
management and careless bookkeeping prevented any semblance of the accurate accounting 
lawyers must maintain with respect to a client’s funds. As a result of Statmore’s poor 
management and failure to keep track of payment from Kuzara, there was a commingling of a 
client’s money—an area of gravest concern of this court in reviewing claimed lawyer 
misconduct. The prohibition against commingling of funds is a salutary rule adopted 
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to provide against the probability in some cases, the possibility in many cases, and the 
danger in all cases that such commingling will result in the loss of clients’ money. Moral 
turpitude is not necessarily involved in the commingling of a client’s money with an 
attorney’s own money if the client’s money is not endangered by such procedure and is 
always available to him. However, inherently there is danger in such practice for 
frequently unforeseen circumstances arise jeopardizing the safety of the client’s funds, 
and as far as the client is concerned the result is the same whether his money is 
deliberately misappropriated by an attorney or is unintentionally lost by circumstances 
beyond the control of the attorney. 
 
A lawyer’s poor accounting procedures and sloppy office management are not excuses or 
mitigating circumstances in reference to commingled funds. 
 
We realize that Statmore has repaid Kuzara the overpayment. However, a lawyer’s restitution of 
a client’s funds after being faced with legal accountability does not exonerate professional 
misconduct. 
 
Among the major considerations in determining whether a lawyer should be disciplined is 
maintenance of the highest trust and confidence essential to the attorney-client relationship. As 
a profession, the bar continuously strives to build and safeguard such trust and confidence, but 
conduct such as before us in the present case weakens the efforts of the overwhelming majority 
of lawyers in Nebraska whose conduct meets, if not exceeds, the Code of Professional 
Responsibility. 
 
To determine whether and to what extent discipline should be imposed, it is necessary that we 
consider the nature of the offense, the need for deterring others, the maintenance of the 
reputation of the bar as a whole, the protection of the public, the attitude of the offender 
generally, and his present or future fitness to continue in the practice of law. 
 
Therefore, under the circumstances we find that a suspension is appropriate discipline for 
Statmore and that Statmore should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of 6 
months. During such suspension, we sincerely suggest that Statmore reappraise the candor, 
fairness, and responsibility a lawyer owes to his client. We recommend that Statmore revise his 
accounting procedures and office management to prevent recurrence of any misconduct. 
Suspension of Statmore shall be effective September 1, 1984, and shall last for 6 months. 
Statmore shall make suitable arrangements that his clients’ matters pending at and during his 
suspension shall be suitably protected. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Was Statmore’s commingling of Kuzara’s funds with his own intentional? Was it 
reckless? Was Kuzara harmed, and if so, how? 
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2. Was a 6 month suspension an appropriate sanction under the circumstances? How does 
it compare to the sanctions for other violations of the duty of care? 
 
Further Reading: 
 
● ABA Model Rules for Client Trust Account Records (2010). 
 
Equity as Compensation 
 
I’ve got the brains you’ve got the looks. Let’s make lots of money. You’ve got the brawn I’ve got 
the brains. Let’s make lots of money.30 
 
Sometimes, attorneys agree to accept an equity interest in their client’s property, in lieu of 
attorney fees. For example, an attorney representing a corporation may accept shares of the 
company rather than cash. This kind of agreement can benefit both the client and the attorney, 
especially if the client is cash-poor, but is a promising investment. The client receives legal 
advice with no upfront expense, and the attorney receives an investment potentially worth much 
more than the hourly fees. Moreover, the attorney has an incentive to provide the best possible 
advice, because it will increase the value of their investment. 
 
But equity compensation is not limited to securities. An attorney may agree to represent a client 
in exchange for an equity interest in the client’s real estate. Or a patent attorney may agree to 
prosecute a patent in exchange for an interest in the patent. 
 
In any case, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct permits equity compensation, but only if 
the attorney complies with the requirements of Model Rule 1.8(a). Essentially, the attorney must 
disclose the terms of the agreement to the client, the attorney must advise the client to seek 
independent legal counsel, and the client must provide informed consent to the agreement, all 
of which must be in writing. In addition, the terms of the agreement must be substantively “fair 
and reasonable” to the client. 
 
The concern is that the attorney’s financial interest in the client’s property could create a conflict 
of interest. In theory, both the client and the attorney want the property to increase in value. But 
in some cases, the attorney’s interest in the property could compromise the impartiality of the 
attorney’s advice, if a potential transaction would benefit the client, but harm the attorney’s 
property interest. 
 
Model Rule 1.8: Current Clients: Specific Rules 
 
a. A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an 
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless: 
																																																								
30 Pet Shop Boys, Opportunities (Let’s Make Lots of Money), Please (1986). 
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1. the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and 
reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a 
manner that can be reasonably understood by the client; 
2. the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a 
reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel on the 
transaction; and 
3. the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the 
essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, 
including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction. 
 
Committee on Prof. Ethics v. Mershon, 316 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1982) 
 
Summary: Mershon did tax and property work for Miller. Mershon, Miller, and Schenk formed a 
corporation to turn land into a development property. Mershon gave the corporation a $6,250 promissory 
note and received 200 shares of stock in exchange for his legal services. The project never happened due 
to lack of funding, and Miller died. Mershon expended $900 in out of pocket expenses for the corporation 
(more than promissory note) but didn’t intend to seek payment. Schenk wanted ½ of the outstanding 
stock. Mershon violated the rules of professional responsibility because he and Miller had differing 
interests in the transaction. Mershon was reprimanded.  
 
McCORMICK, Justice. 
 
This case involves review of a Grievance Commission report recommending that respondent be 
reprimanded for alleged ethical violations arising from a business transaction with a client. We 
adopt the recommendation. 
 
From our de novo review of the record, we find the facts as follows. Respondent is a Cedar 
Falls attorney. He began to do tax and property work for Leonard O. Miller, a farmer, in 1951. 
Miller owned 100 acres of farmland adjacent to a country club near the city. In 1969, when he 
was 68, Miller became interested in developing the land for residential purposes. He employed 
a landscape architect and R. O. Schenk, of Schenk Engineering Company, to prepare a 
preliminary plat and market study. 
 
When the preliminary work was completed, Miller brought Schenk to meet with respondent to 
discuss the project. Miller wished to proceed with the development but did not have sufficient 
funds to pay engineering costs. Schenk suggested that the three men form a corporation to 
which Miller would contribute the land, Schenk would contribute engineering services, and 
respondent would contribute legal services. They agreed the land was worth approximately 
$400 an acre. Schenk estimated engineering costs at $400 an acre, and he said legal costs 
were usually one half that amount. 
 
After several conferences in early 1970, the three men formed a corporation, Union Township 
Development, Inc. Subsequently Miller conveyed the farmland to the corporation at a capitalized 
value of $12,500 and received 400 shares of stock. Schenk gave the corporation a $12,500 
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promissory note and also received 400 shares of stock. Respondent gave the corporation a 
$6,250 promissory note and received 200 shares of stock. The promissory notes were interest 
free and due at the discretion of the corporation. They were to represent the services to be 
rendered by Schenk and respondent. 
 
Development plans were premised on the corporation’s ability to obtain financing on the security 
of the farmland. As it turned out, the corporation was unable to borrow money unless the three 
individuals would guarantee the obligation personally. They refused to do so, and financing was 
never obtained. 
 
The trio met at least annually to discuss the development, but when Miller died on December 
31, 1978, at the age of 77, the project was still at a stalemate. Respondent believed the parties 
had an oral agreement that if development did not occur he and Schenk would relinquish their 
interests in the corporation to Miller. Three days after Miller’s death, he transferred his stock to 
the corporation. He asked Schenk to do the same thing, but Schenk refused, denying any 
obligation to do so. 
 
Respondent was nominated in Miller’s will as executor of his estate. He served in that capacity 
until Miller’s two daughters expressed dissatisfaction with his role in Miller’s conveyance of the 
farmland to the corporation. He then resigned as executor. Consistent with his view, he showed 
Miller as owner of all corporate stock in the preliminary probate inventory. The farmland was 
appraised at $4,000 an acre. 
 
Although respondent had expended $900 in out-of-pocket expenses for the corporation and 
performed legal services worth more than $6,000, he did not intend to seek payment. Schenk, 
however, maintained at the time of the grievance hearing that he still owned one half of the 
outstanding stock of the corporation. 
 
The determinative question in our review is whether this evidence establishes a violation of the 
principle in DR5-104(A), which provides: 
 
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client if they have differing 
interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise his professional 
judgment therein for the protection of the client, unless the client has consented after full 
disclosure. 
 
In order to establish a violation of DR5-104(A) it is necessary to show that the lawyer and client 
had differing interests in the transaction, that the client expected the lawyer to exercise his 
professional judgment for the protection of the client, and that the client consented to the 
transaction without full disclosure. 
 
The definitions section of the code of professional responsibility defines "differing interests": 
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“Differing interests” include every interest that will adversely affect either the judgment or 
loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether it be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other 
interest. 
 
Miller and Mershon plainly had differing interests in at least two aspects of the transaction. One 
was the issue of giving respondent a present interest in the corporation in anticipation of future 
legal services. The fee agreement was made during the existence of the attorney-client 
relationship and thus was subject to the general principles governing attorney-client 
transactions. Because respondent’s fee was tied to the amount of his stock in the corporation, 
he and Miller had differing interests concerning the extent of respondent's stock ownership. 
Another differing interest involved making respondent a debtor of the corporation to assure that 
the services would be performed. Because Miller’s interest was aligned wholly with the 
corporation, he and respondent had differing interests with respect to respondent's promissory 
note. 
 
No dispute exists that Miller relied on respondent to exercise his professional judgment to 
protect him. One respect in which respondent did so was in preparing a written agreement to 
assure that Miller was reimbursed from the first profits of the corporation for the preincorporation 
expenses of preliminary studies. This, however, was the only agreement of the parties that was 
reduced to writing. 
 
The fighting issue before the Commission was whether respondent made full disclosure to Miller 
within the meaning of the Canon before Miller entered the transaction. If full disclosure means 
only that respondent made Miller fully aware of the nature and terms of the transaction, this 
requirement was satisfied. Nothing was hidden from Miller, and he was an active participant in 
the transaction. Full disclosure, however, means more than this. 
 
Because of the fiduciary relationship which exists, the attorney 
 
has the burden of showing that the transaction was in all respects fairly and equitably 
conducted; that he fully and faithfully discharged all his duties to his client, not only by 
refraining from any misrepresentation or concealment of any material fact, but by active 
diligence to see that his client was fully informed of the nature and effect of the 
transaction proposed and of his own rights and interests in the subject matter involved, 
and by seeing to it that his client either has independent advice in the matter or else 
receives from the attorney such advice as the latter would have been expected to give 
had the transaction been one between his client and a stranger. 
 
Respondent acknowledges he did not suggest to Miller that he obtain independent advice. The 
record does not show he otherwise gave Miller the kind of advice Miller should have had if the 
transaction were with a stranger. Respondent let Schenk estimate the value of his legal services 
and thus the extent of respondent’s stock ownership without any investigation to determine 
whether the estimate was accurate. Nor did he suggest to Miller that he make such 
investigation. If Schenk’s estimate was generous, the effect may have been to chill respondent’s 
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scrutiny of the benchmark for the valuation, which was Schenk’s valuation of his own services. 
Furthermore there was no discussion or investigation concerning the reasonableness or wisdom 
of tying respondent’s fee for future services to a present twenty percent interest in the 
corporation. Respondent acknowledges that the arrangement was at least a technical violation. 
 
Nothing was done to assure that Miller would get his farm back if either Schenk or respondent 
did not perform or if the development should not be undertaken. Nothing was done to protect 
Miller or his estate in the event of the death of any of the parties. The promissory notes could 
hardly have been on more favorable terms to the debtors. The record does not show whether 
Miller was informed of the difficulty the corporation might have in enforcing respondent's 
obligation. So far as the record shows, Miller was not told of any possible effect of respondent's 
differing interests on the exercise of his professional judgment. 
 
The Commission found respondent is forthright and honest and gained no profit from the 
transaction. The record confirms this finding. As the Commission also found, however, a 
violation of DR5-104(A) was nevertheless established. Respondent had three alternatives when 
the Schenk proposal was first made. The safest and perhaps best course would have been to 
refuse to participate personally in the transaction. Alternatively, he could have recommended 
that Miller obtain independent advice. Finally, if Miller refused to seek independent advice or 
respondent did not recommend he do so, he could have made the least desirable choice. He 
could have attempted to meet the high standard of disclosure outlined in this opinion. 
 
Having chosen to enter the transaction without recommending that Miller obtain independent 
advice, respondent was obliged to make full disclosure. Because the record does not show full 
disclosure was made before Miller consented to the transaction, a violation of DR5-104(A) has 
been established. This is true even though respondent did not act dishonestly or make a profit 
on the transaction. 
 
In accordance with the Commission recommendation, we reprimand him for the violation. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Did Mershon benefit at Miller’s expense? 
2. Why was Miller reprimanded? What should he have done to avoid a reprimand? Would it 
have changed the outcome? 
3. Was Mershon’s punishment sufficient under the circumstances? 
 
Litigation Finance 
 
Historically, “maintenance,” “champerty,” and “barratry” were illegal and tortious.31 Maintenance 
is litigation funding by a disinterested third party, champerty is litigation funding in exchange for 
																																																								
31 Percy H. Winfield, History of Maintenance and Champerty, 35 L. Q. Rev. 50 (1919). In medieval 
England, maintenance and champerty were both prohibited by statute, and may also have been 
prohibited by the common law. 
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a percentage of any recovery, and barratry is frivolous litigation.32 The prohibition was intended 
to prevent frivolous and abusive litigation. The concern was that nobles would abuse the courts 
to harass their enemies and extort settlements.33 
 
Until recently, United States courts maintained the prohibition on maintenance and champerty. 
But people began to question the legitimacy of rules that prevented people from pursuing valid 
claims simply because they could not pay attorney’s fees. First, courts began permitting 
contingent fee agreements, which are champerty, but limited to lawyers. And then they began 
permitting litigation finance agreements, which are champerty for everyone. 
 
Contingent fee agreements are literally champerty, because an attorney agrees to fund litigation 
in exchange for a percentage of the recovery. And litigation finance agreements are champerty 
squared, because a third party agrees to fund litigation in exchange for a percentage of the 
recovery. But courts have held that both contingent fees and litigation finance are fine, because 
they enable people to pursue valid claims. 
 
Model Rule 1.8: Current Clients: Specific Rules 
 
e. A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or 
contemplated litigation, except that: 
1. a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of 
which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and 
2. a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of 
litigation on behalf of the client. 
f. A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the 
client unless: 
1. the client gives informed consent; 
2. there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment 
or with the client-lawyer relationship; and 
3. information relating to representation of a client is protected. 
 
Model Rule 1.8: Current Clients: Specific Rules 
 
i. A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter 
of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may: 
1. acquire a lien authorized by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses; and 
2. contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 36: Forbidden Client–Lawyer 
Financial Arrangements 
																																																								
32 The word “champerty” derived from the Old French word “champart,” which referred to a feudal lord’s 
claim to a share of the produce of the land worked by a vassal. The word “barratry” derived from the Old 
French word “barater,” which meant “to deceive.” 
33 In practice, the law prohibited champerty, and may have permitted maintenance without champerty. 
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1. A lawyer may not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of 
litigation that the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may: 
a. acquire a lien to secure the lawyer’s fee or expenses; and 
b. contract with a client for a contingent fee in a civil case except when prohibited. 
2. A lawyer may not make or guarantee a loan to a client in connection with pending or 
contemplated litigation that the lawyer is conducting for the client, except that the lawyer 
may make or guarantee a loan covering court costs and expenses of litigation, the 
repayment of which to the lawyer may be contingent on the outcome of the matter. 
3. A lawyer may not, before the lawyer ceases to represent a client, make an agreement 
giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial 
part on information relating to the representation. 
 
Saladini v. Righellis, 426 Mass. 231 (1997) 
 
MARSHALL, J. 
 
The plaintiff, Lisa Saladini, appeals from the decision of a judge in the Superior Court dismissing 
her complaint, sua sponte, on the ground that a written agreement she had with the defendant, 
George P. Righellis, was champertous and unenforceable. Saladini had sought a declaratory 
judgment establishing her rights under the agreement. We granted Saladini’s application for 
direct appellate review to consider whether we should continue to enforce the doctrine. We rule 
that the common law doctrines of champerty, barratry, and maintenance no longer shall be 
recognized in Massachusetts. We reverse the judgment entered in the Superior Court and 
remand this case for further proceedings. 
 
I 
 
On September 23, 1992, Saladini and Righellis entered into a written agreement pursuant to 
which Saladini agreed to advance funds to Righellis to allow him to pursue potential legal claims 
he had arising out of his interest in real estate in Cambridge, known as Putnam Manor. In 
return, Righellis agreed that, if pursuit of his claims yielded any recovery, the first amount 
recovered would be used to reimburse Saladini, and that Saladini would, in addition, receive 
50% of any net recovery remaining after payment of attorney’s fees. Saladini, herself, had no 
interest in Putnam Manor. 
 
Saladini thereafter advanced funds to Righellis that he used to retain an attorney under a 
contingent fee agreement to bring a lawsuit and to pursue his legal claims. At some point 
Righellis became dissatisfied with that attorney’s representation and, with the concurrence of 
Saladini, hired a new lawyer, Robert Potters, to replace him. Righellis signed a new contingent 
fee agreement with Potters. 
 
The original agreement between Saladini and Righellis did not anticipate retaining a second 
attorney to represent Righellis in the Putnam Manor lawsuit. Saladini maintains that to deal with 
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this circumstance, she and Righellis agreed that each would pay one-half of the retainer 
required by Potters, each would pay one-half of the litigation disbursements, and that in all other 
respects the terms of their original agreement would remain in effect. No new or amended 
agreement was executed, but Saladini did pay one-half of the retainer to Potters and one-half of 
the litigation disbursements. All told, Saladini advanced a total of $19,229 to Righellis. 
 
At some point Righellis settled the Putnam Manor lawsuit, with the defendants in that case 
agreeing to pay him $130,000. The first payment of $10,000 was paid on or about November 2, 
1994, with the balance due on January 11, 1995. Neither Potters nor Righellis informed Saladini 
that a settlement had been reached, or that the first settlement funds had been received. 
 
When Saladini became aware of the settlement, she filed suit, seeking to establish her rights 
under the agreement. She also sought, and a judge in the Superior Court granted, injunctive 
relief, enjoining Righellis and Potters from disbursing any of the settlement funds until her claims 
had been adjudicated. 
 
In November, 1995, Righellis filed a motion for summary judgment that Saladini opposed. After 
reviewing the submissions of the parties, a judge in the Superior Court, sua sponte, invited both 
parties to submit memoranda on the issue whether the agreement between Saladini and 
Righellis was champertous. A hearing followed and, in September, 1996, another judge ruled 
that the agreement was champertous and unenforceable as against public policy. She ordered 
that Saladini's complaint be dismissed in its entirety. A judgment to that effect was entered on 
September 24, 1996. Saladini appealed. A judge granted Saladini’s motion to continue the 
preliminary injunction pending her appeal. 
 
II 
 
Champerty has been described as the unlawful maintenance of a suit, where a person without 
an interest in it agrees to finance the suit, in whole or in part, in consideration for receiving a 
portion of the proceeds of the litigation. We described the doctrine as a “narrow and somewhat 
technical concept,” a type of maintenance that occurs when a person engages in “officious 
intermeddling in a suit that no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either party with 
money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it.” 
 
The doctrine has a long and, in this country, checkered history. The ancient prohibition against 
champerty arose in feudal England. More recently the doctrine has been viewed as a check on 
frivolous or unnecessary litigation, or a mechanism to encourage the settlement of disputes 
without recourse to litigation. The extent to which courts, here, accepted the doctrine has varied. 
In some States, champerty was never adopted, or has been abandoned. In others, the doctrine 
was given narrow application. Massachusetts followed the common law prohibition against 
champerty, although we have never enforced the doctrine to the same extent as English 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 130	
courts.34 Nevertheless, under our own development of the doctrine we have little doubt that the 
agreement between Saladini and Righellis would be champertous were we to continue to 
recognize the offense. We no longer are inclined to do so. 
 
We have long abandoned the view that litigation is suspect, and have recognized that 
agreements to purchase an interest in an action may actually foster resolution of a dispute. In 
more recent cases we have questioned whether the doctrine continues to serve any useful 
purpose. In McInerney, we noted that “the decline of champerty, maintenance, and barratry as 
offences is symptomatic of a fundamental change in society’s view of litigation — from ‘a social 
ill, which, like other disputes and quarrels, should be minimized’ to ‘a socially useful way to 
resolve disputes.’” In Christian v. Mooney, we declined to consider whether an agreement 
between a “bounty hunter in troubled titles” and other plaintiffs in a suit was champertous 
because that issue was not contested by the parties to the agreement — even though that 
plaintiff's repeated instigation of litigation regarding troubled real estate titles was the very 
conduct traditionally condemned as violative of the prohibition against champerty. Most recently, 
in Berman v. Linnane, we declined to strike down a contingent fee agreement that did not satisfy 
the requirements of S.J.C. Rule 3:05 as champertous, relying rather on “the public policy 
against the recovery of excessive fees” to limit the financial recovery by an attorney. We 
observed in that case that “at least as to lawyers, other principles fulfil whatever purpose 
champerty once had.” These decisions all reflect the change in our attitude toward the financing 
of litigation. 
 
We also no longer are persuaded that the champerty doctrine is needed to protect against the 
evils once feared: speculation in lawsuits, the bringing of frivolous lawsuits, or financial 
overreaching by a party of superior bargaining position. There are now other devices that more 
effectively accomplish these ends. Our rule governing contingent fees between attorneys and 
clients is based on the principle that an attorney’s fee must be reasonable. We also recognize a 
public policy against the recovery of excessive fees. Additional devices include Mass. R. Civ. P. 
11, providing sanctions for misconduct, and G. L. c. 231, § 6F, regulating the bringing of 
frivolous lawsuits. General Laws c. 93A, and the doctrines of unconscionability, duress, and 
good faith, establish standards of fair dealing between opposing parties. To the extent that we 
continue to have the concerns that the doctrine of champerty was thought to address, we 
conclude that it is better to do so directly, rather than attempting to mold an ancient doctrine to 
modern circumstances.35 As Justice Holmes, then a member of this court, said a century ago: “It 
																																																								
34 For example, we consistently have held that it is not unlawful “to engage in the business of buying 
choses in action and enforcing them by suit if necessary,” although under English common law 
assignments of choses in action are within the scope of champerty. We have not prohibited agreements 
otherwise champertous where the party has an independent interest in the suit. We also have recognized 
the validity of contingent fee arrangements with attorneys, which otherwise would be champertous. 
35 The doctrine of champerty may also be unworkable or have harsh results. Rather than punishing the 
owner of the legal claim who has entered into a champertous agreement, the doctrine bestows on him a 
windfall. In this case, for example, Righellis would be permitted to retain the full benefit of the positive 
result achieved in the Putnam Manor lawsuit, while he would not have to honor his obligations to Saladini, 
the person whose support made pursuit of the lawsuit possible. A defendant sued in a champerty-
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is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of 
Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long 
since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.” 
 
Other States that no longer recognize the doctrine of champerty have continued to scrutinize an 
agreement to finance a lawsuit with care. We shall do likewise. This means that if an agreement 
to finance a lawsuit is challenged, we will consider whether the fees charged are excessive or 
whether any recovery by a prevailing party is vitiated because of some impermissible 
overreaching by the financier. Judges also retain their inherent power to disapprove an 
attorney's fee that is unreasonable. We shall be guided in our analysis by a rule of what is fair 
and reasonable, looking to all of the circumstances at the time the arrangement is made to 
determine whether the agreement should be set aside or modified. In this case, for example, 
had the agreement been challenged, relevant factors might have included the respective 
bargaining position of the parties at the time the agreement was made, whether both parties 
were aware of the terms and consequences of the agreement, whether Righellis may have been 
unable to pursue the lawsuit at all without Saladini’s funds, and whether the claim by Righellis 
that he will receive but $35,000 of the total $130,000 settlement award if Saladini prevails is 
unreasonable in the circumstances. We observe that before the judge raised the issue, Righellis 
had never challenged the validity of his agreement with Saladini. The record before us does not 
permit any conclusion regarding the reasonableness of the agreement between Righellis and 
Saladini on the one hand, or Righellis and Potters on the other. We see no reason why Righellis 
should be the beneficiary of any windfall, or why any adjustment to the financing arrangement 
— if appropriate at all — should be made solely at Saladini's expense. If pursued, those matters 
can be decided by the trial judge. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. On October 4, 2012, the website Gawker published a 2 minute excerpt from a 30 minute 
video of Terry Gene Bollea, better known as “Hulk Hogan,” having sex with Heather 
Clem, the wife of Bollea’s friend Bubba the Love Sponge Clem. Bollea claimed the video 
was made without his knowledge or consent, and filed an action against Gawker in 
Florida state court, alleging an assortment of tort claims. The jury ruled in favor of Bollea, 
awarding him $115 million in compensatory damages and $25 million in punitive 
damages. Gawker could not pay the judgment and filed for bankruptcy. After the trial, 
Peter Thiel disclosed that he had paid millions of dollars to finance Bollea’s action, which 
he described as “one of my greater philanthropic things that I've done.” Many people 
objected to Thiel’s role in Bollea’s action. Was it maintenance, champerty, or barratry? 
Should it have been prohibited? 
2. In 2003, residents of Lago Agrio, Ecuador filed a class action against Chevron in an 
Ecuadorian court, alleging that its Lago Agrio oil field had polluted the environment. The 
plaintiffs were represented by the Ecuadorian lawyer Pablo Fajardo Mendoza and the 
American lawyer Steven Donziger, who obtained more than $32 million in third-party 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
supported litigation may not assert the champerty as a defense, but a court may refuse to enforce a 
champertous agreement even where the defense of champerty has not been asserted. 
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litigation funding. The American documentary filmmaker Joe Berlinger documented the 
litigation and released the film Crude in 2009. In 2011, the Ecuadorian court ruled for the 
plaintiffs and ordered Chevron to pay $18 billion in damages. Chevron’s lawyers at 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP noticed that an early version of Crude had featured an 
ostensibly impartial environmental expert meeting with Donziger before the trial, and 
subpoenaed Berlinger’s outtakes, which provided additional evidence of fraud and 
corruption. In 2014, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
found that Donziger had used “corrupt means” in the Ecuadorian court and refused to 
enforce the verdict, and the Second Circuit affirmed. Both New York and the District of 
Columbia suspended Donziger from the practice of law. Was it improper for Donziger to 
obtain third-party litigation funding? Did the availability of funding create improper 
incentives? Are third-party litigation funders in a position to evaluate the legitimacy of the 
litigation they fund? Should they be? 
 
Further Reading: 
 
● Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 Calif. L. Rev. 48 (1935) 
● Jeremy Kidd, Modelling the Likely Effects of Litigation Financing, 47 Loy. Chi. L.J. 1239 
(2016) 
● Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 61 (2011) 
● Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 367 (2009) 
● Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim is This, Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 Minn. L. 
Rev. 1268 (2011) 
● Victoria Shannon Sahani, Reshaping Third Party Funding, 91 Tulane L. Rev. 405 (2017) 
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2.8: Organizations as Clients 
 
We live as we dream, alone. To crack the shell we mix with the others.36 
 
You pull down the future with the one you love (I see no evil).37 
 
When an attorney represents an organization, the attorney’s client is typically the organization, 
and only the organization. An attorney may represent any kind of organization, irrespective of its 
form. Obviously, an attorney may represent an organization that is a legal entity, like a 
corporation or a limited liability company. But an attorney may also represent an organization 
that is not a legal entity, like a partnership or an unincorporated association. In all of these 
cases, the attorney may represent the organization without representing the constituents of the 
organization. 
 
But an organization is a legal fiction that can act only through its agents. Accordingly, the 
attorney advises the organization by advising its agents, who make decisions on behalf of the 
organization, depending on their role in the organization. In other words, attorneys advise 
organizational clients by advising non-client agents, who make decisions that bind the 
organizational client. 
 
Of course, the agents of an organizational client may consult with each other before making 
decisions for the organization. They may individually ask the attorney for advice about how to 
act on behalf of the organizational client. They may ask the attorney to advise them collectively 
about the organizational client’s options. And they may ask the attorney for advice about the 
statements, decisions, and actions of other agents. 
 
The attorney must provide legal advice to the agents of an organizational client, in their capacity 
as agents of that client. But the attorney must always remember that the client is the 
organization, not the organization’s agent. When the attorney advises an agent, the attorney 
must provide advice for the benefit of the organization, not the agent. And the attorney must 
ensure that the agents observe their duties to the organization. 
 
Specifically, an attorney representing an organizational client must ensure that its agents act 
consistently with the interests of the organization, rather than their own interests. If an agent of 
an organizational client acts or refuses to act in a way that violates a legal obligation to the 
organization, then the attorney must act to protect the interests of the organization. The attorney 
should generally report the concern to the management of the organization. In some cases, the 
attorney may even report confidential information or withdraw from representation, if it is 
necessary to protect the interests of the organization. 
 
Model Rule 1.13: Organization as Client 
 
a. A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting 
through its duly authorized constituents. 
b. If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person 
associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a 
																																																								
36 Gang of Four, We Live as We Dream, Alone, Songs of the Free (1984). 
37 Television, See No Evil, Marquee Moon (1977). 
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matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the 
organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, 
and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall 
proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the 
lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization 
to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, 
including, if warranted by the circumstances to the highest authority that can act on 
behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law. 
c. Except as provided in paragraph (d), if 
1. despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority 
that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a 
timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a 
violation of law, and 
2. the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in 
substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information 
relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, 
but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent 
substantial injury to the organization. 
d. Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's 
representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend 
the organization or an officer, employee or other constituent associated with the 
organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. 
e. A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the 
lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c), or who withdraws under 
circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those 
paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that 
the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal. 
f. In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders 
or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer 
knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those 
of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing. 
g. A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, 
employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of 
Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, 
the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the 
individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 96: Representing an Organization 
as Client 
 
1. When a lawyer is employed or retained to represent an organization: 
a. the lawyer represents the interests of the organization as defined by its 
responsible agents acting pursuant to the organization's decision-making 
procedures; and 
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b. subject to Subsection (2), the lawyer must follow instructions in the 
representation. 
2. If a lawyer representing an organization knows of circumstances indicating that a 
constituent of the organization has engaged in action or intends to act in a way that 
violates a legal obligation to the organization that will likely cause substantial injury to it, 
or that reasonably can be foreseen to be imputable to the organization and likely to 
result in substantial injury to it, the lawyer must proceed in what the lawyer reasonably 
believes to be the best interests of the organization. 
3. In the circumstances described in Subsection (2), the lawyer may, in circumstances 
warranting such steps, ask the constituent to reconsider the matter, recommend that a 
second legal opinion be sought, and seek review by appropriate supervisory authority 
within the organization, including referring the matter to the highest authority that can act 
in behalf of the organization. 
 
In the Matter of Silva, 636 A.2d 316 (R.I. 1994) 
 
Summary: Attorney Daniel Silva represented both Medcon Mortgage Corporation and 
Suncoast Savings and Loan. Medcon was owned by Silva’s friend Edward Medeiros. 
Silva learned that Medeiros was illegally diverting funds and advised him to stop, but did 
not advise Suncoast, because Medeiros claimed attorney-client privilege. The 
Disciplinary Board found that Silva violated the rules of professional conduct, and the 
Supreme Court agreed, holding that Silva should have reported Medeiros’s fraud and 
withdrawn from representing Medcon and Suncoast.  
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
The respondent, Daniel J. Silva, appeared before this court on December 2, 1993, pursuant to 
an order to show cause why discipline should not be imposed. The Disciplinary Board 
conducted an evidentiary hearing and received legal memoranda from the respondent and 
disciplinary counsel. The board has filed with us its decision and a concurring opinion signed by 
three members of the board. 
 
The board found that Silva violated several provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
when he failed to report a diversion of mortgage funds by his long-time friend Edward Medeiros. 
Silva served as counsel to Medeiros’s mortgage company, Medcon Mortgage Corporation, and 
Suncoast Savings and Loan of Hollywood, Florida. In his capacity as closing attorney for 
Suncoast, Silva received wire transfers of mortgage proceeds in his client account. Upon receipt 
of the wire transfers from Suncoast, Silva simply turned the proceeds over to Medeiros and/or 
MEDCON for disbursement. In the fall of 1990 Silva learned that Medeiros had diverted funds 
from a closing funded by Suncoast in which Silva acted as closing attorney. The diverted funds 
were designated to pay off a preexisting mortgage on the property. Silva advised Medeiros that 
his conduct was criminal. Silva did not notify Suncoast of the diversion of funds, nor did he 
inform the title insurance company, which had issued a title policy that did not except the prior 
mortgage from coverage, that the prior mortgage had not been discharged. Silva testified that 
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Medeiros forbade him to do so on the basis of Medeiros's assertion of the attorney/client 
privilege on behalf of both MEDCON and himself personally. 
 
In December 1990 Silva received a wire transfer from Suncoast for another closing with 
MEDCON. Notwithstanding his knowledge of the previous diversion of funds by Medeiros, Silva 
did not disburse the funds in accordance with the terms listed on the closing sheet; instead, he 
turned the proceeds over to MEDCON. Silva kept $100 of the proceeds as his fee for serving as 
a conduit of the funds. Medeiros converted those funds to his own use, and was subsequently 
convicted and imprisoned. The respondent was never charged with committing a criminal act. 
 
The respondent’s position before the board and this court is that he was prohibited from 
disclosing Medeiros’s defalcation by the provisions of Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. Respondent also took the position that he had no obligation to protect Suncoast’s 
interests. We do not agree with either of his contentions. 
 
On the basis of the record before us, we believe that Silva had an obligation to both MEDCON 
and Suncoast to ensure that the transactions in which he acted as attorney and/or agent were 
carried out with fair dealing and good faith. We further believe that Silva had an obligation to 
report Medeiros’s overt act of diverting the funds as soon as he learned of it. In addition Silva 
should have withdrawn from representing both MEDCON and Suncoast as soon as he 
discovered Medeiros’s fraud. 
 
Although we consider Silva’s failure to act appropriately and to make the requisite disclosures 
serious breaches of his ethical obligation, we find no evidence that Silva’s actions were 
motivated by personal gain. Rather, he appears to have had a genuine belief that Medeiros’s 
assertion of the attorney/client privilege and the requirements of Rule 1.6 prohibited the 
disclosure we now say was required. 
 
Silva did not appear to appreciate and understand to whom he owed the duty of confidentiality. 
It is apparent from this record, however, that he was counsel to the corporate entity MEDCON, 
and therefore, it was to MEDCON he owed the duty of confidentiality. Silva’s dealings with 
Medeiros did not establish the attorney/client relationship that would trigger the application of 
the prohibitions against disclosure encompassed in Rule 1.6. Therefore, Silva’s obligations to 
both Suncoast and MEDCON required him to disclose Medeiros’s overt criminal act of 
conversion of the funds. 
 
This court concurs with the findings of the disciplinary board that Silva exercised very poor 
judgment and that he engaged in serious misconduct. We are constrained however to depart 
from the board's recommendation for sanction. We believe that Rule 1.6 has created a great 
deal of confusion among the members of the Rhode Island Bar. We therefore censure Silva for 
his failure to fulfill his ethical obligations to the parties to these transactions. The court’s 
issuance of this sanction rather than the three-month suspension of Silva’s license is due in part 
to the absence of any motive for personal gain and Silva’s ten years at the bar without a 
disciplinary complaint. The court’s position on the appropriate level of sanction, however, would 
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be more severe were it not for the apparent confusion in the mind of this attorney concerning 
whom he represented and the silence of Rule 1.6 on that question. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Medeiros owned Medcon. How could Silva have reported to Medcon? 
2. Could Silva have reasonably believed that he represented Medeiros? 
3. Did the court impose an appropriate punishment? 
 
Representing a Corporation 
 
Brennan v. Ruffner, 640 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 1994) 
Summary: In 1976, Dr. Brennan and Dr. Martell formed a professional association. 
Attorney Charles Ruffner prepared the shareholders agreement. When Dr. Mirmelli 
joined the association in 1982, Ruffner revised the agreement, which provided for the 
involuntary termination of any shareholder by majority vote. All of the shareholders 
agreed. In 1989, Martell and Mirmelli voted to terminate Brennan. Among other things, 
Brennan filed a malpractice action against Ruffner. The trial court granted summary 
judgment to Ruffner, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that Ruffner represented 
the corporation, not Brennan. 
 
PARIENTE, Judge. 
 
We affirm a final summary judgment entered in favor of a lawyer and against a disgruntled 
minority shareholder of a closely held corporation. We find that an attorney/client relationship 
did not exist between the individual shareholder and the attorney representing the corporation. 
Consequently, there is no basis for a legal malpractice action. We further reject the other 
theories of liability asserted by appellant. 
 
In 1976, appellant, Robert J. Brennan, M.D., along with a Dr. Martell, employed appellee, 
Charles L. Ruffner, Esq., to incorporate their medical practice as a professional association. In 
connection with the incorporation, the lawyer prepared a shareholder’s agreement. In 1982, a 
third doctor, Dr. Mirmelli, joined the corporation, and each doctor became a one-third 
shareholder in the new firm. The lawyer, who was corporate counsel since 1976, was requested 
to draft a new shareholder's agreement. After approximately 8 months of negotiation, the 
shareholders executed a new shareholder's agreement. The new agreement included a 
provision for the involuntary termination of any shareholder by a majority vote of the two other 
shareholders. It is undisputed that Dr. Brennan was aware of this provision at the time he signed 
the documents and that he signed the agreement upon reassurances from Dr. Mirmelli that he 
would not join with Dr. Martell in using the provision against Dr. Brennan. 
 
However, despite the assurances, in 1989 Dr. Martell and Dr. Mirmelli involuntarily terminated 
Dr. Brennan as a shareholder and employee of the corporation. Dr. Brennan instituted a lawsuit 
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against Dr. Martell and Dr. Mirmelli claiming breach of contract and fraud in the inducement. 
The verified complaint in that lawsuit specifically alleged that Dr. Brennan was not represented 
by counsel in the negotiation of the shareholder's agreement. That lawsuit was settled. Dr. 
Brennan then filed this suit for legal malpractice, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and 
breach of contract as a third party beneficiary. In contradiction to the sworn allegations of the 
first lawsuit, Dr. Brennan alleged in this complaint that the lawyer represented him individually, 
as well as the corporation, in the preparation and drafting of the agreement. The lawyer denied 
undertaking the representation of Dr. Brennan individually. 
 
In a legal malpractice action, a plaintiff must prove three elements: the attorney's employment, 
the attorney's neglect of a reasonable duty and that such negligence resulted in and was the 
proximate cause of loss to the plaintiff. Florida courts have uniformly limited attorney's liability 
for negligence in the performance of their professional duties to clients with whom they share 
privity of contract.  
 
The material undisputed facts in this case support a legal conclusion that there was no privity of 
contract between Dr. Brennan and the corporation’s lawyer. It is undisputed that the lawyer was 
representing the corporation. The issue raised by Dr. Brennan's complaint was whether the 
lawyer was also representing him individually. While Dr. Brennan made the initial contact with 
the lawyer, there is no evidence in the record to create a credible issue of fact that the lawyer 
ever represented Dr. Brennan individually. Dr. Brennan's sworn complaint against the other 
doctors, which preceded the legal malpractice action against the lawyer, states he was 
unrepresented by counsel in the negotiation of the shareholder's agreement. 
 
Dr. Brennan argues that a separate duty to him as a shareholder arose by virtue of the lawyer's 
representation of the closely held corporation. Although never squarely decided in this state, we 
hold that where an attorney represents a closely held corporation, the attorney is not in privity 
with and therefore owes no separate duty of diligence and care to an individual shareholder 
absent special circumstances or an agreement to also represent the shareholder individually. 
While there is no specific ethical prohibition in Florida against dual representation of the 
corporation and the shareholder if the attorney is convinced that a conflict does not exist, an 
attorney representing a corporation does not become the attorney for the individual stockholders 
merely because the attorney's actions on behalf of the corporation may also benefit the 
stockholders. The duty of an attorney for the corporation is first and foremost to the corporation, 
even though legal advice rendered to the corporation may affect the shareholders. Cases in 
other jurisdictions have similarly held.  
 
We reject the notion that the lawyer in this case could be held liable to one of the minority 
shareholders for a breach of fiduciary duty. In any closely held corporation, there will be an 
inherent conflict between the potential rights of the minority shareholder and the rights of the 
corporation in a shareholder’s agreement concerning termination. At the time this agreement 
was drafted, any one of the three shareholders could have ended up becoming the minority 
shareholder. While Dr. Brennan claimed in the complaint that the lawyer had a duty to advise 
him of a conflict of interest and never advised him of a potential conflict, the facts in the record 
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do not support that contention. Dr. Brennan testified in deposition that he simply did not recall 
any conversations. However, the accountant for the corporation specifically remembered a 
conversation where the lawyer told the doctors collectively that he represented only the 
corporation in the drafting of the shareholder agreement. Absent some evidence that the 
corporation's lawyer conspired or acted with the two shareholders to insert provisions that would 
work to the detriment of the third shareholder; that the corporation’s lawyer concealed his 
representation of another individual shareholder; or that the attorney agreed to the dual 
representation, there is no breach of fiduciary duty established in this case.  
 
Finally, even assuming arguendo that a duty existed based on an attorney/client relationship, a 
third party beneficiary theory or a breach of fiduciary relationship, we simply do not find any 
factual dispute concerning the issue of proximate cause. It is undisputed that Dr. Brennan was 
aware of the provisions in the agreement and chose to take his chances upon being reassured 
by Dr. Mirmelli that he would never use the provisions against Dr. Brennan. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did the court hold that Ruffner represented the corporation, rather than Brennan? 
What if Brennan were a majority shareholder of the corporation? 
2. Did Ruffner provide Brennan with legal advice? If so, did Ruffner provide negligent legal 
advice? 
3. Did Ruffner represent any of the doctors? 
4. Did Ruffner represent anyone? 
 
Representing a Partnership 
 
Mursau Corp. v. Florida Penn Oil & Gas, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 259 (W.D. Pa. 1986) 
Summary: Thomas Murray owned Mursau Corporation, which purchased a limited 
partnership in Florida-Penn Oil and Gas, Inc., in a deal managed by Goldberg & 
Snodgrass. Mursau filed a breach of fiduciary duty action against G&S, but the district 
court granted summary judgment to G&S, because it found no attorney-client 
relationship or evidence of fraud. 
 
COHILL, Chief Judge. 
 
Presently before us are Motions for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of each Defendant. 
Having held oral argument and having reviewed the affidavits, depositions, briefs and other 
exhibits filed, we find no genuine issue as to any material fact. Consequently, we will grant 
these motions. 
 
Facts 
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Plaintiff, Mursau Corporation, through its President and majority stockholder, Thomas H. 
Murray, Esquire, purchased a limited partnership interest in Defendant Florida-Penn Oil & Gas, 
Inc.’s 1981-102 Drilling Program. Defendant Christian E. Carlsen is the President of Fla-Penn 
and Defendant David Graham is a stockholder of Fla-Penn. Defendant Goldberg & Snodgrass, 
a law firm in which individual Defendants Lee H. Goldberg and Stewart R. Snodgrass are 
partners, was retained by Fla-Penn to structure the 102 program and prepare a tax opinion 
letter with regard to that program. 
 
Mursau’s acquisition of the limited partnership interest in the 102 program came about as a 
result of Murray contacting Goldberg in early October, 1981. Murray was interested in the 102 
program as a tax shelter for Mursau. Since Mursau’s fiscal year ended on October 31, Murray 
wanted to close the deal on or before October 30, in order to secure tax advantages for Mursau 
in 1981. 
 
At his initial meeting with G&S, Murray was given a copy of a Private Placement Memorandum 
for an earlier Fla-Penn oil and gas partnership, the 101 program. He was told that the PPM for 
the 102 program would be materially similar but that the costs would be reduced proportionally 
according to the lesser number of wells to be drilled under the 102 program. The 101 program 
drilled 10 wells; the 102 program would drill only 4. Murray reviewed the PPM for the 101 
program with independent counsel, then signed a commitment letter for the 102 program.  
 
On October 29, 1981, Murray received a copy of the PPM for the 102 program which was in fact 
materially similar to the PPM for the 101 program. At the closing on October 30, 1981, Murray 
refused to tender a check on behalf of Mursau unless he was granted check-signing authority 
for the partnership, a demand clearly in conflict with the limited partnership agreement already 
signed by Murray. Murray wanted that authority so that, after closing, he could dispute the 
payment of certain costs provided for in the PPM, including a finder's commission to the group 
securing the limited partners participation. As indicated by his notes comparing the costs under 
the 101 and 102 program, Murray was fully aware of the $49,600 finder's commission prior to 
the time set for closing.  
 
Although Murray initially walked out of the closing because of the refusal of Fla-Penn to 
acquiesce in his demands, he returned after a conversation with Snodgrass outside on the 
sidewalk. Fla-Penn never acceded to Murray’s demands. After the closing, Fla-Penn paid G&S 
$20,000 for legal fees and $49,600 as a finder’s commission. Murray became aware of these 
payments sometime in December of 1981. 
 
In the complaint, Murray essentially alleges breach of fiduciary duty arising out of an attorney-
client relationship between Mursau and G&S and Goldberg and Snodgrass individually.  
 
The Defendants maintain that the 102 PPM as well as the 101 PPM, on which the 102 was 
modeled, disclose all material information. Both PPMs disclose the payment of legal fees to 
G&S and the finder's commission; both disclose the potential conflict of interest of G&S as 
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counsel for the partnership and the general partner. Both advise prospective limited partners to 
consult independent counsel.  
 
In order to recover for a breach of fiduciary duty by an attorney, the plaintiff has a threshold 
burden of showing existence of an attorney-client relationship. The intent to create an attorney-
client relation can be implied from the conduct of the parties where no express relationship 
exists.  
 
Although the relationship of attorney and client may be implied from the conduct of the parties, 
such conduct must evidence an offer or request by the client for legal services and an 
acceptance of the offer by the attorney. It is clear that an attorney client relationship exists only 
with the consent of both parties. 
 
As noted above, G&S’s representation of the partnership and general partner was disclosed to 
Plaintiff, and Plaintiff was advised to obtain independent counsel. Murray admits that he did 
retain legal counsel who, on behalf of Mursau, met with G&S about the 102 plan. Murray 
received a bill and remitted payment to his independent counsel for legal services.  
 
In contrast, Plaintiff paid no fees to G&S. As stated in the 102 PPM, the partnership paid G&S 
for adapting the 101 PPM for use in the 102 plan and for preparing the tax opinion letter to 
accompany the 102 PPM. The legal fees paid to G&S by the partnership did not include any 
amount for services rendered to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff concedes that the only legal advice he 
received from G&S concerned the tax aspects of the 102 plan. We conclude that the legal 
advice on the tax consequences of the 102 plan was a service provided to and paid for by the 
partnership as part of its efforts to secure a limited partner for its venture. 
 
Since we see no evidence from which we can imply an offer or request for services by Plaintiff, 
nor an acceptance of any such request by G&S, we must conclude that no attorney-client 
relationship was formed between Mursau, the limited partnership, and G&S. G&S did have an 
attorney-client relationship with the partnership and probably the general partner who organized 
the venture. Although Mursau indirectly benefited by receiving the services G&S performed on 
behalf of the partnership to enable the partnership to attract a limited partner, it never 
requested, nor did it receive, other legal advice or services from G&S. 
 
Even were we to find evidence from which an attorney-client relationship between G&S and 
Mursau could be inferred, as discussed above, we see no facts indicating any fraud or other 
breach tending to violate such a relationship. 
 
Viewing the facts presented in a light most favorable to Mursau, the nonmoving party, we 
believe Defendants have met their burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of 
material fact and are entitled to summary judgment. 
 
Questions: 
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1. Did Mursau have any attorney-client relationship with G&S? 
2. Did Mursau pay G&S for legal services? 
3. Why did the court conclude that Mursau had no attorney-client relationship with G&S in 
relation to this matter? 
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2.9: Agents as Clients 
 
There's nothing wrong with having aspirations, nothing wrong with walking tall. But if misfortune 
deals the consequences, sooner or later, friend, you’ve got to fall.38 
 
In theory, an attorney who represents an organization represents only the organization, and 
does not represent the organization’s agents. However, organizations can act only through their 
agents, and when attorneys represent organizations, they do so by providing legal advice to the 
organization’s agents, who made decisions on behalf of the organization. Attorneys must 
convince the organization’s agents to hire them. Attorneys must convince the organization’s 
agents to follow their advice. And attorneys must obey the decisions of the organization’s 
agents. It is easy for attorneys representing an organization to see its agents as their clients, 
rather than the organization itself. 
 
But that is a terrible mistake. When attorneys represent organizations, they must never treat its 
agents as their clients. They must always represent the interests of the organization, and only 
the organization. Attorneys representing an organization must always act in the best interest of 
the organization, and they must ensure that its agents also act in the best interests of the 
organization. And if the interests of the organization conflict with the interests of its agents, the 
attorney must always pursue the interests of the organization. 
 
Usually, the interests of an organization and its agents coincide, and the agents pursue the 
interests of the organization to the best of their ability. But that is not always the case. 
Sometimes, the interests of an organization and its agents diverge, and the agents pursue their 
own interests, at the expense of the organization. 
 
Attorneys representing organizations must always be vigilant to ensure that the organization’s 
interests are aligned with the interests of its agents, and that its agents are acting in the 
organization’s interests, rather than their own. For example, if an agent wants to make a 
transaction on behalf of the organization that will benefit the agent at the organization’s 
expense, the attorney must object. Likewise, if the agent wants to disclose confidential 
information about the organization that will benefit the agent, but harm the organization, the 
attorney must object. 
 
Agents as Quasi-Clients 
 
Attorneys representing an organization must always be careful to ensure that its agents do not 
become quasi-clients. If an attorney is retained by an organization, then the attorney has an 
express attorney-client relationship with the organization. But in order to represent an 
organization, an attorney must provide legal advice to its agents, who will act on the 
organization’s behalf. Accordingly, the attorney must only provide legal advice relating to the 
interests of the organization, and must not provide legal advice relating to the interests of its 
																																																								
38 Hüsker Dü, Friend, You've Got to Fall, Warehouse: Songs and Stories (1987). 
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agents. In fact, attorneys representing an organization should explicitly inform its agents that 
they represent the organization, and not its agents. And they should advise the organization’s 
agents to seek outside counsel, if their interests may diverge from the interests of the 
organization. 
 
In theory, an attorney representing an organization who wants to interview an agent of the 
organization can prevent the agent from becoming a client by explicitly warning the agent that 
the attorney represents the organization, and does not represent the agent. This warning is 
often called an “Upjohn warning” or “corporate Miranda warning,” because its purpose is to 
inform agents of their right to remain silent. After all, an organization cannot force its agents to 
testify against themselves. But it can fire them, if they refuse to participate in an investigation. 
 
If an attorney representing an organization provides legal advice to an agent of that 
organization, then the agent may become a quasi-client of the attorney. That is awkward, 
because it can create a conflict of interest. 
 
American Bar Association White Collar Crime Committee Working Group 
Model “Upjohn Warning” or “Corporate Miranda” Warning 
 
I am a lawyer for Corporation A. I represent only Corporation A, and I do not represent 
you personally. 
 
I am conducting this interview to gather facts in order to provide legal advice for 
Corporation A. This interview is part of an investigation to determine the facts and 
circumstances of X in order to advise Corporation A how best to proceed. 
 
Your communications with me are protected by the attorney-client privilege. But the 
attorney-client privilege belongs solely to Corporation A, not you. That means 
Corporation A alone may elect to waive the attorney-client privilege and reveal our 
discussion to third parties. Corporation A alone may decide to waive the privilege and 
disclose this discussion to such third parties as federal or state agencies, at its sole 
discretion, and without notifying you. 
 
In order for this discussion to be subject to the privilege, it must be kept in confidence. In 
other words, with the exception of your own attorney, you may not disclose the 
substance of this interview to any third party, including other employees or anyone 
outside of the company. You may discuss the facts of what happened but you may not 
discuss this discussion. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
 
Are you willing to proceed? 
 
Questions: 
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1. Does this model warning adequately explain that the attorney represents the 
organization and not its agents? 
2. If you were an attorney representing an organization, would you have any concerns 
about this warning? 
3. If you received this warning, would you answer any questions? Would you give candid 
answers? Would you obtain outside counsel? What if you were unaware of the subject 
matter of the inquiry? 
 
In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F. 3d 334 (4th Cir. 2005) 
 
Summary: AOL started an internal investigation re: its relationship with PurchasePro. 
AOL retained Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering to assist in the investigation. AOL general 
counsel told its employees that were interviewed that the GC represented the company, 
but could represent them if there was no conflict of interest. GC also told the employees 
that they could retain personal counsel at company expense. The SEC began to 
investigate AOL’s relationship with PurchasePro. One employee, Wakeford, was 
deposed by SEC and believed the attorneys represented both them and the company. 
Others, John Doe #1, #2, that were deposed sought independent counsel. The court 
denied Wakeford’s motion to quash because it found that attorney-client privilege in the 
subpoenaed documents belonged only to AOL. 
 
WILSON, District Judge. 
 
This is an appeal by three former employees of AOL Time Warner from the decision of the 
district court denying their motions to quash a grand jury subpoena for documents related to an 
internal investigation by AOL. Appellants in the district court that the subpoenaed documents 
were protected by the attorney-client privilege. Because the district court concluded that the 
privilege was AOL’s alone and because AOL had expressly waived its privilege, the court 
denied the appellants' motion. We affirm. 
 
I. 
 
In March of 2001, AOL began an internal investigation into its relationship with PurchasePro, 
Inc. AOL retained the law firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering to assist in the investigation. Over 
the next several months, AOL’s general counsel and counsel from Wilmer Cutler interviewed 
appellants, AOL employees Kent Wakeford, John Doe 1, and John Doe 2. 
 
The investigating attorneys interviewed Wakeford, a manager in the company’s Business Affairs 
division, on six occasions. At their third interview, and the first one in which Wilmer Cutler 
attorneys were present, Randall Boe, AOL’s General Counsel, informed Wakeford, “We 
represent the company. These conversations are privileged, but the privilege belongs to the 
company and the company decides whether to waive it. If there is a conflict, the attorney-client 
privilege belongs to the company.” Memoranda from that meeting also indicate that the 
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attorneys explained to Wakeford that they represented AOL but that they “could” represent him 
as well, “as long as no conflict appeared.” The attorneys interviewed Wakeford again three days 
later and, at the beginning of the interview, reiterated that they represented AOL, that the 
privilege belonged to AOL, and that Wakeford could retain personal counsel at company 
expense. 
 
The investigating attorneys interviewed John Doe 1 three times. Before the first interview, Boe 
told him, “We represent the company. These conversations are privileged, but the privilege 
belongs to the company and the company decides whether to waive it. You are free to consult 
with your own lawyer at any time.” Memoranda from that interview indicate that the attorneys 
also told him, “We can represent you until such time as there appears to be a conflict of interest, 
but the attorney-client privilege belongs to AOL and AOL can decide whether to keep it or waive 
it.” At the end of the interview, John Doe 1 asked if he needed personal counsel. A Wilmer 
Cutler attorney responded that he did not recommend it, but that he would tell the company not 
to be concerned if Doe retained counsel. 
 
AOL’s attorneys interviewed John Doe 2 twice and followed essentially the same protocol they 
had followed with the other appellants. They noted, “We represent AOL, and can represent you 
too if there is not a conflict.” In addition, the attorneys told him that, “the attorney-client privilege 
is AOL’s and AOL can choose to waive it.” 
 
In November, 2001, the Securities and Exchange Commission began to investigate AOL’s 
relationship with PurchasePro. In December 2001, AOL and Wakeford, through counsel, 
entered into an oral “common interest agreement,” which they memorialized in writing in 
January 2002. The attorneys acknowledged that, “representation of their respective clients 
raised issues of common interest to their respective clients and that the sharing of certain 
documents, information, and communications with clients” would be mutually beneficial. As a 
result, the attorneys agreed to share access to information relating to their representation of 
Wakeford and AOL, noting that “the oral or written disclosure of Common Interest Materials 
would not diminish in any way the confidentiality of such Materials and would not constitute a 
waiver of any applicable privilege.” 
 
Wakeford testified before the SEC on February 14, 2002, represented by his personal counsel. 
Laura Jehl, AOL’s general counsel, and F. Whitten Peters of Williams & Connolly, whom AOL 
had retained in November 2001 in connection with the PurchasePro investigation, were also 
present, and both stated that they represented Wakeford “for purposes of the deposition.” 
During the deposition, the SEC investigators questioned Wakeford about his discussions with 
AOL’s attorneys. When Wakeford’s attorney asserted the attorney-client privilege, the SEC 
investigators followed up with several questions to determine whether the privilege was 
applicable to the investigating attorneys’ March-June 2001 interviews with Wakeford. Wakeford 
told them he believed, at the time of the interviews, that the investigating attorneys represented 
him and the company. 
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John Doe 1 testified before the SEC on February 27, 2002, represented by personal counsel. 
No representatives of AOL were present. When SEC investigators questioned Doe about the 
March-June 2001 internal investigation, his counsel asserted that the information was protected 
and directed Doe not to answer any questions about the internal investigation “in respect to the 
company’s privilege.” He stated that Doe’s response could be considered a waiver of the 
privilege and that, “if the AOL lawyers were present, they could make a judgment, with respect 
to the company's privilege, about whether or not the answer would constitute a waiver.” 
 
On February 26, 2004, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia issued a subpoena 
commanding AOL to provide “written memoranda and other written records reflecting interviews 
conducted by attorneys for AOL” of the appellants between March 15 and June 30, 2001. While 
AOL agreed to waive the attorney-client privilege and produce the subpoenaed documents, 
counsel for the appellants moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds that each appellant 
had an individual attorney-client relationship with the investigating attorneys, that his interviews 
were individually privileged, and that he had not waived the privilege. Wakeford also claimed 
that the information he disclosed to the investigating attorneys was privileged under the 
common interest doctrine. 
 
The district court denied John Doe 1’s and John Doe 2’s motions because it found they failed to 
prove they were clients of the investigating attorneys who interviewed them. The court based its 
conclusion on its findings that: (1) the investigating attorneys told them that they represented the 
company; (2) the investigating attorneys told them, “we can represent you,” which is distinct 
from “we do represent you”; (3) they could not show that the investigating attorneys agreed to 
represent them; and (4) the investigating attorneys told them that the attorney-client privilege 
belonged to the company and the company could choose to waive it. 
 
The court initially granted Wakeford’s motion to quash because it found that his communications 
with the investigating attorneys were privileged under the common interest agreement between 
counsel for Wakeford and counsel for AOL. Following a motion for reconsideration, the court 
reversed its earlier ruling and held that the subpoenaed documents relating to Wakeford’s 
interviews were not privileged because it found that Wakeford’s common interest agreement 
with AOL postdated the March-June 2001 interviews. In addition, the court held that Wakeford 
failed to prove that he was a client of the investigating attorneys at the time the interviews took 
place. The court based its conclusion on its findings that: (1) none of the investigating attorneys 
understood that Wakeford was seeking personal legal advice; (2) the investigating attorneys did 
not provide any personal legal advice to him; and (3) the investigating attorneys believed they 
represented AOL and not Wakeford. This appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
Appellants argue that because they believed that the investigating attorneys who conducted the 
interviews were representing them personally, their communications are privileged. However, 
we agree with the district court that essential touchstones for the formation of an attorney-client 
relationship between the investigating attorneys and the appellants were missing at the time of 
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the interviews. There is no evidence of an objectively reasonable, mutual understanding that the 
appellants were seeking legal advice from the investigating attorneys or that the investigating 
attorneys were rendering personal legal advice. Nor, in light of the investigating attorneys’ 
disclosure that they represented AOL and that the privilege and the right to waive it were AOL’s 
alone, do we find investigating counsel’s hypothetical pronouncement that they could represent 
appellants sufficient to establish the reasonable understanding that they were representing 
appellants. Accordingly, we find no fault with the district court's opinion that no individual 
attorney-client privilege attached to the appellants’ communications with AOL's attorneys. 
 
“The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications 
known to the common law.” “When the privilege applies, it affords confidential communications 
between lawyer and client complete protection from disclosure.” Because its application 
interferes with “the truth seeking mission of the legal process,” however, we must narrowly 
construe the privilege, and recognize it “only to the very limited extent that excluding relevant 
evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all 
rational means for ascertaining the truth.” Accordingly, the privilege applies only to “confidential 
disclosures by a client to an attorney made in order to obtain legal assistance.” The burden is on 
the proponent of the attorney-client privilege to demonstrate its applicability.” 
 
The person seeking to invoke the attorney-client privilege must prove that he is a client or that 
he affirmatively sought to become a client. “The professional relationship hinges upon the 
client's belief that he is consulting a lawyer in that capacity and his manifested intention to seek 
professional legal advice.” An individual’s subjective belief that he is represented is not alone 
sufficient to create an attorney-client relationship. Rather, the putative client must show that his 
subjective belief that an attorney-client relationship existed was reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
 
With these precepts in mind, we conclude that appellants could not have reasonably believed 
that the investigating attorneys represented them personally during the time frame covered by 
the subpoena. First, there is no evidence that the investigating attorneys told the appellants that 
they represented them, nor is there evidence that the appellants asked the investigating 
attorneys to represent them. To the contrary, there is evidence that the investigating attorneys 
relayed to Wakeford the company's offer to retain personal counsel for him at the company's 
expense, and that they told John Doe 1 that he was free to retain personal counsel. Second, 
there is no evidence that the appellants ever sought personal legal advice from the investigating 
attorneys, nor is there any evidence that the investigating attorneys rendered personal legal 
advice. Third, when the appellants spoke with the investigating attorneys, they were fully 
apprised that the information they were giving could be disclosed at the company’s discretion. 
Under these circumstances, appellants could not have reasonably believed that the 
investigating attorneys represented them personally. Therefore, the district court’s finding that 
appellants had no attorney-client relationship with the investigating attorneys is not clearly 
erroneous. 
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The appellants argue that the phrase “we can represent you as long as no conflict appears,” 
manifested an agreement by the investigating attorneys to represent them. They claim that, “it is 
hard to imagine a more straightforward assurance of an attorney-client relationship than ‘we can 
represent you.’” We disagree. As the district court noted, “we can represent you” is distinct from 
“we do represent you.” If there was any evidence that the investigating attorneys had said, “we 
do represent you,” then the outcome of this appeal might be different. Furthermore, the 
statement actually made, “we can represent you,” must be interpreted within the context of the 
entire warning. The investigating attorneys’ statements to the appellants, read in their entirety, 
demonstrate that the attorneys’ loyalty was to the company. That loyalty was never implicitly or 
explicitly divided. In addition to noting at the outset that they had been retained to represent 
AOL, the investigating attorneys warned the appellants that the content of their communications 
during the interview “belonged” to AOL. This protocol put the appellants on notice that, while 
their communications with the attorneys were considered confidential, the company could 
choose to reveal the content of those communications at any time, without the appellants’ 
consent. 
 
We note, however, that our opinion should not be read as an implicit acceptance of the watered-
down “Upjohn warnings” the investigating attorneys gave the appellants. It is a potential legal 
and ethical mine field. Had the investigating attorneys, in fact, entered into an attorney-client 
relationship with appellants, as their statements to the appellants professed they could, they 
would not have been free to waive the appellants’ privilege when a conflict arose. It should have 
seemed obvious that they could not have jettisoned one client in favor of another. Rather, they 
would have had to withdraw from all representation and to maintain all confidences. Indeed, the 
court would be hard pressed to identify how investigating counsel could robustly investigate and 
report to management or the board of directors of a publicly-traded corporation with the 
necessary candor if counsel were constrained by ethical obligations to individual employees. 
However, because we agree with the district court that the appellants never entered into an 
attorney-client relationship with the investigating attorneys, they averted these troubling issues. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did the court hold that no attorney-client relationship existed? Do you agree with its 
conclusion? 
2. What information should an attorney representing an organization be required to provide 
to the agents of that organization in order to ensure that the agents understand that the 
attorney represents the organization, and does not represent them? 
3. Does it make sense for attorneys representing an organization to say they can represent 
an agent of the organization unless there is a conflict? 
 
United States v. Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
 
Summary: Warley was a partner at KPMG. She was questioned in course of IRS 
investigation by attorneys hired by KPMG. The firm waived its attorney-client privilege 
and gave the government documents that described attorney’s communication with 
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Warley. Warley says the attorneys were representing her and KPMG and her attorney-
client privilege was compromised by the actions of KPMG and the evidence should be 
suppressed. Evidence suggests there was no Upjohn warning. Warley’s showing of her 
subjective belief that the attorneys represented her is insufficient to meet her burden of 
proving privilege. Thus, the court denied Warley’s motion for relief from the 
government’s alleged violation of her attorney-client privilege.  
 
KAPLAN, District Judge. 
 
Defendant Carol Warley was a partner in KPMG LLP, one of the world’s largest accounting 
firms. She was questioned in the course of an IRS investigation by attorneys hired by KPMG. 
When that investigation gave way to a threatened indictment of KPMG, the firm, in an effort to 
curry favor with prosecutors and avoid prosecution, waived its attorney-client privilege and gave 
the government documents embodying the substance of the attorneys’ communications with 
Ms. Warley. Warley contends that the attorneys were representing her as well as KPMG, that 
her attorney-client privilege was compromised by the actions of the government and KPMG, and 
that the evidence should be suppressed. She thus raises a troublesome question that arises 
whenever an employee of a business organization consults with counsel retained by the entity 
about matters involving both the employee and the entity — when does the lawyer represent the 
employee as well as the entity? 
 
This problem could be avoided if counsel in these situations routinely made clear to employees 
that they represent the employer alone and that the employee has no attorney-client privilege 
with respect to his or her communications with employer-retained counsel. Indeed, the Second 
Circuit advised that they do so years before the communications here in question. But there is 
no evidence that the attorneys who spoke to Ms. Warley followed that course. 
 
Facts 
 
Ms. Warley was a partner of KPMG at all relevant times. In 2003, the IRS was investigating 
KPMG’s tax shelter activities, including some in which clients of Warley had participated. In the 
course of the investigation, Warley communicated with KPMG’s in-house counsel and with two 
law firms retained by KPMG, Kronish Lieb Weiner & Hellman LLP and King & Spalding LLP. 
Warley does not recall having been told that the attorneys represented only KPMG or that any 
privilege belonged solely to the firm and could be waived by the firm without her consent. 
 
In September 2004, in circumstances that have been discussed elsewhere, KPMG waived its 
attorney-client privilege for communications relating to the IRS summons. It gave the 
government documents relating to these communications, and the government apparently 
intends to use them in prosecuting Warley and others. The government argues that KPMG's 
waiver was sufficient to allow it to obtain the documents and disputes Warley's claim of 
privilege. 
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Warley identifies two sets of allegedly privileged communications relating to which the 
government has documents. First, Warley was interviewed by attorneys from Kronish and King 
& Spalding on two occasions in August 2003. The government is in possession of a 
memorandum of these interviews prepared by a Kronish attorney as well as his handwritten 
notes. In addition, it has listed as a trial witness one of the Kronish attorneys present at these 
interviews. 
 
The second allegedly privileged communication is an email exchange in January and February 
of 2003 between Warley and Steven Gremminger, an in-house attorney for KPMG, relating to 
the tax strategies under investigation. The government has a copy of this email string. 
 
Both parties point to the substance of the communications to support their respective claims that 
privilege did or did not attach. Warley further relies upon KPMG’s 2003 partnership agreement, 
which provided that “the General Counsel shall act on behalf of all Members, except where a 
dispute arises between an individual Member and the Firm.” Finally, Warley alleges that counsel 
retained by KPMG jointly represented KPMG and her personally in two lawsuits prior to the 
events at issue here. 
 
Discussion 
 
A. Scope of Privilege 
 
The question whether employee communications with counsel retained by the employer about 
matters relating to the employment are privileged vis-a-vis the employee — in other words, 
whether the employee has a personal attorney-client privilege that only the employee may 
waive — is troublesome because competing interests are at play. 
 
On the one hand, an employee, like any other agent, owes the employer a duty to disclose to 
the employer any information pertinent to the employment. This includes an obligation “to assist 
the employer's counsel in the investigation and defense of matters pertaining to the employer’s 
business.” Moreover, an employer has a substantial interest in retaining freedom of action to 
respond to investigations and other legal threats, an interest borne of the desire to remain in 
business and of duties to other constituents of the entity. Allowing individual employees to 
assert personal attorney-client privilege over communications with the employer's counsel could 
frustrate an employer's ability to act in its own self interest, perhaps to the detriment of other 
employees, stockholders, or partners. 
 
Nevertheless, there are weighty considerations on the other side of the scale. Once a 
government investigation begins, the interests of employees and of the entity may diverge. 
Indeed, that may be true in other circumstances in which employees communicate with 
employer counsel. Employees often are unaware of the potential personal consequences of 
cooperating with lawyers hired by their employers. Even more troublesome, they may cooperate 
with employer-retained counsel in the belief that their communications are protected by a 
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personal privilege, sometimes as a result of a misapprehension of the law and occasionally 
perhaps as a result of deception, inadvertent or otherwise. 
 
Courts have wrestled with this problem for some time now. In the absence of evidence that the 
employee was deceived by the employer as to the existence of a personal attorney-client 
relationship or as to a personal right to control the disclosure of privileged materials, circuits 
have employed different standards to determine when personal privilege attaches. Some have 
looked at whether the individual reasonably believed that there was a personal attorney-client 
relationship, although the Second Circuit has rejected this approach. Others have focused on 
whether the individual expressly requested personal advice or representation. In In re Bevill, 
Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp., the Third Circuit enunciated a five-part test that 
has been adopted by at least two other circuits 
 
First, the individual claiming personal privilege must show they approached counsel for 
the purpose of seeking legal advice. Second, they must demonstrate that when they 
approached counsel they made it clear that they were seeking legal advice in their 
individual rather than in their representative capacities. Third, they must demonstrate 
that the counsel saw fit to communicate with them in their individual capacities, knowing 
that a possible conflict could arise. Fourth, they must prove that their conversations with 
counsel were confidential. And, fifth, they must show that the substance of their 
conversations with counsel did not concern matters within the company or the general 
affairs of the company. 
 
Our circuit addressed the issue in United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The 
Teamsters court first noted that courts typically have said that the attorney-client privilege for an 
employee’s communication with corporate counsel about corporate matters belongs to the 
corporation, not the individual employee. Nevertheless, it said, courts have found a personal 
privilege where the individual met “certain requirements.” It quoted the Third Circuit's Bevill test 
as one such example and noted that other courts have required the employee “make it clear to 
corporate counsel that he seeks legal advice on personal matters.” Drawing upon all of these 
sources, the Circuit concluded that the individual before it lacked any personal privilege with 
respect to the communications at issue because he “neither sought nor received legal advice 
from his employer's counsel on personal matters.” 
 
Teamsters’ holding thus rests on the scope of “personal matters.” But the meaning of that 
phrase has not been developed. Do “personal matters” involve solely the individual, with no 
impact on the entity's interests whatsoever? Or may they encompass matters that implicate both 
the individual and the entity? Although the facts of Teamsters suggest that the Circuit might 
have contemplated the former view, it did not expressly address the question. 
 
Some guidance may be gained from circuits that have addressed this issue in the context of the 
fifth Bevill factor, which requires that the communication “not concern matters within the 
company or the general affairs of the company.” The Tenth Circuit concluded that this factor 
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only precludes an officer from asserting an individual attorney client privilege when the 
communication concerns the corporation’s rights and responsibilities. However, if the 
communication between a corporate officer and corporate counsel specifically focuses 
upon the individual officer’s personal rights and liabilities, then the fifth prong of Bevill 
can be satisfied even though the general subject matter of the conversation pertains to 
matters within the general affairs of the company. For example, a corporate officer’s 
discussion with his corporation’s counsel may still be protected by a personal, individual 
attorney-client privilege when the conversation specifically concerns the officer’s 
personal liability for jail time based on conduct interrelated with corporate affairs. 
 
The First Circuit adopted the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation and discussed its application where 
communications involving the individual’s liabilities “do not appear to be distinguishable” from 
those concerning the entity’s interests. Acknowledging that both the employee and the entity 
could have an attorney-client relationship with the attorney with respect to such a 
communication, but noting also the fiduciary duty owed by a corporate officer to the corporation, 
the First Circuit concluded that “a corporation may unilaterally waive the attorney-client privilege 
with respect to any communications made by a corporate officer in his corporate capacity, 
notwithstanding the existence of an individual attorney-client relationship between him and the 
corporation’s counsel.” Thus, under the First Circuit formulation, individual privilege may be 
asserted successfully only when “communications regarding individual acts and liabilities are 
segregable from discussions about the corporation.” To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, 
“would open the door to a claim of jointly held privilege in virtually every corporate 
communication with counsel.” 
 
The Tenth and First Circuits thus have argued persuasively that communications implicating 
personal liability for acts within the scope of an individual’s employment may be protected by 
individual attorney-client privilege, at least in some circumstances. It is an open question 
whether such communications involve “personal matters” within the meaning of Teamsters. But 
it is unnecessary to resolve that issue here. As discussed below, and particularly in light of the 
fact that the burden of proof lies with the party asserting privilege, Warley fails to meet any 
standard. 
 
B. Warley’s Claims 
 
To begin with, there is no evidence that Warley was deceived by KPMG or its attorneys about 
the nature of her relationship with counsel. Although she claims to have “understood that 
counsel were representing her personally as a partner in the firm,” her subjective belief alone 
does not support a conclusion that KPMG’s acts were responsible for that belief. Accordingly, 
the analysis of her claims rests on whether the communications involved “personal matters.” 
 
Warley’s communications with counsel were about events and conduct within the scope of her 
work as a partner at KPMG, thus clearly implicating KPMG’s interest in responding to the IRS 
investigation. The events and conduct, however, also implicated Warley’s personal interests and 
liabilities, as is amply evidenced by her status as a defendant in this case. Warley’s 
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communications thus present the difficult circumstance where both the individual’s and the 
entity’s interests are involved. 
 
As discussed above, the scope of “personal matters” under Teamsters is unclear. Under a 
narrow reading, the fact that the communications implicated KPMG’s interests alone would 
require that Warley’s claim of privilege be rejected. Even under the approach adopted by the 
First and Tenth Circuits, however, Warley could not prevail on a privilege claim absent a 
showing that communications implicated her interests alone and were segregable from those 
involving KPMG’s interests. Nothing in the allegedly privileged documents or the affidavits 
submitted with this motion indicates that the communications focused on her personal interests 
alone. The Court therefore need not determine the parameters of “personal matters,” as 
Warley’s disclosures would not come within even a broad view of the term. 
 
Warley nevertheless argues that her communications were privileged vis-a-vis herself because 
(1) the KPMG partnership agreement provides that “the General Counsel shall act on behalf of 
all Members, except where a dispute arises between an individual Member and the Firm,” and 
(2) counsel retained by KPMG represented both Warley and the firm in litigation on two 
occasions prior to the communications here at issue. But these contentions are not persuasive. 
 
To begin with, the occasions on which Warley and KPMG were jointly represented occurred in 
circumstances in which Warley was a witness, not a party, to the litigation. The Court is not 
persuaded that representation of an employee by employer-retained counsel where the 
employee’s role is that of a witness in a lawsuit against the employer could give rise to a 
reasonable expectation on the part of the employee that all communications she might have 
with employer-retained counsel, even a long time thereafter, were made in the context of an 
individual attorney-client relationship. 
 
Nor has Warley offered any evidence that she in fact subjectively relied either upon the 
language in the partnership agreement or the previous litigation experience in concluding that 
Kronish, King & Spalding, or Gremminger was representing her individually. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the end, Warley’s showings amount merely to a claim of her subjective belief which, without 
more, is insufficient to meet her burden of proving privilege. For the foregoing reasons, Warley’s 
motion for relief from the government’s alleged violation of her attorney-client privilege is denied. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Did Warley believe KPMG’s attorneys represented her personally? If so, why was she 
wrong. Did anyone tell her that KPMG’s attorneys were not representing her personally? 
2. Why does Warley want to claim that the documents at issue are protected by the 
attorney-client privilege? Why can’t she make a privilege claims? Could KPMG have 
made a privilege claim over the same information? 
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3. Should Warley have a malpractice claim against KPMG’s attorneys? 
 
Further Reading: 
 
● Grace M. Giesel, Upjohn Warnings, the Attorney-Client Privilege, and Principles of 
Lawyer Ethics: Achieving Harmony, 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 109 (2010) 
● Ashish S. Joshi, Corporate Miranda: Clarifying Lawyers' Loyalty During an Internal 
Investigation, American Bar Association (2009) 
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Section 3: The Legal Duties of an Attorney 
 
3.1: Fiduciary Duties 
 
Attorneys are fiduciaries of their clients. As fiduciaries, they have certain legal duties to their 
clients, which include: 
 
● The Duty of Care: Ordinary care under the circumstances. 
● The Duty of Loyalty: Absolute loyalty. 
● The Duty of Impartiality: Absolute candor. 
● The Duty of Confidentiality: Absolute confidentiality. 
 
The duties of care, loyalty, impartiality, and confidentiality attach whenever an attorney-client 
relationship begins and may continue after an attorney-client relationship ends. Accordingly, 
attorneys may owe duties to both current and former clients, which may affect an attorney’s 
ability to continue representing those clients or to represent new clients. 
 
The Duty of Care 
 
Attorneys must exercise reasonable care when representing their clients. Typically, courts 
expect attorneys to use the degree of care expected of an ordinary attorney in similar 
circumstances. In other words, the duty of care imposed on an attorney is a duty of professional 
care, reflecting the expectations of both the client and other attorneys. An attorney who fails to 
exercise reasonable care is negligent, and may be liable in tort for malpractice. Attorneys may 
have a duty of care to both current and former clients, and any negligent act in relation to 
representation of a client may create a malpractice claim. 
 
In order to prove a malpractice claim for a breach of the duty of care, the plaintiff must show that 
a duty of care existed, the attorney breached the duty of care, and the breach caused a harm to 
the plaintiff. Of course, a duty of care exists only if an attorney-client relationship exists. So the 
first element of a malpractice claim for negligence is proving the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship. 
 
The Duty of Loyalty 
 
Attorneys are fiduciaries of their clients because clients justifiably vest confidence, good faith, 
reliance, and trust in their attorneys. Accordingly, attorneys have a fiduciary duty to maintain an 
undivided loyalty to their clients at all times. Attorneys must ensure that their duties to their 
clients never conflict with their own financial interests, the interests of another client, or any 
other interest that would affect their ability to provide competent and diligent representation. 
 
Under the duty of loyalty, attorneys cannot represent anyone with an interest adverse to one of 
their clients, because it would create a conflict of interest. If that interest becomes an issue, the 
attorney’s loyalty would be divided between the two clients. Obviously, an attorney cannot 
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represent two parties with interests directly adverse to each other, like opposing parties in 
litigation, because the conflict of interest is fundamental and unavoidable. MR 1.7, cmt. [8]. But 
the restriction imposed by the duty of loyalty applies more broadly. Any adverse or potentially 
adverse interest may create a conflict of interest, even if that interest is not yet at issue. 
 
The Duty of Impartiality 
 
As fiduciaries of their clients, attorneys have a duty to provide candid and impartial advice. In 
order to satisfy the duty of impartiality, attorneys must be able to exercise their independent 
professional judgment, without any conflicts of interest. If a client’s interests are adverse or 
potentially adverse to the attorney’s interests or the interests of another client, a conflict of 
interest exists that will compromise the attorney’s impartiality. Under those circumstances, 
attorneys will have an incentive to provide advice that benefits themselves or their other clients, 
and withhold advice that does not. Even if the client is not harmed by the advice itself, the client 
is harmed by not receiving candid and impartial advice reflecting the full range of available 
options. 
 
For example, if an attorney represents a client in a contract negotiation, and the outcome of the 
negotiation could affect the interests of another client, a conflict of interest exists, because the 
attorney has an incentive to provide advice that will benefit the other client and withhold advice 
that will harm the other client. Even if the advice benefits both clients, the client receiving the 
advice is harmed by not receiving candid and impartial advice. Likewise, if an attorney both 
represents and has a financial interest in a corporation, a conflict of interests exists, because 
the attorney has an incentive to provide advice that will benefit the attorney’s investment and 
withhold advice that will not, depriving the client of the full range of options. 
 
Model Rule 2.1: Advisor 
 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and 
render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other 
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be 
relevant to the client's situation. 
 
The Duty of Confidentiality 
 
As fiduciaries of their clients, attorneys also have a duty to maintain the confidentiality of private 
information disclosed to them by their clients. Under the duty of confidentiality, attorneys must 
never disclose confidential client information to a third party not bound by the duty of 
confidentiality or use confidential client information to benefit themselves or another client. 
Clients are entitled to confide in their attorney, secure in the knowledge that the confidential 
information they disclose cannot be used against them. 
 
If a client’s interests are adverse or potentially adverse to the attorney’s interests or the interests 
of another client, a conflict of interests exists that will compromise the attorney’s ability to 
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maintain confidentiality. Under those circumstances, attorneys have an incentive to use the 
confidential information for their own benefit or the benefit of their other client. Even if the client 
is not harmed by the use of the confidential information, the client is harmed by the betrayal of 
trust. 
 
Model Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information 
 
a. A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the 
client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out 
the representation or the disclosure is permitted. 
 
Limitations on the Duties of an Attorney 
 
While the absolute duties of loyalty, impartiality, and confidentiality are the quintessence of 
professional responsibility, they are necessarily observed in the breach. Taken literally, they 
would inevitably preclude attorneys from ever representing more than one client. It is always 
possible that the interests of a potential client will conflict with those of a current client. It is 
always possible that advice given to one client will affect the interests of another client. And it is 
always possible that confidential information disclosed by one client will be relevant to another. 
In practice, the duties of an attorney must yield to the practical realities of representation. 
 
Accordingly, the duties of attorneys are shaped by the rights of clients, attorneys, and the bar. 
Clients are entitled to hire the attorney of their choice, and may consent to representation, 
despite a formal conflict. Attorneys are entitled to represent more than one client, so long as 
they disclose any conflicts and the client consents. And the bar is entitled to prevent parties 
from using conflicts strategically to disqualify opposing counsel. 
 
In other words, clients may provide informed consent to certain conflicts of interest. Attorneys 
may represent clients with conflicts of interests under certain circumstances, so long as the 
clients provide informed consent. And under certain circumstances, the bar may even permit 
attorneys to represent parties with conflicting interests without consent. 
 
However, attorneys must always observe the duty of care. An attorney who fails to exercise 
reasonable care under the circumstances is negligent and potentially liable for malpractice, 
even if the client consents. 
 
Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) 
 
Summary: Earl F. Anders and Roberta Ishmael were married and owned a trucking 
company. Eventually, they decided to divorce. Under California law, Ishmael was entitled 
to 50% of the marital assets. Attorney Robert Millington had previously represented 
Anders and his company. Anders asked Millington to represent Ishmael. He agreed, and 
prepared a settlement agreement that Ishmael signed. Ishmael was entitled to $41,250, 
but under the agreement she received $8,807. Ishmael filed a malpractice action, and 
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the trial court granted Millington’s motion for summary judgment. The appellate court 
reversed, holding that a jury could have found that Millington breached his duty of care. 
 
FRIEDMAN, J. 
 
This is a legal malpractice action in which the plaintiff-client appeals from a summary judgment 
granted the defendant-attorney. The factual narrative will possess heightened significance 
against a backdrop of general doctrine: 
 
Actionable legal malpractice is compounded of the same basic elements as other kinds 
of actionable negligence: duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, damage. Touching the 
first element, duty, the general rule is that “the attorney, by accepting employment to 
give legal advice or to render other legal services, impliedly agrees to use such skill, 
prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and 
exercise in the performance of the tasks which they undertake.” 
 
In this case the defense is that the client sought no advice from the attorney and was given 
none; by the client's express admission, she did not rely on the attorney, thus, that her alleged 
damage was not proximately caused by the attorney's cause of action. 
 
The facts are presented by summary judgment affidavits, which include extracts from 
depositions. There is no significant conflict in the evidence. Roberta Ishmael, the plaintiff, was 
formerly married to Earl F. Anders. The couple had three children. They lived in Gridley, where 
Mr. Anders was a partner in a family trucking business. Domestic difficulties resulted in a 
separation, and Mrs. Anders moved to Sacramento where she secured employment. She and 
her husband agreed upon a divorce and property settlement. She knew that she was entitled to 
one-half the marital property. 
 
Mr. Anders called upon defendant Robert Millington, a Gridley attorney who had for some time 
represented him and his trucking firm. Mr. Millington advised Anders that if he could establish 
adulterous conduct by Mrs. Anders, he might be awarded more than one-half the community 
property. For one reason or another there was a decision that the wife rather than the husband 
would apply for divorce. At Anders’ request Mr. Millington agreed to act as the wife's attorney, to 
prepare the necessary papers and to file a divorce action for her. He drew up a complaint and a 
property settlement agreement and handed these documents to Mr. Anders, who took them to 
Sacramento and had his wife sign them. She knew that Mr. Millington had represented her 
husband in the past. Faulty recall prevents ascertainment whether Mrs. Anders ever met 
personally with the attorney before the papers were drawn. She did not discuss the property 
settlement agreement with the attorney before she signed it. Mr. Millington believed the divorce 
and property settlement arrangements were “cut and dried” between the husband and wife; he 
“assumed that she knew what she was doing;” he believed that she was actually getting half the 
property but made no effort to confirm that belief. 
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In her deposition the former Mrs. Anders testified that in signing the complaint and property 
settlement agreement she relied solely on her husband and did not rely on the attorney. Later, 
when so instructed, she traveled to the courthouse at Oroville, where she and her corroborating 
witness met Mr. Millington. He escorted her through a routine ex parte hearing which resulted in 
an interlocutory divorce decree and judicial approval of the property settlement. 
 
According to her complaint, the former Mrs. Anders discovered that in return for a settlement of 
$8,807 she had surrendered her right to community assets totaling $82,500. Ascribing her loss 
to the attorney's negligent failure to make inquiries as to the true worth of the community 
property, she seeks damages equivalent to the difference between what she received and one-
half the asserted value of the community. 
 
By the very act of undertaking to represent Mrs. Anders in an uncontested divorce suit, Mr. 
Millington assumed a duty of care toward her, whatever its degree. Described in terms 
traditionally applicable to the attorney-client relationship, the degree of care exacted by that duty 
was that of a figurative lawyer of ordinary skill and capacity in the performance of like tasks. 
 
The degree of care is related to the specific situation in which the defendant found himself. The 
standard is that of ordinary care under the circumstances of the particular case. A lawyer owes 
undivided loyalty to his client. Minimum standards of professional ethics usually permit him to 
represent dual interests where full consent and full disclosure occur. The loyalty he owes one 
client cannot consume that owed to the other. Most descriptions of professional conduct prohibit 
his undertaking to represent conflicting interests at all; or demand that he terminate the three-
way relationship when adversity of interest appears. Occasional statements sanction informed 
representation of divergent interests in “exceptional” situations. Even those statements demand 
complete disclosure of all facts and circumstances which, in the attorney's honest judgment, 
may influence his client's choice, holding the attorney civilly liable for loss caused by lack of 
disclosure. 
 
Divorces are frequently uncontested; the parties may make their financial arrangements 
peaceably and honestly; vestigial chivalry may impel them to display the wife as the injured 
plaintiff; the husband may then seek out and pay an attorney to escort the wife through the 
formalities of adjudication. We describe these facts of life without necessarily approving them. 
Even in that situation the attorney’s professional obligations do not permit his descent to the 
level of a scrivener. The edge of danger gleams if the attorney has previously represented the 
husband. A husband and wife at the brink of division of their marital assets have an obvious 
divergence of interests. Representing the wife in an arm's length divorce, an attorney of ordinary 
professional skill would demand some verification of the husband's financial statement; or, at 
the minimum, inform the wife that the husband's statement was unconfirmed, that wives may be 
cheated, that prudence called for investigation and verification. Deprived of such disclosure, the 
wife cannot make a free and intelligent choice. Representing both spouses in an uncontested 
divorce situation (whatever the ethical implications), the attorney's professional obligations 
demand no less. He may not set a shallow limit on the depth to which he will represent the wife. 
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The general standard of professional care is appropriate to the garden variety situation, where 
the attorney represents only one of several parties or interests. It falls short of adequate 
description where the attorney's professional relationship extends to two clients with divergent 
or conflicting interests in the same subject matter. A more specific statement of the same rule is 
needed to guide the fact trier to the law's demands when the attorney attempts dual 
representation. In short, an attorney representing two parties with divergent interests must 
disclose all facts and circumstances which, in the judgment of a lawyer of ordinary skill and 
capacity, are necessary to enable his client to make free and intelligent decisions regarding the 
subject matter of the representation. 
 
In view of the degree of care imposed by law on an attorney in defendant's position, a fact trier 
might reasonably find him negligent in failing to disclose to plaintiff the limited representation 
she was receiving and in failing to point to the possibility of independent legal advice. The 
question of breach was thus a triable issue which could not be resolved on a summary judgment 
motion.  
 
Legal malpractice may consist of a negligent failure to act. The attorney's negligence, whether 
consisting of active conduct or a failure to act, need not be the sole cause of the client's loss. 
Here the attorney is charged not with erroneous advice, but with failure to advise, failure to 
investigate, failure to disclose. The wife's reliance on her husband's alleged misrepresentations 
is not at all inconsistent with the claim that her loss was the result of the attorney's negligent 
failure. A jury might find that the husband's misrepresentations were a realizable likelihood 
which made the attorney's inaction negligent, thus forming a concurrent (and not superseding) 
cause of harm. Causation was a jury question which could not be resolved as a matter of law. 
 
Contributory negligence on plaintiff's part was specially pleaded and, if established, would bar 
malpractice recovery. Plaintiff, as she testified, relied on her husband's list of assets; apparently 
did not trouble to investigate or even to inquire whether she was getting her share of property; 
was seemingly content to let her husband take charge; accepted his attorney for the limited 
purpose of piloting her through the divorce formalities. A court, however, cannot say that 
reasonable jurors would inevitably characterize her conduct as contributory negligence. That 
issue was a triable issue of fact. 
 
Thus, notwithstanding the lack of conflict in the evidence, the summary judgment rests on the 
determination of issues reserved for decision by a fact trier and which could not be resolved as 
a matter of law. Since triable issues of fact existed, the motion should have been denied. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Did Anders assert a violation of the duty of care, the duty of loyalty, or both? 
2. Did Anders show a violation of the duty of care, the duty of loyalty, or both? 
3. Could Anders have prevailed on a violation of either the duty of care or the duty of 
loyalty? 
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The Appearance of Impropriety 
 
Let this, my young Readers, be your constant Maxim, That no Man can be good enough to 
enable him to neglect the Rules of Prudence; nor will Virtue herself look beautiful, unless she be 
bedecked with the outward Ornaments of Decency and Decorum.39 
 
The ABA has long held that judges should avoid “the appearance of impropriety.” When the 
ABA adopted the Canons of Judicial Ethics in 1924, Canon 4 held that judges should avoid “the 
appearance of impropriety.” When it adopted the Code of Judicial Conduct in 1972, Canon 2 
held that a judge should avoid “the appearance of impropriety in all his actions.” When it 
adopted the Model Code of Judicial Conduct in 1990, Canon 2A maintained the appearance of 
impropriety standard, holding that “the test for the appearance of impropriety is whether the 
conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge's ability to carry out 
judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.” And Rule 1.2 of 
the revised Model Rules of Judicial Conduct retains the same standard. 
 
But lawyers have resisted applying the appearance of impropriety standard to themselves. 
When the ABA adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969, it included the 
appearance of impropriety standard only as an “ethical consideration,” rather than a “disciplinary 
rule,” making it aspirational, rather than mandatory. And when the ABA adopted the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983, it eliminated the appearance of impropriety standard 
entirely. 
 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility 
Canon 9: A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety 
Ethical Consideration 9-2 
 
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by irresponsible or improper 
conduct of a lawyer. On occasion, ethical conduct of a lawyer may appear to laymen to 
be unethical. In order to avoid misunderstandings and hence to maintain confidence, a 
lawyer should fully and promptly inform his client of material developments in the matters 
being handled for the client. While a lawyer should guard against otherwise proper 
conduct that has a tendency to diminish public confidence in the legal system or in the 
legal profession, his duty to clients or to the public should never be subordinate merely 
because the full discharge of his obligation may be misunderstood or may tend to 
subject him or the legal profession to criticism. When explicit ethical guidance does not 
exist, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that promotes public 
confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the legal system and the legal profession. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 121(c)(iv): The perspective for 
determining conflict of interest 
 
																																																								
39 Henry Fielding, The History of Tom Jones, A Foundling (1749). 
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This Section employs an objective standard by which to assess the adverseness, 
materiality, and substantiality of the risk of the effect on representation. The standard of 
this Section is not the “appearance of impropriety” standard formerly used by some 
courts to define the scope of impermissible conflicts. That standard could prohibit not 
only conflicts as defined in this Section, but also situations that might appear improper to 
an uninformed observer or even an interested party. 
 
The propriety of the lawyer's action should be determined based only on facts and 
circumstances that the lawyer knew or should have known at the time of undertaking or 
continuing a representation. It should not be evaluated in light of information that 
became known only later and that could not reasonably have been anticipated. 
 
The standard of this Section allows consideration in a given situation of the social value 
of the lawyer's behavior alleged to constitute the conflict. For example, a lawyer's 
statement about a matter of public importance might conflict with a client's objectives, 
but the public importance of free expression is a factor to be considered in limiting the 
possible reach of the relevant conflicts rule. 
 
Whether there is adverseness, materiality, and substantiality in a given circumstance is 
often dependent on specific circumstances that are ambiguous and the subject of 
conflicting evidence. Accordingly, there are necessarily circumstances in which the 
lawyer's avoidance of a representation is permissible but not obligatory. A lawyer also 
would be justified in withdrawing from some representations in circumstances in which it 
would be improper to disqualify the lawyer or the lawyer's firm. 
 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct: Canon 1 
Rule 1.2: Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary 
 
A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and 
the appearance of impropriety. 
 
Rule 1.2, Comment 5 
 
The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in 
reasonable minds a perception that the judge violated this Code or engaged in other 
conduct that reflects adversely on the judge’s honesty, impartiality, temperament, or 
fitness to serve as a judge. 
 
Bd. Of. Ed. Of. NY City v. Nyquist, 590 F. 2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979) 
 
Summary: The Board of Education of the City of New York used separate seniority lists 
when deciding layoffs of male and female Health and Physical Education teachers 
(HPETs). The Commissioner of Education held that using separate lists was illegal, but 
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the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) disagreed, arguing that 
merging the lists would violate Title IX by disproportionately affecting women. The BoE 
filed a declaratory judgment action against three male and three female HPETs. The 
male HPETs were represented by James R. Sandner of New York State United 
Teachers (NYSUT). The female HPETs filed a motion to disqualify Sandner, on the 
ground that their union dues helped pay for his services. The district court granted the 
motion, but the Second Circuit reversed, holding that no conflict of interest existed, and 
that any appearance of impropriety was insufficient to require disqualification. 
 
Before FEINBERG, MANSFIELD and SMITH, Circuit Judges. 
 
FEINBERG, Circuit Judge: 
 
This unusual case presents difficult questions regarding the appropriate role of federal courts 
when called upon by disqualification motions to evaluate the conduct of attorneys who appear 
before them. Three male Health and Physical Education teachers (HPETs) in the New York City 
school system appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York, Morris E. Lasker, J., disqualifying their counsel upon the motion of three female 
HPETs. Appellant male teachers claim that the order was an abuse of discretion because it 
disregarded their constitutional rights, and was without any sound basis. For reasons set forth 
below, we hold that the motion to disqualify should have been denied, and we therefore reverse 
the order of the district court. 
 
The contending parties on appeal - the male and female HPETs - are all defendants in this 
declaratory judgment action brought by the Board of Education of the City of New York and the 
Chancellor of the City School District. In February 1977, these plaintiffs found themselves in the 
middle of apparently contradictory positions held by the Commissioner of Education of the State 
of New York and the office of Civil Rights of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
(HEW). In a case involving one of these appellants, the State Commissioner had ruled that the 
use of separate seniority lists for male and female HPETs for the purpose of layoffs was illegal. 
Shortly thereafter, HEW initially indicated to the Board that HEW took exactly the contrary view, 
that merger of the lists would violate Title IX. Caught in this apparent dilemma, plaintiffs 
provisionally merged the seniority lists of male and female HPETs and commenced this action 
for a declaratory judgment in which all concerned parties would be present. The complaint 
named as defendants HEW and its Secretary, the New York State Commissioner of Education, 
the State Division of Human Rights, three named male HPETs, individually and as 
representatives of all male HPETs, and three named female HPETs, individually and as 
representatives of all female HPETs. The male and female defendants have asserted 
counterclaims and cross-claims. The relief sought by plaintiffs is a judgment declaring that the 
provisional policy of merging the seniority lists, effective February 1, 1977 but not retroactively, 
is lawful. 
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The two classes of defendants are the actual contending parties in this litigation. The male 
HPETs allege that maintaining separate seniority lists for male and female HPETs is illegal and 
that: 
 
all defendant male Health and Physical Education teachers who were laid off on or after 
September 1, 1975, are entitled to reinstatement with back pay and all other retroactive 
benefits incident to their positions to the date of their layoff if less senior female teachers 
were retained at that time or at any time thereafter. 
 
The female HPETs allege that their seniority status perpetuates past discriminatory practices of 
plaintiffs and that if the provisional merged seniority list is used for layoff purposes “it will result 
in the layoff of at least six times as many female HPETs as male HPETs.” The stakes in the 
lawsuit are obviously high. 
 
The male HPETs are represented in this action by James R. Sandner, Esq., who is also 
General Counsel of New York State United Teachers (NYSUT). That organization is an 
unincorporated membership association of approximately 180,000 teachers, librarians, 
guidance counsellors and other school related employees of the almost 800 school districts in 
New York State. We are told that in each of the school districts there is a separate local union, 
which is the exclusive bargaining representative for employees in that unit. The majority of these 
individual unions have chosen to affiliate themselves with NYSUT, but the latter does not 
collectively bargain for any public employees. It does, however, provide a number of services to 
its members, including a legal service program under the direction and control of Mr. Sandner. 
Both the male and female HPETs are represented in collective bargaining by the American 
Federation of Teachers (AFT), to whom they pay dues. A portion of the dues paid to the AFT is 
remitted to NYSUT, which, at least in part, apparently finances the legal service program. 
 
Under the program, NYSUT’s members may apply to obtain legal representation free of charge. 
Mr. Sandner and his staff may take an applicant's case when, in their judgment, the claim is 
both job-related and meritorious. It is through this procedure that the male defendants retained 
Mr. Sandner as their attorney. NYSUT itself, however, has taken no position on the merits or on 
any other issue in this litigation. 
 
The female HPETs moved to disqualify Mr. Sandner as counsel for the male HPETs or, in the 
alternative, to require NYSUT to furnish counsel for the female teachers. Judge Lasker 
concluded that “the female teachers are paying, in part, for their opponents’ legal expenses.” 
This violated “at least the spirit, if not the letter, of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility that ‘A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of impropriety.’” Accordingly, 
the judge granted the motion and this appeal by the male HPETs followed. 
 
We begin the discussion by noting that, curiously, the power of the federal courts to disqualify 
attorneys in litigation pending before them has long been assumed without discussion, and 
attention has focused on identifying the circumstances in which exercise of the power is 
appropriate. Our reading of the cases in this circuit suggests that we have utilized the power of 
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trial judges to disqualify counsel where necessary to preserve the integrity of the adversary 
process in actions before them. In other words, with rare exceptions disqualification has been 
ordered only in essentially two kinds of cases: (1) where an attorney's conflict of interests in 
violation of Canons 5 and 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility undermines the court’s 
confidence in the vigor of the attorney's representation of his client, or more commonly (2) 
where the attorney is at least potentially in a position to use privileged information concerning 
the other side through prior representation, for example, in violation of Canons 4 and 9, thus 
giving his present client an unfair advantage. In such cases, we note Chief Judge Kaufman's 
oft-quoted admonition that, 
 
When dealing with ethical principles, we cannot paint with broad strokes. The lines are 
fine and must be so marked. Guideposts can be established when virgin ground is being 
explored, and the conclusion in a particular case can be reached only after a painstaking 
analysis of the facts and precise application of precedent. 
 
But in other kinds of cases, we have shown considerable reluctance to disqualify attorneys 
despite misgivings about the attorney's conduct. This reluctance probably derives from the fact 
that disqualification has an immediate adverse effect on the client by separating him from 
counsel of his choice, and that disqualification motions are often interposed for tactical reasons. 
And even when made in the best of faith, such motions inevitably cause delay. For example, 
this lawsuit has been at a standstill now for close to a year. 
 
Weighing the needs of efficient judicial administration against the potential advantage of 
immediate preventive measures, we believe that unless an attorney's conduct tends to “taint the 
underlying trial” by disturbing the balance of the presentations in one of the two ways indicated 
above, courts should be quite hesitant to disqualify an attorney. Given the availability of both 
federal and state comprehensive disciplinary machinery, there is usually no need to deal with all 
other kinds of ethical violations in the very litigation in which they surface. 
 
With these thoughts in mind, we turn to the ethical problems presented by the instant appeal. 
The district court disqualified Mr. Sandner because a “layman's faith would be severely 
troubled” by the fact that “the female teachers are paying, in part, for their opponents' legal 
expenses.” There is no claim, however, that Mr. Sandner feels any sense of loyalty to the 
women that would undermine his representation of the men. Nor is there evidence that his 
representation of the men is anything less than vigorous. There is also no claim that the men 
have gained an unfair advantage through any access to privileged information about the 
women. Were there any such problem, the women would not be asking, and the district judge 
would not have ordered, as an alternative to disqualification of Mr. Sandner, that NYSUT pay 
their attorney's fees. Thus, in no real sense can Mr. Sandner's representation of the men be 
said to taint the trial. 
 
We agree that there is at least some possibility that Mr. Sandner's representation of the men 
has the appearance of impropriety, because of the large number of union members involved 
and the public importance of the civil rights issue at the heart of the dispute. But in any event, 
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we think that disqualification was inappropriate. We believe that when there is no claim that the 
trial will be tainted, appearance of impropriety is simply too slender a reed on which to rest a 
disqualification order except in the rarest cases. This is particularly true where, as in this case, 
the appearance of impropriety is not very clear. We note that while on one hand there is an 
element of unfairness to the women, on the other it seems probable that if NYSUT were to take 
a position on the merits of this litigation, Mr. Sandner's representation of the men would 
apparently be within the protection of the "fair representation" cases. This means that the 
question whether Mr. Sandner's conduct is unethical could be a very close one. Since 
disqualification entails immediate disruption of the litigation, it is better to relegate any questions 
about Mr. Sandner's conduct to other appropriate proceedings. In addition to the possibility of 
grievance proceedings and an internal union attack on the legal plan, it may be that judicial 
construction of the plan, in an appropriate lawsuit, could provide some relief for the women. 
 
We therefore reverse the order of the district court disqualifying counsel, and remand for 
continuation of the action. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Who does Sandner represent? Does he represent the female members of the teachers 
union? Does he have any duties to the plaintiffs in this action? 
2. Why might someone be concerned about an appearance of impropriety under these 
circumstances? Why did the court find that any appearance of impropriety did not 
prevent Sandner from representing the male teachers? 
3. Do you agree with the court’s conclusion? Would you feel differently if the male teachers 
were paying for their own representation? Would you feel differently if the union provided 
representation for the female teachers? 
 
In re Disciplinary Proc. Against Sanders, 145 P. 3d 1208 (Wa. 2006) 
 
Summary: Justice Sanders of the Washington Supreme Court visited the Special 
Commitment Center on McNeil Island, which houses people civilly committed as 
sexually violent predators. During the visit, Sanders accepted documents from inmates 
and asked them about volitional control, among other things. The Attorney General of 
Washington filed a complaint against Sanders with the Washington Commission on 
Judicial Conduct. After an investigation and a hearing, the Commission found that 
Sanders violated Canon 1 by failing to enforce high standards of judicial conduct and 
also violated Canon 2(A) by failing to promote public confidence in the integrity and 
impartiality of the judiciary. Sanders appealed and the court affirmed.  
 
GROSSE, J. 
 
A visit by a judicial officer to a special facility for sexually violent predators is not in itself 
inappropriate conduct under the Code of Judicial Conduct. However, conversations with the 
residents of the facility concerning the reasons for their confinement, particularly when one or 
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more of these residents has a matter or matters pending before the court on which the judge 
sits, can violate the Code of Judicial Conduct. By asking questions of inmates who were litigants 
or should have been recognized as potential litigants on issues currently pending before the 
court, Justice Richard B. Sanders violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. His conduct created an 
appearance of partiality as a result of ex parte contact. 
 
The Washington Commission on Judicial Conduct received a complaint on March 18, 2003, 
regarding Justice Sanders' conduct while visiting the Special Commitment Center (SCC) on 
McNeil Island. The Commission conducted an independent investigation of the allegations, 
determined that sufficient evidence existed to support the complaint, and sent a Statement of 
Allegations to Justice Sanders on October 8, 2003. In April 2004, the Commission determined 
that probable cause existed to believe that Justice Sanders violated Canons 1, 2(A) and 3(A)(4) 
of the Code of Judicial Conduct. After a fact-finding hearing, the Commission issued its decision 
holding that Justice Sanders violated Canons 1 and 2(A), but did not violate Canon 3(A)(4). The 
Commission found that Justice Sanders' conduct violated Canon 1 by failing to enforce high 
standards of judicial conduct and also violated Canon 2(A) by failing to promote public 
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The Commission imposed the 
sanction of admonishment. Under Discipline Rules for Judges 3, Justice Sanders filed a notice 
of contest. 
 
Justice Sanders embarked on a tour of the SCC despite warnings from his colleagues on the 
Supreme Court about potential ex parte contact with litigants. During the tour of this facility, 
Justice Sanders accepted documents on two separate occasions from the inmates. Moreover, 
in meetings with the residents, some of whom had cases pending before the court, he directly 
asked them about the issue of volitional control. 
 
At the time of the visit, the Supreme Court was in the process of deciding In re Detention of 
Thorell. Drafts of both a majority opinion and a dissent by Justice Sanders were circulating 
among the justices at the Supreme Court. Thorell was a seminal case in which separate actions 
by six petitioners were combined, including at least one of the SCC residents with whom Justice 
Sanders met. A pivotal issue before the Supreme Court in Thorell was volitional control. The 
court was weighing whether the “fact finder must determine that the person facing commitment 
as a sexually violent predator (SVP) has serious difficulty controlling behavior and, if so, 
whether this determination must be a separate finding based upon a jury instruction.” Thus, the 
factual record was before the court in each of the consolidated six cases. 
 
The Commission held, and we agree, that the record established through clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence that Justice Sanders violated Canons 1 and 2(A). In support of that 
holding, the findings reference two of the three letters from resident Andre Brigham Young 
inviting the justices to visit McNeil Island. Those letters indicate that the residents were looking 
for something more than just a tour of the facility. In fact, Young suggested that others 
(opposing counsel and defense attorneys) should be asked to attend to avoid “the appearance 
of partiality.” The letters in and of themselves should have given sufficient notice to Justice 
Sanders that this visit had the potential of being more than an institutional tour. Additional 
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warning flags were also raised by three justices who expressed concerns about the visit and 
potential problems. Moreover, a simple computer check would have revealed that Rickey 
Calhoun and Andre Brigham Young, two people mentioned in the prior communication with 
Justice Sanders, had cases pending before the Supreme Court. When Justice Sanders met with 
the residents in small groups, he warned the residents that he could not hear their particular 
case issues. However, these warnings were followed by specific questions asking the residents 
about their confinement and what they thought of volitional control. 
 
The Commission justifiably found that Justice Sanders, with full awareness of the potential for 
situations that could conflict with the Code of Judicial Conduct, embarked on the tour and met 
with litigants who had pending cases before the court. Further, by raising such critical issues as 
volitional control with these litigants, Justice Sanders created a situation that clearly violated 
both the letter and the spirit of the canons and created serious concern for both counsel and 
fellow jurists about the appearance of partiality. 
 
Justice Sanders claims that a violation of Canons 1 and 2(A) cannot be found without a 
concomitant violation of a proscribed act or canon and thus the Commission's failure to find a 
direct violation of Canon 3(A)(4) precludes it from finding a violation of the other canons. We 
disagree. 
 
In our view, Turco is dispositive. There, the court found that the judge's act of striking his wife in 
public had a sufficient nexus to the judicial role, particularly when the judge heard domestic 
violence cases. If extrajudicial tortious conduct can provide a nexus to the judicial role, then a 
fortiori, judicial conduct can provide a basis for a violation of Canons 1 and 2(A). In the instant 
case, Justice Sanders’ actions were not simply undertaken as a private citizen, but rather within 
the context of his judicial duties. Our conclusion is underscored by the decision in In re 
Disciplinary Proceeding Against Ritchie. In that case, Judge John G. Ritchie argued that 
Canons 1 and 2(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, together with the statute regulating the 
behavior, were too vague to give him adequate notice of the prohibited behavior. In denying the 
claim, the court stated: 
 
It is true the conduct pursuant to which he was disciplined is not clearly proscribed by 
RCW 3.58.040, insofar as the statute does not expressly prohibit judges from combining 
business and pleasure trips, and does not define “reasonable traveling expenses” or 
“business of the court”. 
 
Judge Ritchie's vagueness challenge is ultimately immaterial, however, because he was 
not disciplined for violating the statute. Rather, he was censured for violating Canons 1 
and 2(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct which hold judges to a higher standard of 
integrity and require avoiding even the appearance of impropriety. 
 
As noted in the Commission's decision, there are a number of facts in this case that, when 
taken together, clearly demonstrate that a predictable appearance of partiality could be 
foreseen. 
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Where a judge’s decisions are tainted by even a mere suspicion of partiality, the effect on the 
public's confidence can be debilitating. The canons of judicial conduct should be viewed in 
broad fashion, and judges should err on the side of caution. Under Canon 3(D)(1), “judges 
should disqualify themselves in a proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.” In Sherman, the court found that where a trial judge “may have inadvertently 
obtained information critical to a central issue on remand, a reasonable person might question 
his impartiality.” The court set the test for determining impartiality: 
 
In deciding recusal matters, actual prejudice is not the standard. The Commission 
recognizes that where a trial judge's decisions are tainted by even a mere suspicion of 
partiality, the effect on the public's confidence in our judicial system can be debilitating. 
The test for determining whether the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned 
is an objective test that assumes that “a reasonable person knows and understands all 
the facts.” 
 
This court in In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Sanders noted that the interest of the State in 
maintaining and enforcing high standards of judicial conduct under the auspices of Canon 1 is a 
compelling one. In Sanders, this court balanced that interest against Justice Sanders' First 
Amendment rights and found that an independent basis for finding a violation of Canon 1 under 
those circumstances was not possible. Justice Sanders argues that the language in Canon 1 is 
hortatory and therefore cannot stand as an independent basis for a violation of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct. In the instant case, Canon 1 sets the conceptual framework under which 
Canon 2(A) operates. Canon 2(A) provides the more specific restraint, to wit: “Judges should 
act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of 
the judiciary.” Under the circumstances of this case, Canon 1 taken in conjunction with Canon 
2(A) provides a sufficiently specific basis to find a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 
Here, it was clear that there was a substantial basis and expectation that Justice Sanders would 
be in contact with possible litigants who had pending litigation before the court and that this 
contact would be viewed as improper. We concur with the Commission's finding that it was 
clearly reasonable to question the impartiality of the justice under the circumstances of this 
case. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did the court hold that visiting the Special Commitment Facility did not create an 
appearance of impropriety, but speaking to a resident of the facility did? 
2. Would it create an appearance of impropriety for a judge to visit a prison? What if the 
judge spoke to an inmate? 
3. Would it create an appearance of impropriety for a judge to speak with a person who 
had a pending civil action? 
 
Further Reading: 
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● Peter W. Morgan, The Appearance of Propriety: Ethics Reform and the Blifil Paradoxes, 
44 Stan. L. Rev. 593 (1992) 
● W. Bradley Wendel, Impartiality in Judicial Ethics: A Jurisprudential Analysis, 22 Notre 
Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 305 (2008) 
● Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of Impropriety, and the Proposed 
New ABA Judicial Code, 34 Hofstra Law Review 1337 (2006) 
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3.2: Malpractice 
 
Attorneys may be liable for malpractice if they violate any of their fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, 
impartiality, or confidentiality. However, the standard for liability may differ depending on the 
duty at issue. Attorneys may be liable for a violation of the duty of care only if they are negligent. 
But they may be liable for any violation of the duties of loyalty, impartiality, and confidentiality. 
 
Under the duty of care, attorneys must always exercise reasonable care under the 
circumstances. Attorneys are professionals, so the professional standard of care applies. In 
other words, an attorney must exercise the standard of care that an ordinary attorney would 
exercise under similar circumstances. If an attorney breaches the duty of care, then the attorney 
is negligent, and may be liable in tort for malpractice. 
 
By contrast, under the duties of loyalty, impartiality, and confidentiality, attorneys must always 
avoid conflicts of interest, provide candid advice, and protect confidential information. Any 
violation of these duties is a tort, irrespective of negligence. In effect, they are analogous to 
strict liability torts. 
 
The Elements of the Tort of Legal Malpractice 
 
Legal malpractice is a tort, with the same basic elements as any other tort claim: duty, breach, 
causation, and damages. An attorney has a duty only if an attorney-client relationship exists. 
Accordingly, the plaintiff in an action claiming legal malpractice must prove: 
 
1. Existence of an attorney-client relationship 
2. Breach of a legal duty 
3. Factual causation of harm 
4. Proximate causation of harm 
5. Actual damages 
 
Legal Duty 
 
Attorneys owe legal duties to their clients, but do not owe legal duties to non-clients. 
Accordingly, the threshold question in a malpractice action is whether the plaintiff is a client to 
whom the attorney owes legal duties. 
 
Marker v. Greenberg, 313 N.W.2d 4 (Minn. 1981) 
 
Summary: Theodore Marker hired attorney Robert Greenberg for estate planning 
services. Among other things, Greenberg prepared deeds conveying real estate to 
Marker and his son as joint tenants. When Marker died, the real estate was subject to 
estate tax. Marker’s son sued Greenberg for malpractice, alleging that if the real estate 
had been conveyed as tenants in common, it would not have been subject to estate tax. 
The trial court granted Greenberg’s motion for summary judgment and the appeals court 
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affirmed, holding that Marker’s son lacked an attorney-client relationship with Greenberg, 
and could not bring a malpractice action as a beneficiary of the estate because he 
received the property. 
 
SCOTT, Justice. 
 
This is an appeal from an order of the Hennepin County District Court in a legal malpractice 
action brought by the surviving joint tenant against the attorney who drafted the deed. By that 
order the trial court granted respondent Robert Greenberg's motion for summary judgment on 
the grounds that plaintiff could not bring the action absent an attorney-client relationship and 
that the six-year statute of limitations barred the action since the statutory period began to run in 
1973 when the alleged negligence occurred. We affirm. 
 
For purposes of this appeal, the facts are uncontested. Appellant's father, Theodore Marker, 
retained respondent, an attorney, for estate planning services. In December 1972 respondent 
prepared a will for appellant's father. In August 1973, on behalf of appellant's father, respondent 
drafted deeds which conveyed certain real estate to appellant's father and appellant as joint 
tenants. 
 
Appellant’s father died on December 24, 1977. Because the real estate in question was held by 
appellant and his father as joint tenants, its entire value, $120,000, was included in the 
decedent’s gross estate for tax purposes. 
 
Appellant asserts that, if he and his father had held the real estate as tenants in common, 
$20,858.18 in federal and state taxes would have been saved. Appellant commenced this action 
to recover the amount of the additional estate taxes, claiming the loss resulted from 
respondent’s negligence in not having the real estate conveyed into tenancy in common. 
 
Appellant was never a client of respondent. Appellant does not allege that he was a beneficiary 
of his father’s estate with respect to this property, but that he was a surviving joint tenant. 
 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the respondent and dismissed the 
complaint. Therefore, the issue arises as to whether a surviving joint tenant has a cause of 
action for malpractice against the attorney who drafted the joint tenancy deeds when the 
surviving joint tenant was never a client of the attorney. 
 
The general rule in legal malpractice is that an attorney is liable for professional negligence only 
to a person with whom the attorney has an attorney-client relationship and not, in the absence 
of special circumstances such as fraud or improper motive, to anyone else. Courts have 
recognized exceptions, however, where strict privity is not required. Exceptions are frequently 
found in cases involving drafting or executing a will. 
 
Many courts have followed the lead of the California Supreme Court, which declared in Lucas v. 
Hamm, that an intended beneficiary may bring an action for legal malpractice against the 
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decedent's attorney where the attorney's negligent act caused the named beneficiary to lose the 
intended bequest. 
 
The relaxation of the strict privity requirement is very limited, however. Especially in probate 
proceedings, this stringent restriction is a necessity to prevent a myriad of causes of action. The 
will cases listed above which follow Lucas v. Hamm are all situations in which the attorney by 
his actions produced an instrument that failed to carry out the testamentary intent of the testator, 
either by faulty drafting or by improper attestation. The cases extending the attorney's duty to 
non-clients are limited to a narrow range of factual situations in which the client's sole purpose 
in retaining an attorney is to benefit directly some third party. As stated by the Iowa Supreme 
Court in Brody v. Ruby, “It is clear, however, that the third party, in order to proceed successfully 
in a legal malpractice action, must be a direct and intended beneficiary of the lawyer's services.” 
 
In determining the extent of an attorney's duty to a non-client, courts frequently consider the 
factors expressed by the Lucas court: 
 
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable to a third 
person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of various factors, 
among which are the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, 
the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, 
the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury, and the 
policy of preventing future harm. 
 
Applying these factors to the deed drafted by respondent for appellant's father reveals that the 
respondent owed no duty to appellant. This is not a case where the property did not pass to the 
intended recipient upon the death of the testator. The deed was effective at the time it was 
recorded in 1973. There was no invalidity in the deed. Appellant does not allege that the 
disposition of the property was contrary to the intent of his father. The benefit which Theodore 
Marker wished to give to his son was the joint ownership of the property, and this was 
accomplished by the documents. 
 
The facts of Bucquet v. Livingston, to which appellant compares his situation, are 
distinguishable. In Bucquet, the beneficiaries of an inter vivos trust alleged professional 
negligence by the defendant attorney in drafting the trust agreement. The complaint alleged that 
the attorney was employed to plan the settlor's estate and to carry out his intent that the non-
marital half of the trust principal would ultimately pass to the beneficiaries free of estate taxes 
after his wife's death. Because the attorney negligently included a general power of appointment 
in the instrument, additional taxes were imposed which reduced the corpus of the trust passing 
to the beneficiaries. In that case the express purpose of the trust was minimization of taxes. No 
such purpose is alleged in the instant case. In Bucquet the desired savings in taxes failed 
because of the faulty drafting by the attorney. In the present case, there is no allegation that the 
deed as drafted failed to accomplish the objective of the client as expressed to the respondent. 
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The facts of the instant case are more similar to those of Hiemstra v. Huston. In that case the 
court recognized the exception established in earlier California cases holding an attorney liable 
to an intended beneficiary for defects in drafting of a will. The court nevertheless held that the 
complaint failed to state a cause of action in the allegations that under a will drafted by the 
defendant attorneys the plaintiff son received a smaller bequest than he would have received 
under an earlier will of testator. The court noted that plaintiff did not assert any legal deficiency 
in the will, nor did plaintiff assert either as a conclusion or by allegation of ultimate facts that the 
will failed to reflect the intent of the testator. The court concluded that if plaintiff was deprived of 
a substantial part of his father's estate, it was the result not of any negligence on the part of the 
defendant attorneys but of the testator's intention as expressed in the valid document. 
 
In the case before us, the objective of the deed was to transfer ownership of the real estate to 
joint tenancy between the father and the son. The complaint alleges no invalidity in the 
documents and no conflict of the result with decedent's intentions. The estate taxes that were 
due at Theodore Marker's death were the natural result of the form of ownership chosen by the 
decedent and not the result of any negligence by respondent. In this case summary judgment 
was proper. We therefore need not discuss the disputed application of the statute of limitations. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why didn’t Marker have an attorney-client relationship with Greenberg? 
2. Was Greenberg negligent? Would Marker’s father have had a malpractice action against 
Greenberg? 
3. Who is the real party in interest: Marker or his father’s estate? Why did Marker’s father 
choose joint tenancy rather than tenancy in common? What outcome was Marker’s 
father trying to accomplish? Did Greenberg help him achieve that outcome? All else 
being equal, do you think Marker’s father would have wanted to minimize the tax? 
 
Breach of Duty 
 
If an attorney-client relationship exists, then the attorney owes certain legal duties to the client. 
In order to prevail in a malpractice action, the plaintiff must prove that the attorney breached one 
of those legal duties. However, different duties have different liability standards. For example, 
the duty of care requires attorneys to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. But 
the duty of loyalty requires absolute loyalty. 
 
Equitania Ins. v. Slone & Garrett, 191 S.W.3d 552 (Ky. 2006) 
 
Summary: Attorney Laurel Garrett represented Vimont in an effort to prevent 
Pavenstedt from gaining control of Equitania Insurance. Vimont filed a malpractice claim 
against Garrett, alleging that she provided unsound advice. The trial court instructed the 
jury that attorneys are not liable for errors of judgment, and the jury found for Garrett. 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that attorneys must exercise ordinary care under 
the circumstances. 
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WINTERSHEIMER, Justice. 
 
This appeal is from an opinion of the Court of Appeals which affirmed a judgment of the circuit 
court based on a summary judgment/jury verdict that rejected the claim of the Equitania 
Insurance Company and its Vimont shareholder group for legal malpractice against Garrett and 
her law firm. 
 
The major issues are whether the proper standard for proving liability in a legal malpractice case 
was followed and whether the instructions given by the trial judge to the jury regarding specific 
factual issues violated the rule in favor of barebones jury instructions. 
 
Two groups of shareholders, the Vimont group, composed of four of the shareholders, and the 
Pavenstedt group, composed of a group of shareholders led by Johann Pavenstedt began to vie 
for control of Equitania, an insurance company which provided insurance for horse owners. 
After the Vimont group bought out the Pavenstedt group, the company continued to decline in 
its efforts to return a profit. Vimont eventually entered an agreement to sell the book of business 
to Markel Insurance Company. That deal was closed in January 1995. In March of that year, the 
Vimont group filed a civil action in circuit court, seeking to rescind the agreement between them 
and the Pavenstedt group. That case was assigned to Fayette Circuit Judge Gary Payne. A 
judgment was rendered against the Vimont group and it was upheld by the Court of Appeals in 
an unpublished opinion. 
 
Laurel Garrett and the law firm of Slone & Garrett represented the Vimont group in its attempt to 
gain control of the company prior to Vimont buying the shares of Pavenstedt. As a result of that 
representation, Vimont filed a civil action against Garrett in circuit court in February of 1997, 
alleging legal malpractice by Garrett in connection with her representation. That case was 
assigned to Fayette Circuit Judge John R. Adams and it is the principal subject of this appeal. 
Judge Adams ruled against Vimont and the Court of Appeals upheld that decision. This appeal 
followed. 
 
This case is a complex legal malpractice claim brought by Vimont against Garrett alleging that 
she negligently advised them during the midst of the shareholder dispute. They claim that 
Garrett negligently failed to properly advise them as to how to retain control of the corporation; 
that the methods she advised violated the insurance code; violated a fiduciary duty to 
shareholders; was unethical, and was substantially more expensive. The circuit judge granted 
Garrett a partial summary judgment based on his interpretation of the contract which was 
different from the interpretation made by the circuit judge in the earlier civil case. The other 
portion of the claim was resolved in favor of Garrett by a jury verdict. The Court of Appeals 
upheld the decision of the circuit court, and this Court granted discretionary review. 
 
I. Jury Instructions 
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Correct instructions are absolutely essential to an accurate jury verdict. The fundamental 
function of instructions is to tell the jury what it must believe from the evidence in order to 
resolve each dispositive factual issue in favor of the party who has the burden of proof on that 
issue. 
 
We should note it is well recognized that the function of instructions is only to state what the jury 
must believe from the evidence. There should not be an abundance of detail but the jury 
instructions should provide only the “bare bones” of the question for the jury. The bare bones 
may then be fleshed out by counsel during closing argument. 
 
The jury instructions given by the trial court over the objection by Vimont were not an accurate 
statement of the law regarding legal malpractice in Kentucky. Vimont objected to the instructions 
and tendered instructions of their own which were not used. The instructions given follow: 
 
Instruction No. 2: It was the duty of Defendant, Laurel Garrett, in undertaking the legal 
representation of the plaintiffs, to possess to an ordinary extent the technical knowledge 
commonly possessed in her profession, to exercise that degree of care and skill which 
an ordinary, reasonably competent lawyer would exercise under the same or similar 
circumstances. Provided, however, a lawyer cannot be held responsible for errors in 
judgment or for advising a course of action even if that course of action ultimately proves 
to be unsuccessful. 
 
The given instructions were incorrect for several reasons. It was properly preserved because 
there was an objection to Instruction No. 2 in the submitted instructions. 
 
Kentucky law does not provide for an exception for attorney liability for errors in judgment. A 
case relied on by the Court of Appeals, Daugherty v. Runner, stated that misjudgment of the law 
will generally not render a lawyer liable. However, Daugherty did not state that a lawyer can 
never be held liable for an error in judgment. The tendered instructions did not advise the jury 
that it had to be an error of law which precluded liability, nor did it inform the jury that there are 
circumstances in which misjudgment of the law could be a basis for liability. There can be many 
circumstances in which lawyers can commit errors of judgment which deviate from the standard 
of care. Whether an error of judgment is legal malpractice is a question of fact for the jury. 
 
Vimont offered an expert, Manning Warren, to evaluate the methods undertaken by Garrett to 
assist the company in its shareholders dispute. Specifically, Warren testified that Garrett should 
have pursued an administrative process with the Department of Insurance to join the Vimont 
group to the Pavenstedt agreement which, if successful, would have resulted in the 
shareholders maintaining control of Equitania and would have resolved the issue. This would 
have avoided a prolonged battle with Pavenstedt and would have avoided spending over two 
million dollars by buying the stock. They also would have avoided the issues with the 
Department of Insurance regarding change of control as a result of their purchase. It was their 
conclusion that Garrett committed ongoing malpractice by failing to advise them of change of 
control issues. Warren further testified that it was a deviation to fail to pursue this option. 
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However, it is apparently undisputed that the Department of Insurance would not have approved 
a Pavenstedt sale even if it had been properly submitted. 
 
Kentucky should not allow lawyers to avoid liability for committing errors in judgment which the 
average reasonably prudent lawyer would not commit. Any avoidance of liability should only be 
allowed for errors of judgment made in absolute good faith. 
 
Here, Garrett failed to plead or present evidence regarding her alleged errors in judgment so as 
to justify her decision. The error in judgment instruction indirectly required the jury to define and 
understand abstract legal principles. The jury could not have reasonably understood the 
distinction between errors in judgment and legal malpractice. It is of interest to note that the 
instruction provided by Vimont in this case is similar to the instructions provided in Daugherty. 
 
The proper jury instruction must follow a form similar to that in Palmore: 
 
It was the duty of Defendant in undertaking the legal representation of Plaintiff to 
exercise the degree of care and skill expected of a reasonably competent lawyer acting 
under similar circumstances. If you are satisfied from the evidence that Defendant failed 
to comply with this duty and that such failure was a substantial factor causing the loss, 
you will find for Plaintiff; otherwise you will find for Defendant. 
 
This instruction form contains the elements prescribed in Daugherty without requiring the jury to 
understand abstract legal principles. The jury is able to determine from the evidence whether 
there was a breach of duty and whether that breach caused the loss. 
 
Consequently, under the circumstances regarding the instructions, this matter is reversed and 
remanded. The decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are reversed and this matter 
is remanded to the trial court for a jury determination as to all factual issues. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why was Garrett’s advice unsound? What was her defense? 
2. How should juries evaluate malpractice claims alleging violations of the duty of care? 
What is the correct standard of liability? 
 
Causation of Harm 
 
Clients can recover for malpractice only if their attorney’s negligence was both the “factual” or 
“but for” cause and proximate cause of a legally cognizable harm. An attorney who is negligent 
but causes no harm is not liable for malpractice. 
 
Courts typically apply the “suit within a suit” or “trial within a trial” doctrine to legal malpractice 
actions. Under this doctrine, the factfinder must determine not only how the attorney’s breach of 
duty affected the action, but also how the action would have ended without the breach of duty. 
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In other words, the client must prove that the attorney’s breach of duty caused a foreseeably 
worse outcome. 
 
Accordingly, an attorney is not liable for malpractice if the client’s injury was inevitable. For 
example, an attorney who negligently fails to file an action with no chance of success is not 
liable for negligence. But what if the action had a small chance of success? And what if the 
action had no chance of success, but still had settlement value? 
 
In an action for transactional malpractice, the client must prove that the attorney’s breach of 
duty caused a worse outcome than non-breach would have caused. For example, the client 
could show that alternative actions would have produced a better result. 
 
The client must also prove that the attorney’s negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. 
In other words, the plaintiff must provide that a reasonable attorney under the circumstances 
would have foreseen the injury. 
 
In theory, causation is a straightforward concept. Attorneys are liable for malpractice only if their 
actions caused a harm that they could have foreseen. But in practice, causation of harm and 
foreseeability can be difficult to determine in the face of diverse probabilities and uncertain 
counterfactuals. 
 
For example, consider the following scenarios: 
 
● The attorney advises the client not to accept a $10,000 settlement for a $100,000 
damages claim, and the jury rules for the defendant. 
● The attorney advises the client not to accept a $10,000 settlement for a $100,000 
damages claim, and the judge grants the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 
● The attorney advises the client not to accept a $10,000 settlement for a $100,000 
damages claim, and the judge grants the defendant’s motion to dismiss. 
● Before discovery, the attorney advises the client not to accept a $10,000 settlement for a 
$100,000 damages claim before discovery. After discovery, the client accepts a $5,000 
settlement. 
● The attorney advises the client to accept a $10,000 settlement for a $100,000 damages 
claim, and the client later obtains a $50,000 settlement. 
● The attorney advises the client to accept a $10,000 settlement for a $100,000 damages 
claim. The client accepts the settlement, but could have obtained a $20,000 settlement. 
 
In each of these circumstances, has the attorney caused a foreseeable harm? 
 
Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) 
 
Summary: Lula Daugherty Roach died in the hospital after a car accident. Runner 
represented Roach’s estate, and filed an action against the other driver, but not against 
the hospital. The estate eventually hired another attorney to file a medical malpractice 
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action, but it was barred by the statute of limitations. The estate filed a malpractice 
action against Runner for failing to file a medical malpractice action. The jury found for 
Runner, but also held that the estate would have recovered $146k in a medical 
malpractice action. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Runner did not 
necessarily violate the duty of care. 
 
HAYES, Judge. 
 
This appeal is from a judgment entered pursuant to a jury verdict which exonerated the 
appellee, an attorney, from the charges of legal malpractice. The charges of the legal 
malpractice claim arose from a medical malpractice cause of action on behalf of the deceased, 
Lula Daugherty Roach. This type of action is commonly referred to as a “suit within a suit.” The 
basis for the legal malpractice claim is that appellee Runner, while representing the deceased 
Roach for injuries sustained in an automobile accident, failed to pursue a medical malpractice 
claim by the estate of Roach against the hospital where Roach was treated for her injuries after 
her accident and against the doctors who treated her, until her claim was barred by the statute 
of limitations. 
 
The jury found for Runner on the legal malpractice claim and additionally found that the 
appellant would have recovered on the medical malpractice case, if suit had been timely filed, in 
the amount of $146,123.75. Both parties appealed. 
 
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in submitting the issue of Runner’s negligence 
to the jury and in failing to instruct the jury properly. 
 
Appellee's cross-appeal is of a protective nature wherein it is contended that if we reverse the 
trial court based on appellant’s assignments of error, then appellee believes the jury verdict 
awarding appellant $146,123.75 on his medical malpractice claim is erroneous because of 
improperly admitted evidence. 
 
We will not reach the claim of appellee on cross-appeal since we affirm the judgment of the 
lower court. 
 
On February 22, 1972, Mrs. Roach and her husband Russell were involved in an automobile 
accident near Richmond, Kentucky. After receiving emergency medical treatment in Richmond, 
Mrs. Roach was transferred to St. Joseph Hospital in Lexington, Kentucky. She was admitted on 
February 22, 1972, under the care of an orthopedic doctor, George Gumbert, Jr. Mrs. Roach 
died in the hospital on March 17, 1972. The official cause of death listed on the certificate of 
death was bronchial pneumonia due to, or as a consequence of, generalized peritonitis and 
bacterial endocarditis. On the date of Mrs. Roach's death, her husband Russell, individually and 
as executor of the estate of Mrs. Roach, entered into a contract with attorney Runner to the 
effect that Runner was to “institute a claim for damages against any and all responsible parties 
as a result of injuries received upon the 22nd day of February, 1972.” The contract was a 
standard contract approved by the Louisville Bar Association. 
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A later contract, dated July 28, 1973, was entered into between James Russell Roach and 
another attorney, whereby this “second attorney” was to represent Roach, individually and as 
administrator of the estate of Lula Roach, in the medical malpractice claim. James Russell 
Roach was a nonresident, so the present appellant, Byrd E. Daugherty, was appointed ancillary 
administrator. 
 
Suit was filed on August 1, 1973, in Fayette Circuit Court on behalf of Daugherty by his present 
attorney, against St. Joseph Hospital and others based on the medical malpractice claim. The 
trial court in that case granted a summary judgment against Daugherty and the estate of Lula 
Roach because the suit was not filed within the period of limitations. 
 
Runner testified he was not hired to represent the estate of Lula Roach on a medical 
malpractice claim; made an investigation of the facts surrounding the auto accident; filed suit on 
same in Federal Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington against the driver of the 
other auto in the accident, and never suspected the possibility of a medical malpractice claim. 
 
Appellant contends it is what Runner did not do that makes him liable for malpractice. It is 
asserted he did not examine the hospital records until after the statute of limitations had run on 
any medical malpractice claim, and that he never advised his client that he did not handle 
medical malpractice cases. There was also testimony on behalf of appellant that Russell Roach, 
who had died prior to the trial, had telephoned Runner in January, 1973, inquiring of Runner the 
status of any medical malpractice investigation Runner was conducting. Runner denied ever 
having such a conversation. It is uncontradicted, however, that appellant hired the “second 
attorney” on March 15, 1973, to represent him in the medical malpractice claim against St. 
Joseph Hospital and others. 
 
The Fayette Circuit Court had determined that the statute of limitations began to run on the 
medical malpractice claim “on March 17, 1972, and certainly no later than July 20, 1972, when 
the record of the decedent's treatment was fully complete.” From the evidence in the record and 
the legal briefs filed on behalf of the parties, it is unclear why the second attorney, who accepted 
a retainer fee, did not file the medical malpractice claim within the period of time permitted by 
the statute and case law of this Commonwealth. 
 
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in (1) submitting the question of the attorney's 
negligence to the jury; (2) allowing an expert opinion to be presented to the jury based upon 
improper evidence; and, (3) in failing to instruct the jury that the fact that other hired counsel 
might have been able to toll the statute of limitations was no defense to appellee Runner. 
 
The standard of care is generally composed of two elements — care and skill. The first has to 
do with care and diligence which the attorney must exercise. The second is concerned with the 
minimum degree of skill and knowledge which the attorney must display. 
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In determining whether that degree of care and skill exercised by the attorney in a given case 
meets the requirements of the standard of care aforementioned, the attorney’s act, or failure to 
act, is judged by the degree of its departure from the quality of professional conduct customarily 
provided by members of the legal profession. 
 
As it would be in negligence cases generally, the question of whether the conduct of the 
attorney meets the standard of care test is one for the trier of the facts to determine. 
 
Having determined that the standard of care an attorney owes his client is not that of a 
“reasonable man” under the circumstances, but is that care and skill as men of the legal 
profession commonly, or ordinarily, possess and exercise under the circumstances, and having 
determined that this is generally a question for the trier of the facts, we look now at the facts of 
the instant case. 
 
The appellant Daugherty contends the trial court erred in submitting the negligence of appellee 
Runner to the jury. He in effect is saying he, Daugherty, was entitled to a directed verdict on this 
point because Runner was negligent as a matter of law. 
 
Appellant was required to prove in the legal malpractice suit (1) that Runner was employed by 
appellant; (2) that he neglected his duty to exercise the ordinary care of a reasonably competent 
attorney acting in the same or similar circumstances; and (3) that such negligence resulted in 
and was the substantially contributing factor in the loss to the client. 
 
The appellant has presented two theories in support of his argument that he was entitled to a 
directed verdict on the question of Runner’s negligence. The first is that Runner was retained to 
bring all possible legal actions resulting from the injuries and death of Mrs. Roach, including a 
medical malpractice action, if appropriate, and that he failed to carry out this duty. This 
argument is clearly without merit. The written contract between the parties recited that Runner 
was retained “to institute a claim for damages against any and all responsible parties, as a 
result of injuries received upon the 22 day of February, 1972.” While there was some testimony 
about a conversation with Runner regarding a medical malpractice action, the evidence was 
disputed on that matter, and the question of whether Runner had any duty to handle any 
medical malpractice case was certainly one for the jury. 
 
Appellant's second theory in support of his directed verdict argument seems to be that even if 
Runner was not employed specifically to pursue a medical malpractice action, that he 
nevertheless had a duty to obtain and examine the medical records of the patient, to investigate 
the treatment procedures administered to her, and to inform his client that there may have been 
some question about the medical care and treatment she received, but that he did not handle 
medical malpractice. Appellee’s contention on this issue is simply that Mr. Runner was not 
retained under the contract to handle a medical malpractice case, and he therefore had no 
duties in that regard. 
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We are not ready to hold that Mr. Runner had absolutely no duties to his client with regard to a 
medical malpractice action simply because the written contract did not specifically mention a 
malpractice suit. To do so would require the client, presumably a layman who is unskilled in the 
law, to recognize for himself all potential legal remedies. An attorney cannot completely 
disregard matters coming to his attention which should reasonably put him on notice that his 
client may have legal problems or remedies that are not precisely or totally within the scope of 
the task being performed by the attorney. 
 
On the other hand, we certainly cannot say that Mr. Runner was neglectful as a matter of law. 
There was considerable testimony concerning Runner’s negligence, or lack of it. There was 
expert testimony from two attorneys, one for each side. 
 
Runner’s testimony, in summary, was that he was hired to represent the Roaches only for the 
injuries Mrs. Roach sustained as a result of the automobile collision of February 22nd. He 
testified that he did not handle medical malpractice claims because he was not competent to do 
so. He had never processed one. He testified that the fact Mrs. Roach entered the hospital with, 
according to the hospital admission report, multiple contusions and abrasions, a fractured nose, 
fractured right shoulder and a compressed fracture of the spine, and that she died in the 
hospital some thirty (30) days later, did not arouse his suspicion of a medical malpractice claim. 
He did not review the hospital records until he filed the wrongful death action on behalf of Mrs. 
Roach in Federal Court in Lexington, Kentucky, on June 9, 1972. Runner’s law associate, who 
actually reviewed the medical records on June 9, 1972, testified the records were incomplete as 
there was no autopsy report in the medical records on June 9th. 
 
Runner further testified that no one representing the deceased Mrs. Roach ever called to his 
attention the possibility of a medical malpractice claim until the “second attorney” previously 
mentioned contacted him some few days before the statute of limitations ran on the medical 
malpractice claim. Runner's testimony was that he told this other attorney to “go ahead” with the 
medical malpractice claim. 
 
Appellant offered proof that Runner was contacted by members of Mrs. Roach's family 
concerning the medical malpractice case long before the statute ran. They were concerned with 
what Runner was doing about the medical malpractice case. The appellant produced expert 
testimony from a local lawyer to the effect that Runner's failure to inquire into the cause of death 
of Mrs. Roach and his failure to review the medical records was not consistent with good legal 
practice and, in fact, was a substantial departure therefrom. 
 
The other important testimony was that the Roach family, including Daugherty, a brother of Mrs. 
Roach, had discussed, among themselves, the medical malpractice case as early as December, 
1972. They had in fact contacted two attorneys in Lexington, who declined the case. They were 
aware of the statute of limitations. 
 
The family then proceeded to northern Kentucky, where on March 15, 1973, they employed the 
“second attorney” to represent the estate in the medical malpractice case. He filed no complaint. 
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Some time after July 28, 1973, he turned the case over to the appellant's current attorney, who 
on August 1, 1973, filed a medical malpractice claim in Fayette Circuit Court which was 
subsequently dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. 
 
Under these circumstances the question of whether Runner had exercised the degree of care 
and skill expected of a reasonably competent attorney was a question for the jury to decide. 
This is true especially in light of the fact that there was disputed testimony concerning whether 
the possibility of a medical malpractice action had been discussed with Runner. 
 
The issue of Runner's negligence was submitted to the jury under the following instructions: 
 
4. It was the duty of the defendant, E. Michael Runner, Attorney at Law, in undertaking 
the legal representation of the Estate of Lula Daugherty Roach, to exercise that degree 
of care and skill expected of a reasonably competent lawyer acting in the same or similar 
circumstances about which you have heard evidence, and this general duty, included the 
following specific duties: 
 
(A) Not to undertake representation in a legal matter in which he knew or should 
have known he was not competent without associating with himself a lawyer that 
was competent to handle it; 
(B) Not to undertake representation in a legal matter without preparation 
adequate in the circumstances. 
 
5. The Jury will answer the following interrogatory: Do you believe from the evidence that 
the defendant, E. Michael Runner, failed in one or more of the duties imposed upon him 
by instruction number 4, and such failure was the substantial factor in the Estate of Lula 
Daugherty Roach not recovering the award set out in instruction number 3 and 
incorporated in Verdict A? 
 
Nine of the jurors answered the question in the negative. While we may have found differently 
had we sat as jurors in this case, we believe there is sufficient evidence to support this jury's 
verdict, and we therefore will not disturb it. Based upon the conflicting evidence, we fail to see 
how Runner was negligent as a matter of law. 
 
We note that the trial court's instruction mistakenly required the jury to find that Runner’s breach 
of duty, if any, was “the” substantial factor in the plaintiff’s failure to recover. The instruction 
should have read, “a” substantial factor. However, the trial court was not made aware of the 
error by objection, and it has not been raised on appeal, nor could it be. For this reason we are 
not able to review the question. In any event, it does not appear to be so substantial as to have 
caused the plaintiff any prejudice. 
 
In conclusion, we would add that we do agree somewhat with a statement appellant makes in 
his well-written brief. Appellant states thusly: 
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Perhaps the issue that is involved in this case is far beyond the instant action, and must 
be laid at the doors of the Bar as a whole and more specifically, appellee. Maybe we, as 
a profession, have not discharged our responsibility to inform the public as a whole, and 
more specifically, Mr. Roach, that we specialize and limit our practice. However, in the 
end result, the effect on the client is the same; the public expects, and has the right to 
demand, that their legal affairs will be approached with expertise and initiative and 
anything short of that is a violation of the trust and confidence reposed in a member of 
our profession. 
 
To that, we would simply repeat that all the evidence in this case was submitted to a jury of 
twelve citizens of this community, nine of whom found for the attorney. Even though we may 
have found differently had we sat as jurors in this case, we cannot disturb their verdict, as it was 
sufficiently supported by the evidence. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. What was the harm to Roach’s estate? Could Runner have prevented that harm? Could 
anyone else have prevented the harm? 
2. What was the error in the jury instructions? Do you agree with the court’s conclusion that 
the error was not prejudicial? 
 
TIG Ins. v. Giffin Winning Cohen & Bodewes, 444 F. 3d 587 (7th Cir. 2006) 
 
Summary: Giffin Winning represented Illinois State University in a gender discrimination 
action, and failed to produce three gender equity studies to Joel Bellows, attorney for the 
plaintiffs. Soon afterward, TIG and Latham & Watkins took over ISU’s defense. Soon 
afterward, Gorrell gave Bellows the studies and claimed they were based on a 
nonexistent database. Bellows moved to sanction Giffin Winning and ISU for not 
producing the database, and TIG paid Latham & Watkins $1.2 million to defend ISU. The 
action ultimately settled, and TIG filed a malpractice action against Giffin Winning for 
failing to produce the studies. The district court dismissed the action, and the circuit 
court affirmed, holding that TIG failed to allege proximate cause because the injury was 
not foreseeable. 
 
EVANS, Circuit Judge. 
 
TIG Insurance Company appeals the dismissal of its malpractice case against the Giffin 
Winning law firm and one of its attorneys, Carol Hansen Posegate. 
 
To explain the malpractice claim we must reach back to the underlying lawsuit, in which Giffin 
Winning, at least for a time, represented Illinois State University (ISU) in a class-action, gender-
discrimination lawsuit brought by several female professors. In the suit, the plaintiffs contended 
that they were being paid less than male professors and that ISU retaliated against female 
professors who complained about the discrimination. Their attorney was Joel Bellows. TIG was 
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ISU’s liability insurer at the time and it paid the attorney fees which are at the heart of the 
present malpractice action; TIG, in turn, was reimbursed by its reinsurers. 
 
The malpractice alleged in the present case arose out of discovery problems in the case. The 
major problem involved Giffin Winning’s failure to produce three documents called gender equity 
studies (two of which are at issue here) in their response to a discovery request. The response 
was signed in October 1996. A month later the case was stayed. Soon thereafter, the law firm of 
Latham & Watkins filed an appearance on behalf of ISU and essentially took control of ISU’s 
defense, though Giffin Winning remained of record. Latham had an attorney-client relationship 
with ISU’s insurer TIG. Giffin Winning did not. 
 
The facts show that Giffin Winning received two gender equity studies from ISU in 1994 — while 
the Varner case was still pending before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Two 
years later, when the law firm received the second request for documents, the subject of the 
October 1996 response at issue here, they routed the request to William Gorrell, the former 
executive director for Information Systems and the head of the Planning Policy department at 
ISU. He did not at that time forward the studies to Giffin Winning for production and the law firm 
did not produce them on its own. On this point, Judge Mihm later said that Gorrell was the one 
who "dropped the ball entirely." 
 
During the stay in the case, Bellows talked with Gorrell, who by then was no longer employed by 
ISU and had his own lawsuit pending against the school for wrongful termination. He 
independently provided Bellows with the gender equity studies. He also executed an affidavit 
detailing particulars of a “planning policy database” on which he said the studies were based. 
 
Once the stay was lifted, Bellows confronted Latham with the studies. (The Latham firm was 
now representing ISU). Bellows demanded that ISU turn over the database on which he alleged 
the studies were based. Apparently thinking the best defense is a good offense, Latham’s first 
response apparently was to point fingers, saying Bellows had also not adequately complied with 
discovery requests. Also at this time, Latham began preparing a motion to disqualify Bellows for 
improperly soliciting privileged information from Gorrell. 
 
For his part, Bellows filed a motion for sanctions against both ISU and Giffin Winning, in part 
based on the failure to produce the gender equity studies. As relevant here, Bellows’ contention 
in his motion for sanctions was not simply that the studies were not produced. After all, he now 
had the studies. Rather, he claimed that the gender equity studies were not produced because 
of a conspiracy to hide the “Planning Policy database.” To have produced the studies, he 
argued, “would have alerted the Varner plaintiffs to the existence of the databases.” 
 
We now arrive at the essence of the case — the pivotal facts about the database. At a 4-day 
hearing on the pending motions, Gorrell testified that the database contained variables relevant 
to the issue of gender equity and was maintained in a format which enabled a user to prepare 
comparative studies. He testified that the gender equity studies were prepared from this 
database. He said he had done one of the studies himself, though he also said he had never 
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personally accessed the database. The actual data processing, he said, was done by his 
research assistant, Anna Wells, and her preparation of the data for his 1994 study would have 
taken her no more than a day or two using the database: 
 
Q How long did it take Anna Wells to compile the information for the 1994 study? 
A It could be done in a day or two. 
 
That apparently was news to Wells. She testified that she did not use any database in compiling 
the data. 
 
Q Ms. Wells, when you collected the information reflected in these tables, was there a 
single source that you could go to to collect all the information reflected in the tables? 
A No. 
Q Was there a single database maintained by the Planning Policy department that 
contained all of the information reflected in these tables? 
A No. 
 
She used hard copy (probably the same 279 banker boxes of material which had, in fact, been 
produced to Bellows), and it took her “a few weeks, several weeks” to locate the information and 
format it for use. Why? Because, as Judge Mihm found, there was no database and never had 
been: 
 
I don't believe that the plaintiffs have ever established the existence of the kind of 
database that I thought was being alleged here, that there was some button at ISU that 
could be punched that would involve a print-out of all this information. That clearly is not 
true. The nonexistence of the database — which Bellows said there was an alleged 
conspiracy to hide — is not seriously contested. 
 
Nevertheless, Judge Mihm sanctioned Giffin Winning $10,000 for discovery lapses, a sanction 
which was later vacated. Judge Mihm, however, wisely denied Bellows’ request for a default 
judgment based on the failure to produce the gender equity studies. He remarked that “I don't 
believe it was appropriate — but even if I had ordered that, I think that would have been 
reversed on appeal.” In addition, although he denied Latham's motion to disqualify Bellows 
because of his contact with Gorrell, Judge Mihm sanctioned Bellows $10,000 as well. 
Ultimately, the case was settled; mercifully, we think. 
 
We now get to the present malpractice action that TIG filed against Giffin Winning in which the 
damages TIG alleges are the attorney fees it paid Latham to defend against the sanction motion 
— a whopping $1.2 million, give or take, for the work of 27 attorneys and various paralegals. It 
seems that when Latham said it took the motion seriously, it meant it. As we said, TIG paid the 
bill and was subsequently reimbursed by its reinsurers. 
 
The elements of a legal malpractice action in Illinois are well-settled. They are: “(1) the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship that establishes a duty on the part of the attorney; (2) 
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a negligent act or omission constituting a breach of that duty; (3) proximate cause; and (4) 
damages.” A legal malpractice case is similar to any other negligence claim, and traditional 
principles apply. Proximate cause describes two distinct requirements — cause in fact and legal 
cause. Cause in fact exists only if the defendant's conduct was a “material element and a 
substantial factor in bringing about the injury.” Legal cause, on the other hand, is largely a 
question of foreseeability. The relevant inquiry is whether “the injury is of a type that a 
reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her conduct.” The occurrence must have 
been “reasonably” foreseeable: “Not what actually happened, but what the reasonably prudent 
person would then have foreseen as likely to happen, is the key to the question of 
reasonableness.” 
 
This is not the same as (but, in this case, necessarily a bit difficult to distinguish from) a 
determination as to whether the fees themselves are reasonable. For purposes of proximate 
cause, if the fees do not reflect work reasonably, foreseeably related to the negligence alleged 
in the case, it does not matter that in some other sense they might be “reasonable.” We draw 
this distinction in response to TIG's argument, that because the fees were paid, they are prima 
facie reasonable. In this situation, we find the argument breathtaking, say nothing of irrelevant. 
 
Proximate cause is the issue on which this case falters. Having said that, we recognize that the 
Illinois courts indicate that proximate cause should ordinarily be decided not as a matter or law, 
but by a trier of fact. However, in a situation in which it is clear as a matter of law that the injury 
could not have been foreseeable, Illinois courts have upheld summary judgment on the issue. 
The situation before us is such a case. 
 
The fundamental negligence allegedly committed by Giffin Winning was a failure to produce 
documents — especially gender equity studies — pursuant to a discovery request. The 
attorneys had routed the request to Gorrell, who was at that point still employed by ISU. He did 
not forward the studies to the attorneys. However, the attorneys had copies of the studies, 
which they also failed to produce. This is a clear breakdown of the discovery process, which we 
infer was not going at all smoothly on either side of this case. 
 
In this all-too-common situation, the question for us is whether it would be reasonably 
foreseeable that a failure to produce these documents would result in the injury alleged here. 
Could the attorneys foresee that Gorrell, who failed to produce the documents when they turned 
the request over to him, would then, after he became disgruntled with ISU, independently 
provide the documents to Bellows? Beyond that, would reasonable people foresee that Gorrell 
would mislead Bellows about a database which did not exist? Would reasonable people then 
think that, upon hearing Gorrell's story, Bellows’ first impulse would be to move for sanctions 
including default judgment in the case? Would reasonable people foresee that, next, a large law 
firm, apparently thinking of Judge Mihm as a bit trigger-happy, would jump into high gear out of 
fear of default judgment and launch an army of 27 attorneys, plus paralegals, to defend against 
the possibility that Judge Mihm might grant default judgment on the basis of an alleged 
conspiracy to hide something which does not exist? In other words, was the Latham response to 
a failure to produce documents and the resulting injury foreseeable? 
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We think it was not as a matter of law. Our point can be illustrated by a very different sort of 
negligence action. In Abrams, the city failed to send an ambulance for a woman, Abrams (of 
course), who was in labor. A friend, who then drove her to the hospital, ran a red light and 
collided with a car driven by a drug-and-alcohol-impaired driver with a suspended license. 
Abrams was seriously injured and spent 2 weeks in a coma; sadly, her baby died. The court 
found, however, that as a matter of law there was no proximate cause. The city could not have 
foreseen the situation that unfolded. Perhaps a bit callously, the court remarked that “millions of 
women in labor make it safely to the hospital each year by private transportation.” 
 
It is also true — though less tragically so — that countless failures to produce documents occur 
in the federal courts every year. That is not a good thing. But we are not at a point at which it is 
foreseeable that such a failure will spawn a million-dollar bill for attorney fees. If it were, litigation 
would become more of a blood sport than it already is. Lawyers would be even more obsessive 
about irrelevant and tedious details. No good could come of it. 
 
There is, in fact, nothing which distinguishes the failure to produce in this case with countless 
others. Judge Mihm himself made this point in response to Bellows’ argument that this was the 
worst discovery abuse he had ever seen. Judge Mihm said: 
 
But you said in your 34 years of practice this was the most shocking thing you had ever 
seen in terms of this discovery issue. I wonder what kind of practice you've had if that's 
the case because, boy, in the scheme of things, I've seen things 50 times worse than 
this. 
 
What is foreseeable as a result of a failure to produce documents is the reasonable procedure 
set out in Civil Rule of Civil Procedure 37, which provides for sanctions only after other 
reasonable efforts to work out disagreements fail. It may be that, as Judge Mihm also said, that 
did not happen enough in this case. But ISU and Giffin Winning could hardly be expected to 
foresee all this trouble over a phantom database. Why would they? It was ISU's alleged 
database and Giffin Winning was representing ISU at the time. They knew of no database; they 
were hiding no database; there was no database. For Giffin Winning's carelessness in failing to 
produce documents (which Bellows had in his possession), the sanction of $10,000 might well 
have been sustained on appeal. But as a matter of law, the injury alleged here was not 
reasonably foreseeable. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. What was TIG’s injury? Did Giffin Winning’s negligence cause that injury? 
2. Why did the court hold that TIG’s injury was not reasonably foreseeable? Was TIG’s 
injury a reasonably foreseeable risk? 
 
Damages 
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The plaintiff in a legal malpractice action can only recover actual damages, and can only 
recover damages that were reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. As a consequence, the 
plaintiff must prove the amount of damages, and cannot recover speculative damages. 
 
Kituskie v. Corbman, 714 A. 2d 1027 (Pa. 1998) 
 
Summary: Kituskie was injured by Trapp in a car accident while on vacation in California. 
He returned home to Pennsylvania and hired attorney Corbman to represent him in a tort 
action. Corbman negligently failed to file an action within California’s two-year statute of 
limitations, and advised Kituskie to file a legal malpractice action. Trapp’s insurance 
policy had a $25,000 maximum, but the jury awarded Kituskie $2.3 million in damages 
against Corbman. The appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that 
the jury must consider the collectability of damages, and that the defendant bears the 
burden of proof that damages are not collectable. The Supreme Court affirmed. 
 
CASTILLE, Justice. 
 
This Court granted allocatur in this matter in order to address two issues. The first issue is 
whether the collectibility of damages in an underlying action is relevant to and, therefore, 
admissible in a legal malpractice action. The second issue is, if collectibility of damages should 
be considered, which party bears the burden of proving collectibility. Because we find that 
collectibility of damages in the underlying action should be considered in a legal malpractice 
action and that the defendant/attorney bears the burden of proof, we affirm the order of the 
Superior Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute. Leo J. Kituskie is a Pennsylvania resident 
who is a practicing periodontist. On September 3, 1989, Kituskie was injured in a two-car 
automobile accident during his vacation in San Jose, California. The traffic collision report for 
the accident stated that a vehicle being driven by Evan Mark Trapp crossed a highway on-ramp 
into the path of Kituskie’s automobile after it struck a curb and a cyclone fence. The traffic 
collision report also indicated that Trapp was driving while intoxicated and that his vehicle was 
being operated at the time of the accident at a high rate of speed. After the accident, Kituskie 
returned to the Philadelphia area in order to begin treatment for his injuries. As a result of this 
automobile accident, Kituskie avers that he suffers from a degenerative and arthritic back 
condition which makes it difficult for him to work full-time as a periodontist. 
 
On September 9, 1989, Kituskie retained Scott K. Corbman, Esquire, to pursue his claim 
against Trapp for the personal injuries he sustained in the accident. Corbman is an attorney 
licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and is a principal/shareholder in 
the law firm of Garfinkle, Corbman, Greenberg and Jurikson, P.C. 
 
Corbman proceeded to obtain Kituskie’s medical reports. After reviewing the medical reports, 
Corbman made a claim on Kituskie's behalf against Trapp's insurance carrier, California State 
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Automobile Association ("CSAA"). During settlement negotiations with CSAA, Corbman learned 
that Trapp’s insurance policy had a limit of $25,000. 
 
On September 17, 1990, more than one year after the accident, Corbman discovered that the 
California statute of limitations for injuries such as those suffered by Kituskie was only one year 
as opposed to the two-year statute of limitations in Pennsylvania. CSAA ultimately informed 
Corbman that it would not make a settlement offer to Kituskie because the one-year statute of 
limitations had passed without Corbman instituting a formal legal action. As soon as Corbman 
learned this information, Corbman met with Kituskie and informed him that his claim had been 
terminated because no suit was filed or settlement reached within the one-year statute of 
limitations period. During this meeting, Corbman advised Kituskie to seek the services of 
another attorney in order to assert a legal malpractice claim against Corbman and the Garfinkle 
firm. 
 
On August 28, 1991, Kituskie, represented by new counsel, filed a legal malpractice claim 
against Corbman and the Garfinkle law firm in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. 
Immediately prior to jury selection, counsel for each side filed motions in limine requesting that 
each side be precluded from presenting expert testimony on the issue of CSAA possibly settling 
the matter within the policy limits of Trapp’s policy. Neither of these motions dealt directly with 
the issue of whether the jury in this legal malpractice action could consider Kituskie’s ability to 
collect on an underlying judgment against Trapp. However, the trial court, realizing that its 
resolution of whether collectibility of damages in an underlying case could be an issue at trial, 
withheld its disposition of the two motions in limine. On January 6, 1995, prior to commencing 
the trial in this matter, the trial court decided that collectibility of damages in an underlying case 
was not relevant to a legal malpractice claim in Pennsylvania. Thus, the trial court granted both 
motions in limine. 
 
Following a trial on the matter, on January 11, 1995, a jury found that Corbman and the 
Garfinkle firm were liable to Kituskie for legal malpractice in the amount of $2,300,000. Corbman 
and the Garfinkle firm appealed to the Superior Court. The Superior Court, in a published 
opinion, vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings because it held that the 
collectibility of damages in an underlying case should be considered in a legal malpractice 
action. The Superior Court also held that the attorney being sued for legal malpractice bore the 
burden of proving as a defense in the form of mitigation of damages that the potential underlying 
case which formed the basis of the legal malpractice award would have been uncollectible. This 
Court granted allocatur in order to decide whether collectibility should be part of a legal 
malpractice action and, if so, which party bears the burden of proof as to that issue. 
 
In order to establish a claim of legal malpractice, a plaintiff/aggrieved client must demonstrate 
three basic elements: 
 
1) employment of the attorney or other basis for a duty; 
2) the failure of the attorney to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge; and 
3) that such negligence was the proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff. 
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An essential element to this cause of action is proof of actual loss rather than a breach of a 
professional duty causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of future harm. 
Damages are considered remote or speculative only if there is uncertainty concerning the 
identification of the existence of damages rather than the ability to precisely calculate the 
amount or value of damages. In essence, a legal malpractice action in Pennsylvania requires 
the plaintiff to prove that he had a viable cause of action against the party he wished to sue in 
the underlying case and that the attorney he hired was negligent in prosecuting or defending 
that underlying case (often referred to as proving a “case within a case”). 
 
A review of case law in the Commonwealth shows that the issue of whether collectibility of 
damages in an underlying case should also be a part of a legal malpractice action is one of first 
impression. Other jurisdictions, however, have addressed this issue and have held that 
collectibility of damages should also be considered in a legal malpractice action. 
 
Like these other jurisdictions, this Court believes that collectibility of damages in the underlying 
action should also be part of the analysis in a legal malpractice action. We do so because we 
recognize that a legal malpractice action is distinctly different from any other type of lawsuit 
brought in the Commonwealth. A legal malpractice action is different because, as described 
above, a plaintiff must prove a case within a case since he must initially establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he would have recovered a judgment in the underlying 
action (here, the underlying action would have involved Kituskie’s lawsuit against Trapp). It is 
only after the plaintiff proves he would have recovered a judgment in the underlying action that 
the plaintiff can then proceed with proof that the attorney he engaged to prosecute or defend the 
underlying action was negligent in the handling of the underlying action and that negligence was 
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's loss since it prevented the plaintiff from being properly 
compensated for his loss. However, this Court has held that the plaintiff in a legal action should 
only be compensated for his actual losses. Actual losses in a legal malpractice action are 
measured by the judgment the plaintiff lost in the underlying action and the attorney who 
negligently handled the underlying action is the party held responsible for the lost judgment. 
However, as noted by the Superior Court, “it would be inequitable for the plaintiff to be able to 
obtain a judgment against the attorney which is greater than the judgment that the plaintiff could 
have collected from the third party; the plaintiff would be receiving a windfall at the attorney's 
expense.” Thus, we now hold that collectibility of damages in the underlying case is a matter 
which should be considered in legal malpractice actions. 
 
Because this Court has concluded that collectibility of damages is an issue which should be 
considered in legal malpractice actions, we now must decide who bears the burden of proof. 
While other jurisdictions considering the issue of collectibility of damages have unanimously 
concluded that collectibility is a part of a legal malpractice action, they have been split on which 
party in the legal malpractice action bears the burden of proof. A majority of courts in other 
jurisdictions have placed the burden of proving collectibility on the plaintiff because it is viewed 
as being closely related to the issue of proximate cause, a burden which clearly the plaintiff 
bears as part of his prima facie case. In doing so, these courts place the burden on the plaintiff 
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because a plaintiff can prove that the attorney’s malfeasance was the proximate cause of his 
loss only if he demonstrates that he would have succeeded on the underlying action and that he 
would have succeeded in collecting on the resulting judgment. 
 
A minority of courts in other jurisdictions, however, have rejected the majority's line of reasoning 
and placed the burden of proving non-collectibility on the defendant/attorney. These courts have 
recognized that the plaintiff must prove a case within a case. These minority of courts, however, 
do not believe that it logically follows from the case within a case burden of proof that the 
plaintiff must also prove that the damages in the underlying case would have been collectible. 
Instead, these courts believe that the burden of proof in a legal malpractice action only requires 
the plaintiff to prove a loss of judgment on a valid claim. To require the plaintiff to also prove 
collectibility of damages would result in placing an unfair burden on the plaintiff where the 
plaintiff’s legal malpractice action is often brought years after the initial accident causing his 
injuries solely because the defendant/lawyer failed to act in a timely and competent manner. 
Thus, the minority of courts believe that it is more logical and fair to treat collectibility as an 
affirmative defense which the defendant/attorney must plead and prove in order to avoid or 
mitigate the consequences of that attorney's negligent acts. Moreover, this minority has 
criticized the majority position because it ignores the possibility of settlement between the 
plaintiff and the underlying tortfeasor and also overlooks that the passage of time itself can be a 
militating factor either for or against collectibility of the underlying case. 
 
After considering both positions, this Court finds the reasoning of the minority position to be 
more persuasive. Thus, we adopt the minority position and hold that a defendant/lawyer in a 
legal malpractice action should plead and prove the affirmative defense that the underlying case 
was not collectible by a preponderance of the evidence. 
 
Accordingly, for the reasons expressed above, we find that the Superior Court correctly held 
that collectibility of damages in an underlying case is a matter which must be considered in a 
legal malpractice action and that the defendant/lawyer bears the burden of proving that the 
underlying case which formed the basis of the damages award in a legal malpractice action 
would not have been fully collectible. Therefore, the order of the Superior Court is affirmed and 
the matter remanded for further proceedings. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did the court hold that Kituskie could only recover collectable damages? Why 
couldn’t he recover all of his damages? 
2. Why did the court hold that Corbman bore the burden of proving that damages were not 
collectable? Will it be hard for Corbman to prove the damages were not collectable, 
under the circumstances? 
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3.3: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
The Sixth Amendment and the Due Process clause guarantee criminal defendants the right to 
the effective assistance of counsel. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Supreme 
Court held that indigent criminal defendants are entitled to appointed counsel in all felony cases. 
And in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), it held that appointed counsel must 
provide a competent defense. If a criminal defendant receives ineffective assistance of counsel, 
then any conviction is unconstitutional and void. However, courts evaluating ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims are “highly deferential” to the decisions of appointed counsel, and 
will provide relief only if counsel’s decisions are both unreasonable and prejudicial. Accordingly, 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims are difficult to prove, unless counsel provided no 
defense at all or had a conflict of interest. 
 
U.S. Const. Amend. 6 
 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) 
 
The Supreme Court established the rules governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims in 
criminal cases in the landmark case Strickland v. Washington. In Strickland, the Court held that 
due process and the Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees all criminal 
defendants the right to the effective assistance of counsel. “The benchmark for judging any 
claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result.” 
 
In order to prove a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant must show 
that counsel violated the duty of care or loyalty, and that the violation prejudiced the defendant. 
“First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires 
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were 
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” 
 
The evaluation of counsel’s performance must be “highly deferential” and “judge the 
reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as 
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of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Accordingly, the defendant “must identify the acts or 
omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional 
judgment” and “the court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the 
identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.” 
 
In addition, the defendant must show that counsel’s unreasonable conduct was prejudicial. “Any 
deficiencies in counsel’s performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute 
ineffective assistance under the Constitution.” There is a legal presumption of prejudice if the 
defendant was actually or constructively denied the assistance of counsel, the government 
interfered with representation, or counsel had a conflict of interest that adversely affected 
performance. But if counsel violated the duty of care, the defendant must show that counsel’s 
unreasonable conduct was actually prejudicial. “The defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.” 
 
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (2009) 
 
Summary: Mirzayance confessed to killing his cousin, and pleaded both not guilty and 
not guilty by reason of insanity. During the guilt phase of the trial, the jury rejected 
evidence of insanity and convicted Mirzayance of first-degree murder. On the advice of 
counsel, Mirzayance withdrew his insanity plea, because his parents effectively refused 
to testify, and there was no other new evidence. On state and federal habeas, 
Mirzayance argued that counsel’s advice to withdraw his insanity plea was ineffective 
assistance of counsel, because he had no other defense. The district court granted 
habeas, because Mirzayance had “nothing to lose” by an insanity defense, and the 
circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the insanity defense 
had no “reasonable probability” of success. 
 
Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
In this case, respondent Alexandre Mirzayance claimed ineffective assistance of counsel 
because his attorney recommended withdrawing his insanity defense. The California courts 
rejected this claim on state postconviction review. We must decide whether this decision was 
contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. We hold that it was 
not. Mirzayance failed to establish that his counsel's performance was ineffective. 
 
I 
 
Mirzayance confessed that he stabbed his 19-year-old cousin nine times with a hunting knife 
and then shot her four times. At trial, he entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of 
insanity (NGI). Under California law, when both of these pleas are entered, the court must hold 
a bifurcated trial, with guilt determined during the first phase and the viability of the defendant's 
NGI plea during the second. During the guilt phase of Mirzayance's trial, he sought to avoid a 
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conviction for first-degree murder by obtaining a verdict on the lesser included offense of 
second-degree murder. To that end, he presented medical testimony that he was insane at the 
time of the crime and was, therefore, incapable of the premeditation or deliberation necessary 
for a first-degree murder conviction. The jury nevertheless convicted Mirzayance of first-degree 
murder. 
 
The trial judge set the NGI phase to begin the day after the conviction was entered but, on the 
advice of counsel, Mirzayance abandoned his NGI plea before it commenced. He would have 
borne the burden of proving his insanity during the NGI phase to the same jury that had just 
convicted him of first-degree murder. Counsel had planned to meet that burden by presenting 
medical testimony similar to that presented in the guilt phase, including evidence that 
Mirzayance was insane and incapable of premeditating or deliberating. Because the jury 
rejected similar evidence at the guilt phase (where the State bore the burden of proof), counsel 
believed a defense verdict at the NGI phase (where the burden was on the defendant) was 
unlikely. He planned, though, to have Mirzayance’s parents testify and thus provide an 
emotional account of Mirzayance’s struggles with mental illness to supplement the medical 
evidence of insanity. But on the morning that the NGI phase was set to begin, Mirzayance’s 
parents refused to testify. After consulting with co-counsel, counsel advised Mirzayance that he 
should withdraw the NGI plea. Mirzayance accepted the advice. 
 
After he was sentenced, Mirzayance challenged his conviction in state postconviction 
proceedings. Among other allegations, he claimed that counsel’s recommendation to withdraw 
the NGI plea constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. The California trial 
court denied the petition, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed without offering any reason 
for its rejection of this particular ineffective-assistance claim. Mirzayance then filed an 
application for federal habeas relief, which the District Court denied without an evidentiary 
hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court and ordered an evidentiary hearing on 
counsel’s recommendation to withdraw the NGI plea. During that evidentiary hearing, a 
Magistrate Judge made factual findings that the District Court later adopted. 
 
According to the Magistrate Judge, counsel’s strategy for the two-part trial was to seek a 
second-degree murder verdict in the first stage and to seek an NGI verdict in the second stage. 
This strategy faltered when the jury instead convicted Mirzayance of first-degree murder. In the 
circumstances of this case, the medical evidence that Mirzayance planned to adduce at the NGI 
phase essentially would have duplicated evidence that the jury had necessarily rejected in the 
guilt phase. First-degree murder in California includes any killing that is “willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated.” To prove NGI, a defendant must show that he was incapable of knowing or 
understanding the nature of his act or of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the 
offense. Highlighting this potential contradiction, the trial judge instructed the jury during the guilt 
phase that “the word ‘deliberate,’” as required for a first-degree murder conviction, “means 
formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of 
considerations for and against the proposed course of action.” 
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When the jury found Mirzayance guilty of first-degree murder, counsel doubted the likelihood of 
prevailing on the NGI claim. According to the Magistrate Judge: 
 
The defense suspected that a jury’s finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
Mirzayance had “deliberated” and “premeditated” his killing of the victim as a practical 
matter would cripple Mirzayance’s chances of convincing the jury later, during the sanity 
phase, that Mirzayance nevertheless “was incapable of knowing or understanding the 
nature and quality of his act and of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the 
commission of the offense.” 
 
Any remaining chance of securing an NGI verdict now depended (in counsel’s view) on 
presenting some “emotional impact” testimony by Mirzayance’s parents, which counsel 
had viewed as key even if the defense had secured a second-degree murder verdict at 
the guilt phase. 
 
But, as the Magistrate Judge found, on the morning that the NGI phase was set to begin, 
Mirzayance’s parents effectively refused to testify: 
 
The parents at least expressed clear reluctance to testify, which, in context, conveyed 
the same sense as a refusal. 
 
Although the parties disputed this point, the parents’ later actions supported the Magistrate 
Judge’s finding that the parents' reluctance to testify amounted to refusal: 
 
Corroborating the Court's finding that Mirzayance’s parents indicated a strong 
disinclination to testify at the NGI phase are the facts that (1) they did not testify later at 
his sentencing hearing, and (2) the reason for their choosing not to do so is that it would 
have been “too emotional” for them. If weeks after the guilty verdict and the withdrawal 
of their son's NGI plea, Mirzayance’s parents’ emotions still prevented them from 
testifying at the sentencing hearing, then surely those emotional obstacles to their 
testifying in the NGI phase would have been at least as potent, and probably more so. 
 
The Magistrate Judge found that counsel made a carefully reasoned decision not to go forward 
with the NGI plea: 
 
Counsel carefully weighed his options before making his decision final; he did not make 
it rashly. Counsel’s strategy at the NGI phase depended entirely on the heartfelt 
participation of Mirzayance’s parents as witnesses. Moreover, counsel knew that, 
although he had experts lined up to testify, their testimony had significant weaknesses. 
Counsel’s NGI-phase strategy became impossible to attempt once Mirzayance’s parents 
expressed their reluctance to testify. All counsel was left with were four experts, all of 
whom reached a conclusion — that Mirzayance did not premeditate and deliberate his 
crime — that the same jury about to hear the NGI evidence already had rejected under a 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof. The experts were subject to other 
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impeachment as well. Counsel discussed the situation with his experienced co-counsel 
who concurred in counsel’s proposal that he recommend to Mirzayance the withdrawal 
of the NGI plea. 
 
Based on these factual findings, the Magistrate Judge stated that, in his view, counsel’s 
performance was not deficient. 
 
Despite this determination, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the court was bound by the 
Court of Appeals’ remand order to determine only whether “there were tactical reasons for 
abandoning the insanity defense.” Even though the Magistrate Judge thought that counsel was 
reasonable in recommending that a very weak claim be dropped, the Magistrate Judge 
understood the remand order to mean that counsel’s performance was deficient if withdrawing 
the NGI plea would achieve no tactical advantage. The Magistrate Judge found that 
“Mirzayance had nothing to lose” by going forward with the NGI phase of the trial, and thus held, 
under the remand order, that counsel’s performance was deficient. As to prejudice, the 
Magistrate Judge concluded the court was similarly bound by the remand order because the 
Court of Appeals described the NGI defense as remaining “viable and strong.” Accordingly, the 
Magistrate Judge found prejudice and recommended granting the writ of habeas corpus. The 
District Court accepted this recommendation and granted the writ. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. It first stated that the lower court had misunderstood its remand 
order, which it described as requiring an examination of “counsel's reason for abandoning the 
insanity defense,” rather than as mandating that the District Court must find deficient 
performance if it found counsel had “nothing to lose” by pursuing the insanity defense. 
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of deficient performance. According to 
the court, Mirzayance’s “parents did not refuse, but merely expressed reluctance to testify.” And 
because they may have been willing, “competent counsel would have attempted to persuade 
them to testify, which counsel here admits he did not.” The Court of Appeals also “disagreed 
that counsel's decision was carefully weighed and not made rashly.” 
 
Furthermore, even though it had suggested that the District Court unnecessarily evaluated 
counsel’s strategy under a “nothing to lose” standard, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District 
Court in large part because Mirzayance’s “counsel did not make a true tactical choice” based on 
its view that counsel had nothing to gain by dropping the NGI defense. The court held that 
“reasonably effective assistance would put on the only defense available, especially in a case 
such as this where there was significant potential for success.” The Court of Appeals also found 
prejudice because, in its view, “if counsel had pursued the insanity phase of the trial, there is a 
reasonable probability that the jury would have found Mirzayance insane.” 
 
We granted the petition for writ of certiorari. 
 
Even if Mirzayance’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim were eligible for de novo review, it 
would still fail. Strickland requires a defendant to establish deficient performance and prejudice. 
Mirzayance can establish neither. 
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Mirzayance has not shown “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.” 
 
The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under 
prevailing professional norms. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly 
deferential, and a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strategic choices made 
after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually 
unchallengeable. 
 
Here, Mirzayance has not shown that his counsel violated these standards. Rather, his counsel 
merely recommended the withdrawal of what he reasonably believed was a claim doomed to 
fail. The jury had already rejected medical testimony about Mirzayance’s mental state in the guilt 
phase, during which the State carried its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Magistrate Judge explained this point: 
 
All counsel was left with were four experts, all of whom reached a conclusion — that 
Mirzayance did not premeditate and deliberate his crime — that the same jury about to 
hear the NGI evidence already had rejected under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard of proof. The experts were subject to other impeachment as well. 
 
In fact, the Magistrate Judge found that counsel “convincingly detailed ways in which the 
experts could have been impeached, for overlooking or minimizing facts which showcased 
Mirzayance’s clearly goal-directed behavior.” 
 
In the NGI phase, the burden would have switched to Mirzayance to prove insanity by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Mirzayance’s counsel reasonably believed that there was 
almost no chance that the same jury would have reached a different result when considering 
similar evidence, especially with Mirzayance bearing the burden of proof. Furthermore, counsel 
knew he would have had to present this defense without the benefit of the parents’ testimony, 
which he believed to be his strongest evidence. Counsel reasonably concluded that this defense 
was almost certain to lose. 
 
The Court of Appeals took the position that the situation was not quite so dire because the 
parents “merely expressed reluctance to testify.” It explained that “competent counsel would 
have attempted to persuade them to testify.” But that holding is in tension with the Magistrate 
Judge’s findings and applies a more demanding standard than Strickland prescribes. The 
Magistrate Judge noted that the parents “conveyed the same sense as a refusal.” Indeed, the 
Magistrate Judge found that the parents “did not testify later at Mirzayance’s sentencing 
hearing” because it “would have been ‘too emotional’ for them.” Competence does not require 
an attorney to browbeat a reluctant witness into testifying, especially when the facts suggest 
that no amount of persuasion would have succeeded. Counsel’s acceptance of the parents’ 
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“conveyance of a refusal” does not rise to the high bar for deficient performance set by 
Strickland. 
 
Mirzayance’s failure to show ineffective assistance of counsel is confirmed by the Magistrate 
Judge’s finding that “counsel carefully weighed his options before making his decision final; he 
did not make it rashly.” The Magistrate Judge explained all of the factors that counsel 
considered — many of which are discussed above — and noted that counsel “discussed the 
situation with his experienced co-counsel” before making it. In making this finding, the 
Magistrate Judge identified counsel's decision as essentially an informed decision “made after 
thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options.” As we stated in Strickland, 
such a decision is “virtually unchallengeable.” 
 
Without even referring to the Magistrate Judge’s finding, the Court of Appeals “disagreed that 
counsel’s decision was carefully weighed and not made rashly.” In its view, “counsel acted on 
his subjective feelings of hopelessness without even considering the potential benefit to be 
gained in persisting with the plea.” But courts of appeals may not set aside a district court’s 
factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous. Here, the Court of Appeals failed 
even to mention the clearly-erroneous standard, let alone apply it, before effectively overturning 
the lower court's factual findings related to counsel’s behavior. 
 
In light of the Magistrate Judge’s factual findings, the state court's rejection of Mirzayance’s 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was consistent with Strickland. The Court of Appeals 
insisted, however, that “‘reasonably effective assistance’ required here that counsel assert the 
only defense available.” But we are aware of no “prevailing professional norms” that prevent 
counsel from recommending that a plea be withdrawn when it is almost certain to lose. And in 
this case, counsel did not give up “the only defense available.” Counsel put on a defense to first-
degree murder during the guilt phase. Counsel also defended his client at the sentencing phase. 
The law does not require counsel to raise every available nonfrivolous defense. Counsel also is 
not required to have a tactical reason — above and beyond a reasonable appraisal of a claim’s 
dismal prospects for success — for recommending that a weak claim be dropped altogether. 
Mirzayance has thus failed to demonstrate that his counsel’s performance was deficient. 
 
In addition, Mirzayance has not demonstrated that he suffered prejudice from his counsel's 
performance. To establish prejudice, “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.” To prevail on his ineffective-assistance claim, Mirzayance must show, therefore, that 
there is a “reasonable probability” that he would have prevailed on his insanity defense had he 
pursued it. This Mirzayance cannot do. It was highly improbable that a jury, which had just 
rejected testimony about Mirzayance's mental condition when the State bore the burden of 
proof, would have reached a different result when Mirzayance presented similar evidence at the 
NGI phase. 
 
IV 
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Mirzayance has not shown that the state court's conclusion that there was no ineffective 
assistance of counsel "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law.” In fact, he has not shown ineffective assistance at all. The judgment of 
the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to deny the 
petition. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Did Mirzayance’s insanity plea have any chance of success? Was there any reason to 
withdraw it? 
2. Could Mirzayance’s attorney have had a tactical reason for advising him to withdraw his 
insanity plea? 
 
Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) 
 
Summary: Jae Lee was a lawful permanent resident of the United States, who was 
indicted for an “aggravated felony.” Lee pleaded guilty on the advice of his attorney, who 
assured him that he would not be deported. In fact, Lee was subject to mandatory 
deportation. Lee filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had 
known it would mean mandatory deportation. The district court denied relief, because 
Lee would “almost certainly” have been found guilty and deported anyway, and the 
circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the attorney’s 
incompetence deprived Lee of a chance of avoiding deportation. 
 
Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
Petitioner Jae Lee was indicted on one count of possessing ecstasy with intent to distribute. 
Although he has lived in this country for most of his life, Lee is not a United States citizen, and 
he feared that a criminal conviction might affect his status as a lawful permanent resident. His 
attorney assured him there was nothing to worry about — the Government would not deport him 
if he pleaded guilty. So Lee, who had no real defense to the charge, opted to accept a plea that 
carried a lesser prison sentence than he would have faced at trial. 
 
Lee’s attorney was wrong: The conviction meant that Lee was subject to mandatory deportation 
from this country. Lee seeks to vacate his conviction on the ground that, in accepting the plea, 
he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Everyone 
agrees that Lee received objectively unreasonable representation. The question presented is 
whether he can show he was prejudiced as a result. 
 
I 
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Jae Lee moved to the United States from South Korea in 1982. He was 13 at the time. His 
parents settled the family in New York City, where they opened a small coffee shop. After 
graduating from a business high school in Manhattan, Lee set out on his own to Memphis, 
Tennessee, where he started working at a restaurant. After three years, Lee decided to try his 
hand at running a business. With some assistance from his family, Lee opened the Mandarin 
Palace Chinese Restaurant in a Memphis suburb. The Mandarin was a success, and Lee 
eventually opened a second restaurant nearby. In the 35 years he has spent in the country, Lee 
has never returned to South Korea. He did not become a United States citizen, living instead as 
a lawful permanent resident. 
 
At the same time he was running his lawful businesses, Lee also engaged in some illegitimate 
activity. In 2008, a confidential informant told federal officials that Lee had sold the informant 
approximately 200 ecstasy pills and two ounces of hydroponic marijuana over the course of 
eight years. The officials obtained a search warrant for Lee's house, where they found 88 
ecstasy pills, three Valium tablets, $32,432 in cash, and a loaded rifle. Lee admitted that the 
drugs were his and that he had given ecstasy to his friends. 
 
A grand jury indicted Lee on one count of possessing ecstasy with intent to distribute. Lee 
retained an attorney and entered into plea discussions with the Government. The attorney 
advised Lee that going to trial was “very risky” and that, if he pleaded guilty, he would receive a 
lighter sentence than he would if convicted at trial. Lee informed his attorney of his noncitizen 
status and repeatedly asked him whether he would face deportation as a result of the criminal 
proceedings. The attorney told Lee that he would not be deported as a result of pleading guilty. 
Based on that assurance, Lee accepted the plea and the District Court sentenced him to a year 
and a day in prison, though it deferred commencement of Lee’s sentence for two months so that 
Lee could manage his restaurants over the holiday season. 
 
Lee quickly learned, however, that a prison term was not the only consequence of his plea. Lee 
had pleaded guilty to what qualifies as an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, and a noncitizen convicted of such an offense is subject to mandatory 
deportation. Upon learning that he would be deported after serving his sentence, Lee filed a 
motion to vacate his conviction and sentence, arguing that his attorney had provided 
constitutionally ineffective assistance. 
 
At an evidentiary hearing on Lee’s motion, both Lee and his plea-stage counsel testified that 
“deportation was the determinative issue in Lee’s decision whether to accept the plea.” In fact, 
Lee explained, his attorney became “pretty upset because every time something comes up I 
always ask about immigration status,” and the lawyer “always said why are you worrying about 
something that you don’t need to worry about.” According to Lee, the lawyer assured him that if 
deportation was not in the plea agreement, “the government cannot deport you.” Lee’s attorney 
testified that he thought Lee’s case was a “bad case to try” because Lee's defense to the charge 
was weak. The attorney nonetheless acknowledged that if he had known Lee would be 
deported upon pleading guilty, he would have advised him to go to trial. Based on the hearing 
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testimony, a Magistrate Judge recommended that Lee’s plea be set aside and his conviction 
vacated because he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
The District Court, however, denied relief. Applying our two-part test for ineffective assistance 
claims from Strickland v. Washington, the District Court concluded that Lee’s counsel had 
performed deficiently by giving improper advice about the deportation consequences of the 
plea. But, “in light of the overwhelming evidence of Lee’s guilt,” Lee “would have almost 
certainly” been found guilty and received “a significantly longer prison sentence, and 
subsequent deportation,” had he gone to trial. Lee therefore could not show he was prejudiced 
by his attorney's erroneous advice. Viewing its resolution of the issue as debatable among 
jurists of reason, the District Court granted a certificate of appealability. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. On appeal, the 
Government conceded that the performance of Lee’s attorney had been deficient. To establish 
that he was prejudiced by that deficient performance, the court explained, Lee was required to 
show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 
and would have insisted on going to trial.” Lee had “no bona fide defense, not even a weak 
one,” so he “stood to gain nothing from going to trial but more prison time.” Relying on Circuit 
precedent holding that “no rational defendant charged with a deportable offense and facing 
overwhelming evidence of guilt would proceed to trial rather than take a plea deal with a shorter 
prison sentence,” the Court of Appeals concluded that Lee could not show prejudice. We 
granted certiorari. 
 
II 
 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the effective assistance of counsel at “critical 
stages of a criminal proceeding,” including when he enters a guilty plea. To demonstrate that 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective, a defendant must show that counsel's representation 
“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that he was prejudiced as a result. The 
first requirement is not at issue in today’s case: The Government concedes that Lee’s plea-
stage counsel provided inadequate representation when he assured Lee that he would not be 
deported if he pleaded guilty. The question is whether Lee can show he was prejudiced by that 
erroneous advice. 
 
A 
 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will often involve a claim of attorney error “during the 
course of a legal proceeding” — for example, that counsel failed to raise an objection at trial or 
to present an argument on appeal. A defendant raising such a claim can demonstrate prejudice 
by showing “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.” 
 
But in this case counsel’s “deficient performance arguably led not to a judicial proceeding of 
disputed reliability, but rather to the forfeiture of a proceeding itself.” When a defendant alleges 
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his counsel’s deficient performance led him to accept a guilty plea rather than go to trial, we do 
not ask whether, had he gone to trial, the result of that trial “would have been different” than the 
result of the plea bargain. That is because, while we ordinarily “apply a strong presumption of 
reliability to judicial proceedings,” “we cannot accord” any such presumption “to judicial 
proceedings that never took place.” 
 
We instead consider whether the defendant was prejudiced by the “denial of the entire judicial 
proceeding to which he had a right.” When a defendant claims that his counsel’s deficient 
performance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept a plea, the defendant can show 
prejudice by demonstrating a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not 
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” 
 
The dissent contends that a defendant must also show that he would have been better off going 
to trial. That is true when the defendant’s decision about going to trial turns on his prospects of 
success and those are affected by the attorney’s error — for instance, where a defendant 
alleges that his lawyer should have but did not seek to suppress an improperly obtained 
confession. 
 
Not all errors, however, are of that sort. Here Lee knew, correctly, that his prospects of acquittal 
at trial were grim, and his attorney’s error had nothing to do with that. The error was instead one 
that affected Lee’s understanding of the consequences of pleading guilty. The Court confronted 
precisely this kind of error in Hill. Rather than asking how a hypothetical trial would have played 
out absent the error, the Court considered whether there was an adequate showing that the 
defendant, properly advised, would have opted to go to trial. The Court rejected the defendant's 
claim because he had “alleged no special circumstances that might support the conclusion that 
he placed particular emphasis on his parole eligibility in deciding whether or not to plead guilty.” 
 
Lee, on the other hand, argues he can establish prejudice under Hill because he never would 
have accepted a guilty plea had he known that he would be deported as a result. Lee insists he 
would have gambled on trial, risking more jail time for whatever small chance there might be of 
an acquittal that would let him remain in the United States. The Government responds that, 
since Lee had no viable defense at trial, he would almost certainly have lost and found himself 
still subject to deportation, with a lengthier prison sentence to boot. Lee, the Government 
contends, cannot show prejudice from accepting a plea where his only hope at trial was that 
something unexpected and unpredictable might occur that would lead to an acquittal. 
 
B 
 
The Government asks that we, like the Court of Appeals below, adopt a per se rule that a 
defendant with no viable defense cannot show prejudice from the denial of his right to trial. As a 
general matter, it makes sense that a defendant who has no realistic defense to a charge 
supported by sufficient evidence will be unable to carry his burden of showing prejudice from 
accepting a guilty plea. But in elevating this general proposition to a per se rule, the 
Government makes two errors. First, it forgets that categorical rules are ill suited to an inquiry 
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that we have emphasized demands a “case-by-case examination” of the “totality of the 
evidence.” And, more fundamentally, the Government overlooks that the inquiry we prescribed 
in Hill v. Lockhart focuses on a defendant's decisionmaking, which may not turn solely on the 
likelihood of conviction after trial. 
 
A defendant without any viable defense will be highly likely to lose at trial. And a defendant 
facing such long odds will rarely be able to show prejudice from accepting a guilty plea that 
offers him a better resolution than would be likely after trial. But that is not because the 
prejudice inquiry in this context looks to the probability of a conviction for its own sake. It is 
instead because defendants obviously weigh their prospects at trial in deciding whether to 
accept a plea. Where a defendant has no plausible chance of an acquittal at trial, it is highly 
likely that he will accept a plea if the Government offers one. 
 
But common sense (not to mention our precedent) recognizes that there is more to consider 
than simply the likelihood of success at trial. The decision whether to plead guilty also involves 
assessing the respective consequences of a conviction after trial and by plea. When those 
consequences are, from the defendant’s perspective, similarly dire, even the smallest chance of 
success at trial may look attractive. For example, a defendant with no realistic defense to a 
charge carrying a 20-year sentence may nevertheless choose trial, if the prosecution’s plea 
offer is 18 years. Here Lee alleges that avoiding deportation was the determinative factor for 
him; deportation after some time in prison was not meaningfully different from deportation after 
somewhat less time. He says he accordingly would have rejected any plea leading to 
deportation — even if it shaved off prison time — in favor of throwing a “Hail Mary” at trial. 
 
The Government urges that, in such circumstances, the possibility of an acquittal after trial is 
“irrelevant to the prejudice inquiry,” pointing to our statement in Strickland that “a defendant has 
no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker.” That statement, however, was made in 
the context of discussing the presumption of reliability we apply to judicial proceedings. As we 
have explained, that presumption has no place where, as here, a defendant was deprived of a 
proceeding altogether. In a presumptively reliable proceeding, “the possibility of arbitrariness, 
whimsy, caprice, ‘nullification,’ and the like” must by definition be ignored. But where we are 
instead asking what an individual defendant would have done, the possibility of even a highly 
improbable result may be pertinent to the extent it would have affected his decisionmaking. 
 
C 
 
“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task,” and the strong societal interest in 
finality has “special force with respect to convictions based on guilty pleas.” Courts should not 
upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have 
pleaded but for his attorney’s deficiencies. Judges should instead look to contemporaneous 
evidence to substantiate a defendant's expressed preferences. 
 
In the unusual circumstances of this case, we conclude that Lee has adequately demonstrated 
a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea had he known that it would lead to 
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mandatory deportation. There is no question that “deportation was the determinative issue in 
Lee’s decision whether to accept the plea deal.” Lee asked his attorney repeatedly whether 
there was any risk of deportation from the proceedings, and both Lee and his attorney testified 
at the evidentiary hearing below that Lee would have gone to trial if he had known about the 
deportation consequences. 
 
Lee demonstrated as much at his plea colloquy: When the judge warned him that a conviction 
“could result in your being deported,” and asked “does that at all affect your decision about 
whether you want to plead guilty or not,” Lee answered “Yes, Your Honor.” When the judge 
inquired “how does it affect your decision,” Lee responded “I don't understand,” and turned to 
his attorney for advice. Only when Lee’s counsel assured him that the judge’s statement was a 
“standard warning” was Lee willing to proceed to plead guilty. 
 
There is no reason to doubt the paramount importance Lee placed on avoiding deportation. 
Deportation is always “a particularly severe penalty,” and we have “recognized that ‘preserving 
the client’s right to remain in the United States may be more important to the client than any 
potential jail sentence.’” At the time of his plea, Lee had lived in the United States for nearly 
three decades, had established two businesses in Tennessee, and was the only family member 
in the United States who could care for his elderly parents — both naturalized American 
citizens. In contrast to these strong connections to the United States, there is no indication that 
he had any ties to South Korea; he had never returned there since leaving as a child. 
 
The Government argues, however, that a defendant “must convince the court that a decision to 
reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.” The Government 
contends that Lee cannot make that showing because he was going to be deported either way; 
going to trial would only result in a longer sentence before that inevitable consequence. 
 
We cannot agree that it would be irrational for a defendant in Lee’s position to reject the plea 
offer in favor of trial. But for his attorney’s incompetence, Lee would have known that accepting 
the plea agreement would certainly lead to deportation. Going to trial? Almost certainly. If 
deportation were the “determinative issue” for an individual in plea discussions, as it was for 
Lee; if that individual had strong connections to this country and no other, as did Lee; and if the 
consequences of taking a chance at trial were not markedly harsher than pleading, as in this 
case, that “almost” could make all the difference. Balanced against holding on to some chance 
of avoiding deportation was a year or two more of prison time. Not everyone in Lee’s position 
would make the choice to reject the plea. But we cannot say it would be irrational to do so. 
 
Lee’s claim that he would not have accepted a plea had he known it would lead to deportation is 
backed by substantial and uncontroverted evidence. Accordingly we conclude Lee has 
demonstrated a “reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s errors, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” 
 
Justice THOMAS, with whom Justice ALITO joins except for Part I, dissenting. 
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The Court today holds that a defendant can undo a guilty plea, well after sentencing and in the 
face of overwhelming evidence of guilt, because he would have chosen to pursue a defense at 
trial with no reasonable chance of success if his attorney had properly advised him of the 
immigration consequences of his plea. Neither the Sixth Amendment nor this Court's 
precedents support that conclusion. I respectfully dissent. 
 
The Court and both of the parties agree that the prejudice inquiry in this context is governed by 
Strickland v. Washington. The Court in Strickland held that a defendant may establish a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel by showing that his “counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness” and, as relevant here, that the representation prejudiced 
the defendant by “actually having an adverse effect on the defense.” 
 
To establish prejudice under Strickland, a defendant must show a “reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 
Strickland made clear that the “result of the proceeding” refers to the outcome of the 
defendant’s criminal prosecution as a whole. It defined “reasonable probability” as “a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” And it explained that “an error by counsel 
does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect 
on the judgment.” 
 
The parties agree that this inquiry assumes an “objective” decisionmaker. That conclusion also 
follows directly from Strickland. According to Strickland, the “assessment of the likelihood of a 
result more favorable to the defendant must exclude the possibility of arbitrariness, whimsy, 
caprice, ‘nullification,’ and the like.” It does not depend on subjective factors such as “the 
idiosyncrasies of the particular decisionmaker,” including the decisionmaker’s “unusual 
propensities toward harshness or leniency.” These factors are flatly “irrelevant to the prejudice 
inquiry.” In other words, “a defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker.” 
Ibid. Instead, “the assessment of prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the 
decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards that 
govern the decision.” 
 
When the Court extended the right to effective counsel to the plea stage, it held that “the same 
two-part standard” from Strickland applies. To be sure, the Court said — and the majority today 
emphasizes — that a defendant asserting an ineffectiveness claim at the plea stage “must show 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded 
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” But that requirement merely reflects the reality 
that a defendant cannot show that the outcome of his case would have been different if he 
would have accepted his current plea anyway. In other words, the defendant’s ability to show 
that he would have gone to trial is necessary, but not sufficient, to establish prejudice. 
 
The Hill Court went on to explain that Strickland's two-part test applies the same way in the plea 
context as in other contexts. In particular, the “assessment” will primarily turn on “a prediction 
whether,” in the absence of counsel’s error, “the evidence” of the defendant's innocence or guilt 
“likely would have changed the outcome” of the proceeding. Thus, a defendant cannot show 
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prejudice where it is “inconceivable” not only that he would have gone to trial, but also “that if he 
had done so he either would have been acquitted or, if convicted, would nevertheless have 
been given a shorter sentence than he actually received.” In sum, the proper inquiry requires a 
defendant to show both that he would have rejected his plea and gone to trial and that he would 
likely have obtained a more favorable result in the end. 
 
To the extent Hill was ambiguous about the standard, our precedents applying it confirm this 
interpretation. In Premo v. Moore, the Court emphasized that “strict adherence to the Strickland 
standard” is “essential” when reviewing claims about attorney error “at the plea bargain stage.” 
In that case, the defendant argued that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he 
had failed to seek suppression of his confession before he pleaded no contest. In analyzing the 
prejudice issue, the Court did not focus solely on whether the suppression hearing would have 
turned out differently, or whether the defendant would have chosen to go to trial. It focused as 
well on the weight of the evidence against the defendant and the fact that he likely would not 
have obtained a more favorable result at trial, regardless of whether he succeeded at the 
suppression hearing. 
 
The Court in Missouri v. Frye, took a similar approach. In that case, the Court extended Hill to 
hold that counsel could be constitutionally ineffective for failing to communicate a plea deal to a 
defendant. The Court emphasized that, in addition to showing a reasonable probability that the 
defendant “would have accepted the earlier plea offer,” it is also “necessary” to show a 
“reasonable probability that the end result of the criminal process would have been more 
favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less prison time.” In short, the 
Court did not focus solely on whether the defendant would have accepted the plea. It instead 
required the defendant to show that the ultimate outcome would have been different. 
 
Finally, the Court's decision in Lafler v. Cooper is to the same effect. In that case, the Court 
concluded that counsel may be constitutionally ineffective by causing a defendant to reject a 
plea deal he should have accepted. The Court again emphasized that the prejudice inquiry 
requires a showing that the criminal prosecution would ultimately have ended differently for the 
defendant — not merely that the defendant would have accepted the deal. The Court stated that 
the defendant in those circumstances “must show” a reasonable probability that “the conviction 
or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the 
judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.” 
 
These precedents are consistent with our cases governing the right to effective assistance of 
counsel in other contexts. This Court has held that the right to effective counsel applies to all 
“critical stages of the criminal proceedings.” Those stages include not only “the entry of a guilty 
plea,” but also “arraignments, postindictment interrogation, and postindictment lineups.” In those 
circumstances, the Court has not held that the prejudice inquiry focuses on whether that stage 
of the proceeding would have ended differently. It instead has made clear that the prejudice 
inquiry is the same as in Strickland, which requires a defendant to establish that he would have 
been better off in the end had his counsel not erred. 
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B 
 
The majority misapplies this Court's precedents when it concludes that a defendant may 
establish prejudice by showing only that “he would not have pleaded guilty and would have 
insisted on going to trial,” without showing that “the result of that trial would have been different 
than the result of the plea bargain.” In reaching this conclusion, the Court relies almost 
exclusively on the single line from Hill that “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have 
insisted on going to trial.” For the reasons explained above, that sentence prescribes the 
threshold showing a defendant must make to establish Strickland prejudice where a defendant 
has accepted a guilty plea. In Hill, the Court concluded that the defendant had not made that 
showing, so it rejected his claim. The Court did not, however, further hold that a defendant can 
establish prejudice by making that showing alone. 
 
The majority also relies on a case that arises in a completely different context, Roe v. Flores-
Ortega. There, the Court considered a defendant's claim that his attorney failed to file a notice 
of appeal. The Court observed that the lawyer’s failure to file the notice of appeal “arguably led 
not to a judicial proceeding of disputed reliability,” but instead to “the forfeiture of a proceeding 
itself.” The Court today observes that petitioner's guilty plea meant that he did not go to trial. 
Because that trial “never took place,” the Court reasons, we cannot “apply a strong presumption 
of reliability” to it. And because the presumption of reliability does not apply, we may not depend 
on Strickland's statement “that a defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless 
decisionmaker.” This point is key to the majority's conclusion that petitioner would have chosen 
to gamble on a trial even though he had no viable defense. 
 
The majority’s analysis, however, is directly contrary to Hill, which instructed a court undertaking 
a prejudice analysis to apply a presumption of reliability to the hypothetical trial that would have 
occurred had the defendant not pleaded guilty. After explaining that a court should engage in a 
predictive inquiry about the likelihood of a defendant securing a better result at trial, the Court 
said: “As we explained in Strickland v. Washington, these predictions of the outcome at a 
possible trial, where necessary, should be made objectively, without regard for the 
‘idiosyncrasies of the particular decisionmaker.’” That quote comes from the same paragraph in 
Strickland as the discussion about the presumption of reliability that attaches to the trial. In other 
words, Hill instructs that the prejudice inquiry must presume that the foregone trial would have 
been reliable. 
 
The majority responds that Hill made statements about presuming a reliable trial only in 
“discussing how courts should analyze predictions of the outcome at a possible trial,” which “will 
not always be necessary.” I agree that such an inquiry is not always necessary — it is not 
necessary where, as in Hill, the defendant cannot show at the threshold that he would have 
rejected his plea and chosen to go to trial. But that caveat says nothing about the application of 
the presumption of reliability when a defendant can make that threshold showing. 
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In any event, the Court in Hill recognized that guilty pleas are themselves generally reliable. 
Guilty pleas “rarely” give rise to the “concern that unfair procedures may have resulted in the 
conviction of an innocent defendant.” That is because “a counseled plea of guilty is an 
admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes 
the issue of factual guilt from the case.” Guilty pleas, like completed trials, are therefore entitled 
to the protections against collateral attack that the Strickland prejudice standard affords. 
 
Finally, the majority does not dispute that the prejudice inquiry in Frye and Lafler focused on 
whether the defendant established a reasonable probability of a different outcome. The majority 
instead distinguishes those cases on the ground that they involved a defendant who did not 
accept a guilty plea. According to the majority, those cases “articulated a different way to show 
prejudice, suited to the context of pleas not accepted.” But the Court in Frye and Lafler (and Hill, 
for that matter) did not purport to establish a “different” test for prejudice. To the contrary, the 
Court repeatedly stated that it was applying the “same two-part standard” from Strickland. 
 
The majority today abandons any pretense of applying Strickland to claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel that arise at the plea stage. It instead concludes that one standard applies 
when a defendant goes to trial (Strickland); another standard applies when a defendant accepts 
a plea (Hill); and yet another standard applies when counsel does not apprise the defendant of 
an available plea or when the defendant rejects a plea (Frye and Lafler). That approach leaves 
little doubt that the Court has “opened a whole new field of constitutionalized criminal 
procedure” — “plea-bargaining law” — despite its repeated assurances that it has been applying 
the same Strickland standard all along. In my view, we should take the Court’s precedents at 
their word and conclude that “an error by counsel does not warrant setting aside the judgment of 
a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” 
 
III 
 
Applying the ordinary Strickland standard in this case, I do not think a defendant in petitioner's 
circumstances could show a reasonable probability that the result of his criminal proceeding 
would have been different had he not pleaded guilty. Petitioner does not dispute that he 
possessed large quantities of illegal drugs or that the Government had secured a witness who 
had purchased the drugs directly from him. In light of this “overwhelming evidence of guilt,” the 
Court of Appeals concluded that petitioner had “no bona fide defense, not even a weak one.” 
His only chance of succeeding would have been to “throw a ‘Hail Mary’ at trial.” As I have 
explained, however, the Court in Strickland expressly foreclosed relying on the possibility of a 
“Hail Mary” to establish prejudice. Strickland made clear that the prejudice assessment should 
“proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and 
impartially applying the standards that govern the decision.” 
 
In the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt and in the absence of a bona fide defense, a 
reasonable court or jury applying the law to the facts of this case would find the defendant guilty. 
There is no reasonable probability of any other verdict. A defendant in petitioner’s shoes, 
therefore, would have suffered the same deportation consequences regardless of whether he 
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accepted a plea or went to trial. He is thus plainly better off for having accepted his plea: had he 
gone to trial, he not only would have faced the same deportation consequences, he also likely 
would have received a higher prison sentence. Finding that petitioner has established prejudice 
in these circumstances turns Strickland on its head. 
 
IV 
 
The Court's decision today will have pernicious consequences for the criminal justice system. 
This Court has shown special solicitude for the plea process, which brings “stability” and 
“certainty” to “the criminal justice system.” The Court has warned that “the prospect of collateral 
challenges” threatens to undermine these important values. And we have explained that 
“prosecutors must have assurance that a plea will not be undone years later,” lest they “forgo 
plea bargains that would benefit defendants,” which would be “a result favorable to no one.” 
 
The Court today provides no assurance that plea deals negotiated in good faith with guilty 
defendants will remain final. For one thing, the Court’s artificially cabined standard for prejudice 
in the plea context is likely to generate a high volume of challenges to existing and future plea 
agreements. Under the majority's standard, defendants bringing these challenges will bear a 
relatively low burden to show prejudice. Whereas a defendant asserting an ordinary claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel must prove that the ultimate outcome of his case would have 
been different, the Court today holds that a defendant who pleaded guilty need show only that 
he would have rejected his plea and gone to trial. This standard does not appear to be 
particularly demanding, as even a defendant who has only the “smallest chance of success at 
trial” — relying on nothing more than a “Hail Mary” — may be able to satisfy it. For another, the 
Court does not limit its holding to immigration consequences. Under its rule, so long as a 
defendant alleges that his counsel omitted or misadvised him on a piece of information during 
the plea process that he considered of “paramount importance,” he could allege a plausible 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
In addition to undermining finality, the Court’s rule will impose significant costs on courts and 
prosecutors. Under the Court's standard, a challenge to a guilty plea will be a highly fact-
intensive, defendant-specific undertaking. Petitioner suggests that each claim will “at least” 
require a “hearing to get the facts on the table.” Given that more than 90 percent of criminal 
convictions are the result of guilty pleas, the burden of holding evidentiary hearings on these 
claims could be significant. In circumstances where a defendant has admitted his guilt, the 
evidence against him is overwhelming, and he has no bona fide defense strategy, I see no 
justification for imposing these costs. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Does an ineffective assistance of counsel claim more closely resemble a breach of the 
duty of care or a breach of the duty of loyalty? 
2. Is there a difference between a lawyer making a bad decision and a lawyer providing 
inaccurate advice? Should there be? 
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3. Should courts apply the “case within a case” doctrine to ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims? 
4. The dissent argues that guilty pleas are reliable. But scholarship suggests that they are 
not. Should this affect the analysis of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in relation 
to plea bargains? 
 
Malpractice in Criminal Cases 
 
Criminal defense attorneys who provide negligent representation may also be liable to their 
clients in tort for malpractice. However, most courts have adopted a different standard for 
evaluating malpractice claims in civil and criminal representation, holding that criminal 
defendants can recover for malpractice only if they prove “actual innocence.” In other words, 
where civil clients only have to prove that they would have won in order to recover in a legal 
malpractice action, criminal clients have to prove that they were entitled to win on the merits. 
 
Ang v. Martin, 114 P. 3d 637 (Wash. 2005) 
 
Summary: Jessy and Editha Ang provided medical services to the State of Washington, 
and were indicted for social security fraud, among other things. The Angs hired attorneys 
Richard Hansen and Michael G. Martin, who advised them to accept a plea bargain. 
After accepting the plea bargain, the Angs hired attorney Monte Hester, who advised 
them to withdraw it. Eventually, the Angs were acquitted. The Angs filed a legal 
malpractice action against Hansen and Martin. The trial court instructed the jury that the 
Angs could recover only if they proved “actual innocence,” and the jury found they did 
not. The Angs appealed, arguing that acquittal is actual innocence, but the Court of 
Appeals and Supreme Court affirmed. 
 
OWENS, J. 
 
We are asked to determine whether plaintiffs in a malpractice action against their former 
criminal defense attorneys were properly required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that they were actually innocent of the underlying criminal charges. The Court of Appeals 
concluded that, as an element of their negligence claim, plaintiffs were required “to prove 
innocence in fact and not merely to present evidence of the government's inability to prove 
guilt.” We affirm the Court of Appeals. 
 
FACTS 
 
Psychiatrist Jessy Ang and his wife Editha jointly owned Evergreen Medical Panel, Inc., a 
company that provided the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries with 
independent medical examinations of injured workers. As a result of Dr. Ang’s contact with a 
target of a governmental task force investigating social security fraud, Dr. Ang himself became a 
person of interest. In February 1994, the task force executed a search warrant on Dr. Ang’s 
office and seized copies of two sets of signed tax returns that reported conflicting amounts of 
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income. The Angs were arrested in April 1996, following the execution of a search warrant at 
their residence. A year later, the Angs were indicted on 18 criminal counts, including conspiracy 
to defraud the United States, bank and tax fraud, and filing false statements. 
 
The Angs retained defendants Richard Hansen and Michael G. Martin for flat fees of $225,000 
and $100,000, respectively. Attorneys Hansen and Martin engaged in a round of plea 
negotiations prior to trial, but the Angs rejected the plea bargain. The case proceeded to a jury 
trial before Judge Tanner in federal district court in December 1997. On the fifth day of trial, just 
prior to the conclusion of the government's case, Hansen and Martin recommended that the 
Angs accept another proffered plea, one that the Angs viewed as the least attractive of any 
agreement previously presented. After Dr. Ang was allegedly told that Mrs. Ang could face 
sexual assault in prison, the Angs agreed to plead guilty to two of the 18 counts. 
 
The Angs then engaged attorney Monte Hester to review the plea discussions and provide a 
second opinion. Hester concluded that the government had not met its burden of proof and that 
the plea agreement provided the Angs with no material benefit. Retaining Hester and Keith A. 
MacFie to represent them, the Angs successfully moved to withdraw the pleas, which Judge 
Tanner had never formally accepted. In September 1999, the matter again proceeded to trial 
before Judge Tanner, with the Angs waiving their right to a jury. Although the government 
offered another plea bargain prior to trial, one requiring no plea on Dr. Ang's part, a 
misdemeanor or felony for Mrs. Ang, and a $500,000 fine, the Angs rejected the plea and were 
acquitted on all 18 counts. 
 
The Angs, along with Evergreen Medical, filed the present legal malpractice action against 
Hansen and Martin in May 2000 in Pierce County Superior Court. The complaint stated claims 
for legal malpractice and for violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act. The trial 
court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and a jury trial began in November 
2001. The trial court instructed the jury that the Angs had to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that they were innocent of the underlying criminal charges. On January 11, 2002, 
responding to the initial two questions on a special verdict form, the jury found that the Angs had 
not “proven by a preponderance of the evidence they were innocent of all the criminal charges 
against them.” As to the verdict form’s third question, asking whether “any of the defendants had 
been negligent,” the jury made a finding of negligence against Martin only. 
 
The plaintiffs appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed. This court granted the plaintiffs’ 
petition for review. 
 
ISSUES 
 
Where a legal malpractice suit stems from the representation of clients in a criminal prosecution, 
must plaintiffs who were acquitted of the criminal charges prove their actual innocence of the 
crimes, or does their acquittal satisfy the innocence element of their malpractice action? 
 
ANALYSIS 
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Essential Elements of Legal Malpractice Claims against Criminal Defense Counsel. A plaintiff 
claiming negligent representation by an attorney in a civil matter bears the burden of proving 
four elements by a preponderance of the evidence: 
 
(1) The existence of an attorney-client relationship which gives rise to a duty of care on 
the part of the attorney to the client; (2) an act or omission by the attorney in breach of 
the duty of care; (3) damage to the client; and (4) proximate causation between the 
attorney’s breach of the duty and the damage incurred. 
 
The fourth element, proximate causation, includes “cause in fact and legal causation.” Cause in 
fact, or “but for” causation, refers to “the physical connection between an act and an injury.” In a 
legal malpractice trial, the “trier of fact will be asked to decide what a reasonable jury or fact 
finder in the underlying trial or ‘trial within the trial’ would have done but for the attorney’s 
negligence.” Legal causation, however, presents a question of law: “It involves a determination 
of whether liability should attach as a matter of law given the existence of cause in fact.” To 
determine whether the cause in fact of a plaintiff’s harm should also be deemed the legal cause 
of that harm, a court may consider, among other things, the public policy implications of holding 
the defendant liable. In “criminal malpractice” suits, two elements related to proximate causation 
have been added. In Falkner v. Foshaug, the Court of Appeals “concluded that postconviction 
relief is a prerequisite to maintaining a criminal malpractice suit and proof of innocence is an 
additional element a criminal defendant/malpractice plaintiff must prove to prevail at trial in his 
legal malpractice action.” 
 
The trial court in the present case thus instructed the jury as follows on the elements of the 
Angs criminal malpractice claims: 
 
To prove their legal malpractice claims, the plaintiffs bear the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence each of the following: 
First, that there is an attorney-client relationship giving rise to a duty owed by a 
defendant to a plaintiff; 
Second, that plaintiffs have obtained a successful challenge to their convictions based 
on their attorneys failure to adequately defend them; 
Third, that plaintiff was innocent of the crimes charged; 
Fourth, that there is an act of omission by a defendant that breached the duty of care of 
an attorney; 
Fifth, that a plaintiff was damaged; and 
Sixth, that a breach of duty by a defendant is a proximate cause of a plaintiff’s damages. 
 
The Angs assigned error to this instruction, contending that their undisputed acquittal of the 
criminal charges met not only the additional element of postconviction relief but also the 
innocence requirement. 
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By successfully withdrawing their guilty pleas and receiving an acquittal on all charges, the Angs 
unquestionably received the equivalent of postconviction relief, but contrary to their contention, 
they did not thereby satisfy the innocence requirement. The Angs mistakenly claim that they 
were simply required to prove legal innocence, not actual innocence.” Legal guilt or innocence is 
that determination made by the trier of fact in a criminal trial,” whereas “actual guilt is intended 
to refer to a determination in a civil trial, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant 
engaged in the conduct he was accused of in the prior criminal proceeding.” But the Falkner 
court referred explicitly to the “actual innocence requirement” and at no point equated the 
innocence requirement with legal innocence. Plainly, a requirement of legal innocence would 
have been redundant alongside the additional, unchallenged requirement of postconviction relief 
and would have necessitated a confusing overlay of standards of proof, requiring the 
malpractice jury to consider whether the Angs had proved by a preponderance of the evidence 
that they would not have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in the underlying criminal 
trial. 
 
Moreover, proving actual innocence, not simply legal innocence, is essential to proving 
proximate causation, both cause in fact and legal causation. Unless criminal malpractice 
plaintiffs can prove by a preponderance of the evidence their actual innocence of the charges, 
their own bad acts, not the alleged negligence of defense counsel, should be regarded as the 
cause in fact of their harm. Likewise, if criminal malpractice plaintiffs cannot prove their actual 
innocence under the civil standard, they will be unable to establish, in light of significant public 
policy considerations, that the alleged negligence of their defense counsel was the legal cause 
of their harm. Summarizing the policy concerns, the Falkner court observed that, “requiring a 
defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is innocent of the charges 
against him will prohibit criminals from benefiting from their own bad acts, maintain respect for 
our criminal justice systems procedural protections, remove the harmful chilling effect on the 
defense bar, prevent suits from criminals who may be guilty, but could have gotten a better deal, 
and prevent a flood of nuisance litigation.” 
 
In the alternative, the Angs argue that, if a plaintiff’s actual guilt or innocence has any place in a 
criminal malpractice suit, the issue should be raised as an affirmative defense, not as an 
element of the plaintiffs cause of action. The Angs find support in Shaw II, the only decision 
adopting the actual innocence requirement and shifting to the criminal malpractice defendant 
“the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence as to the actual guilt of the plaintiff.” As 
respondent Martin explained, however, “the criminal defendant/malpractice plaintiff is in a far 
better position to bear the burden of establishing innocence,” since, unlike his defense attorney, 
he “knows if he is actually innocent,” “was, presumably, present or involved in the underlying 
events which led to the criminal charges,” “has unlimited access to the information about his 
own acts necessary to prove innocence,” “would know what, if any, inculpatory facts he withheld 
from his lawyer,” and would have the “opportunity to accept a plea, potentially an Alford plea 
which could preserve his malpractice claim, before all facts and witness testimony have been 
developed or are known to his or her attorney.” We find this practical analysis persuasive and 
thus decline to adopt the minority position of Shaw II. 
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In sum, we conclude that the Angs were properly required to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that they were actually innocent of the underlying criminal charges. We therefore 
affirm the Court of Appeals. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We conclude that, as plaintiffs in a criminal malpractice action, the Angs were properly required 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they were actually innocent of the underlying 
criminal charges. We find no persuasive reasons for this court to follow the minority position and 
shift the burden to the defendant attorneys to prove that their former clients were actually guilty 
of the charged crimes. 
 
C. JOHNSON, MADSEN, BRIDGE and FAIRHURST, JJ., concur. 
 
SANDERS, J. (dissenting). 
 
I dissent because the malpractice standard for criminal cases should be the same as civil. There 
is no reason to invite malpractice in criminal cases by heightening the plaintiff’s burden to prove 
postconviction relief and actual innocence. In every situation a client should rightfully expect 
competent legal representation. 
 
We have clearly stated the standard for legal malpractice: 
 
To establish a claim for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: 
(1) The existence of an attorney-client relationship which gives rise to a duty of care on 
the part of the attorney to the client; (2) an act or omission by the attorney in breach of 
the duty of care; (3) damage to the client; and (4) proximate causation between the 
attorney's breach of the duty and the damage incurred. 
 
This rule does not suggest the additional requirements the majority adds to cases of criminal 
malpractice, namely, postconviction relief and proof of actual innocence. I see no reason to add 
them. 
 
The majority cites a Court of Appeals case, Falkner v. Foshaug, to support additional elements. 
The Court of Appeals opinion Falkner is not binding authority, nor is case law from other 
jurisdictions upon which Falkner is based. Nor am I persuaded by its logic. Attorneys who 
negligently represent their clients should be responsible for any harm that results from the 
misconduct. It does not matter if the subject matter of the case is civil or criminal. Forcing 
criminal defendants to prove actual innocence does not serve any purpose except to frustrate 
the client’s right to competent representation. 
 
Citing a “public policy” present in the minds of the individuals in the majority, the majority argues 
the defendant's acts should be viewed as the cause of any harm unless he demonstrates his 
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innocence. However, our constitution sets the “public policy” which entitles criminal defendants 
to adequate representation. I prefer that policy as my guide. 
 
The issue is causation. Under our precedent, cause in fact is determined by the jury as a 
question of fact. Cause in fact is a minimum threshold that asks but for the lawyer’s negligence 
would the client have been harmed. In other words, would the result be different if the lawyer 
had used reasonable care? 
 
Legal causation is a subsequent inquiry, asking as a matter of law whether liability should 
attach. The majority argues a criminal defendant should not profit from his crimes, and hence 
the defense attorney should not be liable for his negligence unless the defendant first proves his 
own innocence. I disagree. The criminal defendant is equally entitled to competent 
representation, and the negligent attorney should take responsibility for his malpractice. The 
majority’s rule simply invites malpractice since the defense attorney knows he is held to a lower 
standard. Proving innocence is impossible since a negative cannot be proved. 
 
Here the Angs’s defense attorneys, Michael Martin and Richard Hansen, recommended a 
particular plea agreement. The Angs initially agreed but later withdrew the plea on 
recommendation from new counsel and were acquitted on all charges at a subsequent trial. 
They sued their former defense attorneys and a jury found that Martin alone was negligent even 
though it found the Angs had not proved their innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Since the latter consideration should be irrelevant, Martin should bear the responsibility for his 
negligence. I would reverse as to Martin, and remand for a trial on damages. 
 
ALEXANDER, C.J. (concurring in dissent). 
 
I agree with Justice Sanders that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that Jessy and Editha 
Ang had to prove that they were actually innocent of the crime charged in order to prevail in 
their legal malpractice claim against attorneys Richard Hansen and Michael Martin. For that 
reason, we should reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for a new trial on 
the Angs’ claim against Martin. 
 
I write separately because, in my view, we should not stop with a determination that the trial 
court erred but should go further to indicate that the defendant attorney may raise the issue of 
the plaintiff’s actual guilt in the criminal case as an affirmative defense. That was the position 
taken by the Supreme Court of Alaska in a similar case, Shaw v. Department of Administration. 
There, the court said that because plaintiffs in such actions must already bear the burden of 
proving that they have obtained postconviction relief from their criminal convictions, they should 
not have to prove their “actual innocence.” The court went on to indicate, however, that the 
defendant may raise the issue of the plaintiff’s “actual guilt” as an affirmative defense and seek 
to establish it by a preponderance of the evidence. Although the Alaska court did not engage in 
an extensive discussion of its reasons for placing the burden on the defendant to establish this 
affirmative defense, it did indicate that putting the burden there is consistent with the 
requirement that defendants establish traditional affirmative defenses that look to plaintiffs’ 
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actions such as contributory/comparative negligence and assumption of the risk. The Alaska 
rule makes perfect sense to me for that reason and for the additional reason that it is consonant 
with the traditional notion that one is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Furthermore, shifting the burden to the defendant relieves the plaintiff of the almost 
impossible burden of proving innocence while at the same time addressing the policy concern 
noted by the majority, that criminals should not benefit from “their own bad acts.” 
 
IRELAND, J. Pro Tem., concurs. 
 
CHAMBERS, J. (concurring in dissent). 
 
I concur in Justice Sanders’ dissent but write separately to express my indignation that this 
court, based upon the policy of protecting lawyers, would carve out a special protection for 
criminal defense attorneys whose acts of professional negligence are harmful to their clients. 
Under this logic, it is not enough for the injured client to prove actual harm from the attorney’s 
failure to meet professional standards; the injured client must also prove that her hands were 
always clean. Under this logic, why not give immunity to accountants for professional 
negligence unless the accountant’s client can prove he or she never understated income or 
requested an unavailable deduction, even when the accountants’ bad acts caused actual harm 
to their clients or society? Surely tax dodgers should not profit from their misdeeds. Under this 
logic, why not give immunity to health care providers who harm their patients unless the patient 
can prove perfect good health but for the negligence of the provider? Surely the unhealthy 
should not profit from their illness. 
 
But this logic ignores the fact that professionals owe a duty to the sick as well as the healthy; to 
the scrupulously honest business woman as well as the one looking for the angle; to the guilty 
as well as the innocent. Those of us caught in the grip of the law are always entitled to 
competent legal representation whether or not we are totally innocent. The heart of the criminal 
defense lawyer’s job is often not to prove absolute innocence; the irreducible core of the job is 
to make the state prove its case and make the best case for the defendant possible. Often the 
sole issue is the level of culpability and the sanction to be imposed upon the client. The 
government may seek multiple counts where a single count is appropriate, seek charges of a 
higher degree than the evidence supports, or seek a sentence disproportionate to the offense. 
The negligence of her lawyer may cost her client her fortune, her liberty, or her life. The “actual 
innocence” requirement is impractical and harmful in the area of criminal malpractice law; it 
creates an almost impossible burden and provides almost absolute immunity to criminal defense 
lawyers. 
 
The most troubling aspect of the actual innocence requirement announced by the majority lies 
with its origin. It is based upon a policy to protect lawyers from lawsuits. Tort actions are 
maintained for a variety of reasons, including the deterrence of wrongful conduct. As a matter of 
basic policy, accountability, compensation, and deterrence of wrongful conduct should trump 
protecting lawyers from lawsuits. 
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Second, while it may be true that a majority of courts that have reached the issue require the 
plaintiff to establish actual innocence, the numbers do not appear to be great. Only Missouri, 
New York, Massachusetts, Alaska, Pennsylvania, California, New Hampshire, Nebraska, Illinois, 
Florida, and Wisconsin require either proof of actual innocence or that the conviction was set 
aside on postconviction relief. This is hardly a national consensus. 
 
This court should protect the public from lawyers’ misdeeds, not the other way around. A plaintiff 
who is not categorically innocent seeking compensation under ordinary principles of tort law 
faces no light burden. Such a guilty plaintiff must prove a duty, a breach of that duty, injuries 
proximately caused by the breach, and the amount of his damages. I see no reason to provide 
additional protections for lawyers. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Is the “actual innocence” requirement imposed by the court similar to the “case within a 
case” doctrine? Does it requirement a criminal defendant to prove more? 
2. Should a criminal defendant be required to prove actual innocence in order to show 
malpractice? Can a criminal defense lawyer provide negligent representation to a guilty 
client? 
3. The majority is concerned about the possibility of criminals “benefiting from their own 
bad acts.” What is the benefit in question? 
4. Criminal defense attorneys are often appointed counsel. Should that affect the standard 
of care? Should it affect the standard for evaluating whether they have provided 
negligent representation? Should the standard for malpractice differ depending on 
whether the client is paying for representation? 
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Section 4: Conflicts of Interest 
 
4.1: Identifying Conflicts of Interest 
 
I can't believe you had a life before me. I can't believe they let you run around free, just putting 
your body wherever it seemed like a good idea.40 
 
What is a Conflict of Interest? 
 
Attorneys must always watch for and avoid “conflicts of interest.” A conflict of interest exists 
whenever an attorney may have to choose between the interests of a client and some other 
interest. Under the fiduciary duty of loyalty, attorneys must always put the interests of their 
clients before any other interests, including their own. Accordingly, a conflict of interest exists 
whenever the interests of a client differ from the interests of another client, the attorney, or a 
third party with a relationship to the attorney. 
 
Broadly speaking, there are four categories of conflicts of interest, e.g. conflicts between the 
interests of a client and: 
 
1. the lawyer’s own interests 
2. the lawyer’s duties to another client 
3. the lawyer’s duties to a former client 
4. the lawyer's duties to a third person.  
 
The conflict of interest rules are intended to ensure that attorneys observe the duty of loyalty, by 
preventing them from representing clients with competing interests. 
 
However, the term “conflict of interest” is hard to define with any precision, because the concept 
of a conflict of interest is both procedural and substantive, reflecting the intersection of formal 
rules and normative values. Not every formal conflict of interest presents a real conflict of 
interest. Some conflicts are trivial, and do not create a substantial concern. Others are merely 
speculative, and do not require analysis.  
 
Formally, a conflict of interests exists whenever an attorney’s legal duties to a client actually or 
potentially conflict with the interests of the attorney, another actual or potential client, or a third 
party to whom the attorney has a legal duty. But substantively, perhaps not every formal conflict 
of interest should necessarily qualify as an actual conflict of interest. Many are trivial, and many 
more will never materialize. If a formal conflict does not present a substantive conflict, is it really 
a conflict at all? 
 
Ultimately, the definition of a conflict of interest depends on the purpose of the conflicts rules. If 
the purpose of the rules is to protect clients from their attorneys, then perhaps the rules should 
																																																								
40 Liz Phair, Jealousy, Whip-Smart (1994). 
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be interpreted and applied literally, in order to ensure that unscrupulous attorneys cannot avoid 
regulation. But if the purpose of the rules is to govern a business relationship between clients 
and their attorneys, then perhaps the rules should be interpreted and applied more flexibly, in 
order to help parties reach a mutually agreeable outcome.  
 
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics: Canon 6 (1908) 
 
It is the duty of the lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the 
circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or connection with the 
controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of counsel. 
 
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all 
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a 
lawyer represents conflicting interests when, on behalf of one client, it is his duty to 
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose. 
 
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity forbids also the subsequent 
acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any 
interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed. 
 
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1980) 
Canon 5: A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a 
Client 
 
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, 
solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and loyalties. 
Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third 
persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client. 
 
Model Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: Current Clients 
 
a. Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest 
exists if: 
1. the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or 
2. there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client 
or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. 
b. Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a 
lawyer may represent a client if: 
1. the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent 
and diligent representation to each affected client; 
2. the representation is not prohibited by law; 
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3. the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against 
another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other 
proceeding before a tribunal; and 
4. each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 121: The Basic Prohibition of 
Conflicts of Interest 
 
A conflict of interest is involved if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's 
representation of the client would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's 
own interests or by the lawyer's duties to another current client, a former client, or a third 
person. 
 
Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 653 F. 2d 746 (2d Cir. 1981) 
 
Summary: Jonathan Logan, Inc. fired Charles Glueck, who hired Phillips Nizer to 
represent him in a wrongful termination action. Logan filed a motion to disqualify Phillips 
Nizer because the firm represented the Apparel Manufacturers Association, Inc., a 
membership organization that includes one of Logan’s divisions. The district court 
granted the motion, because the relationship between Phillips Nizer and Logan 
resembled an attorney-client relationship, and the subject matter of Glueck’s action was 
“substantially related” to Phillips Nizer’s representation of the Association. The circuit 
court affirmed, because representing both Glueck and the Association would create a 
“realistic risk” of Phillips Nizer breaching its duty of loyalty. 
 
NEWMAN, Circuit Judge: 
 
The issue on this appeal is whether in the circumstances of this case a law firm that represents 
an incorporated trade association may represent an individual client in a suit against a 
corporation one division of which is a member of the association. The District Court for the 
Southern District of New York ruled that the firm must be disqualified. We conclude that Judge 
Conner applied the correct standards of law and reached a result well within his discretion, and 
we therefore affirm. 
 
The appellant, Charles Glueck, formerly employed as an executive of appellee Jonathan Logan, 
Inc., brought this suit against Logan, alleging that he was discharged in breach of his 
employment contract. Logan promptly moved to disqualify Glueck’s law firm, Phillips, Nizer, 
Benjamin, Krim & Ballon. The motion was based on the following undisputed facts. Phillips Nizer 
represents the Apparel Manufacturers Association, Inc., a not-for-profit incorporated trade 
association of dress manufacturers with more than 100 members. The sole function of the 
Association is to negotiate multi-employer collective bargaining agreements on behalf of its 
members with employees represented by the International Ladies Garment Workers’ Union. 
One of the Association’s members is R & K Originals, a division of Logan. The division’s 
president, Manny Eagle, is executive vice-president of the Association and a member of the 
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Association’s negotiating committee. Eagle has had occasion to meet with lawyers from Phillips 
Nizer and discuss labor matters with them. On these facts, Judge Conner granted appellee’s 
motion to disqualify Phillips Nizer from representing Glueck in his suit against Logan. From that 
ruling, Glueck appeals. 
 
Recognizing the serious impact of attorney disqualification on the client’s right to select counsel 
of his choice, we have indicated that such relief should ordinarily be granted only when a 
violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility poses a significant risk of trial 
taint. That risk is encountered when an attorney represents one client in a suit against another 
client, in violation of Canon 5, or might benefit a client in a lawsuit by using confidential 
information about an adverse party obtained through prior representation of that party, in 
violation of Canon 4. Mindful of our standards, the parties have joined issue on whether Logan 
is a client of Phillips Nizer by virtue of the firm’s representation of the Association. Glueck 
contends that members of an incorporated trade association are not clients of the association’s 
lawyer and emphasizes that the retainer agreement between Phillips Nizer and the Association 
explicitly negates the firm’s representation of the Association’s members. Logan responds that 
the members of an incorporated association are the clients of the association’s lawyer and 
argues that Phillips Nizer’s retainer agreement only assures it the right to charge separate fees 
for legal work done specifically for an Association member. 
 
We share Judge Conner’s view that the issue is not whether Phillips Nizer’s relationship to 
Logan is in all respects that of attorney and client, but whether there exist sufficient aspects of 
an attorney-client relationship “for purposes of triggering inquiry into the potential conflict 
involved in Phillips Nizer’s role as plaintiff's counsel in this action.”41 Having concluded that such 
inquiry should be made, Judge Conner then applied the strict standards that ordinarily prohibit 
representation of adverse interests, and determined that, in view of the relationship between the 
subject of Glueck’s lawsuit and the nature of the services rendered by Phillips Nizer to the 
Association and its members, Phillips Nizer had not demonstrated “that there will be no actual or 
apparent conflict in loyalties or diminution in the vigor of its representation.” 
 
We reach the same conclusion, but analyze the issue in a slightly different way. We do not 
believe the strict standards are inevitably invoked whenever a law firm brings suit against a 
member of an association that the firm represents. If they were, many lawyers would be 
needlessly disqualified because the standards of Canon 5 impose upon counsel who seeks to 
avoid disqualification a burden so heavy that it will rarely be met. That burden is properly 
imposed when a lawyer undertakes to represent two adverse parties, both of which are his 
clients in the traditional sense. But when an adverse party is only a vicarious client by virtue of 
membership in an association, the risks against which Canon 5 guards will not inevitably arise. 
A law firm that represents the American Bar Association need not decline to represent a client 
injured by an automobile driven by a member of the ABA. Moreover, if Canon 5 were applicable 
to all suits against association members, there would be a temptation to water down the strict 
standards of Canon 5 and find them met more easily than in cases where the adverse parties 
																																																								
41 We have previously held the standards of Canon 5 to be applicable even though the interests adverse 
to those of a law firm's client are not those of another client in the traditional sense. 
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are really clients of the same lawyer. In this case, Judge Conner, after finding Canon 5 
applicable, applied what amounted to a “substantial relationship” test, and concluded that the 
subject of Glueck’s lawsuit was substantially related to Phillips Nizer’s representation of the 
Association. However, "the ‘substantial relationship’ test does not set a sufficiently high 
standard by which the necessity for disqualification under Canon 5 should be determined.” We 
think the standards of Canon 5 should be strict. We also believe those standards should apply 
to suits against association members only when the risks against which Canon 5 protects are 
likely to arise. 
 
This approach leads us to use the “substantial relationship” test in determining when Canon 5 
should be applied to suits brought by an association’s law firm against an association member. 
Disqualification will ordinarily be required whenever the subject matter of a suit is sufficiently 
related to the scope of the matters on which a firm represents an association as to create a 
realistic risk either that the plaintiff will not be represented with vigor or that unfair advantage will 
be taken of the defendant. Moreover, although our concern is with the risk of tainting a trial, 
once that risk appears, it is appropriate to assess the risk that prosecution of a plaintiff’s lawsuit 
by an association’s law firm will inhibit the free flow of information from the defendant to the firm 
that is necessary for the firm’s proper representation of the association. 
 
Though structured in a slightly different framework,42 Judge Conner’s findings fully justify 
disqualification under the approach we have outlined. Judge Conner relied upon the risk that the 
issue of whether Logan had cause to terminate Glueck might well arise in the course of 
collective bargaining discussions conducted by Phillips Nizer for the Association. He also noted 
the risk that in preparing for collective bargaining sessions, the law firm might learn of Logan’s 
policies or past practices bearing on the subject of Glueck’s termination. These risks 
demonstrate the requisite relationship between Glueck’s lawsuit and the subject matter of 
Phillips Nizer’s representation of the Association. Because of that relationship, the strict 
standards apply,43 and we agree with Judge Conner that appellant has not sustained the heavy 
burden of demonstrating that, under those standards, disqualification can be avoided. The entry 
of an order of disqualification was well within the proper exercise of discretion by the District 
Court.44 The order is affirmed. 
																																																								
42 Judge Conner, in effect, used the “substantial relationship” test to determine whether Phillips Nizer had 
met its burden under Canon 5; we use the test to determine whether Canon 5 is applicable. 
43 We reject the appellant's contention that the result reached by Judge Conner is foreclosed by Board of 
Education v. Nyquist. That decision concerned a lawyer who represented male teachers in litigation 
adverse to the interests of female teachers, under circumstances where the lawyer was supplied to the 
male teachers pursuant to a legal service program supported in part by the union dues of both the male 
and female teachers. A disqualification order was reversed for lack of any risk that the lawyer’s loyalty to 
his male clients would be diminished or that he might gain unfair advantage through access to any 
privileged information from the female teachers. 
44 We reject, as did Judge Conner, the appellant's contention that disqualification should not occur 
because Logan's division, R & K Originals, is a member of the Association, rather than Logan itself. The 
risks identified by Judge Conner are sufficient to warrant disqualification even though only Logan's 
division is a member of the Association. Nor do we accept the contention that it will be unduly 
burdensome for law firms that represent trade associations to inform themselves of the corporate identity 
of those members of an association that are constituent parts of a non-member corporation. 
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Questions: 
 
1. Why did Phillips Nizer have a conflict of interest? 
2. Why did the district court disqualify Phillips Nizer? Why did the circuit court disqualify 
Phillips Nizer? How did their reasoning differ, if at all? 
3. The court distinguishes this case from Board of Education v. Nyquist. Do you find that 
distinction convincing? 
4. If the Association kicked out Logan, would Phillips Nizer still have a conflict of interest or 
be disqualified? 
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Gutting v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 710 F. 2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1983) 
 
Summary: Ferdinand Gutting was the president of Falstaff Brewing, which gave him a 
life insurance policy, payable unless he was discharged for proper cause. Paul 
Kalmanovitz bought Falstaff and fired Gutting, and when Gutting died, Falstaff refused to 
pay his life insurance benefits. Virginia Gutting filed a breach of contract claim, and hired 
attorney James S. McClellan to represent her. Falstaff filed a motion to disqualify 
McClellan, on the ground that he had previously represented Falstaff. McClellan 
withdrew, and Gutting hired Harry B. Wilson. But Wilson also withdrew after identifying a 
conflict of interest, and Gutting hired David G. Dempsey. In the meantime. Falstaff filed a 
motion for summary judgment, arguing that Gutting had admitted all of the facts alleged 
in its complaint by failing to timely answer its request for admissions. The district court 
granted the motion, but the circuit court reversed, holding that the district court should 
have considered the disqualification of Gutting’s counsel. 
 
LAY, Chief Judge. 
 
Virginia M. Gutting appeals from an order of the district court entering summary judgment in 
favor of Falstaff Brewing Corporation and denying her motion for summary judgment. Gutting’s 
primary argument on this appeal is based on the claim that the district court erred in denying her 
motion for leave to file answers out of time to Falstaff’s request for admissions and in ordering 
the matters set forth in the request deemed admitted. Because we conclude that the district 
court erred by not allowing Gutting to file late answers to the request for admissions, we reverse 
and remand. 
 
Virginia Gutting is the widow of Ferdinand (Ferd) J. Gutting, former member of the Board of 
Directors and President of Falstaff. In 1972 Falstaff established an insurance plan for certain 
key employees. Pursuant to this plan, in January 1973, Ferdinand Gutting entered into a written 
agreement with Falstaff entitled Employee’s Death Benefit Agreement. The purpose of the 
agreement was to provide for Falstaff’s payment of a death benefit to Virginia Gutting, Ferd 
Gutting’s designated payee. Falstaff purchased three life insurance policies on Ferd Gutting’s 
life to secure this obligation. The agreement provided that all benefits would be forfeited if (1) 
the life insurance policies were contested successfully by the insurance company; (2) the 
employee left Falstaff’s employment voluntarily, subject to certain vesting provisions; or (3) the 
employee was discharged “for proper cause.” 
 
In early 1975, Paul Kalmanovitz purchased voting control of Falstaff and became Chairman of 
the Board. Subsequently, for reasons in dispute in this lawsuit, Ferd Gutting’s employment with 
Falstaff was terminated and the Board of Directors voted to deny Ferd Gutting all benefits 
because his termination was for cause. Ferd Gutting died in December 1980. Falstaff has 
refused to pay the amounts due to Virginia Gutting pursuant to the terms of the Employee’s 
Death Benefit Agreement and she brought suit to recover the proceeds. Throughout this 
litigation Falstaff has asserted as an affirmative defense that Ferd Gutting was terminated for 
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cause and thus forfeited all benefits due his beneficiary under the agreement. Virginia Gutting 
claims the termination was not for “proper cause” as that term is defined in the agreement. 
 
Procedural History. 
 
Virginia Gutting filed a complaint on July 8, 1981, through her attorney James S. McClellan. On 
September 30, 1981, Falstaff filed a motion to disqualify McClellan because he formerly had 
been a member of Falstaff’s Board of Directors and outside general counsel to Falstaff. Falstaff 
asserted that McClellan had material, firsthand knowledge of events relevant to Falstaff’s 
defense and that McClellan would likely be called as a witness. While the motion to disqualify 
was pending, on October 13, 1981, Falstaff filed its request for admissions, first interrogatories, 
and request for production of documents.45 Thereafter, the district court held a conference at 
which McClellan indicated he would withdraw voluntarily. On December 4, 1981, McClellan 
formally withdrew. 
 
On December 11, 1981, Harry B. Wilson entered his appearance on behalf of Gutting. On 
January 4, 7, and 8, 1982, Falstaff served notices of 15 depositions to begin on February 8 in 
Providence, Rhode Island, and to continue throughout February and early March around the 
country. On January 7 counsel for Falstaff, Steven P. Sanders, sent a letter to Harry Wilson 
concerning the failure to respond to the request for admissions and asking for the answers. 
Wilson and Sanders discussed the request over the telephone several days later and Sanders 
agreed to wait an indefinite period of time. 
 
According to an affidavit filed by Wilson he began to prepare for the upcoming depositions and 
to draft responses to discovery requests on January 29, 1982. Wilson further swore that on 
January 30 he concluded his firm had a serious conflict of interest because some of the 
scheduled deponents were current clients of the firm. These clients had on-going litigation 
matters with Falstaff. Wilson researched the nature of the conflict, discussed it with lead counsel 
in the case, and called Sanders on February 6, 1982, to inform him of the conflict of interest. On 
February 8 Wilson appeared before the district court and requested leave to withdraw. The 
motion evidently was pending throughout February and the scheduled depositions for February 
were postponed. 
 
																																																								
45 Falstaff's request for admissions strategically concerned the major contested factual issue in the case 
of whether Ferd Gutting had been discharged for cause. The request stated in full: 
 
1. Admit that the life insurance program set forth and discussed in your complaint allowed Falstaff 
to terminate all life insurance benefits with respect to any employee whose employment was 
terminated "for cause." 
2. Admit that if "cause" existed for the termination by Falstaff of Ferd Gutting's employment, 
Falstaff had the right to terminate all life insurance benefits otherwise available to Ferd Gutting 
and his heirs and beneficiaries. 
3. Admit that Ferd Gutting was told by Falstaff at the time of the termination of his employment by 
Falstaff that he was being discharged from his employment "for cause." 
4. Admit that Ferd Gutting was discharged from his employment with Falstaff "for cause." 
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Falstaff alleges that on February 27, 1982, Wilson again telephoned Sanders to advise him that 
the depositions scheduled for the following week would have to be canceled. Sanders refused, 
in part due to a March 15 trial setting, and both parties appeared in court on March 1. Wilson 
sought a protective order asking the court to postpone the March 2 and 3 depositions because 
of his conflict of interest. The court indicated the depositions would not be delayed unless new 
counsel for Gutting entered an appearance. Later the same day, Gutting’s third attorney, David 
G. Dempsey, entered his appearance and the depositions were postponed one day. The court 
granted Wilson leave to withdraw and continued the trial setting until June 7, 1982. 
 
On April 9, 1982, Dempsey filed several motions on behalf of Gutting, including a motion for 
leave to file answers to the request for admissions out of time. On the same date, Falstaff filed a 
motion for summary judgment on the theory that all fact issues in the case had been admitted 
by Gutting’s failure to make a timely response to the request. On April 21, the court denied 
Gutting’s motion for leave to file the answers and delayed ruling on Falstaff’s summary 
judgment motion. The case was still scheduled to proceed to trial on June 7, 1982, and Falstaff 
chose to proceed with 11 scheduled discovery depositions. On May 28, 1982, the district court 
granted Falstaff’s summary judgment motion. The court ruled there was no genuine issue of 
material fact that the death benefits had been properly withheld under the terms of the 
agreement because the matter of Ferd Gutting’s termination for cause had been deemed 
admitted. 
 
Discussion 
 
2. Conflicts of Interest of Gutting’s Counsel. 
 
Gutting contends that the late responses should have been allowed because Falstaff’s motion to 
disqualify McClellan and Wilson’s withdrawal due to his conflict of interest rendered her without 
effective representation. The conflicts of interest experienced by McClellan and Wilson 
disrupted their professional duties to take actions best suited to furthering Gutting’s interests. 
Once the conflicts became apparent, each attorney became unable to exercise his independent 
professional judgment. Gutting seems to be arguing that she should not be penalized because 
of her attorney’s “inability” to take actions on her behalf. We agree that her counsels’ conflicts of 
interest should have been considered by the district court. 
 
The rules of professional responsibility that prohibit an attorney from representing differing 
interests are designed to protect the client from the attorney’s potential abuses. It would appear 
to us that the purpose of such rules would be best furthered if an attorney discovering a conflict 
of interest took no action that may be inimical to the client’s interests. The existence of a 
conflict, if not actually tolling the time period for answering discovery requests, should at least 
be a factor when evaluating the reasons for an untimely response. 
 
In the instant case, Falstaff first filed the motion to disqualify McClellan and then filed the 
request for admissions barely two weeks later. Falstaff could not expect Gutting to answer the 
request during the pendency of the motion to disqualify her attorney. Indeed, once McClellan 
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agreed to withdraw, Falstaff agreed to wait for a response until a new attorney had entered an 
appearance and had an opportunity to review the file. Wilson entered an appearance on 
December 11, 1981; his appearance was formally accepted on December 17. Sanders, counsel 
for Falstaff, concedes that he advised Wilson the extension of time for a response was good for 
a reasonable period of time. In early January 1982 Sanders and Wilson again informally agreed 
that the time for answering the requests could be extended a little while longer. Falstaff admits 
that it would have accepted the answers through the end of January and perhaps during the first 
few days of February. In the affidavit of Wilson, he swears that he discovered a possible conflict 
of interest on January 30, 1982, as he was preparing responses to the discovery requests. He 
notified Sanders of the conflict of interest on February 6 and requested leave to withdraw on 
February 8. At the time Wilson discovered the existence of the conflict, Falstaff concedes that 
answers to the request still would have been accepted. It was sometime after January 30 that 
Falstaff began to consider the matters in the request admitted. 
 
Falstaff contends that regardless of Wilson’s conflict of interest he could have responded to the 
request for admissions. Wilson’s conflict related only to certain upcoming depositions and did 
not affect his ability to answer the request. We disagree. As we read the conflict-of-interest 
1`rules, any actions taken by Wilson may have appeared to be inimical to Gutting's interests. 
Wilson could not have responded to the request as long as he was hindered by a conflict of 
interest in any aspect of his representation.46 
 
We do not mean to imply disapproval of the district court's use of discovery sanctions in 
appropriate cases. An attorney’s conflict of interest and his or her resulting inability to act must 
be distinguished from the situation in which the attorney’s failure to act was inexcusable. In Mrs. 
Gutting’s case it would be inequitable to deem the requests admitted and penalize her because 
of her attorney’s compliance with the rules of professional responsibility. 
 
We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings with directions 
that the district court set a reasonable time period in which to allow Gutting to file answers to the 
request for admissions. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. What is the purpose of the conflict of interest rules? Who are they intended to protect? 
Who do they actually protect? 
2. Should Gutting’s attorneys have been disqualified? What if she consented to the 
conflict? 
 
Further Listening: 
																																																								
46 We do not know why it took Wilson one week to inform Sanders of the conflict and another three weeks 
to withdraw formally from the case and have Mr. Dempsey enter his appearance. Falstaff complains of 
this time lag because it was required to cancel several depositions. Given the pending deposition 
schedule and trial setting, an expeditious substitution of counsel would have been appropriate. 
Nevertheless, our analysis of the conflict-of-interest problem remains the same. 
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4.2: Resolving Conflicts of Interest 
 
I saw the future in a dream last night. Somebody’s gonna get hurt, somebody’s gonna get hurt. I 
hope it’s not me, but I suspect it’s going to have to be.47 
 
While conflicts of interest implicate the duty of loyalty, they do not necessarily preclude 
representation or require withdrawal from representation. Some conflicts of interest cannot be 
resolved. For example, an attorney cannot represent both the plaintiff and the defendant in an 
action, and typically cannot represent any parties with actual or potential claims against each 
other. But many conflicts of interest can be resolved, if the attorney can represent the client 
without breaching the duty of loyalty, and the client provides informed consent to representation 
despite the conflict. 
 
Waiver of Conflicts of Interest 
 
In order to resolve a conflict of interest problem, attorneys should apply the four-step process 
outlined in Model Rule 1.7, comment [2]:  
 
1. clearly identify the client or clients; 
2. determine whether a conflict of interest exists; 
3. decide whether the representation may be undertaken despite the existence of a conflict, 
i.e., whether the conflict is consentable; and  
4. if so, consult with the clients affected and obtain their informed consent, confirmed in 
writing. 
 
This process provides a framework for identifying, evaluating, and resolving conflicts of interest. 
Essentially, it requires an attorney to ask: 1) whether an attorney-client relationship exists; 2) 
whether the attorney’s legal duties to a client conflict with the interests of the attorney, another 
current or former client, or a third-party to whom the lawyer owes a legal duty; 3) whether 
representation is legally permissible and practically possible under the circumstances; and 4) 
whether the client is adequately informed of the nature and potential consequences of the 
conflict, and has consented to representation in writing, despite the conflict. However, each of 
those steps requires an exercise of judgment on the part of the attorney. 
 
Identifying Clients 
 
A “client” is any party with whom an attorney has an attorney-client relationship of any kind. The 
conflict of interest rules apply to both clients and quasi-clients. As a consequence, a party may 
be a client for the purpose of the conflict of interest rules even if the attorney did not intend to 
form an attorney-client relationship. For example, a party that disclosed confidential information 
to an attorney in the course of seeking representation may be a client for the purpose of the 
conflict of interest rules, even if the party never hired the attorney. The agents or employees of a 
																																																								
47 The Mountain Goats, Black Pear Tree (2008). 
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client organization may be clients, if they reasonably believe the attorney has agreed to 
represent them personally or have provided confidential information pertaining to their own 
circumstances. And a subsidiary of a client organization may also be a client, if the attorney 
effectively represents the subsidiary as well as the parent. 
 
Identifying Conflicts of Interest 
 
A “conflict of interest” exists if an attorney’s fiduciary duties to a client conflict with the interests 
of the attorney, another current or former client, or a third-party to whom the attorney owes a 
legal duty. In other words, if the interests of the attorney, another current or former client, or 
third-party could provide an incentive for the attorney not to observe those legal duties to the 
client, then a conflict of interest exists. If the attorney could benefit from putting another interest 
ahead of the client’s interests, providing less than candid and impartial advice, or using 
confidential information provided by the client, then a conflict of interest exists, whether or not 
the attorney ever has or would violate the fiduciary duties of loyalty, impartiality, and 
confidentiality. 
 
Notably, a conflict of interest does not require actual harm to the client, only potential harm. 
There is no such thing as a “potential conflict of interest.” A conflict of interest exists as soon as 
the potential for harm is created, whether or not the harm ever materializes. The risk of harm to 
the client’s interests creates the conflict of interest, so the question is not whether a conflict 
exists, but how serious a conflict it presents. In some cases, the risk of harm may be too small 
to create a meaningful conflict, or an attorney’s legal duties may themselves prevent the conflict 
from arising. But the conflict still exists, it simply is not a material conflict that requires an 
attorney to decline or withdraw from representation.  
 
The paradigmatic conflict of interest exists when an attorney represents directly adverse parties, 
or one client litigating a claim against another. Notably, a conflict of interest exists whenever 
clients are directly adverse in any action, even if the attorney represents neither client in that 
action. Of course, co-defendants and co-plaintiffs may be directly adverse, because cross-
claims and third-party claims create direct adversity. And potential claims may also create direct 
adversity, even if they are never filed. Accordingly, attorneys should be wary whenever they 
represent clients on the opposite sides of any transaction. Any potential adversity may create a 
conflict of interest. 
 
Of course, a conflict of interest may exist without direct adversity. If an attorney represents two 
clients with opposing interests, it may “materially limit” the attorney’s ability to represent both 
clients, because it may create an incentive for the attorney to compromise those interests. If 
dual representation could affect the attorney’s decisions, then a conflict of interest exists. 
 
Conflicts of interest can arise unexpectedly, as a client’s interests may change over time. 
Accordingly, a conflicts analysis can never be a “one and done” practice. Attorneys must always 
be vigilant to identify and resolve conflicts of interest whenever they arise. 
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However, a conflict of interest may or may not be material. A conflict of interest is material if it 
creates a substantial risk of providing an incentive for an attorney to violate a fiduciary duty to a 
client. But by extension, a conflict of interest is no material if it does not create such a risk. 
Attorneys must obtain the informed consent of their client in order to resolve a material conflict 
of interest. But attorneys need not obtain informed consent in order to resolve an immaterial 
conflict of interest, because no actual conflict exists. Of course, it can be difficult to determine 
whether a conflict is material, and immaterial conflicts have an unfortunate tendency to become 
material.  
 
Waivable Conflicts of Interest 
 
If a material conflict of interest exists, then the attorney must determine whether it is waivable. 
Some conflicts are waivable, but others are not. Specifically, a conflict is waivable only if it does 
not make representation prohibited or impossible under the circumstances. For example, some 
attorneys, typically former government employees, are prohibited by law from representing 
certain clients, so that is a conflict of interest that cannot be waived. Likewise, courts have 
uniformly held that attorneys cannot represent parties to an action with claims against each 
other, so that is also a conflict of interest that cannot be waived. However, many courts have 
held that attorneys can represent directly adverse clients, so long as the attorney does not 
represent both clients in the same matter, and both clients provide informed consent, so that is 
a conflict of interest that may be waived. 
 
Informed Consent 
 
If a waivable conflict of interest exists, then the attorney must obtain informed consent to the 
conflict from the client or clients. For example, if an attorney’s interests conflict with a client’s 
interests, then the attorney must obtain informed consent from the client. If a client’s interests 
conflict with another client’s interests, then the attorney must obtain informed consent from both 
clients. And if a client’s interests conflict with a third party’s interests, then the attorney must 
obtain informed consent from the client. 
 
Sometimes, obtaining informed consent is easy. For example, a formal conflict of interest may 
not create a real conflict of interest, and the client may readily consent. Indeed, some clients 
may even see some formal conflicts of interest as advantages, rather than liabilities. One 
person’s “conflict of interest” may be another person’s “investment in the outcome.” 
 
But other times, obtaining informed consent may be difficult or impossible. A former client may 
well resent their former attorney representing an adversary and withhold consent. And a quasi-
client may be even more likely to harbor misgivings. In those circumstances, even a relatively 
trivial conflict of interest may become an insuperable barrier to representation. 
 
Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: Current Clients 
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a. Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest 
exists if: 
1. the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or 
2. there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client 
or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. 
b. Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a 
lawyer may represent a client if: 
1. the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent 
and diligent representation to each affected client; 
2. the representation is not prohibited by law; 
3. the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against 
another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other 
proceeding before a tribunal; and 
4. each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 122: Client Consent to a Conflict of 
Interest 
 
1. A lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a conflict of interest prohibited by § 121 
if each affected client or former client gives informed consent to the lawyer's 
representation. Informed consent requires that the client or former client have 
reasonably adequate information about the material risks of such representation to that 
client or former client. 
2. Notwithstanding the informed consent of each affected client or former client, a lawyer 
may not represent a client if: 
a. the representation is prohibited by law; 
b. one client will assert a claim against the other in the same litigation; or 
c. in the circumstances, it is not reasonably likely that the lawyer will be able to 
provide adequate representation to one or more of the clients. 
 
Obtaining Informed Consent to a Conflict of Interest 
 
An attorney may represent a client despite a conflict of interest only if the attorney obtains 
informed consent to the conflict from the client, ideally in writing. In order to obtain informed 
consent, the attorney must provide the client with adequate disclosure of the conflict. 
Specifically, the attorney must disclose any and all competing interests that could create a 
conflict. And the attorney must explain the nature of every conflict and how they could affect the 
attorney’s representation of the client, including the attorney’s fiduciary duties of loyalty, 
impartiality, and confidentiality. In addition, attorneys should, and often must, obtain informed 
consent to any conflicts before commencing representation, and typically cannot obtain valid 
informed consent when terminating representation. 
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Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 122(c)(i): The Requirement of 
Informed Consent—Adequate Information 
 
Informed consent requires that each affected client be aware of the material respects in 
which the representation could have adverse effects on the interests of that client. The 
information required depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks of 
the conflicted representation. The client must be aware of information reasonably 
adequate to make an informed decision. 
 
Information relevant to particular kinds of conflicts is considered in several of the 
Sections hereafter. In a multiple-client situation, the information normally should address 
the interests of the lawyer and other client giving rise to the conflict; contingent, optional, 
and tactical considerations and alternative courses of action that would be foreclosed or 
made less readily available by the conflict; the effect of the representation or the process 
of obtaining other clients' informed consent upon confidential information of the client; 
any material reservations that a disinterested lawyer might reasonably harbor about the 
arrangement if such a lawyer were representing only the client being advised; and the 
consequences and effects of a future withdrawal of consent by any client, including, if 
relevant, the fact that the lawyer would withdraw from representing all clients. Where the 
conflict arises solely because a proposed representation will be adverse to an existing 
client in an unrelated matter, knowledge of the general nature and scope of the work 
being performed for each client normally suffices to enable the clients to decide whether 
or not to consent. 
 
When the consent relates to a former-client conflict, it is necessary that the former client 
be aware that the consent will allow the former lawyer to proceed adversely to the former 
client. Beyond that, the former client must have adequate information about the 
implications (if not readily apparent) of the adverse representation, the fact that the 
lawyer possesses the former client's confidential information, the measures that the 
former lawyer might undertake to protect against unwarranted disclosures, and the right 
of the former client to refuse consent. The former client will often be independently 
represented by counsel. If so, communication with the former client ordinarily must be 
through successor counsel. 
 
The lawyer is responsible for assuring that each client has the necessary information. A 
lawyer who does not personally inform the client assumes the risk that the client is 
inadequately informed and that the consent is invalid. A lawyer's failure to inform the 
clients might also bear on the motives and good faith of the lawyer. On the other hand, 
clients differ as to their sophistication and experience, and situations differ in terms of 
their complexity and the subtlety of the conflicts presented. The requirements of this 
Section are satisfied if the client already knows the necessary information or learns it 
from other sources. A client independently represented—for example by inside legal 
counsel or by other outside counsel—will need less information about the consequences 
of a conflict but nevertheless may have need of information adequate to reveal its scope 
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and severity. When several lawyers represent the same client, responsibility to make 
disclosure and obtain informed consent may be delegated to one or more of the lawyers 
who appears reasonably capable of providing adequate information. 
 
Disclosing information about one client or prospective client to another is precluded if 
information necessary to be conveyed is confidential. The affected clients may consent 
to disclosure, but it also might be possible for the lawyer to explain the nature of 
undisclosed information in a manner that nonetheless provides an adequate basis for 
informed consent. If means of adequate disclosure are unavailable, consent to the 
conflict may not be obtained. 
 
The requirement of consent generally requires an affirmative response by each client. 
Ambiguities in a client's purported expression of consent should be construed against 
the lawyer seeking the protection of the consent. In general, a lawyer may not assume 
consent from a client's silent acquiescence. However, consent may be inferred from 
active participation in a representation by a client who has reasonably adequate 
information about the material risks of the representation after a lawyer's request for 
consent. Even in the absence of consent, a tribunal applying remedies such as 
disqualification will apply concepts of estoppel and waiver when an objecting party has 
either induced reasonable reliance on the absence of objection or delayed an 
unreasonable period of time in making objection. 
 
Effective client consent to one conflict is not necessarily effective with respect to other 
conflicts or other matters. A client's informed consent to simultaneous representation of 
another client in the same matter despite a conflict of interest does not constitute 
consent to the lawyer's later representation of the other client in a manner that would 
violate the former-client conflict rule. 
 
NuStar Farms, LLC v. Zylstra, 880 N.W.2d 478 (Iowa 2016) 
 
Summary: Between 2002 and 2014, attorney Larry Stoller represented Robert and 
Marcia Zylstra in several different matters. In 2007, Stoller and the Zylstras discussed a 
manure easement agreement with NuStar Farms. In 2014, Stoller began representing 
NuStar, which had a dispute with the Zylstras over a deed. Soon afterward, Stoller 
ended his representation of the Zylstras and filed an action against them for NuStar. The 
Zylstras retained attorney John Sandy, who filed a motion to disqualify Stoller. The trial 
court denied the motion, but the Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that Stoller had 
a conflict of interest and the Zylstras did not consent. 
 
ZAGER, Justice. 
 
In this interlocutory appeal, we are asked to decide whether an attorney should be disqualified 
from representing one party in a lawsuit, either because his representation of the two parties 
was concurrent or because he had previously represented the opposing party in a similar 
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matter. The district court concluded that the attorney need not be disqualified. For the reasons 
stated below, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 
the prior attorney-client relationship failed the "substantial relationship" test. However, we 
conclude that the attorney did have a concurrent conflict of interest. Therefore, we find the 
district court abused its discretion in not disqualifying the attorney. 
 
Background Facts and Proceedings. 
 
Attorney Larry Stoller began representing Robert and Marcia Zylstra in 2002. Stoller 
represented them in a number of legal matters between 2002 and 2014, including financial 
issues, business acquisitions, and real estate transactions. Although the Zylstras were 
represented by Stoller on a number of occasions, they also used the services of other attorneys 
throughout this time period. At issue for the purposes of this case are a meeting in January 
2007 and a small claims case ending in 2014. 
 
On January 24, 2007, Robert met with Stoller to discuss estate planning and manure easement 
agreements. At the time of the meeting, the Zylstras were shareholders in Sibley Dairy, LLP. 
During this meeting, Robert showed Stoller a multipage document containing multiple manure 
easement agreements that the Zylstras intended to enter into with NuStar Farms, LLC. The 
parties disagree as to the extent of Stoller's involvement during this meeting regarding the 
manure easement agreements. Stoller asserts that he only briefly glanced at the easement 
agreements and then advised Robert that he should seek the advice of another attorney. 
Although Stoller acknowledges he made notations on the first page of the document, he argues 
that the notations do not indicate he read the entirety of the multipage manure easement 
agreements. Robert asserts that he asked Stoller to review the manure easement agreements 
and provide advice. Robert further alleges that Stoller examined the agreements during the 
meeting and advised him to go ahead and complete and sign them. 
 
The record reflects that Stoller made notations on the documents. However, Stoller claims the 
notations were made at Robert's request to help Robert remember what to discuss with one of 
the attorneys that Stoller suggested Robert contact. Both parties agree that Stoller suggested 
Robert find an attorney with more experience in the area of manure easements. Stoller sent a 
follow-up email to Robert with two attorney references who he thought could assist the Zylstras 
with the easements. The email also confirmed that Robert asked Stoller to look at the 
easements and that Stoller "briefly looked at them." Further, Stoller wrote, "The changes you 
were talking about should be run by the other attorney and I suggest that if approved they be 
included in the easements. I would also think that some permit would be necessary." The record 
also reflects that during this conference they discussed estate planning matters. This is 
confirmed in the follow-up email and Stoller's office notes of the conference. Stoller billed the 
Zylstras for 1.20 hours and described the meeting as, "Conference with Robert on manure 
easement; review easements and agreement." There is nothing in the record to indicate that 
Stoller represented the Zylstras when they executed the manure easement agreements with 
NuStar or that he had any further involvement in the sale of Sibley Dairy. 
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Stoller continued to represent the Zylstras in a number of other legal matters between 2007 and 
2014. In December 2013, Stoller began representing the Zylstras in a small claims matter. The 
case was submitted to the small claims court on February 10, 2014, but the court did not issue 
its ruling until May 30. Stoller began representing NuStar in early May in an action regarding 
loan covenants. Also in early May, Stoller began contacting the Zylstras on behalf of NuStar. At 
least part of these contacts involved the Zylstras' failure to provide NuStar with a deed to 
property involving ingress. Stoller acknowledges that he contacted Robert about the Zylstras’ 
need to sign the deed. On May 13, Stoller sent the Zylstras an email that stated it was the third 
time he had contacted them about the deed to ingress property sold by the Zylstras to NuStar. 
Stoller wrote in the email, 
 
I must now put you on formal notice that if the signed deed is not received by my office 
by the close of business on Wednesday, May 14, 2014, that I will need to pursue the 
appropriate remedies for specific performance and damages on behalf of Nustar. 
 
Stoller also wrote in his email, "I have tried to remain neutral in those matters and advised both 
parties that I could represent neither." 
 
In this same email, Stoller informed the Zylstras that he would no longer be representing them in 
any future matters. Robert acknowledges that he understood the May 13 email as a severance 
of the attorney-client relationship. Stoller emailed the Zylstras again on May 14, expressing 
disappointment that the Zylstras were not going to sign the deed. Stoller also reminded Robert 
of his prior financial situation and how Stoller had helped him in the past. 
 
By May 15, the Zylstras had retained John Sandy to represent them in their dealings with 
NuStar. In Sandy's correspondence to Stoller that same day, he alerted Stoller that the Zylstras 
found his representation of NuStar to be a conflict of interest based on his prior legal 
representation and counsel provided to the Zylstras. Sandy specifically requested that Stoller 
cease further representation of NuStar when those interests conflicted with the Zylstras. 
 
On June 5, Stoller sent the Zylstras a letter notifying them of the judge's ruling in the small 
claims case and informing them that he believed the decision was appealable. Stoller further 
notified the Zylstras of their rights to appeal and the deadlines associated with such an appeal. 
Stoller wrote he would be willing to file an appeal on their behalf and included information about 
his retainer and billing rate. Stoller also advised the Zylstras that if they chose to have another 
attorney represent them on the appeal he would release their file to that attorney. 
 
On July 9, Stoller filed a multicount petition on behalf of NuStar against the Zylstras. The petition 
alleged the Zylstras agreed to sell NuStar a parcel in farmland in 2008, but they failed to tender 
the requisite deed. One count of the petition also alleged the Zylstras did not abide by certain 
terms contained in the manure easement agreements. In response, the Zylstras filed a 
preanswer motion to dismiss based on statute of limitations grounds. They also filed a motion 
seeking to disqualify Stoller as the attorney for NuStar based on a conflict of interest. 
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On August 8, the district court held a hearing, and the parties argued both the motion to dismiss 
and the motion to disqualify Stoller. On October 14, the district court denied both motions. On 
November 10, the Zylstras filed an application for interlocutory appeal seeking review of the 
district court's denial of their motion to disqualify Stoller. We granted the application for 
interlocutory appeal on December 5. 
 
Analysis 
 
The right of a party to choose his or her own attorney is important, but it must be balanced 
against the need to maintain "the highest ethical standards" that will preserve the public's trust 
in the bar and in the integrity of the court system. A court must necessarily balance these two 
competing interests when determining whether to disqualify an attorney. In doing so, the court 
“must also be vigilant to thwart any misuse of a motion to disqualify for strategic reasons.” When 
we evaluate motions to disqualify an attorney, we use our Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 
as the starting point. 
 
Rule 32:1.7 covers concurrent conflicts of interest and states in pertinent part, 
 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest 
exists if: 
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or 
(2) there is significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially 
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person 
by a personal interest of the lawyer. 
 
The rule goes on to state that a lawyer may continue with the representation of a client if certain 
stipulations are met, one of which is that each client gives informed, written consent. 
 
The Zylstras allege that Stoller's representation of NuStar was a concurrent conflict of interest 
with his representation of them. They argue that he began the action on behalf of NuStar in 
early May, while knowing that the representation would be adverse to the Zylstras because it 
involved a deed between the two parties. Further, Stoller began contacting the Zylstras on 
behalf of NuStar before the May 13 email officially terminating his attorney-client relationship 
with the Zylstras on the small claims case. Stoller responds that there was no concurrent conflict 
of interest because he did not file the action on behalf of NuStar against the Zylstras until after 
the May 13 email terminating the attorney-client relationship. In the alternative, the Zylstras 
argue that Stoller's June 5 email indicates that he was continuing to represent them in the small 
claims matter until the court issued its ruling. Even thereafter, Stoller advised the Zylstras there 
was a basis to appeal the judgment, the time for perfecting such an appeal, and his willingness 
to continue representing them in the appeal. Stoller contends that it was his duty to inform the 
Zylstras, as his former clients, of the outcome of the small claims hearing and the time limits for 
appeal. He further contends that, although he said he would be willing to represent the Zylstras 
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on the appeal, he was also recommending they find alternate representation and thus was only 
informing them of their options if they chose to go forward with an appeal. 
 
Before we turn to an analysis of whether a concurrent conflict of interest exists, we must 
address two questions: when the attorney-client relationship between the Zylstras and Stoller 
ended, and when the attorney-client relationship between NuStar and Stoller began. The first 
question we may dispose of easily. Generally, a lawyer's representation of a client extends until 
the time period for motions or appeals expires in a civil action. However, both the attorney and 
the client may terminate the relationship prior to this natural ending. Both Stoller and the 
Zylstras agree that the attorney-client relationship was terminated with the May 13 email. 
Further, while Stoller did offer to represent the Zylstras on the appeal, the Zylstras did not 
actually appeal the small claims case and did not solicit Stoller's services on any other legal 
matters. We find that the attorney-client relationship between Stoller and the Zylstras ended with 
the May 13 email. 
 
The next question we must address is when the attorney-client relationship between Stoller and 
NuStar began. The attorney-client relationship is governed by general contract principles. It may 
be either express, such as when representation is based on a written agreement, or implied by 
the conduct of the parties. There are three elements that must be met to find that an attorney-
client relationship has been established: 
 
(1) a person sought advice or assistance from an attorney, (2) the advice or assistance 
sought pertained to matters within the attorney's professional competence, and (3) the 
attorney expressly or impliedly agreed to give or actually gave the desired advice or 
assistance. 
 
The relationship between Stoller and NuStar clearly meets this test. NuStar sought advice from 
Stoller at least beginning in early May about the action that required a deed from the Zylstras. 
The advice they sought from Stoller pertained to matters within his professional ability. Stoller 
has practiced law for a number of years and across a number of areas. Last, Stoller both agreed 
to give and actually gave NuStar advice and assistance. On NuStar's behalf, Stoller began 
contacting the Zylstras regarding the deed that NuStar was demanding. We find that the 
attorney-client relationship between NuStar and Stoller began, at the latest, in early May. This is 
also confirmed by Stoller's correspondence with the Zylstras on May 13 in which he asserts that 
it was the third time he had contacted them in regard to the deed. We now turn to a discussion 
of whether this attorney-client relationship involved a concurrent conflict of interest that violates 
rule 32:1.7. 
 
There are two ways for a concurrent conflict of interest to exist under rule 32:1.7. The first is if 
“the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client.” The second is if 
“there is a significant risk that the representation will be materially limited by the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person.” We may find a concurrent 
conflict of interest under either situation. 
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We have acknowledged that rule 32:1.7(a) “applies where directly adverse representation will 
take place, as when one current client is about to file suit against another current client.” The 
comments to the rule expand on what a “directly adverse” action may be: 
 
Loyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that 
client without that client's informed consent. Thus, absent consent, a lawyer may not act 
as an advocate in one matter against a person the lawyer represents in some other 
matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated. 
 
Stoller acknowledged in a letter to the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board that he 
began the representation of NuStar in early May and that the Zylstras were aware of his 
representation of NuStar. It is unclear from the record at what point Stoller realized the action 
would include the deed that NuStar wanted the Zylstras to sign. However, by the time Stoller 
sent the May 13 email, he was already contemplating taking action against the Zylstras on 
behalf of NuStar. The email stated, 
 
I must now put you on formal notice that if the signed deed is not received by my office 
by the close of business on Wednesday, May 14, 2014, that I will need to pursue the 
appropriate remedies for specific performance and damages on behalf of Nustar. 
 
In this email, Stoller clearly demonstrates the intent to pursue a future, adverse action against 
the Zylstras on behalf of NuStar. Although Stoller terminated the attorney-client relationship with 
the Zylstras in the same email, the intent to pursue legal action unless the Zylstras complied 
with NuStar's request to sign the deed arose before the email was sent — which is precisely 
why the demand or “formal notice” language is included. We find that Stoller's representation of 
NuStar was a directly adverse concurrent conflict of interest. Because Stoller did not properly 
obtain consent from the Zylstras to represent NuStar, his actions fall squarely within the 
guidance of the comments that “absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one 
matter against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even when the matters are 
wholly unrelated.” Thus, we find Stoller should be disqualified from representing NuStar in the 
action against the Zylstras. Because the district court applied the law in error, we find that it 
abused its discretion in concluding that Stoller should not be disqualified. 
 
Rule 32:1.9(a) — Duties to Former Clients 
 
Stoller argues that, even though there was a concurrent conflict of interest in the past, the 
conflict no longer exists because he severed the attorney-client relationship, and therefore he 
can continue to represent NuStar in the current action against the Zylstras. Rule 32:1.9(a) 
concerns a lawyer's duties to former clients. In pertinent part, it provides, 
 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent 
another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's 
interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former 
client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
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The comments expand on what makes a matter “substantially related” for purposes of the rule. 
A matter is substantially related if it involves the same transaction or legal dispute. If there is “a 
substantial risk that confidential factual information as would normally have been obtained in the 
prior representation would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter,” 
then the matter is substantially related. 
 
We consider three factors when we determine whether a substantial relationship exists: 
 
(1) the nature and scope of the prior representation; (2) the nature of the present lawsuit; 
and (3) whether the client might have disclosed a confidence to his or her attorney in the 
prior representation which could be relevant to the present action. 
 
Under the first factor, we must consider the scope — if any — of Stoller's representation of the 
Zylstras in regard to the manure easement agreements. There is no question that Stoller and 
Robert met to discuss the agreements and that Stoller was aware the Zylstras intended to enter 
into the agreements with NuStar. During the meeting, Robert showed Stoller the easement 
agreements. Stoller acknowledges that he looked at the first page and made some notations, 
though he contends the notations were made at Robert's request so Robert would know what 
he needed to discuss with another attorney. Stoller further claims that he did not read the 
entirety of the agreements. During the meeting, Stoller advised Robert to find another attorney 
to help him with the agreements because it was not an area of the law Stoller was familiar with. 
He gave Robert the names of two attorneys to contact. 
 
Stoller sent an email to Robert following the meeting that summarized their discussion about the 
easement agreements. The email stated that Robert asked Stoller to look at the easements and 
that he “briefly looked at them.” Stoller also wrote, “The changes you were talking about should 
be run by the other attorney and I suggest that if approved they be included in the easements. I 
would also think that some permit would be necessary.” This reflects at least some level of 
advice given to Robert by Stoller. However, this is in stark contrast to our previous cases where 
we have found an attorney was extensively involved in prior representation. 
 
In Doe, we found an attorney was highly involved in a client's prior representation when he had 
met with the clients, had telephone conversations with the clients, appeared as their attorney, 
and signed pleadings on their behalf. In Marks, we found that the attorney violated rule 32:1.9(a) 
when he represented a client in a foreclosure action and later represented his own wife in the 
sale of property to that same former client. We found that the attorney's representation of the 
client and his wife were substantially related because he had obtained information about the 
client's property during the foreclosure action. In comparison to our prior cases, we cannot say 
that the scope of Stoller's representation of the Zylstras regarding the manure easement 
agreements was in any way significant. 
 
The second factor we consider is the nature of the present lawsuit between the Zylstras and 
NuStar. In the original petition that Stoller filed on behalf of NuStar, he included six counts. All of 
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the counts except one deal with a real estate contract between NuStar and the Zylstras. Stoller 
did not participate in the real estate contract on behalf of the Zylstras. Count IV alleges a breach 
of the manure easement agreements between NuStar and the Zylstras. Although the majority of 
the counts do not relate to the manure easement agreements that Stoller had knowledge of, at 
least one part of the current lawsuit does relate to the prior scope of Stoller's representation. 
 
The final factor we consider is “whether the client might have disclosed a confidence to his or 
her attorney in the prior representation which could be relevant to the present action.” The 
meeting between Robert and Stoller to discuss the manure easement agreements was brief. 
The parties only superficially discussed the substance of the agreements and Stoller specifically 
suggested that Robert seek other competent agricultural law counsel to review the agreements 
before signing them. The email from Stoller does note that the two discussed whether permits 
were required or whether Robert should change anything in the agreements. However, nothing 
from this meeting indicates that Robert disclosed anything in confidence about the agreements 
to Stoller that would affect the current lawsuit between the Zylstras and NuStar. 
 
We do not find that a substantial relationship exists sufficient to disqualify Stoller under rule 
32:1.9(a). We therefore find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that 
Stoller could not be disqualified under the substantial relationship test. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that any prior relationship 
between Stoller and Zylstra in regard to the manure easement agreements failed the substantial 
relationship test. However, we find that Stoller did have a concurrent conflict of interest. 
Therefore, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in not disqualifying Stoller 
from representing NuStar in the action. On remand, the district court should enter an order 
disqualifying Stoller from further representation of NuStar in this lawsuit. 
 
Questions: 
1. Why did the court hold that a conflict of interest prevented Stoller from representing 
NuStar in this action? Do you think that a substantial conflict of interest existed? 
2. Why didn’t the Zylstras want Stoller to represent NuStar in the action against them? 
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4.3: Breach of the Duty of Loyalty 
 
Don't look so surprised. You've been telling me lies. True confessions.48 
 
Your depths made a pressure that punctured my works and all your fluids couldn't tolerate the 
force of my thirst. I love the place where we shared our tiny grace, but just because it’s real 
don't mean it’s gonna work.49 
 
Attorneys have a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their clients. And attorneys who breach that duty of 
loyalty may be liable for malpractice. Typically, attorneys breach their duty of loyalty by ignoring 
or concealing a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest reflects an incentive to breach the duty 
of loyalty. And attorneys who act on that incentive have probably committed malpractice. 
 
The Scope of the Duty of Loyalty 
 
While attorneys owe their clients both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty, the duties are not the 
same. The duty of care requires reasonable care under the circumstances, but the duty of 
loyalty is an absolute duty. In other words, attorneys must always be vigilant for conflicts of 
interest. And if a conflict arises, attorneys must either resolve the conflict or withdraw from 
representation. 
 
Moguls of Aspen, Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, 956 P. 2d 618 (Colo. App. 1997) 
 
Summary: While representing Moguls of Aspen in a dispute with its landlord, Faegre & 
Benson provided inaccurate legal advice, which caused Moguls of Aspen to lose its 
lease and go out of business. Moguls of Aspen sued Faegre & Benson for malpractice, 
but the trial court refused to instruct the jury on its claim for breach of the duty of loyalty, 
finding that the facts did not support the claim. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that 
Moguls of Aspen presented evidence of negligence, but did not present evidence of a 
conflict of interest. 
 
Opinion by Judge CRISWELL. 
 
Plaintiffs, Moguls of Aspen, Inc. (MOA) and Mogul Shop, Inc. (MSI), appeal from the judgment 
entered upon a jury verdict in favor of defendants, Faegre & Benson, a law firm, and Christian 
Onsager, one of its members. We affirm. 
 
Plaintiffs are two corporations wholly owned by Nancy Snell. MOA leased commercial space 
and subleased it to MSI, which operated a retail ski apparel shop on the premises. 
 
																																																								
48 The Undertones, True Confessions (1979). 
49 The Blow, True Affection, Paper Television (2006). 
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Plaintiffs first contacted the defendant law firm as a result of a dispute between them and the 
lessor of the commercial space concerning the amount of rent owed. After receiving notice from 
the lessor that they were in default on their lease, plaintiffs’ real estate attorney contacted the 
law firm to discuss the possibility of filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. 
 
A meeting was held with two attorneys of the law firm on June 25, 1991. Plaintiffs brought both 
the written lease and the lessor's notice of default to the meeting. At trial, their evidence sought 
to establish that an attorney-client relationship was established at this meeting. According to 
plaintiffs, while the plain language of the lease stated that the lessor could terminate the lease 
ten days after serving the notice of default, defendants did not advise them of this fact, nor did 
they disclose the legal effect of taking no immediate action to preserve the lease. 
 
Plaintiffs asserted that, after this initial meeting, defendants performed no further work on 
plaintiffs’ behalf until August 7, 1991. At trial, plaintiff’s experts testified that these acts and 
omissions by defendants constituted professional negligence, as well as breaches of their 
fiduciary duties to act with “due diligence” and “in the client's best interest.” 
 
On August 7, 1991, after the lessor had served a demand for payment or possession on them, 
plaintiffs again contacted one of the attorneys who had been present at the June 25, 1991, 
meeting. This attorney told plaintiffs that he was too busy to handle the matter, and he referred it 
to defendant Onsager. Onsager informed plaintiffs that the lessor could not obtain possession of 
the premises unless an additional three-day notice was served upon them. This advice was 
admittedly inaccurate. 
 
On August 22, 1991, the lessor terminated plaintiffs’ lease. As a result, plaintiffs ceased doing 
business. 
 
The original complaint in this case was filed a few days before the statute of limitations expired. 
At that time, because MSI, the owner of the business, was subject to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
proceeding and its trustee had elected not to pursue a legal malpractice claim against 
defendants, MSI was not made a party to the action. Nancy Snell was an original plaintiff. 
However, before trial, the trial court dismissed all of Snell's individual claims, concluding that 
there was no evidence to support a reasonable inference that Snell, the individual, as 
distinguished from the two wholly-owned corporations, had an attorney-client relationship with 
defendants. 
 
Nevertheless, the court allowed the complaint to be amended to add MSI as a plaintiff. It also 
concluded that, because the claims that Snell had attempted to state were substantially the 
same as the claims now asserted by MSI, the latter claims would relate back to the date that 
Snell filed the initial complaint. Hence, it held that MSI's claim was not time-barred. 
 
During the course of the later trial, the court submitted the claim of professional malpractice to 
the jury. It refused, however, to instruct upon any separate claim based upon an alleged 
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violation of fiduciary duty. The jury rejected the claim submitted to it, and the court entered 
judgment upon that verdict. 
 
MOA and MSI appeal from that judgment, asserting that the court erred in refusing to instruct 
the jurors with respect to their claim that defendants had violated certain fiduciary duties that 
defendants owed to them. We disagree. 
 
The court here instructed the jurors upon the alleged professional malpractice of defendants 
consistent with the standard instruction. In accordance with this instruction, the jurors were 
required to determine whether defendants acted in a reasonably prudent manner, as measured 
against the acts or omissions of a reasonably careful attorney under the same or similar 
circumstances. 
 
Plaintiffs tendered an instruction which set forth the elements of a claim based upon the 
violation of a fiduciary duty. In addition, they tendered an instruction describing the fiduciary 
duties that plaintiffs asserted defendants had violated. This instruction would have told the jurors 
that defendants owed the following duties to plaintiffs (none of the terms of which were further 
defined or described): 
 
A duty to their client to employ that degree of knowledge, skill and judgment ordinarily 
possessed by members of the legal profession in carrying out the services for their 
client. 
A duty to their client to act with due diligence in the affairs of their client. 
A duty to their client to provide accurate information to their client regarding the status of 
legal matters intrusted to them. 
A duty to their client of undivided loyalty and should exercise independent judgment on 
behalf of their client. 
A duty to their client to the highest degree of fairness and good faith. 
A duty to their client of full disclosure. 
 
The trial court, however, determined that the evidence would support no claim beyond one 
based upon defendants’ alleged negligence and lack of due diligence, the claim for which was 
adequately covered in the other elemental instruction. Hence, it refused to instruct the jurors as 
plaintiffs requested. We conclude that such refusal was proper. 
 
Plaintiffs assert that each of the duties described in their tendered instructions was violated 
because: (1) plaintiffs were not advised at the initial meeting as to the procedure pursuant to 
which the lease could be terminated or the effect of such termination upon the effectiveness of 
any later bankruptcy proceedings; (2) defendants failed adequately to investigate plaintiffs’ 
circumstances and failed to formulate a plan of action on their behalves from the initial meeting 
until plaintiffs contacted defendants again in August; and (3) on this latter date, the attorney who 
initially consulted with plaintiffs asserted that he was too busy with other matters to provide any 
further services and referred them to defendant Onsager. 
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All of these allegations, while serious, do not implicate defendants actions except in a 
negligence or malpractice context. There is no allegation or evidence that defendants’ acts or 
omissions, if any, resulted from an improper motive, a conflict of interest, or any other 
consideration beyond carelessness and lack of attention. 
 
Under such circumstances, other courts have concluded that a claim for breach of a fiduciary 
duty is duplicative of a claim for professional malpractice and that only the latter claim should be 
the subject of adjudication. As stated in Calhoun v. Rane: 
 
A fiduciary relationship exists as a matter of law between an attorney and his client. 
Thus, in effect any alleged malpractice by an attorney also evidences a simultaneous 
breach of trust; however, that does not mean every cause of action for professional 
negligence also sets forth a separate and independent cause of action for breach of 
fiduciary duty. In the present case, we find that the client has not pleaded a cause of 
action for breach of fiduciary duty distinct from the alleged malpractice case still pending 
in the trial court. A duplicative count may be properly dismissed. 
 
No Colorado appellate court has yet addressed this issue with respect to the alleged breach of a 
fiduciary duty resulting from a lawyer's malpractice. There have been several instances in which 
a trial court has allowed both types of claims to be passed upon by a jury. But, the question 
whether, under the particular factual circumstances, the claims were duplicative was not 
addressed. In Bailey v. Allstate Insurance Co., the issue presented was whether the damages 
awarded under each of the two claims were duplicative, not whether the claims themselves 
were separate. 
 
Nevertheless, previous Colorado decisions with respect to claims asserted against members of 
the medical profession are consistent with the analysis adopted by other courts as to claims 
asserted against lawyers. 
 
Further, each of the duties referred to in plaintiffs’ tendered instructions, insofar as the evidence 
would implicate any of them, is stated in absolute terms, i.e., duty “to provide accurate 
information.” Yet, where, as here, it is the attorney’s lack of due diligence and negligence that is 
the basis for the claim, the duty is not an absolute one. Rather, as the court properly instructed 
the jurors, the duty is to act with that care and diligence with which a reasonably careful attorney 
would act under the same or similar circumstances. 
 
We agree with plaintiffs that some duties owed by attorneys may be absolute. The duty of 
“undivided loyalty” may be one. However, contrary to plaintiffs’ assertions, here, the evidence 
does not implicate such a duty; the violations of duty alleged here were grounded upon the 
lawyers’ alleged negligence and lack of due diligence. 
 
We recognize that circumstances may exist in which a lawyer may be guilty both of malpractice 
and of other violations of his or her fiduciary obligations. If a claimed fiduciary violation is 
separate and independent from any alleged negligence, separate claims may well be properly 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 248	
asserted. This, however, is not such a case. And, the trial court properly recognized that it was 
not. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did Moguls of Aspen fail to state a claim for breach of the duty of loyalty? What 
additional allegations would have stated a claim for breach of the duty of loyalty? 
2. How does the duty of care differ from the duty of loyalty? Is it possible to negligently 
breach the duty of loyalty?  
 
Breach of the Duty of Loyalty 
 
David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tulley, 203 Cal. App. 3d 884 (Cal. App. 1988) 
 
Summary: David Welch Company was a collection agency. In 1972, Erksine & Tulley 
and Michael Carroll began providing legal representation to Welch. Among other things, 
they assisted Welch in collecting debts for employee-benefit trust funds from delinquent 
employers. In 1980, E&T and Welch ended their attorney-client relationship. Soon 
afterward, E&T began submitting proposals to collect debts for Welch’s clients, without 
Welch’s consent. Welch filed an action for breach of fiduciary duty and the trial court 
found for Welch. The appeals court affirmed, holding that E&T’s duty of loyalty to Welch 
required it to obtain informed consent before submitting proposals to Welch’s clients. 
 
CHANNELL, J. 
 
Following a court trial, defendants Erskine & Tulley (E&T) and Michael Carroll appeal from a 
judgment entered against them and in favor of David Welch Co. (Welch). The trial court held 
that E&T, a law corporation, and Attorney Carroll had breached their fiduciary duty towards 
Welch, their former client, and had received a benefit of $350,000, which defendants were 
deemed to hold in constructive trust for Welch. Defendants were ordered to disgorge that 
benefit to Welch. Welch cross-appeals from that portion of the judgment providing that its 
recovery shall be only from those defendants, and only in the amount of $350,000. 
 
This controversy arises from the fact that after E&T and Welch terminated their attorney-client 
relationship in December 1980, E&T gradually acquired the collection business activities 
formerly performed by Welch in behalf of several employee benefit trust funds. The basic issue 
in the trial court was whether, in doing so, the law firm or any of its attorneys breached a 
fiduciary duty towards their former client. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
Welch is a licensed collection agency which, over several years, developed a highly profitable 
specialty in collecting delinquent employer contributions owed to 35 or more employee-benefit 
trust funds. From 1972 to 1980, E&T acted as counsel for Welch, with Attorney Carroll doing 
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most of the work for them in the later years. Before undertaking the representation of Welch, 
neither E&T nor Carroll had experience in collection agency work for trust funds. 
 
The evidence was in conflict as to how defendants acquired their knowledge for conducting this 
type of collection activity. Defendants presented evidence indicating that, from a legal 
standpoint, it was like any other collection work, and that no specialized knowledge or expertise 
was required. Welch presented evidence that the E&T attorneys were specially trained by the 
owner, David Welch, on these matters; they were entrusted with complete access to information 
about Welch's confidential and profitable business techniques; and they were introduced by 
Welch as its attorneys to the trustees of the various trust funds. All of the information so 
provided was intended by Welch to be confidential. 
 
When collecting a debt, Welch had the trust fund assign legal title to it, with the trust fund 
retaining equitable title. If its own collection efforts proved unsuccessful, Welch had E&T file suit 
in Welch's name as assignee of the trust fund. Before turning a case over to its counsel, Welch 
would carry out its own collection efforts, investigate the financial status of the delinquent 
employer, and prepare a case file which included all of the background documents, suggestions 
for handling the matter, and a draft complaint ready for filing in court. 
 
Because collecting for trust funds was so profitable, David Welch organized his business in a 
manner designed to preserve the confidentiality of its procedures. He separated the trust fund 
activity from his other collection activities, used only his most trusted employees, physically 
located the activity on a separate floor of his office, and took other steps to minimize 
dissemination of information and to protect against someone within his firm from breaking away 
and starting a competitive business. 
 
In late 1979, the collection agency was sold, and Welch was taken over by Philip W. Coyle. In 
1980, Welch stopped referring collection matters to E&T. The parties thereafter agreed to 
terminate their relationship, effective after December 31, 1980. At approximately the same time, 
notices were sent by Coyle to Welch's trust fund clients indicating that Welch soon would be 
increasing its fees for those clients for the first time since 1968. 
 
In mid-1981, the Sheet Metal Workers Trust severed its relationship with Welch, and transferred 
its collection business to E&T. At the time, Welch viewed this as an isolated incident. During 
1982 and early 1983, several more trust funds did likewise. The evidence indicates that E&T did 
not solicit these particular clients, but instead responded to inquiries from each trust fund 
requesting a proposal. On the other hand, there was no evidence that E&T disclosed to Welch, 
its former client, that it was submitting these proposals, nor that E&T sought to secure Welch's 
consent to take over these accounts. In each instance, Welch learned it had lost its account 
from someone other than E&T, usually in the form of a letter from the trust fund announcing as a 
fait accompli that their business was being transferred to E&T. 
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By the time Welch filed its complaint against E&T in February 1983, the law firm had obtained 
the collection accounts of at least 10 of Welch's former trust fund clients, with annual billings 
approximating $156,715. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
 
Defendants' first set of contentions relates to whether substantial evidence supports the trial 
court's findings that they breached their fiduciary duty towards Welch. With respect to a cause 
of action alleging breach of a fiduciary duty, the existence of the duty is a question of law. “The 
relation between attorney and client is a fiduciary relation of the very highest character, and 
binds the attorney to most conscientious fidelity — uberrima fides.” 
 
There is no dispute that a fiduciary duty did exist in this case. The issue is whether defendants 
breached that duty towards Welch, which is a question of fact. As in other claims of lack of 
evidence, the question is “whether there is any substantial evidence contradicted or 
uncontradicted which will support the finding of fact.” 
 
Defendants’ initial contention concerning this issue is that the trial court erred in finding a breach 
of fiduciary duty based on alleged violations of rules 4-101 and 5-101 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. Before trial, defendants had successfully moved for summary judgment 
as to the first cause of action, which had alleged that a violation of the rules, as a matter of law, 
provided a basis for civil liability. Nevertheless, these rules, together with statutes and general 
principles relating to other fiduciary relationships, all help define the duty component of the 
fiduciary duty which the attorney owes to his or her client. 
 
In their argument, defendants cite rules 4-101 and 5-101 and then proceed to argue why their 
conduct neither fits within one of those rules nor otherwise constitutes a breach of a fiduciary 
duty. Defendants repeatedly suggest that the trial court concluded that their “mere acceptance 
of legal work from plaintiff's former clients” constituted such a breach. But more than that is 
required to establish a breach, and more than that was proven. 
 
For example, the trial court found that defendants “breached their fiduciary duty owed to plaintiff 
by accepting employment adverse to plaintiff without plaintiff's informed and written consent 
relating to a matter in reference to which defendants had obtained confidential information by 
reason of or in the course of their employment by plaintiff.” 
 
This finding was patterned after rule 4-101, a rule which on its face applies to former as well as 
present clients. The primary purpose of that rule is to protect the confidential relationship which 
exists between attorney and client. It has been said that an attorney may not “at any time use 
against his former client knowledge or information acquired by virtue of the previous 
relationship.” The actual use or misuse of confidential information is not determinative; it is the 
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possibility of the breach of confidence which controls. This duty to protect confidential 
information continues even after the formal relationship ends. 
 
Although neither party is able to cite a case involving a fact pattern analogous to this one, rule 
4-101 seems to apply literally to this case. The typical case falling within the rule arises in the 
context of legal representation of a client whose interests are adverse to another client or former 
client of the attorney. But "adverse" also connotes being “opposed to one's interest” or 
“unfavorable.” The acquisition by an attorney of business clientele of a former client operates to 
the economic advantage of the attorney and unfavorably upon the former client. Concerning 
access to confidential information, David Welch testified as to his company's efforts to maintain 
the confidentiality of this portion of Welch's business, including its fees schedules, its methods 
of operation, and other information. Nevertheless, all of this information was shared with 
defendants. Finally, defendants accepted the new employment without first notifying or in any 
way seeking the informed consent of Welch before submitting its proposals to the various trust 
funds. 
 
The trial court further found that “defendants breached their fiduciary duty owed to plaintiff by 
knowingly acquiring a pecuniary interest adverse to plaintiff without first obtaining plaintiff's 
informed written consent.” This finding highlights what we consider to be a critical factor in 
finding a breach of duty in this case, namely, the fact that defendants, who previously had been 
privy to Welch’s confidential information, in no way informed Welch that they were preparing 
proposals designed to undercut Welch's business relationships. 
 
We agree with defendants that the various trust funds were free to send their business to any 
entity they chose, as absent a contract to that effect, they were under no continuing duty to 
continue business with Welch. Similarly, any law firm, other than E&T, was free to make 
proposals at the request of those trust funds in an effort to obtain their business, as E&T did in 
this case. But, due to the preexisting attorney-client relationship during which defendants were 
in a position to and did obtain confidential information about Welch's business, these 
defendants had a higher duty, which was to refrain from acquiring any pecuniary interest 
involving collection work for these trust funds unless they first notified and obtained the informed 
consent of Welch to submit their business proposals. As they did not do so, the trial court 
properly found that they had breached their fiduciary duty towards Welch. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why was it a breach of the duty of loyalty for E&T to submit proposals to Welch’s clients 
without Welch’s consent? What if Welch unreasonably refused consent? 
2. Why did it matter that Welch allegedly shared confidential information with E&T? If 
Welch had not shared confidential information with E&T, would it still have been a 
breach of the duty of loyalty for E&T to submit proposals to Welch’s clients without 
Welch’s consent? 
3. When E&T provided collection services to Welch’s former clients, did it create an 
attorney-client relationship? Does it matter for the purpose of the duty of loyalty? 
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4. After the attorney-client relationship between E&T and Welch ended, could E&T 
compete with Welch for business without Welch’s consent? Are there circumstances 
where it could and circumstances where it couldn’t? 
 
Remedies for the Breach of the Duty of Loyalty 
 
Maxwell v. Gallagher, 709 A. 2d 100 (DC App. 1998) 
 
Summary: Gallagher & Co., Real Estate, Inc. was a closely-held corporation. In 1987, 
Maxwell & Bear provided legal advice to Gallagher and its owners in connection with the 
division of ownership shares in the corporation. In the transaction, 11 of the 100 shares 
in the corporation were transferred to Maxwell & Bear, which filed a declaratory 
judgment action to claim its shares. The corporation and its owners counterclaimed, 
seeking recission of the transfer for breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court found that the 
transaction created a conflict of interest that Maxwell & Bear did not resolve, causing a 
breach of the duty of loyalty, and ordered recission. The trial court found no actual 
damages, but awarded $75,000 in punitive damages to the plaintiffs. The appellate court 
affirmed the recission, but reversed the punitive damages award, because the trial court 
found no actual damages. 
 
FARRELL, Associate Judge: 
 
This appeal from a judgment and award of damages for breach of fiduciary duty requires us, 
inter alia, to consider once again the relationship between compensatory (or actual) and punitive 
damages. Because the trial judge as factfinder expressly found that the appellees (counter-
claimants) had not proven a basis for an award of actual damages, we hold that the judge's 
award of punitive damages was impermissible. We reverse that award but otherwise affirm the 
judgment. 
 
I. 
 
Plaintiff James S. Maxwell sought a declaratory judgment in Superior Court confirming the right 
of the law firm Maxwell & Bear to retain its ownership of eleven shares of stock in Gallagher & 
Co., Real Estate, Inc., of which Maxwell and Robert H. Bear had been directors and Maxwell an 
officer. The remaining owners of the corporation, Eugene J. Gallagher and Daniel J. O’Lone, as 
well as the corporation, answered and filed a counterclaim adding Bear as a counter-defendant. 
They sought rescission of the stock transfer to Maxwell & Bear primarily on grounds of breach of 
fiduciary duty by the firm in providing legal representation to the corporation and the other 
owners. Following a bench trial, Judge Mitchell—Rankin issued an exhaustive written order and 
opinion concluding that Maxwell and Bear each had furnished legal representation to the 
corporation and Messrs. Gallagher and O'Lone during the relevant times and had breached 
their resultant fiduciary duty by placing their personal interest in controlling the corporation 
ahead of the interests of the clients. The judge ordered rescission of the stock held by Maxwell 
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& Bear, awarded $1 in nominal damages to the appellees after finding no support for an award 
of actual damages, and ordered Maxwell and Bear to pay $75,000 in punitive damages. 
 
II. 
 
The trial judge found that Maxwell & Bear undertook to represent the corporation and its 
principals at meetings in December 1987 and January 1988 during which the division of 
ownership shares in the closely-held corporation was negotiated and agreed upon, resulting in 
the allocation of eleven of the one hundred shares to the law firm of Maxwell & Bear. The judge 
further found that Maxwell undertook the representation “under circumstances where the 
interest between the members including Maxwell & Bear and the corporate client were not 
compatible, and under circumstances where the law firm fostered and exploited the divergence.” 
In particular, the stock division, including “the equity interest solicited and obtained by the law 
firm was not consummated to facilitate the best interest of the corporation, but only to satisfy the 
demands of individual members and the law firm.” Moreover, from the beginning of the attorney-
client relationship, Maxwell had never disclosed to, or discussed with, the other principals the 
possible conflicts of interest that relationship entailed. By engaging in this course of “double 
dealing” designed to insure themselves effective control of the corporation, the judge found that 
Maxwell and Bear breached fundamental attorney-client obligations as reflected in multiple 
provisions of the District of Columbia Code of Professional Responsibility. 
 
On appeal, Maxwell and Bear primarily dispute the trial judge's finding that they undertook legal 
representation of the other principals in connection with the division of the stock. They concede 
that they represented Gallagher, O’Lone, and Pollard on other matters (indeed, they so 
stipulated at trial), but argue that when it came to the pivotal meetings at which the stock 
division was negotiated, all present knew that Maxwell and Bear “were there for their own 
business reasons.” 
 
Significant first is that Maxwell and Bear do not deny that they purported to represent the 
corporation with regard to the stock division. They contend that “there is no evidence to support 
any finding that the attorneys ever undertook any professional responsibility in connection with 
the issuance of the stock other than to the corporation.” Yet in that admitted capacity, they 
concede that they owed a fiduciary duty, and the trial judge expressly found that they had 
placed their private interest in securing control of the corporation above the interests of the 
corporate client. 
 
Moreover, there is ample record support for the judge's finding that the law firm purported to 
represent the other principals at the stock division meetings. Those meetings took place against 
the background of a course of dealing starting in 1984 during which Maxwell and Bear played 
the “dual/multiple roles” of business associates and legal counsel to Gallagher, including when 
jointly forming a predecessor company in 1986. As a later illustration, the judge found that 
Gallagher “sought and received legal advice from Mr. Maxwell as to the most appropriate time 
to resolve Mr. Pollard’s interest in the company,” an important issue because Pollard faced 
collateral legal (and potential criminal) liability at the time he joined the corporation. Indeed, the 
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December 18, 1997 meeting at which the stock division became the paramount subject was 
originally called by Maxwell, at Gallagher's request, to discuss a real estate commission dispute 
the company had had with another real estate firm, “a matter in which Maxwell & Bear served as 
legal counsel for Messrs. Gallagher, Pollard, and O’Lone.” According to testimony by O'Lone, 
Maxwell expressly justified the law firm's demanded percentage ownership as payment for the 
ongoing representation it was providing to and on behalf of the company and its principals. In 
short, we find no reason to disturb the finding of a legal relationship between Maxwell & Bear 
and the others extending through the stock division and beyond. 
 
Nor will we disturb the finding that appellants breached the duties imposed by that relationship 
by failing to disclose the business advantages they sought which “might affect the firm's legal 
judgment vis-a-vis Mr. Gallagher” and by acting repeatedly to effectuate their own interests at 
the expense of the other principals. 
 
The relation of attorney and client is one of the highest trust and confidence, and demands the 
utmost good faith on the part of the attorney. This relation is not only highly confidential, but 
presents so many opportunities for the reaping of special benefits at the expense of the client by 
an attorney so disposed, that courts will closely scrutinize any transaction in which the attorney 
has assumed a position antagonistic to his client. In thus “scrutinizing” the relationship at hand, 
the trial judge found ample reason, as do we, to conclude that 
 
the law firm acted in complete disregard of the interests of the corporate client and Mr. 
Gallagher. The law firm made no disclosures to any client, obtained no informed 
consents from any client, and sought by its disregard of its ethical and fiduciary duties to 
its corporate client to benefit itself. 
 
We therefore sustain the judge's rescission of the stock transfer "as the tangible product of the 
breaches of fiduciary duty." 
 
III. 
 
Although the trial judge ordered cancellation of the stock transfer, she also found “no record 
evidence of any meaningful evaluation of the stock” at the time it was divided. Nor did the 
appellees present at trial any evidence of the dollar value of the stock. This exemplified what the 
trial judge found to be a complete failure of the appellees to present proof of loss from the 
breach of duty for which compensatory damages could be awarded. Maxwell and Bear argue 
that, in the absence of such proof, it was error for the trial judge to award punitive damages. We 
are constrained to agree. Despite some uncertainty in our decisions over the years, the principle 
we derive from them is that, before punitive damages may be awarded, there must be a basis in 
the record for an award of actual damages, even if nominal. Since the trial judge expressly 
found no such basis in the record of this case, punitive damages will not lie. 
 
A. 
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In her original opinion, the judge denied the counterclaim “with respect to compensatory 
damages, in the absence of proof of the same,” but awarded $75,000 in punitive damages for 
the breach of fiduciary duty. The appellees then moved to amend the judgment “solely for the 
court to make an express finding that they are entitled to compensatory damages in at least a 
nominal amount.” The judge modified her order by awarding appellees “nominal damages in the 
amount of $1.00,” but she made explicit that this was not an award for actual damages because 
the appellees had shown no basis for such compensation. The judge distinguished between 
proof of “injury” and “evidence of any loss occasioned by” the injury. Referring to her original 
finding that “the harm caused to the corporation as a client and to Mr. Gallagher as a client by 
the law firm’s cavalier and self-interested approach to its ethical and fiduciary duties is amply 
demonstrated by the facts in this case,” she continued: 
 
Although this Court does agree there is ample justification for a finding of injury as 
provided in the original order, it does not concur with appellees that they are entitled to 
compensatory damages. The reason is simple: they have failed to produce evidence of 
any loss occasioned by Maxwell’s and Bear’s conduct for which they should be 
compensated. Having proven only breach of fiduciary duty, and hence injury, appellees 
are entitled only to a nominal damage award but are not equally entitled to a 
corresponding compensatory damage award. 
 
The judge thus awarded nominal damages of $1.00 as what she believed to be the required—
and sufficient—predicate for punitive damages to a “plaintiff whose legal right has been 
technically violated but has proved no real damage.” In a word, the breach of fiduciary duty 
without more supplied the basis for the punitive damage award. 
 
B. 
 
First of all, we reject the appellees’ assertion that the trial judge found actual damages but was 
merely unable to quantify them—the $1.00 in nominal damages being a proxy for that 
indeterminate but actual loss. The appellees alleged only economic damages, something not 
inherently impossible to quantify if they had been proven. More importantly, the judge took pains 
to state repeatedly that the appellees had “failed to produce evidence of any loss”— hence any 
compensable damage—resulting from the breach of fiduciary duty. We therefore must decide 
whether the award of punitive damages was permissible without proof that actual damages 
were warranted. 
 
We think the essence of our case law is this: A plaintiff must prove a basis for actual damages 
to justify the imposition of punitive damages. The amount of such damages may be nominal, 
stemming from the difficulty of quantifying them or from some other cause. But without proof of 
at least nominal actual damages, punitive damages may not be awarded. 
 
Our most recent statement of this rule was in Ayala v. Washington. There we said: 
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Under the law of the District of Columbia, although there must be a basis for 
compensatory damages before punitive damages will be considered, a plaintiff need not 
prove anything more than nominal actual damages to justify the imposition of punitive 
damages. 
 
In awarding punitive damages despite the absence of a basis for actual damages, the trial judge 
relied partly on the following passage from Brown v. Coates: 
 
Once it has been shown that one trained and experienced holds himself out to the public 
as worthy to be trusted for hire to perform services for others, and those so invited do 
place their trust and confidence, and that trust is intentionally and consciously 
disregarded, and exploited for unwarranted gain, community protection, as well as that 
of the victim, warrants the imposition of punitive damages. 
 
The cogency of this reasoning is indisputable but Brown does not bear upon the issue 
presented here of the necessity vel non of proof of actual damages before punitive damages 
may be awarded. We hold that, because the trial judge expressly found that appellees had 
proven no actual damages, punitive damages could not be awarded. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did the court find that Maxwell & Bear violated its duty of loyalty? How could 
Maxwell & Bear have avoided violating its duty of loyalty? 
2. Did Maxwell & Bear owe a duty of loyalty to the corporation or to the owners of 
the corporation? Could Maxwell & Bear represent all of the owners of the 
corporation? 
3. Why did the court find no actual damages? Was it right? 
 
Further Reading: 
 
● Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 659 (1990) 
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4.4: Current Client Conflicts of Interest 
 
I’ll never leave him down though I might mess around. It's only ‘cause I need some affection. So 
I creep, yeah, just creepin’ on. On the down low, ‘cept nobody is supposed to know. So I creep 
yeah, ‘cause he doesn't know what I do, and no attention goes to show.50 
 
Attorneys have fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, impartiality, and confidentiality to both the clients 
they intend to represent and the quasi-clients they do not. Sometimes, it is unclear whether a 
conflict of interest implicates the duty of care or the duty of loyalty. 
 
Typically, attorneys have more than one client at a time. Whenever they contemplate forming a 
new attorney-client relationship, they must determine whether it would create a conflict of 
interest with one of their existing clients. And they must always be attentive to the possibility that 
conflicts of interest will arise between different clients. 
 
In case a conflict of interest exists with respect to a new client, or arises with respect to an 
existing client, attorneys must obtain informed consent from all of their clients affected by the 
conflict, or withdraw from representation. 
 
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP v. Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc., 10 A.D.3d 267 (NY 
App. Div. 2004) 
 
Summary: Weil, Gotshal & Manges represented Fashion Boutique in an action against 
Fendi, but also represented Prada, which acquired Fendi. When Weil filed an action 
against Fashion Boutique for unpaid legal fees, Fashion Boutique counterclaimed 
against Weil for malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, because it failed to investigate 
or introduce relevant testimony. The trial court dismissed the malpractice claims, but not 
the fiduciary duty claims. The appellate court reversed, reinstating the malpractice claim 
and dismissing the fiduciary duty claim as redundant. 
 
This action for $2.7 million in unpaid legal fees arose out of the representation, commencing in 
1993, of counterclaim plaintiff Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc. and its principals by 
counterclaim defendant law firm and two of its partners. Fashion Boutique alleges that, while 
representing it against Fendi in an action in federal court, Prada, which had acquired a 
controlling interest in Fendi in October 1999, retained the law firm. The federal action was based 
on alleged disparaging remarks by Fendi, a competing Fifth Avenue boutique, and its parent 
Fendi, which led to the destruction of Fashion Boutique’s retail business, thereby violating the 
Lanham Act and New York State law prohibiting product disparagement. The law firm 
represented Fashion Boutique through extensive pretrial discovery, a summary judgment 
motion resulting in the dismissal of the Lanham Act claim and a July 2000 jury trial, which 
resulted in the award of $35,000 in compensatory damages and $75,000 in punitive damages in 
favor of Fashion Boutique. Earlier, in March 2000, the Fendi defendants had made a settlement 
																																																								
50 TLC, Creep, CrazySexyCool (1994). 
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offer of $1.4 million, which, although recommended by the law firm, was rejected by Fashion 
Boutique. The law firm was granted leave to withdraw in September 2000. In December 2002, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Lanham 
Act claim. 
 
The law firm thereafter commenced this action for unpaid legal fees; Fashion Boutique 
answered and asserted counterclaims for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, 
seeking $15,555,537 in damages, based on two principal allegations. It alleged that the two law 
firm partners “disregarded their fiduciary obligation and breached their duty of undivided loyalty 
to Fashion Boutique” by agreeing in late 1999 to represent Prada and thereby creating an 
“irresolvable conflict of interest.” It also alleges that, as a result of this conflict, the law firm did 
not use adequately the testimony of a witness, Caroline Clarke, a former Fendi officer, who, it is 
claimed, could supply “critical elements” of proof relevant to the dismissed Lanham Act claim. 
According to Fashion Boutique, Ms. Clarke, in an October 6, 1999 e-mail, told one of the 
defendant law firm partners that she could testify about hundreds of incidents in which Fendi 
employees made disparaging remarks about Fashion Boutique and that she knew of a 
“continued policy of disparagement” against Fashion Boutique. In a prior February 1994 
deposition, Ms. Clarke denied personal knowledge of any Fendi policy to disparage the quality 
of Fashion Boutique merchandise. Notwithstanding, Fashion Boutique claimed that the law firm 
failed to appreciate the significance of the “new evidence” contained in the e-mail and to use 
Ms. Clarke’s testimony more effectively to reinstate the Lanham Act claim and prove the 
remaining claims at trial. Fashion Boutique also alleged that the law firm failed to alert the trial 
judge to claimed threats against Ms. Clarke at the time of trial and that, because of its divided 
loyalty, in the face of these threats, the law firm, in effect, abandoned her as a witness; that after 
the dismissal of the Lanham Act claim, it improvidently advised Fashion Boutique to agree to a 
stipulated judgment and take an immediate appeal; and that it failed to conduct adequate cross-
examination of Fendi witnesses and to submit certain financial records to the jury on the punitive 
damages issue. 
 
The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaims, arguing that no conflict of interest exists since 
the product disparagement action is completely unrelated to the trademark enforcement issues 
in certain “gray goods” litigation in which the law firm was advising Prada. The law firm also 
argued that, even if a conflict of interest case had been properly pleaded, Fashion Boutique 
cannot establish the element of loss causation. The motion court granted the motion in part and 
denied it in part, dismissing the second counterclaim for legal malpractice but sustaining the first 
counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty. In so ruling, the motion court rejected the probative 
value of Clarke’s October 1999 e-mail, the focal point of Fashion Boutique’s counterclaims, 
finding, “Nothing in the E-mail would have altered the federal courts’ conclusion, upon which 
dismissal of the Lanham Act claim was based, that Fendi's actions did not constitute ‘advertising 
or promotion’ within the meaning of the Lanham Act.” Similarly, as to Fashion Boutique's 
common-law product disparagement claims, the motion court found that the documentary 
evidence “refutes Fashion Boutique’s contention that, but for the counterclaim-defendants’ 
failure to properly utilize Clarke as a witness, Fashion Boutique would have obtained a 
substantially greater award of damages on its claims under New York State law.” The court also 
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rejected the claim that “Clarke was unable to testify fully and freely at trial, because Fendi was 
subjecting her to an alleged campaign of threats and intimidation.” The court noted that the 
federal trial court examined Clarke at a hearing outside the jury’s presence to consider the effect 
of the purported threats on her testimony, at the conclusion of which the court concluded: “I 
have listened to a very distraught woman who has addressed subjects which are irrelevant to 
this lawsuit.” The motion court rejected each of the criticisms of the way in which the law firm 
conducted the trial, finding that they constitute “simply dissatisfaction with strategic choices.” 
Despite this finding, the court sustained the breach of fiduciary duty counterclaim, holding that 
even if the law firm may not have had an actual conflict of interest it might not have been 
“sensitive to forces that might operate upon it subtly in a manner likely to diminish the quality of 
its work.” The same documentary evidence that refuted legal malpractice, the court held, “does 
not utterly refute” the allegations that the law firm’s “failure to make better use of Clarke’s 
testimony, and delay in advising the federal trial court of the purported campaign of intimidation 
against Clarke until after she had already given her trial testimony, substantially contributed to 
the failure to achieve a better result in the Fendi action.” We reverse. 
 
Fashion Boutique’s theory of liability, common to both the legal malpractice and breach of 
fiduciary duty counterclaims, is that during the latter part of the law firm’s representation of 
Fashion it labored under a conflict of interest that was at such an extent that it compromised the 
law firm’s level of advocacy and contributed to a trial outcome less favorable than would 
otherwise have been achieved. In dismissing the legal malpractice counterclaim, the motion 
court reviewed a record consisting of 17 different exhibits, ranging from pleadings to transcripts 
of arguments to testimony, both at trial and in depositions, as well as an e-mail, on the basis of 
which it made factual findings in support of its decision. The testimonial portion of that 
submission, alone, ran to more than 700 pages. Such a review, culminating in factual findings, 
would be most unusual even if this motion had been converted, which it was not, to one for 
summary judgment. The law firm argued that the 500 pages of exhibits constituted documentary 
evidence. In opposing the motion, Fashion Boutique relied on the detailed factual allegations of 
its counterclaims and whether reasonable inferences could be drawn therefrom. A court is 
obliged to accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true, according to plaintiff the benefit of 
every possible favorable inference, and determining “only whether the facts as alleged fit within 
any cognizable legal theory. Dismissal is warranted only if the documentary evidence submitted 
conclusively establishes a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law.” The motion court 
clearly departed from this standard. Disregarding the allegations of the counterclaims and the 
possible inferences to be drawn therefrom, it reviewed evidence, including deposition and trial 
testimony and a three-page e-mail narrative, described by its author, Ms. Clarke, as an 
“overview” of the areas of interest as to which she could offer testimony, and made factual 
findings. In considering such evidence, the court went far beyond what the Legislature intended. 
The submissions here are of a type that “do not meet the requirement of conclusively 
establishing the defense as a matter of law.” For instance, the motion court disregarded the fact 
that Ms. Clarke’s e-mail was only an overview of her testimony and viewed it as the whole of her 
testimony. Nor did the court take into account the many ways Ms. Clarke indicated she could 
testify with personal knowledge about Fendi’s campaign of disparagement. On this record, we 
find that the legal malpractice counterclaim’s allegation that but for the law firm’s failure, due to 
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its debilitating conflict of interest, to make proper use of Ms. Clarke’s testimony, the Fashion 
Boutique case against Fendi would have had a more favorable result, was not conclusively 
controverted. Thus, the legal malpractice counterclaim should be reinstated. 
 
As to the claim for breach of fiduciary duty, we have consistently held that such a claim, 
premised on the same facts and seeking the identical relief sought in the legal malpractice 
cause of action, is redundant and should be dismissed. 
 
We take this occasion to note that the court erred in holding that the “but for” standard of 
causation, applicable to a legal malpractice claim, does not apply to the claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty. Instead, it applied the less rigorous “substantial factor” causative standard. We 
have never differentiated between the standard of causation requested for a claim of legal 
malpractice and one for breach of fiduciary duty in the context of attorney liability. The claims 
are coextensive. Under New York law, to establish the elements of proximate cause and actual 
damages, where the injury is the value of the claim lost, the client must meet the “case within a 
case” requirement, demonstrating that “but for” the attorney’s conduct the client would have 
prevailed in the underlying matter or would not have sustained any ascertainable damages. The 
cases relied upon by Fashion Boutique did not involve a former client’s breach of fiduciary claim 
against his attorneys, but rather a typical commercial dispute as to the fiduciary obligation owed 
by a lawyer to his former partners when departing to join another firm. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did Fashion Boutique think Weil committed malpractice? Why did Fashion Boutique 
think Weil breached its fiduciary duty? 
2. How did the trial court analyze those claims? Why did the appellate court reverse? 
3. What is the difference between a malpractice claim and a breach of fiduciary duty claim? 
Are they redundant? Which kind of claim did Fashion Boutique have, if either? 
 
Prospective Informed Consent 
 
Obtaining a client’s informed consent to a conflict of interest after it arises can be difficult. After 
all, it may not be in the client’s interest to consent to the conflict. Accordingly, many lawyers ask 
new clients to provide informed consent to conflicts that may arise in the course of 
representation. 
 
Should clients be able to provide informed consent to potential future conflicts? When should 
prospective consent be permitted? Are there circumstances in which it should not be permitted? 
How should courts determine whether prospective consent was sufficiently informed to be 
effective? 
 
Model Rule 1.7, Comment [22] 
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Whether a lawyer may properly request a client to waive conflicts that might arise in the 
future is subject to the test of paragraph (b). The effectiveness of such waivers is 
generally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably understands the 
material risks that the waiver entails. The more comprehensive the explanation of the 
types of future representations that might arise and the actual and reasonably 
foreseeable adverse consequences of those representations, the greater the likelihood 
that the client will have the requisite understanding. Thus, if the client agrees to consent 
to a particular type of conflict with which the client is already familiar, then the consent 
ordinarily will be effective with regard to that type of conflict. If the consent is general and 
open-ended, then the consent ordinarily will be ineffective, because it is not reasonably 
likely that the client will have understood the material risks involved. On the other hand, 
if the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is reasonably 
informed regarding the risk that a conflict may arise, such consent is more likely to be 
effective, particularly if, e.g., the client is independently represented by other counsel in 
giving consent and the consent is limited to future conflicts unrelated to the subject of the 
representation. In any case, advance consent cannot be effective if the circumstances 
that materialize in the future are such as would make the conflict nonconsentable under 
paragraph (b). 
 
Visa USA, Inc. v. First Data Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1100 (N.D. Ca. 2003) 
 
Summary: Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe represented Visa. First Data asked Heller 
to represent it in a patent infringement action, and Heller agreed, if First Data consented 
to Heller’s representation of Visa in any future disputes. Soon afterward, Visa sued First 
Data, represented by Heller. First Data filed a motion to disqualify Heller. The court 
denied the motion because First Data knowingly consented to the conflict and Heller 
protected First Data’s confidentiality. 
 
HAMILTON, District Judge. 
 
Plaintiff Visa sued defendant First Data in April 2002 for trademark infringement, dilution, and 
various breach of contract claims. First Data has contracted with Visa to process financial 
transactions on Visa’s behalf. First Data has recently launched a new business initiative, which 
will allow First Data to bypass Visa’s regulations on the processing of certain Visa-related 
transactions. Visa claims these private arrangements violate its contractual and trademark 
rights. 
 
Visa is represented in this matter by the law firm of Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe’s San 
Francisco office. In March 2001, before this lawsuit was filed, First Data was sued in an 
unrelated patent infringement action currently pending in the District of Delaware. First Data 
sought to retain Heller’s Silicon Valley office as counsel in the Delaware action. After running a 
conflicts check, Heller informed First Data that it had a long-standing relationship with Visa. 
While Heller did not see any conflicts between the two parties at that time, Heller could not 
represent First Data in the patent infringement case unless First Data agreed to permit Heller to 
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represent Visa in any future disputes, “including litigation,” that might arise between First Data 
and Visa. First Data consented to those terms, which were memorialized in an engagement 
letter between Heller and First Data. The relevant portion of the letter states: 
 
Our engagement by you is also understood as entailing your consent to our 
representation of our other present or future clients in “transactions,” including litigation 
in which we have not been engaged to represent you and in which you have other 
counsel, and in which one of our other clients would be adverse to you in matters 
unrelated to those that we are handling for you. In this regard, we discussed Heller’s 
past and on-going representation of Visa in matters which are not currently adverse to 
First Data. Moreover, as we discussed, we are not aware of any current adversity 
between Visa and First Data. Given the nature of our relationship with Visa, however, we 
discussed the need for the firm to preserve its ability to represent Visa on matters which 
may arise in the future including matters adverse to First Data, provided that we would 
only undertake such representation of Visa under circumstances in which we do not 
possess confidential information of yours relating to the transaction, and we would staff 
such a project with one or more attorneys who are not engaged in your representation. 
In such circumstances, the attorneys in the two matters would be subject to an ethical 
wall, screening them from communicating with each other regarding their respective 
engagements. We understand that you do consent to our representation of Visa and our 
other clients under those circumstances. 
 
After First Data agreed to the waiver, Visa also agreed to Heller's dual representation. 
 
A few months later, in July 2001, First Data publicly announced its intention to launch its new 
private arrangement plan, and in the beginning of 2002, First Data officially notified Visa. Visa 
then sued First Data. First Data in response threatened antitrust counterclaims against Visa, 
and then began settlement discussions. Almost four months after the complaint was filed, and 
shortly after settlement talks broke down, First Data informed Visa in August 2002 that it 
intended to move to disqualify Heller as counsel for Visa in this matter. 
 
First Data claims that when it signed the waiver letter, it was not adequately informed of the 
possibility that its patent counsel could sue it for millions of dollars in damages and raise claims 
disparaging First Data and attacking the very core of its business. First Data contends that 
under the California Rules of Professional Conduct, Heller at a minimum was required to 
reaffirm First Data's prospective consent when the actual conflict between Visa and First Data 
arose. First Data has also indicated that it believes that Heller's patent lawyers have access to 
confidential information from First Data that Visa could use against First Data in this action. 
 
Heller and Visa argue that First Data was fully informed about the situation and agreed to allow 
Heller to represent Visa in future litigation against First Data. Heller and Visa argue that the 
California Rules of Professional Conduct and other ethical rules expressly permit prospective 
written consent to a conflict waiver, and that no rules require Heller to obtain a second consent 
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to continue in their representation of Visa. Heller also indicates that it has put an ethical wall in 
place that adequately protects First Data's confidential information. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A. Motion to Disqualify Counsel—Legal Standards 
 
The Northern District of California has adopted the California Rules of Professional Conduct, 
and attorneys practicing in this court are required to adhere to those standards, as articulated in 
the rules and any court decisions interpreting them. The right to disqualify counsel is within the 
discretion of the trial court as an exercise of its inherent powers. 
 
Motions to disqualify counsel are strongly disfavored. Thus, such requests “should be subjected 
to particularly strict judicial scrutiny.” 
 
In reviewing a motion to disqualify counsel, the district court must make “a reasoned judgment 
and comply with the legal principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue.” 
The district court is permitted to resolve disputed factual issues in deciding a motion for 
disqualification and must make findings supported by substantial evidence. 
 
B. Simultaneous Representation of Adverse Clients and Written Waivers 
 
1. Conflict Waiver Letters 
 
First Data claims that Heller has violated Cal. Rule of Prof. Conduct 3-310(C)(3), which states: 
 
A member of the California State Bar shall not, without the informed written consent of 
each client: 
 
(3) represent a client in a matter and at the same time in a separate matter accept as a 
client a person or entity whose interest in the first matter is adverse to the client in the 
first matter. 
 
First Data argues that this rule automatically disqualifies Heller from representing both Visa and 
First Data, even though First Data’s patent litigation is unrelated to this action. 
 
When evaluating whether a law firm may concurrently represent two clients, even on unrelated 
matters, it is presumed that the duty of loyalty has been breached and counsel is automatically 
disqualified. But, as Visa and Heller note, the presumption may be rebutted and a law firm may 
nonetheless simultaneously represent two adverse clients if full disclosure of the situation is 
made to both clients and both agree in writing to waive the conflict. Here, it is undisputed that 
Heller and First Data executed a conflict waiver letter. Thus, Heller is not automatically 
disqualified from representing both Visa and First Data. 
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2. Prospective Waivers 
 
First Data next argues that Heller’s use of a prospective waiver, which purported to waive all 
future conflicts between Visa and First Data, was improper without, at minimum, a second 
disclosure and waiver once the situation between Visa and First Data ripened into an actual 
conflict. Visa and Heller argue that the prospective waiver signed by First Data was proper and 
fully informed, and thus no second waiver was required. 
 
An advance waiver of potential future conflicts, such as the one executed by First Data and 
Heller, is permitted under California law, even if the waiver does not specifically state the exact 
nature of the future conflict. The only inquiry that need be made is whether the waiver was fully 
informed. In some circumstances, a second waiver will be warranted, but only if the attorney 
believes that the first waiver was insufficiently informed. There is no case law requiring a second 
disclosure in all circumstances for an advance waiver to be valid. 
 
3. Fully Informed Waiver 
 
A second waiver by First Data in a nonrelated litigation would only be required if the waiver 
letter insufficiently disclosed the nature of the conflict that subsequently arose between Visa and 
First Data. Thus, to prevail on this motion, First Data must show that it was not fully informed 
about the consequences of its conflicts waiver when it signed the waiver letter. To show full 
disclosure, Heller must demonstrate that it “communicated information reasonably sufficient to 
permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.” 
 
An evaluation of whether full disclosure was made and the client made an informed waiver “is 
obviously a fact-specific inquiry.” Factors that may be examined include the breadth of the 
waiver, the temporal scope of the waiver (whether it waived a current conflict or whether it was 
intended to waive all conflicts in the future), the quality of the conflicts discussion between the 
attorney and the client, the specificity of the waiver, the nature of the actual conflict (whether the 
attorney sought to represent both clients in the same dispute or in unrelated disputes), the 
sophistication of the client, and the interests of justice. In evaluating all these factors, there is 
substantial evidence showing that Heller made a full and reasonable disclosure to First Data 
and First Data knowingly waived any conflicts concerning Heller's ongoing representation of 
Visa. 
 
a. Heller Fully Disclosed the Conflict to First Data. 
 
Most significantly, the waiver letter itself demonstrates that Heller fully explained to First Data 
the nature of the conflict waiver at issue. When First Data first approached Heller to represent it 
in the patent litigation, Heller explained to First Data that, even though there were no present 
conflicts between Visa and First Data, there was a significant risk of future adversity because 
Visa and First Data were major competitors in the processing side of the credit card business. 
Heller thus informed First Data that it would not be able to take the matter unless First Data 
would waive any conflicts that might arise out of Heller's ongoing work for Visa in matters up to 
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and including possible future litigation. This understanding was confirmed in the written waiver 
letter. 
 
Our engagement by you is also understood as entailing your consent to our 
representation of our other present or future clients in “transactions,” including litigation 
in which we have not been engaged to represent you and in which you have other 
counsel, and in which one of our other clients would be adverse to you in matters 
unrelated to those that we are handling for you. In this regard, we discussed Heller’s 
past and on-going representation of Visa U.S.A. and Visa International in matters which 
are not currently adverse to First Data. Moreover, as we discussed, we are not aware of 
any current adversity between Visa and First Data. Given the nature of our relationship 
with Visa, however, we discussed the need for the firm to preserve its ability to represent 
Visa on matters which may arise in the future including matters adverse to First Data, 
provided that we would only undertake such representation of Visa under circumstances 
in which we do not possess confidential information of yours relating to the transaction. 
 
The letter identifies the adverse client, Visa, and discloses as fully as possible the nature of any 
potential conflict that could arise between the two parties. The letter also clearly states that the 
waiver contemplates Heller’s representation of Visa against First Data in matters “including 
litigation.” First Data was given ample information concerning the conflict in question that it was 
asked to waive, reviewed this information, and then agreed to the waiver. First Data has failed 
to demonstrate that it was not fully and reasonably informed when it signed the waiver letter. 
 
The cases where law firms have been disqualified for insufficient disclosures involve situations 
much more egregious than the facts presented here. For instance, in Image, Kodak successfully 
disqualified Coudert Brothers, Image’s attorneys, from representing Image in that action 
because Coudert had also represented Kodak in unrelated corporate matters. Kodak produced 
evidence that Coudert had deliberately misrepresented the scope of their representation of 
Image to Kodak by downplaying their actual conflict. Specifically, Coudert failed to mention to 
Kodak’s business people that they would be arguing against Kodak before the U.S. Supreme 
Court in a landmark antitrust case that had been litigated for six years. They also failed to 
disclose any of this information to Kodak’s in-house counsel, and failed to obtain a written 
consent. After weighing these factors, the court determined that this could not constitute full 
disclosure and ordered Coudert disqualified. 
 
Here, in contrast, Heller notified First Data’s director of intellectual property and division general 
counsel of the potential for a future conflict, fully discussed the nature of that conflict, and 
informed First Data that Heller would be unable to represent First Data unless the conflict was 
waived. The facts and law do not support a finding that First Data was not given sufficient 
information to understand the scope of its waiver. 
 
b. Knowing Consent 
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There is also substantial evidence in the record that First Data was aware of this potential 
conflict with Visa and Heller when it signed the waiver letter, and thus First Data knowingly 
waived that conflict in order to have Heller to represent it in the patent litigation. First Data in its 
Answer stated that it had been contemplating its new private arrangement initiative and had 
given preliminary notice to Visa about it “as early as 1999.” In 2000, First Data had also 
indicated that Visa’s business plans concerning private arrangements raised antitrust concerns 
for the payment-card industry in amicus papers and motions to intervene in the Department of 
Justice antitrust litigation against Visa. 
 
First Data does not deny that it first began contemplating this arrangement in 1999 or that it 
foresaw antitrust concerns in 2000 over Visa’s position on private arrangements. Instead, First 
Data argues that it did not realize that Heller would represent Visa in those matters and had 
assumed that Heller would, at most, represent Visa against First Data on incidental matters 
such as implementation and enforcement of payment processor rules. First Data admits that it is 
“unlikely” that such matters would result in litigation with Visa. 
 
This is not credible. Heller informed First Data that it represented Visa in large-scale commercial 
litigation, and that due to the nature of the potential conflicts between the two parties, Heller 
would not be able to represent First Data at all without a broad prospective waiver. First Data 
had also submitted briefs in high-profile antitrust litigation in which Heller was representing Visa, 
and where First Data had threatened Visa with further antitrust claims. First Data knew that 
Heller was Visa's counsel on major matters that could potentially involve First Data. Given this 
information, First Data could not have believed that Heller would be uninvolved in any major 
litigation that could potentially arise between Visa and First Data, or that Visa would have 
restricted itself to hiring Heller solely for relatively minor regulatory disputes between the two 
parties. 
 
First Data contended on reply and at the hearing that even if it did know in 2001 when it signed 
the waiver letter that Visa and First Data could potentially be involved in high-stakes litigation 
over First Data’s private arrangement initiative, First Data had no duty to recognize that conflict 
on its own. First Data argues that it was instead Visa and Heller’s duty to inform First Data of 
these risks, citing State Farm. In State Farm, though, the law firm in question had made no 
disclosure to the junior client, and then argued that because the two clients were aware of the 
conflict when the junior client hired the law firm, they had implicitly consented to a conflict 
waiver. The court found that the attorneys were still required to disclose the conflict and obtain 
explicit consent from the clients in that circumstance. State Farm requires only that the 
attorneys disclose conflicts to clients. Here, those requirements were met when Heller disclosed 
the existence of the potential Visa conflict before forming an attorney-client relationship with 
First Data and obtained a written conflict waiver agreement. No case law allows First Data to 
ignore its own additional knowledge concerning the nature of the potential conflict when 
deciding whether to waive. 
 
c. First Data is a Sophisticated User of Legal Services 
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In determining whether First Data gave informed consent in the waiver letter, the court may also 
properly consider First Data’s level of experience with legal services. 
 
First Data is a Fortune 500 company with over $6 billion in annual revenues. It is a 
knowledgeable and sophisticated user of legal services. It has a legal department of about fifty 
attorneys and routinely hires top-tier national law firms such as Bingham McCutchen, Heller, 
and Sidley Austin to handle its complex corporate transactions and litigation matters. First Data 
can and should be expected to understand the full extent of what it waived when it signed 
Heller’s explicit waiver letter. 
 
C. Ethical Walls 
 
It is undisputed that Heller immediately put an intra-firm ethical wall in place when Visa sued 
First Data, which barred contact between the Heller attorneys representing First Data and the 
Heller attorneys representing Visa. First Data argues that the institution of an ethical wall is 
insufficient to repair Heller’s breach of its duty of loyalty, and that Heller has breached its duty of 
confidentiality to First Data by its dual representation of Visa and First Data. 
 
Heller conceded at oral argument that if it had breached its duty of loyalty to First Data through 
its dual representation of Visa and First Data, an ethical wall would not be sufficient to cure the 
breach. But Heller did not breach its duty of loyalty to First Data by agreeing to represent Visa in 
this matter after receiving a valid prospective conflict waiver from First Data. Heller thus is not 
claiming that the ethical wall is necessary to protect Heller’s duty of loyalty to First Data. 
 
Rather, Heller instituted the ethical wall to protect Heller’s duty of confidentiality to its client First 
Data. First Data states that it has shared information concerning its finances and its general 
business plan to its patent lawyers, and argues that such information is presumed imputed to all 
Heller attorneys. Heller can rebut that presumption by “showing that effective screening 
procedures were implemented to prevent the passing of information between the tainted 
lawyers and other members of the firm.” Because First Data makes no showing in its papers 
beyond the presumption of shared confidentiality in support of its allegations, and because 
Heller has demonstrated that it immediately put an ethical wall in place as soon as Heller was 
retained as Visa’s counsel in this action, there has been no breach of the duty of confidentiality 
here. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did First Data think that Heller had a conflict of interest? Why did the court 
disagree? 
2. Should a client be able to consent to being sued by their attorney? 
3. How did Heller avoid creating a conflict of interest? How did the duty of loyalty and the 
duty of confidentiality create different problems? 
 
Conflicts of Law 
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When courts decide whether a conflict of interest exists and how to evaluate it, they must also 
decide what law to apply. For state courts, the choice of law question is relatively easy. They 
must apply the state law governing lawyers, although they may refer to federal law and general 
principles in interpreting the state law. 
 
But for federal courts, the choice of law question is more complicated. They are necessarily 
reviewing the actions of attorneys who are members of a state bar and subject to state rules. 
But they also have their own bar and may consider national rules and principles. 
 
Accordingly, federal courts must decide whether to apply state or national law in determining 
whether a conflict of interest exists, and how to evaluate any conflicts of interest they find. 
 
In re Dresser Industries, Inc., 972 F. 2d 540 (5th Cir. 1992) 
 
Summary: Susman Godfrey represented Dresser Industries in several actions, but also 
represented the plaintiffs in the Drill Bits class action, and informed Dresser of a 
potential conflict. Dresser declined to seek new counsel, but moved to disqualify 
Susman Godfrey when it became a defendant in Drill Bits. The district court denied the 
motion, based on Texas law, but the circuit court reversed, based on the Model Rules. 
 
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this petition for a writ of mandamus, we determine whether a law firm may sue its own client, 
which it concurrently represents in other matters. In a word, no; and most certainly not here, 
where the motivation appears only to be the law firm’s self-interest.51 We therefore grant the 
writ, directing the district judge to disqualify counsel. 
 
I 
 
The material facts are undisputed. This petition arises from a consolidated class action antitrust 
suit brought against manufacturers of oil well drill bits. 
 
Dresser Industries, Inc., is now a defendant in Drill Bits, charged — by its own lawyers — with 
conspiring to fix the prices of drill bits and with fraudulently concealing its conduct. Stephen D. 
Susman, with his firm, Susman Godfrey, is lead counsel for the plaintiff’s committee. As lead 
counsel, Susman signed the amended complaint that levied these charges against Dresser, his 
firm’s own client. 
 
Susman Godfrey concurrently represents Dresser in two pending lawsuits. CPS International, 
Inc. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., is the third suit brought by CPS International, a company that 
																																																								
51 “Bits was going to be a case that was going to be active, big, protracted, the first price fixing case that's 
come along in Houston in a long time. I had made somewhat of a reputation in that area, and I guess it's 
kind of painful not to be able to play in the game anymore.” Deposition of Stephen D. Susman. 
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claims Dresser forced it out of the compressor market in Saudi Arabia. CPS International initially 
sued Dresser for antitrust violations and tortious interference with a contract. The antitrust claim 
has been dismissed, but the tort claim is scheduled for trial. Susman Godfrey has represented 
Dresser throughout these actions, which commenced in 1985. During its defense of Dresser, 
Susman Godfrey lawyers have had relatively unfettered access to data concerning Dresser’s 
management, organization, finances, and accounting practices. Susman Godfrey’s lawyers 
have engaged in privileged communications with Dresser’s in-house counsel and officers in 
choosing antitrust defenses and other litigation strategies. Susman Godfrey has also, since 
1990, represented Dresser in Cullen Center, Inc. v. W.R. Gray Co., a case involving asbestos in 
a Dresser building, which is now set for trial in Texas state court. 
 
On October 24 and November 24, 1991, Susman Godfrey lawyers wrote Dresser informing it 
that Stephen Susman chaired the plaintiffs’ committee in Drill Bits, that Dresser might be made 
a Drill Bits defendant, and that, if Dresser replaced Susman Godfrey, the firm would assist in the 
transition to new counsel. Dresser chose not to dismiss Susman Godfrey in CPS and Cullen 
Center. 
 
Dresser was joined as a defendant in Drill Bits on December 2, 1991. Dresser moved to 
disqualify Susman as plaintiffs’ counsel on December 13. Both Dresser and Susman Godfrey 
submitted affidavits and depositions to the district court, which, after a hearing, issued a detailed 
opinion denying the motion. 
 
The district court noted that Southern District local rule 4B provides that the code of professional 
responsibility for lawyers practicing in that district is the Code of Responsibility of the State Bar 
of Texas. Although the court further noted that other district courts look to other codes in 
deciding motions to disqualify, nevertheless, it concluded that “Dresser's motion to disqualify 
Susman Godfrey is governed wholly by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.” 
The court then focused on Texas Disciplinary Rule 1.06, which provides: 
 
(b) Except to the extent permitted in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a person 
if the representation of that person: 
(1) involves a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are 
materially and directly adverse to the interests of another client of the lawyer or 
the lawyer’s firm; or 
(2) reasonably appears to be or become adversely limited by the lawyer's or law 
firm’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person or by the lawyer's or 
law firm's own interests. 
(c) A lawyer may represent a client in the circumstances described in (b) if: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation of each client will not be 
materially affected; and 
(2) each affected or potentially affected client consents to such representation 
after full disclosure. 
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The district court described the Drill Bits complaint as a civil antitrust case, thus somewhat 
softening Dresser’s description of it as an action for fraud or criminal conduct. The court held, 
“as a matter of law, that there exists no relationship, legal or factual, between the Cullen Center 
case and the Drill Bits litigation,” and that no similarity between Drill Bits and the CPS suits was 
material. The court concluded that “Godfrey's representation of the plaintiffs in the Drill Bits 
litigation does not reasonably appear to be or become adversely limited by Susman Godfrey’s 
responsibilities to Dresser in the CPS and Cullen Center cases,” and accordingly denied the 
motion to disqualify. Finally, the court denied permissive interlocutory appeal. 
 
II 
 
In evaluating a motion to disqualify, we interpret the controlling ethical norms governing 
professional conduct as we would any other source of law. When the facts are undisputed, 
district courts enjoy no particular advantage over appellate courts in formulating ethical rules to 
govern motions to disqualify. Thus, in the event an appropriate standard for disqualification is 
based on a state's disciplinary rules, a court of appeals should consider the district court's 
interpretation of the state disciplinary rules as an interpretation of law, subject essentially to de 
novo consideration. 
 
III 
 
The district court clearly erred in holding that its local rules, and thus the Texas rules, which it 
adopted, are the “sole” authority governing a motion to disqualify. Motions to disqualify are 
substantive motions affecting the rights of the parties and are determined by applying standards 
developed under federal law. 
 
The district court's authority to promulgate local rules is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 2071, which 
allows the courts only to adopt “rules for the conduct of their business.” Thus, although the 
district court should determine rules for the conduct of attorneys for the purpose of identifying 
conduct subject to sanctions, its local rules alone cannot regulate the parties’ rights to counsel 
of their choice. 
 
IV 
 
We apply specific tests to motions to disqualify counsel in circumstances governed by statute or 
the Constitution. When presented with a motion to disqualify counsel in a more generic civil 
case, however, we consider the motion governed by the ethical rules announced by the national 
profession in the light of the public interest and the litigants’ rights. Our source for the standards 
of the profession has been the canons of ethics developed by the American Bar Association. 
We have applied particularly the requirement of canon 5 that a lawyer exercise “independent 
professional judgment on behalf of the client” and the admonition of canon 9 that lawyers should 
“avoid even the appearance of impropriety.” 
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Our most far-reaching application of the national standards of attorney conduct to an attorney’s 
obligation to avoid conflicts of interest is Woods v. Covington County Bank. We held in Woods 
that standards such as the ABA canons are useful guides but are not controlling in adjudicating 
such motions. The considerations we relied upon in Woods were whether a conflict has (1) the 
appearance of impropriety in general, or (2) a possibility that a specific impropriety will occur, 
and (3) the likelihood of public suspicion from the impropriety outweighs any social interests 
which will be served by the lawyer's continued participation in the case. 
 
We applied the Woods standard to a conflict that arose when an attorney brought a suit against 
a former client in Brennan's Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurant, Inc. In Brennan’s, the plaintiffs moved 
to have the court disqualify the attorney for the defendants because, prior to the litigation, the 
attorney had jointly represented both parties. We affirmed the disqualification of the attorney, 
holding that an attorney could not sue a former client in a matter substantially related to the 
representation of a former client. Similarly, in Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp. v. Armco 
Steel Corp., we held that the court should bar an attorney from suing the co-defendant of a 
former client if the co-defendants and their attorneys exchanged information. 
 
In Woods, Wilson Abraham, and Brennan’s, we applied national norms of attorney conduct to a 
conflict arising after the attorney's prior representation had been concluded. Now, however, we 
are confronted with our first case arising out of concurrent representation, in which the attorney 
sues a client whom he represents on another pending matter. We thus consider the problem of 
concurrent representation under our framework in Woods as tailored to apply to the facts arising 
from concurrent representation. 
 
We turn, then, to the current national standards of legal ethics to first consider whether this dual 
representation amounts to impropriety. Neither the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
nor the Code of Professional Responsibility allows an attorney to bring a suit against a client 
without its consent. This position is also taken by the American Law Institute in its drafts of the 
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers. 
 
Unquestionably, the national standards of attorney conduct forbid a lawyer from bringing a suit 
against a current client without the consent of both clients. Susman’s conduct violates all of 
these standards — unless excused or justified under exceptional circumstances not present 
here. 
 
Exceptional circumstances may sometimes mean that what is ordinarily a clear impropriety will 
not, always and inevitably, determine a conflicts case. Within the framework we announced in 
Woods, Susman, for example, might have been able to continue his dual representation if he 
could have shown some social interest to be served by his representation that would outweigh 
the public perception of his impropriety.52 Susman, however, can present no such reason. There 
																																																								
52 We found above that the Texas rules of discipline do not control a motion to disqualify in federal court. 
We are mindful, however, that the Texas rules’ allowance of some concurrent representation is based, in 
part, on a concern that concurrent representation may be necessary either to prevent a large company, 
such as Dresser, from monopolizing the lawyers of an area or to assure that certain classes of unpopular 
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is no suggestion that other lawyers could not ably perform his offices for the plaintiffs, nor is 
there any basis for a suggestion of any societal or professional interest to be served. This fact 
suggests a rule of thumb for use in future motions for disqualification based on concurrent 
representation: However a lawyer's motives may be clothed, if the sole reason for suing his own 
client is the lawyer's self-interest, disqualification should be granted. 
 
V 
 
We find, therefore, that Dresser's right to the grant of its motion to disqualify counsel is clear 
and indisputable. We further find that the district court clearly and indisputably abused its 
discretion in failing to grant the motion. We have thus granted the petition and have issued the 
writ of mandamus, directing the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas to 
enter an order disqualifying Stephen D. Susman and Susman Godfrey from continuing as 
counsel to the plaintiffs. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did the circuit court think a conflict of interest existed? Why did the court think 
Dresser did not or could not provide consent? 
2. Should the court have applied the Texas rule or the model rule? 
	  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
clients receive representation. Although we do not now reach the matter, our consideration of social 
benefit to offset the appearance of impropriety might allow such a representation if the balance clearly 
and unequivocally favored allowing such representation to further the ends of justice. 
We believe, moreover, that the Texas rules are drawn to allow concurrent representation as the exception 
and not the rule. Even if the Texas rules had applied, no special circumstances being present here, Texas 
rule 1.06’s prohibition of representation of potentially adverse interests would have barred the 
representation. 
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4.5: Former Client Conflicts of Interest 
 
It's harder to be friends than lovers, and you shouldn't try to mix the two. ‘Cause if you do it and 
you’re still unhappy, then you know that the problem is you.53 
 
Attorneys have fiduciary duties not only to their current clients, but also to their former clients. 
While some of an attorney’s fiduciary duties apply only to current clients, other duties survive 
the attorney-client relationship. For example, the duty of care typically applies only to current 
clients, although an attorney may also have a duty of care not to negligently harm the interests 
of former clients. The duty of loyalty applies primarily to current clients, but also applies to 
former clients in certain circumstances. And the duty of confidentiality applies with equal force to 
both current and former clients. 
 
Rule 1.9: Duties to Former Clients 
 
a. A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent 
another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's 
interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former 
client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
b. A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related 
matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously 
represented a client 
1. whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and 
2. about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 
1.9(c) that is material to the matter;  unless the former client gives informed 
consent, confirmed in writing. 
c. A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former 
firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: 
1. use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former 
client except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client, or 
when the information has become generally known; or 
2. reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules would 
permit or require with respect to a client. 
 
Rule 1.9 Duties To Former Clients, Comment [2] 
 
The scope of a “matter” for purposes of this Rule depends on the facts of a particular situation 
or transaction. The lawyer’s involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree. When a 
lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other 
clients with materially adverse interests in that transaction clearly is prohibited. On the other 
hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded 
from later representing another client in a factually distinct problem of that type even though the 
																																																								
53 Liz Phair, Divorce Song, Exile in Guyville (1993). 
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subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations 
can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions 
within the same military jurisdictions. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so 
involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing 
of sides in the matter in question. 
 
Rule 1.9 Duties To Former Clients, Comment [3] 
 
Matters are “substantially related” for purposes of this Rule if they involve the same transaction 
or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential factual information as 
would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the 
client's position in the subsequent matter. For example, a lawyer who has represented a 
businessperson and learned extensive private financial information about that person may not 
then represent that person’s spouse in seeking a divorce. Similarly, a lawyer who has previously 
represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping center would be 
precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis 
of environmental considerations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of 
substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shopping center in resisting 
eviction for nonpayment of rent. Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other 
parties adverse to the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying. Information acquired in a 
prior representation may have been rendered obsolete by the passage of time, a circumstance 
that may be relevant in determining whether two representations are substantially related. In the 
case of an organizational client, general knowledge of the client’s policies and practices 
ordinarily will not preclude a subsequent representation; on the other hand, knowledge of 
specific facts gained in a prior representation that are relevant to the matter in question 
ordinarily will preclude such a representation. A former client is not required to reveal the 
confidential information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the 
lawyer has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about the 
possession of such information may be based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided 
the former client and information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer 
providing such services. 
 
Wilson P. Abraham Const. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F. 2d 250 (5th Cir. 1977) 
 
Summary: Stephen D. Susman represented Whitlow Steel in a Texas federal antitrust 
conspiracy action. Armco, Ceco, and Laclede were Whitlow’s co-defendants in that 
action, and were also the defendants in a Louisiana federal antitrust conspiracy action. 
Ultimately, they pleaded to all of the charges. William E. Wright filed a civil action against 
Whitlow, Armco, Ceco, and Laclede in Texas, on behalf of Wilson P. Abraham 
Construction. And then Wright filed an action against Armco, Ceco, and Laclede in 
Louisiana, and hired Susman as co-counsel. Defendant’s in the Louisiana action filed a 
motion to disqualify Susman because he represented Whitlow in the antitrust conspiracy 
action. The district court denied the motion, and the circuit court vacated and remanded 
for the district court to determine whether Susman received confidential information. 
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This is an appeal from an order of the district court denying the defendants’ motion to disqualify 
counsel for plaintiff. Though the appeal is not from a final judgment in the traditional sense, we 
take jurisdiction of it as a collateral matter severable from the underlying suit, and too important 
to be denied review at this time. 
 
This dispute centers around exactly what relationship cocounsel for the plaintiff, a Mr. Stephen 
D. Susman, had with the various defendants in this suit in a prior legal matter. The factual 
background which leads up to this current dispute is somewhat detailed and complicated. It 
begins in 1972 when Mr. Susman was associated with the firm of Fulbright and Jaworski in 
Houston, Texas. At that time, he undertook to represent Whitlow Steel Company, Inc., an 
independent rebar fabricator in Houston. This representation was in connection with a Federal 
Grand Jury investigation of the rebar steel industry in Texas. In August 1973, charges of 
antitrust violations were levied against Whitlow, Armco Steel Corp., The Ceco Corp., and 
Laclede Steel Company. Armco, Ceco, and Laclede are the defendants in the present action 
before this court. As counsel for Whitlow, Mr. Susman met on more than one occasion with the 
representatives of Armco, Ceco, and Laclede. At these meetings some efforts allegedly were 
made to develop a cooperative defense. Exactly what information was exchanged, and the 
importance of that information, is hotly disputed. Mr. Susman contends that the meetings were 
disorganized and nothing of substance was ever discussed. The defendants contend that 
documents were in fact discussed and disseminated, grand jury witness lists were prepared, 
and reports were given as to exactly what testimony was being presented before the grand jury 
by the various witnesses. The gist of the defendants’ argument is that Mr. Susman was privy to 
a substantial amount of confidential information. Mr. Susman flatly denies this. 
 
At the same time of the grand jury investigation of the Texas steel industry, a separate grand 
jury investigation of the Louisiana steel industry was underway. In April 1974, four mills 
(including Armco, Ceco, and Laclede), an independent fabricator, and five individuals were 
indicted for “bid rigging.” All defendants except one pled nolo contendere to the Louisiana 
indictment. After Armco, Ceco, and Laclede were sentenced in Louisiana, they filed motions to 
dismiss the Texas indictment. They argued that because of the close relationship of the Texas 
case to the Louisiana case, the double jeopardy clause prevented further prosecution. The 
Texas district court refused to rule on the defendants’ motion at that time saying that the motion 
presented such a close factual question that it could not be ruled on until the court heard all the 
evidence at trial. This ruling prompted the defendants to enter pleas in order to avoid trial. 
 
The final fact which needs to be brought out to fully understand the controversy before this 
Court is that some time after the Texas grand jury investigation, a civil suit was filed in Texas 
against Whitlow and the defendants in this suit. The counsel for the plaintiff in that suit was a 
Mr. William E. Wright. That civil suit is still pending, but at the time it was filed Mr. Susman was 
still counsel for Whitlow. Mr. Susman, however, denies that anything of substance was done in 
connection with the defense of that case where he represented Whitlow. 
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We are now in a position to set forth exactly what the present controversy involves. The plaintiff 
in the present suit, Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corporation, has filed a civil suit in 
Louisiana based primarily upon some facts which led to the Louisiana indictments. Counsel for 
the plaintiff in this suit is William E. Wright, the same person who had been counsel for another 
party in the Texas civil suit in which Mr. Susman represented Whitlow Steel Company. The 
defendants allege that the complaint in this case is virtually identical to the Texas complaint in 
which they were also party defendants. In any event, Mr. Wright has sought to engage Mr. 
Susman as co-counsel in this case. The defendants are challenging this alleging basically that 
Mr. Susman has a conflict of interest because of his previous relationship with them when he 
represented Whitlow Steel Company. 
 
The law in this Circuit is fairly straightforward. This Court has recently reaffirmed with regards to 
attorney disqualification that a former client seeking to disqualify an attorney who appears on 
behalf of his adversary, need only to show that the matters embraced within the pending suit are 
substantially related to the matters or cause of action wherein the attorney previously 
represented him. This rule rests upon the presumption that confidences potentially damaging to 
the client have been disclosed to the attorney during the former period of representation. The 
Court may not even inquire as to whether such disclosures were in fact made or whether the 
attorney in fact is likely to use the damaging disclosures to the detriment of his former client. 
The inquiry is limited solely to whether the matters of the present suit are substantially related to 
matters of the prior representation, and this is because this Court recognizes that in order to aid 
the frank exchange between attorney and client, it is necessary to preclude even a possibility 
that information given in confidence by a former client will ever be used without that client's 
consent. The law in this Circuit is, of course, little more than a reinforcement of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules, promulgated by the 
American Bar Association and adopted by the Supreme Court of Louisiana effective July 1, 
1970. 
 
The case before us, however, presents somewhat of a twist to the usual attorney-client 
controversy. It is not a former client of Mr. Susman who seeks to disqualify him, but rather co-
defendants of a former client. The defendants here contend that in a case alleging conspiracy, 
such as the case at bar, the defendants have a right to consult together about the case, and that 
all information derived by any of the counsel from such consultation is necessarily privileged. 
The defendants persuasively argue that in a joint defense of a conspiracy charge, the counsel of 
each defendant is, in effect, the counsel of all for the purposes of invoking the attorney-client 
privilege in order to shield mutually shared confidences. We agree, and hold that when 
information is exchanged between various co-defendants and their attorneys that this exchange 
is not made for the purpose of allowing unlimited publication and use, but rather, the exchange 
is made for the limited purpose of assisting in their common cause. In such a situation, an 
attorney who is the recipient of such information breaches his fiduciary duty if he later, in his 
representation of another client, is able to use this information to the detriment of one of the co-
defendants. Just as an attorney would not be allowed to proceed against his former client in a 
cause of action substantially related to the matters in which he previously represented that 
client, an attorney should also not be allowed to proceed against a co-defendant of a former 
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client wherein the subject matter of the present controversy is substantially related to the 
matters in which the attorney was previously involved, and wherein confidential exchanges of 
information took place between the various co-defendants in preparation of a joint defense. 
 
Having stated the bare facts of this rather complicated dispute, and having set forth the law, we 
unfortunately are unable to presently resolve the controversy. Exactly what information was 
exchanged between Mr. Susman when he represented Whitlow Steel Company and worked 
with counsel for the various defendants is greatly contested. Here there is no presumption that 
confidential information was exchanged as there was no direct attorney-client relationship. Mr. 
Susman should not be disqualified unless the trial court should determine that Mr. Susman was 
actually privy to confidential information. The parties also have a completely different version as 
to the similarity of the Texas grand jury investigation and the Louisiana investigation, and 
whether or not these investigations are substantially related to the present case. 
 
Under these circumstances it is impossible for us to resolve this matter without some specific 
factual findings by the trial judge as to the content of the information which was exchanged and 
whether or not the present controversy is substantially related to the prior one. Nowhere in our 
search of the record were we able to find any findings made by the trial judge before he denied 
the defendants’ motion to disqualify Mr. Susman. Consequently, we set aside the district court 
order denying the defendants’ motion for disqualification and remand for the entry of formal 
findings of fact and conclusions of law dealing with these issues. 
 
Doe v. A Corporation, 709 F. 2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1983) 
 
Summary: Attorney John Doe was in-house counsel to A Corporation. Among other 
things, Doe advised A on its employee benefits. In 1980, Doe quit and filed an ERISA 
class action against A, alleging multiple claims, and seeking to represent a class of 
plaintiffs with similar claims. A filed a motion to dismiss Doe’s action, and Doe withdrew 
as class counsel. The district court granted summary judgment to A, because Doe had 
received confidential information about A. The circuit court held that Doe could not 
represent the class or serve as class representative, because it would violate his duty of 
confidentiality to A. But it held that Doe could pursue his own claim against A. 
 
ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge: 
 
A lawyer employed as house counsel for a corporation rendered legal advice concerning 
employee benefits to the corporation and to the administrators of its benefit plan. After he 
resigned from employment with the corporation, he sued for benefits allegedly due him under 
the corporation's pension and life insurance plans. He also sought to represent a class of other 
employees allegedly entitled to those benefits. We affirm the district court’s judgment holding 
that he is barred by his ethical obligations as a lawyer from prosecuting such litigation as the 
class representative of other employees. However, we hold that he may prosecute an action in 
his own behalf and reverse that part of the judgment dismissing his personal claims. 
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I. 
 
The plaintiff, who is identified as John Doe,54 was employed in the legal department of A 
Corporation from 1975 to 1980. In his professional capacity as a lawyer, he consulted with and 
advised both A Corporation and the administrators of its Benefit Plan concerning legal questions 
about employee benefits, including those arising in the course of the administration of the 
Benefit Plan and those involving A Corporation’s group life insurance policy and other benefits. 
He made daily decisions concerning the rights of individual employees and the acceptability of 
their beneficiary designations, gave the plan administrators legal advice, and worked with other 
lawyers in drafting plan provisions. These duties continued until Doe was transferred to A 
Corporation’s litigation section in April 1979. He resigned in March 1980. 
 
Eleven months later Doe filed suit against A Corporation and X Insurance Company, asserting a 
claim arising under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as well as pendent 
claims arising under state law. Doe alleged that X Insurance Company had issued a group 
policy insuring the lives of A Corporation's employees. He alleged that premiums were paid on a 
contributory basis, partly by A Corporation and partly by its employees. As a result of its 
favorable experience, Doe claimed, X Insurance Company had paid dividends to A Corporation, 
which A Corporation retained without disclosing their receipt to its employees or to “the 
appropriate federal and state agencies.” Doe also contended that he was improperly denied 
conversion of his policy to a “comparable term life” policy upon termination of his employment 
and was offered only the right to convert to whole life insurance. Doe conceded that, as part of 
his legal duties for A Corporation, he had advised the corporation whether it had a duty to 
disclose its receipt of dividends to plan participants. 
 
In a separate suit against A Corporation and its Benefit Plan, Doe contended that his pension 
benefits should have been vested when he resigned. This claim was based on a provision in the 
plan, required by ERISA, vesting plan benefits in an employee who has been employed for five 
years. Doe had completed four years and 1600 hours of employment and argued that this was 
legally sufficient for vesting under the plan and the applicable federal statute. 
 
Doe signed the pleadings in each suit as co-counsel. In each he sought, in addition to 
prosecuting his own claim, to appear as representative of a class of employees having like 
claims. In each he sought broad relief for the members of the class, including equitable relief 
and damages, a “special award” for himself of one-third of any recovery, and an attorney's fee 
for himself and his co-counsel based on a percentage of the class recovery. 
 
																																																								
54 To prevent identification of the company and the possible disclosure of confidential information 
concerning its affairs, the district court granted the defendant corporation's motion to seal the record; 
require the suit to be prosecuted without revealing the name of either the lawyer or the corporation; and 
enjoin Doe and his co-counsel from pursuing any actions arising out of the facts on which his suits were 
based, communicating with other persons to induce them to bring a similar action, and disclosing or using 
any information Doe gained during his employment by the corporation. 
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A Corporation filed a motion to dismiss, to enjoin Doe and his co-counsel from prosecuting the 
suit, and to seal the record on the ground that Doe was barred from initiating a lawsuit because 
its prosecution would result in his violating the attorney-client privilege and in his disclosing 
confidential information. Benefit Plan, represented by the same counsel as A Corporation, 
joined in the motion. Doe withdrew as co-counsel for the class but continued to assert his right 
to appear both as an individual plaintiff and as a representative of the plaintiff class. 
 
The district court treated the motion as one for summary judgment. It granted the motion, 
holding that Doe was disqualified to sue either A Corporation or Benefit Plan because they were 
his former clients. Relying on an irrebuttable presumption that the substantial relationship 
between Doe’s duties for A Corporation and the issues in the suit would lead Doe to use his 
former clients’ confidential information to their detriment in prosecuting the action, the court 
dismissed both suits with prejudice to Doe but without prejudice to a suit by any present or 
future employee of A Corporation. 
 
A client is usually entitled to counsel of his choice. But the lawyer may be forbidden by ethical 
strictures to accept tendered employment. Because Doe has now withdrawn as counsel, we 
must go beyond the question whether he would be barred from acting as a lawyer for others 
whose interests conflict with those of his former client and consider how those ethical standards 
constrain his conduct in representing others as class representative, albeit not lawyer, and in 
asserting his own claims. 
 
II. 
 
The attorney-client privilege is evidentiary. A client may invoke it to prevent his lawyer from 
revealing communications made in confidence to the lawyer while acting in the capacity of 
professional legal adviser for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. However, during the course 
of representing a client, a lawyer may receive information that is not shielded by the privilege 
but is considered confidential by the client. He may, for example, receive information from some 
source other than the client or information imparted for a purpose other than obtaining legal 
advice. 
 
Some of the information Doe acquired about A Corporation’s affairs was protected by the 
attorney-client privilege. However, he apparently gained other information that was not 
privileged. For example, he apparently saw letters and other documents that originated with X 
Insurance Company and received and answered questions from other A Corporation employees 
about their rights. 
 
The Code of Professional Responsibility seeks to safeguard both the attorney-client privilege 
and other confidential information by restricting a lawyer's ability to accept employment that 
would threaten disclosure of either. Canon 4 deals directly with the matter: “A Lawyer Should 
Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client.” But other principles are also applicable, for 
Canon 9 states, “A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety.” 
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These provisions protect not only against disclosure of privileged communications but also 
against the revelation of confidential information that is not privileged. 
 
Ethical Consideration 4-4 states: “The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical 
obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client. This ethical precept, 
unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source of information or 
the fact that others share the knowledge.” The ethical duty extends to shielding the 
confidentiality of all information acquired in the course of representing a client, preventing the 
use of any such knowledge to the client's disadvantage. “The use of the word ‘information’ in 
these Ethical Considerations as opposed to ‘confidence’ or ‘secret’ is particularly revealing of 
the drafters’ intent to protect all knowledge acquired from a client without regard to whether 
someone else may be privy to it.” 
 
Adherence to Canon 4 requires that a lawyer be disqualified from representing a party to 
litigation if the adversary party can show that matters in the pending suit are substantially 
related to matters in which the attorney previously represented the adversary. A substantial 
relationship between issues in a lawsuit and a lawyer's earlier work for an adversary may also 
serve as the basis for disqualification under Canon 9. 
 
If a lawyer seeks to act adversely to his former client in a matter that might involve disclosure of 
information acquired during the prior employment, the former client need not prove that the 
lawyer has used or is likely to use such information in order to disqualify the lawyer representing 
the party suing him. There is a conclusive and irrebuttable presumption that permitting the 
lawyer who has switched loyalties to represent the adversary of a former client in substantially 
related litigation will lead to disclosure and misuse of confidential information obtained during 
the previous representation. 
 
The applicability of Canon 9 turns on whether the moving party has shown that there is a 
reasonable possibility of the occurrence of some specifically identifiable improper conduct and 
whether the likelihood of public suspicion outweighs the social interest in the lawyer’s continued 
participation in the case. 
 
If Doe were still attempting to represent the class as its lawyer, he would have a patent conflict 
of interest. 
 
It must be remembered that the attorney in such situations as this does not have the 
shelter enjoyed by a defendant whose adversary must meet a burden of proof. Where 
conflict of interest or abuse of professional confidence is asserted, the right of an 
attorney freely to practice his profession must, in the public interest, give way in cases of 
doubt. 
 
The standard of ethical conduct not only disqualifies Doe from representing a class as lawyer 
but also bars him from disclosing information he received from A Corporation to some other 
lawyer. A lawyer is not merely a panderer who is to do for a client anything that the client would 
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like to do himself had he but the lawyer’s knowledge. As a member of a profession that enjoys 
the exclusive license to engage in the practice of law, he is required to deny requests that would 
violate the ethical tenets of his profession even at the sacrifice of self-interest. 
 
The responsibilities of a class representative are not identical to those of the lawyer for the 
class. The class representative need not be a member of the bar and is not subject to the 
profession’s ethical constraints. But a representative owes duties to the class that require him to 
exert the utmost diligence on behalf of all of its members. To allow Doe to act as class 
representative would create a tension between his obligation as representative to do all he can 
to vindicate the rights of the class members and his personal ethical duty to protect A 
Corporation’s secrets. A lawyer may not, simply by assuming a new identity, escape the 
strictures that would govern his conduct were he representing the class as counsel. Doe 
contends that he must be permitted to represent the class because he has yet another identity 
as a fiduciary for Benefit Plan and his fellow employees of A Corporation. Although the attorney-
client privilege may be inapplicable when either the lawyer or the client stands in a fiduciary 
relationship to the party seeking disclosure, Doe simply was not such a fiduciary. He was a 
lawyer for and representative of A’s corporate interest. 
 
If there are meritorious causes of action against A Corporation, someone other than Doe can 
and must file the suit as class representative just as someone other than he must act as class 
counsel. Obviously, Doe may not divulge information that would enable another to volunteer as 
class representative. If no other class member ever learns of the claim, it may go forever 
unvindicated. The lawyer’s duty to his client creates the possibility that his silence will permit 
valid claims to lie unasserted. 
 
III. 
 
The assertion of ethical barriers to Doe’s attempt to vindicate his personal claims creates a 
conflict with another fundamental policy: the availability of a legal forum for the adjudication of 
rights. The Supreme Court has recognized that, in some circumstances, access to courts is 
protected by the due process clause. While the principle does not give any broad “right” of 
access to federal court, the courtroom door should not lightly be barred to a person who has a 
tenable legal claim. 
 
The conflict between protection of the client’s need for confidentiality and the lawyer’s 
opportunity to assert claims against that client cannot be resolved on the basis that one enjoys 
universal primacy over the other. The Code makes confidentiality the general principle but 
recognizes exceptions to the prohibition against divulging even a client's secrets. Thus, a lawyer 
may reveal confidential information and secrets when it is necessary for him to do so to prevent 
the client from committing a crime, to collect a fee, or to defend himself against an accusation of 
wrongful conduct. The rationale for the last of these exceptions is: “It would be a manifest 
injustice to allow the client to take advantage of the rule of exclusion as to professional 
confidence to the prejudice of his attorney, or that it should be carried to the extent of depriving 
the attorney of the means of obtaining or defending his own rights.” 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 282	
 
In none of the cases relied upon by A Corporation has a lawyer been prohibited from asserting a 
personal cause of action. In Richardson v. Hamilton International Corp., the plaintiff was an 
attorney who held stock in the defendant corporation. He had represented the corporation in his 
private practice before filing the lawsuit. He filed a shareholder’s derivative action as a class 
action. The court disqualified him from appearing as a lawyer in the action and prohibited him 
from maintaining the suit while recognizing that another shareholder could maintain the action. 
Because a derivative suit is brought on behalf of the corporation, not the suing individual, the 
lawyer was not seeking to assert a cause of action to vindicate his personal rights. 
 
Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. contains language arguably to the contrary. 
The court affirmed a district court decision “to the extent that the orders appealed from prohibit 
the attorney from acting as a party or as an attorney for a party.” Yet the court had earlier in its 
opinion stated: “The attorney never sought to ‘prosecute litigation,’ either as a party or as 
counsel for a plaintiff party.” 
 
The distinction between what is forbidden to the lawyer appearing as an attorney-at-law and 
what is permitted an individual who is a lawyer but asserts only his personal rights was drawn in 
Hull v. Celanese. The court affirmed the disqualification of a law firm seeking to represent a 
potential intervenor in a sex discrimination suit. The intervenor was herself a lawyer and an 
employee of the defendant; she had worked on the defense of the sex discrimination suit in 
which she sought to intervene. The court made clear that: “This decision should not be read to 
imply that the lawyer cannot pursue her claim of employment discrimination based on sex.” 
 
In an attempt to demonstrate that Doe has been guilty of unethical conduct that should be 
added to the balance against him, A Corporation has brought to our attention material of record 
indicating impropriety. Before filing suit, Doe threatened A Corporation with litigation on behalf of 
a purported class if it did not meet demands that included the payment to him of a “contingent 
attorney fee” of 10% of a fund he described as “millions of dollars.” From his actions thereafter, 
something other than a disinterested effort to vindicate the rights of a group of wronged 
employees might be inferred. When he filed suit, he did not seek only redress for his own claims 
and for those members of the classes he wished to represent: in the suit involving the group 
insurance, he demanded payment to himself, personally, of a “special award” of one-third of the 
“class” recovery, which he asserted to be in the “millions,” as well as treble damages, and he 
sought “at least $300,000” as personal recompense in the suit against the Benefit Plan. In 
addition, he signed the complaints as co-counsel, and sought to be awarded an attorneys’ fee in 
both actions, the fee in the group insurance suit to be based on a “percentage” of the “class” 
recovery. If, indeed, it develops after the facts are fully explored that Doe attempted either to 
blackmail or to mulct the corporation, we do not condone that conduct. If he has violated the 
Code of Professional Responsibility, disciplinary charges should be brought against him. The 
district court did not, however, dismiss Doe’s personal claim because of his misconduct. The 
district judge granted summary judgment on the basis that Doe’s prior representation of A 
Corporation was a per se bar. A lawyer, however, does not forfeit his rights simply because to 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 283	
prove them he must utilize confidential information. Nor does the client gain the right to cheat 
the lawyer by imparting confidences to him. 
 
The sole interest A Corporation can assert, other than defeating Doe's claim, is preservation of 
confidentiality for the secrets Doe learned while in its employment. The corporation’s interest in 
confidentiality, however, can be at least partially protected by anonymity. There is no social 
interest in allowing the corporation to conceal wrongdoing, if in fact any has occurred. Nor is 
there any social interest in allowing it to deny Doe pension rights or insurance benefits if they 
are legally due him. But that would be the effect of our refusing to allow Doe to prosecute his 
individual lawsuit. 
 
IV. 
 
Doe, in turn, seeks to disqualify counsel for the defendants on the basis that they represent both 
A Corporation and the Benefit Plan, whose interests are allegedly conflicting. He relies on 
Disciplinary Rule 5-105(B), which provides: “A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if 
the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to 
be adversely affected by his representation of another client, or if it would be likely to involve 
him in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).” 
 
Counsel representing both A Corporation and Benefit Plan assert that they have made a full 
disclosure to their respective clients and that both have consented to the joint representation, 
waiving any possible claim of conflict of interest which may arise. A potential or even real 
conflict of interest may, of course, be waived, even in criminal cases. At the moment, A 
Corporation and Benefit Plan share an important common interest in seeking to prevent misuse 
of their confidences by their former lawyer and employee. While their interests may at some 
time diverge, it is for them, once fully informed, to determine whether their lawyer can be faithful 
to both of their interests. 
 
Accordingly, we AFFIRM as much of the judgment as dismisses the class action claims in both 
suits without prejudice, places the case records under seal, and enjoins Doe and co-counsel 
from communicating with other persons to induce them to file suit and from disclosing any 
confidential information Doe gained during his employment by A Corporation. We REVERSE 
the judgment insofar as it dismisses Doe’s personal claim with prejudice and REMAND for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each party shall bear its own costs. 
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Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s Restaurants, Inc., 590 F. 2d 168 (5th Cir. 1979) 
 
Summary: The Brennan family owned Brennan’s, Inc. in New Orleans and Brennan’s 
Restaurants, Inc., which operated other restaurants. Edward F. Wegmann was general 
counsel for all of the family businesses, and helped them register trademarks. After a 
dispute, the family divided the enterprise, but did not determine rights to the trademarks. 
Brennan’s Restaurants filed a trademark infringement action against Brennan’s, which 
hired Wegmann to represent it. Wegmann hired Arnold Sprung, a trademark specialist, 
as co-counsel. Brennan’s Restaurants filed a motion to disqualify Wegmann and Sprung, 
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which the district court grant. The circuit court affirmed the disqualification of Wegmann, 
based on the appearance of impropriety, but vacated and remanded the disqualification 
of Sprung, to determine whether he actually learned any confidential information from 
Wegmann. 
 
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is an action for trademark infringement and unfair competition. This appeal, however, 
concerns the disqualification of attorneys. The district court barred the appellants’ attorneys 
from further representing them on grounds of conflict of interest. The correctness of this order is 
the only issue before us. 
 
I 
 
The underlying dispute in this case arises out of the business affairs of the Brennan family of 
New Orleans, Louisiana, who have been in the restaurant business for many years. All of the 
corporate parties are owned and closely held by various members of the Brennan family. 
Appellee Brennan’s, Inc., the plaintiff below, owns and operates Brennan’s restaurant at 417 
Royal Street in New Orleans. The corporate appellants own and operate other restaurants in 
Louisiana, Texas, and Georgia. There has been no trial as yet, but a review of the facts leading 
to the present suit, as disclosed by the pleadings and affidavits, is necessary to a decision of 
this appeal. For convenience, the parties will be referred to in the capacities in which they 
appear in the court below. 
 
Prior to 1974, all the members of the Brennan family were stockholders and directors of plaintiff, 
and some of them were stockholders and directors of the corporate defendants. All the 
corporations were independent legal entities in the sense that none held any of the stock of 
another, but they were all owned by members of the Brennan family and had interlocking boards 
of directors. In 1971, Edward F. Wegmann became general counsel for the family businesses, 
and his retainer was paid pro rata by all the corporations. He continued this joint representation 
until November 1973. 
 
As part of his services, Mr. Wegmann, in close cooperation with trademark counsel in 
Washington, D.C., prosecuted applications for the federal registration of three service marks: 
“Brennan’s,” “Breakfast at Brennan’s,” and a distinctive rooster design. A registration for the 
rooster design was issued in February 1972, but the applications for the other two marks were 
initially denied on the ground that they were primarily a surname. On the advice of Washington 
trademark counsel, Mr. Wegmann collected data supporting a demonstration that the marks had 
acquired a secondary meaning, and the applications were amended to include this material. 
Registrations were subsequently issued in plaintiff's name in March 1973. These registered 
service marks are the subject of this lawsuit. 
 
Later in 1973 a dispute developed within the Brennan family over the operation and 
management of the family businesses. This dispute was resolved in November 1974 by dividing 
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the corporations’ stock between the two opposing family groups. Plaintiff became 100% owned 
by one group and the corporate defendants became 100% owned by the second group, 
composed of the individual defendants. Mr. Wegmann elected to continue to represent 
defendants and severed his connections with plaintiff and its shareholders. 
 
At no time during the negotiations which culminated in the November 1974 settlement was there 
any discussion of who would have the right to use the registered service marks. Both sides 
claimed ownership of the marks and continued to use them after the settlement. Attempts to 
negotiate a license or concurrent registration were unsuccessful. Plaintiff filed this suit for 
trademark infringement and unfair competition on May 21, 1976. In their answer and 
counterclaim defendants alleged that the marks were registered in plaintiff’s name for 
convenience only, and, “in truth and actuality, the applications were filed and the registrations 
issued for the benefit and ownership of all of the Brennan family restaurants, including the 
corporate defendants.” Defendants also alleged that the marks and registrations are invalid. 
 
Upon the filing of this suit, Mr. Wegmann, on behalf of the defendants, retained the services of 
Arnold Sprung, a New York patent and trademark attorney, to assist him in the defense of the 
case. On October 22, 1976, plaintiff moved for the disqualification of both attorneys: Mr. 
Wegmann on the ground that his present representation was at odds with the interests of 
plaintiff, his former client, and Mr. Sprung by imputation of Mr. Wegmann’s conflict. After a 
hearing, the district court granted the motion. It found that the subject matter of the present suit 
is substantially related to matters in which Mr. Wegmann formerly represented plaintiff, and to 
allow him now to represent an interest adverse to his former client creates the appearance of 
impropriety. It also found that “the close working relationship which has been shown to exist 
between Mr. Wegmann and Mr. Sprung creates a significant likelihood that Mr. Sprung would 
have had access to or been informed of confidential disclosures made to Mr. Wegmann by his 
former client.” 
 
II 
 
We first consider the disqualification of Mr. Wegmann. 
 
Defendants argue that the district court failed to consider that in his prior representation of 
plaintiff, Mr. Wegmann also represented defendants. This fact of joint representation is crucial, 
they assert, since no confidences can arise as between joint clients. Hence, the argument goes, 
Mr. Wegmann violates no ethical duty in his present representation. 
 
We have not addressed this precise question before. In Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp. 
v. Armco Steel Corp., we reaffirmed the standard that “a former client seeking to disqualify an 
attorney who appears on behalf of his adversary, need only to show that the matters embraced 
within the pending suit are substantially related to the matters or cause of action wherein the 
attorney previously represented him,” but we acknowledged that “this rule rests upon the 
presumption that confidences potentially damaging to the client have been disclosed to the 
attorney during the former period of representation.” Defendants contend that this presumption 
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cannot apply in this case. This argument, in our view, interprets too narrowly an attorney’s duty 
to “preserve the confidences and secrets of a client.” The fundamental flaw in defendants’ 
position is a confusion of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege with the ethical duty to 
preserve a client’s confidences. Assuming the prior representation was joint, defendants are 
quite correct that neither of the parties to this suit can assert the attorney-client privilege against 
the other as to matters comprehended by that joint representation. But the ethical duty is 
broader than the evidentiary privilege: “This ethical precept, unlike the evidentiary privilege, 
exists without regard to the nature or source of information or the fact that others share the 
knowledge.” “A lawyer should not use information acquired in the course of the representation of 
a client to the disadvantage of the client.” The use of the word “information” in these Ethical 
Considerations as opposed to “confidence” or “secret” is particularly revealing of the drafters’ 
intent to protect all knowledge acquired from a client, since the latter two are defined terms. 
Information so acquired is sheltered from use by the attorney against his client by virtue of the 
existence of the attorney-client relationship. This is true without regard to whether someone else 
may be privy to it. The obligation of an attorney not to misuse information acquired in the course 
of representation serves to vindicate the trust and reliance that clients place in their attorneys. A 
client would feel wronged if an opponent prevailed against him with the aid of an attorney who 
formerly represented the client in the same matter. As the court recognized in E.F. Hutton & Co. 
v. Brown, this would undermine public confidence in the legal system as a means for 
adjudicating disputes. We recognize that this concern implicates the principle embodied in 
Canon 9 that attorneys “should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.” We 
have said that under this canon there must be a showing of a reasonable possibility that some 
specifically identifiable impropriety in fact occurred and that the likelihood of public suspicion 
must be weighed against the interest in retaining counsel of one’s choice. The conflict of interest 
is readily apparent here, however, and we think that the balance weighs in favor of 
disqualification. The need to safeguard the attorney-client relationship is not diminished by the 
fact that the prior representation was joint with the attorney’s present client. Since the district 
court's findings of prior representation and substantial relationship are not disputed, we affirm 
the disqualification of Mr. Wegmann. 
 
III 
 
Whether Mr. Sprung should be disqualified presents a more difficult case. He has never had an 
attorney-client relationship with plaintiff; the district court disqualified him by imputation of Mr. 
Wegmann's conflict. Up to this point we have accepted, for the sake of argument, defendants’ 
assertion that they were formerly joint clients with plaintiff of Mr. Wegmann. There is no dispute 
that plaintiff and defendants were previously represented by Mr. Wegmann simultaneously, but 
plaintiff maintains that, at least with respect to the registration of the service marks, Mr. 
Wegmann was representing plaintiff alone. The district court made no findings on the issue. 
Because we think that the disqualification of Mr. Sprung may turn on this fact and others not 
found by the court below, we vacate that part of the court's order relating to Mr. Sprung and 
remand the cause for further proceedings. For the guidance of the court on remand, we set forth 
our view of the applicable ethical standards. 
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If the court finds that Mr. Wegmann previously represented plaintiff and defendants jointly, we 
can see no reason why Mr. Sprung should be disqualified. As between joint clients there can be 
no “confidences” or “secrets” unless one client manifests a contrary intent. Thus, Mr. Sprung 
could not have learned anything from Mr. Wegmann that defendants did not already know or 
have a right to know. Plaintiff argues that this permits the defendants indirectly to gain the 
benefit of Mr. Wegmann’s services when they could not do so directly. If the representation was 
joint, however, defendants possess no information as to which plaintiff could have had any 
expectation of privacy in relation to the defendants. The only remaining ground for 
disqualification then would be an appearance of impropriety. In Part II of this opinion, we 
decided there is such an appearance when an attorney represents an interest adverse to that of 
a former client in a matter substantially related to the subject of the prior representation. Mr. 
Sprung has never been plaintiff’s counsel, however; he is only the cocounsel of one who was. 
We are enjoined not to give Canon 9 an overly broad application and to maintain “a reasonable 
balance between the need to ensure ethical conduct on the part of lawyers and other social 
interests, which include the litigant's right to freely chosen counsel.” In the case of Mr. Sprung, 
we think the balance weighs against disqualification. Assuming that Mr. Wegmann’s prior 
retainer was joint, plaintiff has suffered no actual prejudice from communications between Mr. 
Wegmann and Mr. Sprung. There is a possibility that Mr. Sprung has obtained informally 
information that he would otherwise have had to seek through discovery. The Second Circuit 
has indicated that circumvention of the discovery rules is grounds for automatic disqualification. 
This seems to us an overly rigid approach. In a disqualification case, it is well to remember that 
“in deciding questions of professional ethics men of good will often differ in their conclusions.” 
As the Second Circuit itself has said: 
 
When dealing with ethical principles, we cannot paint with broad strokes. The lines are 
fine and must be so marked. Guideposts can be established when virgin ground is being 
explored, and the conclusion in a particular case can be reached only after painstaking 
analysis of the facts and precise application of precedent. 
 
Under the peculiar facts of this case, we do not think there would be such an appearance of 
impropriety in Mr. Sprung's continued representation of defendants as to warrant his 
disqualification. 
 
If the district court finds that Mr. Wegmann did not previously represent these parties jointly, it 
does not necessarily follow that Mr. Sprung should be disqualified. The courts have abjured a 
per se approach to the disqualification of cocounsel of disqualified counsel. In the absence of an 
attorney-client relationship between Mr. Sprung and plaintiff, a presumption of disclosure of 
confidences is inappropriate. Mr. Sprung should not be disqualified unless he has learned from 
Mr. Wegmann information the plaintiff had intended not be disclosed to the defendants. 
 
Marcum v. Scorsone, 457 S.W.3d 710 (Ky. 2015) 
 
Summary: Appellants Marcum, Conway, Foster Northrop, and Cheney sought a writ of 
prohibition in the Court of Appeals to bar enforcement of an order disqualifying their 
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lawyers, the firm Miller, Griffin & Marks, PSC (MGM), in a shareholder-derivative suit 
brought by Paul R. Plante, Jr., where the order was granted based on a finding of an 
“appearance of impropriety.” The court held that MGM’s representation of two 
shareholders and officers of the company while advising the company’s board of 
directors did not create an actual conflict of interest. Moreover, the mere appearance of 
any resulting impropriety was not sufficient to merit MGM’s disqualification.  
 
OPINION OF THE COURT BY Justice, NOBLE. 
 
Appellants, Frank D. Marcum, James D. Conway, Foster Northrop, and Mark Cheney, sought a 
writ of prohibition in the Court of Appeals to bar enforcement of an order disqualifying their 
lawyers, the firm Miller, Griffin, & Marks, PSC (MGM), in a shareholder-derivative suit brought 
by the Real Party in Interest, Paul R. Plante, Jr., where the order was granted based on a 
finding of an “appearance of impropriety.” The Court of Appeals denied the writ, concluding that 
one of the prerequisites for a writ, specifically a showing of irreparable harm, had not been 
made. This Court concludes that the Appellants have adequately shown the prerequisites for 
the availability of a writ and that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard (“an 
appearance of impropriety”) in disqualifying the firm. Moreover, disqualification was improper 
under the correct standard (a showing of actual conflict), at least based on the current record 
and findings of the trial court. Thus, this Court reverses and remands for entry of the requested 
writ. 
 
I. Background 
 
The shareholder-derivative suit underlying this writ action gives an excellent corporate 
representation of the infamous “Gordian knot.” The Real Party in Interest (Plante) and the 
Appellants (Marcum, Conway, Northrop and Cheney), along with Bill Seanor, began their 
journey as the shareholders of Arthrodynamic Technologies Animal Health Division, Inc. (ADT), 
a Kentucky corporation that sells veterinary products. Originally, Marcum and Conway each 
owned 37.5% of the shares; Cheney owned 10%; and Northrop, Plante, and Seanor each 
owned 5%. All six shareholders were originally on the board of directors. Over time, disputes 
among the shareholders led to changes in the officers and membership of the corporate board. 
 
In late 2010, Plante and Seanor seized control of the board, apparently having convinced a 
majority of the directors that Marcum and Conway had acted improperly, and caused Marcum 
and Conway to be removed from the board. Plante and Seanor were installed as the secretary 
and president respectively. In February 2011, Conway and Marcum, holding a total of 75% of 
the shares of ADT, returned to the board, though Plante and Seanor remained in their role as 
officers. 
 
In March 2011, a majority of the board caused the corporation to file a lawsuit against Marcum 
and Conway in Fayette Circuit Court alleging breach of fiduciary duties, misappropriation of 
corporate funds, and other claims. The suit was later transferred to Woodford Circuit Court. 
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Miller, Griffin and Marks (MGM) represented Marcum and Conway individually in that action 
through the services of Thomas Miller. 
 
On August 29, 2011, Bioniche Animal Health USA, Inc., which had been ADT’s manufacturer, 
filed suit against ADT in federal court over a contract dispute. ADT was defended in the litigation 
by Stites Harbison PLLC, a Kentucky law firm, and Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, a firm 
headquartered in Atlanta. 
 
In October and November 2011, there was some shaking up of the board’s membership related 
to Marcum’s claimed purchase of shares owned by Northrop, Cheney, and Conway. Northrop 
tendered his resignation from the board, which was accepted at an October board meeting. In 
October, Cheney also executed a resignation letter, addressed to Seanor as president, but the 
letter was never delivered and was instead held by Marcum’s counsel. Upon acceptance of 
Northrop’s resignation, Bob Watson was named to the board in his stead. On October 31, 2011, 
a board meeting was held at which Seanor was removed as president and replaced by Marcum, 
Cheney was made vice-president, Seanor was made secretary, and Watson was made 
Treasurer. 
 
At the board meetings in October and November 2011, MGM attorneys were present, recorded 
minutes, and participated in discussions with the board members. Before the November 
meeting, Marcum, acting as president, sent letters to the litigation firms asking that they take no 
further action in the Bioniche litigation. At the November 2011 meeting, MGM advised the 
directors to settle with Bioniche. Plante was a director at the time, and he objected to the 
settlement. Three of the four Appellants (Marcum, Cheney, and Conway) were also on the 
board at that time, however, and they, along with Watson, voted in favor of settling. Though the 
record does not disclose the exact timing, it appears that the lawsuit by ADT against Marcum 
and Conway was also discussed at these meetings, and it was dismissed soon after. 
 
That, however, means that the suit by ADT against Marcum and Conway overlapped with the 
Bioniche litigation against ADT. Both were ongoing actions as of the October and November 
2011 board meetings. As a result, MGM represented the two individuals, Marcum and Conway, 
in an action brought by ADT, at the board’s behest, at the same time that the firm was advising 
the board in some capacity about the Bioniche suit. 
 
On January 3, 2012, the underlying shareholder derivative action was filed by Plante and 
Seanor (who has since settled his claim) in Fayette Circuit Court. The original complaint named 
only two of ADT's directors, Marcum and Conway, as defendants. On April 18, 2012, Northrop 
came back on the board, replacing Watson. After some discovery, the complaint was amended 
to also name Cheney and Northrop as defendants. The suit alleges, among other things, that 
the Appellants had violated various provisions of ADT’s shareholder agreement with respect to 
sales of stock. MGM was retained to represent Appellants as they defended against this claim. 
Another law firm, Stoll Keenon Ogden, represents ADT, which was included in the suit as a 
nominal party on whose behalf Plante has brought the suit. 
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On June 18, 2012, Plante moved to disqualify MGM as the counsel for the Appellants, alleging 
that because MGM had represented the board, including Plante, in giving advice on the 
Bioniche litigation, and because MGM had represented Marcum and Conway individually in 
ADT’s suit against them in Woodford County, MGM’s participation in the underlying shareholder 
action created a conflict of interest or at least an appearance of impropriety sufficient to require 
MGM’s disqualification. In other words, because MGM represented Marcum and Conway 
against ADT (of which Plante was a board member) in the Woodford County suit, and then 
represented the board in the Bioniche suit (by advising the board), MGM effectively acted as 
counsel both against the board and for the board. By extension, Plante, as a shareholder, 
argued that MGM had taken a position against him and represented him at the same time. 
 
In January 2013, Marcum, Conway, Cheney, and Northrop met, acting as a quorum of the 
board. They adopted a resolution stating that there was no conflict of interest in MGM’s 
representation of them “with respect to ADT,” and purporting to waive any conflict that might 
exist. 
 
Briefing and arguments regarding this motion and other matters occurred for some period of 
time. (The exact scope of these proceedings is not clear because a writ action does not contain 
the entire record of an underlying lawsuit.) Eventually, however, the motion was submitted for 
decision, and the trial court ruled in Plante’s favor, granting his motion to disqualify MGM from 
representing the Appellants. The court specifically found that “during the course of MGM's 
representation of Conway and Marcum in the lawsuit filed against them by ADT, MGM also 
provided legal advice to the board of directors of ADT in a separate lawsuit with Bioniche.” 
 
But then the trial court specifically found, in the next two sentences, that it was making “no 
finding on whether Miller and MGM provided legal advice in their capacity as representative of 
Conway and Marcum or with the intent to represent ADT in settlement negotiations with 
Bioniche,” and “no finding as to any actual impropriety on the part of Miller and MGM.” 
(Emphasis added.) The court then said that it was difficult to see how Plante, as a part owner of 
the corporation ADT, could perceive that he got “utmost advocacy” when MGM represented 
“both the corporation in advising about Bioniche and individuals adverse to the corporation in 
the suit against Conway and Marcum.” The court then concluded that disqualification of MGM 
was required based on “the appearance of impropriety” under Lovell v. Winchester. 
 
The Appellants filed a writ action at the Court of Appeals. The court denied the writ because 
they had not shown irreparable injury, one of the usual prerequisites for issuance of such a writ. 
 
The case is appealed to this Court as a matter of right. 
 
II. Analysis 
 
In disqualifying MGM, the trial judge, to his credit, was simply following precedent, namely, 
Lovell v. Winchester. He justified the disqualification because he saw an appearance of 
impropriety. He was bound by this Court’s decision to apply that standard. 
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But this Court is not so bound, except by the force of stare decisis. And this Court has 
concluded that disqualification based on an appearance of impropriety is inappropriate under 
the existing Rules of Professional Conduct. It is telling that the appearance-of-impropriety 
standard does not appear in those rules, except in commentary condemning its use and noting 
that it has been deleted from the rules. Although this Court has previously upheld the use of that 
standard in deciding lawyer disqualification questions, the standard must now be rejected. 
Disqualification under that standard is “little more than a question of subjective judgment by the 
former client.” In essence, all the former client has to do is claim discomfort with the subsequent 
representation to create the appearance that something untoward is going on and thus that 
there is an appearance of impropriety. Moreover, “since ‘impropriety’ is undefined, the term 
‘appearance of impropriety’ is question-begging.” Even if impropriety is the same as an actual 
conflict, there should be something more substantive than just a possible conflict before 
disqualification takes place. 
 
The simple fact is that disqualification is easier to achieve under the appearance-of-impropriety 
standard. While that is appropriate for judicial recusal questions, because there is a heightened 
concern about public confidence in the judiciary, that concern is less pressing when dealing with 
the private lawyer-client relationship. If anything, use of such a low standard in that context 
creates a “greater likelihood of public suspicion of both the bar and the judiciary” and “would 
ultimately be self-defeating,” because it creates the impression that courts are ruling based on 
appearances rather than facts. Before a lawyer is disqualified based on a relationship with a 
former client or existing clients, the complaining party should be required to show an actual 
conflict, not just a vague and possibly deceiving appearance of impropriety. And that conflict 
should be established with facts, not just vague assertions of discomfort with the representation. 
 
There is no doubt that personal choice of representation is based on a litigant's belief in the 
competency of chosen counsel, and the confidence placed in counsel. Even though all 
practicing lawyers are presumed to be competent, common sense dictates that not all lawyers 
share the same degree of competence. Otherwise, clients would not care who their lawyers 
were, and there would be little competition among lawyers for business. A litigant has the 
reasonable expectation that he will have the best representation he can and is willing to afford, 
and taking his chosen counsel away based on an “appearance” alone creates the belief that the 
court is arbitrary or capricious. That undermines faith in the judicial process, which, in turn, 
clearly affects the orderly administration of justice negatively in general and, in that specific 
case, irreparably. On the other hand, specific findings of an actual conflict refute arbitrariness, 
and promote faith in the fairness of the proceeding. 
 
Lovell applied a standard that is no longer a part of the Rules of Professional Conduct and is 
simply inadequate to preserve the interests involved when a conflict of interest is alleged. To the 
extent that Lovell and other cases have approved the appearance-of-impropriety standard, they 
are overruled. Instead, in deciding disqualification questions, trial courts should apply the 
standard that is currently in the Rules of Professional Conduct, which at this time requires a 
showing of an actual conflict of interest. 
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To resolve that question, the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing. And before 
disqualifying counsel, the court must find that an actual conflict exists, and state on the record 
what that conflict is. To the extent that the trial judge did not do this, consideration of a special-
cases writ is appropriate in this case. Thus, a writ is available as a remedy. 
 
Moreover, this Court concludes that the writ should issue. In many ways, the trial court in this 
case complied with what we require today for disqualification of counsel. The trial court ordered 
briefing on the disqualification issue, and conducted multiple hearings. The court heard 
evidence and did not rely merely on allegations in motions and pleadings. And, as noted above, 
the trial court applied the standard previously approved by this Court. 
 
But, also as noted above, that standard is no longer appropriate under the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. A mere appearance of impropriety, as found by the trial court in this case, cannot 
support disqualification of counsel. Such an extreme remedy must be based on an actual 
conflict of interest. And the trial court’s order specifically stated it was not finding an actual 
impropriety, that is, an actual conflict. 
 
Although the Court's order stated that MGM had represented ADT at the same time that it 
represented individuals adverse to ADT, that does not, by itself, support disqualification in the 
shareholder-derivative suit. First, it is not entirely clear that MGM actually represented the 
corporation when providing advice on whether to settle the Bioniche litigation. In fact, the trial 
court’s order specifically states that it “makes no findings on whether Miller and MGM provided 
legal advice in their capacity as representatives of Conway and Marcum or with the intent to 
represent ADT in settlement negotiations with Bioniche.” And ADT, as a corporate entity, had 
been represented by other counsel in that litigation. Although Plante has argued that MGM 
represented the corporation, whether that was actually the case is less than clear. Thus, the 
concern that MGM may have been both for and against ADT at the same time may be 
unfounded. At the very least, there are insufficient findings in the trial court’s order to show an 
actual conflict. 
 
Second, even if there was an actual conflict when MGM advised the board about the Bioniche 
litigation, while also representing Marcum and Conway against ADT, that conflict only extended 
to the Bioniche litigation. Once that case settled, and the Marcum-Conway case was dismissed, 
there was no longer a conflict stemming from the simultaneous representation—and certainly 
not one that extends to the derivative suit underlying this action. 
 
For that reason, this Court concludes the trial court’s disqualification order was improper under 
the standard articulated today. A writ of prohibition barring its enforcement is the appropriate 
remedy. 
 
This is not to say, however, that Plante cannot show a sufficient conflict to have MGM 
disqualified once this case returns to the trial court. It is possible that by advising the board, of 
which Plante was a member, about the Bioniche litigation, MGM was representing Plante. Since 
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the allegedly improper resolution of the Bioniche litigation is part of the underlying derivative 
suit, among other things, it is possible that MGM may have an actual conflict under Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.9, which governs duties to former clients. There has also been some 
suggestion that MGM now represents the entire board, including Plante, in the derivative action, 
although only the Appellants appear to have been named as defendants. If MGM is 
representing the entire board, that could give rise to a conflict with an existing client under Rule 
1.7. 
 
But the focus in the trial court appears not to have been these possible conflicts, but the conflict 
that previously existed in the Bioniche litigation itself. Regardless, the trial court's order does not 
have findings sufficient to show such a conflict based on duties to former clients, and this Court 
cannot make such findings, especially based on the limited record in a writ action. If the issue is 
raised again in the trial court, it will be necessary to establish exactly who represents and has 
represented whom, and when the representation occurred before the conflict issues can be 
resolved. It will also be necessary to establish the precise relationship of the parties to each 
other and in what capacities they have sued or been sued. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
The Court concludes that review of the disqualification order in this case is available through the 
special-cases exception for writs. Further, this Court concludes the trial court applied a 
disqualification standard that is no longer appropriate under the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
and that the trial court's factual findings are insufficient to allow disqualification under the proper 
standard of a showing of actual conflict. For those reasons, a writ of prohibition barring 
enforcement of the trial court's order is appropriate at this time, even though the issue of 
disqualification may be revisited in the trial court. The Court of Appeals’ decision to deny the writ 
is therefore reversed, and this matter is remanded to that court to issue the writ. 
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4.6: Associational Conflicts of Interest 
 
When attorneys are associated with each other in a partnership, firm, or similar organization, a 
conflict of interest affecting one of the associated attorneys may be imputed to the other 
attorneys who are members of the association. For example, associated attorneys typically may 
not represent clients with adverse interests, just like individual attorneys may not represent 
clients with adverse interests. Associated attorneys may not represent new clients whose 
interests are adverse to the interests of a client of an associated attorney. And if the clients of 
an associated attorney develop adverse interests, the attorneys may be required to withdraw 
from representation. 
 
Of course, conflicts of interest do not necessarily preclude representation. The clients of 
associated attorneys may provide informed consent to representation despite the conflict, just 
like the clients of individual attorneys. 
 
Often, the clients of associated attorneys have conflicts of interest relating to the duty of 
confidentiality. If the conflict in question can be resolved by informed consent, associated 
attorneys often can avoid violating the duty of confidentiality by adopting screening procedures 
that prevent attorneys representing one client from accessing confidential information provided 
by the other client. 
 
Rule 1.10: Imputation of Conflicts of Interest: General Rule 
 
a. While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client 
when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7 
or 1.9, unless 
1. the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the disqualified lawyer and does 
not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client 
by the remaining lawyers in the firm; or 
2. the prohibition is based upon Rule 1.9(a) or (b) and arises out of the disqualified 
lawyer’s association with a prior firm, and 
i. the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the 
matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; 
ii. written notice is promptly given to any affected former client to enable the 
former client to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule, 
which shall include a description of the screening procedures employed; a 
statement of the firm's and of the screened lawyer's compliance with 
these Rules; a statement that review may be available before a tribunal; 
and an agreement by the firm to respond promptly to any written inquiries 
or objections by the former client about the screening procedures; and 
iii. certifications of compliance with these Rules and with the screening 
procedures are provided to the former client by the screened lawyer and 
by a partner of the firm, at reasonable intervals upon the former client's 
written request and upon termination of the screening procedures. 
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b. When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from 
thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client 
represented by the formerly associated lawyer and not currently represented by the firm, 
unless: 
1. the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly 
associated lawyer represented the client; and 
2. any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6 and 
1.9(c) that is material to the matter. 
c. A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the 
conditions stated in Rule 1.7. 
d. The disqualification of lawyers associated in a firm with former or current government 
lawyers is governed by Rule 1.11. 
 
Rule 1.10 Imputation of Conflicts of Interest: General Rule, Comment [1] 
 
For purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the term “firm” denotes lawyers in a law 
partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to 
practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a 
corporation or other organization. 
 
Rule 1.10 Imputation of Conflicts of Interest: General Rule, Comment [2] 
 
The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty 
to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be 
considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the 
rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by 
the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph 
(a)(1) operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm.  
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 123 (2000): Imputation of a Conflict 
of Interest to an Affiliated Lawyer 
 
Unless all affected clients consent to the representation under the limitations and conditions 
provided in § 122 or unless imputation hereunder is removed as provided in § 124, the 
restrictions upon a lawyer imposed by §§ 125- 135 also restrict other affiliated lawyers who: 
1. are associated with that lawyer in rendering legal services to others through a law 
partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship, or similar association; 
2. are employed with that lawyer by an organization to render legal services either to that 
organization or to others to advance the interests or objectives of the organization; or 
3. share office facilities without reasonably adequate measures to protect confidential client 
information so that it will not be available to other lawyers in the shared office. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 124 (2000): Removing Imputation 
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1. Imputation specified in § 123 does not restrict an affiliated lawyer when the affiliation 
between the affiliated lawyer and the personally prohibited lawyer that required the 
imputation has been terminated, and no material confidential information of the client, 
relevant to the matter, has been communicated by the personally prohibited lawyer to 
the affiliated lawyer or that lawyer's firm. 
2. Imputation specified in § 123 does not restrict an affiliated lawyer with respect to a 
former-client conflict under § 132, when there is no substantial risk that confidential 
information of the former client will be used with material adverse effect on the former 
client because: 
a. any confidential client information communicated to the personally prohibited 
lawyer is unlikely to be significant in the subsequent matter; 
b. the personally prohibited lawyer is subject to screening measures adequate to 
eliminate participation by that lawyer in the representation; and 
c. timely and adequate notice of the screening has been provided to all affected 
clients. 
3. Imputation specified in § 123 does not restrict a lawyer affiliated with a former 
government lawyer with respect to a conflict under § 133 if: 
a. the personally prohibited lawyer is subject to screening measures adequate to 
eliminate involvement by that lawyer in the representation; and 
b. timely and adequate notice of the screening has been provided to the appropriate 
government agency and to affected clients. 
 
Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F. 2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976) 
 
Summary: Attorney Manly Fleischmann was a partner in Jaeckle, Fleischmann and 
Mugel of Buffalo and in Webster, Sheffield, Fleischmann, Hitchcock and Brookfield of 
New York City. Cinerama distributed movies and operated movie theaters. Cinerama 
hired Fleischmann and Jaeckle to defend it in an antitrust action in upstate New York. 
Then, Cinema 5 hired Webster to represent it in an antitrust action in New York City. 
Cinerama filed a motion to disqualify Webster because Fleischmann was a partner. 
Fleischmann responded that the actions were not substantially related. The district court 
granted the motion, and the circuit court affirmed. 
 
Before MOORE, FEINBERG and VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judges. 
 
VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal from an order granting defendants’ motion to disqualify plaintiff's counsel presents a 
somewhat unusual set of facts. Counsel has been disqualified from further representation of 
plaintiff because a partner in this New York City law firm is also a partner in a Buffalo firm which 
is presently representing the defendant Cinerama, Inc. in other litigation of a somewhat similar 
nature. Although we agree with the district court that there was no actual wrongdoing and intend 
no criticism of the lawyers involved, we find no abuse of the district court’s discretion, and so 
affirm. 
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There is little or no dispute as to the facts, most of them having been stipulated. Attorney Manly 
Fleischmann is a partner in Jaeckle, Fleischmann and Mugel of Buffalo and in Webster, 
Sheffield, Fleischmann, Hitchcock and Brookfield of New York City. He divides his time between 
the two offices. Cinerama is a distributor of motion pictures and the operator of several large 
theater chains. In January 1972 the Jaeckle firm was retained to represent Cinerama and 
several other defendants in an action brought in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of New York. Plaintiffs in that suit are local upstate theater operators who allege antitrust 
violations resulting from discriminatory and monopolistic licensing and distribution of motion 
pictures in the Rochester area. A similar action involving allegedly illegal distribution in the 
Buffalo area was commenced in March 1974, and the Jaeckle office represents the interests of 
Cinerama in this action also. Both suits are presently pending in the Western District. 
 
The instant action, brought in the Southern District of New York in August 1974, alleges a 
conspiracy among the defendants to acquire control of plaintiff corporation through stock 
acquisitions, with the intention of creating a monopoly and restraining competition in New York 
City's first-run motion picture theater market. Judge Brieant found that there was sufficient 
relationship between the two law firms and the two controversies to inhibit future confidential 
communications between Cinerama and its attorneys and that disqualification was required to 
avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety. 
 
Appellant’s counsel strongly dispute these findings. They say that they should not be 
disqualified unless the relationship between the controversies is substantial, and they contend 
there is nothing substantial in the relationship between an upstate New York conspiracy to 
deprive local theater operators of access to films and an attempted corporate take-over in New 
York City. 
 
The “substantial relationship” test is indeed the one that we have customarily applied in 
determining whether a lawyer may accept employment against a former client. However, in this 
case, suit is not against a former client, but an existing one. One firm in which attorney 
Fleischmann is a partner is suing an actively represented client of another firm in which attorney 
Fleischmann is a partner. The propriety of this conduct must be measured not so much against 
the similarities in litigation, as against the duty of undivided loyalty which an attorney owes to 
each of his clients. 
 
A lawyer’s duty to his client is that of a fiduciary or trustee. When Cinerama retained Mr. 
Fleischmann as its attorney in the Western District litigation, it was entitled to feel that at least 
until that litigation was at an end, it had his undivided loyalty as its advocate and champion, and 
could rely upon his “undivided allegiance and faithful, devoted service.” Because “no man can 
serve two masters,” Matthew 6:24, it had the right to expect also that he would “accept no 
retainer to do anything that might be adverse to his client's interests.” Needless to say, when 
Mr. Fleischmann and his New York City partners undertook to represent Cinema 5, Ltd., they 
owed it the same fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty and allegiance. 
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Ethical Considerations 5-1 and 5-14 of the American Bar Association's Code of Professional 
Responsibility provide that the professional judgment of a lawyer must be exercised solely for 
the benefit of his client, free of compromising influences and loyalties, and this precludes his 
acceptance of employment that will adversely affect his judgment or dilute his loyalty. The Code 
has been adopted by the New York State Bar Association, and its canons are recognized by 
both Federal and State Courts as appropriate guidelines for the professional conduct of New 
York lawyers. 
 
Under the Code, the lawyer who would sue his own client, asserting in justification the lack of 
“substantial relationship” between the litigation and the work he has undertaken to perform for 
that client, is leaning on a slender reed indeed. Putting it as mildly as we can, we think it would 
be questionable conduct for an attorney to participate in any lawsuit against his own client 
without the knowledge and consent of all concerned. This appears to be the opinion of the 
foremost writers in the field, and it is the holding of the New York courts. In Matter of Kelly, New 
York's highest court said that “with rare and conditional exceptions, the lawyer may not place 
himself in a position where a conflicting interest may, even inadvertently, affect, or give the 
appearance of affecting, the obligations of the professional relationship.” Nor is New York alone 
in this view. In Grievance Committee v. Rottner, Connecticut’s highest court held that the 
maintenance of public confidence in the bar requires an attorney to decline employment 
adverse to his client, even though the nature of such employment is wholly unrelated to that of 
his existing representation. 
 
Whether such adverse representation, without more, requires disqualification in every case, is a 
matter we need not now decide. We do hold, however, that the “substantial relationship” test 
does not set a sufficiently high standard by which the necessity for disqualification should be 
determined. That test may properly be applied only where the representation of a former client 
has been terminated and the parameters of such relationship have been fixed. Where the 
relationship is a continuing one, adverse representation is prima facie improper, and the 
attorney must be prepared to show, at the very least, that there will be no actual or apparent 
conflict in loyalties or diminution in the vigor of his representation. We think that appellants have 
failed to meet this heavy burden and that, so long as Mr. Fleischmann and his Buffalo partners 
continue to represent Cinerama, he and his New York City partners should not represent 
Cinema 5, Ltd. in this litigation. 
 
Because he is a partner in the Jaeckle firm, Mr. Fleischmann owes the duty of undivided loyalty 
to that firm's client, Cinerama. Because he is a partner in the Webster firm, he owes the same 
duty to Cinema 5, Ltd. It can hardly be disputed that there is at least the appearance of 
impropriety where half his time is spent with partners who are defending Cinerama in multi-
million dollar litigation, while the other half is spent with partners who are suing Cinerama in a 
lawsuit of equal substance.55 
																																																								
55 Mr. Fleischmann's personal participation in the Buffalo litigation was minimal, and we are confident that 
he would make every effort to disassociate himself from both lawsuits and would not divulge any 
information that came to him concerning either. However, we cannot impart this same confidence to the 
public by court order. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 300	
 
Because “an attorney must avoid not only the fact, but even the appearance, of representing 
conflicting interests,” this requires his disqualification. Moreover, because of the peculiarly close 
relationship existing among legal partners, if Mr. Fleischmann is disqualified, his partners at the 
Webster firm are disqualified as well. 
 
Nothing that we have heretofore said is intended as criticism of the character and professional 
integrity of Mr. Fleischmann and his partners. We are convinced that the dual representation 
came about inadvertently and unknowingly, and we are in complete accord with Judge Brieant’s 
finding that there has been no actual wrongdoing. Furthermore, the record shows that after 
learning of the conflict which had developed, the Jaeckle firm, through Mr. Fleischmann, offered 
to withdraw its representation of Cinerama in the Western District actions. However, that offer 
was not accepted, and Mr. Fleischmann continued, albeit reluctantly, to have one foot in each 
camp. 
 
Under the circumstances, Judge Brieant’s order of disqualification cannot be construed as an 
abuse of his discretion. We therefore affirm. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did the court grant Cinerama’s motion to disqualify Fleischmann? Did it identify a 
conflict of interest? Was Fleischmann working on the action against Cinerama? 
2. Why did Cinerama file a motion to disqualify Webster? Should Cinema 5’s preferences 
matter under the circumstances? 
 
Borden v. Borden, 277 A. 2d 89 (D.C. App. 1971) 
 
Summary: Helen Borden filed a complaint to divorce her husband, George, on the ground of 
adultery. Helen was represented by an attorney from the Neighborhood Legal Services Program 
(NLSP). Helen’s attorney moved for assignment of counsel to represent George. The trial court 
ordered attorney David S. Raycroft, who works for NLSP, to represent George. Both attorneys 
from NLSP filed a motion to set aside the trial court’s order since both attorneys were employed 
by NLSP and the order created a conflict of interest under the Code of Professional 
Responsibility. The trial court denied the motion because no economic conflict existed. The 
appellate court reversed, because the NLSP functions as a firm and there is an inherent conflict 
of interest that public policy concerns do not override.  
 
KERN, Associate Judge: 
 
The issue presented by this appeal is whether it was error for the trial judge sitting in the 
Domestic Relations Branch of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions to refuse to 
vacate his order assigning an attorney employed by the Neighborhood Legal Services Program 
(NLSP) to represent the defendant in this action, when the plaintiff was already represented by 
an NLSP lawyer. 
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On September 22, 1969, appellant Helen Borden filled a complaint seeking a divorce from 
appellee George Borden on the ground of adultery. On April 2, 1970, appellant, represented by 
an attorney from NLSP and proceeding in forma pauperis, moved for assignment of counsel to 
represent appellee. The trial court ordered David S. Raycroft, an attorney employed by the 
NLSP, to enter an appearance on behalf of and represent appellee. On June 8, 1970, 
appellant's attorney, joined by appellee's attorney, filed a motion to set aside the trial court's 
order of appointment of counsel on the ground that since both attorneys in the case were 
employed by the NLSP the order created a conflict of interest under the Code of Professional 
Responsibility, and the divorce ultimately obtained could be invalid due to alleged collusion. 
 
On June 9, 1970, the trial judge denied the motion to set aside his appointment of counsel, 
relying specifically on his order in another case, McGee v. McGee, which stated, inter alia: 
 
Since, therefore, no economic conflict exists, no corporate interests is in any way 
involved and no legal partnership as such has been disclosed it would appear that in fact 
and objectively speaking there is no conflict of interest. 
 
Mrs. Borden appeals from this order of denial. 
 
While the trial court’s refusal to set aside his order of appointment is not final in the sense of 
disposing of the case on its merits, it does have “a final and irreparable effect upon the rights of 
the parties” and is therefore appealable. The effect of the trial court's order is to force the parties 
to go to trial represented by attorneys who practice law within the same organization, which 
appears on its face to constitute a conflict of interest, and who have stated upon the record their 
inability to represent the cause of their clients and remain faithful to the Code of Professional 
Responsibility. In addition, the parties have ground for concern that the final decree in the case 
on the merits could be subject to the subsequent charge of collusion and its validity thus put in 
question. We think that the administration of justice would best be served by recognizing the 
cloud which the order of appointment of counsel has put upon the present proceedings and by 
treating the order as final for the purpose of review.  
 
Turning to the merits of the assignment of counsel order, it is axiomatic that members of the 
same law firm may not represent adverse parties. Corporation Counsel concedes this but takes 
the position that: 
 
NLSP cannot be analogized to the typical law firm for purposes of application of the 
conflict-of-interest concept NLSP’s activities more logically fall within the group legal 
services concept.  
 
It argues that under N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, the constitutional right being asserted must be 
balanced on the scale of public interest against the alleged professional impropriety. When this 
is done, in the instant case, so the argument goes, the right and need of the poor to have legal 
representation in domestic relations matters is paramount to the allegedly remote possibility of a 
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conflict of interest growing out of the representation of both parties by NLSP attorneys. It is 
pointed out that since NLSP attorneys receive no compensation from their clients there can be 
no economic conflict of interest, as would be the case if they were practicing in the same law 
firm. 
 
We are not persuaded that the possibility of conflict of interest which appellee’s attorney 
proffered as his reason for wishing to withdraw from participation in this case is remote. While 
the NLSP is not a law firm it is a group of attorneys practicing law together in an organizational 
structure much like a law firm. It has a Board of Directors and an Executive Director who are 
analogous to a firm’s managing partners. It has one attorney in each of its branch offices whose 
responsibility is to supervise the junior attorneys, much like a firm's senior partner working with 
his associates. All NLSP attorneys participate in office meetings and receive intra-office 
communications on substantive law, litigation techniques and tactics and office policy. Lawyers 
who practice their profession side-by-side, literally and figuratively, are subject to subtle 
influences that may well affect their professional judgment and loyalty to their clients, even 
though they are not faced with the more easily recognized economic conflict of interest. In 
addition, the appointment of attorneys who work together presents an impression scarcely 
consistent with the bar’s efforts to maintain public confidence in the law and lawyers. 
 
Also we fail to find in this case the extraordinary circumstances present in N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 
where legal representation to vindicate constitutional rights of a group of citizens was simply 
unavailable except in the form of group legal services which the State contended amounted to 
barratry, maintenance and champerty. With all deference to the trial court’s efforts to date to 
assure full representation of all who seek access to the Domestic Relations Court we are not 
persuaded that the supply of attorneys available in the District of Columbia has been exhausted 
so that NLSP attorneys must now represent both sides of a divorce action. 
 
Finally, we are reluctant to approve any action in the matter of professional ethics which 
distinguishes between attorneys who are in private practice and attorneys who are not. In the 
first place, Congress has expressly recognized that “anti-poverty lawyers” are to be governed by 
the traditional standards of the profession. The ABA has held that legal aid attorneys have a 
“primary obligation of loyalty” to their clients and are required “to act in accordance with the 
Code of Professional Responsibility.” Other jurisdictions have specifically barred anti-poverty 
lawyers from representing adverse parties in domestic relations litigation because such 
representation falls afoul of the Canons. We are reluctant ever to make an exception from the 
professional norm for attorneys employed by the government or others who provide legal 
representation without compensation from the client because then we might encourage a 
misapprehension that the special nature of such representation justifies departure from the 
profession's standards. We should avoid always any action that would give the appearance that 
government attorneys are “legal Hessians” hired “to do a job” rather than attorneys at law. On 
the other hand, we should expect always from these attorneys uncompromising adherence to 
the profession's established standards. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 303	
We conclude that it was error for the trial court to refuse to vacate its assignment of an NLSP 
attorney to represent appellee in the trial of appellant's divorce action which was being 
presented by another NLSP attorney and that this case must be remanded for appointment of 
new counsel for appellee. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. What was the conflict of interest? 
2. Why did NLSP’s corporate counsel argue against the motion?  
3. What public policy concerns did the court say were not sufficient to override the inherent 
conflict of interest? 
4. Did the court’s ruling harm or benefit NLSP’s mission to provide legal services to the 
poor? 
 
People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc., 20 Cal. 4th 
1135 (Cal. 1999) 
Summary: Attorney Eliot G. Disner was “of counsel” to Shapiro, Rosenfeld & Close. 
Attorney Geordan Goebel represented SpeeDee Oil Change Systems. Goebel 
consulted with Shapiro about an antitrust action SpeeDee had filed against Mobil Oil, 
and then associated Shapiro with the action as counsel. Cohon and Gardner 
represented Mobil in the SpeeDee action. Cohon consulted with Disner about the 
SpeeDee action, and planned to retain him as a consultant. But when Cohon and 
Gardner learned that Shapiro was representing SpeeDee, they filed a motion to 
disqualify the firm, because of its association with Disner. The trial court denied the 
motion, and the intermediate appellate court affirmed, because Disner did not 
provide any confidential information to Shapiro. The California Supreme Court 
reversed, because Disner represented adversaries in the same litigation.  
 
CHIN, J. 
 
When a conflict of interest requires an attorney’s disqualification from a matter, the 
disqualification normally extends vicariously to the attorney’s entire law firm. This rule 
safeguards clients’ legitimate expectations that their attorneys will protect client 
confidences. Here, we decide whether the same rule should apply when a party 
unknowingly consults an attorney “of counsel” to the law firm representing the party's 
adversary in the subject of the consultation. 
 
Mobil Oil Corporation consulted Attorney Eliot G. Disner, who was of counsel to Shapiro, 
Rosenfeld & Close. Mobil was a defendant in a complaint in intervention by respondents 
Gary and Annette Burch et al., Southern California franchisees of SpeeDee Oil Change 
Systems, Inc. While Mobil was consulting Disner, respondents associated the Shapiro firm 
as counsel of record in their action against Mobil. Mobil moved to disqualify the Shapiro firm 
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upon learning of its association, arguing that Disner had a conflict of interest that required 
its vicarious disqualification. 
 
The trial court denied Mobil's motion. The court found no basis for a presumption that 
Disner disclosed confidences to the Shapiro firm, notwithstanding Disner's relationship with 
the firm. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that substantial evidence existed for 
implied findings that Disner’s relationship with the Shapiro firm was not “close, personal, 
continuous, and regular” and that Disner conveyed no confidential information to the firm. 
We granted Mobil's petition for review. 
 
We adopt the prevailing rule concerning “of counsel” conflicts of interest and reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal. For attorneys in the same firm to represent adverse parties 
in the same litigation is so patently improper that the rule of disqualification is a per se or 
“automatic” one. Conflicting representations that would disqualify all of a law firm’s attorneys 
are not more acceptable when an attorney of counsel to the firm creates the conflict. 
Clients, and the public, should expect confidentiality and loyalty from attorneys who 
effectively declare they practice law in a close, personal, and continuing association. These 
legitimate expectations would be frustrated if a firm could represent one party in litigation 
while an attorney of counsel to the firm represented an adversary in the same case. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Attorney Geordan Goebel, a sole practitioner, had represented respondents since 1994. 
Because of the action’s scope, he decided to associate a law firm as attorneys of record to 
help him prosecute respondents’ claims. Goebel approached the Shapiro firm because of its 
expertise in franchise law and met with Mitchell Shapiro on June 22, 1996. Around this time, 
the Shapiro firm's letterhead listed 14 attorneys’ names, with 4 more attorneys listed as of 
counsel to the firm, all at the same office address. Among those identified as of counsel to 
the firm was Eliot G. Disner, an attorney who had substantial experience with antitrust 
issues. 
 
Over the next few weeks, Goebel developed a “good working relationship” with the Shapiro 
firm. On July 10, he signed a notice associating the Shapiro firm as counsel of record for 
respondents. Mitchell Shapiro signed the notice for the Shapiro firm on July 12. The notice 
of association of counsel was served by mail on July 15, 1996, and filed with the court the 
following day. 
 
The law firm of Cohon and Gardner represented Mobil in the SpeeDee Oil action. Early in 
July 1996, Jeffrey Cohon, an associate with Cohon and Gardner, spoke to Attorney Steven 
Hecht about contacting Disner concerning the case. Hecht knew both Cohon and Disner 
personally. To facilitate an initial check for conflicts, Cohon told Hecht the name of the case 
and the principal attorneys involved. Hecht spoke with Disner later that week. Hecht asked 
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Disner if he knew of the case involving SpeeDee Oil and Mobil. When Disner said he did 
not, Hecht asked him to call Jeffrey Cohon. 
 
Disner and Cohon spoke by telephone on July 11 or 12. When Cohon returned Disner's 
call, the receptionist answered the telephone, “Shapiro, Rosenfeld and Close.” Cohon's call 
was put through to Disner, who confirmed he had spoken with Hecht and had not heard of 
the SpeeDee Oil case or the attorneys involved in it. In a conversation Cohon believed was 
confidential, he and Disner discussed the case’s substantive allegations, its procedural 
status, and Mobil's theories. They arranged a meeting for July 16. 
 
On July 16, 1996, Cohon and Gardner Attorneys Bennett Cohon, Jeffrey Cohon, and 
Steven Gardner met with Disner to discuss his assisting with Mobil's representation. They 
spoke for one to two hours over lunch. Gardner received a copy of Disner's resume, 
which—like Disner's business card—prominently featured the Shapiro firm's name and 
address. 
 
Gardner briefed Disner on the case and Mobil's position. The matters disclosed to Disner 
included "the background of the case, Mobil's theories in the case, Mobil's discovery 
strategy and an analysis of the procedural and substantive issues which had arisen to date 
and [were] likely to arise in the future, the state of the case, experts, and consultants, and 
specific factual issues." The Cohon and Gardner attorneys considered the information 
disclosed to Disner to be confidential and attorney work product. 
 
According to Gardner's and Jeffrey Cohon's declarations, when the meeting ended, 
Gardner and Disner agreed to prepare a document formally retaining Disner as a 
consultant. Disner did not directly contradict the Cohon and Gardner attorneys' statements. 
His declaration stated that at the end of the meeting, the Cohon and Gardner attorneys 
"expressed interest" in using his services, although they did not know "exactly" how they 
intended to do so. 
 
Gardner further declared that Disner agreed to check some statutes and case law that 
applied to a few of the issues they discussed. He stated that he and Disner spoke again 
later in the afternoon of July 16, and Disner conveyed the results of his review of those 
issues. No declaration contradicted Gardner's account of those discussions. 
 
The next day, July 17, Gardner received the notice of the Shapiro firm's association as 
counsel for respondents. Consequently, that same day the Cohon and Gardner firm 
informed Disner that Mobil would not be using his services. Gardner immediately faxed a 
letter to the Shapiro firm, Disner, and Goebel, stating that Mobil objected to the Shapiro 
firm's participation in the case on behalf of respondents. Gardner's letter asserted the 
Shapiro firm had an ethical conflict because of Cohon and Gardner's conversations with 
and disclosures to Disner concerning the case. The Shapiro firm responded with a letter 
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faxed the next day, contending there was no basis for the firm's disqualification. The 
response stated that the Shapiro firm had already associated as counsel for respondents 
when Disner met with the Cohon and Gardner attorneys. The response also stated that 
Disner was of counsel to the Shapiro firm and not an associate, partner, or shareholder. 
 
Four days later, on July 22, 1996, Mobil filed an ex parte application for an order shortening 
time for a motion to disqualify the Shapiro firm. Mobil's motion was set for hearing on July 
24, 1996. The moving and opposing papers included declarations and exhibits setting out 
the facts related above. In addition, Disner's declaration stated he had not "discussed the 
merits of the SpeeDee Oil action with any attorney or other employee" of the Shapiro firm. 
He also said he customarily reviewed possible conflicts of interest with the firm before 
associating with them on cases. Disner and the Shapiro firm did not discuss a potential 
conflict in this instance because neither had asked the other to associate for the SpeeDee 
Oil case. Similarly, Mitchell Shapiro declared that he had "not discussed this action" with 
Disner and did not know "what was discussed between" Disner and the Cohon and Gardner 
attorneys. 
 
The Shapiro firm's declarations submitted in opposition to Mobil's motion provided additional 
details of the firm's relationship with Disner. Disner's declaration stated: "Although I am 
designated as `Of Counsel' to SRC [the Shapiro firm], I have a separate law practice from 
SRC. I have my own clients, whom I bill separately from SRC. I pay rent to SRC for office 
space. I have my own staff whom I pay for their services. I do not share in any profits of 
SRC, nor do I incur any liabilities on behalf of SRC. In those few cases (perhaps 3-4 per 
year) on which I associate with SRC, which is strictly determined on a case-by-case basis, if 
I use any attorney from SRC to perform services, I pay SRC a percentage of that attorney[s] 
usual hourly rate for the time spent working on my clients' cases. Similarly, if SRC uses my 
services on any cases, it pays me a percentage of my usual hourly fee for services 
rendered.” 
 
The trial court denied Mobil's motion to disqualify the Shapiro firm. The court decided the 
matter based on the written submissions, stating: “There is no basis on which to presume 
that Eliot Disner, Esq., who is of counsel to the Shapiro firm, imparted any confidential 
information to the firm, as concerns this case. Disner and the Shapiro firm were initially 
unaware of each other's involvement in this case and Disner was not retained by MOBIL 
nor is he presently involved in this case." 
 
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order, applying an abuse of discretion standard of 
review. The court viewed the matter as one involving conflicting evidence and inferences on 
the actual nature of the particular "of counsel" relationship in question: "We agree that if the 
Shapiro firm simultaneously represented both Mobil and the respondents in this litigation, it 
would be subject to automatic disqualification. And we assume for purposes of discussion 
that by performing legal research for Mobil, Mr. Disner represented it. However, the trial 
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court impliedly concluded Mr. Disner practiced law separate and apart from [the Shapiro 
firm] except on those few annual occasions when Mr. Disner or [the Shapiro firm] 
associated the other on a particular case.... [There] was probative and persuasive evidence 
of a `close, personal, continuous, and regular' professional affinity which characterizes the 
`of counsel' relationship.... However, there was conflicting evidence which indicated there 
was in reality no `close, personal, continuous, and regular' relationship.... Simply stated, the 
evidence concerning the relationship was in conflict and the trial judge resolved that dispute 
in favor of one side. Furthermore, even if a concern for client confidentiality arose on the 
facts of this case, substantial evidence established Mr. Disner did not impart any 
confidential information to [the Shapiro firm]. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion." 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This case requires us to resolve two distinct questions. First, were Disner's contacts and 
discussions with the Cohon and Gardner attorneys such that he represented Mobil for 
purposes of a conflict of interest analysis? Second, if so, should any conflict of interest be 
imputed to the law firm to which he was of counsel so as to require its disqualification? To 
answer these questions, we first review the principles involved when one party seeks to 
disqualify its opponent's counsel, beginning with the appropriate standard of appellate 
review. 
 
DISQUALIFICATION PRINCIPLES 
 
A motion to disqualify a party's counsel may implicate several important interests. 
Consequently, judges must examine these motions carefully to ensure that literalism does 
not deny the parties substantial justice. Depending on the circumstances, a disqualification 
motion may involve such considerations as a client's right to chosen counsel, an attorney's 
interest in representing a client, the financial burden on a client to replace disqualified 
counsel, and the possibility that tactical abuse underlies the disqualification motion. 
Nevertheless, determining whether a conflict of interest requires disqualification involves 
more than just the interests of the parties. 
 
A trial court's authority to disqualify an attorney derives from the power inherent in every 
court "[t]o control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all 
other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter 
pertaining thereto." Ultimately, disqualification motions involve a conflict between the clients' 
right to counsel of their choice and the need to maintain ethical standards of professional 
responsibility. The paramount concern must be to preserve public trust in the scrupulous 
administration of justice and the integrity of the bar. The important right to counsel of one's 
choice must yield to ethical considerations that affect the fundamental principles of our 
judicial process.  
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Protecting the confidentiality of communications between attorney and client is fundamental 
to our legal system. The attorney-client privilege is a hallmark of our jurisprudence that 
furthers the public policy of ensuring "`the right of every person to freely and fully confer and 
confide in one having knowledge of the law, and skilled in its practice, in order that the 
former may have adequate advice and a proper defense.' [Citation.]" To this end, a basic 
obligation of every attorney is "[t]o maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to 
himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client."  
 
To protect the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship, the State Bar Rules of 
Professional Conduct prohibits attorneys from accepting, without the client's informed 
written consent, "employment adverse to the client or former client where, by reason of the 
representation of the client or former client, the [attorney] has obtained confidential 
information material to the employment." Where an attorney successively represents clients 
with adverse interests, and where the subjects of the two representations are substantially 
related, the need to protect the first client's confidential information requires that the 
attorney be disqualified from the second representation. For the same reason, a 
presumption that an attorney has access to privileged and confidential matters relevant to a 
subsequent representation extends the attorney's disqualification vicariously to the 
attorney's entire firm.  
 
A related but distinct fundamental value of our legal system is the attorney's obligation of 
loyalty. Attorneys have a duty to maintain undivided loyalty to their clients to avoid 
undermining public confidence in the legal profession and the judicial process.The effective 
functioning of the fiduciary relationship between attorney and client depends on the client's 
trust and confidence in counsel. The courts will protect clients' legitimate expectations of 
loyalty to preserve this essential basis for trust and security in the attorney-client 
relationship. Therefore, if an attorney—or more likely a law firm—simultaneously represents 
clients who have conflicting interests, a more stringent per se rule of disqualification applies. 
With few exceptions, disqualification follows automatically, regardless of whether the 
simultaneous representations have anything in common or present any risk that 
confidences obtained in one matter would be used in the other.  
 
The most egregious conflict of interest is representation of clients whose interests are 
directly adverse in the same litigation. Such patently improper dual representation suggests 
to the clients—and to the public at large—that the attorney is completely indifferent to the 
duty of loyalty and the duty to preserve confidences. However, the attorney's actual 
intention and motives are immaterial, and the rule of automatic disqualification applies. "The 
rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct," but 
also to keep honest attorneys from having to choose between conflicting duties, or being 
tempted to reconcile conflicting interests, rather than fully pursuing their clients' rights. The 
loyalty the attorney owes one client cannot be allowed to compromise the duty owed 
another.  
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Here, any concerns about compromised attorney loyalty must take into account the limited 
period during which the Shapiro firm represented respondents and Disner was engaged in 
communications with Mobil's counsel. Mobil effectively ended the risk of divided loyalty by 
promptly terminating Disner's services. However, the concern for client confidences, like the 
attorney's duty to preserve those confidences, continues after the attorney's services end. 
Therefore, we examine the relationship between Disner and Mobil, conducted through 
Mobil's counsel, to determine whether Disner should be deemed to have represented Mobil 
for purposes of a conflict of interest analysis. 
 
CONSULTATION AND REPRESENTATION 
 
In considering whether an attorney-client relationship has reached a point where the 
attorney can be subject to disqualification for a conflict of interest, we begin with the 
relationship's early stages, as noted in Beery v. State Bar: “The fiduciary relationship 
existing between lawyer and client extends to preliminary consultations by a prospective 
client with a view to retention of the lawyer, although actual employment does not result. 
When a party seeking legal advice consults an attorney at law and secures that advice, the 
relation of attorney and client is established prima facie. The absence of an agreement with 
respect to the fee to be charged does not prevent the relationship from arising.” 
 
The primary concern is whether and to what extent the attorney acquired confidential 
information. That question is not necessarily answered by the amount of time involved. 
"Even the briefest conversation between a lawyer and a client can result in the disclosure of 
confidences." Consequently, a formal retainer agreement is not required before attorneys 
acquire fiduciary obligations of loyalty and confidentiality, which begin when attorney-client 
discussions proceed beyond initial or peripheral contacts. An attorney represents a client—
for purposes of a conflict of interest analysis—when the attorney knowingly obtains material 
confidential information from the client and renders legal advice or services as a result.  
 
The initial discussions between Disner and the Cohon and Gardner attorneys involved 
substantial amounts of material confidential information. Moreover, Disner did not receive 
the information about Mobil's case theories, strategy, and analyses from a lay person who 
might or might not be knowledgeable about which matters were significant. Instead, after 
receiving the background information on the case, Disner participated in an extended 
briefing with the attorneys conducting Mobil's defense against respondents' claims. 
Obviously, communications of that kind are likely to involve an efficient transfer of material 
confidential information and attorney work product. 
 
The record here shows without contradiction that Disner received material confidential 
information concerning respondents' claims against Mobil. In his first telephone 
conversation with one of Mobil's attorneys, Disner discussed the substantive allegations, 
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the procedural status, and Mobil's theories of the case. During their luncheon meeting, 
Mobil's attorneys again briefed Disner on Mobil's theories and on its attorneys' discovery 
strategy, analyses of the issues, and assessment of the state of the case. Moreover, he 
acted on some of that information and provided Mobil's attorneys with the results of his own 
research. Although Disner stated that he did not discuss "the merits" of the case with 
attorneys or employees of the Shapiro firm, the firm's declarations fail to establish that 
Mobil's confidences were unavailable to its adversaries' attorneys, or that effective 
screening procedures secured those confidences from disclosure. 
 
Therefore, the undisputed facts established that, for purposes of a conflict of interest 
analysis, Disner represented Mobil. Consequently, Disner and the firm to which he was of 
counsel, the Shapiro firm, represented opposing parties in the same litigation. The potential 
for a breach of the duty of confidentiality, whether inadvertent or otherwise, is apparent. The 
record provides no basis for considering whether an ethical screen, or other means of 
protecting Mobil's confidences, could serve the same prophylactic purpose as 
disqualification. We turn, then, to the reasons for applying the rule of disqualification to 
attorneys of counsel to a firm. 
 
IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION AND “OF COUNSEL” ATTORNEYS 
 
As amicus curiae, the State Bar of California, observes, "The `of counsel' designation has, 
over the years, come to mean a variety of things in jurisdictions across the nation." 
Attorneys who are of counsel to a firm may be permanent full-time practitioners who for 
various reasons are not on the traditional career path towards partnership in the firm. Of 
counsel attorneys also may be part-time affiliates of a firm who have other personal or 
professional commitments, or they may be potential partners brought into a firm for a 
probationary period.  
 
The minimum requirements for designating an attorney in California as being of counsel to a 
firm are found among the standards for communications that presumptively violate the 
prohibition against false or deceptive communications: "A `communication' which states or 
implies that a member or law firm is `of counsel' to another lawyer or a law firm unless the 
former has a relationship with the latter (other than as a partner or associate, or officer or 
shareholder pursuant to Business and Professions Code sections 6160-6172) which is 
close, personal, continuous, and regular."  
 
We agree with the State Bar's view that the essence of the relationship between a firm and 
an attorney of counsel to the firm "is the closeness of the `counsel' they share on client 
matters. Members of the public are encouraged to consult with those sharing an `of counsel' 
relationship with the expectation that the counselling resources of both are fully available to 
clients." The same view was reflected in the Bar Association of San Francisco's Formal 
Opinion No. 1985-1: "[A] firm which lists an attorney as `of counsel' on its letterhead, shingle 
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or listing is making an affirmative representation to its clients that the services of that 
attorney are available to clients of the firm." 
 
As noted earlier, the need to protect client confidences can cause one attorney's conflict of 
interest disqualification to be imputed to other attorneys in the same firm. When attorneys 
presumptively share access to privileged and confidential matters because they practice 
together in a firm, the disqualification of one attorney extends vicariously to the entire firm.  
The vicarious disqualification rule recognizes the everyday reality that attorneys, working 
together and practicing law in a professional association, share each other's, and their 
clients', confidential information. The expectation that attorneys associated together will 
share confidences is reflected in the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, rule 1.6, comment [8]: "Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, 
disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has 
instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers." 
 
The close, personal, continuous, and regular relationship between a law firm and the 
attorneys affiliated with it as of counsel contains many of the same elements that justify the 
rule of vicarious disqualification applied to partners, associates, and members. An of 
counsel attorney, particularly one frequently in the firm's offices or in contact with the firm's 
attorneys, may be consulted on a variety of matters without being formally identified as co-
counsel. This close, fluid, and continuing relationship, with its attendant exchanges of 
information, advice, and opinions, properly makes the of counsel attorney subject to the 
conflict imputation rule, regardless of whether that attorney has any financial stake in a 
particular matter.  
 
We find persuasive amicus curiae the State Bar of California's conclusion in its 1993 ethics 
opinion on the subject: "[T]o the extent the relationship between a principal member [of the 
State Bar] or law firm and another member or law firm is sufficiently `close, personal, 
regular and continuous,' such that one is held out to the public as `of counsel' for the other, 
the principal and `of counsel' relationship must be considered a single, de facto firm for 
purposes of rule 3-310. Accordingly, if the `of counsel' is precluded from a representation by 
reason of rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, the principal is 
presumptively precluded as well, and vice-versa." The American Bar Association 
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility reached the same conclusion in its 
Formal Opinion No. 90-357: "There can be no doubt that an of counsel lawyer (or firm) is 
`associated in' and has an `association with' the firm (or firms) to which the lawyer is of 
counsel, for purposes of both the general imputation of disqualification ... and the imputation 
of disqualification resulting from former government service.... Similarly, the of counsel 
lawyer is `affiliated' with the firm and its individual lawyers for purposes of the general 
attribution of disqualifications under DR 5-105(d) of the Model Code." Notwithstanding the 
variations to be expected across the nation on any point of law, the prevailing view is that 
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for purposes of disqualification, the of counsel attorney is considered to be affiliated with a 
firm so that the disqualification of one from representation must be imputed to the other.  
 
In order to designate themselves as of counsel, attorneys must have close, personal, 
continuous, and regular relationships with their affiliated firms. Consequently, the attorneys 
brought together in these relationships frequently will have occasion to share client 
confidences in the course of exchanging advice and performing legal services for those 
clients. The fundamental nature of the relationship makes a presumption of shared 
confidences as appropriate for the of counsel attorney as it is for partners, associates, and 
members of law firms. From the clients' and the public's perspective, the of counsel attorney 
can hardly be distinguished from other attorneys who may be more closely tied to a firm 
financially. As a result, the need to preserve confidentiality and public confidence in the 
integrity of the legal profession and judicial process require that of counsel attorneys be 
regarded as the same as partners, associates, and members of law firms for conflict of 
interest issues. 
 
In this case, the of counsel attorney obtained confidential information and provided legal 
services to Mobil. For conflict of interest purposes, the attorney's involvement went beyond 
initial or peripheral contacts and rose to the level for which fiduciary duties of confidentiality 
and loyalty properly can be imposed. This development meant that Disner and the Shapiro 
firm represented adversaries in the same litigation, with the concomitant potential for a 
breach of the duty of confidentiality. 
 
Disner's conflict of interest must be imputed to the Shapiro firm because of the public 
designation of their relationship. Consequently, Disner's conflict of interest must inevitably 
lead to the Shapiro firm's vicarious disqualification from representing respondents to assure 
the preservation of Mobil's confidences and the integrity of the judicial process. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did the Supreme Court hold that the Shapiro firm was disqualified from 
representing SpeeDee? 
2. How could the Shapiro firm have avoided disqualification? 
3. Could adopting “firewall” have enabled the Shapiro firm to represent SpeeDee? 
 
Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining Company, Inc., 81 Ohio St. 3d 1 (1998) 
 
Summary: Attorney Pearson and the Spangenberg law firm represented Kala in an 
action against his former employer, Aluminum Smelting. During Kala’s appeal, Pearson 
left Spangenberg and joined the Duvin firm, which represented Aluminum Smelting in 
the same action. Kala filed a motion to disqualify Duvin, which the Ohio Supreme Court 
granted despite Duvin’s efforts to firewall Pearson, because of the strong appearance of 
impropriety. 
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LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
 
The issue before the court is whether a law firm should be automatically disqualified from 
representing a party when an attorney leaves his or her former employment with a firm 
representing a party and joins the law firm representing the opposing party, or whether that law 
firm may overcome any presumption of shared confidences by instituting effective screening 
mechanisms. Although this issue has been dealt with in many other jurisdictions, this is a case 
of first impression for Ohio. To fairly decide this issue, we must consider the Disciplinary Rules 
and Ethical Considerations in the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, competing public 
policy interests, and the guidance provided by federal case law. 
 
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES 
 
A fundamental principle in the attorney-client relationship is that the attorney shall maintain the 
confidentiality of any information learned during the attorney-client relationship. A client must 
have the utmost confidence in his or her attorney if the client is to feel free to divulge all matters 
related to the case to his or her attorney. 
 
The obligation of an attorney to preserve the confidences and secrets of the client continues 
even after the termination of the attorney’s employment. 
 
In addition, an attorney should avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Because of the 
importance of these ethical principles, it is the court's duty to safeguard the preservation of the 
attorney-client relationship. In doing so, a court helps to maintain public confidence in the legal 
profession and assists in protecting the integrity of the judicial proceeding. 
 
When an attorney leaves his or her former employment and becomes employed by a firm 
representing an opposing party, a presumption arises that the attorney takes with him or her any 
confidences gained in the former relationship and shares those confidences with the new firm. 
This is known as the presumption of shared confidences. Some courts have held that such a 
change of employment results in an irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences that 
necessitates the disqualification of the attorney (primary disqualification) and the entire new firm 
(imputed disqualification). 
 
CLIENT'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE COUNSEL 
 
Balanced against the former client’s interest in preventing a breach of confidence is the public 
policy interest in permitting the opposing party's continued representation by counsel of his or 
her choice. Disqualification interferes with a client's right to choose counsel. 
 
“Disqualification, as a prophylactic device for protecting the attorney-client relationship, is a 
drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary. A 
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disqualification of counsel, while protecting the attorney-client relationship, also serves to 
destroy a relationship by depriving a party of representation of their own choosing.” 
 
This issue has become increasingly important as the practice of law has changed. A review of 
the historical development of disqualification issues reveals the early conflicts created by the 
clash of the above principles. 
 
HISTORY OF MOTIONS TO DISQUALIFY 
 
Many of the early disqualification cases arose out of charges of conflict of interest where 
government attorneys left the public service and went into private practice. Early courts 
struggled with the need to fashion a rule that would preserve the confidences of the government 
client yet not discourage able attorneys from entering public service through fear of being locked 
forever into government service, unable to change positions. 
 
“If past employment in government results in the disqualification of future employers from 
representing some of their long-term clients, it seems clearly possible that government attorneys 
will be regarded as ‘Typhoid Marys.’ Many talented lawyers, in turn, may be unwilling to spend a 
period in government service, if that service makes them unattractive or risky for large law firms 
to hire.” 
 
As more and more private attorneys also began changing firms, motions to disqualify under the 
irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences increased, and inequities and abuses also 
began to surface. While some of these motions to disqualify were legitimate and necessary, 
such motions were also often misused to harass an opponent, disrupt the opponent's case, or to 
gain a tactical advantage, and therefore were viewed with increasing caution. 
 
As a result, several federal cases began fashioning a way to deal with the competing interests 
caused by increased mobility of attorneys and the rise of motions to disqualify. The Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Manning summed up the changing practice of law as follows: 
 
Perhaps these motions have become more numerous simply because the changing 
nature of the manner in which legal services are delivered may present a greater 
number of potential conflicts. Certainly, the advent of law firms employing hundreds of 
lawyers engaging in a plethora of specialties contrasts starkly with the former 
preponderance of single practitioners and small firms engaging in only a few practice 
specialties. In addition, lawyers seem to be moving more freely from one association to 
another, and law firm mergers have become commonplace. At the same time that the 
potential for conflicts of interest has increased as the result of these phenomena, the 
availability of competent legal specialists has been concentrated under fewer roofs. 
 
Consequently, these new realities must be at the core of the balancing of interests 
necessarily undertaken when courts consider motions for vicarious disqualification of 
counsel. 
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As a result of the changing legal profession, federal courts and the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct began allowing the use of various mechanisms to isolate an attorney who 
had transferred employment. Although originally applied only to government attorneys, these 
mechanisms have now been extended to situations involving transfers of private counsel as 
well. 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION 
 
Several federal courts in addressing both primary and imputed disqualification have devised a 
three-part test to determine whether disqualification is proper when one attorney leaves a firm 
and joins another firm representing an opposing party. We believe this test adequately covers 
many different scenarios and will give the courts of Ohio guidance on disqualification issues. 
 
First, a court must determine whether a substantial relationship exists between prior and 
present representations. If there is no substantial relationship, then no ethical problem exists. 
For example, when an attorney had represented a client in a trademark infringement case, the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied disqualification in a later unrelated civil RICO case. 
 
Second, if a substantial relationship is found between the current matter and the prior matter, 
the court must examine whether the attorney shared in the confidences and representation of 
the prior matter. There is a presumption that such confidences would also be shared among 
members of the prior firm, but that presumption may be rebutted. 
 
In Freeman, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in setting the rules on primary 
disqualification, instructed the trial court that it could “rely on any of a number of factors, among 
them being the size of the law firm, the area of specialization of the attorney, the attorney’s 
position in the firm, and the demeanor and credibility of witnesses at the evidentiary hearing.” 
 
If the presumption of shared confidences within the prior firm is rebutted by such evidence, then 
there is again no need for primary disqualification, as there are no confidences to be shared. 
However, if that presumption is not rebutted, and the attorney does or is presumed to possess 
client confidences, primary disqualification results, and a presumption of shared confidences 
arises between the attorney and the members of the attorney's new firm. The issue then is 
whether a presumption of shared confidences will also disqualify the entire new firm (imputed 
disqualification). Kala implies that this presumption should be irrebuttable and that once an 
attorney, particularly one as involved in the case as Pearson was, moves to opposing counsel's 
firm, no steps can be taken to restore confidence so as to overcome the appearance of 
impropriety; the entire firm must be disqualified. 
 
Some courts have taken this approach. New Jersey has refused to adopt the rebuttable-
presumption approach, finding that there is no way to overcome the appearance of impropriety 
in a "side-switching attorney" case. Cardona, 942 F.Supp. at 976-977. The New Jersey courts 
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cite the impossibility of proving when a breach has been made, as those lawyers within the new 
firm are least likely to divulge such information. Judge Orlofsky in Cardona explained: 
 
"At the heart of every `side-switching attorney' case is the suspicion that by changing sides, the 
attorney has breached a duty of fidelity and loyalty to a former client, a client who had freely 
shared with the attorney secrets and confidences with the expectation that they would be 
disclosed to no one else. It is for this reason that the `appearance of impropriety doctrine' was 
adopted to protect the public, our profession, and those it serves. In short, this much maligned 
doctrine exists to engender, protect and preserve the trust and confidence of clients." 
 
On the other hand, with the realities of modern-day practice, as discussed in the Manning case, 
such a hard-and-fast rule works an unfair hardship also. Ultimately, one must have faith in the 
integrity of members of the legal profession to honor their professional oath to uphold the Code 
of Professional Responsibility, safeguarded by the precautions required to rebut the 
presumption of shared confidences. If used properly, the process of screening attorneys who 
possess client confidences from other members of a firm can preserve those confidences while 
avoiding the use of the motion to disqualify as a device to gain a tactical advantage. Therefore, 
we believe that the fairer rule in balancing the interests of the parties and the public is to allow 
the presumption of shared confidences with members of the new firm to be rebutted. 
 
Thus, the third part of the test on disqualification is whether the presumption of shared 
confidences with the new firm has been rebutted by evidence that a "Chinese wall" has been 
erected so as to preserve the confidences of the client.56 The Chinese wall is the specific 
institutional screening mechanisms that will prevent the flow of confidential information from the 
quarantined attorney to other members of the law firm. 
 
Factors to be considered in deciding whether an effective screen has been created are whether 
the law firm is sufficiently large and whether the structural divisions of the firm are sufficiently 
separate so as to minimize contact between the quarantined attorney and the others, the 
likelihood of contact between the quarantined attorney and the specific attorneys responsible for 
the current representation, the existence of safeguards or procedures which prevent the 
quarantined attorney from access to relevant files or other information relevant to the present 
litigation, prohibited access to files and other information on the case, locked case files with 
keys distributed to a select few, secret codes necessary to access pertinent information on 
electronic hardware, instructions given to all members of a new firm regarding the ban on 
exchange of information, and the prohibition of the sharing of fees derived from such litigation. 
 
																																																								
56 “Chinese wall" has become the legal term to describe a “procedure which permits an attorney involved 
in an earlier adverse role to be screened from other attorneys in the firm so as to prevent disqualification 
of the entire law firm simply because one member of firm previously represented a client who is now an 
adversary of the client currently represented by the firm.” Black's Law Dictionary (6 Ed.Rev.1990) 240. 
This term refers historically to the Great Wall of China, which served ancient Chinese emperors as a 
barrier to invasion. Ironically, however, the Great Wall of China was of limited military value. The concept 
is also referred to in cases and commentary as "screening devices," "ethical screens," or "institutional 
mechanisms for screening." [Editor’s note: Screening procedures are now typically called “firewalls.”] 
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A very strict standard of proof must be applied to the rebuttal of this presumption of shared 
confidences, however, and any doubts as to the existence of an asserted conflict of interest 
must be resolved in favor of disqualification in order to dispel any appearance of impropriety. 
 
Some courts have held that unrebutted affidavits attesting to a Chinese wall are sufficient to 
prevent disqualification. However, we reject such a bright-line test, as the court should maintain 
discretion to weigh issues of credibility. The court should be free to assess the reputation of an 
attorney and law firm for integrity and honesty. The court should also be free to balance the 
appearance of impropriety against the protections of a Chinese wall. For example, suppose a 
sole practitioner representing a plaintiff switches sides to a five-person defense firm 
representing the opposing party, leaving his former client to seek new counsel. The appearance 
of impropriety in such a fact pattern may be impossible to overcome. 
 
If applied properly, screening mechanisms to insulate a quarantined attorney from the rest of the 
firm can protect client confidences while allowing for attorney mobility and the right of a client to 
choose counsel. 
 
ADDITIONAL FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN MOTIONS TO DISQUALIFY 
 
In addition to the screening devices, there are other important factors to be considered by the 
trial court. First, the screening devices must be employed as soon as the disqualifying event 
occurs. Very few cases address how early the disqualifying event occurs. In the Manning case, 
a conflict arose with the attorney's former firm only after the attorney, with the former client's 
knowledge, had moved to an uninvolved law firm. In Cromley, the attorney and the new firm 
agreed that “absolutely nothing of a substantive nature regarding the instant lawsuit would occur 
until decisions were made and the clients were made aware of them.” Other cases reviewed 
have been silent as to the issue of when screening procedures were timely employed, although 
all cases agree that the screens must be in place when the attorney joins the firm. Instituting 
screens after a motion to disqualify is too late. Accordingly, a court must weigh the timeliness of 
the screening devices. 
 
A second factor to consider is the hardship that a client would incur in obtaining new counsel if a 
motion to disqualify is granted. Hardship may be more of an issue if a conflict arose after a 
transfer. However, hardship may not carry much weight in a “side-switching” case. Ironically, 
where an attorney switches sides and joins an opposing counsel’s firm, the attorney has de 
facto deprived his or her first client of the attorney of that client's choice, namely himself or 
herself. If the attorney has been lead counsel, other counsel in the firm must spend time and 
effort to take over the lead. If no one remaining in the prior firm is able to handle the matter, or if 
the attorney was a sole practitioner, the former client must seek out new counsel and incur the 
burden and expense created by the switch. In this scenario, the departing attorney has created 
a competing hardship for his or her former client, and the claim by the new firm of hardship 
created by its own doing in accepting the new attorney into the firm may no longer be 
persuasive. These are matters that should be left to the trier of fact to weigh. 
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In addition, a law firm contemplating hiring counsel who had been directly involved on the 
opposing side also has a duty to disclose to its own client that such a hiring may place the firm 
in conflict and could result in disqualification. The law firm may have to subordinate its desire to 
augment its staff against its duties to its client and avoid placing the firm's interests above the 
client's interests. 
 
Finally, the court should hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to disqualify and must issue 
findings of fact if requested based on the evidence presented. Because a request for 
disqualification implies a charge of unethical conduct, the challenged firm must be given an 
opportunity to defend not only its relationship with the client, but also its good name, reputation 
and ethical standards. In Analytica, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit summarized the 
situation as follows: 
 
An attorney’s and/or a law firm’s most valuable asset is their professional reputation for 
competence, and above all honesty and integrity, which should not be jeopardized in a 
summary type of disqualification proceeding of this nature. As court proceedings are 
matters of public record, a news media report concerning a summary disqualification 
order, based on a scant record of this type, can do irreparable harm to an attorney's or 
law firm's professional reputation. We must recognize that the great majority of lawyers, 
as officers of the court, do conduct themselves well within the bounds of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility. 
 
THE REBUTTABLE-PRESUMPTION TEST FOR MOTIONS TO DISQUALIFY 
 
In conclusion, we hold that in ruling on a motion for disqualification of either an individual 
(primary disqualification) or the entire firm (imputed disqualification) when an attorney has left a 
law firm and joined a firm representing the opposing party, a court must hold an evidentiary 
hearing and issue findings of fact using a three-part analysis: 
 
(1) Is there a substantial relationship between the matter at issue and the matter of the 
former firm's prior representation; 
(2) If there is a substantial relationship between these matters, is the presumption of 
shared confidences within the former firm rebutted by evidence that the attorney had no 
personal contact with or knowledge of the related matter; and 
(3) If the attorney did have personal contact with or knowledge of the related matter, did 
the new law firm erect adequate and timely screens to rebut a presumption of shared 
confidences with the new firm so as to avoid imputed disqualification? 
 
APPLICATION OF TEST TO THIS CASE 
 
Under the facts of this case, Pearson clearly met the substantial-relationship test and 
possessed client confidences, as he was the lead attorney on Kala's lawsuit. Thus, the first two 
parts of the test require disqualification of Pearson and raise a presumption in favor of 
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disqualification of Duvin. No one disputes that Pearson, himself, cannot work further on the 
case. 
 
Therefore, we must determine whether the entire firm should be disqualified under the third part 
of the analysis, imputed disqualification. The appellate court took evidence in the form of 
affidavits but denied the parties oral argument. The appellate order consisted of the following 
findings: 
 
"Motion by appellant to disqualify counsel for defendants/appellees is granted. Appellee's new 
counsel shall file a notice of appearance on or before May 31, 1996." 
 
Therefore, we must examine the record we have before us, which consists of exhibits and 
affidavits filed while the parties were briefing the disqualification question in the court of appeals. 
 
Kala retained Pearson and the Spangenberg firm in 1993 as his attorneys. From 1993 through 
1995, Kala trusted Pearson, relied upon him as his attorney, and disclosed all matters pertaining 
to his case involving his former employer, Aluminum Smelting. Pearson proceeded to file an 
appeal after the directed verdict and apparently even participated in a settlement conference 
with the Eighth District Court of Appeals on November 13, 1995. On January 8, 1996, Pearson 
obtained a continuance to file Kala's appellate brief. On January 22, 1996, Pearson left the 
Spangenberg firm and joined the Duvin firm, which was representing Aluminum Smelting and 
had been throughout the prior proceedings with Kala. The only conclusion that can be reached 
from the record is that Pearson was negotiating with Duvin while still actively representing Kala 
without disclosing to Kala his negotiations. 
 
The appearance of impropriety is so strong that nothing that the Duvin firm could have done 
would have had any effect on Kala's perception that his personal attorney had abandoned him 
with all of his shared confidences and joined the firm representing his adversary while the case 
was still pending. No steps of any kind could possibly replace the trust and confidence that Kala 
had in his attorney or in the legal system if such representation is permitted. This is the classic 
"side-switching attorney" case. 
 
We find that under this set of egregious facts, the appearance of impropriety was so great that 
the attempts made by Duvin to erect a Chinese wall were insufficient to overcome the 
appearance of impropriety. Accordingly, we affirm the disqualification ruling of the court of 
appeals. 
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4.7: Specific Conflicts of Interest 
 
I was gambling in havana, I took a little risk. Send lawyers, guns, and money, Dad, get me out 
of this, hiyah!57 
 
Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, special rules govern the attorney-client 
relationship in specific circumstances, and define obligations imposed by the attorney’s fiduciary 
duties. As discussed in Class 9, attorneys may engage in financial transactions with their clients 
only if transaction is fair and reasonable to the client, and the attorney obtains the client’s 
informed consent to the transaction in writing. But Rule 1.8 also imposes other specific 
obligations on attorneys in relations to other potential agreements and transactions with their 
clients. For example, it requires attorneys to obtain informed consent before using confidential 
client information to the detriment of the client, and limits the ability of attorneys to receive gifts 
from or makes loans to their clients. 
 
Rule 1.8: Current Clients: Specific Rules 
 
a. A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an 
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless: 
1. the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and 
reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a 
manner that can be reasonably understood by the client; 
2. the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a 
reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel on the 
transaction; and 
3. the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the 
essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, 
including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction. 
b. A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the 
disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted 
or required by these Rules. 
c. A lawyer shall not solicit any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, 
or prepare on behalf of a client an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the 
lawyer any substantial gift unless the lawyer or other recipient of the gift is related to the 
client. For purposes of this paragraph, related persons include a spouse, child, 
grandchild, parent, grandparent or other relative or individual with whom the lawyer or 
the client maintains a close, familial relationship. 
d. Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate 
an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in 
substantial part on information relating to the representation. 
e. A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or 
contemplated litigation, except that: 
																																																								
57 Warren Zevon, Lawyers, Guns and Money, Excitable Boy (1978). 
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1. a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of 
which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and 
2. a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of 
litigation on behalf of the client. 
f. A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the 
client unless: 
1. the client gives informed consent; 
2. there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment 
or with the client-lawyer relationship; and 
3. information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 
1.6. 
g. A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate 
settlement of the claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated 
agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed 
consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyer's disclosure shall include the 
existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each 
person in the settlement. 
h. A lawyer shall not: 
1. make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for 
malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making the 
agreement; or 
2. settle a claim or potential claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or 
former client unless that person is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking 
and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal 
counsel in connection therewith. 
 
Loans to Clients 
 
In its majestic equality, the law forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, beg in the 
streets and steal loaves of bread.58 
 
In re Morse, 748 S.E.2d 921 (Ga. 2013) 
 
Summary: Attorney Jack Morse lent a client $1,400 to avoid foreclosure and possible 
jail time for his violation probation. Even though his client repaid the loan in full, Morse 
admitted that this was a violation of Model Rule 1.8(e). Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
of Georgia imposed a voluntary reprimand on Morse.  
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on a Petition for Voluntary Discipline filed by 
Respondent Jack O. Morse (State Bar No. 525800) pursuant to Bar Rule 4-227(b)(2) before a 
																																																								
58 Anatole France, The Red Lily (1894). 
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formal complaint was issued. In his petition, Morse admits violating Rule 1.8(e) of the Georgia 
Rules of Professional Conduct set forth in Bar Rule 4-102(d). Although such a violation is 
punishable by public reprimand, Morse requests the imposition of a Review Panel reprimand. 
The State Bar has no objection. 
 
Morse, who has been a member of the State Bar since 1972, admits that while representing a 
client in a personal injury claim, he lent the client $1,400 for the client's use in avoiding 
foreclosure and possible jail time for his violation of probation. Although the client repaid the 
loan in full, Morse admits that he violated Rule 1.8(e). He asserts that while he has had three 
instances of prior discipline (having received a 90-day suspension in 1996, and Review Panel 
reprimands in both 1993 and 1998 — one of which was for similar misconduct), he has had no 
disciplinary matters for an extended period of time. He further asserts that since 1998, he has 
shown a strong regard for the professional standards of conduct and asks that this Court 
consider, in mitigation, his cooperative attitude with disciplinary authorities and the fact that the 
violation occurred as a result of him attempting to assist the client, a longtime acquaintance. 
 
Under these specific circumstances, we agree that imposition of a Review Panel reprimand is 
an appropriate sanction. Accordingly, we accept Morse's petition for voluntary discipline and 
hereby order that Morse receive a Review Panel reprimand in accordance with Bar Rules 4-
102(b)(4) and 4-220(b) for his admitted violation of Rule 1.8(e). 
 
Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Review Panel reprimand. 
 
All the Justices concur. 
 
BLACKWELL, Justice, concurring. 
 
I concur fully in the opinion of the Court, but I write separately to remind our readers that a 
lawyer providing financial assistance to a litigation client is not always a violation of Rule 1.8(e). 
With two exceptions, Rule 1.8(e) provides that “a lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to 
a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation.” By its plain terms, the Rule only 
prohibits the provision of financial assistance to a litigation client to the extent of some 
“connection” between the financial assistance on the one hand, and the litigation or 
representation on the other. Absent such a “connection,” a lawyer may provide financial 
assistance to a litigation client without running afoul of Rule 1.8(e). 
 
This understanding not only is required by the plain terms of the Rule, but it also is perfectly 
consistent with the three purposes of Rule 1.8(e). First, Rule 1.8(e) is intended to preserve the 
loyalty and independence that the lawyer owes to the client, loyalty and independence that 
might be compromised if the lawyer obtained “too great a financial stake in the litigation.” 
Second, the Rule is intended to “prevent clients from selecting a lawyer based on improper 
factors,” considering that “unregulated lending to clients might generate unseemly bidding wars 
for cases.” Third, the Rule is intended to restrain the pernicious practices of barratry, 
maintenance, and champerty. As I see it, financial assistance to an existing client that has no 
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connection whatsoever with the litigation or representation of the client does not offend any of 
the policies that the Rule is intended to promote. 
 
This case is a little troubling to me because it appears from the record that Morse has been a 
friend of his client for a long time, such that he might have provided financial assistance to his 
client independent of the attorney-client relationship or the litigation, and indeed, even in the 
absence of an attorney-client relationship or litigation. Lawyers can be generous, and it is not 
uncommon for lawyers to help out their kin, their friends, and their neighbors. Nevertheless, 
Morse has unequivocally admitted a violation of Rule 1.8(e), and as such, he has implicitly 
admitted a connection between the financial assistance he provided and the litigation in which 
he represented his client. For that reason, I am content to join the Court in accepting his petition 
for voluntary discipline, and I am satisfied with the discipline that the Court has seen fit to 
impose. I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this concurrence. 
 
State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Smolen, 17 P.3d 456 (Okla. 2000) 
 
Summary: The Oklahoma Bar Association brought an action against attorney Donald E. 
Smolen who made a loan to his client for living expenses in violation of Model Rule 1.8. 
Smolen challenged this action on the grounds that Model Rule 1.8 violated the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it treats similarly situated 
classes of litigants differently: those who need advances for living expenses and those 
who need advances for litigation costs. Accordingly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
applied the rational basis test to determine that this disparate treatment was rationally 
related to legitimate goal of protecting clients and maintaining integrity of the Bar. 
Therefore, the Court imposed a 60 day suspension on Smolen.  
 
I. OVERVIEW 
 
Complainant, the Oklahoma Bar Association, alleged one count of misconduct warranting 
discipline against respondent attorney, Donald E. Smolen (Respondent). The complaint alleged 
that Respondent had violated rule 1.8(e) of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct 
(ORPC), Okla. Stat. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A (1991) (prohibition against providing financial 
assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation). Respondent 
received a public reprimand in 1992 for loaning money to clients. In an unpublished reprimand 
issued in 1987, the respondent received an eight-month suspension from the practice of law. 
The 1987 suspension was imposed for violations of DR 1-102(A)(3) ("engaging in illegal 
conduct involving moral turpitude"), DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging "in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation"), DR 9-102(B) (failing to preserve the "identity of funds and 
property of a client"), and rule 1.3 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings (acting in a 
manner "contrary to prescribed standards of conduct"). 
 
In the present matter, the parties have stipulated to the facts and recommended discipline. The 
Professional Responsibility Tribunal (PRT) accepted the stipulations of fact, found that 
Respondent had violated rule 1.8(e), and recommended Respondent be publicly censured. 
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II. FACTS 
 
During Respondent's representation of Mr. Miles in a case before the Workers' Compensation 
Court, Respondent loaned Mr. Miles $1,200. The check to Mr. Miles recited that the money was 
for travel expenses. Respondent admitted that the true purpose of the loan was for living 
expenses because Mr. Miles' home had been destroyed by fire. Without the loan, Mr. Miles 
indicated he would have to move to Indiana and would be unable to continue his medical 
treatment or make court appearances. At the time of the loan, Mr. Miles was receiving 
temporary total disability benefits of $426.00 a week from which Respondent's attorney fee was 
subtracted. Mr. Miles received $384.00 a week before loan payments. 
 
Respondent's loan to Mr. Miles was interest free and without penalty or cost other than the 
amount of the principal. Mr. Miles was to repay the loan at $100.00 a week from his temporary 
total disability benefits. Mr. Miles made three $100.00 payments on the loan. One of the 
payments was returned to Mr. Miles resulting in his paying only $200.00 on the loan. 
Respondent agreed to forego further repayment until final settlement of the Workers' 
Compensation case. 
 
When Mr. Miles became involved in other legal matters, he sought an attorney to handle the 
additional matters together with the workers' compensation claim. After learning of Mr. Miles 
search for a new attorney, Respondent terminated the attorney-client relationship with Mr. Miles. 
Thereafter, Mr. Miles hired Mr. Elias to represent him. During mediation over a fee dispute 
between Mr. Miles and Mr. Elias, the Tulsa County Bar Association learned of Respondent's 
loan and reported Respondent's conduct to the Oklahoma Bar Association. 
 
Respondent admits the loan to Mr. Miles is not an isolated incident. He testified that he had 
consulted lawyers whose opinions are well respected in legal ethics, and it was their belief that 
Respondent's conduct would not violate rule 1.8(e). Respondent admits that his actions violate 
the express language of rule 1.8(e). However, Respondent submits that he has not violated the 
intent of rule 1.8(e), and that rule 1.8(e) unconstitutionally treats clients who need humanitarian 
loans differently than clients who receive advances of litigation expenses and court costs. 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
Rule 1.8(e) of the ORPC under which Respondent was disciplined in 1992 for giving financial 
assistance to clients, provided: 
 
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a 
lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to a client, except that a 
lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs, 
expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and 
presenting evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses. 
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Based on the Model Rules adopted by the American Bar Association, rule 1.8(e) was amended 
in 1993 to provide: 
 
A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or 
contemplated litigation, except that a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of 
litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter. 
 
The primary change under the Model Rules is that the repayment of litigation expenses and 
court costs may be contingent on the outcome of the case. Both the 1992 and 1993 versions of 
rule 1.8(e) unambiguously prohibit a lawyer from advancing living expenses to clients. In this 
case, Respondent advanced funds for living expenses to be repaid from the client's worker's 
compensation benefits, an action admittedly prohibited by rule 1.8(e). 
 
Most authorities prohibit a lawyer from providing financial assistance to clients for living 
expenses during representation. In 1991, a draft of a provision of the Restatement of Law would 
have allowed a lawyer to make or guarantee a loan to a client "if the loan was needed to enable 
the client to withstand delay in litigation that otherwise might unjustly induce the client to settle 
or dismiss a case because of financial hardship rather than on the merits." However, in 1996 the 
American Law Institute Council decided the rule was ill-advised, and, in 1998, the provision was 
removed. The final draft of the Restatement would not allow a lawyer to make or guarantee a 
loan to a client except for litigation expenses and court costs. Rule 1.8(e) of the American Bar 
Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct adopted in 1983 prohibits a lawyer from 
advancing funds to a client for living expenses. A proposal to allow lawyers to advance clients 
funds for living expenses was rejected by the American Bar Association House of Delegates. 
 
Twenty-nine states have adopted the current version of ABA Model Rule 1.8(e) which allows 
repayment of litigation costs to be contingent on the outcome of the case but forbids advances 
for living expenses. Fourteen other states follow the ABA Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility, adopted in 1969, or a version of the Model Rules or Model Code that requires 
the client remain liable for litigation expenses and court costs and prohibits advances for living 
expenses. Only eight states explicitly allow lawyers to advance or guarantee loans to clients for 
living expenses: Alabama, California, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, North 
Dakota, and Texas. 
 
Only one state has refused to discipline a lawyer for advancing funds to clients for living 
expenses during representation. The Louisiana State Supreme Court stated that advancing 
money to an indigent client for necessary living expenses during representation did not violate 
the Louisiana rules of legal ethics. Even though the court questioned the constitutionality of the 
rule, the court based its conclusion on a finding that the conduct did not violate the rule's intent. 
The lawyer was disciplined for making advances which were not based on the client's needs. In 
The Alaska Supreme Court held the rule did not unconstitutionally deny or interfere with the 
client's access to the courts. Further, no court has invalidated rule 1.8(e) based on a 
constitutional infirmity. 
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We have has previously disciplined lawyers for providing financial assistance to clients for 
purposes other than litigation expenses and court costs. Several other courts addressing the 
question have also imposed discipline on lawyers for like conduct. The Mississippi Supreme 
Court expressed its concern that allowing a lawyer to advance funds to a client for living 
expenses would “generate unseemly bidding wars for cases and inevitably lead to further 
denigration of our civil justice system.” 
 
A. INTENT OF THE RULE 
 
Respondent admits violating rule 1.8(e) but argues that he should not be disciplined because he 
did not violate the intent of the rule. What Respondent in reality requests is that we adopt an 
exception to the rule that allows attorneys to make loans to clients for necessary living expenses 
after the attorney-client relationship is established. 
 
The rule against attorneys providing financial assistance to clients for living expenses is based 
on the common-law prohibitions against practice of champerty and maintenance. The evils 
associated with champerty and maintenance intended to be prevented by rule 1.8(e)'s 
prohibition are: (1) clients selecting a lawyer based on improper factors, and (2) conflicts of 
interest, including compromising a lawyer's independent judgment in the case and creating the 
potentially conflicting roles of the lawyer as both lawyer and creditor with divergent interests. 
 
Respondent argues that he advanced the funds only after the attorney-client relationship was 
established with repayment to be made from benefits which had already been awarded, and the 
loan was for humanitarian purposes. Thus, he posits that the evils of champerty and 
maintenance are absent here and that he should not be disciplined because he did not violate 
the intent of the rule. We reject this argument as have most other states. First, Mr. Miles' 
workers' compensation claim had not been completely resolved. He was receiving only 
temporary benefits at the time Respondent made the loan, and, at least, a potential settlement 
regarding permanent disability remained pending. Second, it would be unrealistic to conclude 
that even if Respondent does not publicize that he makes loans to clients for living expenses, 
potential clients would not learn of Respondent's practice from existing and past clients. Thus, 
potential clients may base their decision to retain Respondent on improper inducements. The 
fact that the loan was for humanitarian purposes may be a mitigating factor. Nonetheless, 
Respondent violated rule 1.8(e). 
 
Given that the Restatement and the ABA have rejected the same exception tendered by 
Respondent and an overwhelming number of courts have also declined to adopt Respondent's 
proposed exception, we also decline to make the ad hoc exception to rule 1.8(e) advocated by 
Respondent. We are not unsympathetic to the plight of litigants. However, because of the 
potential ethical problems which can arise from a lawyer advancing clients money for living 
expenses, the explicit prohibition against such conduct in the Oklahoma Rules of Professional 
Conduct, we believe Respondent should be disciplined. 
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B. CONSTITUTIONALITY 
 
Respondent asserts that rule 1.8(e) is invalid because it does not treat similarly situated classes 
of litigants equally. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws." This same prohibition is present in article 2, section 7 of the 
Oklahoma Constitution. The two classes of clients proposed by Respondent are those who 
need advances for living expenses and those who need advances for litigation costs. 
 
The deferential rational basis test is applied in constitutional challenges based on the equal 
protection clause when the classification is not based upon an inherently suspect characteristic 
or jeopardizes a fundamental right. The divergent treatment must have only "some relevance to 
the purpose for which the classification is made." Respondent does not argue that the 
classification is based on an inherently suspect characteristic or that a fundamental right is 
jeopardized. Thus, Respondent's challenge is analyzed under the rational basis test. 
 
Assuming for purposes of argument that the two classes posed by Respondent are similarly 
situated, rule 1.8(e)'s disparate treatment of advances for litigation expenses and court costs 
and advances for all other expenses is based on legitimate goals and reflects the differences in 
living expenses and litigation expenses and court costs. First, litigation expenses and court 
costs are directly related to the actual litigation. Living and other expenses are not. Second, 
litigation expenses and court costs are within a lawyer's expertise. Other expenses of clients are 
not considered part of a lawyer's expertise. Third, it is a lawyer's duty to advise his client on 
which litigation expenses and court costs are necessary for the litigation. It is not generally the 
lawyer's duty to advise his clients as to what other expenses are necessary. Fourth, a lawyer 
generally pays the litigation expenses and costs directly to the provider. In the case of other 
expenses, the lawyer generally would give the money to the client, and there would be no 
guarantee that the money would be utilized for the loan's intended purpose. 
 
We agree with the drafters of the Restatement and the ABA Model Rules that a rule allowing 
lawyers to make loans to clients for reasons other that advancing litigation expenses and court 
costs is ill-advised. Because of the potentially inherent abuses in allowing lawyers to make 
loans to clients for reasons other than litigation expenses and court costs, the divergent 
treatment is rationally related to a legitimate goal of protecting clients and maintaining the 
integrity of the Bar. Respondent has failed to show that rule 1.8(e) is unconstitutional. 
 
IV. APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINE 
 
Respondent has been previously disciplined by this Court, once in 1987 and again in 1992. In 
1992, Respondent was publicly censured for the same misconduct with which he is presently 
charged. He admits that the current loan is not an isolated incident. One of the purposes of 
discipline is "deterrence of like behavior by both the respondent and other members of the bar." 
This Court is not bound by the stipulated discipline of the parties. Because Respondent was 
previously disciplined in 1987 for violations of ethical standards, was publicly censured in 1992 
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for the same misconduct for which he is being disciplined in this matter, and has admitted that 
the current violation is not an isolated incident, we deem the appropriate discipline is a sixty-day 
suspension. 
 
Fixed-Fee Agreements 
 
American Ins. Ass’n v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 917 S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1996) 
 
Summary: The American Insurance Association and other insurance associations 
sought review of Court of Advisory Ethics Opinion prohibiting any lawyer from entering 
into contract with an insurer to do all of the insurer’s defense work for a set fee. The 
Supreme Court held that such set fee arrangements are prohibited, because under rule 
1.8(f)(2), it interferes with the exercise of the attorney’s independent professional 
judgment. Instead, “the insurance company must hire members of the private bar to 
undertake representation of their insured.” 
 
STUMBO, Justice. 
 
In this consolidated action, Complainants — American Insurance Association, National 
Association of Independent Insurers, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company — timely filed a motion seeking review by this 
Court of Advisory Ethics Opinion E-368 which was issued by the Board of Governors of 
Respondent, Kentucky Bar Association, and which appeared in the Fall 1994 issue of Kentucky 
Bench & Bar. In addition, State Farm requests that this Court review that portion of 
Unauthorized Practice of Law Opinion U-36 which proscribes the use, by insurance companies, 
of salaried attorneys to provide defense services under the insurers' policies of insurance. 
 
After carefully evaluating the opinions at issue, and the briefs filed and arguments advanced by 
both Complainants and Respondent, we hereby approve and adopt E-368 as written, and 
choose not to disturb U-36. 
 
At issue in this action is the following question presented in E-368: 
 
(1) May a lawyer enter into a contract with a liability insurer in which the lawyer or his 
firm agrees to do all of the insurer's defense work for a set fee? 
 
The Board of Governors answered “no” to this question, and stated that the arrangement at 
issue would violate Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7(b)[1] and 1.8(f)(2)[2], stating 
therein “to some extent the lawyer becomes the insurer; and the lawyer stands to gain by 
limiting the services rendered to the client.” The Board, indicating that the lawyer’s duty to the 
insured client was a function of the attorney-client relationship and not governed by or limited by 
the terms of the insurance contract, expressed concern that this set fee arrangement would 
result in the loss of control of the insured client vis-a-vis actions taken by counsel in the course 
of representation. The Board also noted that the insurer would take on a dual role in such a 
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situation, in that “the insurer wants to continue to promise the insured a defense in the contract 
of insurance, while limiting the extent of its undertaking in a side contract between the insured's 
lawyer and the insurer to which the insured is not a party.” The Board characterized the 
circumstance presented in E-368 as but the latest issue to arise from attempts by insurers to cut 
costs. One such cost-cutting measure, referenced in the “Background” section of E-368 and 
more fully discussed in U-36, involved the practice of insurers to attempt to provide defense 
services directly through salaried attorney employees — a practice, the Board concluded, that 
“is not permitted in Kentucky, for in addition to the obvious conflicts of interest that would be 
presented by such an arrangement, the practice would violate the law governing unauthorized 
practice.” 
 
More specifically, this issue was addressed in U-36 through the following question: 
 
May an insurance company employ in-house counsel (salaried employees) to represent 
their insured after a lawsuit has been filed? 
 
This question was answered in the negative. The opinion relied upon both Canon 3 of the ABA 
Code of Professional Responsibility, which governs the areas of unauthorized practice of law, 
and SCR 3.020, which defines the practice of law in Kentucky and recognizes that “nothing 
herein shall prevent any natural person not holding himself out as a practicing attorney from 
drawing any instrument to which he is a party without consideration unto himself therefor.” The 
opinion also cited to long-standing Kentucky case law which proscribes a corporation from being 
licensed to practice a learned profession, such as law. Ethical rules and legal precedent were 
merged in the opinion to reach the conclusion that in the typical action on an insurance contract, 
the insured, and not the insurer, was the party-defendant, and that, therefore, “the insurance 
company must hire members of the private bar to undertake representation of their insured.” 
 
Complainants contend that not only did the Board paint with too broad a brush in applying U-36 
to E-368, but, that the former opinion, of itself, represents only a minority view of the 
interpretation of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, and is, in fact, antithetical to the 
precedent which attempts to follow the intent of the Code. Complainants seek support from the 
ethics opinions and case law of other jurisdictions which allow house counsel to provide 
insurance defense services. Additionally, State Farm asserts that Gardner v. North Carolina 
State Bar, which is referenced in E-368 and which this Complainant terms “the sole court 
decision holding that the use of claim litigation counsel constitutes the unauthorized practice of 
law,” lacks substance. State Farm points out that this decision has been rejected by every court 
to consider it. 
 
In its attack upon U-36, State Farm goes so far as to characterize the opinion as “inconsistent 
with law and logic.” The “law,” to which State Farm refers, appears to be contained in those 
decisions of other jurisdictions which allow insurers to provide insurance defense services 
through salaried attorney employees. Such precedent, as State Farm explains, is based upon 
"the identity or community of financial interest between the insured and insurer in defending the 
claim and because of the insurer's contractual obligation to defend the insured at the insurer's 
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expense." The "logic," to which this Complainant refers, appears to lie within this rubric of 
"community of interest." For example, State Farm indicates that it is contradictory for U-36 to 
require the insurer to hire outside counsel to represent the insured once a complaint has been 
filed, and yet to allow an insurer's employees, including attorneys, to take actions necessary to 
protect the interests of both the insurer and its insured prior to the filing of a complaint, as this 
latter activity is "inextricably intertwined with any defense of the insured." State Farm also 
asserts that as the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law is designed to protect the 
public "from the incompetent, the untrained and the unscrupulous in the practice of law," who 
could be more competent, trained and scrupulous therein than claims litigation counsel 
employed by insurance companies who, because their practice is concentrated in automobile 
and premises liability law, are able to specialize and become more proficient in the disposition of 
such matters. State Farm implies that the legal system as a whole would benefit from such 
house counsel, in that, as the compensation of these attorneys is not tied to billable hours, they 
may be apt to dispose of these cases more quickly. 
 
Notwithstanding the trends of other jurisdictions, any alleged nonsensical application of the 
prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, and the untapped resource of "competent, 
trained and scrupulous" in-house insurance defense counsel as pipe cleaners for a clogged 
legal system, we do not feel that U-36 deserves review. The age-old adage of "if it ain't broke, 
don't fix it" seems appropriate in disposing of Complainants' argument herein, especially in light 
of the fact that U-36 first surfaced nearly fifteen years ago and there is now no compelling 
reason to overrule the more than fifty years of legal precedent which recognizes the principles 
outlined in that opinion. "There is scarcely any judicial dissent from the proposition that a 
corporation cannot lawfully engage in the practice of law." Moreover, "a corporation cannot 
obtain license to practice law, since it is wholly incapable of acquiring the educational 
qualifications necessary to obtain such license, nor can it possess in its corporate name the 
necessary moral character required therefor." Nothing has changed since the rendering of 
Kendall and Hobson, or since the adoption of U-36, to assuage the moral dilemmas and ethical 
concerns connected to the unauthorized practice of law. In fact, no situation is more illustrative 
of the inherent pitfalls and conflicts therein than that in which house counsel defends the insured 
while remaining on the payroll of the insurer. "No man can serve two masters," regardless here 
of either any perceived "community of interest," or Complainants' Pollyanna postulate that 
house counsel will continue to provide undivided loyalty to the insured. Complainants' pleas for 
logic are unpersuasive, as we are inclined to view U-36 in the way in which Respondent 
characterizes the opinion — as a prophylactic measure, not unlike the imputed disqualification 
rules. See Rule 1.10. As such, we believe that U-36 logically discerns when house counsel 
would fall into that precarious position between employee of insurer and advocate of insured, 
and, thus, logically prevents the occurrence of such a happening, and its onerous fallout. 
 
Moreover, we are unswayed by Complainants' reliance on the practices of other jurisdictions 
and what amounts to an “everyone else is doing it, why can’t we” argument. In State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reeder, the task of this Court was to evaluate our state’s Unfair Claims 
Settlement Practices Act to determine if a third-party claimant injured by an insurance 
company’s violation of that statute could maintain a private right of action for damages. In our 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 331	
decision, we were unaffected by the “substantial split in authority among other states as to 
whether individuals can maintain an action under their respective state laws.” In determining 
that such a cause of action did exist in the Commonwealth, we concluded that “whether other 
states permit private individuals to maintain claims is based upon their particular statutory 
system and is of no consequence here. Our decision must be based on the language of the 
Kentucky law.” Likewise, the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct and the means by which 
this state oversees the conduct of its attorneys are personal to Kentucky. “The right to prescribe 
such rules as are necessary to qualify, regulate, and control attorneys as officers of the court is 
a right of self-preservation.” That other jurisdictions govern the practice of law differently, or 
even allow for the unauthorized practice of law, is of no concern to us in this matter. 
 
As for E-368, Complainants assert that there is no language within our Rules of Professional 
Conduct which prevents an attorney and an insurer from entering into an agreement whereby 
the attorney agrees to perform all of the insurer’s defense work for a set fee. In support, 
Complainants analogize the set fee to other alternative billing methods — such as retainers and 
contingency fees — and argue that there exists no real difference between these latter, more 
accepted arrangements, and the set fee. Moreover, American and National contend that if any 
type of fee arrangement is to be viewed as suspect, it is the hourly-based fee, which, these 
Complainants argue, is vulnerable to “padding,” and even creates a conflict of interest wherein 
the client has incentive to control costs by controlling counsel. The necessity to be free to 
exercise independent judgment in order that the attorney may adequately represent the insured 
is not, according to Complainants, jeopardized by the set fee arrangement, as the form of 
compensation is not as significant a factor in evaluating the propriety of the attorney-client 
relationship as, for example, whether or not the attorney has a personal interest in the outcome 
of the litigation. American and National assert that the high standards of ethical conduct with 
which attorneys must comply do not mandate a per se prohibition on set fee arrangements as 
such “a blanket prohibition is overbroad and does nothing to protect the integrity of the 
profession.” Likewise, State Farm maintains that these ethical standards, which include 
counsel’s implied duty of loyalty, mandate zealous representation of the insured, even if the set 
fee has been exhausted. Complainants remind us that not only does this Court have the power 
to defend the attorney-client relationship, but that, should this relationship break down and the 
insured incur damage, the insured would most likely have a cause of action against the attorney 
or the insurer or both. 
 
Taking these latter propositions first, we agree that this Court does indeed have the power to 
protect the attorney-client relationship, and is, herein, exercising such power by adopting E-368 
as written. Moreover, we do not take comfort, as Complainants do, in knowing that the insured, 
aggrieved by inadequate representation occasioned by the set fee arrangement, could proceed 
against the attorney and/or the insurer. Such recourse requires that the insured first suffer a 
harm, a circumstance which cannot be reconciled with this Court’s view that the interest of the 
insured is to be protected. We also do not agree with Complainants' contention that the form of 
compensation has little relevance in examining the attorney-client relationship. To the contrary, 
a set fee arrangement enables the insurer to constrain counsel for the insured by, in effect, 
limiting the defense budget — a practice that Respondent cautioned, in E-331, could create 
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ethical problems similar to those herein. We agree with Respondent that the pressures exerted 
by the insurer through the set fee interferes with the exercise of the attorney's independent 
professional judgment, in contravention of Rule 1.8(f)(2). The set fee arrangement also clashes 
with Rule 1.7(b) in that it creates a situation whereby the attorney has an interest in the outcome 
of the action which conflicts with the duties owed to the client: quite simply, in easy cases, 
counsel will take a financial windfall; in difficult cases, counsel will take a financial loss. Finally, 
Complainants' rationale that other, more commonly used and less restricted billing methods are 
not as bad as, just as bad as, or worse, than the set fee does not influence us in our review of 
E-368. 
 
Complainants maintain that set fee arrangements do not create impermissible conflicts of 
interest between the insurance defense attorney and the insured. In support, Complainants 
again take solace with our Rules of Professional Conduct and contend that ethical constraints 
do not allow for the scope of representation to be dependent upon the fee counsel is to be paid. 
Additionally, Allstate and National retreat to the abstract and assert that potential conflicts of 
interest are everywhere, and not just confined to set fee arrangements. These Complainants 
argue that there is no rational basis which would support a conclusion that one form of 
employment is more likely to generate conflicts than another, especially after considering that 
there is no guarantee that the attorney stands to substantially profit from a set fee arrangement. 
Moreover, State Farm contends that the potential for conflict is very often lacking, because in 
general, the interests of the insurer and the insured are aligned. According to State Farm, only 
when the coverage is in dispute is there any real conflict between these parties. 
 
We dispose of these arguments by first stressing that the mere appearance of impropriety is just 
as egregious as any actual or real conflict. Therefore, E-368, in the same manner as U-36, acts 
as a prophylactic device to eliminate the potential for a conflict of interest or the compromise of 
an attorney’s ethical and professional duties. Furthermore, we do not wear the blinders that 
Complainants apparently have in place, for we view the situation surrounding the set fee 
agreement as ripe with potential conflicts. Respondent was able to cite to nineteen such 
conflicts, including representation of the insured which becomes more complex than anticipated, 
resulting in financial hardship for the attorney; policy and/or coverage defenses asserted by the 
insurer against the insured; and disagreement between the insured and the insurer with regard 
to settlement negotiations. Moreover, we do not believe that in most instances the interests of 
the insured and the insurer are alike, but are more apt to agree with Respondent’s contention 
that while the insured and the insurer may share some common interests, the two parties are 
subject to complete divergence at any time. Inherent in all of these potential conflicts is the fear 
that the entity paying the attorney, the insurer, and not the one to whom the attorney is obligated 
to defend, the insured, is controlling the legal representation. 
 
Finally, Complainants attack the case law and ethics opinions upon which E-368 is founded. In 
particular, State Farm contends that E-368 cites to decisions which have either been overruled, 
are inapposite as silent on the ethical issues addressed in E-368, or lack a basis in law and 
precedent. Complainants also attack E-368 as overbroad and lacking any factual predicate. In 
arguing that a reasoned, fact-based analysis is required in order to evaluate potential conflicts of 
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interest, State Farm relies on the commentary to the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct, 
which states, in part: “A possible conflict does not itself preclude the representation. The critical 
questions are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially 
interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment.” Additionally, Allstate and 
National contend that the Board adopted the wrong version of E-368, in that a revised draft of 
the opinion better articulates the ethical standard which should apply to counsel involved in set 
fee arrangements. These Complainants note that the ethics opinions referenced in E-368 — 
such as E-331 and E-340 — bear out the assertion that blanket prohibitions are unnecessary 
where sufficient reliance is placed upon counsel's ability to comply with the ethical obligations 
owed to the client, including the requirement that counsel act in the best interest of the client. 
 
First, we believe that the ethics opinions and case law cited in E-368 are on point, and defer to 
our previous discussion on the inapplicability of the decisions of other jurisdictions to Kentucky's 
own governance of professional responsibility. Moreover, we are convinced by Respondent's 
assertion that few of the other jurisdictions to which Complainants cite have conducted any 
meaningful analysis of the issues presented, nor do these jurisdictions share our state's 
aversion to the practice of law by corporations. For example, Respondent distinguishes the 
Tennessee opinion of Youngblood, from the North Carolina opinion of Gardner, by noting that 
Tennessee does not proscribe a corporation from practicing law for the public, whereas North 
Carolina does prohibit this practice, as does Kentucky. Finally, notwithstanding the language of 
other ethics opinions issued by Respondent, or Complainants' argument regarding the alleged 
inadequacy of the language of the ethics opinion at issue, we find, as discussed above, that the 
language of E-368 is complete and articulate, and hold that the opinion clearly presents its 
stated purpose and rationale. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we approve E-368 as written, and do not disturb U-36. 
 
In re State Grand Jury Investigation, 983 A.2d 1097 (N.J. 2009) 
 
Summary: In a grand jury proceeding investigating an employer for fraud, the state 
moved to disqualify the counsel of the employees on the grounds that the employer had 
selected the counsel and was paying them. The Supreme Court held that the 
employees’ counsel was not required to be disqualified under RPC 1.7(a) or 1.8(f) 
because the counsel had no present relationship to the employer, were barred from 
disclosing any information to the employer, and were to be paid unless the court granted 
the employer leave to discontinue payment.  
 
Justice RIVERA-SOTO delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
Confronted with a grand jury inquiry that commanded the testimony of several of its employees, 
an employer elected to provide and pay for counsel to those employees for purposes of that 
investigation. Fearing that having individual employees/grand jury witnesses represented by 
counsel retained and compensated by the putative target of the grand jury inquiry violated 
several of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the State moved to disqualify those counsel. The 
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trial court denied that application, limited the amount of information to be transmitted by such 
counsel to the employer, and, further, imposed restrictions both on the ability of the employer to 
discontinue paying the fees of counsel for the employees as well as on the ability of those 
counsel to discontinue representing the subpoenaed employees. 
 
Regardless of the setting—whether administrative, criminal or civil, either as part of an 
investigation, during grand jury proceedings, or before, during and after trial—whether an 
attorney may be compensated for his services by someone other than his client is governed in 
large measure by RPC 1.8(f) and, to a lesser extent, RPC 1.7(a) and RPC 5.4(c). The 
overarching Rule, which purposely is written in the negative, forbids a lawyer from “accepting 
compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless three factors 
coalesce: (1) the client gives informed consent; (2) there is no interference with the lawyer's 
independence of professional judgment or with the lawyer-client relationship; and (3) information 
relating to representation of a client is protected" as provided in the RPCs. A straightforward 
application of RPCs 1.7(a), 1.8(f) and 5.4(c) requires that we affirm the order of the trial court. 
 
I. 
 
The operative facts on which this appeal arise are readily stated. The State commenced a grand 
jury investigation into whether a corporate contractor had submitted fraudulent invoices for 
services purportedly rendered to a county government. That inquiry focused primarily on the 
contractor and three of its employees. In response, the company arranged for counsel for its 
employees. The company entered into four separate retainer agreements with four separate 
lawyers, three of whom were assigned to represent, respectively, the three specific employees 
noted, and the fourth was retained to represent “all non-target current and former employees of 
the company in connection with the current state grand jury investigation.” 
 
The retainer agreements with each of the four lawyers, however, shared common 
characteristics and were, in all substantive and material respects, indistinguishable. A typical 
retainer agreement provided (1) that the company “will be ultimately responsible to the law firm 
for all reasonable and necessary legal fees and expenses incurred in this matter”; (2) that the 
“undertaking by the company is made with the express understanding that the sole professional 
obligation of the law firm will be to the named employee”; (3) that the “law firm is not required to 
disclose any legal strategy, theory, plan of action, or the like, to the company”; (4) that “payment 
of legal fees by the company to the law firm in no way depends upon any such disclosure”; (5) 
that “no professional relationship will arise between the company and the law firm as a result of 
the rendering of legal services by the law firm or the payment of legal fees and expenses by the 
company”; (6) that “the reimbursement of legal fees and expenses is neither conditioned upon 
nor dependent upon the law firm's cooperation with the company or any other party”; (7) that 
while “detailed invoices will be provided to the represented employee, to preserve the 
attorney/client privilege, only summary invoices will be submitted to the company”; and (8) that 
the company would be responsible to pay those invoices “upon receipt.” 
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Based on the company's retention of separate counsel for each of three employees identified by 
the State, the company wrote to each such employee, informing them that: 
 
As you know, the New Jersey Attorney General's office served the company with a 
Grand Jury subpoena seeking various billing and payroll records related to the 
company’s contract with the specified county government. The company has been fully 
cooperative with the State's investigation. 
 
Recently the Attorney General’s office has begun interviewing some of our employees at 
the identified project. Given your position with the company and involvement in this 
project, and based upon the advice of our attorneys in New Jersey, we believe it would 
be prudent to retain separate counsel to represent you personally in connection with the 
State’s investigation. Accordingly, the company has retained a specially retained lawyer 
to represent you in connection with the State’s investigation. You do not have to use that 
specially retained lawyer as your attorney. You are free to hire your own attorney, at 
your own costs. 
 
You should not interpret this decision to mean that the company believes there to have 
been any illegal activity in this matter on the part of any company employee. Rather, it is 
based upon the recognition that your personal rights may conflict with the interests of the 
company. While the company agrees to pay for your legal representation in this matter, 
please understand that it has no obligation to do so and may stop paying those legal 
fees and costs at any time, should it believe it appropriate to do so. 
 
Your specially retained lawyer may be reached at [____]. His firm address is: [_____]. 
Please expect your specially retained lawyer to contact you directly to arrange a 
convenient time to meet and discuss this matter. Please feel free to contact me directly 
or speak with the company's local counsel if you have any questions regarding this 
matter. 
 
Very truly yours, 
/s/ Senior Vice President and General Counsel 
 
The company also announced to all other employees that the company had retained a lawyer—
free of charge to the employees—with whom those employees could consult and who was 
available to represent those employees in respect of the grand jury inquiry. 
 
In time, two of the four lawyers retained by the company to represent its employees were 
subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury; they declined to appear, and the State later 
withdrew those subpoenas. The State then notified the company that it, along with several 
unnamed employees, had been designated as targets of the grand jury’s investigation, and later 
served grand jury subpoenas for the company's records in respect of the retention of counsel for 
its employees. The company complied with that subpoena by producing responsive but non-
privileged documents. 
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The State moved before the Superior Court to disqualify the counsel retained by the company to 
represent its employees “from further participation in this matter, pursuant to RPC 1.7, RPC 1.8 
and RPC 1.10.” In response, each of the employees to whom the company had provided 
counsel to date—the three identified “target” employees and two additional “nontarget” 
employees—submitted certifications asserting that none of them could afford to retain separate 
counsel, and that each was satisfied with and wished to remain with their then counsel. 
 
The trial court noted at the outset that it “viewed the company’s conduct as one that is certainly 
to be appreciated.” Addressing the caliber of the lawyers retained by the company for its 
employees, the trial court explained that “as a major corporation, the company didn’t go out and 
hire some low-level attorney. They went out and hired competent, knowledgeable, respected 
attorneys.” Focusing on the application of the Rules of Professional Conduct to the State's 
motion for disqualification, the court first observed that RPC 1.5 “talks about fees being 
reasonable and that is not an issue before the Court.” Moving on to the application of RPC 1.6, 
which addresses the confidentiality of information between a lawyer and his client, the trial court 
remarked that the retained lawyers had provided certifications and sample redacted bills. 
Agreeing that the procedure employed was proper, the trial court emphasized that “the only 
thing that I would require going forward is that all of the bills sent to the company be redacted 
and that no specific information be detailed in the billing.” 
 
Turning to RPC 1.7, the general conflict of interest rule, the trial court concluded that, “at least at 
this point, there's been no demonstration that there is even a conflict and even if there were, 
these employees have the right to waive that conflict.” It also declared itself “satisfied that there 
has been informed consent given by all of the employees by way of what they have put in the 
certifications.” It concluded that 
 
The Court finds nothing improper about the attorneys that have been retained by the 
company. In fact, the Court would go further and say that the company acted 
responsibly, quite frankly, and with corporate policy and, quite frankly, having been 
advised of the reputation of these attorneys. And clearly the understanding between the 
company and these attorneys was spelled out in not only the retainer agreements, but in 
previous letters before all this was signed. 
 
It added, however, some restrictions: “that the company and the individual attorneys, prior to 
ending any relationship for payment, would have to make application to the Court,” and that 
counsel were to “redact the billings to cure any notion that the State may have that somehow 
the billings will reveal significant aspects of the grand jury investigation.” 
 
The trial court entered an order that denied the State's motion to disqualify counsel. More 
specifically, it 
 
FURTHER ORDERED that before the company may cease paying any of the attorney’s 
legal fees and costs, the company shall provide notice to the Court and all parties, and 
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the Court shall conduct a hearing on the issue of whether the company may cease 
paying such legal fees and costs; and 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that before any of the attorneys may withdraw from this 
case based upon the refusal of the company to pay the attorney’s legal fees and costs, 
such attorney shall provide notice to the Court and all parties, and the Court shall 
conduct a hearing on the issue of the attorney's request to withdraw; and 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the attorneys henceforth shall submit to the company 
legal bills either in summary form or with all detailed information redacted therefrom. 
 
The State sought leave to appeal that determination and, in an unpublished order, the Appellate 
Division denied that application. It then moved before this Court, seeking leave to appeal the 
trial court’s order and other ancillary relief. Those motions were granted. We also granted leave 
to the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey to appear as amicus curiae. For 
the reasons that follow, we affirm the order of the trial court. 
 
II. 
 
According to the State, a per se conflict of interest arises whenever, as here, two facts 
contemporaneously appear: a target in a grand jury investigation unilaterally selects and retains 
a lawyer to represent potential witnesses against it, and the lawyer relies on the target for 
payment of legal fees. In the State’s view, that arrangement will split the attorney's loyalty and 
will discourage the lawyer from counseling the client to cooperate with the State, even when 
cooperation might be in the client's best interest. It asserts that the perceived effect of allowing a 
target to select and pay for counsel for the witnesses against it is to irreparably taint the 
proceedings. The State also claims that such a conflict cannot be waived and that, even if it 
could be waived, a waiver could only be demonstrated through the live testimony of the 
witnesses, and not, as was done here, via certifications. 
 
The lawyers whose disqualification is sought counter that RPC 1.8(f) clearly contemplates an 
employer designated as a grand jury “target” providing and paying for separate counsel for its 
employees during that grand jury inquiry. They reject the State's claim that, in the criminal law 
setting, the better rule is the imposition of a per se conflict. Finally, they assert that, even if a 
potential conflict of interest exists, it has been effectively waived. Amicus ACDL-NJ repeats 
those arguments. 
 
The company echoes the arguments advanced both by the lawyers whose disqualification is 
sought and by amicus, and further asserts that, under the laws of its place of incorporation, it 
has an obligation to provide counsel to its employees, noting that, absent counsel provided by 
and paid for by the company, most of its employees would be unable to afford a lawyer. 
 
III. 
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A. 
 
Our evaluation of an actual or apparent conflict does not take place in a vacuum, but is, instead, 
highly fact specific. In that respect, the Court’s attention is directed to something more than a 
fanciful possibility. To warrant disqualification in this setting, the asserted conflict must have 
some reasonable basis. 
 
The State asserts that a target of a grand jury inquiry providing and paying for the lawyers who 
will represent the target's employees before the very grand jury considering the target's 
culpability creates an insoluble conflict not subject to waiver. Although the State's arguments 
possess considerable initial appeal, in light of modern changes in the manner in which attorney-
client relationships are to be viewed, we are constrained to disagree. 
 
No doubt, it long has been the law of this State that it is “improper for the attorney for an 
employee to have accepted the organization’s promise to pay his bill, for such an arrangement 
has the inherent risk of dividing an attorney’s loyalty between his client and his client’s employer 
who will pay for the services.” In those instances, we have concluded that “a conflict of interest 
inheres in every such situation,” one that cannot be waived “when the subject matter is crime 
and when the public interest in the disclosure of criminal activities might thereby be hindered.” 
Reasoning that “an attorney must realize that the employer who agrees to pay him is motivated 
by the expectation that he will be protected," we have concluded that 
 
It is inherently wrong to represent both the employer and the employee if the employee's 
interest may, and the public interest will, be advanced by the employee's disclosure of 
his employer's criminal conduct. For the same reasons, it is also inherently wrong for an 
attorney who represents only the employee to accept a promise to pay from one whose 
criminal liability may turn on the employee's testimony. 
 
See also Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1981) (emphasizing that “courts and 
commentators have recognized the inherent dangers that arise when a criminal defendant is 
represented by a lawyer hired and paid by a third party, particularly when the third party is the 
operator of the alleged criminal enterprise. One risk is that the lawyer will prevent his client from 
obtaining leniency by preventing the client from offering testimony against his former employer 
or from taking other actions contrary to the employer’s interest”). 
 
B. 
 
That said, effective September 10, 1984, New Jersey replaced its then extant Canons of 
Professional Ethics and Disciplinary Rules with the more modern Rules of Professional 
Conduct. Among these was RPC 1.8(f), which then provided that 
 
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the 
client unless: (1) the client consents after consultation; (2) there is no interference with 
the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the lawyer-client relationship 
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and (3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by RPC 
1.6. 
 
Thereafter, starting in 2001 and continuing for almost two years, New Jersey engaged in a 
“review of the existing Rules of Professional Conduct in light of the work of the American Bar 
Association's Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.” This process 
culminated in yet another round of modifications to the Rules of Professional Conduct. In 
respect of RPC 1.8(f), however, only minor changes were made; it now provides in full as 
follows: 
 
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the 
client unless: 
(1) the client gives informed consent; 
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or 
with the lawyer-client relationship; and 
(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by RPC 1.6. 
 
C. 
 
However, RPC 1.8(f) does not exist in a vacuum: two other RPCs directly touch on the question 
presented. First, RPC 1.7(a) forbids a lawyer from representing a client “if the representation 
involves a concurrent conflict of interest.” That RPC recognizes “a concurrent conflict of interest 
if: there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially 
limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.” 
Second, RPC 5.4(c) provides that “a lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, 
employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the 
lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering such legal services.” 
 
Our task, then, is to harmonize RPCs 1.7(a)(2), 1.8(f) and 5.4(c) seemingly overlapping 
mandates so as to give proper guidance on whether, and under what circumstances, a lawyer 
may represent a client when the fees and costs incurred are being paid by another. 
 
D. 
 
The starting point for analysis must be the RPC that most specifically addresses the question of 
when a lawyer can represent a client while being paid by another: RPC 1.8(f). That RPC makes 
clear that three factors must coalesce in order to allow a lawyer paid by a third party to 
represent a client: the client must give informed consent; the lawyer’s independent professional 
judgment and the lawyer-client relationship must be maintained sacrosanct; and no improper 
disclosures relating or referring to the representation can be made. However, the considerations 
that animate RPC 1.7(a)(2)—that there be no concurrent conflict of interest—and RPC 5.4(c)—
that no third party may influence the lawyer's professional judgment— also are relevant and 
must be addressed. 
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A synthesis of RPCs 1.7(a)(2), 1.8(f) and 5.4(c) yields a salutary, yet practical principle: a lawyer 
may represent a client but accept payment, directly or indirectly, from a third party provided 
each of the six conditions is satisfied. Those conditions are: 
 
(1) The informed consent of the client is secured. In this regard, “‘informed consent’ is 
defined as the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer 
has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and 
reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.” 
 
(2) The third-party payer is prohibited from, in any way, directing, regulating or interfering 
with the lawyer’s professional judgment in representing his client. 
 
(3) There cannot be any current attorney-client relationship between the lawyer and the 
third-party payer. 
 
(4) The lawyer is prohibited from communicating with the third-party payer concerning 
the substance of the representation of his client. The breadth of this prohibition includes, 
but is not limited to, the careful and conscientious redaction of all detail from any billings 
submitted to the third-party payer. 
 
(5) The third-party payer shall process and pay all such invoices within the regular 
course of its business, consistent with manner, speed and frequency it pays its own 
counsel. 
 
(6) Once a third-party payer commits to pay for the representation of another, the third-
party payer shall not be relieved of its continuing obligations to pay without leave of court 
brought on prior written notice to the lawyer and the client. In such an application, the 
third-party payer shall bear the burden of proving that its obligation to continue to pay for 
the representation should cease; the fact that the lawyer and the client have elected to 
pursue a course of conduct deemed in the client's best interests but disadvantageous to 
the third-party payer shall not be sufficient reason to discontinue the third-party payer's 
continuing obligation of payment. If a third-party payer fails to pay an employee's legal 
fees and expenses when due, the employee shall have the right, via a summary action, 
for an order to show cause why the third-party payer should not be ordered to pay those 
fees and expenses. 
 
E. 
 
We now apply this principle, and its conditions, to the case on appeal. 
 
Informed consent. Each of the letters from the company to the individual employees provided 
that the employee “did not have to use the assigned counsel as your attorney. You are free to 
hire your own attorney, at your own costs.” As conceded by counsel for the company during oral 
argument, that “take-it-or-leave-it” approach, on its face, does not satisfy the requirement that 
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the employee's acceptance of counsel be based on informed consent. Therefore, 
presumptively, the retention of counsel here does not comply with RPC 1.8(f)(1). However, as 
acknowledged by the trial court, each of the employees certified that he was satisfied with the 
assigned counsel and wished to remain as that counsel’s client. Therefore, we conclude that the 
arrangement approved by the trial court below is satisfactory, albeit with the caveat that, in the 
future, no such limitations on the choice of counsel should be communicated or imposed on the 
employee/client save for reasonable limitations on fees and expenses. 
 
Interference with the lawyer’s professional judgment. As clearly set forth in the separate 
retention letters between the lawyers and the company, each of the lawyers explained that “the 
sole professional obligation of the law firm will be to the assigned client.” For the avoidance of 
future doubt, such retention letters should clearly and conspicuously note that nothing in the 
representation shall limit the lawyer’s responsibilities to the client, as provided in RPC 1.8(f)(2), 
and that the third-party payer shall not, in any way, seek to “direct or regulate the lawyer's 
professional judgment in rendering such legal services.” RPC 5.4(c). 
 
Current representation. The record is clear that none of the lawyers selected to represent the 
individual employees had any current relationship with the company, and that “no professional 
relationship will arise between the company and the law firm as a result of the rendering of legal 
services by the assigned lawyer or the payment of legal fees and expenses by the company.” 
Those facts, standing alone, constitute a sufficient showing in favor of permitting this 
representation. Again, as an aid in future matters, the retention letters should clearly spell out 
that the lawyer does not have a professional relationship with the third-party payer. 
 
Prohibited communications. Each of the retention letters made clear that the lawyer “is not 
required to disclose any legal strategy, theory, plan of action, or the like, to the company and 
payment of legal fees by the company to the law firm in no way depends upon any such 
disclosure.” In this respect, the better practice is to affirmatively state that the lawyer will not 
disclose any part of the substance of the representation of the client to the third-party payer. 
Consistent with that representation, all billings from the lawyer to the third-party payer must 
have any detail information redacted, simply stating the sum due for services rendered and the 
sum due for expenses incurred. Because these latter conditions were imposed by the trial court, 
the retention letters, as modified by the trial court, clearly comply with the requirements we have 
imposed. 
 
Prompt and continued payment. Once an employer commits to paying the legal fees and 
expenses of its employees, it scrupulously must honor that commitment. Also, if the employer 
wishes to discontinue paying the legal fees and expenses of one or more of its employees, it 
may only do so by leave of court granted. Because this condition also was imposed by the trial 
court and was agreed to by all parties, the arrangements at issue are satisfactory. 
 
In sum, through the combined product of the good faith of an employer, the diligence of 
competent counsel and the exercise of a trial court's supervisory authority, the net result of the 
company's retention and payment of counsel for its employees complies with the Rules of 
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Professional Conduct. For these reasons, the trial court properly denied the State's motion to 
disqualify counsel. 
 
IV. 
 
The order of the Law Division denying the State's motion to disqualify the counsel retained to 
represent the company's employees before the grand jury is affirmed. 
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4.8: Personal Conflicts of Interest 
 
Way out in Reno, Nevada, where romance blooms and fades, a great Philadelphia lawyer was 
in love with a Hollywood maid. Come, love, and we’ll go ramblin’, down where the lights are so 
bright. I'll win you a divorce from your husband, and we can get married tonight.59 
 
Am I the only one who hears the screams and the strangled cries of lawyers in love?60 
 
Do I look like I’m asking for it?61 
 
It's harder to be friends than lovers, and you shouldn’t try to mix the two. Cause if you do it and 
you’re still unhappy, then you know that the problem is you.62 
 
Model Rule 1.8: Current Clients: Specific Rules 
 
(j) A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client unless a consensual sexual 
relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer relationship commenced. 
 
 
Model Rule 1.8, Comments [17]-[19]: Client-Lawyer Sexual Relationships 
 
[17] The relationship between lawyer and client is a fiduciary one in which the lawyer 
occupies the highest position of trust and confidence. The relationship is almost always 
unequal; thus, a sexual relationship between lawyer and client can involve unfair 
exploitation of the lawyer's fiduciary role, in violation of the lawyer’s basic ethical 
obligation not to use the trust of the client to the client's disadvantage. In addition, such a 
relationship presents a significant danger that, because of the lawyer's emotional 
involvement, the lawyer will be unable to represent the client without impairment of the 
exercise of independent professional judgment. Moreover, a blurred line between the 
professional and personal relationships may make it difficult to predict to what extent 
client confidences will be protected by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, since 
client confidences are protected by privilege only when they are imparted in the context 
of the client-lawyer relationship. Because of the significant danger of harm to client 
interests and because the client's own emotional involvement renders it unlikely that the 
client could give adequate informed consent, this Rule prohibits the lawyer from having 
sexual relations with a client regardless of whether the relationship is consensual and 
regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client. 
 
[18] Sexual relationships that predate the client-lawyer relationship are not prohibited. 
Issues relating to the exploitation of the fiduciary relationship and client dependency are 
																																																								
59 Woody Guthrie, Philadelphia Lawyer (1937). 
60 Jackson Browne, Lawyers in Love (1983) 
61 Chia Pet, Hey Baby (1992). 
62 Liz Phair, Divorce Song, Exile in Guyville (1993). 
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diminished when the sexual relationship existed prior to the commencement of the 
client-lawyer relationship. However, before proceeding with the representation in these 
circumstances, the lawyer should consider whether the lawyer's ability to represent the 
client will be materially limited by the relationship. See Rule 1.7(a)(2). 
 
[19] When the client is an organization, paragraph (j) of this Rule prohibits a lawyer for 
the organization (whether inside counsel or outside counsel) from having a sexual 
relationship with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly 
consults with that lawyer concerning the organization’s legal matters. 
 
Walter v. Stuart, 67 P.3d 1042 (Utah 2003) 
 
Summary: Attorney Alan Stewart represented client Beth Walter in a divorce 
proceeding. Stewart told Walter that he was divorced, and they began a personal 
relationship, which soon became sexual. Eventually, Walter learned that Stewart was 
actually married and ended the relationship. Walter filed an action against Stewart, 
alleging breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court granted Stewart’s motion for summary 
judgment, but the Supreme Court reversed, finding that issues of fact existed. 
 
This case arises out of an attorney-client relationship, which turned sexually intimate, between 
one-time client Beth Walter and her former attorney Alan Stewart. Following her discovery that 
Stewart was married, Walter filed claims against Stewart for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, reckless misconduct, breach of contract, and battery. 
Upon Stewart's motion, the trial court entered summary judgment against Walter on all of her 
claims. Walter now appeals. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
In June of 1998, Walter retained Stewart as her attorney in a divorce action. Through that 
representation, Stewart learned that Walter was in a “fragile emotional state and had personal 
self esteem issues,” including a “doubt in her ability to have a successful relationship.” Walter 
decided to relocate to Maryland. In the first part of April of 1999, Walter phoned Stewart several 
times, anxious that her divorce be finalized so she could move. 
 
During his representation of Walter, Stewart became “very flirtatious, often commenting 
regarding Walter’s personal appearance and grooming.” In April of 1999, Stewart began to call 
Walter daily and, on April 15, took her on a lunch date. Following the lunch date Stewart asked 
Walter, “If you move to Maryland, how are we supposed to have a relationship?” Walter then 
“decided to postpone the move to see where Stewart’s ‘relationship’ with her would head.” 
 
Through the first part of May, Stewart continued to tell Walter “that he was waiting to hear from 
her husband’s lawyer to finalize the divorce.” On May 12, after personally contacting her ex-
husband and the trial court, Walter learned that her divorce had actually been finalized on April 
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26. 
 
The divorce decree required Walter to pay her ex-husband an amount of money. On May 13, 
Walter asked Stewart about paying the judgment. Stewart told her “to hold off on payment to 
see if her ex-husband would pursue collection and further advised her that if her ex-husband 
tried to collect on the amount due, she could make arrangements to pay before a judgment was 
levied against her.” Walter took Stewart’s advice and did not make the payment. Also upon 
finalization of her divorce, Walter desired to resume the use of her maiden name and asked 
Stewart “why her name change was not reflected in the divorce decree.” He told her that she 
could take the decree to the Department of Social Security to have her name changed, which 
she did. 
 
Stewart and Walter continued to see each other on a personal basis, and on June 5, 1999, 
Stewart kissed Walter, tried to undress her, and said that he wanted to “make love.” Upon 
Walter’s questioning, Stewart told her that he was a divorced father of four children. The two did 
not engage in sexual relations that day but did become sexually intimate on July 22, 1999. “On 
that night as they discussed sleeping together, Walter told Stewart that she would only do so if 
they were going to have an exclusive-monogamous relationship, a condition with which Stewart 
readily concurred and agreed to.” 
 
During their personal relationship, Stewart took Walter on numerous dates in public as well as 
on business trips. He never wore a wedding ring. He displayed on his desk an engraved clock 
that Walter gave him, and wore clothing she gave him. The two also spoke of getting married. 
 
In August of 1999, Walter received an order to show cause for her failure to pay her ex-husband 
what she owed him under the divorce decree. Walter contacted Stewart, and he said that he 
would take care of the matter and declined her offer to pay for his services. He then made 
payment arrangements with the attorney for Walter’s ex-husband, and the show-cause hearing 
was canceled. “For his services rendered and as a token of appreciation, Walter bought Stewart 
a $100 fountain pen." 
 
In October of 1999, Walter considered breaking off her relationship with Stewart. However, 
when she expressed those feelings to him, he “told her that he loved her, that he wouldn’t 
accept her breaking up with him and that he would ‘stalk her and wait for her in the parking 
garage at work.’” They continued to see each other, exchanged Christmas gifts, and spent 
much of New Years Day 2000 together. Although their dates became less frequent in 2000, 
Stewart continued to express a commitment to their relationship. 
 
In September of 2000, while pursuing an unrelated international adoption, Walter was told by 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service that she had illegally resumed use of her maiden 
name since a name change was not included in her divorce decree. Walter contacted Stewart, 
who told her that she would need to petition the court to amend the divorce decree. Because 
Walter’s ex-husband would not cooperate in the action, she “retained Stewart’s services once 
more to petition the court for a name change and paid him the sum of $350.00.” 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 346	
 
The hearing on Walter’s name change was held on November 2, 2000. “Following the hearing, 
Stewart escorted Walter to her car. When they got to the car he grabbed her around the waist 
and asked her to have sex with him.” “Because of the on again-off again nature of Stewart’s 
relationship with her during the latter half of 2000, Walter became curious regarding his marital 
status.” In a phone conversation on November 12, Stewart told Walter that he and his wife were 
back together and that he had not been divorced, but only separated. After their phone 
conversation, Stewart went to Walter’s home and told her that “he reconciled with his wife to be 
with his children, that he was under discipline by his church for a previous affair, and that he had 
been living with his mother.” Stewart nevertheless expressed a desire to keep in contact. 
 
Over the next four days, Stewart called Walter “approximately four times a day,” and, on 
November 16, took her out to lunch. On the evening of November 16, Walter called Stewart’s 
wife and learned that Stewart had been married for twenty years, had never separated from his 
wife, had not been disciplined by his church for a previous affair, and that he had not lived with 
his mother at any time during his affair with Walter. Shortly after Walter’s conversation with 
Stewart’s wife, Stewart called Walter and told her that she had ruined his life and then hung up. 
The two have not spoken since. 
 
Walter filed a complaint against Stewart. Her complaint includes claims for breach of fiduciary 
duty, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, reckless misconduct, breach of contract, 
and battery. Stewart moved for summary judgment on all of Walter’s claims. The trial court 
granted Stewart’s motion in its entirety, stating simply that Walter’s battery claims were barred 
by the statute of limitations and that Walter “failed to support by Affidavit facts sufficient to 
support” her other claims. She now appeals. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
I. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
 
"Actions for breach of fiduciary duty are grounded on the fundamental principle that attorneys 
must be completely loyal to their clients and must never use their position of trust to take 
advantage of client confidences for themselves or for other parties. In all relationships with 
clients, attorneys are required to exercise impeccable honesty, fair dealing, and fidelity.” Indeed, 
due to their “professional responsibility and the confidence and trust” that their clients 
“legitimately repose” in them, attorneys “must adhere to a high standard of honesty, integrity, 
and good faith in dealing with” their clients. Attorneys are “not permitted to take advantage of 
their position or superior knowledge to impose upon clients; nor to conceal facts or law, nor in 
any way deceive clients without being held responsible therefor.” 
 
“The essential elements of legal malpractice based on breach of fiduciary duty include the 
following: (1) an attorney-client relationship; (2) breach of the attorney's fiduciary duty to the 
client; (3) causation, both actual and proximate; and (4) damages suffered by the client.”  
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It is undisputed that an attorney-client relationship existed between Stewart and Walter through 
at least April of 1999. In May, Walter sought advice from Stewart regarding a sum of money she 
owed her ex-husband under the divorce decree. Stewart “advised Walter to hold off on payment 
to see if her ex-husband would pursue collection and further advised Walter that if her ex-
husband tried to collect on the amount due, she could make arrangements to pay before a 
judgment was levied against her.” This evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to 
Walter, indicates that both Stewart and Walter anticipated further representation of her in the 
divorce action. It is undisputed that Stewart later represented Walter on an order to show cause, 
which came about because of the advice he gave her regarding payment of the judgment. He 
represented her again in a name change hearing. Therefore, viewing the facts in a light most 
favorable to Walter, an attorney-client relationship existed between the parties at all relevant 
times. 
 
As to a breach of the duty owed Walter, the facts viewed in a light most favorable to her indicate 
that Stewart took advantage of information he gained during his representation of her to initiate 
first a dating relationship and then a sexually intimate relationship with Walter. He also 
misrepresented his marital status and the state of her legal affairs for his own interests. 
Stewart’s conduct can be reasonably construed as taking advantage of a client’s fiduciary trust 
through deception. Walter has thus stated facts sufficient to place the element of breach of duty 
into dispute. 
 
Walter states damages that she claims were caused, actually and proximately, by Stewart's 
conduct. The reason for the dissolution of the parties’ relationship, as well as the timing of that 
dissolution relative to the damages Walter alleges, raise a reasonable inference supporting both 
actual and proximate causation. “Causation is an issue of fact, and we refuse to take it from the 
jury if there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer causation.” We cannot, 
therefore, rule against Walter as a matter of law on this element. 
 
Stewart contends that “emotional injury, unaccompanied by a tangible manifestation of that 
injury,” is not recoverable in a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Walter, however, has alleged 
the following damages arising from Stewart’s breach of duty: emotional pain, a need for mental 
health counseling, physical pain, medical bills, loss of employment, and a need for sexual 
therapy. 
 
Because none of the elements of breach of fiduciary duty can be resolved against Walter as a 
matter of law, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on this claim. 
 
Questions: 
 
City Bar Ass’n v. Williamson, 117 Ohio St. 3d 399 (Ohio 2008) 
 
Summary: Attorney Karl Williamson represented a female client in a domestic-violence 
action pending in Fairfield Municipal Court. He began to represent her, and eventually 
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she and her two children moved in with him. When she and her husband reconciled after 
five months, she and her two children moved out. Resultantly, Williamson withdrew from 
representation. The Supreme Court held that Williamson’s relationship with his client 
violated the professional rule and warranted indefinite suspension. 
 
Respondent, Karl E. Williamson has been admitted to the practice of law in Ohio since 1990. 
The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline now recommends that we 
indefinitely suspend respondent’s license to practice based on findings that he became 
intimately involved with a client after agreeing to represent her. On review, we agree that 
respondent committed professional misconduct as found by the board and that an indefinite 
suspension is appropriate. 
 
Relator, Butler County Bar Association, charged respondent with two counts of misconduct, the 
first relating to respondent’s affair with his client and the second for his failure to appear in 
response to relator’s investigative subpoenas. Attempts to serve the complaint by certified mail 
were unsuccessful and the mail was unclaimed, and relator served the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court. A master commissioner appointed by the board heard the case, made findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, and recommended an indefinite suspension. The board adopted the 
master commissioner's findings of misconduct and recommended sanction. 
 
Misconduct 
 
Count One 
 
In May 2004, respondent agreed to represent a female client in proceedings to terminate her 
marriage before the Butler County Common Pleas Court. He also agreed to help her through a 
domestic-violence action pending in Fairfield Municipal Court. The client paid respondent $500 
toward a requested $1,000 fee. 
 
Respondent began dating his client shortly after she hired him. Their relationship became 
intimate in the end of May 2004, after the client paid the $500 and respondent had appeared at 
a preliminary hearing in the domestic-violence case against her husband. By mid-June 2004, 
respondent had allowed the client and her two children to move in with him. The client and her 
children continued to reside with respondent until October 2004, when the client and her 
husband reconciled. 
 
In a letter to his client dated May 27, 2004, respondent claimed to be withdrawing as her lawyer 
in the divorce or dissolution proceedings. Afterward, he began denying their attorney-client 
relationship in correspondence to the lawyer representing her husband, although he continued 
to assist her in secret. As part of his plan to hide their affair, respondent also directed his client 
not to refer to him in public as her lawyer and promised to have another attorney, one of his 
colleagues, “sign off” on any required papers. The colleague later testified in a deposition that 
respondent never consulted him about the client. 
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By engaging in an affair with his client and continuing to represent her, respondent risked his 
client’s legal and personal interests for his own advantage. As we said in Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Sturgeon, “a lawyer who attempts to engage in a sexual relationship with a client puts the 
lawyer’s own personal feelings ahead of the objectivity that must be the hallmark of any 
successful attorney-client relationship.” Respondent thereby violated DR 1-102(A)(5) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), 
1-102(A)(6) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the 
lawyer's fitness to practice law), and 2-110(B)(2) (requiring a lawyer to withdraw from 
representation when the lawyer knows or it is obvious that his or her continued employment will 
violate a Disciplinary Rule). Moreover, by lying to conceal the relationship, respondent violated 
DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving fraud, deceit, 
dishonesty, or misrepresentation). 
 
Count Two 
 
The client and her husband filed grievances against respondent. In investigating their claims, 
relator subpoenaed respondent to appear twice, once in November 2005 and again in February 
2006. Respondent did not comply with either subpoena. He thereby violated Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) 
(requiring a lawyer to cooperate in an investigation of misconduct). 
 
Sanction 
 
“We have consistently disapproved of lawyers engaging in sexual conduct with clients where the 
sexual relationship arises from and occurs during the attorney-client relationship. A lawyer’s 
sexual involvement with a client has warranted a range of disciplinary measures depending on 
the relative impropriety of the situation, including actual suspension from the practice of law.” 
Moreover, a lawyer's failure to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation, in and of itself, may 
warrant an actual suspension from practice. 
 
To determine the appropriate sanction, however, we must also weigh the aggravating and 
mitigating factors of respondent’s case. 
 
We accept the board's findings regarding aggravating factors. Respondent attempted to mislead 
relator by reporting during the investigation that his client was actually represented by 
independent counsel. He also changed the date of the letter purporting to terminate his 
professional relationship with his client so that it appeared to coincide with a date after his last 
appearance in court on her behalf. Moreover, respondent’s license to practice has been under 
suspension since December 5, 2005, for his failure to properly register as an attorney. No 
mitigating evidence dissuades us from imposing the recommended indefinite suspension. 
 
Respondent is therefore indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Ohio. 
 
Questions: 
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Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Paris, 148 Ohio St. 3d 55 (Ohio 2016) 
 
Summary: The Bar association alleged that attorney Tasso Paris made unwelcome 
sexual advance toward a female client and failed to appear at her criminal-sentencing 
hearing for DUI. At several client meetings he referred to her as his beautiful red haired 
Irish girl--which he thought relevant given her DUI coincided with St. Patrick’s day. The 
client’s fiancee was apparently present for all but one of these meetings. He also asked 
his client to go out with him several times and invited her to his house to join him in his 
hot tub on more than one occasion. She discussed this with her fiancee, ultimately 
agreeing she would go out with Paris just to ensure he represented her effectively. But 
she could not bring herself to do so. After this, Paris failed to appear at her sentencing 
hearing. His client then reported him. The Court compared his conduct to other similar 
cases and resultantly would be suspended from the practice of law for six months if he 
failed to pay restitution to the client’s fiancee.  
 
Respondent, Tasso Paris of Cleveland, Ohio was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1987. 
 
In a January 2015 complaint, relator, Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, alleged that Paris 
violated multiple Rules of Professional Conduct by making unwelcome sexual advances toward 
a female client and failing to appear at her criminal-sentencing hearing. 
 
The parties entered into stipulations of fact, misconduct, and aggravating and mitigating factors 
and jointly recommended that Paris be suspended from the practice of law for six months, all 
stayed on the condition that he engage in no further misconduct. A panel of the Board of 
Professional Conduct conducted a hearing at which it admitted stipulations submitted by the 
parties and heard testimony from Paris and the affected client. The panel largely adopted the 
stipulations but, noting that Paris's testimony contradicted some of those stipulations, also found 
that he failed to understand and acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. The panel 
therefore rejected the sanction suggested by the parties and recommended that Paris serve a 
six-month actual suspension from the practice of law in Ohio. The board adopted the panel's 
report in its entirety. 
 
Paris objects to the board’s finding of an additional aggravating factor to which the parties had 
not stipulated. He also argues that given the parties' comprehensive stipulations and the limited 
nature of the testimony before the panel, this court should reject the sanction recommended by 
the panel and adopt the stipulated sanction of the parties. We adopt the board's findings of fact 
and misconduct but sustain Paris’s objections and suspend him from the practice of law in Ohio 
for six months, all stayed on conditions. 
 
Misconduct 
 
Following an automobile accident that occurred on March 17, 2013, a woman hired Paris to 
defend her in the Cleveland Municipal Court against charges of driving under the influence and 
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driving under suspension, and her fiancé paid him $1,000. Paris stipulated that he referred to 
her as his “beautiful Irish girl” but testified that he had referred to her as “a red haired Irish girl, 
coming out of an Irish bar, in Cleveland, Ohio, on March 17th” only in the context of explaining 
that no one was going to believe her claim that she had had only one drink before her St. 
Patrick’s Day automobile accident. Paris also stipulated that during the course of his 
representation, he asked his client to go out with him several times and invited her to his house 
to join him in his hot tub on more than one occasion. Although he never denied the truth of that 
stipulation, he also testified that the client's fiancé was present at all but one of their meetings. 
 
Paris stipulated that his client was afraid to do anything about his conduct out of fear that it 
would affect his representation. The client testified that his conduct made her uncomfortable but 
that she never told him that she would not go out with him. Instead, she attempted to avoid the 
issue by saying, “We’ll see” or “We will talk about it.” The client and her fiancé discussed her 
concerns on several occasions and agreed that she would just go out with Paris so that he 
would do a better job representing her, but she could not bring herself to go through with it. She 
testified that as the case dragged on, however, she would have done “whatever he wanted” to 
get it resolved. 
 
On August 6, 2013, the client pleaded guilty to driving while under suspension and failure to 
maintain reasonable control of her vehicle and was ordered to appear at a later date for 
sentencing. Paris stipulated that he not only failed to attend the sentencing hearing but that he 
also failed to notify the client of his absence and to request that another attorney attend the 
hearing on his behalf. At the panel hearing, Paris acknowledged that stipulation and confirmed 
its truth. He testified, however, that he had asked his father to attend the client's sentencing 
hearing and that upon returning to the office after the hearing, his father reported that the case 
had been “sent to another judge.” Paris’s father was not called as a witness, but he represented 
Paris before the panel. During his closing argument, he stated that he attended the sentencing 
hearing at Paris’s request. But the parties had stipulated — and the client's testimony confirmed 
— that when the judge asked her whether she was represented by counsel, she responded that 
Paris had failed to appear and that she did not expect him to because “he’s been doing nothing 
but trying to get in my pants.” 
 
Based on the client’s statement, the judge vacated the client’s plea and recused herself from the 
case. The case was reassigned, and a public defender was appointed to represent the client. 
The client ultimately pleaded guilty to operating an unsafe vehicle and was fined $200. She later 
filed a grievance against Paris. 
 
The board adopted the parties’ stipulations and agreed that Paris’s conduct violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client) 
and 1.8(j) (prohibiting a lawyer from soliciting or engaging in sexual activity with a client unless a 
consensual sexual relationship existed prior to the lawyer-client relationship). 
 
Recommended Sanction 
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When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider several relevant factors, 
including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, relevant aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, and the sanctions imposed in similar cases. 
 
The board adopted the parties’ stipulation that Paris has no prior disciplinary record and 
cooperated with relator’s investigation. It also noted that Paris did not present evidence of any 
other mitigating factors. 
 
In addition to adopting the parties’ stipulated aggravating factors — that Paris acted with a 
selfish motive and engaged in multiple offenses — the board found that Paris’s conduct harmed 
a vulnerable client. The board also found that Paris did not understand or accept the wrongful 
nature of his conduct based on testimony in which he (1) asked why the client referred a female 
friend to him after terminating his representation if he was “hitting on” her, (2) stated that the 
client's fiancé was present during all but one of their meetings, (3) claimed that he merely 
referred to the client as a “red haired Irish girl” — and only when explaining that no one was 
going to believe her claim that she had had only one drink before her St. Patrick's Day 
automobile accident, and (4) claimed that his father had attended the client’s sentencing 
hearing. While noting that relator offered no evidence that Paris engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct, the board also commented that “there is likewise no evidence to assure the panel 
that it was an isolated event that is unlikely to reoccur.” 
 
The parties jointly recommend that Paris be suspended for six months but that the suspension 
be stayed in its entirety on the condition that he engage in no further misconduct. In support of 
that sanction, the parties cited Disciplinary Counsel v. Hubbell (imposing a conditionally stayed 
six-month suspension on an attorney who attempted to initiate a romantic relationship with a 
client whom he represented, pro bono, in a custody dispute), and Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Quatman (imposing a conditionally stayed one-year suspension on an attorney who put his 
hands on a client's breasts for several seconds and told her that they were “very nice”). 
 
Noting the increasing frequency of cases involving repeated and unwelcome solicitation of 
clients for sexual activity, the board, however, urges us to hold that in the absence of significant 
mitigating factors, this court will impose an actual suspension on attorneys who have engaged 
in such conduct — as we do in cases involving attorneys who have engaged in a material 
misrepresentation to a court or have engaged in a pattern of dishonesty with a client. 
 
In accordance with this suggested presumption and in light of Paris’s repeated and unwelcome 
solicitation of his client, his failure to appear for her sentencing hearing after she rebuffed his 
advances, his failure to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct, and the absence of 
additional mitigating evidence, the board recommends that we suspend Paris from the practice 
of law for six months with no stay. 
 
Paris’s Objections 
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In his objections to the board’s report and recommendation, Paris urges us to reject the board’s 
finding of the additional aggravating factor that Paris failed to accept the wrongful nature of his 
conduct. He also challenges the board's recommended sanction and urges us to adopt the 
parties’ stipulated sanction of a fully stayed six-month suspension. 
 
We agree that Paris did not plainly acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct or make a 
particularly strong showing of remorse at the panel hearing. But we also note that despite the 
intention of the parties to submit the case entirely upon their stipulations, the panel sought to 
hear testimony not only from Paris but also from the grievant. This created some confusion 
regarding the scope of the evidence to be presented at the hearing. It also resulted in the 
inadvertent admission of testimony that touched upon stipulated issues. Although relator and 
the panel chairperson expressed that it was their intention to rely on the stipulations rather than 
the testimony in those instances, there is a possibility that some of Paris’s contradictory 
testimony was offered to rebut portions of the grievant’s testimony on those stipulated issues. 
Therefore, in the interest of fairness, we decline to adopt additional aggravating factors based 
on that testimony. Moreover, in light of Paris's nearly 30 years of practice with no disciplinary 
record prior to this incident, we are inclined to agree that there is some evidence that his 
behavior in this matter is an isolated incident. 
 
We have consistently disapproved of the conduct of lawyers who have solicited or engaged in 
sexual activity with their clients even before the adoption of Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j), and depending 
on the relative impropriety of the situation, we have imposed a wide range of disciplinary 
measures for such conduct. We have publicly reprimanded attorneys who have commenced 
consensual sexual relationships with their clients that have not compromised the clients' 
interests. On the other end of the spectrum, we have disbarred an attorney who solicited sex 
from clients in exchange for a reduced legal fee, made inappropriate sexual comments to 
clients, touched them in a sexual manner, exposed himself to a client, and lied repeatedly 
during the disciplinary process. 
 
In between those two extremes, we typically impose term suspensions with all or part of the 
suspension stayed, depending on the severity of the misconduct and the applicable aggravating 
and mitigating factors. 
 
We by no means condone Paris’s conduct in this matter, but on the stipulated facts before us, 
we find that his actions are most comparable to cases in which we have imposed fully stayed 
suspensions. Therefore, we sustain Paris’s objection to the board's recommended sanction and 
find that a six-month suspension, stayed on conditions, is the appropriate sanction for his 
misconduct. 
 
Accordingly, Tasso Paris is suspended from the practice of law for six months, with the entire 
suspension stayed on the conditions that he make full restitution of $1,000 to the affected client 
and engage in no further misconduct. If Paris fails to comply with the conditions of the stay, the 
stay will be lifted and he will serve the full six-month suspension. Costs are taxed to Paris. 
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KENNEDY, J., concurring. 
 
I agree with the majority that a six-month suspension, stayed on conditions, is the appropriate 
sanction for the misconduct of respondent, Tasso Paris. The majority opinion tacitly rejects the 
board's request that we adopt a new presumption that in the absence of significant mitigating 
factors, the court will impose an actual suspension for the repeated and unwelcome solicitation 
of vulnerable clients for sexual activity. The dissenting opinion argues in favor of adopting this 
presumption. I write separately to squarely address whether it is this court's role to create a new 
presumption in favor of an actual suspension in lieu of our deeply rooted process of determining 
the appropriate sanction in each individual case. 
 
Gov. Bar R. V(13) imposes a duty on the Board of Professional Conduct to examine the unique 
facts and circumstances of each disciplinary case, the aggravating and mitigating factors 
applicable to the individual attorney, and his or her life circumstances in order to determine the 
appropriate sanction for that particular attorney. Therefore, the establishment of a presumption 
of an actual suspension would be antithetical to our rules. 
 
In 1995, this court established a presumption of an actual suspension in cases with misconduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, absent mitigating factors justifying a 
stay. A majority of the court in Fowerbaugh reasoned that a presumption was warranted for 
conduct by an attorney involving deception, falsehood, or fraud because “such conduct strikes 
at the very core of a lawyer’s relationship with the court and with the client. Respect for our 
profession is diminished with every deceitful act of a lawyer.” 
 
In my view, however, deception and fraud are not the only types of misconduct that strike at the 
core of a lawyer’s relationship with the court and with the client. Instead, every act of 
misconduct does so and diminishes the honor and nobility of our great profession. But to echo 
the views expressed in Justice Resnick's separate opinion in Fowerbaugh: 
 
It is the responsibility of this court to give guidance as to what conduct constitutes a 
violation of the Disciplinary Rules. It is not the province of this court to use syllabus law 
to mandate a particular sanction once a violation has been found. The sanction in each 
individual's case should be determined based upon the unique facts and circumstances 
of that case. 
 
Without question, inappropriate sexual conduct by an attorney toward his or her client 
undermines the attorney-client relationship and diminishes respect for our profession. However, 
if we were to adopt a presumption of an actual suspension for this category of misconduct 
based on the reasoning advanced by the majority in Fowerbaugh, why not extend this approach 
and establish a similar presumption for any and all cases involving violations that undermine the 
attorney-client relationship and diminish respect for our profession? Adoption of the proposed 
presumption in this case would move us closer to a reality in which the “exception swallows the 
rule.” 
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Gov.Bar R. V(2)(A) provides that “except as otherwise expressly provided in rules adopted by 
the Supreme Court, all grievances involving alleged misconduct by attorneys shall be brought, 
conducted, and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this rule.” This provision 
applies to all of Gov. Bar R. V, including Gov. Bar R. V(13). Presuming an actual suspension 
would fundamentally transform our well-established individualized process of attorney discipline 
into a formulaic “one size fits all” system. This philosophical shift should be carried out, if ever, 
only pursuant to this court's longstanding rulemaking process, not through judicial fiat. It is for 
the members of the legal community — guided by the principle that the primary purpose of the 
disciplinary process is not to punish the offender but to “protect the public against members of 
the bar who are unworthy of the trust and confidence essential to the relationship of attorney 
and client” — to debate whether it would be appropriate to establish a presumption of an actual 
suspension. 
 
Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
 
This court has been asked to consider establishing a presumption that in the absence of 
significant mitigating factors, we will impose an actual suspension on attorneys who engage in 
the repeated and unwelcome solicitation of vulnerable clients for sexual activity. We already 
presume that an actual suspension will be the sanction for behavior involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation, unless mitigating factors justify a stay. I believe that the same type 
of sanction should be imposed upon respondents like Tasso Paris, especially because it 
appears that cases of this type are increasing. 
 
In my view, this court should do more than merely express disapproval of the attorney’s actions 
by imposing a stayed suspension. The extent of the mitigation is that he has no previous 
discipline and has cooperated with the investigation. On the other hand, he stipulated that he 
acted with a selfish motive and engaged in multiple offenses. In addition, the board found that 
he did not understand or accept the wrongful nature of his actions and so failed to show that his 
misconduct was unlikely to recur. Most importantly, the client was harmed when Paris did not 
appear for her sentencing, conduct that she attributed to her rebuffing his sexual advances. 
 
I respectfully dissent from the court's judgment with respect to the sanction in this case. I would 
adopt the recommendation of both the panel and the board and would suspend Paris from the 
practice of law for a period of six months. 
 
O'CONNOR, C.J., and O'NEILL, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
 
Questions: 
 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Engler, 110 Ohio St. 3d 138 (Ohio 2006) 
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Summary: Attorney Engler had two sexual encounters with a 28-year-old female divorce 
client. The client relationship began in June 2004 when Engler credited her bill for a 
$400 painting of hers. In August she and her husband agreed to dissolve their marriage. 
In September, Engler and his client met at a restaurant to discuss the dissolution 
process and afterwards they had consensual sexual relations. Seven to ten days later, 
they did it again at Engler’s home. Engler informed his client that they could no longer 
have a personal relationship until her case was over and she was no longer his client. 
Engler did some more work for his client but was dismissed in October. He reimbursed 
his client for all she had paid and returned her painting. Because of several mitigating 
factors including he had no prior record, he made restitution, he was cooperative in the 
disciplinary proceedings, and had a good reputation, the Court imposed nothing more 
than a public reprimand.  
 
Respondent, David Lee Engler of Boardman, Ohio was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1985. 
 
On October 10, 2005, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged respondent with violating the Code 
of Professional Responsibility by engaging in a sexual relationship with a client. A panel of the 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline heard the cause on the parties’ consent-
to-discipline agreement, filed pursuant to Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations Governing 
Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline. The panel accepted the parties’ agreement and made corresponding findings of 
misconduct and a recommendation, which the board adopted. 
 
Misconduct 
 
The parties stipulated that respondent had two sexual encounters with a divorce client and had 
thereby violated DR 1-102(A)(6) (prohibiting conduct that adversely reflects on a lawyer's fitness 
to practice law) and 5-101(A)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from accepting employment if the exercise 
of professional judgment on behalf of a client will be or reasonably may be affected by the 
lawyer's personal interests). The parties also agreed that respondent’s misconduct warranted a 
public reprimand. 
 
Respondent has a law practice under the name of Engler & Associates. On June 29, 2004, a 
28-year-old female client consulted respondent about ending her marriage. During their 
discussions, respondent learned that the client was an artist and had sold some of her 
paintings. He indicated an interest in possibly purchasing her work, and sometime later, the 
client brought paintings to respondent's office. Respondent offered to buy some of the paintings 
by crediting the client for $400 toward his $1,000 fee. The client agreed to trade the paintings 
and paid the balance of respondent's $600 legal fee. 
 
The client expected her husband to agree to dissolve their marriage, and in late August 2004, 
respondent sent a separation agreement to the husband for review. On September 8, 2004, 
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respondent met his client at a restaurant to discuss the dissolution process. Afterward, 
respondent and the client went to his house and engaged in consensual sexual relations. 
 
Approximately seven to ten days later, the client visited respondent at home again, and the 
couple again had consensual sex. Respondent subsequently told his client that he could not 
continue to have a personal relationship with her until her case had ended and she was no 
longer his client. About the same time, respondent wrote a memo to the client's file indicating he 
had told the client he could not have a personal relationship with her and that the client had 
agreed. 
 
In late September 2004, an attorney representing the husband sent respondent proposed 
changes to the dissolution agreement. Early in October 2004, respondent met with his client in 
the presence of his assistant to review the changes and then wrote to the other lawyer 
regarding those changes. 
 
In a telephone conversation on October 12, 2004, respondent again told his client that he could 
not continue their personal relationship while he was representing her. The next day, the client 
sent a letter of dismissal to respondent. Respondent promptly replied with a letter indicating that 
he had completed his work in her case. Respondent enclosed a final invoice and a check 
reimbursing the client for the remaining balance of her paid fees. Later, respondent also 
returned the paintings that he had accepted from his client in partial payment of his fees. 
 
Recommended Sanction 
 
In recommending a sanction for respondent’s misconduct, the board weighed the mitigating and 
aggravating factors of his case. 
 
The parties stipulated to the mitigating factors that (1) respondent had no prior disciplinary 
record, (2) he had made timely good-faith efforts at restitution, (3) he made a full and free 
disclosure of information and was cooperative in the disciplinary proceedings, and (4) he had a 
good reputation in the legal community apart from the underlying misconduct. According to the 
parties, respondent on his own initiative had also received instruction on ethics and practice 
management from a former president of the Mahoning County Bar Association. In addition, the 
board found that respondent had acknowledged his wrongdoing in this isolated incident of 
misconduct. 
 
Adopting the panel’s report, the board recommended that respondent receive a public 
reprimand for his misconduct. 
 
Review 
 
We agree that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(6) and 5-101(A)(1), as found by the board. 
Moreover, we generally impose a public reprimand when a sexual relationship develops during 
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an attorney-client relationship if the affair is legal and consensual and has not compromised 
client interests. Therefore, we find the recommended sanction appropriate. 
 
Respondent is therefore publicly reprimanded for his violations of DR 1-102(A)(6) and 5-
101(A)(1). 
 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Hines, 133 Ohio St. 3d 166 (Ohio 2012) 
 
Summary: Attorney Dean Hines agreed to represent a client in an ongoing domestic-
relations dispute with her ex-husband. Hines invited her to dinner and assured her a 
personal relationship would not pose a conflict of interest; after a second dinner the next 
evening, they had sex. His client testified she was afraid to resist Hines’ advances 
because she needed his legal assistance. In the months that followed Hines hired her as 
his bookkeeper, leased her a car, helped with her mortgage and utility payments, and 
travelled together to Austria, Arizona, and South Carolina, and let her and her children 
live with him while she recuperated from surgery. Eventually, the relationship fell apart 
and Hines called 911 for a domestic violence incident. He fired the client the next day--
the same time at which she received an adverse ruling she could only object to within 11 
days. Considering some aggravating factors, including the client’s sensitivity and Hines 
downplaying of his wrongdoing, the Court imposed a six month suspension. 
 
Respondent, Dean Edward Hines of Centerville, Ohio was admitted to the practice of law in 
Ohio in 1994. On October 11, 2010, relator, disciplinary counsel, filed a complaint alleging that 
Hines had engaged in an inappropriate relationship with a client and violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) 
and 8.4(h). 
 
The parties stipulated to Hines’s misconduct. Upon the parties’ stipulations, the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline accepted the parties’ joint recommendation that 
we publicly reprimand Hines. However, we did not accept the recommendation and remanded 
the case for further proceedings. 
 
On October 14, 2011, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline issued a 
second report and recommended a 12-month suspension of Hines’s law license, with six 
months stayed. 
 
Misconduct 
 
In early 2009, Hines agreed to represent a new client in an ongoing domestic-relations dispute 
with the client’s ex-husband. On March 16, 2009, after several appointments and a pretrial 
conference, Hines invited the client to dinner, where he discussed his interest in dating her. 
Hines assured the client that a personal relationship between the two would not pose a conflict 
of interest with respect to their attorney-client relationship. After another dinner the next 
evening, Hines and the client became sexually intimate. Describing her feelings at this time, the 
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client later testified that she was overwhelmed by Hines’s advances and that she was afraid to 
resist him when she needed his legal assistance. 
 
In the months that followed, Hines continued to represent the client in the domestic dispute 
while continuing their romantic relationship. Hines hired the client to work as a bookkeeper at 
his law firm, leased a car for her use, and contributed to her mortgage and utility payments. 
They traveled together to Austria, Arizona, and South Carolina, and when the client underwent 
surgery requiring a lengthy recovery period, Hines moved the client and her children into his 
home. 
 
The relationship fell apart in November 2009. On November 9, 2009, Hines called 9-1-1 to 
report a domestic dispute with the client. He filed charges of aggravated menacing and 
domestic violence and obtained a temporary protection order barring any contact with Hines. 
The charges were eventually dropped. 
 
The day after their altercation, Hines fired the client. A few days later, he mailed a letter 
simultaneously notifying her of an adverse ruling in the underlying domestic case and of the end 
of their attorney-client relationship. 
 
When Hines mailed the letter, 11 days remained in which the client could protect her legal rights 
by objecting to the magistrate’s ruling. Hines must have known about the client's vulnerability; 
during their relationship, she had faced financial troubles and a serious physical illness requiring 
surgery, not to mention the legal issues for which she had sought Hines’s help. Yet Hines did 
not seek leave for an extension of this deadline, refer the client to another attorney, or otherwise 
assist the client in protecting her rights. Instead, he left a vulnerable client without legal 
representation or assistance at a critical time in her case, and he did so through an accusatory 
letter that blamed the client for the adverse decision. 
 
Although he left the client without counsel to protect her rights, Hines continued to make 
overtures to her. He repeatedly e-mailed her and sent her text messages. As a practical matter, 
these overtures encouraged the client to violate the temporary protection order. She did not 
accept that invitation, even after Hines’s promises that he would not report her to police if she 
responded. 
 
The parties have stipulated that Hines’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j), which generally 
prohibits sexual activity between attorneys and their clients, and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h), which bars 
behavior that reflects adversely on the fitness of a lawyer to practice law. We adopt the board's 
findings of fact and misconduct. 
 
Sanction 
 
The parties stipulated to the absence of aggravating factors. However, the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline identified several aggravating factors pertaining to 
Hines's misconduct: (1) he “knew from the outset that his conduct violated the Ohio Rules of 
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Professional Conduct but he nevertheless acted with a clearly selfish motive,” (2) he “has 
attempted to excuse or minimize that conduct rather than acknowledge that it was wrong,” and 
(3) the client “was a vulnerable person and has been harmed as a result of” Hines's misconduct. 
Hines objects to these findings. We overrule the objections and adopt the findings of 
aggravating factors. 
 
The parties stipulated to the following mitigating factors: (1) Hines has no prior disciplinary 
record, (2) Hines cooperated with the investigation of his misconduct, and (3) as evidenced by 
several letters of support, Hines enjoys a positive reputation in the legal community. 
 
Disciplinary counsel suggests a six-month suspension, with all six months stayed. Hines 
suggests a public reprimand or a stayed suspension of no more than six months. The Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommends that we suspend Hines from the 
practice of law for 12 months, with the final six months stayed. 
 
In the past, we have imposed public reprimands on attorneys who engaged in improper 
consensual relationships with their clients, when the relationships did not compromise the 
clients’ interests. But this is not a simple case of mutual consent; Hines used his position of 
power to initiate and pursue an intimate relationship with a vulnerable client who was afraid to 
resist. Furthermore, Hines’s conduct in leaving the client without legal assistance at a critical 
juncture in her case threatened her interests. A public reprimand is not enough. 
 
Nor do we find Hines's misdeeds comparable to those of attorneys whom we have suspended. 
Hines’s conduct involved only one client, he has not engaged in any deception to hide the 
misconduct, and he has cooperated with the disciplinary process. 
 
The appropriate penalty in cases like these is often a stayed suspension, which reflects the 
hope that the misconduct is limited to one occurrence and the reality that its recurrence would 
necessitate serious consequences. 
 
Like Hines, the attorney in Burkholder pursued an improper relationship with a vulnerable 
domestic-relations client. Burkholder made numerous advances to the client until she fired him. 
However, Burkholder had no prior disciplinary violations, and he cooperated throughout the 
disciplinary process. We imposed a six-month, stayed suspension of Burkholder's license to 
practice law. 
 
We imposed the same penalty in Disciplinary Counsel v. Siewert. The attorney in Siewert 
engaged in a consensual but improper relationship with a domestic-relations client. Unlike 
Hines, Siewert had a record of prior discipline; however, we noted as mitigating factors 
Siewert’s struggles with depression and his efforts to correct his personal problems. 
 
We find Burkholder and Siewert instructive. Like the attorneys in those cases, Hines made a 
serious mistake and abused the position of trust conferred upon attorneys, but the limited nature 
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of his misconduct and his cooperative approach to the investigation give us reason to believe 
that Hines will conduct himself appropriately in the future. 
 
Accordingly, we suspend Hines from the practice of law for six months, and we stay the 
suspension on the condition that Hines engage in no further misconduct. Costs are taxed to 
Hines. 
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Section 5: Confidentiality 
 
5.1: The Duty of Confidentiality 
 
I don’t know where you heard it. Don't know who’s spreading it round. All I know is, I’m clean as 
a whistle, baby. I didn't utter a sound. I never said nothing.63 
 
Attorneys have a fiduciary duty of confidentiality to their clients. The duty of confidentiality 
provides that attorneys may not disclose confidential information provided to them by their 
clients, unless their clients consent to disclosure, or an exception to the duty of confidentiality 
permits disclosure. The duty of confidentiality applies to both current and former clients. Clients 
disclose confidential information to their attorneys in order to obtain legal advice. Generally, 
clients are entitled to assume that their attorney has a duty to maintain the confidentiality of any 
information disclosed in private. However, the duty of confidentiality does not apply to 
information that is “generally known” to the public. 
 
The duty of confidentiality is broader in scope than the attorney-client privilege and the work 
product doctrine. Information that is not privileged or protected from disclosure as attorney work 
product may still be protected by the duty of confidentiality. Attorneys may not disclose 
confidential information about their clients without informed consent, unless one of the 
exceptions to confidentiality applies. Accordingly, the duty of confidentiality provides less 
protection to confidential client information than the attorney-client privilege or the work product 
doctrine, which may preclude the disclosure of confidential information when the duty of 
confidentiality alone would not. 
 
Model Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information 
 
a. A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the 
client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out 
the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b). 
b. A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
1. to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; 
2. to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to 
result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in 
furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services; 
3. to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or 
property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the 
client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used 
the lawyer’s services; 
4. to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these Rules; 
																																																								
63 Liz Phair, Never Said, Exile in Guyville (1993). 
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5. to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between 
the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim 
against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to 
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation 
of the client;  
6. to comply with other law or a court order; or 
7. to detect and resolve conflicts of interest arising from the lawyer’s change of 
employment or from changes in the composition or ownership of a firm, but only 
if the revealed information would not compromise the attorney-client privilege or 
otherwise prejudice the client.  
c. A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized 
disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of a 
client. 
 
Model Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, Comment [2] 
 
A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the 
client's informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the 
representation. This contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer 
relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to 
communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally 
damaging subject matter. The lawyer needs this information to represent the client 
effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful conduct. Almost 
without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, 
in the complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. Based upon 
experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is 
upheld. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 59 (2000): Definition of 
“Confidential Client Information” 
 
Confidential client information consists of information relating to representation of a 
client, other than information that is generally known. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 59 (2000): Comment b, Kinds of 
confidential client information 
 
A client’s approach to a lawyer for legal assistance implies that the client trusts the 
lawyer to advance and protect the interests of the client. The resulting duty of loyalty is 
the predicate of the duty of confidentiality. The information that a lawyer is obliged to 
protect and safeguard is called confidential client information in this Restatement. 
 
This definition covers all information relating to representation of a client, whether in oral, 
documentary, electronic, photographic, or other forms. It covers information gathered 
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from any source, including sources such as third persons whose communications are 
not protected by the attorney-client privilege. It includes work product that the lawyer 
develops in representing the client, such as the lawyer’s notes to a personal file, whether 
or not the information is immune from discovery as lawyer work product. It includes 
information acquired by a lawyer in all client-lawyer relationships, including functioning 
as inside or outside legal counsel, government or private-practice lawyer, counselor or 
litigator, advocate or intermediary. It applies whether or not the client paid a fee, and 
whether a lawyer learns the information personally or through an agent, for example 
information acquired by a lawyer's partners or associate lawyers or by an investigator, 
paralegal, or secretary. Information acquired by an agent is protected even if it was not 
thereafter communicated to the lawyer, such as material acquired by an investigator and 
kept in the investigator's files. 
 
The definition includes information that becomes known by others, so long as the 
information does not become generally known. The fact that information falls outside the 
attorney-client privilege or work-product immunity does not determine its confidentiality 
under this Section. 
 
A lawyer may learn information relevant to representation of a client in the course of 
representing another client, from casual reading or in other accidental ways. In the 
course of representation, a lawyer may learn confidential information about the client 
that is not necessary for the representation but which is of a personal or proprietary 
nature or other character such that the client evidently would not wish it disclosed. Such 
information is confidential under this Section. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 60 (2000): A Lawyer's Duty to 
Safeguard Confidential Client Information 
 
1. Except as provided in §§ 61- 67, during and after representation of a client: 
a. the lawyer may not use or disclose confidential client information as defined in § 
59 if there is a reasonable prospect that doing so will adversely affect a material 
interest of the client or if the client has instructed the lawyer not to use or disclose 
such information; 
b. the lawyer must take steps reasonable in the circumstances to protect 
confidential client information against impermissible use or disclosure by the 
lawyer's associates or agents that may adversely affect a material interest of the 
client or otherwise than as instructed by the client. 
2. Except as stated in § 62, a lawyer who uses confidential information of a client for the 
lawyer's pecuniary gain other than in the practice of law must account to the client for 
any profits made. 
 
Confidential & Privileged Information 
 
In re Advisory Opinion No. 544 of NJ Sup. Court, 511 A. 2d 609 (N.J. 1986) 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 365	
 
Summary: The Community Health Law Project represented indigent and disabled 
clients in New Jersey. Organizations providing funding requested client-identifying 
information, but the Law Project provided only anonymized information. Some of the 
funders objected, and the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics found that 
disclosure would not violate client confidence. The Law Project appealed, and the court 
held that the attorney-client privilege and duty of confidentiality precluded the Law 
Project from disclosing identifying information about its clients without informed consent 
or a reasonable regulatory obligation. 
 
We are called to consider in this case the application of attorney-client protections to the 
relationship between a public legal services organization and the individuals whom it assists. 
The issue posed is whether certain information relating to the clients of a legal services 
organization, which provides legal assistance to mentally impaired or disabled and indigent 
persons, may be disclosed to the private and governmental entities that provide funds to the 
organization, without violating the protections of confidentiality accorded attorney-client 
communications and relationships. 
 
The legal services organization resisting such disclosure is the Community Health Law Project. 
It is a non-profit organization providing legal services to indigent, mentally disabled and retarded 
persons in Essex, Mercer, Union, and Camden counties. Its legal services are funded by private 
and public sources. Various contracts with the funding entities obligate the Law Project to make 
periodic reports relating to the services provided, including in some instances information about 
the individual clients served. 
 
Under the funding plans of several community mental health centers, identifying, descriptive 
information, such as a client's name, address, and date of birth, have been sought by the 
entities providing funds. The Law Project has chosen not to reveal the identity of individual 
clients by furnishing such information. Rather, it has attempted to accommodate these requests 
by providing data that have been aggregated and by disclosing information on individual clients 
only to the extent and in a manner that the revelation would not serve to identify the clients 
directly or indirectly. However, several funding entities expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
generalized nature of the information received from the Law Project and have insisted upon 
obtaining individual client-identifying information. 
 
In the face of these more particularized demands, the Law Project has taken the position that 
such identifying information is or may be protected from disclosure under the strictures 
governing the professional conduct of lawyers. However, confronted by this genuine ethical 
dilemma, the Law Project sought guidance from the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics 
in January 1984 to ensure that disclosure would not violate any ethical precepts. 
 
In Opinion No. 544, the ACPE ruled that the disclosure of the information requested by private 
and public funding entities does not violate the confidences of the Law Project’s clients and that 
the information requested would not violate client secrets or confidences within the meaning of 
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then-applicable ethics standards. The Law Project then filed a petition with this Court to review 
the determination of the ACPE, which was originally denied. A motion for reconsideration of the 
denial was then granted by this Court. 
 
We must initially consider the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to the relationships that 
exist between the Law Project and its clientele. The Law Project, as we have noted, is an 
organization that provides legal services to a particular class of persons, consisting of indigent, 
mentally-retarded, or disabled individuals. These persons are in need of legal assistance but 
cannot otherwise afford to retain an attorney and hence turn to the Law Project for legal help. 
The Law Project engages licensed attorneys of the State, who furnish legal advice and 
counselling to the individuals eligible for such services. 
 
As licensed attorneys, the Law Project’s lawyers are subject in every respect to the rules 
governing the professional conduct of lawyers. Accordingly, lawyers employed by governmental 
or public interest organizations are bound by the same ethical mandates of the Supreme Court's 
Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as other standards governing the professional activities 
of licensed attorneys. 
 
Further, the persons who receive the legal services of the Law Project through its individual staff 
attorney are “clients.” A client, in the context of the attorney-client privilege, is a person who 
“consults a lawyer for the purpose of retaining the lawyer or securing legal service or advice 
from him in his professional capacity.” Consequently, it is not questioned that there exists 
between the Law Project and its attorneys who render legal services and the persons who 
receive those services an attorney-client relationship to which the attorney-client privilege fully 
applies. 
 
It is also beyond question that indigent, needy, or otherwise eligible clients, assisted by 
attorneys without fees, are entitled to the same protections as clients who retain private counsel. 
Because the status of clients in every sense is ascribed to these persons, we must accordingly 
consider in this case the extent of these client-protections, particularly as to matters falling 
within the ambit of the attorney-client privilege. 
 
The major focus of the attorney-client privilege has historically and traditionally been upon the 
communications that occur or information that is exchanged between an attorney and his or her 
client relating to the special attorney-client relationship. The attorney-client privilege is 
recognized as one of “the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications.” While the 
attorney-client privilege has evolved and changed in terms of its emphasis and applications, the 
primary justification and dominant rationale for the privilege has come to be the encouragement 
of free and full disclosure of information from the client to the attorney. This has led to the 
recognition that the privilege belongs to the client, rather than the attorney. 
 
The extent of the protection accorded communications and other information arising in the 
course of any attorney-client relationship is governed by the attorney-client privilege as well as 
several ethics standards. The attorney-client privilege itself, while rooted in the common law, 
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has acquired a basis in both statute and rule. This codification provides that communications 
between a lawyer and his or her client in the course of that relationship and in professional 
confidence are privileged; a client has a privilege (a) to refuse to disclose any such 
communication, and (b) to prevent his or her lawyer from disclosing it. While in a sense the 
privilege belongs to the client, the lawyer is obligated to claim the privilege unless otherwise 
instructed by the client or the client's representative. 
 
The scope of the attorney-client privilege or protections is also subject to ethics rules governing 
attorney conduct. In this case, the ACPE determined the issue posed by the Law Project under 
the former Disciplinary Rules. It applied Disciplinary Rule 4-101(A), entitled “Preservation of 
Confidences and Secrets of a Client.” Under this rule, confidences are defined as information 
protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law. Ibid. The rule also deals with 
“secrets,” which are defined as other information gained in the professional relationship that the 
client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or 
detrimental to the client. 
 
The Disciplinary Rules have been superseded by the Rules of Professional Conduct. The 
relevant rule now provides that a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of 
a client unless the client consents after consultation except for disclosures that are impliedly 
authorized in order to carry out the representation. In comparison to the provisions of the former 
Disciplinary Rule, this Rule expands the scope of protected information to include all information 
relating to the representation, regardless of the source or whether the client has requested it be 
kept confidential or whether disclosure of the information would be embarrassing or detrimental 
to the client. Thus, the definition of confidential information under Rules of Professional Conduct 
1.6(a) is broader and more inclusive than that of Disciplinary Rule 4-101(A). 
 
The ethics rules generally forbid disclosure of client information, without the client's consent, 
unless one of the exceptions to the rule is available. Disclosure of client information is 
permissible if the client consents after consultation. In this case no one urges the possible 
applicability of this provision dealing with consent. In situations such as this where the clients 
receiving legal services are indigent as well as mentally impaired or disabled, they may not be 
able to appreciate the nature or importance of their own interests or their ability to resist or 
decline consent or disclosure. 
 
The appropriate analysis must therefore focus upon whether the revelation of client information 
to someone other than the lawyer amounts to the impermissible disclosure of a privileged 
communication or a secret or information relating to the relationship. That inquiry is here 
particularized in terms of whether certain information that identifies the disabled and indigent 
persons receiving legal services from a legal services project may be disclosed to funding 
sources without violating the attorney-client privilege as defined by both statute and the Court's 
ethics strictures governing professional conduct. 
 
Arguably “information gained in the course of an attorney-client relationship,” as provided under 
the former Disciplinary Rule 4-101(A), might not include information that consists of only the 
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identity of the client. The thrust of this definitional standard appears to be directed to information 
in the nature of communications. While a client’s identity per se might not be necessarily 
considered a privileged communication as such, in some instances disclosure of identity may 
indirectly reveal other information about the client. Hence, depending upon the nature of such 
additional or collateral information that is revealed by the disclosure of a client's identity, the 
need for confidentiality could appropriately cloak even identity. In this case, for example, 
disclosure of the identity of clients of the Law Project would be tantamount to the revelation of 
the mental and financial status of the individuals, as well as the fact that he or she has a legal 
problem that required the services of an attorney. 
 
Furthermore, under the former Disciplinary Rules, it would appear that matters such as the 
identification or address of a client could still be considered to be a “secret” entitled to non-
disclosure. In Fellerman v. Bradley, an attorney refused to disclose the address of his client, 
thereby thwarting the enforcement of a divorce judgment against the client. The Court 
concluded that this information could be considered a confidence or in the nature of a protected 
secret covered by the attorney-client privilege and the Disciplinary Rule, holding nonetheless 
that, in the circumstances, the fraud exception to the privilege applied to preclude non-
disclosure of the client's address. 
 
The dilemma posed by requests for client-identity information has been addressed by the 
American Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics and various state advisory 
committees. In an opinion issued in 1969, the Committee ruled that a legal services office could 
allow the accounting office to examine its intake and disposition forms provided all identifying 
data were deleted. Similarly, in 1974, the Committee determined that a legal services 
organization could reveal client information to its Board of Directors if anonymity was preserved, 
the information was reasonably required by the board for a legitimate purpose, and the client 
expressed an informed consent. 
 
The Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee reached a similar 
result. It determined that a client's name, address, zip code, sex, race, age, social security 
number, phone number, source of referral, and the dates representation began were all secrets 
within the meaning of Disciplinary Rule 4-101 and could not be disclosed to funding sources 
unless the client consented. 
 
We are persuaded by the soundness of these opinions. Also highly relevant to our analysis is 
the fact that client information that serves to identify the client would clearly be protected under 
the current Rules of Professional Conduct, RPC 1.6. As noted, this rule accords confidentiality 
to any information relating to the representation of a client. Manifestly this would include a 
client's identity. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that under current standards governing attorney conduct, client-identity 
may not be disclosed to any private or public funding agency in the absence of appropriate 
consent or other legal justification. In so ruling, we determine that a client's identity constitutes 
information relating to the representation of a client under the current Rules of Professional 
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Conduct and a secret entitled to non-disclosure, if not a protected confidential communication, 
under the attorney-client privilege and former Disciplinary Rule 4-101(A), which was relied upon 
by the ACPE in this case. 
 
It is further suggested that even though this information might otherwise be subject to a privilege 
against disclosure, there may be a legal justification that would allow such disclosure. 
Disclosure of such information is permissible because, it is contended, the information sought is 
required to be furnished by law. The Division of Mental Health and Hospitals has promulgated 
regulations requiring reporting for all agencies receiving financial assistance through the 
Division, to aid in monitoring compliance and for program planning and development. Also, 
under N.J.A.C. 10:37-6.84 information such as client services and fiscal reports are to be 
submitted to the Division. Further, the Divisions of Mental Health and Hospitals and 
Developmental Disabilities and the various county mental health agencies are required to 
maintain the confidentiality of any client information it receives from the Law Project. It is 
contended that the reporting of information is needed to comply with these regulations and that 
this would not constitute either impermissible disclosure or public disclosure of client information 
violative of applicable ethics restrictions. 
 
Under the Rules of Professional Conduct a lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary to comply with the law. However, the regulations 
promulgated by the Division that provide for reporting as related to the persons assisted by the 
Law Project do not specifically require client-identifying information. Moreover, there is no legal 
requirement that client-identifying information be disclosed to private funding agencies. In the 
absence of such requirements, we may not infer that this client-identifying information is 
necessary to be disclosed as a matter of law. Hence, it may remain privileged under the Rules 
of Professional Conduct. 
 
This result, we point out, would not be different under the former ethics rules. In Fellerman v. 
Bradley, the compliance-with-law exception of Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(3), was deemed to 
prohibit disclosure of attorney-client information except in a situation in which the client was 
attempting through non-disclosure to evade an order of a court. We expressed the view that the 
policies underlying the privilege would not be advanced by allowing the client through his 
attorney to perpetrate a fraud on the court or to thwart justice by consenting to and 
subsequently ignoring a judgment of the court by refusing to disclose the client's address. 
 
We acknowledge that if by statute or valid rule or regulation information concerning the identity 
of clients of a legal services organization were clearly required to be reported for legitimate 
governmental purposes, the analysis and result could well be different. A different conclusion as 
to the propriety of disclosure might also obtain in the event private funding sources sought client 
information under enforceable rules or regulations. It can reasonably be assumed that in such a 
context, the welfare and interests of clients would remain a paramount concern and that the 
disclosure occasioned by such necessary reporting would be attended by suitable protections 
reflecting needs for confidentiality and privacy. 
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II. 
 
We conclude that client-identifying data with respect to persons receiving legal assistance 
through the Law Project constitute matters clearly covered by the Rules of Professional Conduct 
as “information relating to representation.” Such material is also covered under the attorney-
client privilege and the former Disciplinary Rule as information in the nature of client secrets that 
could be embarrassing or detrimental to the client if revealed. Under these strictures we are 
satisfied that it would be improper to reveal such information to either public or private funding 
sources in the absence of valid consent or reasonable rules clearly requiring such disclosure for 
legitimate purposes. 
 
Accordingly, we reverse Opinion No. 544. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did the court hold that the Law Project could not produce identifying information? 
2. What is the difference between confidential information and privileged information? 
When can an attorney disclose confidential information? When can an attorney disclose 
privileged information? 
3. When should attorneys address the disclosure of confidential information, if their clients 
cannot provide informed consent? 
 
“Generally Known” Information 
 
The duty of confidentiality prevents attorneys from using information about their current or 
former clients only if the information is “confidential.” Accordingly, the duty of confidentiality does 
not apply to information that is “generally known.” Of course, whether information is “generally 
known” may be unclear. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 59 (2000): Comment d, Generally 
Known Information 
 
The “generally known” standard of this Section is the standard of ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.9(b), which is not further elaborated upon in its Comment. 
The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1969) included in DR 4-101(A) all 
information, without regard to its public or private nature, within its definition of 
“confidences and secrets.” ABA Model Rule 1.9(b), on the other hand, excepts from its 
requirement of confidentiality information that “has become generally known.” No similar 
exception is contained, however, in the general-purpose analog to ABA Model Rule 
1.9(b), ABA Model Rule 1.8(b) Commentators have differed over the wisdom of the ABA 
Model Rule approach. Case law is sparse, but extant authority agrees with the position 
taken in the Section and Comment. 
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The law generally provides that a client communication cannot become public and still 
remain protected by the attorney-client privilege. The general law of agency also permits 
a former agent to compete with a former principal so long as the agent employs only 
information about the principal that is “a matter of general knowledge.” The scant case 
authority is divided on the question whether the definition of confidential client 
information includes publicly available information. 
 
The position taken in the Section and Comment—that “generally known” information is 
not part of the definition of confidential client information for either present or past 
clients—adheres to ABA Model Rule 1.9(b). The absence of a similarly limiting provision 
in ABA Model Rule 1.8(b), which applies to ongoing representations, is not inconsistent. 
Any such lawyer use would be impermissible on the broad ground that a lawyer may not 
use even publicly known information to the detriment of a current client, whether to 
further a personal interest of the lawyer or to further the interest of another client. 
Revealing client information adversely in a way that is gratuitous or negligent would 
violate the duty to take all reasonably available steps to advance the client's lawful 
objectives. 
 
Dougherty v. Pepper Hamilton LLP, 133 A. 3d 792 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) 
 
Summary: Pepper Hamilton LLP represented John J. Dougherty in a federal grand jury 
investigation, which included a search of his house. The search warrant affidavit was 
filed under seal, but the FBI later attached it to an unrelated public document by 
accident. When Dougherty ran for public office, the Philadelphia Inquirer published 
several articles stating that he had committed crimes. Daugherty filed a defamation 
action against the Inquirer, which hired Pepper Hamilton. When Pepper Hamilton 
threatened to submit the affidavit and other information, Daugherty filed a motion to 
disqualify, as well as a malpractice action. The trial court granted the Inquirer’s motion 
for summary judgment, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the affidavit was 
still “confidential,” despite being attached to a public document, because it was not 
“generally known.” 
 
OPINION BY SHOGAN, J.: 
 
Appellant, John J. Dougherty, appeals from the order granting summary judgment in favor of 
Pepper Hamilton LLP and its attorneys Amy B. Ginensky, Michael E. Baughman, Peter M. 
Smith, and Raphael Cunniff, in this civil action alleging breach of fiduciary duty and breach of 
contract. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
 
We summarize the protracted history of this case as follows. On October 30, 2003, Appellant 
retained Pepper Hamilton to represent him in relation to a federal matter involving a grand jury 
subpoena he received. Although Appellant was not the target of the grand jury investigation, an 
FBI Affidavit was filed to secure a search of Appellant’s residence. Appellant has alleged that he 
provided Pepper Hamilton unfettered access to documents during the firm's representation of 
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Appellant. Also, counsel from Pepper Hamilton was present during the execution of the search 
warrant at Appellant’s home in November of 2006. 
 
Initially, the FBI Affidavit securing the search warrant was under seal, but, somehow, the FBI 
Affidavit inadvertently became attached to a document presented in an unrelated criminal matter 
involving an unrelated person named “Donald Dougherty, Jr.” According to Appellant, on 
January 30, 2008, the federal government filed a response to Donald Dougherty Jr.’s motion to 
suppress evidence, which was entered as Document No. 27 on the federal criminal docket for 
the prosecution of Donald Dougherty, Jr. This filing was allegedly made under “restricted 
status.”64 Document No. 27 referenced, as Exhibit “A,” a copy of an affidavit by an FBI agent in 
support of the issuance of a search warrant for Donald Dougherty, Jr.'s premises. However, the 
affidavit that was attached to Document No. 27 as Exhibit “A” was actually the FBI Affidavit in 
support of the search of Appellant's premises. 
 
At least some of the documents in Donald Dougherty Jr.’s case were filed under seal and, thus, 
not accessible to the public. Subsequently, however, in April of 2008, certain documents in 
Donald Dougherty Jr.’s case were unsealed by Judge Robreno of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. More specifically, Judge Robreno's April 11, 2008 
order authorized the eastern district Clerk of Court to lift the seal on Documents 31, 32, 48 and 
38. Appellant alleges that Document No. 27 was also, albeit mistakenly, removed from 
“restrictive status” around this time. 
 
When Appellant was running for a vacant seat in the Pennsylvania Senate in April of 2008, the 
Philadelphia Inquirer published several articles about Appellant. The articles implied that 
Appellant had engaged in criminal conduct in the past and was likely to do so again if elected to 
the Pennsylvania Senate. In March of 2009, Appellant initiated a defamation suit against the 
Inquirer in state court. In 2011, Pepper Hamilton assumed representation of the defense for the 
Inquirer in the defamation suit filed by Appellant. In 2012, Pepper Hamilton informed the trial 
court that the defense of the defamation action would rely on information relating to the federal 
investigation in which Pepper Hamilton had previously represented Appellant. In 2013, 
Appellant moved to have Pepper Hamilton removed as defense counsel in his defamation 
action against the Inquirer. The trial court denied the motion to disqualify Pepper Hamilton. On 
appeal this Court reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded the matter for the entry 
of an order barring Pepper Hamilton and its attorneys from representing the Inquirer. 
 
On December 10, 2012, while Pepper Hamilton and its attorneys were still representing the 
Inquirer, the firm filed a motion for summary judgment in the defamation suit and included in the 
attached exhibits a copy of the FBI Affidavit. On December 12, 2012, the Inquirer then published 
a front-page article, which included detailed references to the FBI Affidavit. 
 
																																																								
64 Documents filed on the federal court's PACER system are publicly available for a fee to those who 
have registered for and received a PACER account. However, in his memorandum of law in support of his 
response to Pepper Hamilton's motion for summary judgment, Appellant asserts that a document on 
“restricted status” is unavailable to anyone but the court and the parties. 
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On February 11, 2013, Appellant initiated the instant action by filing a complaint against 
Appellees alleging breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract. Appellant alleged that, in 
representing the Inquirer in the defamation suit, Pepper Hamilton acted against the interests of 
Appellant, its former client. The trial court has summarized the subsequent procedural history of 
this case as follows: 
 
Appellees filed Preliminary Objections on April 3, 2013. These Preliminary Objections 
were overruled by this Court by Order dated June 18, 2013. An Answer was filed by 
Appellees on July 8, 2013. On May 27, 2014, after some discovery was conducted and a 
Revised Case Management Order entered, Appellees filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. An Answer in response to the Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by 
Appellant on June 27, 2014. A Reply in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment 
was filed by Appellees on July 2, 2014. A Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the 
Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by Appellees on July 25, 2014, and a 
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition was filed by Appellant on July 29, 2014. By 
Order dated July 29, 2014, and entered on the docket on July 30, 2014, Summary 
Judgment was granted. 
 
This timely appeal followed. 
 
Appellant presents the following issues for our review: 
 
A. Whether the Trial Court erred in granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on 
the mistaken basis that, because Pepper’s breach of fiduciary duty was also a violation 
of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, Appellant cannot assert a claim 
against Pepper as a matter of law. 
B. Whether the Trial Court erred in holding that Appellees were entitled to summary 
judgment because, although they used information against Appellant that is substantially 
related to their former representation of him, that information is publicly available and 
thus cannot form the basis of a disloyalty claim. 
C. Whether the Trial Court prematurely granted Appellees motion for summary judgment 
where the parties had exchanged limited written discovery and taken no depositions. 
 
Each of Appellant’s issues challenges the propriety of the trial court’s determination granting 
summary judgment.  
 
A legal malpractice claim based on breach of contract, “involves (1) the existence of a contract, 
(2) a breach of a duty imposed by the contract, and (3) damages.” With respect to a legal 
malpractice claim based on breach of contract, this Court has stated the following: 
 
The attorney’s liability must be assessed under the terms of the contract. Thus, if the 
attorney agrees to provide her best efforts and fails to do so, an action in assumpsit will 
accrue. An attorney who agrees for a fee to represent a client is by implication agreeing 
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to provide that client with professional services consistent with those expected of the 
profession at large. 
 
With respect to a breach of fiduciary duty claim, “a confidential relationship and the resulting 
fiduciary duty may attach wherever one occupies toward another such a position of advisor or 
counsellor as reasonably to inspire confidence that he will act in good faith for the other's 
interest.” The leading case in Pennsylvania discussing breach of a fiduciary duty by an attorney 
with regard to a conflict of interest is Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz. In 
Maritrans, our Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction 
preventing Pepper Hamilton from representing its former clients’ competitors. The Court found 
that a cause of action for breach of a fiduciary duty against a law firm was actionable where the 
firm acquired confidential information during the course of its representation. In discussing 
actionability for breach of a fiduciary duty, our Supreme Court reiterated the following long-
standing principles: 
 
Activity is actionable if it constitutes breach of a duty imposed by statute or by common 
law. Our common law imposes on attorneys the status of fiduciaries vis a vis their 
clients; that is, attorneys are bound, at law, to perform their fiduciary duties properly. 
Failure to so perform gives rise to a cause of action. It is “actionable.” 
 
At common law, an attorney owes a fiduciary duty to his client; such duty demands 
undivided loyalty and prohibits the attorney from engaging in conflicts of interest, and 
breach of such duty is actionable. 
 
The Maritrans Court highlighted that Pepper Hamilton “was furnished with substantial 
confidential commercial information” and “came to know the complete inner-workings of the 
company along with Maritrans’ longterm objectives, and competitive strategies.” As explained by 
the Court, adherence to a fiduciary duty “ensures that clients will feel secure that everything 
they discuss with counsel will be kept in confidence” and that Pepper Hamilton “had a duty to 
administer properly their responsibilities to respect the confidences of Maritrans.” It further 
explained that the rationale behind this policy is to prevent an attorney from taking “undue 
advantage of the confidential communications of such client.” 
 
In reaching its determination, the Court in Maritrans emphasized the confidential information 
that Pepper Hamilton garnered during the course of its representations. 
 
Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9 further addresses attorney duties to former 
clients and provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
 
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter 
represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that 
person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the 
former client gives informed consent. 
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(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or 
former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: 
(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client 
except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the 
information has become generally known; or 
(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules would permit 
or require with respect to a client. 
 
The explanatory comment to Rule 1.9(c) offers the following pertinent insight: 
 
[8] Paragraph (c) provides that information acquired by the lawyer in the course of 
representing a client may not subsequently be used or revealed by the lawyer to the 
disadvantage of the client. However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a client does 
not preclude the lawyer from using generally known information about that client when 
later representing another client. 
 
In addition, section 59 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers defines the 
term “Confidential Client Information” as “Confidential client information consists of information 
relating to representation of a client, other than information that is generally known.” Comment b 
to the above definition explains that “the definition includes information that becomes known by 
others, so long as the information does not become generally known.” Furthermore, comment d 
states the following: 
 
d. Generally known information. Confidential client information does not include 
information that is generally known. Such information may be employed by a lawyer who 
possesses it in permissibly representing other clients and in other contexts where there 
is a specific justification for doing so. Information might be generally known at the time it 
is conveyed to the lawyer or might become generally known thereafter. At the same 
time, the fact that information has become known to some others does not deprive it of 
protection if it has not become generally known in the relevant sector of the public. 
 
Whether information is generally known depends on all circumstances relevant in 
obtaining the information. Information contained in books or records in public libraries, 
public-record depositaries such as government offices, or in publicly accessible 
electronic-data storage is generally known if the particular information is obtainable 
through publicly available indexes and similar methods of access. Information is not 
generally known when a person interested in knowing the information could obtain it only 
by means of special knowledge or substantial difficulty or expense. Special knowledge 
includes information about the whereabouts or identity of a person or other source from 
which the information can be acquired, if those facts are not themselves generally 
known. 
 
A lawyer may not justify adverse use or disclosure of client information simply because 
the information has become known to third persons, if it is not otherwise generally 
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known. Moreover, if a current client specifically requests that information of any kind not 
be used or disclosed in ways otherwise permissible, the lawyer must either honor that 
request or withdraw from the representation. 
 
We further observe that there is no Pennsylvania case law directly on point. However, as the 
Supreme Court of Ohio aptly stated in Akron Bar Association v. Holder, “An attorney is not free 
to disclose embarrassing or harmful features of a client’s life just because they are documented 
in public records or the attorney learned of them in some other way.” Likewise, in Lawyer 
Disciplinary Board v. McGraw, the Supreme Court of West Virginia observed that “the ethical 
duty of confidentiality is not nullified by the fact that the information is part of a public record or 
by the fact that someone else is privy to it.” 
 
Here, the trial court concluded that because the FBI Affidavit was inadvertently appended to a 
document in an unrelated criminal matter, the information contained therein was public. 
Specifically, the trial court stated that “the fact that the FBI Affidavit in question was publicly 
available for many years precludes a determination that the receipt of the improperly filed FBI 
Affidavit through a breach by Appellees of the attorney-client relationship and duty of fidelity is 
actionable.” 
 
Our review of the record, in the light most favorable to Appellant as the non-moving party, 
reflects that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in this case. Indeed, this case 
presents genuine issues of fact. The record reveals that the FBI Affidavit in question became 
part of another criminal matter through inadvertence. Even accepting that the FBI Affidavit was 
publicly available through PACER prior to December 10, 2012, we are left to ponder whether 
the FBI Affidavit was actually “generally known.” All that is acknowledged at this point in the 
proceedings is that the FBI Affidavit was inadvertently appended to a document in a case that 
did not involve Appellant as a party. Therefore, it appears that such document was not “indexed” 
under Appellant's name and that a person interested in the FBI Affidavit “could obtain it only by 
means of special knowledge.” Furthermore, it is unknown exactly how and when the FBI 
Affidavit came into the possession of the Inquirer and eventually became the subject of an 
article in the Inquirer during Pepper Hamilton’s representation of the Inquirer. Whether Pepper 
Hamilton committed a breach of its duties to Appellant depends on the answers to these 
questions. Thus, these questions are sufficient to establish genuine issues of material fact 
regarding Pepper Hamilton's conduct. Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, in the event that 
the FBI Affidavit was not generally known information, it appears that Pepper Hamilton 
breached its duty to Appellant as a former client and such breach was actionable. Accordingly, 
we reverse the order granting summary judgment. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did the court hold that the information about Daugherty was protected by the duty of 
confidentiality, even though it was publicly available? 
2. How well-known does information have to be before it becomes “generally known”? Why 
didn’t the Inquirer’s articles make the information at issue “generally known”? 
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Matter of Tennant, 392 P. 3d 143 (Mont. 2017) 
 
Summary: Attorney David G. Tennant was the subject of a disciplinary complaint based 
on his representation of Richard and Debbie Harshman. When the Harshmans did not 
pay Tennant’s bill, he filed an attorney’s lien on their property and purchased it at the 
Sheriff’s sale. The Harshmans filed a complaint against Tennant with the Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel, claiming that Tennant improperly used confidential client 
information to their detriment. The Commission on Practice found no violation of the duty 
of confidentiality, but the Montana Supreme Court reversed, because the information 
was not “generally known.” 
 
Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion and Order of the Court. 
 
These consolidated proceedings include two formal disciplinary complaints filed against 
Montana attorney David G. Tennant. The complaints, which arise from Tennant’s debt collection 
practices against clients and former clients, will be referenced in this Opinion and Order as the 
Ray complaint and the Harshman complaint. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Tennant represented Richard and Debbie Harshman in an action for eviction of tenants from, 
and possession of, real property in Hungry Horse, Montana. The Harshmans obtained a default 
judgment against their tenants for damages to the property, including attorney fees of 
$3,063.54. When he was unable to collect the attorney fees through execution on the tenants 
and the Harshmans did not pay their bill to Tennant’s firm, Tennant filed an attorney’s lien on 
the property. He later filed a complaint against the Harshmans alleging breach of contract, 
account stated, and foreclosure of the attorney's lien, in which action he was granted a default 
judgment of $8,148.68. Tennant assigned the judgment to a collection agency, which obtained a 
writ of execution on the Harshmans’ property. A sheriff's sale was held, at which the collection 
agency was the successful bidder. The Harshmans later redeemed their property. 
 
Both Ray and the Harshmans filed complaints against Tennant with the Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel, and ODC filed formal disciplinary complaints in both matters. On August 31, 2016, 
Tennant filed conditional admissions and an affidavit of consent to discipline in these 
consolidated proceedings, pursuant to Rule 26, Montana Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement. ODC objected to Tennant’s conditional admissions. On October 20, 2016, the 
Commission on Practice held a hearing on the complaints and to consider Tennant’s conditional 
admissions. Tennant was present with counsel and testified on his own behalf. 
 
On January 5, 2017, the Commission submitted to this Court its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Recommendation for Discipline. The Commission rejected Tennant’s conditional 
admissions. The Commission concluded that ODC failed to carry its burden of proving by clear 
and convincing evidence any MRPC violations alleged in the Harshman complaint. 
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The Commission recommends that, as a result of his violations of the Montana Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Tennant be disciplined by public censure by this Court. The Commission 
recommends that, in the future, Tennant be required to provide to clients and former clients 
copies of any attorney's liens he or his firm files against them. In addition, the Commission 
recommends that, for a period of three years, Tennant be required to provide to ODC copies of 
any attorney's liens filed by him or his firm, copies of all complaints filed by him or his firm and 
served against former clients for unpaid fees, and copies of judgments or assignments of 
judgments obtained by him or his firm against former clients. 
 
ODC has filed written objections to the Commission's findings, conclusions, and 
recommendation, and Tennant has filed a response. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
ODC argues that the Commission erred in concluding that it failed to prove violation of Rule 1.9, 
MRPC, in relation to the Harshmans. Rule 1.9(c) provides: 
 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former 
firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: 
(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client 
except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the 
information has become generally known. 
 
ODC alleged Tennant violated this Rule when he bid on the Harshmans’ Hungry Horse property 
at the sheriff’s sale, because Tennant's knowledge of the property derived from his 
representation of the Harshmans. The Commission determined that because Tennant could 
have found out that the Harshmans owned property in Hungry Horse via public record and then 
foreclosed his fee lien and bid at the sheriff’s sale, no violation of Rule 1.9 occurred. 
 
As ODC emphasizes, Rule 1.9’s language requires that, in order for the attorney to be free from 
the prohibition against using representation-related information to the disadvantage of a former 
client, the information at issue must be “generally known.” 
 
Whether information is generally known depends on all circumstances relevant in 
obtaining the information. Information contained in books or records in public libraries, 
public-record depositories such as government offices, or in publicly accessible 
electronic-data storage is generally known if the particular information is obtainable 
through publicly available indexes and similar methods of access. Information is not 
generally known when a person interested in knowing the information could obtain it only 
by means of special knowledge or substantial difficulty or expense. 
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A lawyer may not justify adverse use or disclosure of client information simply because 
the information has become known to third persons, if it is not otherwise generally 
known. 
 
Some courts have applied a strict definition of “generally known” in the context of a Rule 1.9 
analysis. That the information at issue is generally available does not suffice; the information 
must be within the basic understanding and knowledge of the public. “The client's privilege in 
confidential information disclosed to his attorney is not nullified by the fact that the 
circumstances to be disclosed are part of a public record, or that there are other available 
sources for such information, or by the fact that the lawyer received the same information from 
other sources.” 
 
In this case, although it would have been possible for Tennant to discover the existence of the 
Harshmans’ property through searches of public records, he undisputedly learned of the 
property as part of his representation of the Harshmans. Tennant used that information to the 
Harshmans’ disadvantage. We will not interpret the “generally known” provision of Rule 1.9(c) to 
allow Tennant to take advantage of his former clients by retroactively relying on public records 
of their information for self-dealing. The Commission erred in concluding that Tennant did not 
violate Rule 1.9, MRPC. 
 
ODC further claims that, absent the Harshmans’ redemption of their property, Tennant would 
have exceeded his fee claim and lien by receiving a windfall from the sheriff's sale of upwards of 
$80,000 — his former clients’ equity in their property. ODC submits that this is a clear violation 
of Rule 1.9(c), MRPC. However, the Harshmans did redeem their property, and ODC's 
assumptions do not satisfy its burden of proof. 
 
Sanctions 
 
Finally, ODC argues that the Commission's recommended sanctions are inadequate given 
Tennant’s unethical conduct and will not deter the same type of conduct by other Montana 
attorneys. ODC had recommended that Tennant be suspended from the practice of law for at 
least seven months and that he be required to retake and pass the Multistate Professional 
Responsibility Exam. 
 
We have concluded that ODC established one ethical violation in addition to those recognized 
by the Commission. However, that violation ultimately did not harm Tennant's clients — the 
Harshmans redeemed their property. Further, the additional violation does not undermine the 
Commission’s overall conclusions on the evidence presented, and on this record we are not 
inclined to deviate from the discipline recommended by the Commission. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. A Sheriff’s sale is a public event. Why did the court hold that the duty of confidentiality 
protected this information about the Harshmans? 
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2. What would have happened if someone other than Tennant had purchased the 
Harshmans’ property? 
 
Stanley A. Kaplan, The Case of the Unwanted Will,  65 ABA J. 484 (1979) 
 
John Smith and his wife Mary go to a lawyer who has handled some minor legal matters for 
John to make their wills prior to going on a trip abroad.  
 
John tells his lawyer what disposition he and his wife desire to make of their estates, and the 
lawyer prepares separate wills for them to sign prior to their departure. After John has signed 
his will, the lawyer suggests to John that he would like to be alone with Mary before she signs. 
John withdraws to another office. The lawyer asks Mary if the will is as she would have made it 
had her husband not been present at the conference and if the will were to be secret from her 
husband. 
 
She says no, that the will as drawn contains several provisions that are contrary to her wishes, 
and that she would change if her husband were not to know the ultimate disposition of her 
estate. However, she says that she would not be willing to precipitate the domestic discord and 
confrontation that would occur if her husband were to learn that she had drawn a will contrary to 
his wishes and in accordance with her own desires.  
 
Mary asks the lawyer if he will write one page of her will to provide that certain persons 
benefiting by her will as drawn will be replaced by certain other persons. The lawyer states that 
under the circumstances he does not think that he can in fairness represent her in making these 
changes but suggests that she go ahead and sign this will and then, as soon as possible, go to 
some other lawyer and have her will rewritten in accordance with her true wishes. 
 
The departure time for the trip comes on Mary before she is able to make arrangements to have 
her will rewritten. John and Mary are involved in an airplane accident and both are killed while 
on the trip. Their son, Tom, who is named as executor in each of their wills, comes to the lawyer 
who drew the wills and asks him to represent him as executor in connection with probating the 
wills and distributing the estate. 
 
What are the ethical problems the lawyer faces in connection with probate and distribution in 
accordance with the wills as drawn? Did the lawyer have any obligation to speak to Mary 
separately, as he did, about her will? When the lawyer learned from Mary that she had other 
wishes that were being suppressed, what were his obligations? What, if anything, should the 
lawyer have done and, did not do after learning Mary's true wishes? Do Mary's true but 
unfulfilled wishes concerning the revision of her will have any legal effect? Does the lawyer have 
any right or obligation to disclose what Mary told him about her testamentary desires? 
 
Comments from George W. Overton 
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The first question to be asked in all problems involving professional responsibility or ethics is 
“Who is the client?” Not “Who brought Mary to my office?” Not even “Who is paying my bill?" 
And emphatically not “Whose anger will cost me the most business?” In facts given, John 
probably presumes that the lawyer is his and that he is the lawyer’s client, and that's all that 
need be said. The lawyer probably accepted this notion without clarification. 
 
The problem is that in the drafting of Mary’s will Mary is the client, no matter who pays the bill 
and no matter what chain of events brought Mary to the lawyer's office. The first issue that has 
to be disposed of is: Can the lawyer continue to serve Mary in the preparation of any will other 
than the one first drafted? Can he do so without John’s knowledge? I suggest that he cannot.  
 
The lawyer must explain to Mary her three alternatives: 
 
1. To execute the will, and she and the lawyer remain silent unless questioned. 
Presumably this won't work, because the lawyer, if questioned by John, cannot lie to 
him, although I do not believe the lawyer has a duty to volunteer any information. It is 
enough that he says, in response to a question, either “John, I cannot answer your 
question” or “Mary did not execute the will I drafted" and the lawyer should refuse to 
answer further questions. 
2. To execute the will as drafted, hoping to replace it soon. In this case he must explain to 
Mary that it is unquestionably her will, until revoked, and that even if all their 
conversation were reproduced in court, it would not affect the validity of the will, since it 
could easily be proved that she had testamentary capacity, and contemporaneous 
inconsistent statements are admissable only as to capacity. 
3. To have a new will drawn (or a new insertion) but let the lawyer tell John: “Mary changed 
her will.” The lawyer need not say more to John. 
 
If, as we presuppose in 2, the lawyer explains to Mary her alternatives and the conclusiveness 
of the execution of the will, he is out of trouble at the time of execution.  
 
However, he should reflect, for the future, on how to avoid this awkward box. First of all, the 
custom of separating spouses at execution of wills, although not uncommon, is an anachronism, 
based on the notion that one spouse, presumably the husband, could coerce the other into an 
unintended result? or someone could so claim. The time to elicit separate responses is at the 
first meeting or immediately there after. Probably a letter, following the first meeting, could state 
something like the following: 
 
“I will proceed as instructed to draft both your wills, on the assumption that each of you has 
given me your wishes. If there is anything on this subject that either of you wishes to discuss 
this subject with me separately, please let me know and I will then decide if I can go further.” 
 
As stated above, in preparing Mary’s will the lawyer can only be Mary’s lawyer, but has he made 
this clear to John? Has he been guilty of any implied communication to John inducing John to 
execute a will based on John’s presuppositions of Mary’s will that is misleading or false? In the 
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technical sense, he has not. If John wanted his will to be conditioned on certain dispositions by 
Mary, legal mechanisms existed (conditional bequests, or mutual wills, or a joint will) to 
effectuate those purposes. But the lawyer has undoubtedly not outlined these alternatives. 
 
On the other hand, it should not be said that there is an inherent conflict of interest in 
representing both husband and wife in estate planning. Obviously, most couples would be 
appalled at the notion of having to pay two lawyers’ fees for this service. What is necessary is 
that the lawyer identify the possibility of disagreements at the earliest possible stage. 
 
After Mary's death the lawyer’s responsibility is to file the will and assist, as necessary, in its 
probate. For the reasons stated, Mary’s inconsistent comments made at the time of execution 
are relevant only to the issue of capacity, and I do not see that the lawyer has a duty to anyone 
to raise that issue if he has no doubts on that score. 
 
The intricate ramifications of the ethical problem emerge, however, if the question of capacity is 
raised. Let us suppose that her will excluded some heir by intestacy who attacks the will on this 
ground. Probably in this event the lawyer should inform Tom of the facts, and Tom can decide 
as the personal representative of Mary whether to attempt to assert privilege as to the testimony 
involved. He is not likely to succeed in that endeavor. I cannot see that the lawyer has any duty 
to Mary’s heirs at law to volunteer any information. 
 
Comments from John C. Williams 
 
The problems the lawyer faces concerning John and Mary and their wills are essentially 
problems involving the interests of multiple clients. The special problems are these: 
 
1. How do the general principles of multiple representation apply to estate planning work 
for a married couple? 
2. When a lawyer represents two clients on a common project, what are his responsibilities 
in preserving the confidences of one client from the other? 
3. When a lawyer who represents two clients learns that their interests are in fact 
conflicting, what does the lawyer do about it, particularly in a case in which the conflict is 
known to one of the clients but not the other? 
 
Surprisingly, neither the Code of Professional Responsibility nor published opinions of the 
American Bar Association Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility nor Drinker 
offers much guidance, yet the second two questions presumably arise frequently in the practice 
of, say, a lawyer who represents codefendants in criminal cases or coplaintiffs in personal injury 
cases. 
 
Who is the client? That’s the first question. There may be lawyers who suppose that the 
husband and wife have such a community of interest or that the wife is so subservient to her 
husband that they are, collectively, one client. Mr. Bumble would advise that if the lawyer 
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supposes that, the lawyer is “a ass - a idiot” and probably a bachelor. Clearly, both must be 
considered clients. 
 
As was suggested in the first “Legal Ethics Forum,” there are many good, perhaps compelling, 
reasons to avoid bringing multiple lawyers into an amicable situation. Expense may be a 
prohibitive factor, and one must consider the risk that multiple lawyers will create problems 
where none existed. These considerations are important enough when the clients are two 
business partners. They are even more important when the clients are a happily married 
husband and wife whose interest in the continuity and development of their marital relationship 
may be more important than the outcome of a particularly legal negotiation. 
 
Most married couples probably never consider consulting separate lawyers for the preparation 
of their wills. They assume that their mutual interests will be served by working co-operatively 
toward a co-ordinated estate plan and by confiding in one another in seeking to understand and 
reconcile what differences may exist between them. 
 
This assumption is so prevalent, on behalf of both clients and lawyers, that in most cases the 
“multiple representation” problem is never discussed. Ethical Consideration 5-16 requires that 
before a lawyer may represent multiple clients, he should explain fully to each client the 
implications of the common representation and should accept or continue employment only if 
the clients consent. I believe this is rarely done when the clients are husband and wife who 
retain a lawyer for the preparation of wills. In my judgment it is unnecessary for a lawyer 
formally to seek an express consent to multiple representation when the clients are a married 
couple who want wills drawn, unless the lawyer knows of special circumstances that lead to the 
belief that there is a substantial conflict of interests. An informed consent may properly be 
inferred from the circumstances. 
 
Problems such as those presented by this case might have been avoided, however, if at the 
initial interview with John and Mary the lawyer had probed for possible conflicts. This is 
especially important in cases in which the likelihood is great that the interests of the husband 
and wife may be conflicting, such as in a marriage that is in the process of disintegration, in a 
second marriage in which there are children by the spouses’ prior marriages, or in other cases 
in which the natural objects of the bounty of the husband and wife are not identical. 
 
Finally, one should recognize that women are taking an increasingly active voice in the conduct 
of their personal business. A “liberated woman” may feel that sharing a lawyer with her husband 
enhances neither her personal dignity nor the marital relationship. She may prefer independent 
representation and be prepared to pay for it. 
 
Confidentiality with multiple clients. Disciplinary Rule 4-101 directs that a lawyer shall not 
knowingly reveal a confidence or secret of a client during or after the termination of the 
professional relationship. In a multiple representation case the difficulty is determining what 
constitutes a client’s “confidence.” When John, Mary, and the lawyer meet together face to face, 
what Mary tells the lawyer is not a confidence, so far as John is concerned. But what if Mary 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 384	
meets privately with the lawyer, or telephones or writes him? There is an implied understanding, 
when two or more clients retain a lawyer for work on a common project, that the lawyer is free to 
disclose to all of his clients his communications with each of them. 
 
It was a mistake for the lawyer to ask to meet privately with Mary before she signed her will. By 
doing so, he invited Mary to speak “confidentially” with him and opened the door to the dilemma 
that confronted him when Mary told him that she was dissatisfied with her will. 
 
If, after the lawyer met with John and Mary jointly, he had no reason to be concerned as to lack 
of testamentary capacity on Mary’s part or undue influence or duress by John, the private 
meeting with Mary was a mistake. If he had these concerns, he should have resolved them by 
withdrawing from employment. 
 
The execution of Mary’s will. The lawyer was correct in refusing to cooperate with Mary in 
making a secret change in her will. As E.C. 5-14 states, “maintaining the independence of 
professional judgment required of a lawyer precludes his acceptance or continuation of 
employment that will adversely affect his judgment on behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client. 
This problem arises whenever a lawyer is asked to represent two or more clients who may have 
differing interests.” 
 
Though a husband and wife do not agree completely on the provisions of their wills, a lawyer 
may prepare wills for both, but only if there is an informed consent. That prerequisite is missing 
here. The consent given by implication at the initial meeting was vitiated when Mary sought to 
make a change of which John was not informed. 
 
The root of the conflict is Mary’s problem. She doesn’t like the will that was discussed in her 
husband’s presence, but she doesn’t want to disclose to him her dissatisfaction with it. This 
dilemma is Mary’s and she should decide what to do about it. The lawyer, by meeting privately 
with Mary, has permitted her to transfer the problem to him. 
 
I agree that the lawyer should have presented alternatives to Mary and required her to make the 
choice. I disagree that it would be proper for the lawyer to draw a revised will for Mary on the 
condition that he be permitted to tell John simply that “Mary changed her will.” This is not the full 
disclosure that the canons require. 
 
Validity of Mary’s will. Mary’s will is valid as signed. She understood the provisions of the will 
and the significance of signing it. To my knowledge, there is no authority for refusing to probate 
or for reforming a will on the basis of statements made by the testator at the time of signing that 
he or she was not entirely satisfied with its provisions. 
 
Most lawyers with extensive experience in writing wills have clients who never sign a will without 
protesting that it is not final - perhaps they feel that acceptance of the will somehow involves an 
acceptance of death. The courts properly attach no significance to these statements. There is 
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no evidence that Mary did not understand what she was doing or of lack of capacity, undue 
influence, or duress. The will should be probated as written. 
 
The lawyer’s dilemma. After Mary advised the lawyer that she was dissatisfied with the will and 
intended to change it, did the lawyer have further responsibilities? In the circumstances it is 
clear that Mary considered her statements to the lawyer confidential, and the lawyer led her to 
believe that they would be so treated. If the lawyer discloses to John what Mary has told him 
about her intentions, he is revealing a client’s confidence. 
 
On the other hand, if by silence the lawyer permits John to leave the office with the false 
impression that Mary has signed the will she discussed in John’s presence, the lawyer may be 
seen to have conspired with Mary to defraud John. By doing this, the lawyer has permitted 
Mary’s desires to dilute his loyalty to John. 
 
There is no easy way out for the lawyer. D.R. 5-105 requires that a lawyer shall not continue 
employment if it would be likely to involve him in representing differing interests, unless it is 
obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents, after full 
disclosure. It is strange that the authorities offer little guidance as to what the lawyer must do 
when multiple representation is no longer proper. There is some authority for the proposition 
that the lawyer may continue to represent the client with the most seniority. The better view 
would seem to be that when the interests of clients diverge and become antagonistic, their 
lawyer must be absolutely impartial, which, unless they both or all desire him to represent them 
both or all, usually means that he may represent none. 
 
In most cases the conflict between clients will have become apparent to everyone. Here John 
does not know that the conflict exists. The lawyer may not disclose Mary’s confidences to John, 
but he must disclose to both John and Mary that they have differing interests and that he may 
no longer represent either of them in connection with their estate planning. This will alert John to 
the fact that something is amiss, with out directly breaching Mary’s confidence. This, in my 
judgment, is the least bad solution. 
 
Postdeath disclosure. Mary’s statements to the lawyer about her dissatisfaction with the will 
were confidences not to be disclosed during her lifetime. It is well established, however, that 
after the testator's death the attorney is at liberty to disclose all that affects the execution and 
tenor of a will. If the lawyer were subpoenaed, he would be obliged to testify concerning these 
matters, but Mary’s statements about her will would not be material in any suit to challenge 
 it. Thus, even though the privilege expires on her death, the lawyer should not be required to 
testify. 
 
Further Reading: 
 
● Thomas Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 963 (1987) 
● Teresa Stanton Collett, The Ethics of Intergenerational Representation, 62 Fordham L. 
Rev. 1453 (1994) 
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● Alysa Christmas Rollock, Professional Responsibility and Organization of the Family 
Business: The Lawyer as Intermediary, 73 Ind. L.J. 567 (1998) 
● Russell G. Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics: Competing Approaches to Conflicts 
in Representing Spouses , 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1253 (1994) 
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5.2: Exceptions to the Duty of Confidentiality 
 
Tell me at least six things you may or may not consider personal. I’m not talking about jet ski 
accidents, rather truly things you’d never thought you’d tell.65 
 
This very secret you’re trying to conceal, is the very same one you’re dying to reveal.66 
 
1. Exceptions to the Professional Duty of Confidentiality  
 
There are many state variations in the scope of the duty of confidentiality. As a result, a 
practicing lawyer should be particularly attentive to local law. The lawyer should be 
attentive to the distinction between a permission to disclose and a requirement to 
disclose. This distinction is indicated by the use of “may” or “shall” in the language. 
Remember that the ethical duty of confidentiality covers a broader range of information 
than the privilege. The ethical duty also covers the use of information to the 
disadvantage of a client, a prospective client, or a former client.  
 
The third-party doctrine (the presence of a nonprivileged third person) does not 
necessarily destroy an attorney’s duty of confidentiality. Confidential information remains 
confidential even if it is known to others, unless the information becomes generally 
known.  
 
There are eight exceptions to the Duty of Confidentiality: client’s consent, dispute 
concerning attorney’s conduct, disclosure to obtain legal ethics advice, disclosure 
required by law or court order, disclosure to prevent death or substantial bodily harm, 
disclosure to prevent or mitigate substantial financial harm, and disclosure to detect and 
resolve conflicts of interest.  
 
a. Client’s Informed Consent 
 
Model Rule 1.6 implicitly says that an attorney may reveal or use confidential information 
if the client gives informed consent. “Informed consent” means that the client agrees to a 
proposed course of action after the lawyer has adequately explained the risks and 
reasonable alternatives.  
 
 Model Rule 1.6(a) 
 
 Model Rule 1.0(e) 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 62 (2000): Using or Disclosing 
Information with Client Consent 
																																																								
65 The Blow, Jet Ski Accidents. 
66 Ronald Eldon Sexsmith, Secret Heart, Ron Sexsmith (1995). 
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A lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information when the client consents 
after being adequately informed concerning the use or disclosure. 
 
      b. Implied Authority  
 
An attorney has implied authority from the client to use or disclose confidential 
information when appropriate to carry out the representation, unless the client gives 
specific instructions to the contrary. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 61 (2000): Using or Disclosing 
Information to Advance Client Interests 
 
A lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information when the lawyer reasonably 
believes that doing so will advance the interests of the client in the representation. 
 
      c. Dispute Concerning Attorney’s Conduct  
 
An attorney may reveal a client’s confidential information to the extent necessary to 
protect the attorney’s interests in a dispute that involves the conduct of the attorney. An 
attorney wishing to use this exception should reveal only what is necessary, attempt to 
limit the disclosure to those who need to know it, and obtain protective orders or take 
other steps to minimize the risk of unnecessary harm to the client.  
 
     d. Disclosure to Obtain Legal Ethics Advice  
 
A lawyer may disclose enough of the client’s confidential information as is necessary to 
obtain legal ethics advice for the lawyer.  
 
     e. Disclosure Required by Law or Court Order 
 
ABA Model Rule 1.6(b)(6) permits a lawyer to reveal her client’s confidential information 
to the extent that she is required to do so by law or court order. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 63 (2000): Using or Disclosing 
Information When Required by Law 
 
A lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information when required by law, after 
the lawyer takes reasonably appropriate steps to assert that the information is privileged 
or otherwise protected against disclosure. 
 
     f. Disclosure to Prevent Death or Substantial Bodily Harm  
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ABA Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) permits a lawyer to reveal the client’s confidential information 
to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably 
certain death or substantial bodily harm. This exception applies to death or bodily harm 
whatever the cause; it does not need to be caused by the client, and the cause need not 
be a criminal act. It also does not need to be imminent, just reasonably certain.  
 
The exception also gives the lawyer discretion to disclose the confidential information-- it 
does not require disclosure. Some states may require disclosure if they have not 
accepted the Model Rules. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 66 (2000): Using or Disclosing 
Information to Prevent Death or Serious Bodily Harm 
 
(1) A lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information when the lawyer 
reasonably believes that its use or disclosure is necessary to prevent reasonably certain 
death or serious bodily harm to a person. 
(2) Before using or disclosing information under this Section, the lawyer must, if feasible, 
make a good-faith effort to persuade the client not to act. If the client or another person 
has already acted, the lawyer must, if feasible, advise the client to warn the victim or to 
take other action to prevent the harm and advise the client of the lawyer's ability to use 
or disclose information as provided in this Section and the consequences thereof. 
(3) A lawyer who takes action or decides not to take action permitted under this Section 
is not, solely by reason of such action or inaction, subject to professional discipline, 
liable for damages to the lawyer's client or any third person, or barred from recovery 
against a client or third person. 
 
     g. Disclosure to Prevent or Mitigate Substantial Financial Harm 
 
The Model Rules permit a lawyer to reveal the client’s confidential information to the 
extent necessary to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is 
reasonably certain to result in substantial financial harm to someone if the client is using 
or has used the lawyer’s services in the matter. The exception also applies if the client 
has already acted, and the lawyer’s disclosure can prevent or mitigate the consequent 
financial harm.  
 
   
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 67 (2000): Using or Disclosing 
Information to Prevent, Rectify, or Mitigate Substantial Financial Loss 
 
(1) A lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information when the lawyer reasonably 
believes that its use or disclosure is necessary to prevent a crime or fraud, and: 
(a) the crime or fraud threatens substantial financial loss; 
(b) the loss has not yet occurred; 
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(c) the lawyer's client intends to commit the crime or fraud either personally or through a third 
person; and 
(d) the client has employed or is employing the lawyer's services in the matter in which the 
crime or fraud is committed. 
(2) If a crime or fraud described in Subsection (1) has already occurred, a lawyer may use or 
disclose confidential client information when the lawyer reasonably believes its use or disclosure 
is necessary to prevent, rectify, or mitigate the loss. 
(3) Before using or disclosing information under this Section, the lawyer must, if feasible, make 
a good-faith effort to persuade the client not to act. If the client or another person has already 
acted, the lawyer must, if feasible, advise the client to warn the victim or to take other action to 
prevent, rectify, or mitigate the loss. The lawyer must, if feasible, also advise the client of the 
lawyer's ability to use or disclose information as provided in this Section and the consequences 
thereof. 
(4) A lawyer who takes action or decides not to take action permitted under this Section is not, 
solely by reason of such action or inaction, subject to professional discipline, liable for damages 
to the lawyer's client or any third person, or barred from recovery against a client or third 
person. 
 
    h. Disclosure to Detect and Resolve Conflicts of Interest  
 
Lawyers may disclose limited client information, such as client names and a summary of 
general issues, when a lawyer changes firms, when two firms merge, or when a law 
practice is being purchased. This is allowed in order to detect and resolve conflicts of 
interest. This exception is subject to four conditions: 
 
1. The disclosure may be made only after substantive discussions regarding the 
new relationship have occurred 
2. The disclosure must be limited to the minimum necessary to detect any conflicts 
of interest 
3. The disclosed information must not compromise the attorney-client privilege or 
otherwise prejudice the clients; and 
4. The disclosed information may be used only to the extent necessary to detect 
and resolve any conflicts of interest 
 
               i. Protecting Confidential Information   
 
A lawyer must make reasonable efforts to protect a client’s confidential information from 
inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer and those under the lawyer’s 
supervision, and from unauthorized access by third parties. The reasonableness of the 
lawyer’s efforts is determined by considering such factors as the sensitivity of the client’s 
information, the cost of additional safeguards, and the difficulty of implementing the 
safeguards. 
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, Comment [3] 
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The principle of client-lawyer confidentiality is given effect by related bodies of law: the attorney-
client privilege, the work product doctrine and the rule of confidentiality established in 
professional ethics. The attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine apply in judicial and 
other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to 
produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in 
situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of 
law. The confidentiality rule, for example, applies not only to matters communicated in 
confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its 
source. A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the 
Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 
 
United States v. Franklin, 598 F. 2d 954 (5th Cir. 1979) 
 
Summary: Attorney Robert Senor represented Morton Franklin in relation to various 
criminal charges. Senor offered confidential client information to the government in an 
unsuccessful attempt to obtain more lenient treatment. Franklin filed a motion to dismiss 
his indictment, on the ground that Senor improperly disclosed confidential information. 
The district court denied the motion, and the circuit court affirmed, because Senor 
disclosed the information in order to benefit Franklin, among other things. 
 
PER CURIAM: 
 
Appealing his false loan application and obstruction of justice convictions, defendant contends 
that the indictment should have been dismissed because it was based on information obtained 
by the Government from his attorney. Concluding that the facts of this case do not support the 
relief requested, we affirm. 
 
Defendant was charged with assisting in the submission of a materially false statement to a 
federally insured bank to obtain financing for a gun smuggling operation and with obstructing 
justice by preventing an investigation into these financial arrangements. 
 
DISMISSAL OF INDICTMENT 
 
Prior to trial, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the Government had 
improperly obtained information from his attorney, Robert Senor. Senor had contacted 
Government agents for the purpose of arranging leniency for the defendant on a marijuana 
charge. Without detailing the evidence in relation to these contacts and the information revealed 
to the Government by Senor, it appears from the record that defendant cannot prevail under any 
theory presented. 
 
In Weatherford v. Bursey, the Supreme Court held it fatal to a conviction for the Government to 
obtain defense strategy from an attorney only where there was “a realistic possibility of injury to 
defendant or benefit to the State.” 
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Senor testified he had discussed defense strategy with his friend Edward Ragen, a Supervisory 
Customs Air Officer. Since Ragen did not communicate this information to his superiors and 
was not officially assigned to this case, and the Government did not purposely infiltrate the 
defense camp, there was no realistic possibility of harm to defendant or benefit to the 
Government. Senor's statement to Zisk that Franklin maintained his innocence cannot be 
regarded as a disclosure of the defense strategy. 
 
Defendant further contends that the Government had made Senor its undercover agent. 
Although the affidavit for warrants to search codefendants’ premises and automobiles had listed 
Senor as a “confidential source” and contained information relayed by Senor, the facts do not 
support the contention here made. 
 
Acting on defendant’s behalf in seeking to barter information for leniency on the marijuana 
charge, defendant's attorney initiated the contact. It appeared to the Government that he was 
acting with the approval of his client in his client’s best interests. Throughout these 
communications Senor insisted that his client was innocent of any wrongdoing in the gun 
smuggling operation and only wished to exchange information incriminating others for leniency. 
This case is thus fundamentally different from Messelt v. Alabama, in which an “utter perversion 
of the attorney-client relationship” resulted from the defense attorney’s effort to gain leverage for 
the payment of his fee by suggesting to the prosecution that his client be charged with more 
serious offenses, and his proposal to his client that they participate together in a drug scheme. 
 
The Government’s response to Senor’s efforts was restrained and proper. The Government 
agent, Philip Zisk, told Senor he was not interested in bargaining and already had access to 
information about the smuggling operation. Although Zisk did list Senor as a source of 
information in the application for the search warrants, he testified that the information on which 
the affidavit was based came primarily from undercover officers, that Senor was only one of four 
sources, and that the information provided by him was merely cumulative. Defendant had no 
interest in the property searched, was without standing to challenge the validity of the search, 
and did not attempt to do so. Senor thus was not, as claimed, a confidential agent in the service 
of the Government. 
 
Basically, Senor communicated three items of information to Zisk: (1) defendant's role in 
arranging the financing of what he thought was to be a legitimate gun operation; (2) trips to 
Cleveland by a codefendant to secure financing; and (3) details concerning Franklin's later 
discovery of gun smuggling. That Senor communicated information given by his client to the 
Government does not taint his conviction for several reasons. First, the information was 
available to the Government from other sources and not based on Senor’s communications. 
Second, the information did not incriminate defendant. Third, the information was communicated 
voluntarily as an inducement to a plea bargain. Fourth, at a later meeting defendant himself 
communicated substantially the same information to the Government through Senor, thereby 
waiving any privilege he may have had and ratifying Senor’s communication, if he had not in 
fact approved it from the outset. Fifth, neither the information communicated by Senor nor the 
fact the communication took place was introduced at trial. 
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The only evidence introduced at the trial that implicated defendant and which related to Senor’s 
communication was a codefendant’s diary seized during the search. Even assuming that 
evidence was obtained by the Government in an illegal manner, the proper remedy would be 
suppression, not dismissal of the prosecution. Suppression was not sought. In any event, the 
evidence had minimal impact. 
 
Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss the indictment. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did Franklin think he was entitled to relief? 
2. Did Senor violate his duty of confidentiality to Franklin by disclosing the information at 
issue? 
3. Did disclosure of the information materially impact Franklin’s trial? Should it matter? 
 
In re Original Grand Jury Investigation, 89 Ohio St. 3d 544 (Ohio 2000) 
 
Summary: An attorney represented a client in relation to grand jury investigation. The 
attorney received a letter written by the client that disclosed a possible crime. The 
attorney asked the court how to proceed, and ultimately orally disclosed the contents of 
the letter, without disclosing the letter itself. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the letter 
was a client “secret,” but that disclosure was required in order to prevent a crime. 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J. 
 
The issue presented in this case is whether an attorney can be compelled to disclose to the 
grand jury a letter written by a client and discovered by an investigator that contains evidence of 
a possible crime or whether the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits such 
disclosure. 
 
At the outset, we understand that appellant was faced with an ethical dilemma and had the 
difficult decision of determining how to respond to the competing challenges of maintaining 
client confidentiality and preserving the safety concerns of the public. We appreciate that 
appellant confronted the problem head-on by first asking the Secretary of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court for advice on whether he 
had an obligation to report a possible crime and then by heeding that advice by reporting the 
matter to the court and cooperating with the police. Nevertheless, for the reasons that follow, we 
find that appellant must comply with the grand jury subpoena and relinquish the letter in 
question. 
 
The concept of client confidentiality, including the attorney's ethical obligations concerning 
confidentiality, is embodied in DR 4-101. DR 4-101(A) defines the terms “confidence” and 
“secret” as follows: 
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“Confidence” refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under 
applicable law and “secret” refers to other information gained in the professional 
relationship that the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which 
would be embarrassing or would be likely detrimental to the client. 
 
DR 4-101(B) states, “Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly 
reveal a confidence or secret of a client.” 
 
We must first determine whether the letter sought falls within the definition of a client “secret.” 
Unlike “confidence,” which is limited to information an attorney obtains directly from his or her 
client, the term “secret” is defined in broad terms. Therefore, a client secret includes information 
obtained from third-party sources, including “information obtained by a lawyer from witnesses, 
by personal investigation, or by an investigation of an agent of the lawyer, disclosure of which 
would be embarrassing or harmful to the client.” 
 
The court of appeals found that the letter was not a secret because it was not information 
gained in the professional relationship. Instead, the court said that the letter was simply physical 
evidence, which needed to be disclosed to the authorities. Even though the letter does 
constitute physical evidence of a possible crime, it also contains information detrimental to 
appellant. Thus, we find that the letter falls within the definition of a client “secret,” since it was 
obtained in the professional attorney-client relationship, by appellant’s agent (the investigator), 
and since it contains detrimental information detailing a possible crime committed by appellant's 
former client. 
 
Although the letter is a client secret, this does not necessarily mean that disclosure of the letter 
is absolutely prohibited. An attorney may disclose a client secret if one of the four listed 
exceptions in DR 4-101(C) applies. 
 
Appellant concedes that DR 4-101(C)(3) permits him to “reveal the intention of his client to 
commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime.”67 Nevertheless, appellant 
contends that this provision is narrow in its scope and permits him to orally disclose the 
information contained in the letter, but does not permit him to disclose the physical evidence 
(the letter). Therefore, appellant maintains that DR 4-101(C)(3) did not permit him to reveal 
more than he did when he orally disclosed the intention of his former client to commit a crime 
and prevented a crime from occurring. 
 
We agree with appellant that he was authorized by DR 4-101(C)(3) when he chose to reveal the 
intent of his client to commit a crime, and, actually, went beyond what DR 4-101(C)(3) allows by 
reading the entire letter to the trial court and police. However, the fact that he revealed this 
																																																								
67 Appellant points out that this provision is written in permissive terms, since it states that a lawyer “may” 
reveal the client's intent to commit a crime. We acknowledge that DR 4-101(C)(3) is permissive. 
Nevertheless, this has no bearing on the outcome in this case, since appellant concedes that he already 
disclosed the relevant information to the authorities. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 395	
information does not answer the question whether he is obligated to produce the letter itself. 
Thus, the question that remains is whether appellant is required to relinquish the letter itself and 
present it to the grand jury. We find that the exception found in DR 4-102(C)(2) governs 
disposition of this issue. 
 
DR 4-101(C)(2) provides that an attorney may reveal “confidences or secrets when permitted 
under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order.” Although the language contained in 
DR 4-101(C)(2), like that of DR 4-101(C)(3), is written in permissive terms, courts have 
interpreted provisions similar to DR 4-101(C)(2) in such a manner as to require disclosure. The 
exception of DR 4-101(C)(2) for disclosures required by law has been construed so that “the 
effect of other rules compels disclosures.” Consequently, if a lawyer is “required by law” to 
disclose information to the authorities, “these legal obligations create ‘forced’ exceptions to 
confidentiality.” Under these circumstances, a lawyer’s duty “not to use or disclose confidential 
client information is superseded when the law specifically requires such use or disclosure.” 
 
The exception of DR 4-101(C)(2) for disclosures required by law has been applied in the context 
of mandating that attorneys relinquish evidence and instrumentalities of crime to law-
enforcement agencies. Thus, the rule has emerged that, despite any confidentiality concerns, a 
criminal defense attorney must produce real evidence obtained from his or her client or from a 
third-party source, regardless of whether the evidence is mere evidence of a client's crime, or is 
a fruit or instrumentality of a crime. In either event, the physical evidence must be turned over to 
the proper authorities. In essence, the confidentiality rules do not give an attorney the right to 
withhold evidence. 
 
Appellant contends, however, that there are strong policy reasons against mandating 
disclosure. Appellant believes that mandatory disclosure will discourage attorneys from 
reporting possible threats made by their clients and will therefore run contrary to the intent of the 
code, which is to prevent crimes from occurring. Appellant cites the Massachusetts decision of 
Purcell v. Dist. Atty. for Suffolk Dist., which highlights these concerns. 
 
In Purcell, an attorney informed police about his client’s intention to commit arson. The trial 
court ordered the attorney to testify about the conversation he had with his client concerning his 
client's intention to commit this crime, and the state defended the order on the basis of the 
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. The Massachusetts Supreme Court 
vacated the trial court’s order and held that the attorney did not have to testify against his client. 
In so holding, the court noted: 
 
We must be cautious in permitting the use of client communications that a lawyer has 
revealed only because of a threat to others. Lawyers will be reluctant to come forward if 
they know that the information that they disclose may lead to adverse consequences to 
their clients. A practice of the use of such disclosures might prompt a lawyer to warn a 
client in advance that the disclosure of certain information may not be held in 
confidence, thereby chilling free discourse between lawyer and client and reducing the 
prospect that the lawyer will learn of a serious threat to the well-being of others. 
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Although these may be valid concerns, we find that the Purcell decision is distinguishable from 
the instant case, and that the policy reasons cited in Purcell have less validity here. Purcell 
involved direct communications between an attorney and client. The issue in that case was 
whether the attorney was required to testify against his client. In this case, the attorney-client 
privilege is not at issue. Nor is appellant being asked to testify against his former client. Instead, 
the instant case revolves around whether a physical piece of evidence must be relinquished to 
the grand jury. While we recognize the importance of maintaining a client’s confidences and 
secrets and understand that an attorney may have concerns in turning over incriminating 
evidence against his or her client, we do not believe that these concerns should override the 
public interest in maintaining public safety and promoting the administration of justice by 
prosecuting individuals for their alleged criminal activity. 
 
Since the letter sought in this case contains evidence of a possible crime, we find that the letter 
must be turned over to the grand jury. Accordingly, we hold that where an attorney receives 
physical evidence from a third party relating to a possible crime committed by his or her client, 
the attorney is obligated to relinquish that evidence to law-enforcement authorities and must 
comply with a subpoena issued to that effect. 
 
Other provisions of the code support our holding that appellant must relinquish the letter to the 
grand jury. DR 7-109(A) provides, “A lawyer shall not suppress any evidence that he or his 
client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce.” Furthermore, DR 7-102(A)(3) provides, “In his 
representation of a client, a lawyer shall not conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is 
required by law to reveal.” Reading these rules together, we believe that under the facts 
presented in this case, appellant has a legal obligation to turn the letter over to the grand jury. 
 
We agree with the court of appeals that the sanction imposed against appellant stemming from 
the contempt proceedings should be vacated, given that appellant challenged the subpoena on 
confidentiality grounds in good faith. Under these circumstances, we do not believe appellant 
should be punished and held in contempt. The finding of contempt is vacated on condition that 
appellant comply with the subpoena. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals 
and order appellant to relinquish the letter in question to the grand jury. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I agree with the majority that the letter is a client secret and that Helmick was authorized to 
reveal the intent of his client to commit a crime. DR 4-101(C)(3). Revealing “the information 
necessary to prevent the crime” should have concluded the matter. Unfortunately, the trial court 
and now a majority of this court chose to read DR 4-101(C)(2) liberally. That reading of the 
exception swallows the rule of DR 4-101(B)(1), which states that a lawyer “shall not knowingly 
reveal a confidence or secret of his client,” and declares open season on defense attorney files. 
 
The majority relies on cases from other jurisdictions in which attorneys were required to turn 
over to the proper authorities the fruits and instrumentalities, including a gun, of crime. Those 
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cases are not similar factually to this case. Purcell is, and we should have taken a similarly 
cautious approach. Otherwise, “lawyers will be reluctant to come forward if they know that the 
information that they disclose may lead to adverse consequences to their clients, thereby 
chilling free discourse between lawyer and client and reducing the prospect that the lawyer will 
learn of a serious threat to the well-being of others.” 
 
Helmick acted the way all attorneys with an ethical dilemma should: he sought out competent 
counsel and followed the advice given. He acted in a manner designed to prevent the 
commission of a crime, which is what the (C)(3) exception to DR 4-101 is all about. 
 
Today’s opinion will likely have two unfortunate results. First, overzealous prosecutors will be 
more likely to engage in fishing expeditions. Second, attorneys and their clients will be less 
likely to discuss potential crimes, which will decrease the likelihood that the crimes can be 
prevented. I concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did the appellate court and the Ohio Supreme Court disagree about whether the 
letter was “confidential information” for the purpose of the duty of confidentiality? 
2. Why did the court find that the attorney could disclose the contents of the letter? Do you 
agree? 
3. What is the difference between disclosing the information necessary to prevent a crime 
from occurring and disclosing confidential information? 
 
McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2003)  
Summary: Robert McClure was arrested for the murder of Carol Jones and the 
disappearance of her two children. Attorney Christopher Mecca represented McClure. In 
the course of representation, McClure told Mecca the location of the children. Mecca 
disclosed that information to the police, who found their bodies. McClure was convicted 
for three murders. He filed a habeas petition, alleging that Mecca improperly disclosed 
confidential information. The district court denied the petition, and the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, holding that McClure had not provided informed consent to disclosure, but 
Mecca reasonably believed disclosure could save the children. 
 
WILLIAM W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge: 
 
Oregon state prisoner Robert A. McClure appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas corpus 
petition challenging his jury trial conviction for three aggravated murders. McClure’s original 
defense attorney, Christopher Mecca, placed an anonymous telephone call to law enforcement 
officials directing them to the locations of what turned out to be the bodies of two children whom 
McClure was ultimately convicted of killing. The district court rejected McClure’s arguments that 
the disclosure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, holding there was no breach of the 
duty of confidentiality and no actual conflict of interest. We affirm. 
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I. Background 
 
A. Offense, Arrest and Conviction 
 
On Tuesday, April 24, 1984, the body of Carol Jones was found in her home in Grants Pass, 
Oregon. She had been struck numerous times on the head, arms and hands with a blunt object. 
A gun cabinet in the home had been forced open and a .44 caliber revolver was missing. Two of 
Jones’ children — Michael, age 14, and Tanya, age 10 — were also missing. The fingerprints of 
Robert McClure, a friend of Jones, were found in the blood in the home. On Saturday, April 28, 
McClure was arrested in connection with the death of Carol Jones and the disappearance of the 
children. 
 
That same day, McClure’s mother contacted attorney Christopher Mecca and asked him to 
represent her son. As discussed in more detail below, sometime in the next three days, under 
circumstances described differently by McClure and Mecca, McClure revealed to Mecca the 
separate remote locations where the children could be found. On Tuesday, May 1, Mecca, 
armed with a map produced during his conversations with McClure, arranged for his secretary 
to place an anonymous phone call to a sheriff's department telephone number belonging to a 
law enforcement officer with whom Mecca had met earlier. 
 
Later that day and the following day, sheriff’s deputies located the children's bodies, which were 
in locations more than 60 miles apart. The children had each died from a single gunshot wound 
to the head. Mecca then withdrew from representation. On May 3, McClure was indicted for the 
murders of Carol Jones and her children. At trial, the prosecution produced extensive evidence 
that stemmed from the discovery of the children’s bodies and introduced testimony regarding 
the anonymous phone call. McClure was found guilty of all three murders and was sentenced to 
three consecutive life sentences with 30-year minimums. On direct appeal, his conviction was 
affirmed without opinion.  
 
B. Disclosure of the Children's Whereabouts 
 
The parties agree that Mecca and McClure met at the jail and spoke on the telephone on a 
number of occasions between April 28 and May 1. However, the substance of the conversations 
between McClure and Mecca are the subject of significant dispute. 
 
Mecca recorded his account in notes that he wrote immediately after the children's bodies were 
discovered. Mecca also gave deposition testimony for McClure’s state post conviction 
proceeding, submitted an affidavit prior to McClure's federal habeas proceeding, and gave 
testimony at the federal district court evidentiary hearing in the habeas proceeding. In his notes, 
Mecca wrote that McClure had initially claimed that he was “being framed” for the murder, but 
that he was nervous about his fingerprints being in the house. He had asked Mecca to help him 
remove some other potential evidence, which Mecca declined to do.  
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According to the notes, on the Sunday night after McClure’s Saturday arrest, Mecca received a 
“frantic phone call” from McClure's sister, who was convinced that McClure had murdered 
Jones, but had reason to believe that the children were alive and perhaps “tied up or bound 
someplace.” In response, Mecca set up a meeting with McClure, his sister and his mother at the 
jail, at which McClure’s sister “directly confronted McClure and begged him to divulge 
information about the whereabouts of the kids.” McClure and his sister discussed how McClure 
sometimes did “crazy things” when he was using drugs, but McClure strongly maintained his 
innocence as to Carol Jones’ murder and the children’s disappearance. 
 
According to his notes, when Mecca next spoke with McClure on Monday, McClure was less 
adamant in his denial. Mecca described how, when they met on Monday afternoon, McClure 
began to tell him of his “sexual hallucinations and fantasies” involving young girls and about 
“other situations that happened in the past involving things he would do while under the 
influence of drugs.” “It was at that time,” Mecca wrote, “when I realized in my own mind that he 
had committed the crime and the problem regarding the children intensified.” Mecca wrote that 
he “was extremely agitated over the fact that these children might still be alive.” 
 
After a Monday night visit to the crime scene, Mecca returned to the jail to speak with McClure 
again, at which time he “peeled off most of the outer layers of McClure and realized that there 
was no doubt in my mind that he had killed Carol Jones.” McClure told Mecca he wanted to see 
a psychiatrist, then launched into “bizarre ramblings.” “Each time as I would try to leave,” Mecca 
recalled in his notes, “McClure would spew out other information, bits about the children, and he 
would do it in the form of a fantasy.” Mecca wrote that he “wanted to learn from him what 
happened to those children.” He told McClure “that we all have hiding places, that we all know 
when we go hiking or driving or something, we all remember certain back roads and remote 
places,” and that McClure “related to me one place where a body might be” and then “described 
where the other body would be located.” Mecca wrote that he “wasn't going to push him for 
anything more,” but “when I tried to leave, he said, and he said it tentatively, ‘would you like me 
to draw you a map and just give you an idea?’ and I said ‘Yes’ and he did.” Mecca recorded that 
“at that time, I felt in my own mind the children were dead, but, of course, I wasn’t sure.” 
 
Very late on Monday evening, McClure telephoned Mecca at home and said, “I know who did it.” 
Mecca recorded in his notes that the next morning he went to meet with McClure, and asked 
him about this statement. McClure told Mecca that “Satan killed Carol.” When Mecca asked, 
“What about the kids?” McClure replied, “Jesus saved the kids.” Mecca wrote in his notes that 
this statement “hit me so abruptly, I immediately assumed that if Jesus saved the kids, that the 
kids are alive.” Mecca wrote that he “kind of felt that McClure was talking about a sexual thing, 
but, in any event, I wasn’t sure.” 
 
Mecca’s notes indicate that on Monday, before McClure made the “Jesus saved the kids” 
comment, and again on Tuesday, immediately after the meeting at which he made that 
comment, Mecca had conversations with fellow lawyers, seeking advice regarding “the dilemma 
that he faced.” After the second of these conversations, which took place Tuesday morning, 
Mecca arranged for a noon meeting with the undersheriff and the prosecutor. At the meeting, he 
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“mentioned to them that I may have information which would be of interest to the State” and 
attempted to negotiate a plea. When the prosecutor responded that there would be no deal, 
Mecca recorded in his notes, “I had made up my mind then that I had to do the correct thing. 
The only option I had, as far as I was concerned, was to disclose the whereabouts of the 
bodies.” (Recall that by the time Mecca wrote these notes, he had learned that the children were 
dead.) A law enforcement official testified in a federal court deposition that, after both the state 
bar association and the attorney general “recommended that it would be unwise for Mr. Mecca 
to provide us information,” Mecca “indicated that, even though there might be sanctions, that he 
still was wanting to provide information that he had regarding the children.” Mecca stated that 
when he spoke with McClure’s sister and mother, they were adamant that he do whatever he 
could to locate the children, and that “they were still under the impression that one or both of the 
children were alive, or at least there was a chance they were alive.” 
 
Mecca then returned to the jail Tuesday afternoon and, according to his notes, “advised 
McClure that if there was any possibility that these children were alive, we were obligated to 
disclose that information in order to prevent, if possible, the occurrence of what could be the 
elevation of an assault to a murder, for instance. I further indicated that if he really requested 
psychiatric help, to help him deal with his problem, that this perhaps was the first step.” “In any 
event,” Mecca recorded in his notes, “he consented.” “I arranged to have the information 
released anonymously to the Sheriff’s Department with directions to the bodies.” He noted that 
there was “no provable way to connect” McClure to the information, “but I think it’s rather 
obvious from those in the know, who the information came from.” 
 
In the deposition conducted in conjunction with McClure’s state habeas proceeding, Mecca 
gave a similar account of the events surrounding disclosure of the locations of the children. He 
emphasized that “it all happened relatively quickly” and that there was a public “hysteria about 
these kids, whether the kids were dead, whether the kids were alive.” Mecca reiterated that 
much of the later conversations with McClure consisted of hypotheticals and fantasies — “like 
he was playing a game with me” — but that it was clear that McClure wanted to tell him where 
the children were. Mecca stated in his deposition that “the condition of the children was never 
discussed,” but that the insistence by McClure's mother and sister that McClure wouldn’t hurt 
the children put him “in this mode of thinking these kids might be alive someplace.” 
 
Mecca testified in his deposition that he thought that if the children were alive, it might relieve 
McClure of additional murder charges, but that the children were his main concern. When asked 
if he was “primarily concerned with the children’s welfare or with Mr. McClure’s welfare” at the 
time he disclosed the location of the bodies, Mecca replied, “At that point I was concerned with 
the children’s welfare.” When asked if he explained to McClure that “if they were in fact dead, 
that revealing the location of the bodies would lead to evidence which could implicate Mr. 
McClure in their murders,” Mecca answered: “No. I don't think I had the presence of mind to sit 
down and analyze every single detail and go over with him, ‘Geez, you know, if they are really 
dead, why don't you tell me.’” However, he testified, “McClure knew I thought there was a 
chance those kids were alive.” 
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Mecca testified in the deposition that the plan to place the anonymous telephone call was his, 
but that McClure knew that he planned to do it, and that, in his late-night call, McClure had 
made clear that he “absolutely wanted to disclose where those kids were.” When asked, “Did he 
give you permission to reveal this information?” Mecca responded, “Oh, yes.” 
 
In a 1999 affidavit submitted in conjunction with McClure’s federal habeas proceeding, Mecca 
gave an additional statement regarding McClure's consent: “Mr. McClure did not orally or 
expressly consent to the disclosure. I inferred consent from the circumstances, specifically, the 
fact that Mr. McClure called me at home on several occasions with the request that I see him at 
the jail, and the fact that he drew a map of the location of the bodies of the victim in his own 
handwriting and gave me the map.” 
 
In addition to reviewing Mecca’s notes, his state-court deposition testimony, and his federal-
court affidavit, the federal district court heard testimony from Mecca at an evidentiary hearing. In 
this testimony, Mecca emphasized that he generally takes a low-keyed approach to questioning 
his clients. He also emphasized that McClure was “fully engaged in his defense” and “was 
running the show.” Every time they met or conversed, he said, it was at McClure’s request. He 
said that he and McClure “discussed at various times various methods of what I was going to do 
with this information.” Mecca testified that McClure never expressly said that he consented to 
the disclosure, and that Mecca never asked for such consent. He confirmed his earlier 
testimony that he inferred consent, and added for the first time that this inference was based on 
McClure’s nodding, saying “okay,” and otherwise manifesting assent. He said this was what he 
had meant when he had written in his notes that McClure consented. Mecca also reiterated that 
he never told McClure of the legal risks involved in disclosing the children's locations. 
 
Mecca testified that after the Monday conversation with McClure, “the conclusion I came to was 
that, without telling me, he told me he had killed three people.” But he stated that he did not 
confirm that conclusion by directly asking McClure if it was the case. Instead, he said, he 
emphasized to McClure that if there was a chance the children were alive, they needed to save 
them, and in response McClure “never said they were dead.” After the “Jesus saved the kids” 
comment on Tuesday, Mecca testified, “I allowed myself to believe that these kids might 
somehow be alive.” When asked on cross examination whether, at the time he decided to make 
the anonymous call, he thought there was “a strong possibility the kids still may be alive,” Mecca 
responded that he “felt that it was a possibility. I wouldn’t say a strong possibility.” One of the 
reasons he felt this possibility existed, he said, was that his “client had not indicated anything 
differently.” He testified that the possibility of saving his client from additional murder charges 
“was something that was going through his mind” during his decisionmaking. He noted that the 
weather at that time of year was “warm” and “pleasant,” and that if the children had been left in 
the woods it was possible that the weather would not have contributed to their death. 
 
McClure disagreed with Mecca’s account of the events leading up to the anonymous call. In 
testimony in both the state and federal district court proceedings, he repeatedly insisted that he 
did not give Mecca permission to disclose any information and that he was reassured that 
everything he told Mecca would remain confidential. He said Mecca pressured him into 
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disclosing information by setting up the meeting with his sister and mother, and then 
disseminated that information to his detriment without his knowledge or consent. 
 
McClure testified that Mecca never asked him directly if the children were alive or dead, but that 
the hypothetical conversations that they had were about where Mecca might find dead “bodies,” 
not live “children.” He said his disclosure of those locations was his way of admitting to having 
killed them. He testified that Mecca never told him that he intended to make an anonymous 
telephone call. 
 
III. Discussion 
 
McClure’s single claim is that habeas relief is appropriate because he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. He asserts three independent grounds on 
which ineffectiveness could be found. The first two are based on alleged breaches of Mecca’s 
professional duty to maintain client confidentiality. McClure argues that this duty was breached 
both by a failure to obtain informed consent prior to the disclosure of confidential information 
and by a failure to inquire thoroughly before concluding that disclosure was necessary to 
prevent the deaths of the children. The third ground is that the primacy of Mecca’s concern for 
the victims constituted a conflict of interest that rendered Mecca's counsel constitutionally 
ineffective. 
 
The Duty of Confidentiality 
 
McClure contends that Mecca’s disclosure of McClure’s confidential statements about the 
location of the children violated McClure’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 sets forth a widely recognized duty of 
confidentiality: “A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client.” Our 
legal system is premised on the strict adherence to this principle of confidentiality, and “the 
Supreme Court has long held attorneys to stringent standards of loyalty and fairness with 
respect to their clients.” There are few professional relationships “involving a higher trust and 
confidence than that of attorney and client,” and “few more anxiously guarded by the law, or 
governed by sterner principles of morality and justice.”  
 
As critical as this confidential relationship is to our system of justice, the duty to refrain from 
disclosing information relating to the representation of a client is not absolute. The ABA Model 
Rule provides a list of well-established exceptions to the general principle of confidentiality, two 
of which are pertinent to the present case. First, a lawyer may reveal confidential information if 
“the client consents after consultation.” Second, “a lawyer may reveal such information to the 
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal 
act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm.” The 
relevant provisions of the Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility echo both the general 
principle of confidentiality and these particular exceptions. 
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The duty of an attorney to keep his or her client’s confidences in all but a handful of carefully 
defined circumstances is so deeply ingrained in our legal system and so uniformly 
acknowledged as a critical component of reasonable representation by counsel that departure 
from this rule “makes out a deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” With this 
uncontested premise as our starting point, we examine whether the circumstances surrounding 
Mecca’s revelation of a confidential client communication excused his disclosure, such that his 
performance could have been found by the state court and the district court to be 
constitutionally adequate. Specifically, we look to see if Mecca’s client “consented after 
consultation” or if Mecca “reasonably believed the revelation was necessary to prevent the client 
from committing a criminal act that Mecca believed was likely to result in imminent death or 
substantial bodily harm.” We conclude that the first of these exceptions does not apply to justify 
Mecca's behavior, but that the second does. 
 
1. Consent After Consultation 
 
McClure argues that Mecca rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance because he 
breached his duty of confidentiality by not obtaining McClure's informed consent before 
disclosure. The professional standard that allows disclosure of confidential communications 
when “the client consents after consultation” has two distinct parts: consent by the client, and 
consultation by the counsel. Our required deference to both the state court’s factual findings and 
the district court’s credibility determination leads us to hold that the first of these elements was 
met. However, despite this deference, we hold that the second element was not met. 
 
a. Consent 
 
The state court made the following finding: “Trial counsel received petitioner’s permission to 
anonymously disclose the whereabouts of the children to the authorities.” AEDPA demands that 
this finding of consent be presumed correct and accepted as true unless McClure rebuts the 
presumption with clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The district court, whose 
credibility determinations are given great weight, and whose findings of fact are reviewed only 
for clear error, explicitly accepted that finding, and stated that it did “not find credible petitioner’s 
assertion that he did not consent to the disclosure of the information contained in the map.” It 
found that McClure “voluntarily drew the map and gave it to Mecca,” and that, even in the 
absence of the words “I consent,” Mecca could infer consent from the circumstances and from 
McClure’s conduct. It stated that it found Mecca’s testimony “entirely credible and corroborated 
by his contemporaneous notes which state specifically that petitioner consented to the 
disclosure.” 
 
There is evidence in the record to cast doubt on these consent findings — indeed, enough 
evidence that if we were sitting as trier of fact, we might find that McClure did not give consent. 
McClure repeatedly denied that he consented, and certainly would have had good reason not to 
consent. The state court determination that McClure had consented was made before Mecca 
clarified that the consent was implied and not express. Moreover, it was based on Mecca’s 
unconditional affirmative response, in his state-court deposition, to the question of whether 
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permission to reveal the information was granted. Only later, in the federal habeas proceeding, 
did it come to light that Mecca had merely inferred McClure’s consent. 
 
Further, Mecca’s account of the circumstances from which he inferred McClure’s consent 
changed over the years. His initial account stated that he inferred consent from the fact that 
McClure called him at home, drew the map, and gave it to him. It is a significant leap to infer 
McClure’s consent to disclose the map to law enforcement authorities from the fact that McClure 
gave the map to Mecca. Virtually all clients provide information to their attorneys, but they do so 
assuming that the attorneys will not breach their duty of confidentiality. Further, Mecca’s 
behavior at the time of the disclosure suggested that he thought he lacked the kind of informed 
consent that would give him the legal authority to act. 
 
However, the findings reached by the state and district courts are not so “implausible” — 
particularly in light of the district court's credibility determinations — that they produce a “definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” The district court believed Mecca's 
account at the evidentiary hearing, disbelieved McClure's, and found the discrepancies in 
Mecca’s testimony to be “minor.” Because there are “two permissible views of the evidence, the 
factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” We therefore hold that McClure 
gave his consent to the disclosure. 
 
b. Consultation 
 
However, the mere fact of consent is not sufficient to excuse what would otherwise be a breach 
of the duty of confidentiality. Consent must also be informed. That is, the client can provide valid 
consent only if there has been appropriate “consultation” with his or her attorney. Mecca’s 
consultation with McClure regarding his consent to disclosure was addressed in the state court 
and district court findings. Both courts found that Mecca did not advise McClure about the 
potential harmful consequences of disclosure. The state court found that “before petitioner 
authorized trial counsel to reveal the childrens’ locations to authorities, trial counsel did not 
advise petitioner that if authorities located the children, he could be further implicated in the 
criminal activity and the evidence against him would be stronger.” The district court found that 
“Mecca admits that he did not advise petitioner of all potential adverse consequences.” 
 
Emphasizing that McClure was “fully engaged” in his defense and that he was told that the 
obligation to disclose the children's location arose only if the children were alive, the district 
court held that “under the circumstances, Mecca’s failure to advise petitioner of all possible 
adverse consequences was not unreasonable.” We believe this holding is inconsistent with the 
consultation requirement because it does not attach sufficient importance to the role that an 
attorney's advice plays in the attorney-client relationship. It is not enough, as the district court 
suggests, that McClure “did not dissuade Mecca from his intentions” to share the map with 
authorities. The onus is not on the client to perceive the legal risks himself and then to dissuade 
his attorney from a particular course of action. The district court’s statement that Mecca was 
relieved of his duty to counsel his client because “common sense dictated that petitioner 
understood the consequences of his actions” fails to acknowledge the seriousness of those 
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consequences and the importance of good counsel regarding them. Even in cases in which the 
negative ramifications seem obvious — for example, when criminal defendants opt for self-
representation — we require that a criminal defendant's decision be made on the basis of legal 
guidance and with full cautionary explanation. We disagree with the district court’s conclusion 
that this case was so exceptional that the attorney’s basic consultation duties did not apply. It is 
precisely because the stakes were so high that Mecca had an obligation to consult carefully with 
his client. In the absence of some other exception to the duty of confidentiality, his failure to 
obtain informed consent would demonstrate constitutionally deficient performance under the 
Sixth Amendment. 
 
2. Prevention of Further Criminal Acts 
 
The State contends that, even if Mecca did not have informed consent, his revelation of client 
confidences did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel because he reasonably 
believed that disclosing the location of the children was necessary in order to prevent further 
criminal acts. That is, Mecca reasonably believed that revealing the children's locations could 
have prevented the escalation of kidnapping to murder. This is not a traditional “prevention of 
further criminal acts” case, because all of the affirmative criminal acts performed by McClure 
had been completed at the time Mecca made his disclosure. Mecca was thus acting to prevent 
an earlier criminal act from being transformed by the passage of time into a more serious 
criminal offense. Nonetheless, we believe that where an attorney’s or a client’s omission to act 
could result in “imminent death or substantial bodily harm” constituting a separate and more 
severe crime from the one already committed, the exception to the duty of confidentiality may be 
triggered. 
 
This exception, however, requires that an attorney reveal confidences only to the extent that he 
“reasonably believes necessary to prevent” those criminal acts and imminent harms. In 
assessing the effectiveness of McClure’s counsel in light of this standard, the first step is to 
determine what a constitutionally effective counsel should be required to do before making a 
disclosure. That is, we must determine what basis the attorney had for believing that the 
precondition to disclosure was present, and how much investigation he or she must have 
undertaken before it was “reasonable” to “believe it necessary” to make the disclosure to 
prevent the harm. The second step is to apply that standard to the facts surrounding Mecca's 
decision to disclose. 
 
There is remarkably little case law addressing the first analytical step. Citing cases dealing with 
a separate confidentiality exception allowing attorneys to reveal intended perjury on the part of 
their clients, McClure argues that a lawyer must have a “firm factual basis” before adopting a 
belief of impending criminal conduct. However, we are not persuaded that the perjury cases 
provide the proper standard. 
 
McClure is correct that our inquiry must acknowledge the importance of the confidential 
attorney-client relationship and the gravity of the harm that results from an unwarranted breach 
of that duty. However, the standard applied in the professional responsibility code asks only if 
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the attorney “reasonably believes” disclosure is necessary to prevent the crime. Further, the 
Strickland standard likewise focuses on “whether counsel's assistance was reasonable 
considering all the circumstances.” Accordingly, we hold that the guiding rule for purposes of the 
exception for preventing criminal acts is objective reasonableness in light of the surrounding 
circumstances. 
 
Reasonableness of belief may be strongly connected to adequacy of investigation or sufficiency 
of inquiry in the face of uncertainty. Significantly, as indicated above, Strickland explicitly 
imposes a duty on counsel “to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” In any ineffectiveness of counsel 
case, “a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in 
all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments.” Thus, in 
determining whether Mecca’s disclosure of confidential client information constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel, we must examine whether Mecca “reasonably believed” that the 
precondition for disclosure existed and whether, in coming to that belief, Mecca conducted a 
reasonable investigation and inquiry. 
 
The parties vigorously debate both the reasonableness of Mecca’s belief that the children were 
alive and the reasonableness of his level of investigation and inquiry on that point. McClure 
argues that any conclusion that Mecca had a reasonable belief is unsupported because Mecca 
himself indicated that he harbored doubts as to the children's state, and yet failed to inquire 
further. He points to evidence in the record that Mecca, at least at some stages of his 
representation of McClure, did not believe the children were alive—or that he, at the least, 
suspected that they were dead. It is indisputable that this evidence exists, and that most of this 
evidence is contained in statements by Mecca himself, whom the district court found “highly 
credible.” Mecca’s notes state that, after McClure drew the map, Mecca “felt in my own mind 
that the children were dead, but, of course, I wasn’t sure.” He testified in the district court 
evidentiary hearing that the conclusion he came to was that, “without telling me, McClure had 
told me he had killed three people.” And he stated in this same testimony that, at the time he 
had his secretary place the anonymous call, he thought there was a “possibility,” but not a 
“strong possibility,” that the children were alive. 
 
McClure argues that the statement Mecca says abruptly changed his mind about the status of 
the children — McClure's comment that “Jesus saved the kids” — was so vague and ambiguous 
that it was not a sufficient basis for a “reasonable belief” that disclosure was necessary. Despite 
Mecca’s acknowledgment that this comment led him only to “assume” that McClure was saying 
the children were alive, Mecca never directly asked a question that could have confirmed or 
refuted that assumption. Mecca repeatedly testified that he never squarely asked about the 
condition of the children or whether McClure had killed them. Accordingly, McClure argues, any 
finding that Mecca believed the children were alive is not sufficient to establish effective 
assistance of counsel, because Mecca's failure to engage in a reasonable level of investigation 
and inquiry rendered that belief unreasonable. 
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Given the implicit factual findings of the state court, and the explicit factual findings of the district 
court, which are at least plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, we disagree. The 
ultimate question of the reasonableness of Mecca’s belief is a question of law, which we review 
de novo. In answering that question, however, we look to the facts and circumstances of the 
case, and as to these facts, we give great deference to the findings of the state court and the 
district court. 
 
The district court made a number of specific findings regarding the factual basis for Mecca’s 
belief that the children were alive. It found that only McClure knew the true facts and that he 
deliberately withheld them, leading Mecca to believe the children were alive. It found that 
McClure controlled the flow of information, and that when Mecca informed McClure that he had 
an obligation to disclose the children's whereabouts if there were a chance they were alive, 
McClure did not tell him they were dead. It specifically rejected McClure’s assertion that Mecca 
in fact believed that the children were dead or that he lacked information that they were alive, 
noting that at the time there was no evidence, other than their disappearance and the passage 
of time, that they had been injured or killed. 
 
The district court also made specific factual findings regarding the nature of Mecca’s 
investigation and inquiry. It found that “Mecca attempted to discern whether the children were 
alive” and “that Mecca investigated to the best of his ability under extremely difficult 
circumstances.” McClure argues that these findings are clearly erroneous, and that “arguments 
that Mr. McClure was manipulative and difficult are essentially irrelevant to the lawyer’s 
obligations.” But Strickland holds otherwise. The Strickland Court emphasized that “the 
reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the 
defendant's own statements or actions.” More specifically, it held that “what investigation 
decisions are reasonable depends critically” on the “information supplied by the defendant.” 
 
This is a close case, even after we give the required deference to the state and district courts. 
The choices made by McClure’s counsel give us significant pause, and, were we deciding this 
case as an original matter, we might decide it differently. But we take as true the district court’s 
specific factual findings as to what transpired — including what McClure said and did, and what 
actions Mecca took and why he took them — and we conclude that Mecca made the disclosure 
“reasonably believing it was necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that 
Mecca believed was likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm.” Mecca 
therefore did not violate the duty of confidentiality in a manner that rendered his assistance 
constitutionally ineffective. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that McClure did not receive constitutionally ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the district court's denial of McClure's petition for writ of 
habeas corpus is affirmed. 
 
Questions: 
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1. Do you agree with the court’s conclusion that McClure did not provide informed consent 
to disclosure? 
2. Do you agree with the court’s conclusion that Mecca reasonably believed that disclosure 
could save the children? 
3. Should Mecca have disclosed the information under the circumstances? Should Mecca 
have consulted with McClure about disclosure? 
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5.3: The Attorney-Client Privilege 
 
Nobody knows, nobody sees. Nobody knows, but me.68 
 
The “attorney-client privilege” is an evidentiary privilege that protects certain confidential 
communications between attorneys and their clients. Attorneys have a fiduciary duty of 
confidentiality that prohibits them from disclosing any confidential client information unless their 
client consents or they are required to disclose by law. The attorney-client privilege resembles 
the duty of confidentiality, but provides broader protection for particular kinds of confidential 
communications. 
 
Specifically, the attorney-client privilege applies to confidential attorney-client communications 
for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. All confidential client information is protected by the 
duty of confidentiality, but only confidential attorney-client communications for the purpose of 
obtaining legal advice are protected by the attorney-client privilege. 
 
The attorney-client privilege provides broader protection than the duty of confidentiality. The 
government can require the disclosure of confidential client information in circumstances where 
it could not require the disclosure of privileged attorney-client communications. In fact, the 
government can rarely require the disclosure of privileged information, and courts interpret the 
exceptions to attorney-client privilege quite narrowly. But they also interpret the scope of the 
attorney-client privilege quite strictly. The attorney-client privilege is quite strong, when it 
applies. But it only applies to certain kinds of communications, and it is easy to lose. 
 
To begin with, the attorney-client privilege only protects confidential attorney-client 
communications. In other words, if a third-party receives the communication, then it is not 
privileged, although it may still be confidential. So, if anyone other than the attorney and the 
client participate in the communication, then it is not privileged. 
 
Moreover, the attorney-client privilege only covers communications for the purpose of obtaining 
legal advice. If an attorney-client communication does not concern legal advice, then it is not 
privileged, even if it is confidential. The attorney-client privilege does not cover business advice, 
or other non-legal advice. 
 
In addition, the attorney-client privilege is easily destroyed. Like the duty of confidentiality, the 
attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, not the attorney. Accordingly, only the client can 
waive the privilege, not the attorney. But the client waives the privilege by disclosing privileged 
information to a third-party, whether or not the client intended to waive the privilege. By contrast, 
information remains “confidential” until it is “generally known.” 
 
																																																								
68 Danny Dill & Marijohn Wilkin, Long Black Veil (1959). 
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Attorneys should emphasize to their clients the fragility of the attorney-client privilege. Clients 
should know that any disclosure to a third-party destroys the privilege, regardless of the context. 
Some courts have even held that inadvertent disclosure destroys the privilege. 
 
Identifying Privileged Information 
 
The definition of communications protected by the attorney-client privilege may differ slightly 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. However, as a general rule, information is protected by the 
attorney-client privilege only if: 
 
1. An attorney-client relationship existed when the communication occurred; 
2. The information was confidential and not shared with any third-parties; and 
3. The information was communicated for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. 
 
So, the attorney-client privilege only applies to communications made in the context of an 
attorney-client relationship. Of course, the privilege applies whether the attorney-client 
relationship is express or implied. But if no attorney-client relationship had formed or the 
attorney-client relationship had ended when the communication occurred, then the information 
is not privileged, although it may still be protected by the duty of confidentiality. 
 
In addition, the attorney-client privilege only applies to information that is absolutely confidential. 
If the information is disclosed to any third-parties, it is not privileged, although it may still be 
protected by the duty of confidentiality. This limitation applies to third-parties who participate in 
the initial communication as well as third-parties who receive the communication after the fact. If 
a lawyer with whom the client lacks an attorney-client relationship receives the information, then 
it is not privileged. And if a non-lawyer who is not part of the attorney-client relationship receives 
the information, then it is not privileged. Notably, the “joint-defense privilege” or “common 
defense rule” provides that joint defendants can share certain confidential information under 
certain circumstances, without destroying the privilege. 
 
Finally, the attorney-client privilege only protects information communicated for the purpose of 
obtaining legal advice. Confidential communication between attorneys and clients for the 
purpose of obtaining non-legal advice are not privileged, although they may be protected by the 
duty of confidentiality. Attorneys often provide non-legal advice to their clients, especially when 
those lawyers are employees of companies. Such non-legal advice is not protected by the 
attorney client privilege. 
 
The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, not the attorney. Accordingly, only the client 
can waive the privilege. And clients can waive the privilege either intentionally or unintentionally. 
Attorneys should explicitly inform their clients that sharing privileged information with any third-
party will destroy the privilege, and discourage their clients from sharing any privileged 
information without consultation. 
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Sometimes, attorneys or clients inadvertently disclose privileged information to third-parties. 
Different courts treat such disclosures differently. Some courts hold that accidental disclosure 
does not destroy the privilege, and that the recipient of the information must return or destroy it, 
and may not use it. Other courts hold that accidental disclosure does destroy the privilege. In 
those courts, an attorney may accidentally destroy the privilege, even though the attorney lacks 
the authority to waive the privilege. 
 
While the attorney-client privilege is quite strong, when it applies, there are certain exceptions to 
the privilege. 
 
There are a number of exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. Chief among them is the 
“crime-fraud exception,” which provides that the privilege does not protect attorney-client 
communications made for the purpose of committing or furthering a crime, fraud, or tort. 
However, the exception applies only if the crime, fraud, or tort actually occurs. For example, 
confidential communications between clients and attorneys for the purpose of determining 
whether an action is a crime, fraud, or tort are protected by the privilege, so long as the crime, 
fraud, or tort in questions is not actually committed. 
 
The Purpose Attorney-Client Privilege 
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People v. Belge, 83 Misc. 2d 186 (NY County Court 1975) 
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Summary: Robert F. Garrow, Jr. was charged with murder and represented by Frank H. 
Armani and Francis R. Belge, who presented an insanity defense. In the course of 
representation, Garrow disclosed three other murders to his attorneys. Based on 
information provided by Garrow, Belge discovered the body of one of the victims, but did 
not disclose it to the police until the trial. 
 
Ormand N. Gale, J. 
 
In the summer of 1973 Robert F. Garrow, Jr., stood charged in Hamilton County with the crime 
of murder. The defendant was assigned two attorneys, Frank H. Armani and Francis R. Belge. A 
defense of insanity had been interposed by counsel for Mr. Garrow. During the course of the 
discussions between Garrow and his two counsel, three other murders were admitted by 
Garrow, one being in Onondaga County. On or about September of 1973 Mr. Belge conducted 
his own investigation based upon what his client had told him and with the assistance of a friend 
the location of the body of Alicia Hauck was found in Oakwood Cemetery in Syracuse. Mr. 
Belge personally inspected the body and was satisfied, presumably, that this was the Alicia 
Hauck that his client had told him that he murdered. 
 
This discovery was not disclosed to the authorities, but became public during the trial of Mr. 
Garrow in June of 1974, when to affirmatively establish the defense of insanity, these three 
other murders were brought before the jury by the defense in the Hamilton County trial. Public 
indignation reached the fever pitch, statements were made by the District Attorney of Onondaga 
County relative to the situation and he caused the Grand Jury of Onondaga County, then sitting, 
to conduct a thorough investigation. As a result of this investigation Frank Armani was no-billed 
by the Grand Jury but Indictment No. 75-55 was returned as against Francis R. Belge, Esq., 
accusing him of having violated subdivision 1 of section 4200 of the Public Health Law, which, in 
essence, requires that a decent burial be accorded the dead, and section 4143 of the Public 
Health Law, which, in essence, requires anyone knowing of the death of a person without 
medical attendance, to report the same to the proper authorities. Defense counsel moves for a 
dismissal of the indictment on the grounds that a confidential, privileged communication existed 
between him and Mr. Garrow, which should excuse the attorney from making full disclosure to 
the authorities. 
 
The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, as amicus curiae, succintly state the 
issue in the following language: If this indictment stands, “The attorney-client privilege will be 
effectively destroyed. No defendant will be able to freely discuss the facts of his case with his 
attorney. No attorney will be able to listen to those facts without being faced with the Hobson’s 
choice of violating the law or violating his professional code of Ethics.” 
 
Initially in England the practice of law was not recognized as a profession, and certainly some 
people are skeptics today. However, the practice of learned and capable men appearing before 
the court on behalf of a friend or an acquaintance became more and more demanding. 
Consequently, the King granted a privilege to certain of these men to engage in such practice. 
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There had to be rules governing their duties. These came to be known as “Canons.” The King 
has, in this country, been substituted by a democracy, but the “Canons” are with us today, 
having been honed and refined over the years to meet the changes of time. Most are constantly 
being studied and revamped by the American Bar Association and by the bar associations of 
the various States. While they are, for the most part, general by definition, they can be brought 
to bear in a particular situation. Among those is the following, cited in United States v. Funk: 
“Confidential communications between an attorney and his client are privileged from disclosure 
as a rule of necessity in the administration of justice.” 
 
In the most recent issue of the New York State Bar Journal there is an article by Jack B. 
Weinstein, entitled “Educating Ethical Lawyers.” In a subcaption to this article is the following 
language which is pertinent: “The most difficult ethical dilemmas result from the frequent 
conflicts between the obligation to one’s client and those to the legal system and to society. It is 
in this area that legal education has its greatest responsibility, and can have its greatest effects.” 
In the course of his article Mr. Weinstein states that there are three major types of pressure 
facing a practicing lawyer. He uses the following language to describe these: “First, there are 
those that originate in the attorney’s search for his own wellbeing. Second, pressures arise from 
the attorney’s obligation to his client. Third, the lawyer has certain obligations to the courts, the 
legal system, and society in general.” 
 
Our system of criminal justice is an adversary system and the interests of the State are not 
absolute, or even paramount. “The dignity of the individual is respected to the point that even 
when the citizen is known by the state to have committed a heinous offense, the individual is 
nevertheless accorded such rights as counsel, trial by jury, due process, and the privilege 
against self incrimination.” 
 
A trial is in part a search for truth, but it is only partly a search for truth. The mantle of innocence 
is flung over the defendant to such an extent that he is safeguarded by rules of evidence which 
frequently keep out absolute truth, much to the chagrin of juries. Nevertheless, this has been a 
part of our system since our laws were taken from the laws of England and over these many 
years has been found to best protect a balance between the rights of the individual and the 
rights of society. 
 
The concept of the right to counsel has again been with us for a long time, but since the 
decision of Gideon v. Wainwright, it has been extended more and more so that at the present 
time a defendant is entitled to have counsel at a parole hearing or a probation violation hearing. 
 
The effectiveness of counsel is only as great as the confidentiality of its client-attorney 
relationship. If the lawyer cannot get all the facts about the case, he can only give his client half 
of a defense. This, of necessity, involves the client telling his attorney everything remotely 
connected with the crime. 
 
Apparently, in the instant case, after analyzing all the evidence, and after hearing of the bizarre 
episodes in the life of their client, they decided that the only possibility of salvation was in a 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 415	
defense of insanity. For the client to disclose not only everything about this particular crime but 
also everything about other crimes which might have a bearing upon his defense, requires the 
strictest confidence in, and on the part of, the attorney. 
 
When the facts of the other homicides became public, as a result of the defendant’s testimony 
to substantiate his claim of insanity, “Members of the public were shocked at the apparent 
callousness of these lawyers, whose conduct was seen as typifying the unhealthy lack of 
concern of most lawyers with the public interest and with simple decency.” A hue and cry went 
up from the press and other news media suggesting that the attorneys should be found guilty of 
such crimes as obstruction of justice or becoming an accomplice after the fact. From a layman’s 
standpoint, this certainly was a logical conclusion. However, the Constitution of the United 
States of America attempts to preserve the dignity of the individual and to do that guarantees 
him the services of an attorney who will bring to the Bar and to the Bench every conceivable 
protection from the inroads of the State against such rights as are vested in the Constitution for 
one accused of crime. Among those substantial constitutional rights is that a defendant does not 
have to incriminate himself. His attorneys were bound to uphold that concept and maintain what 
has been called a sacred trust of confidentiality. 
 
The following language from the brief of the amicus curiae further points up the statements just 
made: “The client's Fifth Amendment rights cannot be violated by his attorney. There is no 
viable distinction between the personal papers and criminal evidence in the hands or mind of 
the client. Because the discovery of the body of Alicia Hauck would have presented ‘a 
significant link in a chain of evidence tending to establish his guilt,’ Garrow was constitutionally 
exempt from any statutory requirement to disclose the location of the body. And Attorney Belge, 
as Garrow’s attorney, was not only equally exempt, but under a positive stricture precluding 
such disclosure. Garrow, although constitutionally privileged against a requirement of 
compulsory disclosure, was free to make such a revelation if he chose to do so. Attorney Belge 
was affirmatively required to withhold disclosure. The criminal defendant’s self-incrimination 
rights become completely nugatory if compulsory disclosure can be exacted through his 
attorney.” 
 
In the recent and landmark case of United States v. Nixon the court stated: “the constitutional 
need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and neutral to the 
fair adjudication of a particular criminal case in the administration of justice. Without access to 
specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated.” In the case at bar we must weigh 
the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality in the performance of the defendant’s 
duties as an attorney, against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of 
criminal justice as well as the heart tearing that went on in the victim's family by reason of their 
uncertainty as to the whereabouts of Alicia Hauck. In this type situation the court must balance 
the rights of the individual against the rights of society as a whole. There is no question but 
Attorney Belge’s failure to bring to the attention of the authorities the whereabouts of Alicia 
Hauck when he first verified it, prevented bringing Garrow to the immediate bar of justice for this 
particular murder. This was in a sense, obstruction of justice. This duty, I am sure, loomed large 
in the mind of Attorney Belge. However, against this was the Fifth Amendment right of his client, 
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Garrow, not to incriminate himself. If the Grand Jury had returned an indictment charging Mr. 
Belge with obstruction of justice under a proper statute, the work of this court would have been 
much more difficult than it is. 
 
There must always be a conflict between the obstruction of the administration of criminal justice 
and the preservation of the right against self incrimination which permeates the mind of the 
attorney as the alter ego of his client. But that is not the situation before this court. We have the 
Fifth Amendment right, derived from the Constitution, on the one hand, as against the trivia of a 
pseudo-criminal statute on the other, which has seldom been brought into play. Clearly the latter 
is completely out of focus when placed alongside the client-attorney privilege. An examination of 
the Grand Jury testimony sheds little light on their reasoning. The testimony of Mr. Armani 
added nothing new to the facts as already presented to the Grand Jury. He and Mr. Belge were 
cocounsel. Both were answerable to the Canons of professional ethics. The Grand Jury chose 
to indict one and not the other. It appears as if that body were grasping at straws. 
 
It is the decision of this court that Francis R. Belge conducted himself as an officer of the court 
with all the zeal at his command to protect the constitutional rights of his client. Both on the 
grounds of a privileged communication and in the interests of justice the indictment is 
dismissed. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. You may find this video about the People v. Belge case interesting. 
2. Why did the court hold that the attorney-client privilege superseded the criminal law 
requiring Belge to disclose the location of the victim’s body? Do you agree? 
3. What if Garrow had not been convicted of any other crime? Would the attorney-client 
privilege have prevented Belge from disclosing the location of the victim’s body 
indefinitely? 
4. What if Belge had reason to believe the victim was still alive? Would the privilege have 
prevented him from disclosing the victim’s location? 
 
The Scope of the Attorney-Client Privilege 
 
Colton v. United States, 306 F. 2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962) 
 
Summary: Attorney Edward E. Colton represented Herbert and Mercedes Matter in 
relation to their taxes. The IRS began an investigation of the Matters, and asked Colton 
to provide testimony and relevant documents. Colton refused, citing the attorney-client 
privilege. The district court ordered Colton to answer certain questions and produce 
certain documents, and the circuit court affirmed, holding that those questions and 
documents were not privileged. 
 
LUMBARD, Chief Judge. 
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These appeals raise questions concerning the propriety of a virtually complete refusal by tax 
counsel, primarily on the ground of the attorney-client privilege, to answer questions and 
produce files at an examination conducted by special agents of the Internal Revenue Service 
concerning the tax liability of a client. We hold that it was proper to require counsel to answer 
questions concerning the years during which they performed legal services and the general 
nature of the services. We also affirm the order requiring counsel to produce certain documents 
or files and to answer relevant questions concerning the nature of papers in their possession. 
 
At some time prior to July 29, 1960, the Internal Revenue Service began an investigation into 
the tax liabilities of Herbert Matter and his wife, Mercedes, apparently with a view to possible 
criminal prosecution. On July 29, 1960, the Service served identical summonses upon Edward 
E. Colton, an attorney, and Lillian Kaltman, an attorney associated with Mr. Colton, directing 
them to appear in New York City before special agent Anton Kurtzuk on August 9, 1960 to give 
testimony and to bring with them and produce “retained copies of income tax returns, 
workpapers, correspondence files, memoranda and all other data relating to the preparation and 
the filing of Federal Income Tax Returns for or on the behalf of the Matters covering and 
including the years 1951 through 1958.” The appellants state, and the government does not 
deny, that special agent Kurtzuk informed Miss Kaltman that “he wished to question the 
attorneys about the reasons which the taxpayers gave their counsel for filing certain tax returns 
late”; an affidavit submitted by agent Kurtzuk below states the primary purpose of the 
investigation in similar language. The Service later consented to the adjournment of the return 
date of the summonses to September 21, 1960. 
 
On September 20, 1960, the appellants obtained from the district court an order requiring the 
government to show cause why the summonses should not be quashed or modified and staying 
compliance. The appellants stated that “the subject matter of Mr. Kurtzuk’s proposed inquiry 
would so flagrantly induce a violation of their duty to the taxpayers arising out of the relationship 
of attorney and client that this petition was deemed necessary by the petitioners.” Pending the 
hearing of the petition, the appellants entered into a stipulation with the government that the 
above quoted portion of the summonses be amended to add the phrase “except for such 
portions of said testimony and production that are within the attorney-client privilege.” Pursuant 
to further terms of the stipulation the appellants appeared to testify on November 23, 1960; the 
stipulation provided that if the appearance was not accepted by the Service as adequate 
compliance with the summonses, then the petition to quash should proceed for hearing in the 
district court. 
 
At the November 23 hearing, Mr. Colton and Miss Kaltman testified only that the Matters were 
clients of their firm, refusing to give any substantial information as to the firm’s role, if any, in 
preparing the tax returns in question. They had with them records of the firm pertaining to the 
Matters, but refused to turn them over to the agents for examination without the consent of the 
Matters. Virtually all of the questions asked by the agents were objected to on the basis of the 
attorney-client privilege. Dissatisfied with the results of the hearing, the government caused the 
appellants’ pending motion to quash to come on for hearing in the district court, on February 28, 
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1961. Judge Dawson denied the motion and vacated the stay without opinion, and Mr. Colton 
and Miss Kaltman filed their notice of appeal to this court. 
 
Apparently the Internal Revenue Service requested Colton to return for further questioning and 
he refused. The Service on March 7, 1961 served on Colton alone a new summons in 
substance identical to the earlier ones as modified by the stipulation. Colton again appeared on 
March 24, 1961, in response to this second summons, but gave the Service no more 
satisfaction than he had at his first appearance, again declining on the basis of the attorney-
client privilege to answer certain questions concerning tax work his firm might have done for the 
Matters. 
 
Colton now offers to answer by affidavit thirteen of the questions he objected to at the March 24, 
1961 hearing, and the government has accepted the offer, making the appeal moot insofar as 
these questions are concerned. The remaining questions, all of which were objected to as 
infringing upon the attorney-client privilege, may be grouped under two general headings: those 
inquiring into the date and nature of the services performed by the Colton firm for the Matters, 
and those relating to the files of the firm which the Service sought to have Mr. Colton turn over 
to it. 
 
Those questions which pertain to the date and general nature of the legal services performed by 
the Colton firm for the Matters should be answered as they do not call for any confidential 
communication. The question numbered 16 in the Internal Revenue Service's transcript of the 
hearing, although ambiguous,69 appears to inquire whether in 1951 the firm performed any 
services for the Matters other than the preparation of income tax returns. (Colton now agrees to 
answer the preceding question, which asked whether or not the firm had prepared, or caused to 
be prepared, a 1951 tax return.) Question 18 asked Colton to state the nature of the services he 
admitted to having rendered the Matters in the years prior to 1951. In directing Colton to answer 
this question, Judge Metzner limited the required information to “general responses, such as 
‘litigation,’ ‘drafting of documents,’ ‘tax advice’ and the like,” thus excluding inquiry into specific 
details; since the government does not here contest this interpretation, the question remains so 
limited for our purposes. Questions 52 and 54 inquire whether the firm performed any legal 
services for the Matters during 1954, 1955, 1956 and 1957. Question 55 asks whether the firm 
received “any remunerations” for legal services during those four years. Finally, Question 80 
asks, “Did you or any member of your firm cause to have prepared a 1953 income tax return for 
or on behalf of Herbert and Mercedes Matter in 1954?” 
 
This court has accepted, and few if any lawyers would quarrel with, Dean Wigmore's statement 
of the basic principle underlying the attorney-client privilege: 
 
In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers by clients, the 
apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal advisers must be removed; hence the 
law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client’s consent. 
																																																								
69 16. Q. Did you or any member of your firm perform any services, other than the preparation of income 
tax returns for the year 1951 for Herbert and/or Mercedes Matter? 
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It cannot be seriously argued that this policy justifies any member of the bar from refusing to 
testify as to all transactions he may have had with any person whom he chooses to designate a 
“client.” Thus, according to Judge Wyzanski’s much quoted formulation, it must be shown that: 
 
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to 
whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his 
subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the 
communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) 
without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an 
opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not 
(d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) 
claimed and (b) not waived by the client. 
 
There can, of course, be no question that the giving of tax advice and the preparation of tax 
returns — which unquestionably constituted a very substantial part of the legal services 
rendered the Matters by the Colton firm — are basically matters sufficiently within the 
professional competence of an attorney to make them prima facie subject to the attorney-client 
privilege. But, although the word “communications” must be broadly interpreted in this context, 
the authorities are clear that the privilege extends essentially only to the substance of matters 
communicated to an attorney in professional confidence. Thus the identity of a client, or the fact 
that a given individual has become a client are matters which an attorney normally may not 
refuse to disclose, even though the fact of having retained counsel may be used as evidence 
against the client. To be sure, there may be circumstances under which the identification of a 
client may amount to the prejudicial disclosure of a confidential communication, as where the 
substance of a disclosure has already been revealed but not its source. 
 
We find, however, no such special circumstances in the case at bar. Nor was the permissible 
inquiry in this regard ended when Colton stated that the Matters were his clients and had been 
for some time. The principle that permits inquiry into the existence of a professional relationship 
obviously also permits questioning as to the years during which the relationship has continued. 
Thus, under the accepted doctrine, there was no basis for Colton’s refusal to answer Questions 
52 and 54. 
 
For similar reasons there was no basis for Colton’s refusal to state, in answer to Question 55, 
whether he had received any remuneration from the Matters for legal services rendered during 
the years 1954 through 1957. Although no question as to the relevancy of the matters inquired 
into is before us, we note that the government states that this question is relevant to a 
determination whether the attorney-client relationship actually existed, as well as to the propriety 
of deductions for legal fees taken by the taxpayers in their returns for those years. Such matters 
are surely relevant, and — in the absence of allegations as to special circumstances — we see 
no reason why an attorney should be any less subject to questioning about fees received from a 
taxpayer than should any other person who has dealt with the taxpayer. There is no further 
encroachment here upon any confidential relationship than there is in questioning about the 
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existence or date of the relationship. All these matters are quite separate and apart from the 
substance of anything that the client may have revealed to the attorney. 
 
Moreover, a determination whether Colton rendered legal services to the Matters in a given year 
is proper as a basis for obtaining further unprivileged information from him. Not all 
communications between an attorney and his client are privileged. Particularly in the case of an 
attorney preparing a tax return (as the questioning agent attempted to establish Colton did for 
the Matters), a good deal of information transmitted to an attorney by a client is not intended to 
be confidential, but rather is given for transmittal by the attorney to others — for example, for 
inclusion in the tax return. Such information is, of course, not privileged. 
 
It was also proper for agent Kurtzuk, in Questions 16 and 18, to inquire into the nature of the 
“legal services” rendered by Colton. Attorneys frequently give to their clients business or other 
advice which, at least insofar as it can be separated from their essentially professional legal 
services, gives rise to no privilege whatever. Indeed, Colton admitted at the Service hearing that 
he sometimes gave “a little investment advice” to his clients. Because Colton's work for the 
Matters — both legal and non-legal — may thus have involved unprivileged communications 
with them, it is proper for the Service in its search for unprivileged matters not only to inquire 
into the years during which he rendered “legal services” but also to explore, as it does in 
Questions 16 and 18, to some extent the nature of the services rendered. These questions are 
appropriate to a determination of what, if any, areas may be inquired into further and what is 
protected by the attorney-client privilege. Judge Metzner excluded detailed inquiry into the work 
done. Although it would be inappropriate for us to speculate regarding those questions which 
might properly be asked in this area, we note that some restriction may be necessary to protect 
the privilege and that none of the possible responses called for by Question 18 as now limited 
would reveal anything which could be regarded as a communication within the meaning of the 
privilege doctrine. Nor do we find anything in Question 80 which calls for the revelation of any 
communication by the Matters. 
 
2. The remaining questions, which pertain to documents and files, can be subdivided into two 
categories. The colloquy relating to Questions 22, 73, 74 and 75 reflects Colton’s total refusal, 
on grounds of the attorney-client privilege, to produce “retained copies of income tax returns, 
workpapers, correspondence, memoranda and all other data pertaining to the preparation and 
filing of the returns in question” and the fact that before and after the first hearing before the 
Service the firm had returned some of these papers to the Matters. The remaining questions 
inquire into the general nature of the papers presently or formerly in the firm's possession. 
 
Judge Metzner ordered Colton to answer this last group of questions concerning the nature of 
the papers, and held that the privilege did not justify a blanket refusal to produce those 
documents and files still in the firm’s possession. He did not require Colton to make any efforts 
to recapture any papers no longer in the firm's possession, and the government makes no 
contention here that he should have. The judge apparently also held, and in any event the 
government now concedes, that the privilege is still available to Colton to the extent of 
permitting him to withhold any particular confidential papers which were “specifically prepared 
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by the client for the purpose of consultation with his attorney” and any of the firm’s memoranda 
and worksheets “to the extent of any unpublished expression made by an attorney therein of 
confidences which had passed between him and his clients.” 
 
It is self-evident that individual documents and files may still be withheld insofar as they thus are 
or report confidential communications between Colton and his clients, the Matters. Documentary 
evidence of confidential communications is necessarily privileged as much as testimonial 
evidence. Moreover, if a proper showing is made, Colton will be able to raise the Matters’ 
privilege against self-incrimination as a basis for refusing to produce any independently pre-
existing records or other documents turned over to the firm by the Matters if the Matters could 
have refused to produce them under that privilege. 
 
Clearly Colton’s blanket refusal on the grounds of the attorney-client privilege to produce 
anything was unjustified. As we have noted, the attorney-client privilege protects only those 
papers prepared by the client for the purpose of confidential communication to the attorney or 
by the attorney to record confidential communications, and Colton has not made the necessary 
showing that the papers he refused to produce are of such nature. 
 
Insofar as the papers include pre-existing documents and financial records not prepared by the 
Matters for the purpose of communicating with their lawyers in confidence, their contents have 
acquired no special protection from the simple fact of being turned over to an attorney. It is only 
if the client could have refused to produce such papers that the attorney may do so when they 
have passed into his possession. Any other rule would permit a person to prevent disclosure of 
any of his papers by the simple expedient of keeping them in the possession of his attorney. 
 
Appellant admits in his brief that statements, correspondence, and documents received from 
third parties are not protected by the attorney-client privilege, and the principle is obvious. He 
argues, however, that in any event such papers are wholly unavailable to the government under 
the “work product” rule which the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor held justified an 
attorney’s refusal to permit discovery in a civil case of statements obtained by him from 
prospective witnesses. We need not reach the government’s contention that the work-product 
rule is inapplicable to such administrative investigations as that conducted by the Internal 
Revenue Service here, because Colton has made no suggestion that any of the papers involved 
were collected or prepared in anticipation of litigation, as must be shown to justify invocation of 
this rule. 
 
Because Colton was unjustified in his blanket refusal to produce all of his firm's papers 
concerning the Matters, it was, of course, appropriate for agent Kurtzuk to question him at the 
hearing concerning the nature of the papers in order to determine which of them were and 
which were not privileged. All of the remaining questions are relevant to the government’s 
proper attempt to uncover papers not protected under the attorney-client privilege. Questions 
23, 25 and 76 have the identical purpose of trying to find out whether the firm’s files contain 
documents received from or correspondence with third parties. We have already noted that 
papers received from third parties are unprivileged and no theory has been presented on which 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 422	
communications from an attorney to a third party are privileged. Question 65 inquires whether 
the firm’s “papers contained retained copies of Herbert and Mercedes Matter’s income tax 
returns” for the relevant years. Such copies would be unprivileged as not confidential because 
by definition they contain no information that was not intended to be given to the Internal 
Revenue Service. None of these questions call for any information which could possibly reveal 
protected communications. Thus these questions must be answered and the materials they 
refer to must be produced. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did the court find information relating to the date and general nature of the legal 
services provided by Colton to the Matters was not privileged? Do you agree? 
2. Why did the court found that the identity of a client is not privileged? Do you agree? 
3. Why did the court find that pre-existing documents provided to Colton were not 
privileged? Could the government draw incriminating inferences from the fact the 
Matters provided those documents to Colton? Should that matter for the purpose of the 
attorney-client privilege? 
 
Confidentiality & Privilege 
 
X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Va. 1992) 
ELLIS, District Judge. 
 
Few problems are as vexing as determining what evidence justifies a lawyer's disclosure of a 
client’s confidential information and documents, which the lawyer believes reflect an ongoing or 
future crime or fraud. This case presents precisely this problem. Plaintiff, X Corp. brings this suit, 
in part, to prevent defendant, John Doe, X Corp.’s former in-house counsel, from disclosing X 
Corp.’s confidential information and documents retained by Doe following his discharge from X 
Corp. X Corp. also seeks return of the documents. In support of the relief sought, X Corp. cites 
the attorney-client privilege, the parties’ confidentiality agreement, and the lawyer’s general duty 
to preserve a client’s confidences. For his part, Doe claims that the documents in issue disclose 
ongoing civil and criminal frauds perpetrated by X Corp. against the federal government. As 
such, according to Doe, the documents fall within the public policy crime-fraud exception to the 
attorney-client privilege and to any general or contractual duty of confidentiality. 
 
The matter is before the Court on X Corp.’s motion for a preliminary injunction. For the reasons 
stated here, the motion is granted in part and denied in part. 
 
Facts 
 
X Corp. hired Doe in March 1989 as a member of its in-house legal staff based in Northern 
California. Formerly an Associate Deputy Attorney General of the United States and Chief of 
Staff to the Attorney General, Doe was a member of the bar of the state of Pennsylvania. When 
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he was hired, Doe executed an “Employment, Invention and Confidential Information 
Agreement,” in which he expressly agreed (i) to return to X Corp. all records obtained during, or 
in connection with, his employment and (ii) to preserve X Corp.’s confidential information. 
Thereafter, in the course of his employment, Doe regularly received confidential information 
from X Corp. management and its employees in order to provide legal opinions and advice. 
During approximately two years with X Corp., Doe apparently excelled; his professional 
performance was regarded as excellent. Eventually he was promoted to Group Counsel with 
primary responsibility worldwide for X Corp.’s compliance with numerous government 
regulations and antitrust laws. 
 
In November 1990, Doe was transferred from X Corp.’s California office to Virginia as X Corp.'s 
only United States-based lawyer outside California. The parties sharply dispute the reason for 
the transfer. In X Corp.’s view, the transfer occurred because Doe failed the California bar 
examination. Doe, on the other hand, asserts that he initiated the transfer to escape California’s 
high cost of living and because he and his wife wanted to live closer to their relatives in Virginia. 
Doe also contends that X Corp. negotiated with him to retain his services because he was “an 
important contributor and asset” and because X Corp. wanted to locate a regulatory and 
antitrust attorney near Washington, D.C.  
 
X Corp. terminated Doe’s employment effective February 28, 1992, providing him with thirty-one 
weeks severance pay. The reason for Doe’s discharge is as hotly disputed as the reason for the 
transfer. X Corp. claims Doe was laid-off as part of a company-wide reduction in force involving 
over 700 employees. Doe counters, however, that he was unlawfully fired in retaliation for 
actions X Corp. believed he was taking in furtherance of a possible qui tam suit. On leaving X 
Corp.’s employ, Doe took with him copies of certain documents and files, leaving the originals 
with X Corp. Doe claims these documents reveal that X Corp. is defrauding the federal 
government, in violation of the False Claims Act. 
 
X Corp.’s complaint asserts breach of the Confidentiality Agreement.  X Corp. claims that filing 
this action was necessary to prevent disclosure of X Corp.’s confidential information in the event 
Doe filed his draft complaint on the public record. That circumstance never materialized.  
 
Following oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement. Doe, by counsel, agreed 
to refrain from further disclosures of X Corp.’s claimed confidential information until the Court's 
ruling. 
 
Analysis 
 
Without doubt, this litigation presents “grave or serious questions,” questions involving difficult 
and troubling ethical issues arising in the context of attorney-client confidentiality. Few questions 
are graver or more serious in the practice of law than determining what evidence of crime or 
fraud justifies a lawyer’s disclosure of his client’s confidential information. Moreover, allegations 
of attorney misconduct, or even potential misconduct, engender significant and serious 
questions of professional conduct critical to the client, to the accused attorney, and to the bar as 
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a whole. Such allegations, regardless of their veracity, erode the already fragile public 
confidence in the legal profession and in the administration of justice. And it is undeniable that 
our legal system cannot function effectively unless the public has confidence in the integrity and 
competence of the system and its participants. Thus, it is paramount that lawyers understand 
and abide by settled and accepted norms of professional conduct. But even settled and 
accepted norms frequently provide inadequate or ambiguous guidance in the face of specific 
factual circumstances. So it is here. 
 
This litigation focuses on two professional standards of attorney confidentiality — (i) the 
evidentiary attorney-client privilege and (ii) the broader ethical duty of confidentiality — and their 
application to the specific facts presented. Understanding the distinction between these two 
standards is essential to the matter at bar. For that reason, it is worth describing them here in 
some detail. 
 
The first of these standards, the evidentiary attorney-client privilege, is quite familiar, and the 
principles associated with it are well-settled. This evidentiary privilege applies to disclosures of 
certain types of confidences communicated between client and attorney during the course of the 
attorney's representation of the client. To prevent such disclosures, the client, through counsel 
or otherwise, may invoke the privilege. The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to 
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby 
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice. The 
privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such 
advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client. 
 
Nevertheless, because it “impedes the full and free discovery of the truth,” and is “in derogation 
of the public’s ‘right to every man's evidence,’” the attorney-client privilege is not “favored” by 
federal courts. Accordingly, the privilege is narrowly construed to apply only to those situations 
in which the party invoking the privilege consulted an attorney for the purpose of securing a 
legal opinion or services and in connection with that consultation communicated information 
intended to be kept confidential. 
 
The evidentiary attorney-client privilege, while more familiar, is not the lawyer’s only duty of 
confidentiality to a client. Too often unrecognized is the broader ethical duty of an attorney to 
preserve a client’s confidences and secrets that may fall outside the attorney-client privilege. 
The leading case discussing this ethical duty is the Fifth Circuit's decision in Brennan’s Inc. v. 
Brennan’s Restaurants, Inc. There, defendants took the position that the attorney-client privilege 
barred an attorney from further representation of a former joint client. The Fifth Circuit 
disagreed, noting that “the fundamental flaw in defendants’ position is a confusion of the 
attorney-client evidentiary privilege with the ethical duty to preserve a client's confidences.” The 
panel held that although a former joint client could not assert the attorney-client privilege as to 
matters encompassed by the former joint representation because confidences cannot arise 
between joint clients, a broader ethical duty protects joint clients. In this regard, the court stated: 
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Information acquired from a client is sheltered from use by the attorney against his client 
by virtue of the existence of the attorney-client relationship. This is true without regard to 
whether someone else may be privy to it. The obligation of an attorney not to misuse 
information acquired in the course of representation serves to vindicate the trust and 
reliance that client's place in their attorneys. A client would feel wronged if an opponent 
prevailed against him with the aid of an attorney who formerly represented the client in 
the same matter this would undermine public confidence in the legal system as a means 
for adjudicating disputes. 
As the Fifth Circuit sensibly recognized in Brennan’s, attorney confidentiality is essential to 
sustaining public confidence in the legal profession and the legal system. Clients therefore have 
a right to enforce that confidentiality, absent specific circumstances abrogating that right. Of 
course, an attorney’s duty to his client is limited by his duty to comply with the law and the 
standards of professional conduct.  
 
Consistent with most jurisdictions, Virginia recognizes a broad duty of confidentiality in Canon 4 
of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, which states: “A Lawyer Should Preserve 
the Confidences and Secrets of a Client.” The corresponding Disciplinary Rules provide in 
relevant part: 
DR4-101. Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client. — (A) “Confidence” 
refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law, and 
“secret” refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client 
has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or 
would be likely to be detrimental to the client. 
(B) Except as provided by DR 4-101(C) and (D), a lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client. 
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client. 
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or a third person, 
unless the client consents after full disclosure. 
Thus, mandatory Disciplinary Rule 4-101 defines two categories of protected information: (i) a 
narrow category of “confidences,” comprising information protected by the attorney-client 
privilege, and (ii) a broader category of “secrets,” encompassing “other information gained in the 
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of 
which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.” In distinguishing 
between these two categories, Virginia has manifest its intention to protect from disclosure a 
range of communications broader than that protected by the attorney-client privilege. 
Confidentiality of both categories of information must be maintained. Yet the duty of 
confidentiality imposed by the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility is not absolute. A 
lawyer may reveal confidences and secrets in specific circumstances. 
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Yet despite its similar purpose, DR 4-101(C)(3) "clearly establishes” standard imposes a heavier 
burden on the party seeking disclosure than the prima facie standard of the crime-fraud 
exception to the attorney-client privilege. In other words, matters subject to the attorney-client 
privilege seem to be less stringently protected from disclosure than matters subject to the 
ethical privilege. This, at first blush, seems puzzling, indeed paradoxical, for one would think 
that the attorney-client privilege deserves the greater protection. On reflection, however, the two 
different standards make sense given that they apply in different contexts. Succinctly put, the 
evidentiary attorney-client privilege arises only where disclosures are sought to be compelled in 
some litigation context, whereas the broader ethical duty arises in the context of voluntary or 
uncompelled disclosures, typically outside a litigation context. More particularly, the attorney-
client privilege is an evidentiary privilege applicable where someone seeks to compel an 
attorney or his client to reveal communications between lawyer and client made for the purpose 
of securing a legal opinion or legal services and intended to be kept confidential. Thus, the 
privilege arises in the context of litigation and is therefore subject to discipline of the adversary 
process and the safeguard of judicial scrutiny, if the affected client invokes the privilege and the 
opposing party seeks to overcome it. Significantly, however, the evidentiary attorney-client 
privilege does not control where disclosures occur, or potential disclosures are contemplated, in 
circumstances involving uncompelled disclosure and no judicial scrutiny. In such circumstances, 
the ethical duty — with its appropriately higher standard of protection against unwarranted 
disclosure of suspected fraudulent activities — governs.  
 
Given this, in proving its claim that Doe is obligated to maintain its confidences pursuant to the 
ethical duty, X Corp. bears the initial burden of establishing that the duty exists and that the 
disputed communications are subject to it. To do so, X Corp. must show, inter alia, that the 
communications sought to be protected are “confidences” or “secrets” within the meaning of 
Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility DR4-101(A). If X Corp. carries this burden and 
establishes that Doe is ethically bound not to disclose this material, the burden then shifts to 
Doe. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In sum, the Court concludes that plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction should be granted in 
part and denied in part. Specifically, an appropriately tailored preliminary injunction will issue 
with respect to disclosure of X Corp.’s claimed confidential information and documents. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. How is the duty of confidentiality different from the attorney-client privilege? 
2. Why did the court hold that the information at issue is covered by the duty of 
confidentiality, rather than the attorney-client privilege? 
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5.4: Applying the Attorney-Client Privilege 
 
Pay no mind to what they say, it doesn’t matter anyway, our lips are sealed.70 
 
The fiduciary duty of confidentiality protects confidential communications between attorneys and 
their clients, as described in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The attorney-client 
privilege also protects certain confidential communications between attorneys and their clients, 
but it is not described by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. In contrast to the duty of 
confidentiality, which imposes a fiduciary duty on attorneys, the attorney-client privilege is a 
common law doctrine that creates an evidentiary privilege for certain confidential attorney-client 
communications, specifically communications for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal 
advice. 
 
The attorney-client privilege was created by the courts, and its scope is defined by the courts. 
Accordingly, the attorney-client privilege differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. However, the 
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyer describes the paradigmatic form of the attorney-
client privilege. 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501: Privilege in General 
 
The common law - as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and experience - 
governs a claim of privilege unless any of the following provides otherwise: 
 
● the United States Constitution; 
● a federal statute; or 
● rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. 
 
But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law 
supplies the rule of decision. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 68 (2000): Attorney-Client Privilege 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this Restatement, the attorney-client privilege may be invoked 
with respect to: 
1. a communication 
2. made between privileged persons 
3. in confidence 
4. for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 69 (2000): “Communication” 
 
																																																								
70 The Go-Gos, Our Lips Are Sealed, Beauty and the Beat (1981). 
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A communication within the meaning of § 68 is any expression through which a privileged 
person, as defined in § 70, undertakes to convey information to another privileged person and 
any document or other record revealing such an expression. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 70 (2000): “Privileged Persons” 
 
Privileged persons within the meaning of § 68 are the client (including a prospective client), the 
client's lawyer, agents of either who facilitate communications between them, and agents of the 
lawyer who facilitate the representation. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 71 (2000): “In Confidence” 
 
A communication is in confidence within the meaning of § 68 if, at the time and in the 
circumstances of the communication, the communicating person reasonably believes that no 
one will learn the contents of the communication except a privileged person as defined in § 70 
or another person with whom communications are protected under a similar privilege. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 72 (2000): Legal Assistance as the 
Object of a Privileged Communication 
 
A communication is made for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance within the 
meaning of § 68 if it is made to or to assist a person: 
1. who is a lawyer or who the client or prospective client reasonably believes to be a 
lawyer; and 
2. whom the client or prospective client consults for the purpose of obtaining legal 
assistance. 
 
Who is a “Privileged Person”? 
 
State v. Spell, 399 So. 2d 551 (La. 1981) 
 
Summary: Jenkins, an inmate of the prison, worked at the law library. Defendant argues 
that Jenkins was acting as an attorney when the inculpatory statements were made. 
Jenkins wasn’t an attorney and didn’t hold himself out as a lawyer. Defendant knew 
Jenkins was not an attorney and voluntarily gave information to Jenkins. The 
communication is not subject to the attorney-client privilege.  
 
JASPER E. JONES, Justice Ad Hoc. 
 
Thomas Rhuel Spell was charged by grand jury indictment with the crime of second degree 
murder of Ricky Mire. On December 20, 1979 defendant was convicted before a jury of twelve 
by a vote of eleven to one. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility 
for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for forty years. 
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Defendant appealed his conviction. While the case was pending on appeal, defendant filed a 
motion for new trial based upon a contention that he had discovered new evidence which, if it 
had been introduced at trial, would probably have changed the verdict of guilty. The defendant's 
new trial motion contended that the new evidence could not have been discovered by him 
before or during the trial. This court remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing on 
defendant’s motion for a new trial. 
 
Following a hearing on the new trial motion the trial court denied the new trial. The case is now 
before this court on the merits of the appeal which were not considered before the remand. 
 
The evidence at trial reflected the following facts: 
 
On November 12, 1975, at about 4:00 p. m., Anthony Broussard was driving his car in the south 
part of Crowley, La. in the Parish of Acadia when he was stopped by defendant. Defendant 
asked Broussard to take him for a ride, and Broussard agreed to the request. Shortly after 
Broussard and defendant commenced their ride they observed Ricky Mire walking down the 
street. Defendant had Broussard stop and defendant went and talked to Mire. Mire returned to 
Broussard’s car with defendant and got into the car with Broussard and defendant. 
 
At defendant's direction Broussard drove to an isolated area in Crowley near a dried-up 
drainage canal and stopped. Mire and defendant got out of the car, and while Mire was standing 
near the front of the vehicle, defendant secured the car keys from Broussard, opened the trunk 
of the car and removed from it a tire tool. Mire and defendant then walked out of sight in the 
direction of the drainage ditch. Defendant carried the tire tool with him as he left the vehicle. 
Soon after defendant and Mire disappeared from view Broussard got out of the car and went in 
search of them and found them a short distance away, apparently over the drainage ditch levee. 
Broussard observed defendant push Mire who was in front of him. Broussard then returned to 
his car. After the elapse of about ten minutes defendant returned to Broussard’s vehicle without 
Mire and advised Broussard not to ask any questions and to return him to his car which he had 
left at the point where he had entered Broussard's vehicle. 
 
Broussard did not see the tire tool in defendant’s hands when he returned to the car, but he 
heard defendant drop it upon the floor. When the pair arrived back at defendant’s car, defendant 
got out of Broussard’s car and the tire tool was not left in Broussard’s vehicle. Broussard did not 
see defendant take the tire tool out of his car. 
 
At about 5:00 p. m. that afternoon, three horseback riders found Mire in the drainage ditch 
apparently unconscious with his head and face covered with blood. There was a lot of blood on 
the ground near Mire. They notified the sheriff’s office who obtained an ambulance and carried 
Mire to a Crowley hospital where his head was bandaged in the emergency room. The parish 
coroner arrived at 6:30 p. m. and observed that Mire was in a critical condition and ordered his 
immediate transfer to a Lafayette hospital where Mire died at 9:35 p. m. that night. 
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Mire’s body was returned to Crowley and examined by the parish coroner who testified he died 
from several head injuries that appeared to have been caused by a blunt instrument with a 
sharp end. 
 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
 
Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in admitting over his objection the testimony of 
Ronald Jenkins that defendant had told him he had killed the victim. Defendant contends that 
these inculpatory statements were made to Jenkins in confidence and were therefore 
inadmissible. Jenkins, an inmate of the prison, was assigned to the law library to help other 
prisoners with their legal problems by writing letters, preparing pleadings, and otherwise giving 
them whatever advice he could. Defendant contends that the information was a privileged 
communication because Jenkins was acting as an attorney in the law library at the Dixon 
Correctional Institute when the inculpatory statements were made to him by defendant. 
Defendant cites no authority for his contention. 
 
Jenkins was not an attorney and did not hold himself out as a lawyer. Defendant knew that 
Jenkins was a fellow inmate in the prison and was not an attorney. He voluntarily gave the 
information to Jenkins. The communication is not subject to the attorney-client privilege. In the 
case of State v. Lassai, the court rejected the contention that a communication given by the 
defendant to a counselor at a drug abuse center was privileged where communications to 
certified social workers are classified as privileged communication. The court there said: 
 
Nor does the record disclose a privilege which would prevent the evidentiary use of an 
admission by defendant to the director of counseling at the Euterpe Center; it was not 
shown that she was a social worker, and for that reason R.S. 37:2714 is not applicable. 
Privileges are narrowly construed, and will not be extended to the counselor solely 
because she was “in the same position” as a physician or social worker. 
 
Defendant’s inculpatory statements to Jenkins were not subject to any privilege. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. What if Jenkins had been an imprisoned attorney? 
2. Can Jenkins effectively provide legal advice to the prisoners if their communications with 
him are not privileged? 
 
Jones v. US, 828 A. 2d 169 (DC App. 2003) 
 
Summary: The police contacted Stacy Jones about the murder of Darcie Silver, and 
asked for a DNA sample. Jones called his girlfriend, Tina Ducharme, an attorney 
employed by the federal government, and asked her for advice. Later, Jones was 
arrested and charged with murder. Ducharme testified at the trial. Jones argued that 
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their telephone conversation was protected by the attorney-client privilege. The trial 
court disagreed, and the appellate court affirmed. 
 
TERRY, Associate Judge: 
 
After a jury trial, appellant was convicted of first-degree burglary, first-degree sexual abuse, first-
degree felony murder, and second-degree murder. On appeal he contends that the trial court 
erred when it ruled that the attorney-client privilege did not require the exclusion of testimony 
about a conversation that appellant had with his girlfriend (at the time), who was an attorney 
employed by the federal government. We affirm on the merits, and remand for the sole purpose 
of vacating a redundant conviction. 
 
I 
 
On Saturday, March 23, 1996, at about 10:00 a.m., Metropolitan Police officers found Darcie 
Silver dead in her apartment after they received a call from her concerned co-workers reporting 
that she had failed to show up for work. The medical examiner determined that the cause of 
death was asphyxia by strangulation; other injuries indicated that she might also have been 
smothered. In addition, there were burns around her genital area; pieces of burned newspaper 
were found in the vicinity of her crotch. A vaginal swab revealed the presence of male 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). In addition, investigators found semen stains on Ms. Silver’s 
nightgown and on a denim jacket recovered from her apartment. The DNA evidence was later 
matched to appellant through testing by the FBI. 
 
A police investigation revealed that on Friday evening, March 22, Ms. Silver had dinner with a 
co-worker from her job at Bread & Circus, a supermarket in the Georgetown area of the city. 
She returned to her apartment at approximately 10:00 p.m. and spoke to her father on the 
telephone from 10:47 p.m. on Friday until 12:03 a.m. on Saturday. 
 
Two neighbors in Ms. Silver’s apartment building heard a knocking at the front door of the 
building at about 2:30 a.m. on Saturday. One of the neighbors looked out a window and saw a 
“stocky” man with a fair to medium complexion at the door. This description was similar to that 
of appellant, who is a weightlifter and bodybuilder. Both neighbors heard the man respond to the 
building intercom using the name “Darcie.” They then heard him say that he had locked himself 
out of his apartment and needed to borrow a telephone. The intercom made a buzzing noise, 
which unlocked the front door, and the man walked upstairs to the area of Ms. Silver’s 
apartment. About fifteen minutes later, one neighbor heard a “crash” coming from Silver’s 
apartment, and the other heard a loud “thump.” 
 
II 
 
Appellant’s primary argument on appeal is that the court erred when it ruled that the attorney-
client privilege did not attach to a conversation that he had with his girlfriend at the time, Tina 
Ducharme, who was also a lawyer. 
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After Darcie Silver was murdered, the police interviewed several employees, including 
appellant, at the Bread & Circus store where Ms. Silver worked. The police requested hair and 
blood samples from appellant, but he declined to give them. He told the police that his girlfriend 
was a lawyer and that he “wanted to talk to her first and he even invited them to come to his 
house to talk to them if they wanted to, but only in her company.” Later appellant called his girl 
friend, Tina Ducharme, a lawyer who worked for the federal government. At the time, she was 
away on business in San Diego. Appellant left a message at her hotel there, and she returned 
his call some time thereafter. 
 
During their telephone conversation, appellant told Ms. Ducharme about the police interview at 
Bread & Circus. Defense counsel moved to exclude any testimony from Ms. Ducharme about 
that conversation. At a pre-trial hearing on the motion, Ms. Ducharme testified that appellant 
“told me that the police had been by his work and had questioned him and several other people 
who used to work with Darcie and had asked for blood samples from several individuals.” Ms. 
Ducharme’s response to appellant’s concern was that “obviously he didn’t have to provide the 
police with a sample if they didn’t have a warrant.” She also asked him, however, “why he 
wouldn’t, since it would clear the air. Obviously he didn't have anything to do with it or didn’t 
have anything to be concerned about. I didn't understand why he wouldn’t just go ahead and do 
it.” Appellant also told her that “he had been in Darcie’s apartment before, and he questioned 
whether or not some fingerprints of his would be remaining in the apartment,” particularly on 
some drinking glasses. Ms. Ducharme replied with the “common sense advice” that “probably 
Darcie had washed her glasses in the intervening amount of time.” Finally, appellant asked 
“what if he had gone to the bathroom and left some sperm in there?” Ms. Ducharme laughed 
and commented that “unless he was masturbating in her bathroom, I really didn't think that 
would be a concern.” Ms. Ducharme testified that appellant never said anything about her 
representing him in a criminal matter, nor did she intend to advise appellant as a lawyer, adding, 
“I wasn't qualified to advise anyone on criminal matters.” Appellant, in fact, had never asked her 
to perform any legal work on his behalf. Besides, she said, she was barred by a regulation from 
representing any private individual “either criminally or civilly” because she was a government 
lawyer. Further, she believed the conversation was a typical call between boyfriend and 
girlfriend: “when either of us had a problem, we would call the other person to ask their advice 
or tell them about it.” 
 
Appellant’s account of the conversation was different. He stated that he telephoned Ms. 
Ducharme because he “wanted to know what kind of position I would be putting myself in by 
giving hair and blood samples.” Appellant said that he called her “because she’s an attorney” 
and that he “was seeking legal advice.” He testified, “I never thought she could be subpoenaed 
or anything because she was an attorney.” On the basis of his prior experience with other 
attorneys, appellant believed their conversation would remain confidential. 
 
At the close of the hearing, the court ruled that the conversation was not protected by the 
attorney-client privilege. Accepting Ms. Ducharme’s version of the conversation as credible, the 
court found appellant’s testimony incredible because he “kept switching around on the witness 
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stand as if he was waiting on which way to go.” In addition, the court ruled that the only thing 
Ms. Ducharme “said as a lawyer” was that appellant did not have to give the police hair and 
blood samples, which he had already elected not to do. Otherwise, said the court, the types of 
questions appellant asked Ms. Ducharme were “what if” questions that were more scientific than 
legal: 
 
They were questions about—they’re scientific questions. And she wasn’t a criminal 
lawyer to begin with. What if I used a glass, would the fingerprints still be there? Not a 
legal question. What if I went to the bathroom, would I have semen there? That’s not a 
legal question. None of these were legal questions. The only legal question in this thing 
he already knew the answer to. 
 
As a result, the court refused to allow appellant to invoke the attorney-client privilege, and Ms. 
Ducharme’s testimony about the telephone conversation was later introduced into evidence at 
trial. 
 
In the case at bar, the court heard testimony about the nature and substance of the 
conversation between appellant and his one-time girl friend, Ms. Ducharme. It made a credibility 
determination about the contents of the conversation and a factual finding that Ms. Ducharme 
was not acting as an attorney, but as a friend. On this record we see no reason to depart from 
our usual standard of review for factual findings by a trial court; i.e., we must uphold that court's 
determination of the facts unless it is “plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” In 
particular, a trial court's “findings of fact relevant to the essential elements of a claim of attorney-
client privilege will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.” This standard of review places a 
heavy burden on appellant. Because appellant has not shown that the trial court’s factual 
findings were clearly erroneous or, in the words of our statute, “plainly wrong,” we uphold the 
court’s rejection of his claim of privilege. 
 
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the established privileges for confidential 
communications. Its main purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between 
attorneys and their clients. Nevertheless, courts construe the attorney-client privilege narrowly 
to protect only those purposes which it serves. Thus the privilege applies only in the following 
circumstances: 
 
(1) where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in his 
capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in 
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from 
disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived. 
 
The burden of proving that the attorney-client privilege shields a particular communication from 
disclosure rests with the party asserting the privilege. This means that the party asserting the 
privilege must clearly show that the communication was made “in a professional legal capacity.” 
“In general, American decisions agree that the privilege applies if one of the significant purposes 
of a client in communicating with a lawyer is that of obtaining legal assistance.” 
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Whether a purpose is significantly that of obtaining legal assistance or is for a nonlegal purpose 
depends upon the circumstances, including the extent to which the person performs legal and 
nonlegal work, the nature of the communication in question, and whether or not the person had 
previously provided legal assistance relating to the same matter. 
 
In the case of someone seeking advice from a friend who is also a lawyer, the lawyer-friend 
must be giving advice as a lawyer and not as a friend in order for the privilege to attach. The 
nature of the relationship is a factual question for the trial court to decide. 
 
Finally, the relationship between attorney and client hinges on the client’s intention to seek legal 
advice and his belief that he is consulting an attorney. In this case the government argues that 
the conversation in question was not privileged because Ms. Ducharme was not a criminal 
lawyer; because, as a government employee, she was barred by a regulation from representing 
appellant—or any other individual—in a private capacity; and because she believed that she 
was speaking to appellant as his girlfriend and not as a lawyer.71 These arguments fall short, 
however, because the intent of the person seeking advice is assessed from that person's 
viewpoint, not that of the attorney. The issue ultimately is what appellant believed when he was 
seeking advice and whether his belief about the confidentiality of the conversation was 
reasonable. Thus Ms. Ducharme’s understanding of the conversation and of why appellant had 
called her is relevant only to whether appellant reasonably believed he was consulting her as an 
attorney, with the protections that such a relationship provides. 
 
Guided by these principles, we agree with the trial court that appellant failed to make the clear 
showing necessary to establish that his conversation with Ms. Ducharme was within the 
protection of the attorney-client privilege. We note that the trial court found appellant’s testimony 
incredible, in part, because he appeared to have tailored his testimony to fit the legal standard 
for the privilege, which counsel and the court had discussed in front of him during the hearing. 
The court said to defense counsel: 
 
It's the court's observation that appellant is very bright. And I was especially fond of his 
answer to counsel’s last question about whether he heard me. Then counsel and I had 
this legal discussion, at which time your client then answered the question, he didn’t 
understand the concept. It’s as if we helped him answer the question, the two of us. 
 
In addition, the court ruled that the questions appellant asked Ms. Ducharme were not “legal” 
questions. The court noted that appellant knew his rights when he refused to provide blood and 
hair samples to the police. According to Ms. Ducharme, whose testimony the court expressly 
credited, appellant did not inquire about his right not to give samples without a warrant, but 
																																																								
71 During the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel attempted to impeach Ms. Ducharme with her grand 
jury testimony. Before the grand jury, Ms. Ducharme initially testified that she gave appellant advice “as a 
lawyer,” but then stated a few moments later that appellant had called her “as his girlfriend.” The trial 
court presumably considered this discrepancy but nevertheless found Ms. Ducharme credible. 
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instead asked “scientific” questions about whether or not his fingerprints might remain on a 
glass or whether his semen and hair might be discovered in the bathroom. 
 
While such concerns about “bad facts” might fall within the privilege if they were expressed in a 
communication within a clearly established attorney-client relationship, we conclude, like the 
trial court, that appellant failed to establish that, as a matter of fact, such a relationship existed 
between him and Ms. Ducharme. We see no reason to upset the court’s conclusion, which 
rested largely on its determination that Ms. Ducharme was credible and that appellant was not. 
We find no error in that determination.72 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did the court hold that the communications at issue were not protected by the 
attorney-client privilege? 
2. If Jones had been speaking to hired or appointed counsel, would the communications at 
issue have been protected by the attorney-client privilege? 
 
What is a “Communication”? 
 
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 791 F. 2d 663 (8th Cir. 1986) 
 
BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge. 
 
Janet Cheetham appeals from the district court’s denial of her motion to quash a subpoena 
requiring her testimony before a grand jury investigating one of her clients. We affirm. 
 
I. BACKGROUND. 
 
A grand jury is investigating John Doe on suspicion of bank and credit card fraud. As part of its 
investigation, the grand jury seeks photographs and handwriting exemplars of Doe for 
comparison with signatures used on the fraudulent documents. 
 
The Immigration and Naturalization Service has produced documents purporting to bear the 
signatures and photograph of Doe. These documents also bear the signature of Cheetham 
attesting that she prepared the documents. Cheetham represented Doe in INS matters 
unrelated to the grand jury proceedings, and does not represent Doe in the grand jury 
investigation. 
 
The grand jury subpoenaed Cheetham to testify regarding the authenticity of Doe’s signatures 
and photograph on the INS documents. Cheetham brought a motion to quash before the 
																																																								
72 The government argues that even if there was error in the admission of the conversation, the error was 
harmless because the case against appellant was strong, noting in particular the DNA evidence and the 
testimony of the two neighbors. Given our conclusion that the conversation between appellant and Ms. 
Ducharme was not protected by the attorney-client privilege, we need not reach this issue. 
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magistrate, which was denied. She appealed to the district court, which also denied her motion 
and ordered her to testify.73 Cheetham brings this appeal, contending that the district court erred 
in concluding that her testimony would not be protected by the attorney-client privilege, and in 
not requiring the Government to prove the need for her testimony through affidavit. 
 
II. DISCUSSION. 
 
The common law rule of attorney-client privilege74 extends only to confidential communications 
from a client to his or her attorney. Confidential communications encompass that information 
communicated on the understanding that it would not be revealed to others, and to matters 
constituting protected attorney work product. The identity of one’s client usually falls outside the 
scope of the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, matters existing in the public eye, such as a 
person’s appearance and handwriting, are generally not confidential communications because 
they were not exposed on the assumption that others would not learn of them. Indeed, in this 
case, Doe voluntarily revealed his signatures and photograph to the INS. 
 
Cheetham contends that the attorney-client privilege should apply here because the information 
sought might tend to incriminate her client. She argues that any information gained by an 
attorney in her relationship with a client is privileged if exposure of the information might 
become a link in a chain of evidence connecting her client with a crime. Cheetham asserts that 
she gained the information sought by the grand jury during her legal relationship with Doe, and 
that her testimony could provide the necessary link between Doe and the fraudulent scheme. 
 
We disagree. It is true that certain information ordinarily outside the privilege may become 
privileged if, by revealing the information, the attorney would necessarily disclose confidential 
communications. Nonprivileged information is not suddenly transformed into confidential 
communications, however, whenever it becomes relevant to a criminal investigation or 
prosecution of a client. We conclude that the information sought by the grand jury does not 
constitute confidential communications protected by the attorney-client privilege. 
 
When is a Communication “In Confidence”? 
																																																								
73 Cheetham was ordered to answer these specific questions: 
1. Do you know John Doe? 
2. When did you first meet him? 
3. How many times have you met with him in person? 
4. Would you recognize him if you saw him again? 
5. Did you (or someone from your office) prepare Exhibits 1-5 [the INS documents] at his request? 
6. Is the photograph on Exhibits 1 and 2 a true likeness of John Doe? 
7. Did you witness John Doe sign his name on Exhibits 1-5? 
8. If not, do you know who, if anyone, witnessed the signature? 
74 Cheetham seeks to invoke the Texas statutory attorney-client privilege as controlling in this action. The 
“Texas Rule” provides that “an attorney shall not disclose any other facts which came into knowledge of 
such attorney by reason of such relationship.” However, questions of privilege are governed by the 
common law as interpreted by federal courts in the absence of a relevant Supreme Court rule, federal 
statute, or constitutional provision. We therefore apply the common law rule in this action, and not the 
Texas Rule. 
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Hofmann v. Conder, 712 P. 2d 216 (Utah 1985) 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This matter comes before the Court in an extraordinary proceeding to prohibit the district court 
from compelling petitioner’s hospital nurse to testify about statements she overheard petitioner 
make to his attorney. The trial court made no findings of fact, although it prepared a 
memorandum decision. It appears from that decision that the controlling issue on which the trial 
court decided the matter was a legal one, namely, the standard determining when the presence 
of a third party during communications between a lawyer and client results in a waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege. We hold that the trial court erred in deciding that the attorney-client 
privilege applies only if the presence of a third person, who overhears a confidential 
communication, is “necessary for urgent or life-saving procedures.” The proper standard is 
whether the third person’s presence is reasonably necessary under the circumstances. 
 
The record establishes that the presence of petitioner’s hospital nurse was reasonably 
necessary under the circumstances. The threshold question of whether the communication was 
intended to be confidential was not ruled on by the trial court, or at least the judge’s decision 
gives us no indication of his having made any factual findings on that question. Although there 
are ambiguities in the record, the totality of the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s 
communications to his attorney require the inference that the communication was intended to be 
confidential and within the protection of the statutory privilege. Immediately before the 
communication, petitioner had requested the presence of his attorney, he had stated that he 
would not make a statement to the police that night, and he had acquiesced in the request of his 
attorney that the police and hospital security personnel not only leave the room but also go far 
enough away to be out of earshot. Given his helpless physical condition and the intensive 
nature of the hospital care he had been receiving throughout the evening and during this 
incident, we cannot infer that petitioner intended his communications to his attorney to be public. 
Since the presence of the hospital nurse was reasonably necessary under all the 
circumstances, the privilege was not waived because of that presence. 
 
The order of the trial court is vacated, and this matter is remanded for the entry of a protective 
order preventing the disclosure by the witness of confidential communications overheard by her. 
 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (dissenting). 
 
I agree that Judge Conder applied the wrong standard in concluding that the presence of the 
nurse made the attorney-client privilege unavailable. A third person’s presence should not avoid 
an otherwise available privilege if the third person’s presence is reasonably necessary under the 
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circumstances. The evidence indicates that the nurse’s presence was reasonably necessary for 
Hofmann’s well-being.75 
 
I disagree with the result reached by the Court, however, and would uphold the ruling below, 
because I conclude that petitioner has not met the threshold requirement for claiming an 
attorney-client privilege — petitioner has failed to establish that the communication between the 
client and the attorney was intended by the client to be confidential. “The mere fact that the 
relationship of attorney and client exists between two individuals does not ipso facto make all 
communications between them confidential. The circumstances must indicate whether by 
implication the communication was of a sort intended to be confidential.” I think the Court slights 
this inquiry. By failing to carefully consider the question of the client’s intent, courts may shield 
from scrutiny communications that the privilege was not created to protect. 
 
There is evidence in the record sufficient to establish that the attorney thought the 
communication was at least private and perhaps confidential. However, I find the record very 
sparse on the question of the client’s intention. Although the client was available to give an 
affidavit in support of his claim of privilege, the record is strangely devoid of direct evidence as 
to the client’s state of mind at the time of the communication. As for the facts and circumstances 
in the record that constitute indirect evidence of his intent, I find them ambiguous at best. All 
persons must give evidence, unless they establish a recognized justification for refusing to do 
so. Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the communication was privileged. On the 
present state of the record, I conclude that petitioner has not carried this burden. Therefore, I 
would uphold the trial court’s refusal to find the communication privileged. 
 
Communication for the Purpose of Legal Advice 
 
In the Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 453 Mass. 453 (Mass. 2009) 
 
SPINA, J. 
 
This case requires us to decide whether the attorney-client privilege applies where a client 
leaves messages on his counsel’s telephone answering machine threatening to harm others 
and the attorney discloses those communications in order to protect those threatened. 
 
The salient facts are not in dispute. Attorney John Doe was representing Michael Moe, a father, 
in a care and protection proceeding in the Juvenile Court. On November 8, 2007, two days after 
an adverse ruling by a Juvenile Court judge, Moe left six messages on Attorney Doe’s 
answering machine between 1:08 A.M. and 1:24 A.M. Moe indicated that he knew where the 
judge lived and that she had two children. In the fourth message, a voice that Attorney Doe 
																																																								
75 I also conclude that the privilege is not lost if a third person whose presence is not otherwise justified 
overhears a confidential attorney-client communication without the client’s knowledge, so long as 
reasonable precautions were taken to protect against overhearing. However, because the nurse’s 
presence was justified, the reasonableness of the precautions taken to exclude third parties has no 
bearing on the question before us. 
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recognized as Moe’s wife stated that she and Moe were going to “raise some hell.” In the fifth 
message, Moe stated that “some people need to be exterminated with prejudice.” Attorney Doe 
subsequently erased the messages from the answering machine. 
 
During the following week, Attorney Doe observed that Moe had become “more and more 
angry,” and on November 13, 2007, he filed a motion to withdraw as Moe’s counsel, which was 
subsequently allowed. Concerned for the safety of the judge and her family, he disclosed the 
substance of the messages to the judge. 
 
On November 21, 2007, Attorney Doe was interviewed by a State trooper regarding the 
substance of the messages, but declined to sign a written statement. 
 
A District Court complaint alleging threats to commit a crime and intimidation of a witness 
subsequently issued against Moe. The Commonwealth then initiated grand jury proceedings 
and filed a motion to summons Attorney Doe before the grand jury. That motion was allowed. 
On December 21, 2007, Attorney Doe, citing the attorney-client privilege, moved to quash the 
summons. A judge in the Superior Court denied Attorney Doe’s motion, reasoning that Attorney 
Doe and Moe had not carried their burden of demonstrating that the attorney-client privilege 
applied “because they failed to show that the messages were left in an attempt to obtain legal 
services.” Attorney Doe filed a motion to reconsider, requesting, inter alia, an evidentiary 
hearing. The motion was denied. The Commonwealth and Attorney Doe submitted a joint 
request to report the decision to the Appeals Court. The Superior Court judge reported the case, 
and we transferred the case here on our own motion. 
 
Neither party disputes that Attorney Doe could, consistent with rule 1.6, disclose the substance 
of Moe’s messages. Rule 1.6 provides, in pertinent part: 
 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal confidential information relating to representation of a client 
unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly 
authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph 
(b). 
(b) A lawyer may reveal, and to the extent required by Rule 3.3, Rule 4.1 (b), or Rule 8.3 
must reveal, such information: (1) to prevent the commission of a criminal or fraudulent 
act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily 
harm." 
 
While nothing in rule 1.6 (b) required Attorney Doe to disclose Moe’s communications to the 
judge or police, he had discretion to do so. However, the ethical permissibility of Attorney Doe’s 
disclosure does not resolve the distinct issue presented here: whether Attorney Doe can be 
compelled to testify before the grand jury. 
 
Evidentiary privileges “are exceptions to the general duty imposed on all people to testify.” We 
accept such privileges “only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or 
excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle 
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of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.” The attorney-client privilege “is founded 
upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having 
knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily 
availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.” A party 
asserting the privilege must show that (1) the communications were received from the client in 
furtherance of the rendition of legal services; (2) the communications were made in confidence; 
and (3) the privilege has not been waived. 
 
The Commonwealth contends that the attorney-client privilege does not apply because Moe’s 
communications were not made “for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal services.” In 
making this argument, the Commonwealth implicitly asks us to reconsider a portion of our 
discussion in the Purcell case. 
 
In Purcell, the client was discharged as a maintenance man at the apartment building in which 
his apartment was located and had received an order to vacate his apartment. During 
consultation with an attorney, the client stated an intent to burn the apartment building. The 
attorney disclosed these communications to police and criminal charges were brought against 
the client. When the prosecutor subpoenaed the attorney to testify at trial, the attorney filed a 
motion to quash, which was denied. The central issue in that case was whether the crime-fraud 
exception to the attorney-client privilege applied. We concluded that the communications would 
not fall within the crime-fraud exception unless the district attorney could establish facts by a 
preponderance of the evidence showing that the client's communication sought assistance in or 
furtherance of future criminal conduct. 
 
Recognizing that whether the attorney-client privilege applied at all was open on remand, we 
also considered whether a communication of an intention to commit a crime, if not within the 
crime-fraud exception, could be considered a communication for the purposes of facilitating the 
rendition of legal services. We held that a “statement of an intention to commit a crime made in 
the course of seeking legal advice is protected by the privilege, unless the crime-fraud exception 
applies.” We reasoned that a gap between the crime-fraud exception and the applicability of the 
privilege “would make no sense,” because the attorney-client privilege was premised on the 
benefits of unimpeded communication between attorney and client, and noted that “an informed 
lawyer may be able to dissuade the client from improper future conduct and, if not, under the 
ethical rules may elect in the public interest to make a limited disclosure of the client's 
threatened conduct.” 
 
The limited disclosure adverted to in the Purcell case occurred here. Concerned for the safety of 
the judge, her family, and a social worker, Attorney Doe disclosed Moe’s communications to the 
judge and law enforcement authorities to protect them from harm. 
 
We discern no reason to depart from the Purcell decision, and hold that Moe’s communications 
were made in furtherance of the rendition of legal services and thus protected by the attorney-
client privilege. The Commonwealth’s argument to the contrary essentially raises an issue of 
germaneness. Scholars, commentators, and courts have formulated a number of tests for 
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determining the germaneness of a client's communication. However, none of these formulations 
appears to give clients breathing room to express frustration and dissatisfaction with the legal 
system and its participants. The expression of such sentiments is a not uncommon incident of 
the attorney-client relationship, particularly in an adversarial context, and may serve as a 
springboard for further discussion regarding a client’s legal options. If a lawyer suspects that the 
client intends to act on an expressed intent to commit a crime, the lawyer may attempt to 
dissuade the client from such action, and failing that, may make a limited disclosure to protect 
the likely targets. Requiring the privilege to yield for purposes of a criminal prosecution not only 
would hamper attorney-client discourse, but also would discourage lawyers from exercising their 
discretion to make such disclosures, as occurred here, and thereby frustrate the beneficial 
public purpose underpinning the discretionary disclosure provision of rule 1.6. Furthermore, any 
test to ascertain the germaneness of an ostensibly threatening communication on a case-by-
case basis would make the privilege’s applicability uncertain, rendering the privilege “little better 
than no privilege.” Warning clients that communications deemed irrelevant to the matter for 
which they have retained counsel will not be protected not only may discourage clients from 
disclosing germane information, but also may disincline clients to share their intentions to 
engage in criminal behavior. In the latter circumstance, a lawyer’s ability to aid in the 
administration of justice by dissuading a client from engaging in such behavior is impaired. The 
lawyer also may never receive the very information necessary for him or her to determine 
whether to make a limited disclosure to prevent the harm contemplated by the client. 
 
In sum, we reaffirm that a client’s communications to his lawyer threatening harm are privileged 
unless the crime-fraud exception applies. Because the Commonwealth does not assert that 
Moe’s communications come within the crime-fraud exception, they were privileged. The order 
denying Attorney Doe’s motion to quash is hereby vacated and the case is remanded to the 
Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
Keating v. McCahill, Civil Action No. 11-518 (E.D. Pa. 2012) 
 
Summary: Equisoft hired Keating as a management consultant. Soon afterward, 
Keating quit Equisoft and joined Capgemini. Equisoft hired Synnott, a Canadian lawyer, 
to provide legal advice. After consultation with Synnott, Equisoft sent a letter to 
Capgemini making certain demands. After receiving the letter, Capgemini fired Keating, 
who filed a tort action against Equisoft, asserting several claims. During discovery, 
Equisoft produced certain documents, as well as a privilege log listing relevant 
documents not produced. Keating filed a motion to compel those documents. The court 
found that some of the documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege or the 
work product doctrine, and others were not. 
 
GENE E.K. PRATTER, District Judge. 
 
Plaintiff Daniel Keating has objected to Defendants Equisoft, Inc., Thomas McCahill, and Luis 
Romero’s assertion of attorney-client privilege and work product protection over certain 
documents in the Defendants' privilege log. The parties have submitted twenty-five documents 
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— twenty-four produced with redactions and one withheld in full — to the Court for an in camera 
review to determine whether the communications at issue are shielded from disclosure by the 
attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine. 
 
For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the twenty-four redacted documents may remain 
redacted as presented to the Court, but Equisoft shall produce the one unproduced document in 
redacted form as more fully set forth below. 
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
Mr. Keating, a management consultant in the software industry, alleges that in late November 
2009, his consulting business, the Keating Consulting Group, Inc., entered into a three month 
consulting services contract with Equisoft, Inc. The consulting services contract was terminable 
at-will by either party with 30 days written notice. Mr. Keating also entered into a Non-
Solicitation Agreement, a Confidentiality Agreement, and an Intellectual Property Agreement 
with Equisoft, Inc. 
 
Approximately halfway through the term of the consulting agreement, Mr. Keating was offered 
and accepted a position with Capgemini Financial Services USA, Inc. and entered an 
employment agreement with Capgemini on January 14, 2010. The next day, Mr. Keating 
traveled to Equisoft’s Pennsylvania offices to give Mr. McCahill, Equisoft, Inc.’s Life Insurance 
Division President, the required 30 days notice pursuant to the contract. On January 21, 2010, 
Mr. Keating began working for Capgemini. 
 
In the immediate wake of Mr. Keating giving his notice, Mr. McCahill and certain members of 
Equisoft’s senior management convened to address the issues posed by Mr. Keating's 
resignation. These individuals included the Equisoft CEO Mr. Romero, Equisoft Vice President 
and COO Steeve Michaud, and then-Equisoft General Manager for Philadelphia Operations 
William O’Donnell. Equisoft hired Bernard Synnott, a Canadian attorney to advise senior 
management on issues relating to Mr. Keating’s resignation. Mr. Michaud was responsible for 
communicating with Mr. Synnott on behalf of Equisoft, and “relayed questions, information, 
comments, and advice from Mr. Synnott to senior management, and conveyed questions, 
information and comments from the senior management to Mr. Synnott." 
 
From January 18, 2010 to February 8, 2010, Messrs. Michaud, O’Donnell, and Romero activity 
assisted Mr. Synnott in formulating strategy and drafting a demand letter to effectuate that 
strategy. On February 8, 2010, Mr. Synnott sent the final version of this demand letter to Mr. 
Keating and Capgemini representatives threatening litigation if Mr. Keating continued to work for 
Capgemini. Three weeks after he began his new job, on February 16, 2010, Mr. Keating was 
terminated by Capgemini. 
 
In September 2010, Mr. Synnott received a letter from Mr. Keating's attorney, Heather 
Sussman, Esq., threatening to commence litigation if Equisoft did not comply with various 
demands. For the remainder of September 2010, Messrs. Michaud, O’Donnell, and Romero 
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assisted Mr. Synnott in evaluating Ms. Sussman’s demand letter and drafting a response, which 
was sent on September 24, 2010. 
 
On January 25, 2011, Mr. Keating filed this lawsuit, asserting that his termination from 
Capgemini was the result of Equisoft’s unlawful actions. He claims tortious interference with his 
contractual relationship with Capgemini and his prospective economic advantage, defamation 
via slander and libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and prima facie tort. 
 
After Mr. Keating served his initial document requests, the Defendants provided Mr. Keating 
with a privilege log. On October 17, 2011, one week after Equisoft provided Mr. Keating with 
their privilege log, Mr. Keating filed a motion to compel requesting that Equisoft produce every 
document on its privilege log not already produced because (1) Mr. Synnott, a foreign attorney, 
is not “a member of the bar of a court” as, Mr. Keating claims, is necessary for the attorney-
client privilege to apply, (2) the attorney-client privilege cannot apply where the challenged 
communications do not include a lawyer as a sender or a recipient, and (3) the work product 
doctrine cannot apply where the documents at issue were not prepared by an attorney or his 
representative. 
 
Since the filing of that motion — which was mooted by Order of the Court — the parties have 
reduced the universe of documents in dispute from 253 to 25. Twenty-four of these disputed 
documents have been produced in redacted form, and one document has been withheld in its 
entirety. These 25 documents have been submitted to the Court for an in camera review to 
determine whether the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine shields them 
from disclosure. Along with the documents submitted for judicial review, Equisoft submitted 
affidavits from Mr. Synnott, Mr. Romero, Mr. O’Donnell, and Mr. Michaud in support of its 
assertion of privilege and work product protection. 
 
II. LEGAL STANDARDS 
 
A. Attorney-Client Privilege 
 
Federal courts sitting in diversity, as in this case, apply the law of the host state to determine 
privilege. Thus, Pennsylvania law governs the privilege issues in this case. In order for the 
attorney-client privilege to apply in Pennsylvania, the following conditions must be met: “(1) the 
asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the 
communication was made is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate; (3) the 
communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed by his client, without the 
presence of strangers, for the purpose of securing either an opinion of law, legal services or 
assistance in a legal matter, and not for the purposes of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the 
privilege has been claimed and is not waived by the client.” Here, only the second and third 
elements are in dispute. 
 
The Pennsylvania rule that the lawyer must be “a member of the bar of a court” does not limit 
the privilege to members of the Pennsylvania bar. Rather, “the privilege applies to 
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communications to a person whom the client reasonably believes to be a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer 
admitted to practice in another jurisdiction or a lawyer admitted to practice in a foreign nation is 
a lawyer for the purposes of the privilege.” 
 
The attorney-client privilege protects the communications themselves, not the underlying facts. 
The privilege may cover documents that “while not involving employees assisting counsel, still 
reflect confidential communications between client and counsel or subordinates of counsel for 
the purposes of either (1) providing legal services or (2) providing information to counsel to 
secure legal services. The privilege applies to both corporations and natural persons. The 
“scope of an individual’s employment is highly relevant to the question of maintenance of 
confidentiality,” and “the privilege is waived if the communications are disclosed to employees 
who did not need access to them.” 
 
However, “a document need not be authored or addressed to an attorney in order to be properly 
withheld on attorney-client privilege grounds.” Where a corporate client is involved, “privileged 
communications may be shared by non-attorney employees in order to relay information 
requested by attorneys.” “Documents subject to the privilege may be transmitted between non-
attorneys so that the corporation may be properly informed of legal advice and act 
appropriately.” “Drafts of documents prepared by counsel or circulated to counsel for comments 
on legal issues are considered privileged if they were prepared or circulated for the purpose of 
giving or obtaining legal advice and contain information or comments not included in the final 
version.” 
 
Because the privilege obstructs the truth-finding process, it should be “applied only where 
necessary to achieve its purpose.” And because the privilege promotes the “dissemination of 
sound legal advice,” it applies only where the advice is legal in nature, and not where the lawyer 
provides non-legal business advice. Thus, “the party asserting the privilege bears the burden of 
proving that it applies to the communications at issue” and “Federal Rule of Evidence 501 
requires the federal courts, in determining the nature and scope of an evidentiary privilege, to 
engage in the sort of case-by-case analysis that is central to common-law adjudication.” 
 
B. Work Product Doctrine 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) outlines work product protection in diversity cases. In 
order to come within the qualified immunity from discovery created by Rule 26(b)(3) three tests 
must be satisfied. The material must be: (1) “documents and tangible things;” (2) “prepared in 
anticipation of litigation or for trial;” and (3) “by or for another party or by or for that other party’s 
representative.” 
 
“Work-product immunity protects only documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation of 
litigation or for trial, such as memoranda, letters, and e-mails.” 
 
Documents are prepared in anticipation of litigation when “in light of the nature of the document 
and the factual situation in the particular case, the document can be fairly said to have been 
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prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation.” The preparer’s anticipation of 
litigation must be objectively reasonable. Generally, a reasonable anticipation of litigation 
requires existence of an identifiable specific claim or impending litigation at the time the 
materials were prepared. 
 
As Rule 26(b)(3) makes clear, the materials themselves need not be prepared by a lawyer or a 
lawyer’s representative to qualify for work product protection. Rather, “the focus of the rule 
seems to be on whether the work was done in anticipation of litigation by the person preparing 
the work.” Indeed, the fact that the documents sought for discovery do not include legal advice 
is, “as a matter of law, irrelevant provided they were prepared in anticipation of litigation.” 
 
A party claiming work product protection bears the initial burden of showing that the materials in 
question were prepared in anticipation of litigation. A party seeking disclosure of documents 
claimed as work product must demonstrate substantial need for the materials in the preparation 
of his case and is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the 
materials by other means. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
Seven documents contain all of the redacted material at issue, as the redacted material in the 
other eighteen documents is fully duplicated within these seven. Equisoft argues that attorney-
client privilege and the work product doctrine shield each of these documents from disclosure. 
Accordingly, the Court will analyze each of these documents in turn. 
 
A. Document 96 
 
Document 96 is a February 2010 string of e-mails between Mr. Michaud and Mr. O’Donnell 
regarding the February 8, 2010 demand letter.76 Equisoft produced the document to Mr. Keating 
but redacted two e-mails in the chain: a February 6, 2010 e-mail from Mr. Michaud to Mr. 
O’Donnell, and Mr. O’Donnell's February 7, 2010 response. 
 
																																																								
76 Neither Mr. Michaud nor Mr. O’Donnell are attorneys, and they are the only individuals copied on either 
of the redacted e-mails or any e-mails in the string. Unless otherwise indicated, the same is true for the 
other documents in question. However, each of the individuals in the senior management of the 
Company, as well as Mr. Synnott, have affirmed that Mr. Michaud “was responsible for communicating 
with Mr. Synnott on behalf of the company,” and “often relayed questions, information, comments, and 
advice” from Mr. Synnott to the control group. Because a document “need not be authored or addressed 
to an attorney in order to be properly withheld on attorney-client privilege grounds,” provided it “reflects 
confidential communications between client and counsel for the purposes of (1) providing legal services 
or (2) providing information to counsel to secure legal services,” the absence of an attorney copied on the 
e-mails in question does not necessarily defeat the assertion of the attorney client privilege. Also, as 
noted above, the Court is not persuaded that simply because Mr. Synnott is admitted to practice law only 
in foreign jurisdictions that he is not “a member of the bar of a court" for the purposes of the attorney-
client privilege and the work product doctrine. Therefore, the Court will treat Mr. Synnott as an attorney 
(which he, indeed, is) for the purposes of this analysis. 
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Mr. Michaud attests that the material redacted from his February 6, 2010 e-mail is “advice that 
he received from Mr. Synnott regarding the demand letters” to be sent to Mr. Keating and 
Capgemini. After careful in camera review of the redacted e-mail, the Court concludes that Mr. 
Michaud’s e-mail relayed Mr. Synnott’s legal advice and strategy regarding the demand letters 
to Mr. O'Donnell, and, accordingly, is privileged and may remain withheld except as redacted. 
To require disclosure of this e-mail would reveal client communications and legal advice from 
counsel.  
 
Mr. O’Donnell affirms that his February 7, 2010 e-mail “consists of his opinion regarding the 
legal advice from Mr. Synnott that Mr. Michaud relayed to him regarding the demand letters.” He 
further asserts generally, that he “often conveyed questions, information, and comments, to Mr. 
Michaud with the understanding that he would relay them to Mr. Synnott.” 
 
Unlike Mr. Michaud’s e-mail, the Court does not conclude that Mr. O’Donnell’s e-mail is a 
privileged communication. As an initial matter, without the disclosure of the underlying 
communication from Mr. Synnott via Mr. Michaud, Mr. O’Donnell’s e-mail does not contain any 
confidential information and does not divulge any legal advice from Mr. Synnott. Rather, it 
merely indicates Mr. O’Donnell’s agreement with the redacted advice of counsel communicated 
to him via Mr. Michaud. Additionally, although Mr. O’Donnell has indicated in a general sense 
that he had the “understanding” that Mr. Michaud would relay all of his comments to Mr. Synnott 
relating to Mr. Keating in the month of September, Equisoft has not offered evidence that this 
particular communication was made for the purpose of securing either an opinion of law, legal 
services, or assistance in a legal matter. 
 
Nevertheless, the work product doctrine shields Mr. O’Donnell’s e-mail from disclosure. 
Although it does not qualify as “core or opinion work product that encompasses the mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinion, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a 
party concerning the litigation which is generally afforded near absolute protection from 
discovery,” Mr. O’Donnell’s e-mail most certainly qualifies as a document prepared by a party 
“because of” or in anticipation of litigation. Moreover, Mr. Keating has made no claim of 
substantial need or undue hardship that would justify disclosure notwithstanding the work 
product claim. 
 
Accordingly, the Court finds that protection attaches to Mr. Michaud’s February 6, 2010 e-mail, 
and that the work product doctrine shields Mr. O’Donnell’s February 7, 2010 e-mail from 
disclosure. 
 
B. Document 202 
 
Document 202 is a September 2010 string of e-mails between Mr. Michaud and Mr. O’Donnell 
regarding revisions to a draft of Equisoft’s September 2010 letter. Equisoft produced the 
document to Mr. Keating but redacted two e-mails in the chain: a September 15, 2010 e-mail 
from Mr. Michaud to Mr. O’Donnell, and Mr. O’Donnell’s September 15, 2010 response. 
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Mr. Michaud attests that his e-mail “discloses requests that Mr. Romero and he made to Mr. 
Synnott regarding Ms. Sussman’s demand letter and Mr. Synnott’s response thereto.” Based 
upon the text of the e-mail, the Court discerns no particular “requests” Mr. Romero and Mr. 
Michaud made of Mr. Synnott. The redacted portion of Mr. Michaud’s e-mail merely reflects Mr. 
Michaud’s opinion about whether the draft letter incorporates his and Mr. Romero's 
communications to counsel. The e-mail does not divulge the communications themselves. 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the redacted portion of Mr. Michaud’s e-mail is not 
shielded by the attorney-client privilege. 
 
However, the work product doctrine does shield Mr. Michaud's e-mail from disclosure because it 
is a document prepared by a party in anticipation of litigation, and Mr. Keating has made no 
claim of substantial need or undue hardship that would justify disclosure. 
 
Regarding Mr. O’Donnell's redacted response, Mr. O’Donnell affirms that the redacted portion of 
his e-mail “consists of his comments regarding a draft that he reviewed of Mr. Synnott’s 
response to Ms. Sussman’s demand letter,” and that his intent was for Mr. Michaud to relay 
some or all of his comments to Mr. Synnott.” 
 
Here, Mr. O’Donnell’s statement that he intended for “some or all” of his comments to be 
relayed to Mr. Synnott is unhelpful in the Court's review because it offers no specifics as to 
which of his comments he intended for Mr. Michaud to forward to Mr. Synnott. However, the text 
of the redacted e-mail and the other e-mails on the chain make clear that Mr. O’Donnell 
intended his comments to be forwarded to Mr. Synnott. Indeed, in a 12:10 p.m. e-mail on 
September 15, 2010 in the chain, Mr. Michaud indicated to Mr. O’Donnell his intention “to give 
Mr. Synnott their feedback later today.” Mr. O’Donnell’s e-mail, a mere five hours later, was 
clearly sent with the intention that it be sent along to Mr. Synnott. 
 
However, even if the attorney-client privilege does not apply to Mr. O’Donnell's e-mail, the work 
product doctrine protects the redacted portion of Mr. Michaud’s e-mail from disclosure because 
it is a document prepared by a party in anticipation of litigation. Once again, Mr. Keating has 
made no claim of substantial need or undue hardship that would justify disclosure. 
 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the privilege attaches to the redacted portions of both Mr. 
Michaud’s and Mr. O'Donnell’s e-mails. 
 
C. Document 207 
 
Document 207 is a September 2010 string of e-mails between Mr. Michaud and Mr. O’Donnell 
with an attached draft letter from Mr. Synnott to Mr. Keating’s attorney. Equisoft produced the 
document to Mr. Keating but redacted a portion of Mr. Michaud's 11:39 a.m. e-mail on 
September 17, 2010, and the entirety of the attachment 
 
Mr. Michaud attests that the redacted portion of his September 17, 2010 e-mail is “advice he 
received from Mr. Synnott regarding the timing of his response to Ms. Sussman's demand 
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letter,” and that, consistent with his responsibilities, he relayed this information from Mr. Synnott 
to the other senior management, in this case, Mr. O’Donnell. After careful in camera review of 
the redacted portion of the e-mail, the Court concludes that Mr. Michaud’s e-mail relayed Mr. 
Synnott’s legal advice and strategy to Mr. O’Donnell regarding the demand letters. Accordingly, 
the document is privileged and may remain redacted. 
 
Turning to the attached draft letter, Mr. O’Donnell affirms that it “consists of his proposed 
revisions to a draft that he reviewed of Mr. Synnott’s response to Ms. Sussman’s demand 
letter,” and that “his intent was for Mr. Michaud to relay some or all of his revisions to Mr. 
Synnott.” 
 
First, the draft letter authored by Mr. Synnott is protected by the attorney-client privilege as 
“drafts of documents prepared by counsel are considered privileged if they were prepared or 
circulated for the purpose of giving or obtaining legal advice and contain information or 
comments not included in the final version.” Here, the draft document contains both information 
and comments not contained in the final version. 
 
Second, Mr. O’Donnell’s proposed revisions to the attached letter were clearly intended to be 
communicated to Mr. Synnott through Mr. Michaud for the purpose of securing either an opinion 
of law, legal services or assistance in the legal matter. Although Mr. O'Donnell's statement that 
he intended for “some or all” of his comments to be relayed to Mr. Synnott is unhelpful in the 
Court’s review, that is of no moment. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Mr. O’Donnell’s 
proposed revisions to Mr. Synnott’s draft are protected by the attorney-client privilege. 
 
Third, the attached letter as a whole is shielded from disclosure by the work product doctrine. 
The attachment was a draft document prepared by counsel in reasonable anticipation of 
litigation. That the draft was sent to Mr. O’Donnell through Mr. Michaud does not remove it from 
the protection of the work product doctrine. Regardless, Mr. Keating has not established a 
substantial need for the materials to prepare his case or undue hardship in obtaining the 
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. 
 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the privilege attaches to Mr. Michaud’s e-mail, and both the 
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine shields the attachment from disclosure. 
 
D. Document 215 
 
Document 215 is a September 2010 string of e-mails between Mr. Michaud and Mr. O’Donnell 
regarding revisions to a draft of Equisoft’s September 2010 letter responding to Mr. Keating’s 
attorney. The document includes eight e-mails, four of which contain redactions. 
 
Mr. Michaud’s 11:39 a.m. e-mail on September 17, 2010 is a duplicate of the redacted e-mail in 
Document 207. Accordingly, the Court concludes that this e-mail is privileged and may remain 
redacted for the same reasons as described above. 
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Mr. O’Donnell affirms that the redacted portion of his 10:04 a.m. e-mail on September 20, 2010 
“consists of his comments regarding a draft that he reviewed of Mr. Synnott’s response to Ms. 
Sussman’s demand letter,” and that “his intent was for Mr. Michaud to relay some or all of this 
information to Mr. Synnott.” 
 
After careful in camera review of the redacted portions of Mr. O’Donnell’s e-mail, the Court 
cannot conclude that Mr. O’Donnell's 10:04 a.m. e-mail is shielded from disclosure by the 
attorney-client privilege. As discussed above, Mr. O’Donnell’s statement that he intended for 
“some or all” of his comments to be relayed to Mr. Synnott is unhelpful in the Court’s review. 
The text of the e-mail and the chain as a whole does not indicate that Mr. O’Donnell intended 
Mr. Michaud to communicate his comments to Mr. Synnott for the purpose of securing either an 
opinion of law, legal services or assistance in a legal matter. If anything, as indicated by the 
unredacted portion of the e-mail, Mr. O’Donnell is soliciting a response from Mr. Michaud, as he 
noted, “Let me know what you think.” Thus, this communication is not protected by the attorney-
client privilege. 
 
Mr. Michaud attests that the redacted portion of his 10:11 a.m. e-mail on September 20, 2010 
“consists of his opinion regarding Mr. O’Donnell's comments on and proposed revisions to a 
draft of Mr. Synnott’s response to Ms. Sussman’s demand letter.” The redactions also “consist 
of his opinion regarding litigation threatened by Ms. Sussman in her demand letter and the 
effect Mr. Synnott’s would have on that threatened litigation.” 
 
Upon careful in camera review of Mr. Michaud'’ e-mail, the Court is not persuaded that the 
redacted portions of Mr. Michaud’s e-mail are shielded from disclosure by the attorney-client 
privilege. The redactions merely reflect Mr. Michaud’s own opinion about Mr. O’Donnell’s 
comments, and there is no evidence that Mr. Michaud intended this opinion to be communicated 
to Mr. Synnott. Also, the redacted portion does not divulge any communications between 
counsel and client. The Court is not persuaded that when one non-lawyer (Mr. Michaud) gives 
his opinion to a second non-lawyer (Mr. O’Donnell) about the second non-lawyer’s comments 
about a lawyer’s draft document, that the communication is protected under the attorney-client 
privilege. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the redacted portion of Mr. Michaud’s e-mail is 
not protected by the attorney-client privilege. 
 
Finally, Mr. O’Donnell attests that the redacted portion of his 10:15 a.m. e-mail on September 
20, 2010 “consists of his opinion regarding the litigation threatened by Ms. Sussman in her 
demand letter and the effect Mr. Synnott’s response would have on that threatened litigation,” 
and that “his intent was for Mr. Michaud to relay some or all of this information to Mr. Synnott.” 
 
Once again, Mr. O’Donnell’s statement that he intended for “some or all” of his comments to be 
relayed to Mr. Synnott is unhelpful in the Court’s review. Likewise, it does not appear from the 
text of his e-mail or the other e-mails on the chain that Mr. O’Donnell intended for the redacted 
portion of the communication to be communicated to Mr. Synnott for the purpose of securing 
either an opinion of law, legal services or assistance in a legal matter. Accordingly, the Court 
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concludes that the redacted portion of Mr. Michaud's e-mail is not protected by the attorney-
client privilege. 
 
Even though the attorney-client privilege does not apply to the redacted portions of these 
communications, the work product doctrine shields the redacted portions of this e-mail chain 
from disclosure. The redacted statements were committed to documents and were prepared by 
a party in anticipation of litigation. Mr. Keating has made no claim of substantial need or undue 
hardship that would justify disclosure. 
 
E. Document 226 
 
Document 226 is a September 2010 string of e-mails between Mr. Michaud and Mr. O’Donnell 
regarding revisions to a draft of Equisoft’s September 2010 letter responding to Mr. Keating's 
attorney. The document includes eight e-mails, six of which contain redactions. 
 
Mr. Michaud attests that his two redacted e-mails to Mr. O’Donnell on the e-mail string “consist 
of his opinion about Mr. O’Donnell's comments on a draft of Mr. Synnott’s response to Mr. 
Sussman’s demand letter.” Mr. O’Donnell affirms that his three redacted e-mails to Mr. Michaud 
and one redacted e-mail to himself on the e-mail string “consist of his comments regarding a 
draft that I reviewed of Mr. Synnott’s response to Mr. Sussman’s demand letter,” and that his 
“intent was for Mr. Michaud to relay some or all of his comments to Mr. Synnott.” 
 
The redacted information in Mr. O’Donnell's September 21, 2010 e-mails at 10:16 a.m., (2) 
10:21 a.m., and (3) 10:21:49 a.m. contain substantive revisions to Mr. Synnott’s draft letter and 
were clearly intended to be communicated to Mr. Synnott through Mr. Michaud for the purpose 
of securing either an opinion of law, legal services, or assistance in the legal matter. Indeed, in 
Mr. Michaud’s 8:49 p.m. e-mail of the previous day, he included a revised version of the letter 
he sent to Mr. Synnott, and told Mr. O’Donnell that the lawyer “will call me to discuss the 
changes.” Also, after providing all of his substantive changes, Mr. O’Donnell asked Mr. Michaud 
to “call him after he talks with the lawyer.” Accordingly, in light of the factual background and the 
content of the letters, it seems that Mr. O’Donnell intended the redacted portion of these e-mails 
to be communicated to Mr. Synnott for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. Thus, the Court 
concludes that these three e-mails are protected by the attorney-client privilege. 
 
The Court does not find, however, that the remaining redacted material in the e-mail string is 
protected by the attorney-client privilege. Regarding the redacted material in Mr. Michaud's 
September 21, 2010 e-mails at 10:49 a.m. and 1:31 p.m., as with Mr. Michaud's 10:11 a.m. e-
mail on September 20, 2010 from Document 215, the Court is not persuaded that Mr. Michaud 
providing his opinion to Mr. O’Donnell about Mr. O’Donnell’s comments about a lawyer’s draft 
document is protected under the attorney-client privilege. This is especially true, where, as here, 
the Court cannot discern what “opinion” about Mr. O’Donnell's comments, if any, Mr. Michaud is 
communicating. Mr. Michaud’s two e-mails in this string do not divulge anything about Mr. 
Synnott’s underlying communications in the draft letter, or anything about Mr. O’Donnell’s 
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comments about the letter. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the redacted portions of Mr. 
Michaud’s e-mails are not shielded by the attorney-client privilege. 
 
However, the work product doctrine does shield the redacted portions of Mr. Michaud’s e-mails 
from disclosure. The redacted statements clearly qualify as a document prepared by a party in 
anticipation of litigation. Mr. Keating has made no claim of substantial need or undue hardship 
that would justify disclosure. 
 
Finally, the redacted information in Mr. O’Donnell’s 10:53 a.m. e-mail on September 21, 2010 is 
not protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege because there is no indication that 
he intended his redacted statements to be communicated to Mr. Synnott and the statement 
does not request an opinion of law, legal services, or assistance in a legal matter. However, this 
document is entitled in work product protection for the same reasons as Mr. Michaud’s e-mails. 
 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine 
shields the redacted portions of these documents from disclosure. 
 
F. Document 240 
 
Document 240 is a September 2010 string of e-mails between or among Mr. Michaud, Mr. 
O’Donnell, and Mr. Synnott regarding revisions to Equisoft’s September 2010 draft letter to Mr. 
Keating’s attorney. Equisoft produced the document to Mr. Keating but redacted Mr. Synnott’s 
10:30 a.m. e-mail on September 22, 2010 to Mr. Michaud, and Mr. Michaud’s 12:15 p.m. e-mail 
to Mr. O'Donnell. 
 
Mr. Michaud has affirmed that Mr. Synnott’s letter to him “consists of Mr. Synnott’s comments 
regarding a draft of his response to Ms. Sussman’s demand letter,” and his e-mail to Mr. 
O'Donnell “consists of his comments regarding that draft of Mr. Synnott’s letter and the timing of 
the sending of the final version.” 
 
Mr. Synnott’s e-mail to Mr. Michaud is protected by the attorney-client privilege because it is a 
communication from an attorney to a client “relating to a fact of which the attorney was informed 
by his client for the purpose of securing either an opinion of law, legal services or assistance in 
a legal matter.” 
 
The redacted portion of Mr. Michaud’s e-mail to Mr. O’Donnell is not protected by the attorney 
client privilege, however, because, as noted above, the personal opinion or comments from a 
non-lawyer to another non-lawyer about communications from a lawyer are not protected under 
the attorney client privilege. Rather, only the communications to or from the attorney are 
protected. Accordingly, Mr. Michaud’s e-mail is not shielded from disclosure by the attorney-
client privilege. 
 
However, the work product doctrine does shield the redacted portions of Mr. Michaud’s e-mail 
from disclosure. The redacted statements are contained in a document prepared by a party in 
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anticipation of litigation. Mr. Keating has made no claim of substantial need or undue hardship 
that would justify disclosure. 
 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the privilege attaches to Mr. Synnott's e-mail, and the work 
product doctrine shields Mr. Michaud’s e-mail from disclosure. 
 
G. Document 253 
 
Document 253 is a November 17, 2010 Executive Summary presented to the Equisoft Board of 
Directors, the last paragraph of which reports on Ms. Sussman’s September 2, 2010 demand 
letter and provides Mr. Synnott’s assessment regarding the probability of litigation. Equisoft has 
withheld the entire document — the final paragraph on work product and attorney-client 
privilege grounds and the rest because it is irrelevant to the subject lawsuit. 
 
As an initial matter, the Court agrees that all but the last paragraph of this document is 
completely irrelevant to the subject lawsuit. Accordingly, it need not be disclosed. 
 
With respect to the one relevant paragraph of the document, Mr. Michaud asserts that “along 
with Mr. Romero and Equisoft Finance Director Aurora Ciugulan,” he prepared the document for 
Equisoft’s seven board of directors, Equisoft’s Chief Information Officer Nicolas Ledoux, 
Equisoft Lead Architect Stephane Boutros, and Equisoft VP for Financial Products Jonathan 
Georges. Mr. Michaud asserts that “the final paragraph recounts Mr. Synnott’s assessment of 
the probability of Mr. Keating commencing litigation against Equisoft.” 
 
The evidence submitted to the Court is insufficient to establish that the attorney-client privilege 
protects this document from disclosure. First, Mr. Michaud and Mr. Romero have attested that 
beyond the named individuals, they are “not aware of any further distribution of the document.” 
Indeed, Equisoft has not and cannot argue that Document 253 was seen only by the individuals 
discussed above. Regardless, even if the document was limited to these individuals, many of 
them were outside the group of senior management who Equisoft has indicated was responsible 
for making strategic decisions related to the legal issues involving Mr. Keating. 
 
Moreover, contrary to Mr. Michaud’s assertions, only the final sentence of the Executive 
Summary — rather than the final paragraph — recounts Mr. Synnott’s assessment of the 
probability of Mr. Keating commencing litigation against Equisoft. The remainder of the 
paragraph merely recounts underlying facts that are not shielded by the attorney-client privilege. 
Nothing in the Executive Summary or in any of the supporting affidavits suggests that Mr. 
Synnott drafted these underlying facts. In fact, Mr. Michaud attested that he, not Mr. Synnott, 
prepared the final paragraph of the document. Only the last sentence offers any assessment by 
Mr. Synnott of the probability of litigation. Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that Document 
253 is fully shielded from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. 
 
Nor can the Court conclude that the work product doctrine shields this document from 
disclosure. Mr. Michaud asserts that “he prepared the final paragraph because of potential 
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litigation with Mr. Keating,” but a document “falls within the scope of the work-product doctrine 
only if it was prepared primarily in anticipation of future litigation.” “Documents created in the 
ordinary course of business, even if useful in subsequent litigation, are not protected by the 
work-product doctrine.” Here, the Court cannot conclude that the executive summary was 
prepared primarily in anticipation of litigation. To the contrary, the purpose of the document was 
to update the board of directors on various issues facing the company, including the demand 
letter sent by Mr. Keating. 
 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the last paragraph of Document 253 must be disclosed, but the 
remainder of the document may remain redacted on the basis of attorney-client privilege. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In light of the foregoing, the twenty-four documents that Equisoft has redacted on the basis of 
attorney client privilege and/or the work product doctrine may remain redacted as presented to 
the Court in Equisoft's March 23, 2012 submission, but Equisoft shall produce Document 253 in 
redacted form as discussed above. 
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5.5: Corporate Privilege 
 
When an attorney represents an organization, the default position of the law is that the client is 
the organization, and not its agents. However, an attorney representing an organization can 
form an attorney-client relationship with one or more agents of the organization, in addition to or 
instead of the organization itself, by explicit agreement. For example, an attorney could 
represent a particular agent of the organization, or a component of the organization, like its 
board of directors. 
 
When an attorney-client relationship exists between an attorney and an organization, the 
attorney-client privilege may protect communications between the attorney and the organization. 
As a practical matter, the privilege may protect communications between the attorney and 
certain agents of the organization. Courts must determine whether the privilege applies to 
communications with particular agents and about particular subjects. 
 
When an attorney represents an organization, the attorney-client privilege belongs to the 
organization, not its agents. Accordingly, only the organization can waive the privilege. While an 
agent of the organization must effectuate the waiver, agents may waive the privilege only for the 
benefit of the organization, not for their own personal benefit or the benefit of any third-party. In 
addition, the organization may waive the privilege without the consent of the agent or agents 
who participated in the communication. 
 
Of course, the agents of an organization may form an attorney-client relationship with their own 
attorney, in which case their communications with their attorney may also be protected by the 
attorney-client privilege. But the agents of an organization may not personally claim the privilege 
in relation to communications they made as agents of the organization. 
 
While the attorney-client privilege may protect communications between an attorney 
representing an organization and the agents of that organization, it does not necessarily protect 
all such communications, only those for the purpose of providing legal advice. And it does not 
necessarily protect communications with all agents. A small minority of states apply the “control 
group” test, which provides that the privilege only protects communications with the 
management of the organization. But most states and the federal courts apply the “Upjohn” test 
adopted by the Supreme Court, under which the privilege can protect communications with any 
agent, so long as the communication was for the purpose of providing legal advice, including the 
collection of information for the purpose of providing legal advice. 
 
The “Upjohn” Test for Corporate Privilege 
 
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) 
 
Summary: The Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privilege applies to an 
organization’s attorney’s communications with its agents: 1) when a communication is 
made to the organization’s counsel that is acting in their capacity as counsel (and not as 
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business consultants, for example); 2) at the direction of management for the purpose of 
securing legal advice from counsel; 3) concerning a subject within the scope of 
employment; and 4) when the agent knows that the purpose of the communication is for 
the organization to procure legal advice. 
 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
We granted certiorari in this case to address important questions concerning the scope of the 
attorney-client privilege in the corporate context and the applicability of the work-product 
doctrine in proceedings to enforce tax summonses. With respect to the privilege question the 
parties and various amici have described our task as one of choosing between two “tests” which 
have gained adherents in the courts of appeals. We are acutely aware, however, that we sit to 
decide concrete cases and not abstract propositions of law. We decline to lay down a broad rule 
or series of rules to govern all conceivable future questions in this area, even were we able to 
do so. We can and do, however, conclude that the attorney-client privilege protects the 
communications involved in this case from compelled disclosure and that the work-product 
doctrine does apply in tax summons enforcement proceedings. 
 
I 
 
Petitioner Upjohn Co. manufactures and sells pharmaceuticals here and abroad. In January 
1976 independent accountants conducting an audit of one of Upjohn’s foreign subsidiaries 
discovered that the subsidiary made payments to or for the benefit of foreign government 
officials in order to secure government business. The accountants so informed petitioner Mr. 
Gerard Thomas, Upjohn’s Vice President, Secretary, and General Counsel. Thomas is a 
member of the Michigan and New York Bars, and has been Upjohn’s General Counsel for 20 
years. He consulted with outside counsel and R. T. Parfet, Jr., Upjohn’s Chairman of the Board. 
It was decided that the company would conduct an internal investigation of what were termed 
“questionable payments.” As part of this investigation the attorneys prepared a letter containing 
a questionnaire which was sent to “All Foreign General and Area Managers” over the 
Chairman’s signature. The letter began by noting recent disclosures that several American 
companies made “possibly illegal” payments to foreign government officials and emphasized 
that the management needed full information concerning any such payments made by Upjohn. 
The letter indicated that the Chairman had asked Thomas, identified as “the company's General 
Counsel,” “to conduct an investigation for the purpose of determining the nature and magnitude 
of any payments made by the Upjohn Company or any of its subsidiaries to any employee or 
official of a foreign government.” The questionnaire sought detailed information concerning such 
payments. Managers were instructed to treat the investigation as “highly confidential” and not to 
discuss it with anyone other than Upjohn employees who might be helpful in providing the 
requested information. Responses were to be sent directly to Thomas. Thomas and outside 
counsel also interviewed the recipients of the questionnaire and some 33 other Upjohn officers 
or employees as part of the investigation. 
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On March 26, 1976, the company voluntarily submitted a preliminary report to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission on Form 8-K disclosing certain questionable payments. A copy of the 
report was simultaneously submitted to the Internal Revenue Service, which immediately began 
an investigation to determine the tax consequences of the payments. Special agents conducting 
the investigation were given lists by Upjohn of all those interviewed and all who had responded 
to the questionnaire. On November 23, 1976, the Service issued a summons demanding 
production of: 
 
All files relative to the investigation conducted under the supervision of Gerard Thomas 
to identify payments to employees of foreign governments and any political contributions 
made by the Upjohn Company or any of its affiliates since January 1, 1971 and to 
determine whether any funds of the Upjohn Company had been improperly accounted 
for on the corporate books during the same period. 
 
The records should include but not be limited to written questionnaires sent to managers 
of the Upjohn Company’s foreign affiliates, and memorandums or notes of the interviews 
conducted in the United States and abroad with officers and employees of the Upjohn 
Company and its subsidiaries. 
 
The company declined to produce the documents specified in the second paragraph on the 
grounds that they were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and constituted 
the work product of attorneys prepared in anticipation of litigation. On August 31, 1977, the 
United States filed a petition seeking enforcement of the summons in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Michigan. That court adopted the recommendation of a 
Magistrate who concluded that the summons should be enforced. Petitioners appealed to the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit which rejected the Magistrate's finding of a waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege, but agreed that the privilege did not apply “to the extent that the 
communications were made by officers and agents not responsible for directing Upjohn’s 
actions in response to legal advice for the simple reason that the communications were not the 
‘client’s.’” The court reasoned that accepting petitioners’ claim for a broader application of the 
privilege would encourage upper-echelon management to ignore unpleasant facts and create 
too broad a “zone of silence.” Noting that Upjohn’s counsel had interviewed officials such as the 
Chairman and President, the Court of Appeals remanded to the District Court so that a 
determination of who was within the “control group” could be made. In a concluding footnote the 
court stated that the work-product doctrine “is not applicable to administrative summonses.” 
 
II 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that “the privilege of a witness shall be governed by the 
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in 
light of reason and experience.” The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for 
confidential communications known to the common law. Its purpose is to encourage full and 
frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public 
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that 
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sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends 
upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the client. “The lawyer-client privilege rests on the 
need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking 
representation if the professional mission is to be carried out.” The purpose of the privilege is “to 
encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys.” This rationale for the privilege has 
long been recognized by the Court. Admittedly complications in the application of the privilege 
arise when the client is a corporation, which in theory is an artificial creature of the law, and not 
an individual; but this Court has assumed that the privilege applies when the client is a 
corporation, and the Government does not contest the general proposition. 
 
The Court of Appeals, however, considered the application of the privilege in the corporate 
context to present a “different problem,” since the client was an inanimate entity and “only the 
senior management, guiding and integrating the several operations, can be said to possess an 
identity analogous to the corporation as a whole.” 
 
Such a view, we think, overlooks the fact that the privilege exists to protect not only the giving of 
professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to 
enable him to give sound and informed advice. The first step in the resolution of any legal 
problem is ascertaining the factual background and sifting through the facts with an eye to the 
legally relevant. See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 4-1: 
 
A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for 
his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in the 
exercise of his independent professional judgment to separate the relevant and 
important from the irrelevant and unimportant. The observance of the ethical obligation 
of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates 
the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also 
encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance. 
 
In the case of the individual client the provider of information and the person who acts on the 
lawyer’s advice are one and the same. In the corporate context, however, it will frequently be 
employees beyond the control group as defined by the court below—”officers and agents 
responsible for directing the company’s actions in response to legal advice” —who will possess 
the information needed by the corporation's lawyers. Middle-level—and indeed lower-level—
employees can, by actions within the scope of their employment, embroil the corporation in 
serious legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these employees would have the relevant 
information needed by corporate counsel if he is adequately to advise the client with respect to 
such actual or potential difficulties. 
 
In a corporation, it may be necessary to glean information relevant to a legal problem 
from middle management or non-management personnel as well as from top executives. 
The attorney dealing with a complex legal problem “is thus faced with a ‘Hobson's 
choice’. If he interviews employees not having ‘the very highest authority’, their 
communications to him will not be privileged. If, on the other hand, he interviews only 
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those employees with ‘the very highest authority’, he may find it extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine what happened.” 
 
The control group test adopted by the court below thus frustrates the very purpose of the 
privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant information by employees of the client 
to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client corporation. The attorney’s advice will 
also frequently be more significant to noncontrol group members than to those who officially 
sanction the advice, and the control group test makes it more difficult to convey full and frank 
legal advice to the employees who will put into effect the client corporation’s policy. 
 
The narrow scope given the attorney-client privilege by the court below not only makes it difficult 
for corporate attorneys to formulate sound advice when their client is faced with a specific legal 
problem but also threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their 
client's compliance with the law. In light of the vast and complicated array of regulatory 
legislation confronting the modern corporation, corporations, unlike most individuals, “constantly 
go to lawyers to find out how to obey the law,” particularly since compliance with the law in this 
area is hardly an instinctive matter. The test adopted by the court below is difficult to apply in 
practice, though no abstractly formulated and unvarying “test” will necessarily enable courts to 
decide questions such as this with mathematical precision. But if the purpose of the attorney-
client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree 
of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which 
purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than 
no privilege at all. The very terms of the test adopted by the court below suggest the 
unpredictability of its application. The test restricts the availability of the privilege to those 
officers who play a “substantial role” in deciding and directing a corporation's legal response. 
Disparate decisions in cases applying this test illustrate its unpredictability. 
 
The communications at issue were made by Upjohn employees to counsel for Upjohn acting as 
such, at the direction of corporate superiors in order to secure legal advice from counsel. As the 
Magistrate found, “Mr. Thomas consulted with the Chairman of the Board and outside counsel 
and thereafter conducted a factual investigation to determine the nature and extent of the 
questionable payments and to be in a position to give legal advice to the company with respect 
to the payments.” Information, not available from upper-echelon management, was needed to 
supply a basis for legal advice concerning compliance with securities and tax laws, foreign laws, 
currency regulations, duties to shareholders, and potential litigation in each of these areas. The 
communications concerned matters within the scope of the employees’ corporate duties, and 
the employees themselves were sufficiently aware that they were being questioned in order that 
the corporation could obtain legal advice. The questionnaire identified Thomas as “the 
company's General Counsel” and referred in its opening sentence to the possible illegality of 
payments such as the ones on which information was sought. A statement of policy 
accompanying the questionnaire clearly indicated the legal implications of the investigation. The 
policy statement was issued “in order that there be no uncertainty in the future as to the policy 
with respect to the practices which are the subject of this investigation.” It began “Upjohn will 
comply with all laws and regulations,” and stated that commissions or payments “will not be 
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used as a subterfuge for bribes or illegal payments” and that all payments must be “proper and 
legal.” Any future agreements with foreign distributors or agents were to be approved “by a 
company attorney” and any questions concerning the policy were to be referred “to the 
company’s General Counsel.” This statement was issued to Upjohn employees worldwide, so 
that even those interviewees not receiving a questionnaire were aware of the legal implications 
of the interviews. Pursuant to explicit instructions from the Chairman of the Board, the 
communications were considered “highly confidential” when made, and have been kept 
confidential by the company. Consistent with the underlying purposes of the attorney-client 
privilege, these communications must be protected against compelled disclosure. 
 
The Court of Appeals declined to extend the attorney-client privilege beyond the limits of the 
control group test for fear that doing so would entail severe burdens on discovery and create a 
broad “zone of silence” over corporate affairs. Application of the attorney-client privilege to 
communications such as those involved here, however, puts the adversary in no worse position 
than if the communications had never taken place. The privilege only protects disclosure of 
communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who 
communicated with the attorney: 
 
The protection of the privilege extends only to communications and not to facts. A fact is 
one thing and a communication concerning that fact is an entirely different thing. The 
client cannot be compelled to answer the question, “What did you say or write to the 
attorney?” but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely 
because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communications to his 
attorney. 
 
Here the Government was free to question the employees who communicated with Thomas and 
outside counsel. Upjohn has provided the IRS with a list of such employees, and the IRS has 
already interviewed some 25 of them. While it would probably be more convenient for the 
Government to secure the results of petitioner's internal investigation by simply subpoenaing the 
questionnaires and notes taken by petitioner's attorneys, such considerations of convenience do 
not overcome the policies served by the attorney-client privilege. As Justice Jackson noted in 
his concurring opinion in Hickman v. Taylor: “Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned 
profession to perform its functions on wits borrowed from the adversary.” 
 
Needless to say, we decide only the case before us, and do not undertake to draft a set of rules 
which should govern challenges to investigatory subpoenas. Any such approach would violate 
the spirit of Federal Rule of Evidence 501. While such a “case-by-case” basis may to some 
slight extent undermine desirable certainty in the boundaries of the attorney-client privilege, it 
obeys the spirit of the Rules. At the same time we conclude that the narrow “control group test” 
sanctioned by the Court of Appeals in this case cannot, consistent with “the principles of the 
common law as interpreted in the light of reason and experience,” govern the development of 
the law in this area. 
 
Questions: 
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1. Which agents of an organization can be parties to privileged communications? 
2. When is a communication with an agent of an organization not privileged? 
3. Is the Upjohn test for corporate privilege too narrow, too broad, or just right? 
 
Matter of Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Manag., 805 F. 2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986) 
 
Summary:  
 
SEITZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal arises out of two related proceedings currently before the district court: the Chapter 
11 reorganization of Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corporation (AMC) and the 
liquidation of Bevill, Bresler & Schulman, Inc. (BBS) under the Security Investor Protection Act 
(SIPA). Intervenors John D. Rooney and Robert L. Bevill, two principals of the corporations, 
appeal the order of the district court directing Gilbert Schulman, president of AMC, and Hellring, 
Lindeman, Goldstein, Siegal & Greenberg, counsel for BBS, to respond to questions posed in 
depositions by the trustees for AMC and BBS. The order permits the trustees to discover the 
substance of certain meetings that took place between the law firm and the principals of the 
corporations before the Chapter 11 petition was filed. Because Rooney and Bevill allege that the 
district court's order violates their attorney-client privilege, we have jurisdiction. 
 
I. 
 
We turn first to the facts as narrated by the district court. Gilbert Schulman first became aware 
that AMC was in financial difficulties on March 19, 1985, when Robert Bevill telephoned him in 
Greece. After talking again with Bevill on the following day, Schulman flew back to the United 
States. According to Schulman, he was unable to obtain any information about AMC until he 
consulted with Hellring, Lindeman on March 25, 1985. 
 
Between March 25, 1985 and April 7, 1985, Schulman met with Hellring, Lindeman almost daily. 
Other principals of BBS and AMC, including Bevill and Rooney, were present at some of these 
meetings. 
 
When Schulman first met with Hellring, Lindeman, he explained that he was seeking both 
personal and corporate legal advice. In his deposition, he testified that with regard to the March 
26th meeting: 
 
I stated to Mr. Hellring and Mr. Goldstein that I had arranged for Mr. Bevill to come down 
and meet them and at that point I had said to them that “Possibly you will represent me, 
possibly you will represent Mr. Bevill and me, possibly you will represent the firms,” but I 
was definitely seeking personal legal advice at that time. 
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On March 31, 1985, Hellring, Lindeman was retained to represent BBS. In addition, it continued 
to consider whether it would represent the principals of BBS. On April 4, 1985, Hellring, 
Lindeman informed the principals that they should obtain separate counsel. 
 
On April 7, 1985, AMC filed a petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
A trustee was subsequently appointed by the district court. On April 8, the SEC filed a civil 
complaint in the district court alleging fraud against AMC, BBS, and the principals of the 
corporations, including appellants. In addition, the SEC began a criminal investigation, and there 
is currently a grand jury investigation into the affairs of the two corporations. On May 8, the 
district court placed BBS under a SIPA receivership and the SIPA trustee commenced a 
liquidation proceeding. 
 
On May 13, 1985, the counsel for the AMC trustee began to depose Schulman. By the consent 
of the parties, this deposition was conducted as a joint proceeding in the AMC Chapter 11 
proceeding, the BBS SIPA liquidation, and the SEC proceeding. The AMC trustee sought to 
depose Schulman as to the substantive communications between Hellring, Lindeman and the 
principals, and indicated that the trustee had waived AMC's attorney-client privilege. Schulman's 
counsel instructed Schulman not to answer the questions. Counsel for the other principals also 
instructed Schulman not to respond, asserting the existence of a joint defense privilege. 
 
On May 21, 1985, the deposition of Schulman resumed, and the AMC trustee began 
questioning Schulman about the circumstances surrounding the meetings with counsel, 
including the dates of the meetings, who was present, and whether the discussions involved 
personal or corporate matters. Once again, counsel for the other principals objected on the 
grounds of a joint defense privilege. 
 
The AMC and BBS trustees and the SEC subsequently filed motions with the district court for an 
order directing the principals and Hellring Lindeman to respond to a series of questions as to the 
circumstances surrounding the meetings. In opposition to these motions, Rooney filed an 
unsworn affirmation with the district court stating that he met with counsel for personal advice 
and with the expectation that the communications would be confidential. He further stated that 
he would not have met with counsel without the assurance of confidentiality. 
 
After a hearing, the district court ordered Bevill, Rooney, Schulman, Robert Levine, another 
principal, and Hellring, Lindeman to answer written interrogatories about the scope of counsel's 
representation. Bevill and Rooney refused to answer the interrogatories on the ground of the 
fifth amendment. Schulman stated that he attended all meetings except the March 31st meeting 
for the purpose of securing personal legal advice. Levine concurred in this statement, and also 
stated that the participants in the meetings were engaged in a joint defense effort. Schulman, 
however, has asserted in a letter to the BBS trustee from his counsel that he was never part of a 
joint defense. 
 
Hellring, Lindeman confirmed in their answers to the interrogatories that the principals had 
sought both personal and corporate legal advice at the meetings that occurred from March 25th 
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through April 4th. In a letter to the BBS trustee, it further explained its understanding of its 
representation: 
 
Our firm was initially consulted on Monday, March 25, 1985. On that date and during the 
week of March 25, 1985 we were consulted by officials of Bevill, Bresler & Schulman, 
Inc. on a confidential and privileged basis for the purpose of personal representation as 
well as corporate representation of Bevill, Bresler & Schulman, Inc. and other 
companies. 
 
We were not retained until Sunday, March 31, 1985 on which date we agreed to 
represent Bevill, Bresler & Schulman, the broker/dealer and its affiliated broker/dealer 
companies and to consider further the matter of representation for the individuals and 
other corporations. 
 
During the next few days we continued to be consulted by officials of Bevill, Bresler & 
Schulman, Inc. on a confidential and privileged basis for purposes of personal 
representation and to consider the need therefor. 
 
Within a few days of March 31, 1985 we advised each individual official to retain 
separate and individual counsel. 
 
The trustees, relying on their waiver of the corporations’ attorney-client privileges, moved for an 
order directing Schulman and Hellring, Lindeman to testify about the substance of the meetings 
insofar as they related to the affairs of the two corporations and Schulman's activities as a 
director or officer of the corporations. Bevill and Rooney opposed the motions based on their 
attorney-client privileges and a joint defense privilege. 
 
After hearing argument from counsel on the trustees' motions, the district court, in an oral 
opinion, granted the motions in part. The court held that a corporate officer must satisfy the 
following test to assert a personal claim of attorney-client privilege as to communications with 
corporate counsel: 
 
First, they must show they approached counsel for the purpose of seeking legal advice. 
Second, they must demonstrate that when they approached counsel they made it clear 
that they were seeking legal advice in their individual rather than in their representative 
capacities. Third, they must demonstrate that the counsel saw fit to communicate with 
them in their individual capacities, knowing that a possible conflict could arise. Fourth, 
they must prove that their conversations with counsel were confidential. And, fifth, they 
must show that the substance of their conversations with counsel did not concern 
matters within the company or the general affairs of the company. 
 
The court rejected Rooney’s claim that he consulted with counsel for the sole or primary 
purpose of securing personal legal advice, finding such a claim unsupported by the evidence. It 
then turned to the principals’ contention that the corporate communications were 
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indistinguishable from those that related to their personal legal problems, and that, therefore, all 
communications are privileged. The court agreed with Bevill and Rooney insofar as the trustees 
sought to obtain information about meetings prior to March 31st when Hellring, Lindeman 
agreed to represent BBS. The court thus held that these communications were privileged. The 
trustees do not appeal this ruling. 
 
It, however, rejected the appellants claim of a blanket privilege for those meetings that occurred 
after March 31st. It found that once Hellring, Lindeman agreed to represent BBS, it was to BBS 
that the lawyers owed any duty. Further, based on counsel’s knowledge of BBS and AMC when 
the bankruptcy petition was filed, the court found that “it is obvious that immediately after March 
31, 1985, Hellring, Lindeman turned its attention to the affairs of its corporate clients.” Finally, 
the court stated that the only personal advice that had been identified was that relating to 
separate representation. 
 
The court also rejected Bevill’s and Rooney’s claim of a joint defense privilege, finding that they 
did not bear their burden of showing that a joint defense in fact existed. 
 
The district court ordered Hellring, Lindeman to testify as to all communications about the 
corporations and the roles and functions of the officers that took place after the law firm agreed 
to represent BBS. It further held that no questions could be asked concerning separate 
representation or the officers' potential personal liabilities, unless the communications also 
related to the business and assets of the corporations or the roles of the principals in the 
corporations. Finally, the court stated that Hellring, Lindeman could submit any communications 
it was doubtful about to the court for in camera inspection. This appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
Bevill and Rooney claim that the district court’s order directing disclosure of the substantive 
communications with counsel between March 31st and April 4th violates their attorney-client 
privilege. In addition, Bevill claims that such disclosure is barred by the joint defense privilege. 
 
Privileges in federal court are “governed by the principles of common law as they may be 
interpreted in light of reason and experience.” Whether there is a valid claim of privilege is 
decided on a case-by-case basis. Although the applicability of a privilege is a factual question, 
determining the scope of a privilege is a question of law, subject to plenary review. 
 
A. 
 
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege “is to encourage full and frank communication 
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in observance 
of the law and administration of justice.” This privilege applies to corporations as well as 
individuals. As the Supreme Court has recognized, however, “the administration of the privilege 
in the case of corporations presents special problems. As an inanimate entity, a corporation 
must act through agents.” 
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In this case, we address the relationship between a corporation’s waiver of its privilege and the 
individual directors’ assertion of a claim of personal attorney-client privilege with respect to 
counsel consulted on both a personal and corporate basis after the counsel has been retained 
by the corporation. The parties agree that the trustees had the power to waive the corporations’ 
attorney-client privilege regarding prebankruptcy communications with counsel. They also agree 
that the directors or officers may have an individual attorney-client privilege apart from those of 
the corporations. The dispute centers on whether the individuals’ assertion of an attorney-client 
privilege can prevent the disclosure of corporate communications with corporate counsel when 
the corporation’s privilege has been waived. 
 
As we understand appellants’ position, they claim that the district court erred as a matter of law 
in holding that communications related to their role as corporate officers were not privileged. 
They contend that because their personal legal problems were inextricably intertwined with 
those of the corporation, disclosure of discussions of corporate matters would eviscerate their 
personal privileges. They therefore assert that a blanket privilege should be applied to all 
communications with counsel between March 31st and April 4th. 
 
The appellants’ argument, however, does not pay sufficient attention to the fact that under 
existing law, any privilege that exists as to a corporate officer’s role and functions within a 
corporation belongs to the corporation, not the officer. Because a corporation can act only 
through its agents, a corporation’s privilege consists of communications by corporate officials 
about corporate matters and their actions in the corporation. A corporate official thus may not 
prevent a corporation from waiving its privilege arising from discussions with corporate counsel 
about corporate matters. 
 
The two decisions cited by appellants, In re Citibank v. Andros and Diversified Industries, Inc. v. 
Meredith, do not support their position that they may assert their personal privilege over the 
corporation's waiver with regard to corporate matters. Rather, these two cases simply recognize 
that an individual officer may have an individual claim of attorney-client privilege with regard to 
communications with corporate counsel. 
 
Moreover, we find that appellants' position is contrary to the public policies identified by the 
Supreme Court. The Weintraub Court found that permitting a bankrupt corporations’ 
management to assert the corporation's privilege against the bankruptcy trustee would defeat 
the Bankruptcy Code’s goal of uncovering insider fraud. To provide a blanket privilege regarding 
all discussions of corporate matters on the basis of an assertion of personal privileges by the 
officers would prevent the trustee from investigating possible misconduct by the officers and 
permit the officers to “use the privilege as a shield against the trustee’s efforts.” 
 
The test adopted by the district court does not invade the personal privilege of the officers 
because they do not have an attorney-client privilege with regard to communications made in 
their role as corporate officials. Moreover, the district court has not precluded the possibility that 
appellants may assert their personal privilege as to matters not related to their role as officers of 
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the corporation. First, the order directs that no questions could be asked regarding the need for 
separate representation. Second, the court allowed for the possibility that appellants could 
demonstrate that some of the communications after March 31st were personal and protected 
communications relating to the principals’ personal liabilities, except insofar as they were related 
to their role as corporate officers. Finally, the district court held that it would review in camera 
any communication over which there was a question whether it was personal or corporate in 
nature. 
 
In light of the foregoing analysis, we find that that the district court’s order properly defined the 
extent to which the principals were entitled to bar discovery of communications with counsel 
based on their individual attorney-client privileges. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Under the commonly used Bevill standard, agents of an organization seeking to prove 
either a joint or separate attorney-client relationship with the organization’s attorney must 
establish that: 1) the employee approached the corporation’s attorney for legal advice; 2) 
the employee made it clear that the request had to do with matters that arose in his or 
her individual capacity; 3) the attorney understood this request and advised on the 
matter even though there was a potential for conflict; 4) these communications were 
confidential; and 5) the subject matter of the communication did not concern a more 
general corporate matter. How frequently do you think agents will be able to satisfy 
these criteria? 
 
The “Need to Know” Standard 
 
Summary: 
 
FTC v. GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F. 3d 141 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
 
GINSBURG, Chief Judge: 
 
In the course of investigating whether a manufacturer of drugs listed its patents properly in the 
compilation maintained by the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Trade Commission 
issued a subpoena directing the company to produce documents relating to a particular drug. 
When the company resisted, claiming the attorney-client privilege shields the documents, the 
Commission repaired to the district court, which enforced the subpoena. We reverse the 
decision of the district court because the court both relied upon an argument to which the 
company had no opportunity to respond and ruled erroneously that, by failing to keep 
confidential the contents of the documents, the company had waived the attorney-client 
privilege. 
 
I. Background 
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GlaxoSmithKline manufactures paroxteine hydrochloride hemihydrate under the brand name 
Paxil, the annual sales of which in the United States exceed $1 billion. Several companies have 
applied to the Food and Drug Administration for permission to sell generic versions of Paxil 
when GSK’s patents expire. The Federal Trade Commission is investigating whether GSK, in an 
attempt to prevent or delay competition from generic versions of Paxil, has abused the process 
for listing its patents in the FDA’s compilation of “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic 
Evaluations.” 
 
The Commission issued a subpoena directing GSK to produce two types of documents. First, 
the Commission sought all documents concerning Paxil that the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois had directed GSK to disclose when GSK had sued two 
manufacturers of generic pharmaceuticals for infringement of its patents — the so-called 
Chicago documents. Second, the Commission wanted all “documents related to the 
manufacturing and marketing of Paxil, the listing and use of any patents regarding Paxil, and 
any filings with the FDA regarding Paxil.” GSK and the Commission resolved their differences 
over the inclusion or exclusion of thousands of documents, but because GSK declined to 
produce hundreds of others — primarily on the ground that they were shielded by the attorney-
client privilege — the Commission petitioned the district court to enforce the subpoena. 
 
The parties then agreed upon a procedure for presenting their positions to the district court. 
First, each would submit its contentions about the Chicago documents. If the court compelled 
GSK to produce those documents, then the parties would contest the second category of 
documents as follows. The Commission would “identify for GSK every responsive (and allegedly 
privileged) document that the Commission sought to have produced and the reason(s) why 
each privilege claim was invalid." GSK would then either produce the document or list it in a 
“privilege log identifying any documents as to which it continued to assert privilege.” 
Accordingly, only after the Commission had informed GSK of its objections to the Company's 
claims of privilege would the parties seek judicial resolution. At that final stage the court would 
either call for oral argument or resolve summarily “any issues submitted to it in connection with 
the FTC’s enforcement petition.” 
 
The district court did enforce the subpoena with respect to the Chicago documents. The parties 
then resolved through negotiation their disputes about the disclosure of hundreds more 
documents, leaving unresolved the status of only 91. GSK asserted that all 91 documents were 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and that 34 of them were protected also by the 
privilege for attorney work product. The Commission told GSK it considered the assertions of 
privilege invalid for two reasons: (1) GSK had forfeited its claim to confidentiality by 
disseminating all 91 documents widely both within GSK and to consultants and other third-
parties; and (2) the decision in Apotex estopped GSK from asserting that the 34 documents 
were attorney work product, that is, were prepared in anticipation of litigation. In response to 
these objections, GSK compiled a privilege log describing each of the 91 documents, and the 
parties presented their arguments to the district court. 
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In its opening brief to the district court, the Commission raised the two objections it had 
previously presented to GSK. The Commission also introduced in that brief a new argument: 
Regardless whether Apotex foreclosed the Company’s claim of attorney work product, GSK’s 
privilege log “failed to provide facts demonstrating that the documents were created in 
anticipation of litigation.” When GSK objected that the Commission had not made this argument 
during pre-motion negotiations, the Commission withdrew the argument. It explained in a 
Stipulation approved by the district court that it had “inadvertently failed to provide GSK with the 
agreed advance notice regarding the grounds for challenging the documents.” 
 
GSK submitted its responsive brief to the district court and attached thereto the Company’s 
privilege log and the affidavit of Charles Kinzig, GSK’s Vice President and Director of Corporate 
Intellectual Property. For each document, the log described the contents; listed the author, 
intended recipients, and date of creation; and noted whether the author or intended recipients 
were attorneys. A supplement to the log indicated the title or titles of each person therein named 
who was not an attorney. The Kinzig Declaration stated that the documents had been 
disseminated to various “teams” of company employees and contractors, and explained the 
duties of each team. According to Kinzig, all the teams were “involved in seeking or giving legal 
advice and/or gathering and recording information in anticipation of or preparation for litigation.” 
The Kinzig Declaration states also that every employee and contractor named in the privilege 
log was “bound not to disclose confidential information to persons outside GSK” without 
receiving permission from a high-ranking official of the Company. 
 
The Commission then filed a reply brief in which it made yet another argument for the first time: 
The attorney-client privilege does not shield the documents because they contain no 
confidential information. 
 
The district court ordered GSK to produce the 91 documents. The court rejected GSK’s claims 
of attorney-client privilege on the grounds that (1) “GSK had not sustained its burden of 
demonstrating that the relevant documents were distributed on a ‘need to know’ basis or to 
employees that were ‘authorized to speak or act’ for GSK," and (2) the Company had “failed to 
provide sufficient evidence that the information contained therein is confidential.” The court 
rejected GSK’s claims of attorney work product for the reason withdrawn by the Commission, 
namely, that “GSK failed to set forth objective facts that support the corporation’s assertion that 
the relevant documents were created in anticipation of litigation.” Having determined that “even 
if GSK is not precluded from asserting the privilege for attorney work product, it has failed to 
satisfy its burden of showing the applicability of the doctrine to the relevant documents,” the 
district court found it unnecessary to resolve whether the decision in Apotex estopped GSK from 
claiming otherwise. GSK sought and we granted a stay pending appeal. 
 
II. Analysis 
 
GSK contends the district court erred both by rejecting its claims of privilege based upon 
arguments the Commission did not raise properly and by misapplying the standard for 
determining whether a corporation has kept confidential the contents of a communication. The 
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Commission defends the decision of the district court and argues that GSK is collaterally 
estopped in any event, by reason of the Apotex litigation, from claiming the 34 documents are 
attorney work product. 
 
The district court held that GSK failed to establish either of two prerequisites for recognition of 
the attorney-client privilege — that the documents contain confidential information and that they 
have been kept confidential. As the Company points out, during the parties’ negotiations the 
Commission did not dispute that the documents contain confidential information. The 
Commission did not even raise the argument in its opening brief before the district court, waiting 
instead until its reply brief and thereby depriving GSK of any opportunity to respond. 
 
The Commission had agreed, pursuant to the Scheduling Stipulation approved by the district 
court, to inform GSK of its reasons for disputing the Company's claims of privilege before asking 
the court for a ruling. The Commission therefore was bound not to put before the district court 
any objection not first raised with its adversary. Accordingly, the district court abused its 
discretion when it ruled against GSK based upon an argument that was raised not only in 
violation of the Scheduling Stipulation but so belatedly that the Company had no chance to 
respond to it. 
 
The question that remains is whether the district court erred in ruling that GSK failed to satisfy 
the second prerequisite for attorney-client privilege — that the documents have been kept 
confidential. GSK contends that this issue, too, was raised in a manner that deprived the 
Company of an opportunity to respond. We think not. The Commission took the position in its 
negotiations with GSK that the Company had lost its claim of privilege by disseminating the 
documents widely. This argument put the Company on notice that it needed to establish it had 
kept the documents confidential. The Commission renewed the point in its opening brief to the 
district court thus: “In view of the breadth of distribution and GSK’s failure to carry its burden of 
establishing that each and every recipient had a demonstrable ‘need to know,’ GSK’s assertions 
of attorney-client privilege must fail." And the Company joined this argument on the merits 
before the district court. Having defended as sufficient the evidence it submitted to the district 
court on this point, GSK may not now claim it was unfairly surprised by the argument. 
 
Although the district court was correct to entertain the Commission’s second argument, it erred 
in resolving the legal issue. The applicable standard is, as the district court recognized, whether 
the “the documents were distributed on a ‘need to know’ basis or to employees that were 
‘authorized to speak or act’ for the company.” The Company’s privilege log and the affidavit of 
Charles Kinzig establish that GSK circulated the documents in question only to specifically 
named employees and contractors, most of whom were attorneys or managers and all of whom 
“needed to provide input to the legal department and/or receive the legal advice and strategies 
formulated by counsel.” The affidavit also states that each intended recipient was bound by 
corporate policy or, in the case of the contractors, by a separate understanding, to keep 
confidential the contents of the documents. The Company’s submission thus leads ineluctably to 
the conclusion that no document was “disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the 
corporate structure, needed to know its contents.” 
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The district court faulted GSK for not having explained “why any, let alone all, of the employees 
received copies of certain documents,” and the Commission likewise claims on brief that GSK 
should have shown why each individual in possession of a confidential document “needed the 
information therein to carry out his/her work.” These demands are overreaching. The 
Company’s burden is to show that it limited its dissemination of the documents in keeping with 
their asserted confidentiality, not to justify each determination that a particular employee should 
have access to the information therein. Not only would that task be Herculean — especially 
when the sender and the recipient are no longer with the Company — but it is wholly 
unnecessary. After all, when a corporation provides a confidential document to certain specified 
employees or contractors with the admonition not to disseminate further its contents and the 
contents of the documents are related generally to the employees’ corporate duties, absent 
evidence to the contrary we may reasonably infer that the information was deemed necessary 
for the employees’ or contractors’ work. We do not presume, therefore, that any business would 
include in a restricted circulation list a person with no reason to have access to the confidential 
document — that is, one who has no “need to know.” 
 
Moreover, we can imagine no useful purpose in having a court review the business judgment of 
each corporate official who deemed it necessary or desirable for a particular employee or 
contractor to have access to a corporate secret. It suffices instead that the corporation limited 
dissemination to specific individuals whose corporate duties relate generally to the contents of 
the documents. As we have seen in this case, the privilege log and the Kinzig Declaration 
together establish that GSK did just that, and the Company thereby demonstrated its entitlement 
to the attorney-client privilege. The FTC has proffered nothing to the contrary. 
 
Our conclusion that the documents are protected by the attorney-client privilege extends also to 
those communications that GSK shared with its public relations and government affairs 
consultants. The Kinzig affidavit notes that GSK’s corporate counsel “worked with these 
consultants in the same manner as they did with full-time employees; indeed, the consultants 
acted as part of a team with full-time employees regarding their particular assignments” and, as 
a result, the consultants “became integral members of the team assigned to deal with issues 
that were completely intertwined with GSK’s litigation and legal strategies.” In these 
circumstances, “there is no reason to distinguish between a person on the corporation’s payroll 
and a consultant hired by the corporation if each acts for the corporation and possesses the 
information needed by attorneys in rendering legal advice.” 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why does it matter for the attorney-client privilege whether an agent of an organization 
“needed to know” about a communication? 
2. How demanding is the “need to know” standard? 
3. When does an agent of an organization fail to satisfy the “need to know” standard? 
 
Independent Contractors 
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Steinfeld v. IMS Health Inc., No. 10 Civ. 3301 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
 
PAUL E. DAVISON, Magistrate Judge. 
 
By letter dated October 31, 2011, Plaintiff seeks an order compelling Defendant to produce 
certain documents containing communications shared between attorneys for Defendant and a 
compensation consulting firm and its principal, Steven Root. Defendant’s offer to produce the 
documents at issue for in camera inspection was accepted and that material has been 
reviewed. 
 
IMS retained Root as an independent equity compensation consultant.77 He advises IMS 
directors and counsel on matters involving the company’s executive compensation and benefits 
plans and disclosure obligations. On this basis, Defendant contends that the communications 
shared between counsel for IMS and Root are protected by the attorney-client privilege. 
Defendant relies upon the theory announced by the Eighth Circuit in In re Bieter Co., and which 
a small number of district courts within this circuit have recognized. Under this authority, the 
privilege is extended in certain narrow instances to protect “communications between a 
corporation’s attorney and outside agents or consultants to the corporation who act as the 
functional equivalent of a corporate employee.” Defendant specifically argues that Root was the 
functional equivalent of an IMS employee because he “contributed to the rendering of legal 
advice in communications with the client's outside counsel,” was “necessary to such 
communications,” and “possessed information needed by IMS counsel in order to render legal 
advice” to their client. 
 
Generally, the presence of third parties waives entitlement to the attorney-client privilege. While, 
as discussed below, certain exceptions apply, courts should be cautious when expanding the 
privilege’s application. The party asserting entitlement to the privilege bears the burden of proof. 
 
Because the cases relied upon by counsel in this matter are extremely fact-specific, I first 
discuss Bieter and other cases applying its functional equivalence test. 
 
In Bieter, a two-man partnership formed for purposes of developing farm land. A third-party real 
estate consultant was retained who worked out of the company's office for several years. The 
consultant's primary duty was to secure tenants for the development project. He also worked 
directly with architects, other consultants, and attorneys on matters related to the project and its 
ensuing litigation. He appeared on behalf of the company at public hearings and was viewed by 
the public as a representative of the company. Accordingly, the court determined that “there was 
no principled basis to distinguish the consultant’s role from that of an employee, and his 
involvement in the subject matter of the litigation makes him precisely the sort of person with 
whom a lawyer would wish to confer confidentially in order to understand the company’s 
reasons for seeking representation.” 
																																																								
77 Although Root is an attorney, Defendant acknowledges that IMS retained him as a compensation 
consultant and not as a legal advisor. 
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In In re Copper Market Antitrust Litigation, a Japanese corporation retained a public relations 
firm as an independent consultant after a corporate executive disclosed information which 
prompted government investigations and litigation. The corporation had no experience with, or 
other employees who could deal with, public relations communications in the English-speaking, 
Western media. The PR firm issued press statements on behalf of the corporation and 
otherwise communicated with the Western press as an agent of the corporation. In the course of 
preparing and making its communications and statements, the firm consulted with the 
corporation's in-house and outside counsel. The firm also had the authority to make 
independent decisions on the corporation's behalf with respect to public relations matters. 
Accordingly, the court determined that the firm was the functional equivalent of a corporate 
employee. 
 
In Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v. Marvel Enterprises, a studio contracted with 
individuals as independent contractors to perform movie production services. The film produced 
became the subject of ensuing litigation. The court held that the contractors were the functional 
equivalent of employees because “the sporadic nature of employment in the motion picture 
industry dictates the use of independent contractors over employees.” 
 
In In re Adelphia Communications Corporation, an independent credit counseling firm was 
retained as an independent contractor. An employee of the contractor worked full-time at the 
corporation for three years. He held substantial responsibility with respect to the corporation's 
relations with another company. He also became the primary contact person between the 
corporation and the other company, and was given authority to make decisions and to speak on 
behalf of the corporation. In addition, the employee of the contractor sought legal advice from 
the corporation's counsel as part of his job duties. Accordingly, the court held that this individual 
was “the functional equivalent of a corporate employee.” 
 
In American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company v. Payton Lane Nursing Home, an 
independent construction management contractor was retained by a company for purposes of 
overseeing the daily operations of a construction project. The company itself did not send its 
own employees to the construction site, nor did it employ staff with construction experience. The 
contractor was given authority to speak for, and to make decisions on behalf of, the company 
relating to the construction project. This included negotiating with contractors and pursuing 
payments. The contractor also sought legal advice from the company’s attorney regarding the 
construction project. Accordingly, the court held that the contractor served as the company's 
“eyes and ears” and was therefore the functional equivalent of an employee. 
 
In contrast, in Export-Import Bank of the United States v. Asia Pulp and Paper Company, a 
Singapore corporation retained an independent financial consultant to help the corporation 
restructure its debt. The corporation did not have employees of its own with experience in 
restructuring. The consultant negotiated on behalf of the corporation and communicated the 
corporation’s positions to creditors. Although the corporation provided the consultant with office 
space in its building, the office was not used. Additionally, the court determined that the 
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consultant did not spend a sufficient amount of his time working with corporation. Accordingly, 
the court held that the party asserting entitlement to the attorney-client privilege failed to meet 
its burden to show that the consultant was “so fully integrated into the corporation’s hierarchy as 
to be a de facto employee.” 
 
In this case, Defendant has failed to meet its burden to show that Root is the functional 
equivalent of an IMS employee. First, there is no indication that IMS uses independent 
contractors instead of employees because its business is sporadic. Second, there is no 
evidence that Root has ever appeared on behalf of IMS, corresponded with third parties as a 
representative of IMS, or has been viewed by others as an employee of IMS. In camera review 
of the documents at issue reveals that Root frequently signed his emails as the managing 
director of his consulting firm and submitted memoranda on his own firm’s letterhead. 
 
Third, Defendant offers nothing to suggest that Root was so physically present that he 
functioned as a de facto employee. For example, there is nothing to indicate that Root has ever 
maintained an office at IMS or otherwise spent a substantial amount of his time interacting with, 
and working on behalf of, the corporation. 
 
Fourth, Defendant offers nothing to show that IMS lacked the internal resources necessary for 
an employee to perform Root’s services. Indeed, as in camera review tends to confirm. Root 
participated as part of a “team” of IMS employees and outside counsel. 
 
Fifth, the evidence presented does not reveal that Root exercises any measure of independent 
decision-making authority within this team. Instead, it appears that Root’s role was to provide 
suggestions, comments, and (non-legal) advice. 
 
Finally, Defendant has failed to show that Root has ever sought out legal advice from IMS’s 
attorneys as part of his work with the corporation. Rather, the communications reviewed indicate 
that it was Root who offered advice and suggestions to counsel and the team in general. 
 
Root’s status vis-a-vis Defendant is simply distinguishable from the situations in those cases 
that have followed Bieter. Root is not, therefore, the functional equivalent of an IMS employee.78 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs request to compel production Is GRANTED. Defendant is directed to 
produce to Plaintiff the documents shared with Mr. Root or his firm no later than December 16, 
2011. 
 
Former Employees 
 
																																																								
78 To the extent Defendant separately argues the privilege applies because Root acted as an agent of 
IMS who had information necessary for counsel to render legal advice to IMS, Defendant has similarly 
failed to meet its burden of proof. An attorney's communications with a third party will be privileged “if the 
third party's role is limited to helping a lawyer give effective advice by explaining concepts to the lawyer.” 
Here, Root’s role was simply more expansive than this. He did not explain unfamiliar concepts to counsel, 
but instead provided the “team” with suggestions and advice on what actions may be undertaken. Such 
communications are not privileged. 
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US v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Pa. 2004) 
 
SCUDERI, United States Magistrate Judge. 
 
After consideration of a Motion to Compel Testimony From Susan Elliott filed by the United 
States Government, the Response of Defendants, Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC, Plaintiffs 
Reply, and Medco Defendants’ Sur-Reply, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED, 
as follows: 
 
In the instant motion, Plaintiffs seek to compel additional testimony from Susan Elliott, a former 
employee of Medco Defendants. Plaintiffs deposed Ms. Elliott on July 28, 2004, at which time 
she testified that she did not have her own attorney, and that she was not represented by 
counsel for Medco Defendants. Counsel for Medco Defendants confirmed that they did not 
represent Ms. Elliott. Nevertheless, counsel for Medco Defendants asserted the attorney-client 
privilege and instructed Ms. Elliott not to answer any questions concerning communications 
between Medco Defendants and Ms. Elliott in preparation for her deposition, or concerning 
communications that occurred during breaks in her deposition. Ms. Elliott complied with all 
instructions not to answer such questions. 
 
Statements made under oath by Ms. Elliott at her deposition clearly differed from statements 
she previously made regarding certain activities which are material to this case. As a result, 
Plaintiffs seek additional testimony from Ms. Elliott regarding four (4) specific categories of 
questions: 
 
a. Statements made by Medco Defendants’ counsel to Ms. Elliott regarding the nature of 
the case; 
b. Statements made by Ms. Elliott to Medco Defendants’ counsel regarding her 
conversations with Government investigators; 
c. Descriptions and/or summaries of witness testimony provided to Ms. Elliott by counsel 
for Medco Defendants; and 
d. Conversations between counsel for Medco Defendants and Ms. Elliott while she was 
under oath during the deposition. 
 
Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to question Ms. Elliott on these topics because her 
communications with corporate counsel had the potential to “affect, influence or change” Ms. 
Elliott’s testimony. 
 
Medco Defendants oppose the current motion, arguing that all of the communications at issue 
between Ms. Elliott and counsel for Medco Defendants are protected by the attorney-client 
privilege because the privilege should be applied in the same way for former employees as for 
current employees. 
 
In Upjohn Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a corporation’s attorneys’ 
conversations with current corporate employees could be covered by the attorney-client 
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privilege. The privilege applies when the conversations: (1) were made to the corporate counsel, 
acting as such; (2) were made at the direction of corporate supervisors for the purpose of 
securing legal advice from counsel; (3) concerned matters within the scope of the employees’ 
corporate duties; and (4) the employees were sufficiently aware that they were being questioned 
in order that the corporation could obtain legal advice. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice 
Berger opined that the attorney-client privilege should be extended to protect communications 
between corporate counsel and former employees. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Upjohn 
left open the question of whether communications between corporate counsel and former 
employees were included within the privilege. 
 
As noted by the parties, the Third Circuit has not addressed the question left open by the 
Supreme Court in Upjohn. Moreover, although this Court has acknowledged that the Upjohn 
privilege may apply to former employees as well as current employees, that case is factually 
distinguishable and did not specifically address whether corporate counsel’s communications 
with a former employee are privileged as to the four discrete topics at issue in the instant 
motion. 
 
Fortunately, other federal courts have addressed the present issue under similar circumstances. 
In Infosystems, Inc. v. Ceridian Corp., the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 
extended the privilege over former employees, but limited it to communications which 
themselves were privileged and which occurred during the employment relationship. The Court 
explained that the willingness of former employees to provide information is generally unrelated 
to directions from former corporate superiors and, therefore, “counsel’s communications with a 
former employee of the client corporation generally should be treated no differently from 
communications with any other third-party fact witness.” In City of New York v. Coastal Oil New 
York, Inc., the District Court for the Southern District of New York confronted the same issue 
presented here, namely, whether plaintiffs’ counsel should be permitted to question a former 
employee of the defendant corporation about conversations he had with corporate defense 
counsel in preparation for his deposition, as well as conversations that may have occurred 
during a recess in the deposition. The Court concluded that, because corporate counsel did not 
represent the former employee and there was no evidence that the conversations occurred for 
the purpose of legal advice, the record did not contain any basis for an assertion of the attorney-
client privilege. In so holding, the District Court in Coastal Oil explicitly followed the reasoning of 
Peralta. 
 
In Peralta, the District Court for the District of Connecticut rejected a defendant corporation's 
attempt to utilize the attorney-client privilege to block all questions about communications 
between corporate counsel and a former employee. Instead, the court limited the privilege to 
communications that either: (1) concerned knowledge obtained or conduct that occurred during 
the course of the former employee's employment; or (2) related to communications which were 
themselves privileged and which occurred during the employment relationship. Importantly, the 
court specified that the attorney-client privilege would not apply in certain specific 
circumstances, such as to information given by corporate counsel to the former employee 
regarding the testimony of other witnesses, or to discussions between the former employee and 
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corporate counsel during breaks in a deposition. These are virtually the same circumstances 
present here. Moreover, the court in Peralta explained that allowing limited discovery regarding 
such communications was particularly necessary “given their potential to influence a witness to 
conform or adjust her testimony to such information, consciously or unconsciously.” The 
identical concern is present here. 
 
The Court is persuaded by the reasoning set forth in the aforementioned cases, as well as both 
the reasoning and the practical solutions set forth by the District Courts in Peralta and Coastal 
Oil. The Court is aware of potential difficulties in separating facts developed during litigation, 
which are not privileged pursuant to the aforementioned case law, and facts known by the 
employee as a result of her employment, which likely would be privileged. However, as the court 
in Peralta made clear, the line to be drawn is not difficult: if the communication sought to be 
elicited relates to Ms. Elliott’s conduct or knowledge during her employment with Medco 
Defendants, or if it concerns conversations with corporate counsel that occurred during her 
employment, the communication is privileged; if not, the attorney-client privilege does not apply.  
 
As a result of the foregoing - and because it is apparent that the communications between Ms. 
Elliott and Medco Defendants’ may have influenced her testimony - Plaintiffs’ motion is granted. 
However, Plaintiffs may obtain additional testimony from Ms. Elliott only regarding the four 
specific avenues of inquiry previously discussed, and in a manner consistent with the limitations 
set forth above. 
 
Questions: 
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5.6: The Work Product Doctrine 
 
Let's make some plans ‘cause they can’t go wrong. Getting there may be times three maybe 
not. To loosen your lips and you’re talking rubbish. To loosen your whole mistaken tenfold.79 
 
Andy said a lot of things, I stored them all away in my head. Sometimes, when I can't decide 
what I should do, I think, “What would Andy have said?” He’d probably say, “You think too 
much, that’s ‘cause there's work that you don't want to do.” It’s work. The most important thing is 
work.80 
 
The “Work Product Doctrine” is an evidentiary privilege providing that attorneys ordinarily cannot 
be required to produce documents they created in the course of preparing for litigation. It 
applies to the notes, records, and other documents created by attorneys in gathering 
information in preparation for litigation and in the course of preparing litigation documents. 
 
The work product doctrine differs from the attorney-client privilege in several respects. First, it 
applies to different subject matter. The attorney-client privilege applies to confidential 
communications with clients for the purpose of providing legal advice, but the work product 
doctrine applies to certain documents created by attorneys, whether or not those documents are 
communicated to the client. Second, it belongs to a different party. The attorney-client privilege 
belongs to the client, so the client is the only person who can waive the privilege, but the work 
product doctrine belongs to the attorney. Third, it is not as strong. The attorney-client privilege is 
sacrosanct and abrogated only if abused, but the work product doctrine can give way to 
necessity. 
 
Notably, the work product doctrine may cover any documents created by or for an attorney in 
anticipation of litigation. This requirement is generally interpreted liberally. A document is 
created “in anticipation of litigation” if litigation is conceivable, even if no actual litigation has 
commenced. In addition, the document need not be created by an attorney. A document created 
for an attorney in anticipation of litigation may be protected by the work product doctrine. 
 
However, while the protection provided by the work product doctrine is broader than the 
protection provided by the attorney-client privilege, it is also weaker. Unlike the attorney-client 
privilege, the work product doctrine can be overcome by a showing of necessity. Specifically, 
courts distinguish between “fact” and “opinion” work product. Fact work product is factual 
documents created in anticipation of litigation, and opinion work product is documents that 
reflect the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney. Fact work 
product is discoverable if the opposing party can show a substantial need for the document, and 
it cannot obtain the relevant information by other means, without undue hardship. But opinion 
work product generally is not discoverable, unless one of the exceptions to the attorney-client 
privilege applies. 
																																																								
79 Close Lobsters, Let’s Make Some Plans, What Is There To Smile About (1988). 
80 Lou Reed & John Cale, Work, Songs for Drella (1990). 
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For example, if an attorney records an interview with a non-client witness and takes notes, the 
recording and notes will be protected by the work product doctrine, but not the attorney-client 
privilege. Under the work product doctrine, neither the recording nor the notes would normally 
be discoverable, as opposing counsel can interview the witness independently. But if the 
witness is unavailable, then opposing counsel may be entitled to limited discovery, to the extent 
necessary to obtain material information. Typically, the interview would be discoverable 
because it is fact work product, but the attorney’s notes would not be discoverable because they 
are opinion work product. If fact work product and opinion work product are combined in the 
same document, then the opinion work product would be redacted before the document is 
produced. 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26: General Provisions Governing Discovery 
 
b. Discovery Scope and Limits. 
3. Trial Preparation: Materials. 
A. Documents and Tangible Things. Ordinarily, a party may not discover 
documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of 
litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative (including 
the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or 
agent). But, subject to Rule 26(b)(4), those materials may be discovered 
if: 
i. they are otherwise discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1); and 
ii. the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to 
prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their 
substantial equivalent by other means. 
B. Protection Against Disclosure. If the court orders discovery of those 
materials, it must protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, 
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party's attorney or other 
representative concerning the litigation. 
C. Previous Statement. Any party or other person may, on request and 
without the required showing, obtain the person's own previous statement 
about the action or its subject matter. If the request is refused, the person 
may move for a court order, and Rule 37(a)(5) applies to the award of 
expenses. A previous statement is either: 
i. a written statement that the person has signed or otherwise 
adopted or approved; or 
ii. a contemporaneous stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other 
recording—or a transcription of it—that recites substantially 
verbatim the person's oral statement. 
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The J.M. Taylor, Philadelphia, Pa. (~1940) 
 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) 
 
Summary: A tugboat sank and five crewmen died. The owners and insurers were 
represented by Fortenbaugh, who interviewed the surviving crewmen and memorialized 
the interviews. The estates of the dead crewmen filed wrongful death actions against the 
owners, all of which settled but one. Plaintiff’s counsel asked Fortenbaugh to produce 
any information related to the interviews. Fortenbaugh refused, the district court ordered 
him to produce the information, and the circuit court reversed, under the work product 
doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that work product is discoverable only 
with a sufficient showing of necessity. 
 
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
This case presents an important problem under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to the 
extent to which a party may inquire into oral and written statements of witnesses, or other 
information, secured by an adverse party’s counsel in the course of preparation for possible 
litigation after a claim has arisen. Examination into a person's files and records, including those 
resulting from the professional activities of an attorney, must be judged with care. It is not 
without reason that various safeguards have been established to preclude unwarranted 
excursions into the privacy of a man’s work. At the same time, public policy supports reasonable 
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and necessary inquiries. Properly to balance these competing interests is a delicate and difficult 
task. 
 
On February 7, 1943, the tug “J.M. Taylor” sank while engaged in helping to tow a car float of 
the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad across the Delaware River at Philadelphia. The accident was 
apparently unusual in nature, the cause of it still being unknown. Five of the nine crew members 
were drowned. Three days later the tug owners and the underwriters employed a law firm, of 
which respondent Fortenbaugh is a member, to defend them against potential suits by 
representatives of the deceased crew members and to sue the railroad for damages to the tug. 
 
A public hearing was held on March 4, 1943, before the United States Steamboat Inspectors, at 
which the four survivors were examined. This testimony was recorded and made available to all 
interested parties. Shortly thereafter, Fortenbaugh privately interviewed the survivors and took 
statements from them with an eye toward the anticipated litigation; the survivors signed these 
statements on March 29. Fortenbaugh also interviewed other persons believed to have some 
information relating to the accident and in some cases he made memoranda of what they told 
him. At the time when Fortenbaugh secured the statements of the survivors, representatives of 
two of the deceased crew members had been in communication with him. Ultimately claims 
were presented by representatives of all five of the deceased; four of the claims, however, were 
settled without litigation. The fifth claimant, petitioner herein, brought suit in a federal court 
under the Jones Act on November 26, 1943, naming as defendants the two tug owners, 
individually and as partners, and the railroad. 
 
One year later, petitioner filed 39 interrogatories directed to the tug owners. The 38th 
interrogatory read: “State whether any statements of the members of the crews of the Tugs 
‘J.M. Taylor’ and ‘Philadelphia’ or of any other vessel were taken in connection with the towing 
of the car float and the sinking of the Tug ‘John M. Taylor.’ Attach hereto exact copies of all 
such statements if in writing, and if oral, set forth in detail the exact provisions of any such oral 
statements or reports.” 
 
Supplemental interrogatories asked whether any oral or written statements, records, reports or 
other memoranda had been made concerning any matter relative to the towing operation, the 
sinking of the tug, the salvaging and repair of the tug, and the death of the deceased. If the 
answer was in the affirmative, the tug owners were then requested to set forth the nature of all 
such records, reports, statements or other memoranda. 
 
The tug owners, through Fortenbaugh, answered all of the interrogatories except No. 38 and the 
supplemental ones just described. While admitting that statements of the survivors had been 
taken, they declined to summarize or set forth the contents. They did so on the ground that such 
requests called “for privileged matter obtained in preparation for litigation” and constituted “an 
attempt to obtain indirectly counsel’s private files.” It was claimed that answering these requests 
“would involve practically turning over not only the complete files, but also the telephone records 
and, almost, the thoughts of counsel.” 
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In connection with the hearing on these objections, Fortenbaugh made a written statement and 
gave an informal oral deposition explaining the circumstances under which he had taken the 
statements. But he was not expressly asked in the deposition to produce the statements. The 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting en banc, held that the requested 
matters were not privileged. The court then decreed that the tug owners and Fortenbaugh, as 
counsel and agent for the tug owners, forthwith “answer Plaintiff’s 38th interrogatory and 
supplementary interrogatories; produce all written statements of witnesses obtained by Mr. 
Fortenbaugh, as counsel and agent for Defendants; state in substance any fact concerning this 
case which Defendants learned through oral statements made by witnesses to Mr. Fortenbaugh 
whether or not included in his private memoranda and produce Mr. Fortenbaugh’s memoranda 
containing statements of fact by witnesses or to submit these memoranda to the Court for 
determination of those portions which should be revealed to Plaintiff.” Upon their refusal, the 
court adjudged them in contempt and ordered them imprisoned until they complied. 
 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, also sitting en banc, reversed the judgment of the District 
Court. It held that the information here sought was part of the “work product of the lawyer” and 
hence privileged from discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The importance of 
the problem, which has engendered a great divergence of views among district courts, led us to 
grant certiorari. 
 
The pre-trial deposition-discovery mechanism established by Rules 26 to 37 is one of the most 
significant innovations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the prior federal practice, 
the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact-revelation were performed 
primarily and inadequately by the pleadings. Inquiry into the issues and the facts before trial was 
narrowly confined and was often cumbersome in method. The new rules, however, restrict the 
pleadings to the task of general notice-giving and invest the deposition-discovery process with a 
vital role in the preparation for trial. The various instruments of discovery now serve (1) as a 
device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 16, to narrow and clarify the basic issues 
between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts, or information as to the 
existence or whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues. Thus civil trials in the federal courts 
no longer need be carried on in the dark. The way is now clear, consistent with recognized 
privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before 
trial. 
 
In urging that he has a right to inquire into the materials secured and prepared by Fortenbaugh, 
petitioner emphasizes that the deposition-discovery portions of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure are designed to enable the parties to discover the true facts and to compel their 
disclosure wherever they may be found. It is said that inquiry may be made under these rules, 
epitomized by Rule 26, as to any relevant matter which is not privileged; and since the discovery 
provisions are to be applied as broadly and liberally as possible, the privilege limitation must be 
restricted to its narrowest bounds. On the premise that the attorney-client privilege is the one 
involved in this case, petitioner argues that it must be strictly confined to confidential 
communications made by a client to his attorney. And since the materials here in issue were 
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secured by Fortenbaugh from third persons rather than from his clients, the tug owners, the 
conclusion is reached that these materials are proper subjects for discovery under Rule 26. 
 
As additional support for this result, petitioner claims that to prohibit discovery under these 
circumstances would give a corporate defendant a tremendous advantage in a suit by an 
individual plaintiff. Thus in a suit by an injured employee against a railroad or in a suit by an 
insured person against an insurance company the corporate defendant could pull a dark veil of 
secrecy over all the pertinent facts it can collect after the claim arises merely on the assertion 
that such facts were gathered by its large staff of attorneys and claim agents. At the same time, 
the individual plaintiff, who often has direct knowledge of the matter in issue and has no counsel 
until some time after his claim arises could be compelled to disclose all the intimate details of 
his case. By endowing with immunity from disclosure all that a lawyer discovers in the course of 
his duties, it is said, the rights of individual litigants in such cases are drained of vitality and the 
lawsuit becomes more of a battle of deception than a search for truth. 
 
But framing the problem in terms of assisting individual plaintiffs in their suits against corporate 
defendants is unsatisfactory. Discovery concededly may work to the disadvantage as well as to 
the advantage of individual plaintiffs. Discovery, in other words, is not a one-way proposition. It 
is available in all types of cases at the behest of any party, individual or corporate, plaintiff or 
defendant. The problem thus far transcends the situation confronting this petitioner. And we 
must view that problem in light of the limitless situations where the particular kind of discovery 
sought by petitioner might be used. 
 
We agree, of course, that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal 
treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of “fishing expedition” serve to preclude a party 
from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant 
facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may 
compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery 
procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of 
trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility of surprise. But discovery, like all 
matters of procedure, has ultimate and necessary boundaries. As indicated by Rules 30(b) and 
(d) and 31(d), limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the examination is being 
conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass or oppress the person 
subject to the inquiry. And as Rule 26(b) provides, further limitations come into existence when 
the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege. 
 
We also agree that the memoranda, statements and mental impressions in issue in this case fall 
outside the scope of the attorney-client privilege and hence are not protected from discovery on 
that basis. It is unnecessary here to delineate the content and scope of that privilege as 
recognized in the federal courts. For present purposes, it suffices to note that the protective 
cloak of this privilege does not extend to information which an attorney secures from a witness 
while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation. Nor does this privilege concern the 
memoranda, briefs, communications and other writings prepared by counsel for his own use in 
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prosecuting his client's case; and it is equally unrelated to writings which reflect an attorney's 
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories. 
 
But the impropriety of invoking that privilege does not provide an answer to the problem before 
us. Petitioner has made more than an ordinary request for relevant, non-privileged facts in the 
possession of his adversaries or their counsel. He has sought discovery as of right of oral and 
written statements of witnesses whose identity is well known and whose availability to petitioner 
appears unimpaired. He has sought production of these matters after making the most 
searching inquiries of his opponents as to the circumstances surrounding the fatal accident, 
which inquiries were sworn to have been answered to the best of their information and belief. 
Interrogatories were directed toward all the events prior to, during and subsequent to the sinking 
of the tug. Full and honest answers to such broad inquiries would necessarily have included all 
pertinent information gleaned by Fortenbaugh through his interviews with the witnesses. 
Petitioner makes no suggestion, and we cannot assume, that the tug owners or Fortenbaugh 
were incomplete or dishonest in the framing of their answers. In addition, petitioner was free to 
examine the public testimony of the witnesses taken before the United States Steamboat 
Inspectors. We are thus dealing with an attempt to secure the production of written statements 
and mental impressions contained in the files and the mind of the attorney Fortenbaugh without 
any showing of necessity or any indication or claim that denial of such production would unduly 
prejudice the preparation of petitioner's case or cause him any hardship or injustice. For aught 
that appears, the essence of what petitioner seeks either has been revealed to him already 
through the interrogatories or is readily available to him direct from the witnesses for the asking. 
 
The District Court, after hearing objections to petitioner's request, commanded Fortenbaugh to 
produce all written statements of witnesses and to state in substance any facts learned through 
oral statements of witnesses to him. Fortenbaugh was to submit any memoranda he had made 
of the oral statements so that the court might determine what portions should be revealed to 
petitioner. All of this was ordered without any showing by petitioner, or any requirement that he 
make a proper showing, of the necessity for the production of any of this material or any 
demonstration that denial of production would cause hardship or injustice. The court simply 
ordered production on the theory that the facts sought were material and were not privileged as 
constituting attorney-client communications. 
 
In our opinion, neither Rule 26 nor any other rule dealing with discovery contemplates 
production under such circumstances. That is not because the subject matter is privileged or 
irrelevant, as those concepts are used in these rules.81 Here is simply an attempt, without 
																																																								
81 The English courts have developed the concept of privilege to include all documents prepared by or for 
counsel with a view to litigation. “All documents which are called into existence for the purpose — but not 
necessarily the sole purpose — of assisting the deponent or his legal advisers in any actual or anticipated 
litigation are privileged from production. Thus all proofs, briefs, draft pleadings, etc., are privileged; but not 
counsel’s indorsement on the outside of his brief, nor any deposition or notes of evidence given publicly 
party bona fide for the use of his solicitor for the purposes of the action, whether in fact so used or not. 
Reports by a company’s servant, if made in the ordinary course of routine, are not privileged, even though 
it is desirable that the solicitor should have them and they are subsequently sent to him; but if the solicitor 
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purported necessity or justification, to secure written statements, private memoranda and 
personal recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party’s counsel in the course of his 
legal duties. As such, it falls outside the arena of discovery and contravenes the public policy 
underlying the orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims. Not even the most liberal of 
discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of 
an attorney. 
 
Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for the advancement of 
justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients. In performing his various 
duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from 
unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation of a client's 
case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the 
irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless 
interference. That is the historical and the necessary way in which lawyers act within the 
framework of our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients' 
interests. This work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, memoranda, 
correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and 
intangible ways — aptly though roughly termed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case as 
the “work product of the lawyer.” Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere 
demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney’s 
thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices 
would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. 
The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and 
the cause of justice would be poorly served. 
 
We do not mean to say that all written materials obtained or prepared by an adversary’s counsel 
with an eye toward litigation are necessarily free from discovery in all cases. Where relevant 
and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney’s file and where production of those facts 
is essential to the preparation of one’s case, discovery may properly be had. Such written 
statements and documents might, under certain circumstances, be admissible in evidence or 
give clues as to the existence or location of relevant facts. Or they might be useful for purposes 
of impeachment or corroboration. And production might be justified where the witnesses are no 
longer available or can be reached only with difficulty. Were production of written statements 
and documents to be precluded under such circumstances, the liberal ideals of the deposition-
discovery portions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would be stripped of much of their 
meaning. But the general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney’s course of 
preparation is so well recognized and so essential to an orderly working of our system of legal 
procedure that a burden rests on the one who would invade that privacy to establish adequate 
reasons to justify production through a subpoena or court order. That burden, we believe, is 
necessarily implicit in the rules as now constituted. 
 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
has requested that such documents shall always be prepared for his use and this was one of the reasons 
why they were prepared, they need not be disclosed.” 
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Rule 30(b), as presently written, gives the trial judge the requisite discretion to make a judgment 
as to whether discovery should be allowed as to written statements secured from witnesses. But 
in the instant case there was no room for that discretion to operate in favor of the petitioner. No 
attempt was made to establish any reason why Fortenbaugh should be forced to produce the 
written statements. There was only a naked, general demand for these materials as of right and 
a finding by the District Court that no recognizable privilege was involved. That was insufficient 
to justify discovery under these circumstances and the court should have sustained the refusal 
of the tug owners and Fortenbaugh to produce. 
 
But as to oral statements made by witnesses to Fortenbaugh, whether presently in the form of 
his mental impressions or memoranda, we do not believe that any showing of necessity can be 
made under the circumstances of this case so as to justify production. Under ordinary 
conditions, forcing an attorney to repeat or write out all that witnesses have told him and to 
deliver the account to his adversary gives rise to grave dangers of inaccuracy and 
untrustworthiness. No legitimate purpose is served by such production. The practice forces the 
attorney to testify as to what he remembers or what he saw fit to write down regarding 
witnesses’ remarks. Such testimony could not qualify as evidence; and to use it for 
impeachment or corroborative purposes would make the attorney much less an officer of the 
court and much more an ordinary witness. The standards of the profession would thereby suffer. 
 
Denial of production of this nature does not mean that any material, non-privileged facts can be 
hidden from the petitioner in this case. He need not be unduly hindered in the preparation of his 
case, in the discovery of facts or in his anticipation of his opponents’ position. Searching 
interrogatories directed to Fortenbaugh and the tug owners, production of written documents 
and statements upon a proper showing and direct interviews with the witnesses themselves all 
serve to reveal the facts in Fortenbaugh’s possession to the fullest possible extent consistent 
with public policy. Petitioner’s counsel frankly admits that he wants the oral statements only to 
help prepare himself to examine witnesses and to make sure that he has overlooked nothing. 
That is insufficient under the circumstances to permit him an exception to the policy underlying 
the privacy of Fortenbaugh’s professional activities. If there should be a rare situation justifying 
production of these matters, petitioner's case is not of that type. 
 
We fully appreciate the wide-spread controversy among the members of the legal profession 
over the problem raised by this case. It is a problem that rests on what has been one of the 
most hazy frontiers of the discovery process. But until some rule or statute definitely prescribes 
otherwise, we are not justified in permitting discovery in a situation of this nature as a matter of 
unqualified right. When Rule 26 and the other discovery rules were adopted, this Court and the 
members of the bar in general certainly did not believe or contemplate that all the files and 
mental processes of lawyers were thereby opened to the free scrutiny of their adversaries. And 
we refuse to interpret the rules at this time so as to reach so harsh and unwarranted a result. 
 
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring. 
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The narrow question in this case concerns only one of thirty-nine interrogatories which 
defendants and their counsel refused to answer. As there was persistence in refusal after the 
court ordered them to answer it, counsel and clients were committed to jail by the district court 
until they should purge themselves of contempt. 
 
The interrogatory asked whether statements were taken from the crews of the tugs involved in 
the accident, or of any other vessel, and demanded “Attach hereto exact copies of all such 
statements if in writing, and if oral, set forth in detail the exact provisions of any such oral 
statements or reports.” The question is simply whether such a demand is authorized by the 
rules relating to various aspects of “discovery.” 
 
The primary effect of the practice advocated here would be on the legal profession itself. But it 
too often is overlooked that the lawyer and the law office are indispensable parts of our 
administration of justice. Law-abiding people can go nowhere else to learn the ever changing 
and constantly multiplying rules by which they must behave and to obtain redress for their 
wrongs. The welfare and tone of the legal profession is therefore of prime consequence to 
society, which would feel the consequences of such a practice as petitioner urges secondarily 
but certainly. 
 
“Discovery” is one of the working tools of the legal profession. It traces back to the equity bill of 
discovery in English Chancery practice and seems to have had a forerunner in Continental 
practice. Since 1848 when the draftsmen of New York’s Code of Procedure recognized the 
importance of a better system of discovery the impetus to extend and expand discovery, as well 
as the opposition to it, has come from within the Bar itself. It happens in this case that it is the 
plaintiff’s attorney who demands such unprecedented latitude of discovery and, strangely 
enough, amicus briefs in his support have been filed by several labor unions representing 
plaintiffs as a class. It is the history of the movement for broader discovery, however, that in 
actual experience the chief opposition to its extension has come from lawyers who specialize in 
representing plaintiffs, because defendants have made liberal use of it to force plaintiffs to 
disclose their cases in advance. Discovery is a two-edged sword and we cannot decide this 
problem on any doctrine of extending help to one class of litigants. 
 
It seems clear and long has been recognized that discovery should provide a party access to 
anything that is evidence in his case. It seems equally clear that discovery should not nullify the 
privilege of confidential communication between attorney and client. But those principles give us 
no real assistance here because what is being sought is neither evidence nor is it a privileged 
communication between attorney and client. 
 
To consider first the most extreme aspect of the requirement in litigation here, we find it calls 
upon counsel, if he has had any conversations with any of the crews of the vessels in question 
or of any other, to “set forth in detail the exact provision of any such oral statements or reports.” 
Thus the demand is not for the production of a transcript in existence but calls for the creation of 
a written statement not in being. But the statement by counsel of what a witness told him is not 
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evidence when written. Plaintiff could not introduce it to prove his case. What, then, is the 
purpose sought to be served by demanding this of adverse counsel? 
 
Counsel for the petitioner candidly said on argument that he wanted this information to help 
prepare himself to examine witnesses, to make sure he overlooked nothing. He bases his claim 
to it in his brief on the view that the Rules were to do away with the old situation where a law 
suit developed into “a battle of wits between counsel.” But a common law trial is and always 
should be an adversary proceeding. Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned 
profession to perform its functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary. 
 
The real purpose and the probable effect of the practice ordered by the district court would be to 
put trials on a level even lower than a “battle of wits.” I can conceive of no practice more 
demoralizing to the Bar than to require a lawyer to write out and deliver to his adversary an 
account of what witnesses have told him. Even if his recollection were perfect, the statement 
would be his language, permeated with his inferences. Every one who has tried it knows that it 
is almost impossible so fairly to record the expressions and emphasis of a witness that when he 
testifies in the environment of the court and under the influence of the leading question there will 
not be departures in some respects. Whenever the testimony of the witness would differ from 
the “exact” statement the lawyer had delivered, the lawyer's statement would be whipped out to 
impeach the witness. Counsel producing his adversary's “inexact” statement could lose nothing 
by saying, “Here is a contradiction, gentlemen of the jury. I do not know whether it is my 
adversary or his witness who is not telling the truth, but one is not.” Of course, if this practice 
were adopted, that scene would be repeated over and over again. The lawyer who delivers such 
statements often would find himself branded a deceiver afraid to take the stand to support his 
own version of the witness’s conversation with him, or else he will have to go on the stand to 
defend his own credibility — perhaps against that of his chief witness, or possibly even his 
client. 
 
Every lawyer dislikes to take the witness stand and will do so only for grave reasons. This is 
partly because it is not his role; he is almost invariably a poor witness. But he steps out of 
professional character to do it. He regrets it; the profession discourages it. But the practice 
advocated here is one which would force him to be a witness, not as to what he has seen or 
done but as to other witnesses’ stories, and not because he wants to do so but in self-defense. 
 
And what is the lawyer to do who has interviewed one whom he believes to be a biased, lying or 
hostile witness to get his unfavorable statements and know what to meet? He must record and 
deliver such statements even though he would not vouch for the credibility of the witness by 
calling him. Perhaps the other side would not want to call him either, but the attorney is open to 
the charge of suppressing evidence at the trial if he fails to call such a hostile witness even 
though he never regarded him as reliable or truthful. 
 
Having been supplied the names of the witnesses, petitioner’s lawyer gives no reason why he 
cannot interview them himself. If an employee-witness refuses to tell his story, he, too, may be 
examined under the Rules. He may be compelled on discovery, as fully as on the trial, to 
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disclose his version of the facts. But that is his own disclosure — it can be used to impeach him 
if he contradicts it and such a deposition is not useful to promote an unseemly disagreement 
between the witness and the counsel in the case. 
 
It is true that the literal language of the Rules would admit of an interpretation that would sustain 
the district court’s order. So the literal language of the Act of Congress which makes “any writing 
or record made as a memorandum or record of any occurrence, or event” admissible as 
evidence, would have allowed the railroad company to put its engineer's accident statements in 
evidence. But all such procedural measures have a background of custom and practice which 
was assumed by those who wrote and should be by those who apply them. We reviewed the 
background of the Act and the consequences on the trial of negligence cases of allowing 
railroads and others to put in their statements and thus to shield the crew from cross-
examination. We said, “Such a major change which opens wide the door to avoidance of cross-
examination should not be left to implication.” We pointed out that there, as here, the “several 
hundred years of history behind the Act indicate the nature of the reforms which it was designed 
to effect.” We refused to apply it beyond that point. We should follow the same course of 
reasoning here. Certainly nothing in the tradition or practice of discovery up to the time of these 
Rules would have suggested that they would authorize such a practice as here proposed. 
 
The question remains as to signed statements or those written by witnesses. Such statements 
are not evidence for the defendant. Nor should I think they ordinarily could be evidence for the 
plaintiff. But such a statement might be useful for impeachment of the witness who signed it, if 
he is called and if he departs from the statement. There might be circumstances, too, where 
impossibility or difficulty of access to the witness or his refusal to respond to requests for 
information or other facts would show that the interests of justice require that such statements 
be made available. Production of such statements are governed by Rule 34 and on “showing 
good cause therefor” the court may order their inspection, copying or photographing. No such 
application has here been made; the demand is made on the basis of right, not on showing of 
cause. 
 
I agree to the affirmance of the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals which reversed the 
district court. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did the Supreme Court find that the work product doctrine is justified? 
2. How does the justification for the work product doctrine differ from the justification for the 
attorney-client privilege? 
3. How does the protection provided by the work product doctrine differ from the protection 
provided by the attorney-client privilege? 
4. Why didn’t plaintiff’s counsel make a sufficient showing of necessity in this case?   
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The J.M. Taylor, Philadelphia, Pa. (~1940) 
 
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) 
 
Summary: The Supreme Court held that notes and memoranda generated by Upjohn’s 
attorneys that were not protected by the attorney-client privilege could still be protected 
by the work product doctrine. Specifically, it found that necessity alone was not enough 
to require production of opinion work product. 
 
Our decision that the communications by Upjohn employees to counsel are covered by the 
attorney-client privilege disposes of the case so far as the responses to the questionnaires and 
any notes reflecting responses to interview questions are concerned. The summons reaches 
further, however, and Thomas has testified that his notes and memoranda of interviews go 
beyond recording responses to his questions. To the extent that the material subject to the 
summons is not protected by the attorney-client privilege as disclosing communications 
between an employee and counsel, we must reach the ruling by the Court of Appeals that the 
work-product doctrine does not apply. 
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While conceding the applicability of the work-product doctrine, the Government asserts that it 
has made a sufficient showing of necessity to overcome its protections. The Magistrate 
apparently so found. The Government relies on the following language in Hickman: 
 
We do not mean to say that all written materials obtained or prepared by an adversary's 
counsel with an eye toward litigation are necessarily free from discovery in all cases. 
Where relevant and nonprivileged facts remain hidden in an attorney’s file and where 
production of those facts is essential to the preparation of one’s case, discovery may 
properly be had. And production might be justified where the witnesses are no longer 
available or can be reached only with difficulty. 
 
The Government stresses that interviewees are scattered across the globe and that Upjohn has 
forbidden its employees to answer questions it considers irrelevant. The above-quoted language 
from Hickman, however, did not apply to “oral statements made by witnesses whether presently 
in the form of the attorney’s mental impressions or memoranda.” As to such material the Court 
did “not believe that any showing of necessity can be made under the circumstances of this 
case so as to justify production. If there should be a rare situation justifying production of these 
matters, petitioner's case is not of that type.” Forcing an attorney to disclose notes and 
memoranda of witnesses’ oral statements is particularly disfavored because it tends to reveal 
the attorney’s mental processes. 
 
Rule 26 accords special protection to work product revealing the attorney’s mental processes. 
The Rule permits disclosure of documents and tangible things constituting attorney work 
product upon a showing of substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue 
hardship. This was the standard applied by the Magistrate. Rule 26 goes on, however, to state 
that “in ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the 
court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal 
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.” Although this 
language does not specifically refer to memoranda based on oral statements of witnesses, the 
Hickman court stressed the danger that compelled disclosure of such memoranda would reveal 
the attorney’s mental processes. It is clear that this is the sort of material the draftsmen of the 
Rule had in mind as deserving special protection. 
 
Based on the foregoing, some courts have concluded that no showing of necessity can 
overcome protection of work product which is based on oral statements from witnesses. Those 
courts declining to adopt an absolute rule have nonetheless recognized that such material is 
entitled to special protection. 
 
We do not decide the issue at this time. It is clear that the Magistrate applied the wrong 
standard when he concluded that the Government had made a sufficient showing of necessity 
to overcome the protections of the work-product doctrine. The Magistrate applied the 
“substantial need” and “without undue hardship” standard articulated in the first part of Rule 
26(b)(3). The notes and memoranda sought by the Government here, however, are work 
product based on oral statements. If they reveal communications, they are, in this case, 
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protected by the attorney-client privilege. To the extent they do not reveal communications, they 
reveal the attorneys’ mental processes in evaluating the communications. As Rule 26 and 
Hickman make clear, such work product cannot be disclosed simply on a showing of substantial 
need and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship. 
 
While we are not prepared at this juncture to say that such material is always protected by the 
work-product rule, we think a far stronger showing of necessity and unavailability by other 
means than was made by the Government or applied by the Magistrate in this case would be 
necessary to compel disclosure. Since the Court of Appeals thought that the work-product 
protection was never applicable in an enforcement proceeding such as this, and since the 
Magistrate whose recommendations the District Court adopted applied too lenient a standard of 
protection, we think the best procedure with respect to this aspect of the case would be to 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and remand the case to it for 
such further proceedings in connection with the work-product claim as are consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. How does the Court distinguish between fact work product and opinion work product? 
2. Why is the standard for discovery of fact work product lower than the standard for 
opinion work product? 
3. Should opinion work product ever be discoverable? What if it is inextricable from fact 
work product? 
4. How would discoverability of fact or opinion work product affect the incentives of 
attorneys? 
 
 
National Semiconductor DM7432N Quad 2-Input OR Gates 
 
Sporck v. Peil, 759 F. 2d 312 (3d Cir. 1985) 
 
Summary: Peil filed an action against Sporck and Sprague, alleging that they conspired 
to inflate the value of National Semiconductor stock. Among other things, defendants 
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produced more than 100,000 documents. Counsel for defendants showed Sporck 
documents while preparing him for a deposition. Plaintiff asked Sporck to identify all of 
the documents he reviewed in preparation for the deposition. Sporck refused, the district 
court ordered production, and the circuit court reversed, holding that the attorney’s 
choice of which documents to show Sporck was opinion work product. 
 
JAMES HUNTER, III, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case arises on a Petition for Writ of Mandamus involving a discovery dispute between the 
parties to a securities fraud class action suit. The underlying action involves an allegation by 
plaintiff-respondent Raymond K. Peil that defendant National Semiconductor Corporation, 
defendant-petitioner Charles F. Sporck, NSC’s president, and defendant Peter J. Sprague, 
NSC’s chairman, conspired to inflate artificially the value of NSC stock, in order to enable 
Sporck and Sprague to sell their own shares at the inflated level. The wrongful conduct alleged 
includes various misrepresentations and nondisclosures of material facts during an eight-month 
period continuing from July 1, 1976, until March 1, 1977. 
 
During pretrial discovery, attorneys for Peil served numerous sets of combined interrogatory and 
document requests on defendants. In response, defendants produced hundreds of thousands of 
documents, from which Peil's attorneys selected more than 100,000 for copying. There is no 
allegation in this case that defendants have improperly concealed or refused to produce 
requested documents. 
 
The issue presently before this court arose on May 16, 1983, at the deposition of defendant-
petitioner Sporck. Prior to the deposition, counsel for defendants had prepared Sporck for his 
expected week-long deposition by showing him an unknown quantity of the numerous 
documents produced by defendants in response to plaintiff’s discovery requests. Defense 
counsel selected and compiled these documents in a folder in Philadelphia, and transported 
them to California solely for the deposition. According to defense counsel, the selected 
documents represented, as a group, counsel’s legal opinion as to the evidence relevant both to 
the allegations in the case and the possible legal defenses. It is conceded that none of the 
individual documents, in their redacted form, contained work product of defense counsel. 
 
At the inception of the Sporck deposition, Peil’s attorney asked: “Mr. Sporck, in preparation for 
this deposition, did you have occasion to examine any documents?” Sporck answered 
affirmatively, and Peil’s attorney first orally, and then by written motion pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 34, requested identification and production of “all documents examined, 
reviewed or referred to by Charles E. Sporck in preparation for the session of his deposition 
commencing May 16, 1983.” Defense counsel refused to identify the documents, arguing first 
that all the documents had previously been produced, and second, that the select grouping of 
the documents was attorney work product protected from discovery by Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(3). Defense counsel agreed, however, to allow Peil’s counsel to ask Sporck 
about his reliance on individual documents in the context of specific factual questions, and 
Sporck’s deposition continued on this basis. 
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Peil filed a motion to compel identification and production of the selected documents, on the 
ground that all documents used in preparing a witness for a deposition are properly 
discoverable under Federal Rule of Evidence 612. Judge John B. Hannum granted Peil’s 
motion, and ordered that defendant produce or identify all documents reviewed by Sporck in 
preparation for his deposition. Upon petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, Judge Hannum 
reaffirmed his order, holding that although the select grouping of documents constituted attorney 
work product, it was not “opinion” work product entitled to absolute protection, and that the 
principles behind Federal Rule of Evidence 612 supported Peil’s claim to identification of the 
documents. Sporck now asks this court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to 
vacate both orders. 
 
The threshold issue in this case is whether the selection process of defense counsel in grouping 
certain documents together out of the thousands produced in this litigation is work product 
entitled to protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) and the principles of 
Hickman v. Taylor. Petitioner concedes that the individual documents that comprise the 
grouping are not attorney work product, but argues that the selection process itself represents 
defense counsel’s mental impressions and legal opinions as to how the evidence in the 
documents relates to the issues and defenses in the litigation. Because identification of the 
documents as a group will reveal defense counsel’s selection process, and thus his mental 
impressions, petitioner argues that identification of the documents as a group must be 
prevented to protect defense counsel's work product. We agree. 
 
The work product doctrine had its modern genesis in the seminal opinion in Hickman v. Taylor. 
In Hickman, the Court rejected “an attempt, without purported necessity or justification, to 
secure written statements, private memoranda and personal recollections prepared or formed 
by an adverse party's counsel in the course of his legal duties.” Preserving the privacy of 
preparation that is essential to the attorney's adversary role is the central justification for the 
work product doctrine. Without this zone of privacy: 
 
Much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney’s thoughts, 
heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices 
would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for 
trial. The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the 
clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served. 
 
The work product doctrine as articulated in Hickman has been partially codified in Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). That rule conditions the production of “documents and tangible 
things” prepared in anticipation of litigation by or for an opposing party on the moving party's 
showing of substantial need and undue hardship. Even where such a showing is made, 
however, the trial court, in ordering the production of such materials, “shall protect against 
disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or 
other representative of a party concerning the litigation.” Thus, Rule 26(b)(3) recognizes the 
distinction between “ordinary” and “opinion” work product first articulated by the Supreme Court. 
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Opinion work product includes such items as an attorney’s legal strategy, his intended lines of 
proof, his evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of his case, and the inferences he draws 
from interviews of witnesses. Such material is accorded an almost absolute protection from 
discovery because any slight factual content that such items may have is generally outweighed 
by the adversary system’s interest in maintaining the privacy of an attorney’s thought processes 
and in ensuring that each side relies on its own wit in preparing their respective cases. 
 
We believe that the selection and compilation of documents by counsel in this case in 
preparation for pretrial discovery falls within the highly-protected category of opinion work 
product. As the court succinctly stated in James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co.: 
 
In selecting and ordering a few documents out of thousands counsel could not help but 
reveal important aspects of his understanding of the case. Indeed, in a case such as 
this, involving extensive document discovery, the process of selection and distillation is 
often more critical than pure legal research. There can be no doubt that at least in the 
first instance the binders were entitled to protection as work product. 
 
Further, in selecting the documents that he thought relevant to Sporck’s deposition, defense 
counsel engaged in proper and necessary preparation of his client's case. As the Supreme 
Court noted in Hickman: 
 
Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he assemble information, sift what he 
considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan 
his strategy without undue and needless interference. That is the historical and the 
necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework of our system of jurisprudence 
to promote justice and to protect their client's interest. 
 
In the instant case, without the protection that the work product doctrine accords his 
preparation, defense counsel may have foregone a sifting of the documents, or at the very least 
chosen not to show the documents to petitioner. As a result, petitioner may not have been as 
well-prepared for his deposition, and neither plaintiff nor defendant would have realized the full 
benefit of a well-prepared deponent's testimony. For these reasons, Rule 26(b)(3) placed an 
obligation on the trial court to protect against unjustified disclosure of defense counsel's 
selection process. 
 
This conclusion, however, does not end the issue. Respondent argues, and the trial court 
agreed, that operation of Federal Rule of Evidence 612 removed any protection that defense 
counsel’s selection process would ordinarily enjoy. Because we find that Federal Rule of 
Evidence 612 does not apply to the facts of this case, we disagree. 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 612 provides in relevant part: 
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If a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory for the purpose of testifying, (2) before 
testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in the interest of justice, 
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to 
cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions which 
relate to the testimony of the witness. 
 
This rule is applicable to depositions and deposition testimony. Although applicable to 
depositions, Rule 612 is a rule of evidence, and not a rule of discovery. Its sole purpose is 
evidentiary in function - “to promote the search of credibility and memory.” 
 
By its very language, Rule 612 requires that a party meet three conditions before it may obtain 
documents used by a witness prior to testifying: 1) the witness must use the writing to refresh 
his memory; 2) the witness must use the writing for the purpose of testifying; and 3) the court 
must determine that production is necessary in the interests of justice. The first requirement is 
consistent with the purposes of the rule, for if the witness is not using the document to refresh 
his memory, that document has no relevance to any attempt to test the credibility and memory 
of the witness. 
 
The second requirement — that the witness use the document for the purpose of testifying — 
was designed “to safeguard against using the rule as a pretext for wholesale exploration of an 
opposing party’s files and to insure that access is limited only to those writings which may fairly 
be said in part to have an impact upon the testimony of the witness.” As with the first 
requirement, the second requirement recognizes that the document is of little utility for 
impeachment and cross-examination without a showing that the document actually influenced 
the witness’ testimony. Finally, the third requirement codifies the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Goldman v. United States, that even though a witness may review notes prior to testifying, a trial 
court should exercise discretion to guard against “fishing expeditions among a multitude of 
papers which a witness may have used in preparing for trial.” 
 
In the case before us, the apparent conflict between the protected status of defense counsel's 
document selection process under Rule 26(b)(3) and the asserted need, for cross-examination 
purposes, of the identification of the documents actually selected resulted from the failure to 
establish the first two requirements under Rule 612. In seeking identification of all documents 
reviewed by petitioner prior to asking petitioner any questions concerning the subject matter of 
the deposition, respondent’s counsel failed to establish either that petitioner relied on any 
documents in giving his testimony, or that those documents influenced his testimony. Without 
first eliciting the testimony, there existed no basis for asking petitioner the source of that 
testimony. We conclude, therefore, that deposing counsel failed to lay a proper foundation 
under Rule 612 for production of the documents selected by counsel. 
 
Indeed, if respondent’s counsel had first elicited specific testimony from petitioner, and then 
questioned petitioner as to which, if any, documents informed that testimony, the work product 
petitioner seeks to protect — counsel’s opinion of the strengths and weaknesses of the case as 
represented by the group identification of documents selected by counsel — would not have 
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been implicated. Rather, because identification of such documents would relate to specific 
substantive areas raised by respondent's counsel, respondent would receive only those 
documents which deposing counsel, through his own work product, was incisive enough to 
recognize and question petitioner on. The fear that counsel for petitioner's work product would 
be revealed would thus become groundless. 
 
Rule 612, therefore, when properly applied, does not conflict with the protection of attorney work 
product of the type involved in this case. Because the trial court did not properly condition its 
application of Rule 612 on a showing that petitioner relied upon the requested documents for his 
testimony and that those documents impacted on his testimony, the court committed legal error. 
This error became prejudicial when it implicated work product of petitioner’s counsel. Proper 
application of Rule 612 should never implicate an attorney's selection, in preparation for a 
witness’ deposition, of a group of documents that he believes critical to a case. Instead, 
identification of such documents under Rule 612 should only result from opposing counsel’s 
own selection of relevant areas of questioning, and from the witness’ subsequent admission that 
his answers to those specific areas of questioning were informed by documents he had 
reviewed. In such a case, deposing counsel would discover the documents through his own wit, 
and not through the wit of his adversary. 
 
We conclude, therefore, that the trial court committed clear error of law in ordering the 
identification of the documents selected by counsel. Because we are confident that the district 
court will proceed in accordance with our opinion without formal issuance of the writ, we will 
remand to the district court. 
 
SEITZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
The majority approves in effect the use of the work product doctrine to prevent an identification 
of documents reviewed by a witness in preparation for his deposition. I dissent because I am 
convinced that such a ruling is an impermissible expansion of the work product doctrine at the 
expense of legitimate discovery. 
 
The plaintiffs-respondents sought in the district court the discovery of relevant objective facts: 
the identities of the documents that the deponent reviewed prior to testifying. These facts are 
not, in themselves, the opinion or thought processes of an attorney. Nor were the contents of 
the documents, all of which had already been produced by the defendants, created by 
defendants’ attorney in anticipation of litigation. 
 
Yet, the defendant-petitioner claims that the mere identification of the documents examined 
prior to his deposition would reveal his attorney’s litigation strategy. Presumably, the petitioner’s 
argument must be that if the respondents knew which documents were reviewed, they could, 
upon examination of the documents identified, draw conclusions as to why each document was 
chosen. 
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The problem with the petitioner's theory is that it assumes that one can extrapolate backwards 
from the results of a selection process to determine the reason a document was selected for 
review by the deponent. There are many reasons for showing a document or selected portions 
of a document to a witness. The most that can be said from the fact that the witness looked at a 
document is that someone thought that the document, or some portion of the document, might 
be useful for the preparation of the witness for his deposition. This is a far cry from the 
disclosure of the a lawyer’s opinion work product. Even assuming that the documents were 
selected by the petitioner’s attorney, the subject matter is so undifferentiated that its potential for 
invasion of work product is miniscule at best. 
 
Every act by a litigant or his attorney gives rise to similar vague inferences. For example, a 
typical interrogatory from a leading treatise would permit questions of the following form: 
“Identify each writing which relates or refers directly or indirectly to a transaction in question.” It 
cannot seriously be contended that an answer is not required because it would reveal the fact 
that the attorney thought that certain documents were relevant to the transaction. 
 
Moreover, in order to claim the shield of opinion work product, it must be established that it is 
the attorney’s thought processes that are revealed. The respondents’ request did not require the 
identification of the person who selected the documents. The only disclosed connection to the 
petitioner’s attorney in our situation is that the petitioner gratuitously volunteered the fact that his 
attorney selected the documents. To permit this volunteered information to provide a necessary 
link to attorney’s thought processes, as the majority has done, is to permit the petitioner to cloak 
the non-work product aspects of the information sought with work product protection. Certainly 
an attorney cannot cloak a document under the mantle of work product by simply reviewing it. It 
is difficult to see how an attorney or his witness may insulate the discoverable fact that the 
witness reviewed a particular document by volunteering that the attorney selected the document 
for deposition preparation purposes. 
 
Finally, the petitioner contends that the information sought was “fact” work product, and that the 
respondents have made an insufficient showing of need to require its production. Assuming 
without deciding that the information sought was fact work product, I would not decide this issue 
on a petition for a writ of mandamus. To reach this issue would require us to review a decision 
committed to the discretion of the district court, and such decisions do not constitute “clear and 
indisputable” legal error. Further, revelation of fact work product does not constitute the same 
sort of irreparable harm that would come from the revelation of opinion work product. 
 
Because I find no disclosure of the attorney's work product that would provide a basis for 
granting the writ, I would not reach the issue of whether a proper foundation had been 
established for the requested information under Federal Rule of Evidence 612 or the provision 
covering relevant evidence found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). Decisions on such 
matters are not independently reviewable on a petition seeking the extraordinary remedy of 
mandamus. 
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Based on the record presented by the petitioner, I fail to see how any conclusions may be 
drawn as to what his attorney may or may not have thought about this litigation. The mere 
identification of documents used to prepare a witness for his deposition does not convey any 
meaningful information of the type entitled to protection under the work product doctrine. I would 
deny the petition. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did the majority hold that the attorney’s choice of which documents to show Sporck 
in preparation for the deposition was opinion work product? 
2. Why did the dissent argue that it was not work product at all? 
 
United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F. 3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
 
Summary: Dow Chemicals filed an action disputing a tax adjustment. Among other 
things, the IRS subpoenaed documents from Deloitte & Touche, Dow’s auditor. Deloitte 
refused to produce three documents, under the work product doctrine. The district court 
denied the IRS’s motion to compel, finding that the documents were created in 
anticipation of litigation and reflected attorney thoughts, and therefore were protected by 
the work product doctrine. The circuit court vacated in part and affirmed in part, holding 
that the district court lacked sufficient information to determine whether some of the 
documents were work product, but did not abuse its discretion with respect to other 
documents. 
 
SENTELLE, Chief Judge: 
 
The United States appeals from a district court order denying its motion to compel Dow 
Chemical Company’s independent auditor, Deloitte & Touche USA, LLP, to produce three 
documents in connection with ongoing tax litigation between Dow and the government. The 
district court ruled that all three documents were protected from discovery under the work-
product doctrine. On appeal, the government contends that one of the documents is not work 
product because it was prepared by Deloitte during the audit process. In addition, while it 
concedes that the other two documents are work product, it argues that Dow waived work-
product protection when it disclosed them to Deloitte. We vacate the district court's decision that 
the document prepared by Deloitte is work product and remand for in camera review to 
determine whether it is entirely work product. With respect to the other two documents, we 
affirm the district court’s decision that Dow did not waive work-product protection when it 
disclosed them to Deloitte. 
 
I. Background 
 
This discovery dispute arises from ongoing tax litigation in the U.S. District Court for the Middle 
District of Louisiana. The litigation concerns the tax treatment of two partnerships owned by 
Dow Chemical Company and two of its wholly-owned subsidiaries. The first of these 
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partnerships was Chemtech I; it was succeeded by Chemtech II. In 2005, Dow filed a civil suit 
challenging IRS adjustments to partnership returns filed by Chemtech I and Chemtech II. During 
discovery, the government subpoenaed documents from Dow’s independent auditor, Deloitte & 
Touche USA, LLP. Since the subpoena sought production in Washington, D.C., it issued from 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Deloitte produced a number of documents, 
but refused to produce three documents Dow identified as attorney work product. In response, 
the government filed a motion to compel production. 
 
The three disputed documents are described in Dow’s privilege log and in a declaration by 
William Curry, Dow’s Director of Taxes. The first document is a 1993 draft memorandum 
prepared by Deloitte that summarizes a meeting between Dow employees, Dow’s outside 
counsel, and Deloitte employees about the possibility of litigation over the Chemtech I 
partnership, and the necessity of accounting for such a possibility in an ongoing audit. This 
meeting took place after Dow informed Deloitte about the likelihood of litigation over the 
Chemtech I transaction. The second is a 1998 memorandum and flow chart prepared by two 
Dow employees — an accountant and an in-house attorney. The third is a 2005 tax opinion 
prepared by Dow’s outside counsel. Curry’s declaration explains that the second and third 
documents were disclosed to Deloitte so that it could “review the adequacy of Dow’s 
contingency reserves for the Chemtech transactions. According to Curry, Deloitte “compelled 
Dow’s production of these documents by informing the company that access to these 
documents was required in order to provide Dow with an unqualified audit opinion for its public 
financial statements.” The privilege log describes the subject matter of these documents as “tax 
issues related to the Chemtech partnership” and states that each one is a “document prepared 
in anticipation of litigation.” We will refer to the first document, which was prepared by Deloitte, 
as the “Deloitte Memorandum,” and the second and third documents, which were created by 
Dow, as the “Dow Documents.” 
 
The district court denied the government’s motion to compel without reviewing the disputed 
documents in camera. It concluded that the Deloitte Memorandum was work product because it 
was “prepared because of the prospect of litigation with the IRS over the tax treatment of 
Chemtech.” The court further concluded that, although the document was created by Deloitte, it 
was nonetheless Dow’s work product because “its contents record the thoughts of Dow’s 
counsel regarding the prospect of litigation.” In addition, the court rejected the government’s 
contention that Dow had waived work-product protection for the three documents. The court 
acknowledged that disclosing work product to a third party can waive protection if that 
disclosure is “inconsistent with the maintenance of secrecy from the disclosing party’s 
adversary,” but concluded that Dow’s disclosure to Deloitte was not inconsistent with 
maintaining secrecy because (1) Deloitte was not a potential adversary and (2) nothing 
suggested that it was unreasonable for Dow to expect Deloitte to maintain confidentiality. The 
government appeals this ruling, and Dow has intervened to assert work-product protection. 
 
II. Analysis 
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The government contends that the Deloitte Memorandum is not attorney work product. 
Alternatively, it argues that even if the Deloitte Memorandum is work product, Dow waived work-
product protection when it orally disclosed the information recorded therein to Deloitte. Turning 
to the Dow Documents, the government concedes they are attorney work product, but argues 
that Dow waived work-product protection when it gave them to Deloitte. 
 
A. The Work-Product Doctrine 
 
The Supreme Court established the work-product doctrine in Hickman v. Taylor, which held that 
an attorney's notes recording his interviews with witnesses to the litigation-prompting incident 
were protected from discovery. The Court recognized that to prepare for litigation, an attorney 
must “assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, 
prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference.” This 
preparation “is reflected in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental 
impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways.” The Court 
reasoned that giving opposing counsel access to such work product would cause significant 
problems: 
 
Much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney’s thoughts, 
heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices 
would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for 
trial. The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the 
clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served. 
 
Consequently, the Court concluded that attorney work product is protected from discovery 
unless “the one who would invade that privacy” carries the burden of “establishing adequate 
reasons to justify production through a subpoena or court order.” 
 
The work-product doctrine announced in Hickman was subsequently partially codified in Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), which states: 
 
(A) Documents and Tangible Things. Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents 
and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for 
another party or its representative (including the other party’s attorney, consultant, 
surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent). 
 
Rule 26(b)(3) allows a court to order disclosure when the requesting party can show a 
“substantial need” for the material and an inability to procure equivalent information “without 
undue hardship.” When a court orders disclosure under this exception, however, it must still 
“protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of 
a party’s attorney or other representative concerning the litigation.” This type of work product, 
which is often described as opinion work product, “is virtually undiscoverable.” 
 
B. The Deloitte Memorandum 
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The government makes two categorical arguments that the Deloitte Memorandum cannot be 
work product. First, it argues that the Deloitte Memorandum cannot be work product because it 
was created by Deloitte, not Dow or its representative. Second, it argues that the Deloitte 
Memorandum cannot be work product because it was generated as part of the routine audit 
process, not in anticipation of litigation. If either argument is correct, the Deloitte Memorandum 
cannot be work product, regardless of its contents. We reject both arguments, but nevertheless 
conclude that the district court lacked sufficient information to determine that the entire Deloitte 
Memorandum is work product. 
 
1 
 
The government first contends that Dow cannot claim work-product protection for the Deloitte 
Memorandum because it was prepared by Deloitte. Rule 26(b)(3) only protects “documents and 
tangible things that are prepared by or for another party or its representative.” Given this 
language, the government argues that the Deloitte Memorandum is not work product because 
Deloitte is not Dow’s representative. It relies principally on United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 
in which the Supreme Court refused to recognize an accountant work-product privilege. In 
Arthur Young, the Court contrasted the role of an attorney with that of an accountant, explaining 
that an attorney is “a loyal representative whose duty it is to present the client’s case in the most 
favorable possible light,” whereas an independent certified public accountant has a “public 
responsibility” and “owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation’s creditors and stockholders, as 
well as to the investing public.” In the government’s view, Arthur Young demonstrates that 
Deloitte cannot be Dow’s representative, which in turn means that the Deloitte Memorandum 
cannot be work product under the plain language of Rule 26(b)(3). Dow counters that the 
“representative” for purposes of Rule 26(b)(3) is its counsel, whose thoughts and opinions are 
recorded in the document. In addition, it argues that the Deloitte Memorandum is work product 
because it contains the same type of opinion work product that is found in the Dow Documents, 
which the government concedes are work product. 
 
Even if the government is correct in asserting that the Deloitte Memorandum falls outside the 
definition given by Rule 26(b)(3), this does not conclusively establish that it is not work product. 
The government mistakenly assumes that Rule 26(b)(3) provides an exhaustive definition of 
what constitutes work product. On the contrary, Rule 26(b)(3) only partially codifies the work-
product doctrine announced in Hickman. Rule 26(b)(3) addresses only “documents and tangible 
things,” but Hickman's definition of work product extends to “intangible” things. Moreover, in 
Hickman, the Court explained that the attorney’s “mental impressions” were protected from 
discovery, so that he could not be forced to “repeat or write out” that information in discovery. 
Thus Hickman provides work-product protection for intangible work product independent of Rule 
26(b)(3). 
 
The government focuses on Deloitte’s role in creating the document and on its relationship to 
Dow. Under Hickman, however, the question is not who created the document or how they are 
related to the party asserting work-product protection, but whether the document contains work 
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product — the thoughts and opinions of counsel developed in anticipation of litigation. The 
district court found that the memorandum records those thoughts, even though Deloitte and not 
Dow or its attorney committed them to paper. The work product privilege does not depend on 
whether the thoughts and opinions were communicated orally or in writing, but on whether they 
were prepared in anticipation of litigation. Thus Deloitte’s preparation of the document does not 
exclude the possibility that it contains Dow’s work product. 
 
2 
 
The government next contends that the Deloitte Memorandum cannot be work product because 
it was generated during an annual audit, not prepared in anticipation of litigation. The courts are 
not unanimous on the proper test for determining whether a document was prepared “in 
anticipation of litigation.” Under the test adopted by most circuits, the question is whether the 
document was created “because of” the anticipated litigation. The Fifth Circuit, however, 
requires that anticipation of litigation be the “primary motivating purpose” behind the document’s 
creation. 
 
Like most circuits, we apply the “because of” test, asking “whether, in light of the nature of the 
document and the factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be said to 
have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation.” In addition, while this 
standard addresses a “document,” it applies equally to work product in other forms. Thus for the 
Deloitte Memorandum, the question is whether it records information prepared by Dow or its 
representatives because of the prospect of litigation. 
 
In the government’s view, the Deloitte Memorandum was prepared not “because of the prospect 
of litigation,” but as part of the routine audit process. The government asserts that a document’s 
function, not its content, determines whether it is work product. For this proposition the 
government relies on Delaney, Migdail & Young, Chartered v. IRS. In Delaney, a law firm 
sought to obtain under the Freedom of Information Act memoranda and supporting documents 
relating to the government’s legal analysis of an Internal Revenue Service program concerning 
the use of statistical sampling in auditing large accounts. In that case it was the IRS that 
asserted work-product protection. The court held that the documents were work product 
because they “advised the agency of the types of legal challenges likely to be mounted against 
a proposed program, potential defenses available to the agency, and the likely outcome.” In its 
reasoning, the court noted that a previous work-product decision had identified “the function of 
the documents as the critical issue.” The government seizes on this language, arguing that the 
Deloitte Memorandum is not work product because its function was to facilitate Deloitte’s audit, 
not to prepare Dow for litigation. 
 
We think the government misreads Delaney. While Delaney used the term “function,” it was not 
considering any distinction between function and content in determining whether a document 
constituted work product. On the contrary, the court evaluated the function of the IRS 
documents at issue by examining their contents. It contrasted the documents at issue in the 
Coastal States case, which were like “an agency manual, fleshing out the meaning of the statute 
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it was authorized to enforce,” with the documents at issue in Delaney, which were memoranda 
describing potential legal challenges, possible defenses, and likely outcomes. Delaney does not 
support the proposition that we should look solely to a document's function divorced from its 
contents in determining its status as work product. 
 
In short, a document can contain protected work-product material even though it serves multiple 
purposes, so long as the protected material was prepared because of the prospect of litigation. 
 
3 
 
Rejecting the government's categorical arguments establishes only that the Deloitte 
Memorandum may be protected work product under the law; we must now determine whether it 
is. On examination of the record, we conclude that the district court did not have a sufficient 
evidentiary foundation for its holding that the memorandum was purely work product. According 
to the record, the document was created during Deloitte’s preparation of an audit report which in 
Deloitte’s view required consideration of potential litigation. The meeting generating the 
document included both Deloitte and Dow employees, as well as Dow's outside counsel. The 
document itself was prepared by a third party. While none of this negates the possibility of work-
product privilege, it could make it likely that the document includes other information that is not 
work product. According to Dow’s privilege log and the Curry declaration, the memorandum 
does contain thoughts and analyses by legal counsel, but this does not rule out or even render 
unlikely the possibility that it also includes other facts, other thoughts, other analyses by non-
attorneys which may not be so intertwined with the legal analysis as to warrant protection under 
the work-product doctrine. We will therefore remand this question to the district court for the 
purpose of independently assessing whether the document was entirely work product, or 
whether a partial or redacted version of the document could have been disclosed. Accordingly, 
we vacate the district court's decision that the Deloitte Memorandum was work product and 
remand so that the district court can examine the document in camera to determine whether it is 
entirely work product. 
 
C. The Dow Documents 
 
Although the government concedes that the Dow Documents are work product, it contends that 
Dow waived work-product protection by disclosing them to Deloitte. To the best of our 
knowledge, no circuit has addressed whether disclosing work product to an independent auditor 
constitutes waiver. Among the district courts that have addressed this issue, most have found 
no waiver. 
 
While voluntary disclosure waives the attorney-client privilege, it does not necessarily waive 
work-product protection. The attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine serve 
different purposes: the former protects the attorney-client relationship by safeguarding 
confidential communications, whereas the latter promotes the adversary process by insulating 
an attorney’s litigation preparation from discovery. Voluntary disclosure waives the attorney-
client privilege because it is inconsistent with the confidential attorney-client relationship. 
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Voluntary disclosure does not necessarily waive work-product protection, however, because it 
does not necessarily undercut the adversary process. Nevertheless, disclosing work product to 
a third party can waive protection if “such disclosure, under the circumstances, is inconsistent 
with the maintenance of secrecy from the disclosing party's adversary.” Under this standard, the 
voluntary disclosure of attorney work product to an adversary or a conduit to an adversary 
waives work-product protection for that material. 
 
Applying this standard, the government contends that Dow has waived work-product protection 
for the Dow Documents because Deloitte is (1) a potential adversary and (2) a conduit to other 
adversaries. We reject both contentions and conclude that Dow has not waived the protection. 
 
1 
 
The government contends that Deloitte is a potential adversary of Dow because disputes 
sometimes arise between independent auditors and their clients and because independent 
auditors have the power to issue opinions that adversely affect their clients. Neither argument 
demonstrates that Deloitte is a potential adversary for purposes of waiver analysis. First, as an 
independent auditor, Deloitte cannot be Dow’s adversary. Even the threat of litigation between 
an independent auditor and its client can compromise the auditor's independence and 
necessitate withdrawal. Further, Deloitte’s power to issue an adverse opinion, while significant, 
does not make it the sort of litigation adversary contemplated by the waiver standard. Similarly, 
“any tension between an auditor and a corporation that arises from an auditor’s need to 
scrutinize and investigate a corporation's records and book-keeping practices simply is not the 
equivalent of an adversarial relationship contemplated by the work product doctrine.” Second, 
the possibility of a future dispute between Deloitte and Dow does not render Deloitte a potential 
adversary for the present purpose. If it did, any voluntary disclosure would constitute waiver. Yet 
the work-product doctrine allows disclosures as long as they do not undercut the adversary 
process. 
 
Here, the question is not whether Deloitte could be Dow’s adversary in any conceivable future 
litigation, but whether Deloitte could be Dow’s adversary in the sort of litigation the Dow 
Documents address. We conclude that the answer must be no. In preparing the Dow 
Documents, Dow anticipated a dispute with the IRS, not a dispute with Deloitte. The documents, 
which concern the tax implications of the Chemtech partnerships, would not likely be relevant in 
any dispute Dow might have with Deloitte. Thus Deloitte cannot be considered a potential 
adversary with respect to the Dow Documents. 
 
2 
 
The government also asserts that Deloitte is a conduit to Dow’s adversaries. It claims the district 
court failed to address this question, but this ignores the district court's explicit statement that 
“no evidence suggests that it was unreasonable for Dow to expect Deloitte USA to maintain 
confidentiality.” Like the district court, we conclude that Deloitte is not a conduit to Dow’s 
adversaries. 
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Our prior decisions applying the “maintenance of secrecy” standard, while fact-intensive, have 
generally made two discrete inquiries in assessing whether disclosure constitutes waiver. First, 
we have considered whether the disclosing party has engaged in self-interested selective 
disclosure by revealing its work product to some adversaries but not to others. Such conduct 
militates in favor of waiver, for it is “inconsistent and unfair to allow parties to select according to 
their own self-interest to which adversaries they will allow access to the materials.” 
 
Second, we have examined whether the disclosing party had a reasonable basis for believing 
that the recipient would keep the disclosed material confidential. A reasonable expectation of 
confidentiality may derive from common litigation interests between the disclosing party and the 
recipient. “The existence of common interests between transferor and transferee is relevant to 
deciding whether the disclosure is consistent with the nature of the work product privilege.” This 
is true because when common litigation interests are present, “the transferee is not at all likely 
to disclose the work product material to the adversary.” Alternately, a reasonable expectation of 
confidentiality may be rooted in a confidentiality agreement or similar arrangement between the 
disclosing party and the recipient. Nevertheless, a confidentiality agreement must be relatively 
strong and sufficiently unqualified to avoid waiver. In Williams, for example, we concluded that 
the government’s assurance that it would maintain confidentiality “to the extent possible” was 
not sufficiently strong or sufficiently unqualified to prevent the government from disclosing the 
information to a criminal defendant under Brady v. Maryland. Likewise, we have determined that 
a mere promise to give the disclosing party notice before releasing documents does not support 
a reasonable expectation of confidentiality. 
 
The selective disclosure inquiry is straightforward. Selective disclosure involves disclosing work 
product to at least one adversary. As we have explained, Deloitte is not an adversary, so Dow’s 
disclosure to Deloitte was not selective disclosure. The “reasonable expectation of 
confidentiality” inquiry is more complicated. As to common interests, Dow and Deloitte do not 
have common litigation interests in the Dow Documents — Dow has a litigation interest in the 
documents because of its interest in the Chemtech partnerships, but Deloitte has no similar 
interest in the documents. Absent common interests, the question is whether a confidentiality 
agreement or similar assurance gave Dow a reasonable expectation that Deloitte would keep its 
work product confidential. 
 
We conclude that Dow had a reasonable expectation of confidentiality because Deloitte, as an 
independent auditor, has an obligation to refrain from disclosing confidential client information. 
Rule 301 of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Code of Professional Conduct 
provides: “A member in public practice shall not disclose any confidential client information 
without the specific consent of the client.” William Curry's declaration explains that “Dow 
furnished these documents to Deloitte with the expectation that Deloitte would retain the 
confidentiality of the two documents.” Given the obligation imposed by Rule 301, we think this 
expectation was reasonable. 
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The government responds that this is a “qualified assurance’ that does not suffice to prevent 
waiver because Rule 301 also explains that it “shall not be construed to affect in any way the 
member’s obligation to comply with a validly issued and enforceable subpoena or summons.” 
But an assertion of work-product protection challenges the enforceability of a subpoena with 
respect to those materials. Thus Deloitte could refuse to produce the documents, thereby 
allowing Dow to intervene and assert work-product protection, without violating its obligation to 
comply with enforceable subpoenas. Indeed, this is exactly what Deloitte did. Accordingly, this 
caveat does not significantly diminish the reasonableness of Dow's expectation of 
confidentiality. 
 
The government also attempts to bolster its waiver argument by identifying instances in which 
an independent auditor might disclose information obtained from a company whose finances it 
audits. For example, it asserts that Deloitte could make Dow disclose its confidential tax 
analysis in footnotes to its public financial statements. Likewise, Deloitte could testify about 
confidential information obtained from Dow in proceedings brought by the SEC or private 
parties. Or Deloitte might report illegal acts it detects during its audit. Finally, the government 
returns to Arthur Young, arguing that as an independent auditor, Deloitte is a “public watchdog” 
whose ultimate allegiance is to Dow's creditors, stockholders, and the investing public — all 
potential adversaries of Dow. In sum, the government contends that Dow could not reasonably 
expect confidentiality from Deloitte after giving it the Dow Documents, given the myriad ways 
Deloitte could reveal that information. 
 
Of course Deloitte might disclose some information relevant to Dow’s finances. But the 
government has neither pointed to any regulatory provision nor posited any specific 
circumstance under which Deloitte would be required to disclose attorney work product like that 
contained in the Dow Documents. An independent auditor can fulfill its duties and render an 
opinion concerning a company’s public financial statements without revealing every piece of 
information it reviews during the audit process. In short, Deloitte’s independent auditor 
obligations do not make it a conduit to Dow’s adversaries. 
 
Likewise, the government's reliance on Arthur Young is misplaced. In Arthur Young, the Court 
considered whether accountant work-product should be granted the same protection attorney 
work product receives. The government quotes the Court's statement that “To insulate from 
disclosure a certified public accountant's interpretations of the client's financial statements 
would be to ignore the significance of the accountant's role as a disinterested analyst charged 
with public obligations.” All well and good. In this case, however, the government attempts to 
discover not an independent auditor's “interpretations of the client's financial statements,” which 
Arthur Young would permit, but an attorney's thoughts and opinions developed in anticipation of 
litigation, which the work-product doctrine forbids. 
 
Furthermore, we are mindful that independent auditors have significant leverage over the 
companies whose finances they audit. An auditor can essentially compel disclosure by refusing 
to provide an unqualified opinion otherwise. Finding waiver based on such disclosures could 
well encourage the sort of “inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices" that Hickman sought to 
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avoid. For example, it might discourage companies from seeking legal advice and candidly 
disclosing that information to independent auditors. Moreover, the government has not proffered 
any good reason for wanting the Dow Documents other than its desire to know what Dow's 
counsel thought about the Chemtech partnerships. Granting discovery under these 
circumstances would undercut the adversary process and let the government litigate "on wits 
borrowed from the adversary," We conclude that the district court applied the correct legal 
standard and acted within its discretion in determining that Dow had not waived work-product 
protection. Consequently, we affirm the district court's decision denying the government's 
motion to compel with respect to the Dow Documents. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did the court hold that a document disclosed to a third-party can be protected by 
the work product doctrine? Do you agree with its conclusion? 
2. When would a document disclosed to a third-party not be protected by the work product 
doctrine? 
 
Further Reading: 
 
● Sean Grammel, Comment, Protecting Search Terms as Opinion Work Product: Applying 
the Work Product Doctrine to Electronic Discovery, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2063 (2013) 
● Sherman L. Cohn, The Work-Product Doctrine: Protection, Not Privilege, 71 Geo. L.J. 
917 (1984) 
● Vivian K. Yamaguchi, Discovery and the Work Product Doctrine, 11 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 
863 (1980) 
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5.7: Exceptions to Privilege & Work Product 
 
Hush hush, keep it down now, voices carry.82 
 
Listen, do you want to know a secret? Do you promise not to tell? Closer. Let me whisper in 
your ear, say the words you long to hear.83 
 
While the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine provide strong protection against 
discovery of the communications and documents they protect, they are both subject to waiver 
and other exceptions. 
 
The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, and can be waived by the client. Obviously, a 
client can intentionally waive the attorney-client privilege. But it less clear whether a client can 
unintentionally waive the attorney-client privilege, and if so, when an unintentional waiver will be 
effective. And it is even less clear whether an attorney or third-party can unintentionally waive 
the attorney-client privilege. 
 
Typically, a client’s intentional disclosure of a privileged communication to an non-privileged 
third-party constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, even if the client didn’t intend to 
waive the privilege. But what if the client unintentionally disclosed the communication? For 
example, what if the client misplaced a copy of a privileged communication and a non-privileged 
third-party found it? Or what if the client disclosed a privileged communication to a non-
privileged third-party, under the mistaken belief that the third-party was privileged? 
 
In theory, an attorney cannot waive the attorney-client privilege. But it is unclear whether 
communications intentionally or unintentionally disclosed to a third-party by an attorney retain 
the privilege. For example, what if an attorney inadvertently produces a privileged document? 
Or what if an attorney intentionally discloses a privileged communication to the public? Likewise, 
it is unclear whether communications obtained and disclosed by a third-party retain the 
privilege. 
 
In most jurisdictions, inadvertent disclosure does not necessarily destroy the privilege. 
Specifically, if an attorney inadvertently produces a privileged document, opposing counsel must 
return or destroy the document, and may not read or otherwise use the document. And even an 
intentional disclosure by an attorney will not necessarily destroy the privilege. But in some 
jurisdictions, inadvertent disclosure may destroy the privilege. And if a privileged communication 
becomes generally known, at some point the privilege is probably constructively waived, 
irrespective of how the waiver occurred. 
 
In addition, the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine are subject to the crime-fraud 
exception, which provides that communications and documents in furtherance of a crime or 
																																																								
82 ‘Til Tuesday, Voices Carry, Voices Carry (1985). 
83 The Beatles, Do You Want to Know a Secret, Please Please Me (1963). 
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fraud are not protected. The privilege applies to confidential attorney-client communications 
about a crime or fraud that has already occurred, in order to enable clients to obtain candid legal 
advice. But the privilege does not apply to communications in furtherance of a future crime or 
fraud. 
 
The work product doctrine may be subject to an even broader exception for “attorney 
misconduct,” which provides that documents are not protected if they are the product of 
improper behavior on the part of the attorney.  
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(b): Duty to Disclose 
 
5. Claiming Privilege or Protecting Trial-Preparation Materials. 
A. Information Withheld. When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable 
by claiming that the information is privileged or subject to protection as trial-
preparation material, the party must: 
i. expressly make the claim; and 
ii. describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things 
not produced or disclosed—and do so in a manner that, without revealing 
information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to 
assess the claim. 
B. Information Produced. If information produced in discovery is subject to a claim 
of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the 
claim may notify any party that received the information of the claim and the 
basis for it. After being notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or 
destroy the specified information and any copies it has; must not use or disclose 
the information until the claim is resolved; must take reasonable steps to retrieve 
the information if the party disclosed it before being notified; and may promptly 
present the information to the court under seal for a determination of the claim. 
The producing party must preserve the information until the claim is resolved. 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 502: Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product; Limitations on 
Waiver 
 
The following provisions apply, in the circumstances set out, to disclosure of a communication 
or information covered by the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection. 
 
a. Disclosure Made in a Federal Proceeding or to a Federal Office or Agency; Scope of a 
Waiver. When the disclosure is made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or 
agency and waives the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, the waiver 
extends to an undisclosed communication or information in a federal or state proceeding 
only if: 
1. the waiver is intentional; 
2. the disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern the same 
subject matter; and 
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3. they ought in fairness to be considered together. 
b. Inadvertent Disclosure. When made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or 
agency, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a federal or state proceeding if: 
1. the disclosure is inadvertent; 
2. the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent 
disclosure; and 
3. the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if 
applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B). 
c. Disclosure Made in a State Proceeding. When the disclosure is made in a state 
proceeding and is not the subject of a state-court order concerning waiver, the 
disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a federal proceeding if the disclosure: 
1. would not be a waiver under this rule if it had been made in a federal proceeding; 
or 
2. is not a waiver under the law of the state where the disclosure occurred. 
d. Controlling Effect of a Court Order. A federal court may order that the privilege or 
protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before the 
court - in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other federal or state 
proceeding. 
e. Controlling Effect of a Party Agreement. An agreement on the effect of disclosure in a 
federal proceeding is binding only on the parties to the agreement, unless it is 
incorporated into a court order. 
f. Controlling Effect of This Rule. Notwithstanding Rules 101 and 1101, this rule applies to 
state proceedings and to federal court-annexed and federal court-mandated arbitration 
proceedings, in the circumstances set out in the rule. And notwithstanding Rule 501, this 
rule applies even if state law provides the rule of decision. 
g. Definitions. In this rule: 
1. “attorney-client privilege” means the protection that applicable law provides for 
confidential attorney-client communications; and 
2. “work-product protection” means the protection that applicable law provides for 
tangible material (or its intangible equivalent) prepared in anticipation of litigation 
or for trial. 
 
Inadvertent Waiver 
 
In re Sealed Case, 877 F. 2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
 
Summary: The IRS investigated a company for tax evasion and subpoenaed documents 
relevant to the investigation. The company refused to produce certain documents, 
claiming attorney-client privilege. The government conceded that the attorney-client 
privilege applied to the documents, but argued that it had been waived. The district court 
found that the privilege was waived with respect to all of the documents, because they 
were disclosed to third-parties. The circuit court found that the privilege had been waived 
for some of the documents, but possibly not all of them. 
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SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge: 
 
The appellant, “Company,” appeals from a contempt order of the district court. Company 
refused to comply with a grand jury subpoena insofar as it was directed to six documents that 
Company claimed were covered by attorney-client privilege. The district court held the privilege 
was waived as to all six documents. We agree that there was at least a partial waiver of the 
privilege, but we remand for the district court to further consider of the scope of the waiver. 
 
I. 
 
Appellant is a government contractor performing work for the Defense Department on a cost-
plus basis. Company and its former chief executive officer are under a grand jury investigation 
into the possibility of Company’s tax evasion as well as a possible conspiracy to defraud the 
United States. It is thought CEO may have engineered a scheme whereby he received secret 
rebates (undeclared personal income to him) from subcontractors while the amounts rebated 
were included on Company’s books as payments to the subcontractors and thus business 
expenses. 
 
The grand jury issued a subpoena in June 1988 to Company seeking production of documents 
relating to certain adjusting entries made to Company's books in the latter part of 1987. 
Company produced the documents sought, except for six it claimed were protected by the 
attorney-client privilege. Three of these documents contain notes taken by Company’s former 
vice president for finance at meetings with attorneys from a law firm retained by Company. The 
other three are memoranda from that vice president to Company's chief accounting officer 
transmitting the law firm's legal advice to amend the corporate books to reflect that certain 
amounts previously reported on its books — and to the IRS — as business expenses be shown 
as nondeductible income payments to CEO. 
 
The government moved to compel production of all six documents, arguing that the privilege 
was waived since the documents presumably contained only information that had been or would 
eventually be reported to the IRS. The district court granted the order, concluding “whatever 
attorney-client privilege that may have attached to the documents was waived by the filing (or 
the intention to file) of required forms to the IRS.” Company refused to comply, was held in 
contempt, and thereafter brought an appeal. 
 
While the appeal was pending, the government learned that one of the memoranda in question 
had already been disclosed, in January 1988, by the CAO to the Defense Contract Audit 
Agency during a routine audit of the contractor's travel expenses. The government sought and 
gained a remand to permit the district court to consider this additional ground for the 
government's claim of waiver. Appellant claimed on remand that the disclosure of the one 
document to the DCAA had been inadvertent (“a bureaucratic error”) and offered to prove that 
through the testimony of its CAO, but only if his testimony were limited to that issue and his Fifth 
Amendment privilege were not waived. The district court rejected the proffer, reiterated its prior 
finding that if the privilege existed, it had been waived because the information in the documents 
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was to be publicly reported, and further found that the disclosure of the one document “was a 
voluntary intentional disclosure” which “constituted a further waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege not only with respect to the particular document but also as to all related 
communications.” The district court believed that had the disclosure to DCAA been inadvertent 
rather than intentional, it would have constituted a waiver (if that were the sole grounds for 
finding a waiver) only with respect to that document and not the other five. 
 
Prior to the remand hearing it was further revealed that the vice president had entered into a 
personal immunity agreement with the government in October 1987 and, at that time, given all 
six of the documents to the government without Company’s authorization. From that, we infer 
the government continues to seek the documents through subpoena because it is uncertain as 
to the use that can be made of the copies voluntarily turned over by the vice president. The 
government asserts that the attorney handling the grand jury proceedings has not been given 
access to the documents. Nevertheless, Company urged the district court, in the exercise of its 
supervisory power over grand jury proceedings, to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether the government had engaged in misconduct, which Company apparently thought might 
justify quashing the subpoena. The district court declined to do so and Company appeals that 
determination as well. 
 
II. 
 
The government does not dispute that all six documents fall within Company’s attorney-client 
privilege. It is not argued, for instance, that the memoranda from the vice president to the CAO, 
communicating the advice given by counsel and directing the adjusting entries be made in 
accordance with that advice, are outside the privilege. Nor is it claimed that the conversation 
between the corporate officers and the law firm were not intended to be confidential so that the 
privilege never attached. Instead, the government relies on two grounds for concluding 
Company waived the privilege for all six documents. 
 
The government first claims that because the documents provide background “detail” supporting 
the adjusting bookkeeping entries that have been reported to the IRS, Company has waived its 
privilege in the documents. The government relies on several cases that have addressed the 
status of the attorney-client privilege in cases involving disclosure of financial information to the 
IRS or other third parties. In United States v. Cote, the Eighth Circuit held that the act of filing 
amended IRS returns waived any attorney-client privilege in an attorney-supervised 
accountant's workpapers, which contained information later transcribed onto the returns. But the 
Court remanded to the district court to determine whether any of the workpapers contained 
“unpublished expressions” not part of the data revealed on the tax returns. The Court also 
recognized that in tax cases, waiver typically is not an issue, because “the privilege is said not 
to attach to information which the taxpayer intends his attorney to report in the contents of a tax 
return.” 
 
In that vein, United States v. (Under Seal) held that the privilege did not cover documents, 
including communications between two attorneys relating to a proposed tax ruling for a client, 
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and material supplied by the client concerning commercial transactions upon which the 
proposed tax ruling would be based. These documents, according to the court, either did not 
reveal client communications or were not meant to be confidential. The court thus applied its 
previous holding in In re Grand Jury Proceedings that “if a client communicates information to 
his attorney with the understanding that the information will be revealed to others, that 
information, as well as the details underlying the data which was to be published, will not enjoy 
the privilege.” Apparently recognizing the aphorism that “God is in the details,” the court 
explained in a footnote: 
 
The details underlying the published data are the communications relating the data, the 
document, if any, to be published containing the data, all preliminary drafts of the 
document, and any attorney’s notes containing material necessary to the preparation of 
the documents. Copies of other documents, the contents of which were necessary to the 
preparation of the published document, will also lose the privilege. But if any of the non-
privileged documents contain client communications not directly related to the published 
data, those communications, if otherwise privileged, must be removed by the reviewing 
court before the document may be produced. 
 
Although these cases seem to conflate two theories — waiver of an existing privilege and 
absence of an intent to maintain confidentiality in the first place — we think under either theory 
the IRS cases are inapposite; the government much too facilely claims that the six documents 
are merely “details” underlying past or future returns. To be sure, virtually all the material in the 
documents reflects adjusting entries in Company's books, which have been or will be reported 
to the IRS.84 But the crucial significance of the documents — and the apparent reason the 
government wishes to present them to the grand jury — is that they suggest Company made the 
adjusting entries on the advice of counsel (after the investigation commenced). 
 
The raison d’etre of the hallowed attorney-client privilege is the protection of a client’s 
communications to counsel so that persons, including organizations, will be induced to consult 
counsel when needed. The attorney’s communications (his advice) to the client must also be 
protected, because otherwise it is rather easy to deduce the client's communications to counsel. 
The documents sought in this case reveal directly the attorney’s confidential advice, and their 
disclosure thereby invades the core of the privilege; it permits an inference to be drawn as to the 
nature of the client's communications with its lawyers, and, perhaps, as to their motivation (e.g., 
guilty knowledge) for consulting counsel as well. 
 
Even the very existence of an attorney-client relationship, not normally protected, is privileged in 
the rare case when a “strong possibility exists that disclosure of the information would implicate 
the client in the very matter for which legal advice was sought in the first case.” We therefore do 
not think that any portion of the six documents revealing that the adjusting entries were made on 
the advice of counsel would be disclosable under the government’s primary theory of waiver. 
 
																																																								
84 If the information has not yet been disclosed, it is hard to think of Company’s action as a waiver. 
Rather, data that Company intends to report is never privileged in the first place. 
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Alternatively, however, the government relies on a waiver caused by the disclosure of one 
memo to a DCAA auditor, and we think the government is, in this respect, on firmer ground. It 
will be recalled that Company does not dispute the disclosure but denies its voluntariness, 
claiming it was inadvertent — “a bureaucratic error.” The district court found otherwise, but we 
do not think it matters whether the waiver is labeled “voluntary” or “inadvertent” and thus do not 
find it necessary to consider appellant's claim that the CAO should have been permitted to offer 
limited testimony on this issue only. 
 
Although the attorney-client privilege is of ancient lineage and continuing importance, the 
confidentiality of communications covered by the privilege must be jealously guarded by the 
holder of the privilege lest it be waived. The courts will grant no greater protection to those who 
assert the privilege than their own precautions warrant. We therefore agree with those courts 
which have held that the privilege is lost “even if the disclosure is inadvertent.” 
 
Even assuming Company’s disclosure was due to “bureaucratic error,” which we take to be a 
euphemism that necessarily implies human error, that unfortunate lapse simply reveals that 
someone in the company and thereby Company itself (since it can only act through its 
employees) was careless with the confidentiality of its privileged communications. Normally the 
amount of care taken to ensure confidentiality reflects the importance of that confidentiality to 
the holder of the privilege. To hold, as we do, that an inadvertent disclosure will waive the 
privilege imposes a self-governing restraint on the freedom with which organizations such as 
corporations, unions, and the like label documents related to communications with counsel as 
privileged. To readily do so creates a greater risk of “inadvertent” disclosure by someone and 
thereby the danger that the “waiver” will extend to all related matters, perhaps causing grave 
injury to the organization. But that is as it should be. Otherwise, there is a temptation to seek 
artificially to expand the content of privileged matter. In other words, if a client wishes to 
preserve the privilege, it must treat the confidentiality of attorney-client communications like 
jewels — if not crown jewels. Short of court-compelled disclosure or other equally extraordinary 
circumstances,85 we will not distinguish between various degrees of “voluntariness” in waivers of 
the attorney-client privilege. 
 
Our conclusion that Company’s disclosure of the one memorandum constitutes a waiver still 
leaves a question as to the scope of the waiver. Appellant would confine the waiver to the one 
document, but, as we have previously said, a waiver of the privilege in an attorney-client 
communication extends “to all other communications relating to the same subject matter.” Since 
such determinations properly depend heavily on the factual context in which the privilege is 
asserted, we will not disturb a district court’s decision as to the question unless it can be shown 
the court abused its discretion. In this case, although the district court extended the waiver to all 
six documents, it did not fully explain why the communications were related. Of course, all six — 
including the notes of the meeting — stemmed from the same consultation Company had with 
its law firm. But the “subject matter” of the waiver could, nevertheless, be defined in a number of 
different ways. Did the district court mean, for instance, to define the “subject matter” as all 
																																																								
85 We do not face here any claim that the information was acquired by a third party despite all possible 
precautions, in which case there might be no waiver at all. 
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communications “relating” to the adjustment entries, which — as suggested at oral argument — 
would permit the individual lawyers and corporate officers present at the meeting to be called 
before the grand jury to describe their discussions, or perhaps even other communications 
between Company and its counsel? Or, alternatively, was the waiver limited to those intra-
Company communications revealing that Company’s accounting adjustments were made upon 
the advice of counsel, in which case is it not clear whether the actual notes of the meeting must 
be disclosed? Given the potential implications of a broad definition of the subject matter of 
Company’s waiver, we think it appropriate to remand to the district court for further 
consideration of that issue. 
 
Further Reading: 
 
● Shawn T. Gaither, The Attorney-Client Privilege: An Analysis of Involuntary Waiver, 48 
Clev. St. L. Rev. 311 (2000) 
 
The Crime-Fraud Exception 
 
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933) 
 
MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
There is a privilege protecting communications between attorney and client. The privilege takes 
flight if the relation is abused. A client who consults an attorney for advice that will serve him in 
the commission of a fraud will have no help from the law. He must let the truth be told. There 
are early cases apparently to the effect that a mere charge of illegality, not supported by any 
evidence, will set the confidences free. But this conception of the privilege is without support in 
later rulings. “It is obvious that it would be absurd to say that the privilege could be got rid of 
merely by making a charge of fraud.” To drive the privilege away, there must be “something to 
give colour to the charge;” there must be “prima facie evidence that it has some foundation in 
fact.” When that evidence is supplied, the seal of secrecy is broken. Nor does the loss of the 
privilege depend upon the showing of a conspiracy, upon proof that client and attorney are 
involved in equal guilt. The attorney may be innocent, and still the guilty client must let the truth 
come out. 
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Mary Sue & L. Ron Hubbard (~1970) 
 
United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989) 
 
Summary: In a case against the Church of Scientology (Church), the IRS sought to introduce 
into evidence tape recordings of meetings between representatives of the Church and its 
attorney. The IRS claimed that the tapes fell within the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-
client privilege and asked the district court to listen to the tapes in camera to determine if the 
privilege applied. The IRS attempted to provide the court with partial transcripts of the tape 
recordings that it acquired from a confidential source so that the court could make its 
determination. The district court refused to listen to the tapes and the court of appeals affirmed 
by categorically refusing to listen to the tapes or read the transcripts. The IRS appealed. 
 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
This case arises out of the efforts of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue 
Service to investigate the tax returns of L. Ron Hubbard, founder of the Church of Scientology 
for the calendar years 1979 through 1983. We granted certiorari to consider two issues that 
have divided the Courts of Appeals. The first is whether, when a district court enforces an IRS 
summons, the court may condition its enforcement order by placing restrictions on the 
disclosure of the summoned information. The Court of Appeals in this case upheld the 
restrictions. We affirm its judgment on that issue by an equally divided Court. 
 
The second issue concerns the testimonial privilege for attorney-client communications and, 
more particularly, the generally recognized exception to that privilege for communications in 
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furtherance of future illegal conduct — the so-called “crime-fraud” exception. The specific 
question presented is whether the applicability of the crime-fraud exception must be established 
by “independent evidence” (i.e., without reference to the content of the contested 
communications themselves), or, alternatively, whether the applicability of that exception can be 
resolved by an in camera inspection of the allegedly privileged material. We reject the 
“independent evidence” approach and hold that the district court, under circumstances we 
explore below, and at the behest of the party opposing the claim of privilege, may conduct an in 
camera review of the materials in question. Because the Court of Appeals considered only 
“independent evidence,” we vacate its judgment on this issue and remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
 
I 
 
In the course of its investigation, the IRS sought access to 51 documents that had been filed 
with the Clerk of the Los Angeles County Superior Court in connection with a case entitled 
Church of Scientology of California v. Armstrong. The Armstrong litigation involved, among 
other things, a charge by the Church that one of its former members, Gerald Armstrong, had 
obtained by unlawful means documentary materials relating to Church activities, including two 
tapes. Some of the documents sought by the IRS had been filed under seal. 
 
The IRS, by its Special Agent Steven Petersell, served a summons upon the Clerk on October 
24, 1984, demanding that he produce the 51 documents. The tapes were among those listed. 
On November 21, IRS agents were permitted to inspect and copy some of the summoned 
materials, including the tapes. 
 
On November 27, the Church and Mary Sue Hubbard, who had intervened in Armstrong, 
secured a temporary restraining order from the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California. The order required the IRS to file with the District Court all materials 
acquired on November 21 and all reproductions and notes related thereto, pending disposition 
of the intervenors’ motion for a preliminary injunction to bar IRS use of these materials. By order 
dated December 10, the District Court returned to the IRS all materials except the tapes and the 
IRS’ notes reflecting their contents. 
 
On January 18, 1985, the IRS filed in the District Court a petition to enforce its summons. In 
addition to the tapes, the IRS sought 12 sealed documents the Clerk had refused to produce in 
response to the IRS summons. The Church and Mary Sue Hubbard intervened to oppose 
production of the tapes and the sealed documents. Respondents claimed that IRS was not 
seeking the documents in good faith, and objected on grounds of lack of relevance and 
attorney-client privilege. 
 
Respondents asserted the privilege as a bar to disclosure of the tapes. The IRS argued, among 
other things, however, that the tapes fell within the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client 
privilege, and urged the District Court to listen to the tapes in the course of making its privilege 
determination. In addition, the IRS submitted to the court two declarations by Agent Petersell. In 
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the first, Petersell stated his grounds for believing that the tapes were relevant to the 
investigation. In the second, Petersell offered a description of the tapes’ contents, based on 
information he received during several interviews. Appended to this declaration — over 
respondents’ objection — were partial transcripts of the tapes, which the IRS lawfully had 
obtained from a confidential source.86 In subsequent briefing, the IRS reiterated its request that 
the District Court listen to the tapes in camera before making its privilege ruling. 
 
After oral argument and an evidentiary hearing, the District Court rejected respondents’ claim of 
bad faith. The court ordered production of 5 of the 12 documents and specified: “The documents 
delivered hereunder shall not be delivered to any other government agency by the IRS unless 
criminal tax prosecution is sought or an Order of Court is obtained.” 
 
Turning to the tapes, the District Court ruled that respondents had demonstrated that they 
contain confidential attorney-client communications, that the privilege had not been waived, and 
that “the ‘fraud-crime’ exception to the attorney-client privilege does not apply. The quoted 
excerpts tend to show or admit past fraud but there is no clear indication that future fraud or 
crime is being planned.” On this basis, the court held that the Clerk “need not produce its copy 
of the tapes pursuant to the summons.” The District Court denied the IRS’ motion for 
reconsideration, rejecting the IRS’ renewed request that the court listen to the tapes in toto. 
“While this was at one time discussed with counsel, thereafter Mr. Petersell’s declaration was 
submitted, and no one suggested that this was an inadequate basis on which to determine the 
attorney-client privilege question.” 
 
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the IRS cross-
appealed on two relevant grounds. First, the IRS claimed that the District Court abused its 
discretion by placing conditions on the IRS’ future use of the subpoenaed information. The 
Court of Appeals disagreed, holding: “A district court may, when appropriate, condition 
enforcement of a summons on the IRS’ agreeing to abide by disclosure restrictions.” 
 
Second, the IRS contended that the District Court erred in rejecting the application of the crime-
fraud exception to the tapes. In particular, the IRS argued that the District Court incorrectly held 
that the IRS had abandoned its request for in camera review of the tapes, and that the court 
should have listened to the tapes before ruling that the crime-fraud exception was inapplicable. 
Respondents contended, in contrast, that the District Court erred in the opposite direction: they 
argued that it was error for the court to rely on the partial transcripts, because “in this Circuit, a 
party cannot rely on the communications themselves — whether by listening to the tapes or 
																																																								
86 The IRS denied that the transcripts were made using tapes obtained from the Superior Court or from 
any other illicit source. Agent Petersell declared: “The partial transcripts were not prepared by the United 
States from the tapes in the custody of the Superior Court for Los Angeles County, California, nor from 
copies of the tape now in the custody of the Clerk of this Court. The transcripts were obtained from a 
confidential source by another Special Agent prior to the issuance of this summons. The source was not a 
party to Church of Scientology v. Armstrong, nor an attorney for any party in that proceeding.” As the 
District Court made no finding of illegality, we assume for present purposes that the transcripts were 
legally obtained. 
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reviewing excerpts or transcripts of them — to bear its burden to invoke the exception but must 
bear the burden by independent evidence.” 
 
The panel of the Court of Appeals agreed with respondents that, under Shewfelt, “the 
Government’s evidence of crime or fraud must come from sources independent of the attorney-
client communications recorded on the tapes,” thereby implicitly holding that even if the IRS had 
properly preserved its demand for in camera review, the District Court would have been without 
power to grant it. The Court of Appeals then reviewed “the Government's independent 
evidence.” That review appears to have excluded the partial transcripts, and thus the Court of 
Appeals implicitly agreed with respondents that it was improper for the District Court to have 
considered even the partial transcripts. On the basis of its review of the “independent evidence,” 
the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's determination that the IRS had failed to 
establish the applicability of the crime-fraud exception. 
 
II 
 
This Court is evenly divided with respect to the issue of the power of a district court to place 
restrictions upon the dissemination by the IRS of information obtained through a § 7604 
subpoena-enforcement action. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar 
as it upheld the District Court’s conditional-enforcement order. 
 
III 
 
Questions of privilege that arise in the course of the adjudication of federal rights are “governed 
by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United 
States in the light of reason and experience.” We have recognized the attorney-client privilege 
under federal law, as “the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the 
common law.” Although the underlying rationale for the privilege has changed over time, courts 
long have viewed its central concern as one “to encourage full and frank communication 
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the 
observance of law and administration of justice.” That purpose, of course, requires that clients 
be free to “make full disclosure to their attorneys” of past wrongdoings, in order that the client 
may obtain “the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice.” 
 
The attorney-client privilege is not without its costs. “Since the privilege has the effect of 
withholding relevant information from the factfinder, it applies only where necessary to achieve 
its purpose.” The attorney-client privilege must necessarily protect the confidences of 
wrongdoers, but the reason for that protection — the centrality of open client and attorney 
communication to the proper functioning of our adversary system of justice — “ceases to 
operate at a certain point, namely, where the desired advice refers not to prior wrongdoing, but 
to future wrongdoing.” It is the purpose of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client 
privilege to assure that the “seal of secrecy,” between lawyer and client does not extend to 
communications “made for the purpose of getting advice for the commission of a fraud” or 
crime. 
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The District Court and the Court of Appeals found that the tapes at issue in this case recorded 
attorney-client communications and that the privilege had not been waived when the tapes were 
inadvertently given to Armstrong. These findings are not at issue here. Thus, the remaining 
obstacle to respondents’ successful assertion of the privilege is the Government’s contention 
that the recorded attorney-client communications were made in furtherance of a future crime or 
fraud. 
 
A variety of questions may arise when a party raises the crime-fraud exception. The parties to 
this case have not been in complete agreement as to which of these questions are presented 
here. In an effort to clarify the matter, we observe, first, that we need not decide the quantum of 
proof necessary ultimately to establish the applicability of the crime-fraud exception. Rather, we 
are concerned here with the type of evidence that may be used to make that ultimate showing. 
Within that general area of inquiry, the initial question in this case is whether a district court, at 
the request of the party opposing the privilege, may review the allegedly privileged 
communications in camera to determine whether the crime-fraud exception applies. If such in 
camera review is permitted, the second question we must consider is whether some threshold 
evidentiary showing is needed before the district court may undertake the requested review. 
Finally, if a threshold showing is required, we must consider the type of evidence the opposing 
party may use to meet it: i.e., in this case, whether the partial transcripts the IRS possessed 
may be used for that purpose. 
 
A 
 
We consider first the question whether a district court may ever honor the request of the party 
opposing the privilege to conduct an in camera review of allegedly privileged communications to 
determine whether those communications fall within the crime-fraud exception. We conclude 
that no express provision of the Federal Rules of Evidence bars such use of in camera review, 
and that it would be unwise to prohibit it in all instances as a matter of federal common law. 
 
(1) 
 
At first blush, two provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence would appear to be relevant. Rule 
104(a) provides: “Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, 
the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court. In 
making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to 
privileges.” Rule 1101(c) provides: “The rule with respect to privileges applies at all stages of all 
actions, cases, and proceedings.” Taken together, these Rules might be read to establish that in 
a summons-enforcement proceeding, attorney-client communications cannot be considered by 
the district court in making its crime-fraud ruling: to do otherwise, under this view, would be to 
make the crime-fraud determination without due regard to the existence of the privilege. 
 
Even those scholars who support this reading of Rule 104(a) acknowledge that it leads to an 
absurd result. 
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Because the judge must honor claims of privilege made during his preliminary fact 
determinations, many exceptions to the rules of privilege will become “dead letters,” 
since the preliminary facts that give rise to these exceptions can never be proved. For 
example, an exception to the attorney-client privilege provides that there is no privilege if 
the communication was made to enable anyone to commit a crime or fraud. There is 
virtually no way in which the exception can ever be proved, save by compelling 
disclosure of the contents of the communication; Rule 104(a) provides that this cannot 
be done. 
 
We find this Draconian interpretation of Rule 104(a) inconsistent with the Rule’s plain language. 
The Rule does not provide by its terms that all materials as to which a “claim of privilege” is 
made must be excluded from consideration. In that critical respect, the language of Rule 104(a) 
is markedly different from the comparable California evidence rule, which provides that “the 
presiding officer may not require disclosure of information claimed to be privileged under this 
division in order to rule on the claim of privilege.” There is no reason to read Rule 104(a) as if its 
text were identical to that of the California rule. 
 
Nor does it make sense to us to assume, as respondents have throughout this litigation, that 
once the attorney-client nature of the contested communications is established, those 
communications must be treated as presumptively privileged for evidentiary purposes until the 
privilege is “defeated” or “stripped away” by proof that the communications took place in the 
course of planning future crime or fraud. Although some language in Clark might be read as 
supporting this view, respondents acknowledged at oral argument that no prior holding of this 
Court requires the imposition of a strict progression of proof in crime-fraud cases. 
 
We see no basis for holding that the tapes in this case must be deemed privileged under Rule 
104(a) while the question of crime or fraud remains open. Indeed, respondents concede that “if 
the proponent of the privilege is able to sustain its burden only by submitting the 
communications to the court” for in camera review, the court is not required to avert its eyes (or 
close its ears) once it concludes that the communication would be privileged, if the court found 
the crime-fraud exception inapplicable. Rather, respondents acknowledge that the court may 
“then consider the same communications to determine if the opponent of the privilege has 
established that the crime-fraud exception applies.” Were the tapes truly deemed privileged 
under Rule 104(a) at the moment the trial court concludes they contain potentially privileged 
attorney-client communications, district courts would be required to draw precisely the 
counterintuitive distinction that respondents wisely reject. We thus shall not adopt a reading of 
Rule 104(a) that would treat the contested communications as “privileged” for purposes of the 
Rule, and we shall not interpret Rule 104(a) as categorically prohibiting the party opposing the 
privilege on crime-fraud grounds from relying on the results of an in camera review of the 
communications. 
 
(2) 
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Having determined that Rule 104(a) does not prohibit the in camera review sought by the IRS, 
we must address the question as a matter of the federal common law of privileges. We conclude 
that a complete prohibition against opponents’ use of in camera review to establish the 
applicability of the crime-fraud exception is inconsistent with the policies underlying the 
privilege. 
 
We begin our analysis by recognizing that disclosure of allegedly privileged materials to the 
district court for purposes of determining the merits of a claim of privilege does not have the 
legal effect of terminating the privilege. Indeed, this Court has approved the practice of requiring 
parties who seek to avoid disclosure of documents to make the documents available for in 
camera inspection, and the practice is well established in the federal courts. Respondents do 
not dispute this point: they acknowledge that they would have been free to request in camera 
review to establish the fact that the tapes involved attorney-client communications, had they 
been unable to muster independent evidence to serve that purpose. 
 
Once it is clear that in camera review does not destroy the privileged nature of the contested 
communications, the question of the propriety of that review turns on whether the policies 
underlying the privilege and its exceptions are better fostered by permitting such review or by 
prohibiting it. In our view, the costs of imposing an absolute bar to consideration of the 
communications in camera for purpose of establishing the crime-fraud exception are intolerably 
high. 
 
“No matter how light the burden of proof which confronts the party claiming the exception, there 
are many blatant abuses of privilege which cannot be substantiated by extrinsic evidence. This 
is particularly true of situations in which an alleged illegal proposal is made in the context of a 
relationship which has an apparent legitimate end.” A per se rule that the communications in 
question may never be considered creates, we feel, too great an impediment to the proper 
functioning of the adversary process. This view is consistent with current trends in the law. 
 
B 
 
We turn to the question whether in camera review at the behest of the party asserting the crime-
fraud exception is always permissible, or, in contrast, whether the party seeking in camera 
review must make some threshold showing that such review is appropriate. In addressing this 
question, we attend to the detrimental effect, if any, of in camera review on the policies 
underlying the privilege and on the orderly administration of justice in our courts. We conclude 
that some such showing must be made. 
 
Our endorsement of the practice of testing proponents’ privilege claims through in camera 
review of the allegedly privileged documents has not been without reservation. This Court noted 
that “examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers” might in some cases 
“jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect.” Analogizing to claims of Fifth 
Amendment privilege, it observed more generally: “Too much judicial inquiry into the claim of 
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privilege would force disclosure of the thing the privilege was meant to protect, while a complete 
abandonment of judicial control would lead to intolerable abuses.” 
 
The Court recognized that some compromise must be reached. In Reynolds, it declined to “go 
so far as to say that the court may automatically require a complete disclosure to the judge 
before the claim of privilege will be accepted in any case.” We think that much the same result is 
in order here. 
 
A blanket rule allowing in camera review as a tool for determining the applicability of the crime-
fraud exception, as Reynolds suggests, would place the policy of protecting open and legitimate 
disclosure between attorneys and clients at undue risk. There is also reason to be concerned 
about the possible due process implications of routine use of in camera proceedings. Finally, we 
cannot ignore the burdens in camera review places upon the district courts, which may well be 
required to evaluate large evidentiary records without open adversarial guidance by the parties. 
 
There is no reason to permit opponents of the privilege to engage in groundless fishing 
expeditions, with the district courts as their unwitting (and perhaps unwilling) agents. Courts of 
Appeals have suggested that in camera review is available to evaluate claims of crime or fraud 
only “when justified” or “in appropriate cases.” Indeed, the Government conceded at oral 
argument (albeit reluctantly) that a district court would be mistaken if it reviewed documents in 
camera solely because “the government begged it” to do so, “with no reason to suspect crime or 
fraud.” We agree. 
 
In fashioning a standard for determining when in camera review is appropriate, we begin with 
the observation that “in camera inspection is a smaller intrusion upon the confidentiality of the 
attorney-client relationship than is public disclosure.” We therefore conclude that a lesser 
evidentiary showing is needed to trigger in camera review than is required ultimately to 
overcome the privilege. Ibid. The threshold we set, in other words, need not be a stringent one. 
 
We think that the following standard strikes the correct balance. Before engaging in in camera 
review to determine the applicability of the crime-fraud exception, “the judge should require a 
showing of a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person” that 
in camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the crime-
fraud exception applies. 
 
Once that showing is made, the decision whether to engage in in camera review rests in the 
sound discretion of the district court. The court should make that decision in light of the facts 
and circumstances of the particular case, including, among other things, the volume of materials 
the district court has been asked to review, the relative importance to the case of the alleged 
privileged information, and the likelihood that the evidence produced through in camera review, 
together with other available evidence then before the court, will establish that the crime-fraud 
exception does apply. The district court is also free to defer its in camera review if it concludes 
that additional evidence in support of the crime-fraud exception may be available that is not 
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allegedly privileged, and that production of the additional evidence will not unduly disrupt or 
delay the proceedings. 
 
C 
 
The question remains as to what kind of evidence a district court may consider in determining 
whether it has the discretion to undertake an in camera review of an allegedly privileged 
communication at the behest of the party opposing the privilege. Here, the issue is whether the 
partial transcripts may be used by the IRS in support of its request for in camera review of the 
tapes. 
 
The answer to that question, in the first instance, must be found in Rule 104(a), which 
establishes that materials that have been determined to be privileged may not be considered in 
making the preliminary determination of the existence of a privilege. Neither the District Court 
nor the Court of Appeals made factual findings as to the privileged nature of the partial 
transcripts, so we cannot determine on this record whether Rule 104(a) would bar their 
consideration. 
 
Assuming for the moment, however, that no rule of privilege bars the IRS’s use of the partial 
transcripts, we fail to see what purpose would be served by excluding the transcripts from the 
District Court’s consideration. There can be little doubt that partial transcripts, or other evidence 
directly but incompletely reflecting the content of the contested communications, generally will 
be strong evidence of the subject matter of the communications themselves. Permitting district 
courts to consider this type of evidence would aid them substantially in rapidly and reliably 
determining whether in camera review is appropriate. 
 
Respondents suggest only one serious countervailing consideration. In their view, a rule that 
would allow an opponent of the privilege to rely on such material would encourage litigants to 
elicit confidential information from disaffected employees or others who have access to the 
information. We think that deterring the aggressive pursuit of relevant information from third-
party sources is not sufficiently central to the policies of the attorney-client privilege to require us 
to adopt the exclusionary rule urged by respondents. We conclude that the party opposing the 
privilege may use any nonprivileged evidence in support of its request for in camera review, 
even if its evidence is not “independent” of the contested communications as the Court of 
Appeals uses that term.87 
 
D 
 
																																																								
87 In addition, we conclude that evidence that is not “independent” of the contents of allegedly privileged 
communications — like the partial transcripts in this case — may be used not only in the pursuit of in 
camera review, but also may provide the evidentiary basis for the ultimate showing that the crime-fraud 
exception applies. We see little to distinguish these two uses: in both circumstances, if the evidence has 
not itself been determined to be privileged, its exclusion does not serve the policies which underlie the 
attorney-client privilege. 
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In sum, we conclude that a rigid independent evidence requirement does not comport with 
“reason and experience,” and we decline to adopt it as part of the developing federal common 
law of evidentiary privileges. We hold that in camera review may be used to determine whether 
allegedly privileged attorney-client communications fall within the crime-fraud exception. We 
further hold, however, that before a district court may engage in in camera review at the request 
of the party opposing the privilege, that party must present evidence sufficient to support a 
reasonable belief that in camera review may yield evidence that establishes the exception’s 
applicability. Finally, we hold that the threshold showing to obtain in camera review may be met 
by using any relevant evidence, lawfully obtained, that has not been adjudicated to be 
privileged. 
 
Because the Court of Appeals employed a rigid independent-evidence requirement which 
categorically excluded the partial transcripts and the tapes themselves from consideration, we 
vacate its judgment on this issue and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. On remand, the Court of Appeals should consider whether the District Court's 
refusal to listen to the tapes in toto was justified by the manner in which the IRS presented and 
preserved its request for in camera review. In the event the Court of Appeals holds that the 
IRS’s demand for review was properly preserved, the Court of Appeals should then determine, 
or remand the case to the District Court to determine in the first instance, whether the IRS has 
presented a sufficient evidentiary basis for in camera review, and whether, if so, it is appropriate 
for the District Court, in its discretion, to grant such review. 
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L. Ron Hubbard with audiotape recorders 
 
Blumenthal v. Kimber Mfg., 265 Conn. 1 (2003) 
Summary: The Attorney General of Connecticut opened an antitrust investigation and 
sent Kimber a subpoena. While Kimber produced some documents, it refused to 
produce one email. Exceptions to the attorney-client privilege should be made only when 
the reason for disclosure outweighs the potential chilling of essential communications. 
The burden of proof is on the party seeking to pierce the privilege.  
The crime fraud exception applies only after a determination by the trial court “that there 
is probable cause to believe that a crime or fraud has been attempted or committed and 
that the communication was in furtherance thereof.” Probable cause requires that a 
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prudent person have a reasonable basis to suspect the perpetration or attempted 
perpetration of a crime or fraud and that the communication was in furtherance thereof.  
 
 
Katz, J. 
 
The petitioner, Richard Blumenthal, the attorney general of the state of Connecticut, appeals 
from the decision of the trial court denying his application for an order requiring the respondents, 
Kimber Manufacturing, Inc., a firearms manufacturer with its principal place of business in 
Yonkers, New York, and Leslie Edelman, Kimber’s president, to comply with the petitioner’s 
discovery request for a certain document sent from one Kimber employee to an attorney and 
three other Kimber employees. The petitioner contends that the trial court improperly 
determined that: (1) the communication was protected by the attorney-client privilege; and (2) 
the communication was not otherwise subject to disclosure under the crime-fraud exception to 
that privilege. We conclude that the trial court properly determined that the document was 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and that the petitioner did not meet his burden of 
establishing that the crime-fraud exception applies to exclude the document from protection 
under the privilege. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court. 
 
The record discloses the following relevant facts. On March 17, 2000, Smith and Wesson 
Corporation (Smith & Wesson), a firearms manufacturer located in Springfield, Massachusetts, 
entered into an agreement with representatives of various federal, state and local governmental 
agencies (agreement). The agreement was an attempt to settle both pending and threatened 
litigation by these governmental agencies against various firearms manufacturers. The 
agreement required Smith & Wesson, as well as all other potential signatories to the agreement, 
to engage in certain practices, opposed by most of the firearms industry, regarding the 
manufacturing, sale and marketing of firearms. At the time of the proceeding before the trial 
court, Smith & Wesson was the only firearms manufacturer to have signed the agreement. 
 
On May 2, 2000, based on his suspicion of the respondents' participation in a retaliatory 
economic boycott against Smith & Wesson, the petitioner issued to the respondents 
interrogatories and a subpoena duces tecum, pursuant to the petitioner's investigatory authority 
under General Statutes § 35-42, seeking documents “as to any matter relevant to any alleged 
violation of the Connecticut Antitrust Act”; and specifically any documents related to Smith & 
Wesson. On May 31, 2000, the respondents submitted responses, and thereafter submitted 
supplemental responses on July 20 and December 28, 2000. Unsatisfied with the respondents' 
disclosure, on March 20, 2001, the petitioner filed with the trial court an application for 
compliance. Thereafter, the respondents submitted five additional supplemental responses, 
leading to a total disclosure of approximately 577 pages of documents. After negotiation 
between the parties as to outstanding documents sought, the hearing on the petitioner's 
application for compliance was reduced to one issue — a claim of attorney-client privilege on a 
document sent via electronic mail (e-mail) by Dwight Van Brunt, a Kimber employee, to 
Edelman, Denis Schusterman, another Kimber employee, and Jerry S. Goldman, an attorney in 
private practice.[3] The e-mail also was copied to Ryan Busse, another Kimber employee. The e-
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 527	
mail expressly referred to the Smith & Wesson agreement, and the firearms industry's initial 
reaction to it. 
 
In response to a joint motion for entry of consent order, the trial court directed the respondents 
to submit the e-mail to the court for an in camera determination of the privilege issue. The 
parties submitted to the court a joint stipulation of facts, setting forth the factual and procedural 
background of the matter. At a hearing on the consent order, following a joint request, the trial 
court sealed the record. 
 
Goldman, one of the parties to whom the e-mail had been sent, appeared as counsel on behalf 
of the respondents. Goldman represented to the court that, because the agreement arose out of 
a series of lawsuits that all named John Doe as a defendant in the complaints, potential firearms 
manufacturer defendants, like Kimber, needed to evaluate the agreement and the firearms 
industry's reaction to the agreement in order to plan an effective legal strategy of their own. 
Goldman also provided the court with the corporate titles of each of the e-mail recipients, which 
identified them as senior Kimber officers. Goldman contended that, because the reactions of 
others in the firearms industry to the agreement — such as whether to sign similar agreements 
or litigate — would inform Kimber's legal decision making, Kimber's management needed to 
keep track of these developments and communicate them to him, as Kimber's counsel. 
 
The petitioner contended that the e-mail was not subject to the attorney-client privilege because 
it was not marked as confidential and did not request legal advice; rather, according to the 
petitioner, the subject matter of the e-mail concerned ongoing business developments. The 
petitioner also contended that the respondents had presented no evidence that litigation had 
been filed or even threatened against Kimber, nor any evidence of the existence of “John Doe” 
defendants in such litigation. The petitioner further claimed that, because reference to the e-mail 
itself did not indicate that it satisfied the requirements of the attorney-client privilege, and 
because the respondents did not produce any evidence beyond the e-mail and the stipulated 
facts, the respondents had failed to satisfy their burden of proof to invoke the privilege. 
Furthermore, the petitioner argued that, even if the trial court were to infer that the e-mail had 
been a request for legal advice, and therefore privileged, it would be subject to disclosure under 
the crime-fraud exception to the privilege. 
 
On September 10, 2001, the same day as the consent order hearing, the trial court issued an 
order stating that the e-mail was subject to a valid claim of attorney-client privilege. On January 
30, 2002, in response to the petitioner's motion for articulation, the trial court issued a 
memorandum of decision setting forth the reasons for its decision. Specifically, the trial court set 
forth and applied the four part test that we articulated in Shew v. Freedom of Information 
Commission, for determining whether the attorney-client privilege applies to protect 
communications between corporate employees and attorneys retained by the corporation. The 
court determined that, under the test, the e-mail qualified for protection from disclosure. 
Additionally, the court concluded that the crime-fraud exception did not apply because the e-
mail “is a patent update of firearms litigation developments and does not advocate any criminal 
or illegal activity.” This appeal followed. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 528	
 
I 
 
We turn to the petitioner’s claim that, even if we were to assume that the privilege generally 
applied, the trial court improperly determined that the e-mail was not subject to disclosure under 
the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. Specifically, the petitioner contends 
that other documents submitted as exhibits to the trial court provide probable cause to believe 
that the respondents engaged in an unlawful boycott of Smith & Wesson and that the e-mail 
was in direct furtherance of the boycott. We conclude that the trial court properly concluded that 
the e-mail did not fall under the crime-fraud exception. 
 
As an initial matter, we note that “exceptions to the attorney-client privilege should be made only 
when the reason for disclosure outweighs the potential chilling of essential communications.” 
The crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, therefore, is a limited one, and the 
burden of proof is on the party seeking to pierce the privilege. We also recognize, however, “that 
since the attorney-client privilege has the effect of withholding relevant information from the fact-
finder, it applies only where necessary to achieve its purpose.” In Olson v. Accessory Controls & 
Equipment Corp., we set forth the proper inquiry for determining when the crime-fraud exception 
extinguishes the attorney-client privilege. The exception applies only after a determination by 
the trial court “that there is probable cause to believe that a crime or fraud has been attempted 
or committed and that the communication was in furtherance thereof.” 
 
Probable cause “requires that a prudent person have a reasonable basis to suspect the 
perpetration or attempted perpetration of a crime or fraud, and that the communication was in 
furtherance thereof.” “The appropriate inquiry under the probable cause standard targets the 
client’s intent in obtaining legal advice; only if there is probable cause to believe that the client 
intended to perpetrate a crime or fraud does the exception properly come to bear.” We have 
explained that, “without reference to intent, the attorney-client privilege would be pierced 
whenever probable cause could be made that an illegal act occurred after the client conferred 
with an attorney — even if the consultation was part of a good-faith attempt to follow the law. 
Good-faith consultations with attorneys by clients who are uncertain about the legal implications 
of a proposed course of action however are entitled to the protection of the privilege, even if that 
action should later be held improper.” 
 
We note that, in the present case, the trial court did not determine specifically whether the 
petitioner had met this probable cause requirement. Even if we were to assume, however, that 
there was probable cause to believe that the respondents had committed or intended to commit 
a crime by engaging in an economic boycott in violation of antitrust law, we nevertheless 
conclude that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof. 
 
In addition to probable cause, the crime-fraud exception is limited by a second requirement that 
the communication sought in discovery was made in furtherance of that unlawful act. “The 
crime-fraud exception does not apply simply because privileged communications would provide 
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an adversary with evidence of a crime or fraud. Mere relevance is insufficient; there must be a 
showing that the communications at issue were made with an intent to further an unlawful act.” 
 
Our analysis as to the “in furtherance” requirement is informed largely by our reasoning in part I 
of this opinion. As we previously stated, the trial court reasonably could have found that the e-
mail concerned matters involving the agreement by a major firearms manufacturer seeking to 
avoid litigation, and how that agreement, along with the litigation that gave rise to it, similarly 
might affect the respondents. Moreover, the e-mail reveals nothing that suggests an intent to 
break the law. Indeed, we agree with the trial court's determination that the critical statements at 
issue are “not words of advocacy, but, rather, statements of fact or impression.” Furthermore, to 
the extent that the e-mail refers to any action, it is the actions of others, and not of the 
respondents; it neither advocates that Kimber take any action of its own, nor that others take a 
particular action. The evidence does not support a conclusion that the respondents sent the e-
mail with the intent to further a fraud or crime. Rather, as the trial court reasonably concluded, it 
was intended to keep Goldman informed so that he could provide them with sound legal advice. 
Accordingly, the injury that would inure to the relationship of Kimber and its attorneys by 
disclosure of the e-mail is greater than the benefit that would be gained by its disclosure to the 
petitioner.  
 
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly concluded that the e-mail is not subject to 
disclosure under the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. 
 
 
Attorney Misconduct & the Work Product Doctrine 
 
Moody v. Internal Revenue Service, 654 F. 2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
 
WALD, Circuit Judge: 
 
This action is an appeal from a judgment of the district court upholding the Internal Revenue 
Service’s refusal to disclose documents pertinent to appellant’s Freedom of Information Act 
requests. Appellant Shearn Moody, Jr. filed three requests pursuant to the FOIA, asking for the 
release of all records in the IRS’s possession regarding Moody, several business and charitable 
entities in which he had interests, and “Project Southwest.” The IRS released many documents 
pertinent to these requests, but withheld approximately 150 documents or portions of 
documents. After an in camera examination of a sample of thirty-five of the challenged 
withholdings, the district court upheld the IRS’s claims of exemptions with respect to all except 
portions of four documents. 
 
The appellant promptly challenged every aspect of the trial court’s decision, seeking before this 
court both reversal of the findings of applicability of FOIA exemptions to particular documents 
and a remand on the issues of segregability and the propriety of an award of attorney’s fees. 
The bulk of appellant’s arguments on appeal were explicitly, and we feel correctly, dealt with in 
the district court's admirably comprehensive nineteen page opinion. However, we find two 
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issues deserve additional consideration, and remand the case to the district court for this 
purpose. 
 
DOCUMENT 19 AND THE WORK PRODUCT EXEMPTION 
 
Exemption 5 of the FOIA permits non-disclosure of: 
 
Inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by 
law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency. 
 
Among the civil litigation privileges incorporated into the FOIA by this section is the attorney 
work product privilege. 
 
The work product privilege, “distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege,” 
exempts from discovery documents prepared by an attorney in contemplation of litigation. 
Document 19, which the trial court held non-disclosable as attorney work product, seems to fall 
within this class. It details a meeting held between an IRS lawyer and the federal district judge 
presiding over the receivership of W. L. Moody & Sons, Banker, regarding the enforcement of a 
summons served on E. O. Buck, the bank’s receiver. Prepared as a memorandum to the file by 
the participating IRS attorney, Document 19 predates by two days the filing of a petition to 
enforce the summons. 
 
Appellant contends, however, that the work product doctrine does not cover Document 19 
because it is the fruit of impermissible legal conduct. According to appellant, the purposeful 
exclusion of opposing counsel from the meeting violated the court’s rules and the American Bar 
Association's ethical standards. Moody argues that it would be a perversion of the work product 
doctrine, designed “to encourage effective legal representation within the framework of the 
adversary system,” to allow it to be used to “cover up” activities destructive of that system. 
 
We agree that, at least in some circumstances, a lawyer’s unprofessional behavior may vitiate 
the work product privilege. We therefore remand this case to the district court so that it may 
determine in the first instance whether such circumstances exist in this case, and more 
fundamentally, whether the actions of the IRS attorney in fact violated professional standards. 
 
The work product privilege creates a zone of privacy within which a lawyer can prepare his case 
free of adversarial scrutiny. From its inception, however, the courts have stressed that the 
privilege is “not to protect any interest of the attorney, who is no more entitled to privacy or 
protection than any other person, but to protect the adversary trial process itself.” Some 
protection of lawyers’ “heretofore inviolate” thoughts was deemed necessary to avoid an 
incentive to develop “unfair and sharp practices for the giving of legal advice and in the 
preparation of cases for trial,” as the development of such practices would “poorly serve the 
interests of the clients and the cause of justice.” 
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It would indeed be perverse, as appellant contends, to allow a lawyer to claim an evidentiary 
privilege to prevent disclosure of work product generated by those very activities the privilege 
was meant to prevent. Non-disclosure would then88 provide an incentive for, rather than against, 
the disfavored practices. The integrity of the adversary process is not furthered by protecting a 
lawyer who steps outside his role as “an officer of the court working for the advancement of 
justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients.” An attorney should not be 
able to exploit the privilege for ends outside of and antithetical to the adversary system any 
more than a client who attempts to use the privilege to advance criminal or fraudulent ends. 
 
However, the conclusion that an attorney has no right to object to the disclosure of work product 
made possible by his misconduct does not necessarily mean that the work product privilege is 
inapplicable to such documents. Unlike the attorney-client privilege, which exists solely for the 
benefit of the client, and can be asserted and waived exclusively by him, the work product 
privilege creates a legally protectable interest in non-disclosure in two parties: lawyer and client. 
Just as “an invasion of the attorney’s necessary privacy may not be justified by the misfortune of 
representing a fraudulent client,” the client's interest in preventing disclosures about his case 
may survive the misfortune of his representation by an unscrupulous attorney. A court must look 
to all the circumstances of the case, including the availability of alternate disciplinary 
procedures,89 to decide whether the policy favoring disclosure outweighs the client's legitimate 
interest90 in secrecy. No court should order disclosure under the FOIA or in discovery if the 
disclosure would traumatize the adversary process more than the underlying legal misbehavior. 
 
We have attempted to outline in our footnotes to this opinion some of the factors we would take 
into consideration when balancing the policy favoring disclosure against that favoring continued 
secrecy. However, each case obviously presents new permutations and combinations of fact 
patterns, all of which must be taken into account when reaching a decision. For this reason, the 
trial court, which is both familiar with the case and in a position to gather any evidence deemed 
necessary to a reasoned decision, is best equipped to weigh the balance. 
 
																																																								
88 We stress that in this case, appellee has admitted engaging in the conduct which forms the basis of the 
charge of unprofessional conduct. We are therefore not dealing with a situation where disclosure is 
sought for the purpose of determining whether such misbehavior has in fact occurred. The latter case 
involves an entirely different problem — an exception which threatens to swallow the rule — than is 
presented in this case. 
89 Lawyers, of course, are always subject to disciplinary proceedings, if not criminal or civil malpractice 
sanctions, for malfeasance in the conduct of their legal affairs. Thus, disclosure is not the sole available 
remedy for a breach of a professional duty, and may in fact bear so little relationship to the underlying 
breach as to be inappropriate as a remedy. In this case, of course, if a violation of legal standards 
occurred, it lay in the attorney's exclusion of the opposing party and his counsel from a meeting; 
disclosure of what went on at that meeting to that opponent, the appellant in this FOIA action, would 
therefore seem an appropriate remedy. 
90 A client's interest in non-disclosure would be illegitimate, of course, if he knowingly instigated or 
participated in the conduct which constituted the breach of duty. In some cases, the extent to which a 
client should be allowed to benefit from unprofessionally obtained information may also be questioned; 
such benefits, in some cases, may not be deemed a “legitimate” secrecy interest. 
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We therefore remand this case for reconsideration of the withholdings from Document 19 in light 
of our Neufeld decision, for an evaluation of the attorney’s conduct and, if it is found in violation 
of professional standards, a determination of whether his breach of professional standards 
vitiated the work product privilege otherwise attributable to Document 19. If the documents 
released as a result of the proceedings on remand are sufficient for a court to conclude 
appellant substantially prevailed in his FOIA action, he will then become eligible for an award of 
attorney’s fees. 
 
Haigh v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America, 676 F. Supp. 1332 (E.D. Va. 1987) 
 
SPENCER, District Judge. 
 
Plaintiff Richard Haigh, a Virginia citizen, was employed by defendant Matsushita Electric 
Corporation of America from October 17, 1974 through January 27, 1987. He is fifty-seven 
years old, and is Jewish. Plaintiff Norma Haigh, a Virginia citizen, is Haigh’s wife. 
 
Defendant Panasonic is a Delaware corporation. 
 
The Second Amended Complaint, which is currently before the Court, is sixty-eight pages long, 
and contains a plethora of allegations. In brief, Haigh states that he was a salesman for 
Panasonic who handled the accounts of Best Products and Circuit City. Haigh claims that during 
his tenure business with these two outfits skyrocketed. In December 1986, Haigh was told that 
the Best Products and Circuit City accounts were being taken away from him and given to 
defendant Weber. Haigh also claims he was told his salary would be cut, along with his 
earnable bonuses. Additionally, he was told that he would be reassigned from his Richmond, 
Virginia location to the Panasonic accounts in western Virginia. Haigh claims he argued that the 
reassignment was unlawful, and requested to be told the legitimate business reason for the 
action. In response, defendants Willner and Adamyk allegedly proposed that the Richmond 
accounts of Thalhimers, Miller & Rhoads, Robert’s Leasing, and Dominion Pottery be added to 
Haigh’s new territory. Haigh also asserts that these two defendants sought a complete release 
for all of Panasonic’s actions to date. 
 
In due course, by letter dated January 27, 1987, Haigh stated that his reassignment was 
unacceptable, and claimed that Panasonic had constructively terminated his employment. Since 
that time, Haigh claims to have vigorously sought employment without success. 
 
Defendants move for an order compelling discovery of certain tape recordings, and awarding 
expenses in connection thereto. The facts underlying the motion are as follows. Defendants 
made the usual request for production of documents in August 1987. Subsequently, during 
Haigh’s deposition on October 21, 1987, he admitted that he had taped conversations with fifty-
eight individuals. The tapes were made without the knowledge of these individuals, at Haigh’s 
own initiative, and absent directives from Haigh’s attorneys. Upon learning of their existence, 
defendants asked for the tapes. Plaintiffs turned over three tapes, which contained 
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conversations with named defendants. Plaintiffs also surrendered a list of the names of the 
individuals who were on the recordings. 
 
Defendants now seek the production of all the recordings. Plaintiffs argue that the tapes come 
within the work product privilege in that they were prepared in anticipation of litigation. 
Specifically, plaintiffs state that Haigh consulted legal counsel in December 1986, evidently 
fearing that defendants were trying to push him out of the company. Haigh considered himself 
constructively terminated in late January 1987. On March 12, 1987, he filed an EEOC 
complaint. He states that between February 1987 and October 1987, he made the tape 
recordings. He delivered the cassette tapes to counsel for the plaintiffs within a day or two 
following each conversation, and the contents of such tapes were reviewed by counsel and 
used by counsel to prepare the Complaint and discovery requests. 
 
This matter came before the Court on defendants’ November 2, 1987 motion. The motion was 
briefed by the parties, and oral argument was held on November 13, 1987, at which time the 
Court directed counsel to submit additional memoranda addressed to the question whether the 
work product privilege had been vitiated. The parties have filed their memoranda, and the 
motion is now ripe for decision. Although several issues are raised by the parties, only two need 
to be addressed by this Court. 
 
Issue I — Are the tapes protected by the work product privilege? 
Issue II — If the answer to the question in Issue I is yes, is the privilege vitiated in this case? 
 
Issue I 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) addresses the work product privilege. Basically, in 
order for the privilege to be applicable, the material must be (1) documents or tangible things, 
(2) prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, and (3) prepared by or for another party or by 
or for that other party's representative. Additionally, the question whether the material was 
prepared in anticipation of litigation does not turn on whether a suit had already been filed. 
 
In arguing that the work product privilege does not apply here, defendants make the following 
statement: “The tapes were made by a party to this action and apparently do not contain the 
thoughts and impressions of plaintiff's counsel, who was not involved in the conversations, and, 
therefore, cannot be considered attorneys' work product under the most liberal interpretation of 
that doctrine.” 
 
Defendants are living in the past, and are presenting a pre-1970 argument. “The 1970 
amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 extends the work product protection to documents and things 
prepared for litigation or trial by or for the adverse party himself or his agent. Prior to the 
amendment some cases have held that documents of this kind were not within the immunity.” 
 
Moreover, in an identical situation, the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York held that a party's surreptitiously obtained tape recordings are protected under Fed. 
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R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), assuming that the statements were obtained and recorded in anticipation of 
litigation or in preparation for trial. 
 
Based upon the facts and arguments as now appearing before the Court, the Court is of the 
opinion that the work product privilege would apply to the tape recordings, and production would 
be denied unless the Court became convinced that defendants had a substantial need for the 
recordings and were unable to obtain their equivalent without undue hardship. 
 
Issue II 
 
The Court need not delve into questions of “substantial need,” “undue hardship,” or “substantial 
equivalent.” The Court holds that the work product privilege has, in this case, been vitiated. 
 
In recent years, courts have come to recognize that “in some circumstances, a lawyer’s 
unprofessional behavior may vitiate the work product privilege.” 
 
The Moody opinion was discussed by the Eleventh Circuit in Parrott v. Wilson. There, plaintiff’s 
attorney had clandestinely taped telephone conversations with two witnesses. Defendants 
moved to compel production of the recordings, and plaintiff objected on the ground that the 
tapes were work product under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). It is helpful to quote in length from that 
opinion. 
 
The Moody court reasoned that the purpose of the work product privilege is to protect 
the integrity of the adversary process; therefore, it would be improper to allow an 
attorney to exploit the privilege for ends that are antithetical to that process. In the 
instant case, the record clearly demonstrates that counsel for the appellant clandestinely 
recorded conversations with witnesses. While this practice violates no law, the Code of 
Professional Conduct imposes a higher standard than mere legality. The American Bar 
Association’s Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has ruled that the 
recording of conversations of witnesses without their consent is unethical. 
 
We are mindful of the client's interest in protecting against the disclosure of work 
product. However, we are unable to say that the disclosure in this case “traumatized the 
adversary process more than the underlying legal misbehavior.” The only discernible 
effect of the disclosure was that the depositions of Sharp and Godfrey commenced with 
the playing of the taped conversations. We thus hold that whatever work product 
privilege might have existed was vitiated by counsel's clandestine recording of 
conversations with witnesses. 
 
Carrying the question a step further, one court has recognized the potential difficulties of the 
situation in which an attorney directs his client to engage in behavior that would be improper for 
the attorney. It is apparent to this Court that such a course of action on the part of an attorney 
would clearly be improper. 
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In the instant situation, counsel for plaintiffs did not direct Haigh to undertake the clandestine 
recordings. As represented to this Court, he clearly initiated such conduct on his own, and he, of 
course, is not bound by the ethical strictures which bind his counsel. 
 
This does not end the question, however. The Court is troubled by language contained in 
plaintiff's memorandum in response to the motion to compel. 
 
Haigh began a concerted effort to interview persons throughout the United States who 
may have relevant information relating to his legal claims. Between February 1987 and 
October 1987, Haigh has telephoned approximately fifty-eight such persons and, in most 
instances, tape recorded the conversations. The cassette tapes were delivered to 
counsel for the plaintiffs within a day or two following each such conversation and the 
contents of such tapes reviewed by counsel. In many instances, the information obtained 
during such telephone conversations was used by plaintiffs’ counsel to prepare the initial 
complaint, the first amended and restated complaint, and the second amended and 
restated complaint filed in this action. Counsel also used such information to prepare 
other discovery requests. 
 
While counsel did not tell Haigh to initiate or continue taping conversations, the old adage 
“actions speak louder than words” comes to mind. Indeed, Haigh and his attorneys fell into a 
pattern of conduct whereby Haigh would tape conversations and almost immediately turn the 
tapes over to counsel for their use. This pattern of conduct continued over a period of 
approximately nine months, and included the taping of fifty-eight conversations. 
 
The Court would not be so troubled if it were faced with the situation where a party, in his 
exuberance over pending litigation, pursued such a course of conduct and delivered a handful 
of tapes to his counsel. In that situation, the lawyer’s conduct could fairly be described as simple 
acquiescence in the situation created by the client’s exuberance. There is a point, however, 
where acquiescence ceases to be passive and noncommittal, and becomes active 
encouragement and affirmative support. There is, and can be, no bright line to determine when 
this point is reached. Instead, the circumstances of each case must be viewed in their totality in 
an attempt to get a fix on that point. Here, the Court is certain that that point has been crossed. 
As such, the Court holds that the work product privilege has been vitiated. 
 
The ruling today should not be taken as an indictment of counsel’s ethics or professionalism. To 
be sure, the law on this point is in an infant, perhaps even fetal, state. The Court in no way 
assumes or believes that counsel's intent was to run afoul of ethical strictures. 
 
Additionally, it should be noted that this ruling may be interpreted by some as punishment for 
Haigh’s retention of counsel. Indeed, if Haigh were proceeding pro se, the privilege would not be 
vitiated. However, an attorney’s clients may not reap the benefits of the attorney’s expertise in a 
vacuum-like state. Rather, the client must realize that the attorney is bound by a Code of 
Professional Responsibility, and, when he retains the attorney, he also retains the 
responsibilities imposed on that attorney. 
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Questions: 
 
Further Reading: 
 
● G. Michael Halfenger, The Attorney Misconduct Exception to the Work Product Doctrine, 
58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1079 (1991) 
● David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege 
for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 443 (1986) 
● Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Taking the Business Out of Work Product, 79 Fordham L. 
Rev. 1869 (2011) 
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Section 6: Advocacy & Conduct 
 
6.1: Frivolous Pleadings 
 
Meaningless, who dare to say it wasn’t meaningless? Shout from the rooftops and address the 
press. Ha ha ha it was totally meaningless.91 
 
While courts have always prohibited “frivolous” litigation, they have also struggled to define it. In 
theory, frivolous litigation consists of a pleading or motion that a competent attorney would know 
has no legitimate basis in fact or law. But of course, it is often hard to know whether a legal 
claim is legitimate or has a chance of success. Sometimes, courts change their minds, and 
sometimes, juries are unpredictable. Frivolity is often in the eye of the beholder. 
 
The Supreme Court has revised the procedural rules governing frivolous litigation many times, 
and adopted different approaches to identifying and dissuading frivolous litigation at different 
points in time. The notes of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
seem to reflect both frustration with frivolous litigation and uncertainty how to prevent it. For 
example, the 1983 notes observe, “Experience shows that in practice Rule 11 has not been 
effective in deterring abuses.” They accompanied revisions that encouraged the imposition of 
sanctions. And the 1993 notes observe, “Experience shows that in practice Rule 11 has not 
been effective in deterring abuses.” They accompanied revisions that discouraged the 
imposition of sanctions. 
 
Under the current version of Rule 11, a party may file a motion for sanctions only after serving 
the draft motion on opposing counsel and giving them time to respond. While courts may 
impose sanctions under Rule 11 sua sponte, the Rule implicitly discourages sanctions and 
encourages dispute resolution. 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11: Signing Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; 
Representations to the Court; Sanctions 
 
a. Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least 
one attorney of record in the attorney’s name—or by a party personally if the party is 
unrepresented. The paper must state the signer's address, e-mail address, and 
telephone number. Unless a rule or statute specifically states otherwise, a pleading need 
not be verified or accompanied by an affidavit. The court must strike an unsigned paper 
unless the omission is promptly corrected after being called to the attorney's or party's 
attention. 
b. Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or 
other paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or 
unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and 
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: 
																																																								
91 The Magnetic Fields, Meaningless, 69 Love Songs (1999). 
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1. it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause 
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; 
2. the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law 
or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law 
or for establishing new law; 
3. the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, 
will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further 
investigation or discovery; and 
4. the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically 
so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information. 
c. Sanctions. 
1. In General. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court 
determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an 
appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is 
responsible for the violation. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm must 
be held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its partner, associate, or 
employee. 
2. Motion for Sanctions. A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any 
other motion and must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 
11(b). The motion must be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be 
presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or 
denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service or 
within another time the court sets. If warranted, the court may award to the 
prevailing party the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred for 
the motion. 
3. On the Court's Initiative. On its own, the court may order an attorney, law firm, or 
party to show cause why conduct specifically described in the order has not 
violated Rule 11(b). 
4. Nature of a Sanction. A sanction imposed under this rule must be limited to what 
suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others 
similarly situated. The sanction may include nonmonetary directives; an order to 
pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective 
deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the 
reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses directly resulting from the 
violation. 
5. Limitations on Monetary Sanctions. The court must not impose a monetary 
sanction: 
A. against a represented party for violating Rule 11(b)(2); or 
B. on its own, unless it issued the show-cause order under Rule 11(c)(3) 
before voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against 
the party that is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned. 
6. Requirements for an Order. An order imposing a sanction must describe the 
sanctioned conduct and explain the basis for the sanction. 
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d. Inapplicability to Discovery. This rule does not apply to disclosures and discovery 
requests, responses, objections, and motions under Rules 26 through 37. 
 
Further Reading: 
 
● Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 589 (1998) 
● Julia K. Cowles, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Duty to 
Withdraw a Baseless Pleading, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 697 (1988) 
● Suja A. Thomas, Frivolous Cases, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 633 (2010) 
● Charles Yablon, Hindsight, Regret, and Safe Harbors in Rule 11 Litigation, 37 Loy. L.A. 
L. Rev. 599 (2004) 
● Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 519 (1997) 
 
 
 
Simpson v. Welch, 900 F. 2d 33 (4th Cir. 1990) 
 
Summary: Simpson filed an employment discrimination action against the Chesapeake 
Health Department, but failed to respond to subsequent motions or to appear at the 
hearing, so the district court dismissed the complaint and granted the defendant’s motion 
for fees and costs under Rule 11. The circuit court reversed, because Rule 11 only 
covers frivolous pleadings, not the failure to respond to motions or pleadings. 
 
PER CURIAM: 
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The questions presented are whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiff’s complaint 
and whether the court properly awarded sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. We hold that the dismissal was proper, but that Rule 11 does not provide 
authority for the sanctions imposed in this case. 
 
I 
 
Appellant is a black employee at the Chesapeake Health Department in Chesapeake, Virginia. 
After receiving “Right to Sue” letters from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, she 
filed this employment discrimination suit on February 16, 1989. The individual appellees, the 
present and former directors of the Department, filed a motion to dismiss on March 13, 1989. 
The City of Chesapeake filed a motion for summary judgment on March 20, 1989. 
 
An initial pretrial conference was held on April 3, 1989, at which all counsel were present. At the 
conference, an April 17, 1989 deadline was established for appellant to file responses to the 
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and a hearing on these motions was scheduled 
for May 2, 1989. Appellant failed to oppose these motions, and appellees moved for judgment 
on the pleadings. After appellant's counsel also failed to appear at the May 2, 1989 hearing, the 
district court granted appellees' motions and dismissed the complaint. 
 
The court concluded that the Department and its employees were agents of the state, not the 
City. Therefore, the court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment and held that the 
Eleventh Amendment barred appellant's claims for damages and other relief. The Court also 
held that all of appellant's claims should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted. Appellant’s “vague and conclusory” allegations were 
insufficient to satisfy the notice pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In the alternative, the court held that “plaintiff’s continued failure to follow the rules and orders of 
this Court or even to appear in Court as required justifies dismissal under Rule 41(b).” 
 
Appellees moved for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs, and appellant moved under Rule 
60(b) for relief from the order of dismissal. The district court denied the Rule 60(b) motion, 
finding no excuse for appellant’s counsel’s neglect in failing to respond to appellees’ motions to 
dismiss and for summary judgment. The court extended the deadline for appellant to oppose 
appellees’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, but appellant again failed to file any opposition. 
Thus, on July 13, 1989, the district court granted appellees’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. 
 
II 
 
The allegations in appellant’s complaint are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. Appellant alleges that she was “required to work in places and under conditions where 
prejudice and bias exist,” but her complaint nowhere alleges any specific oppressive conditions 
or expressions of “prejudice and bias.” She alleges that she was “denied opportunities to be 
promoted,” but never indicates the positions for which she applied. She asserts that she was 
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“treated poorly on the job and harassed,” but described no specific incidents of improper 
treatment or of harassment. As the district court stated: 
 
The Complaint contains no factual allegations whatsoever to support these charges. The 
plaintiff has set forth no specific incidents of discrimination, no details of promotions to 
which she was entitled but which she did not receive, no explanation of the forms that 
any alleged harassment took, no specifics regarding her claims of disparate treatment of 
blacks and whites. The Complaint alleges religious discrimination but fails even to state 
what plaintiff’s religious affiliation is, let alone how it has been the basis of any 
discriminatory acts. In short, the Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim 
of racial or religious discrimination. 
 
Appellant’s conclusory allegations of discrimination and harassment do not state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. The district court properly dismissed appellant's complaint in its 
entirety. 
 
In the alternative, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed appellant’s 
complaint for failure to comply with court orders. Appellant failed to oppose appellees’ motions 
to dismiss and for summary judgment, even after the district court extended the time to respond, 
and appellant’s counsel failed to appear at the May 2, 1989 hearing. The district court acted 
within its discretion when it dismissed the complaint under Rule 41(b). 
 
III 
 
Although appellees moved for attorneys’ fees and costs under Rules 11 and 54(d) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the district court’s order awarding 
fees and costs mentions only Rule 11. Rule 11 states: 
 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be 
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name. The signature 
of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the 
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, 
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or 
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, 
motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon 
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or 
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or 
parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the 
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
 
The rule imposes “a duty to conduct a pre-filing examination of both the facts and the law before 
instituting legal process.” The rule does not purport to be a means for district courts to sanction 
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conduct in the course of a lawsuit, such as failure to comply with court orders, that does not 
involve the signing of pleadings, motions, or other papers. 
 
The district court faulted appellant for filing a suit in which the “weight of existing law” favored 
appellees, but the court admitted that there was a legal basis for appellant’s Title VII claims. The 
court justified its sanction under Rule 11 by noting that appellant had failed to oppose the 
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment and that the complaint set forth only vague and 
conclusory allegations. But this does not establish that there was not a factual and legal basis 
for appellant’s claim under Title VII. It merely establishes that appellant’s counsel failed to 
comply with court orders and filed an inartfully pled complaint. Even a vague and conclusory 
complaint may be “well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” Indeed, if Rule 11 permitted 
sanctions merely on the basis of inartful pleading, rather than for a failure to investigate the legal 
and factual basis for that pleading, Rule 12(e) motions for a more definite statement would be 
virtually unheard of. The fact that appellant's complaint was vague and conclusory does not 
justify sanctions under Rule 11. 
 
The district court also awarded attorneys’ fees and costs because of appellant’s counsel’s 
“blatant disregard” for the local rules of the district court and for “his lackadaisical attitude in 
failing to respond to defendants’ Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees.” Because the order 
awarding fees and costs does not indicate any other source of authority, we must presume that 
the district court awarded fees on this ground pursuant to Rule 11. Again, Rule 11 is 
inapplicable. Rule 16(f) specifically provides for sanctions “if a party or party’s attorney fails to 
obey a scheduling or pretrial order, or if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a 
scheduling or pretrial conference.” In contrast, Rule 11, by its own terms, can never be the basis 
for sanctions for failure to file certain papers. Thus, although appellant’s counsel’s conduct in 
the course of this lawsuit fully justified sanctions, Rule 11 is an inappropriate vehicle for the 
imposition of such sanctions. Because appellees’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs rested on 
a number of grounds and because the district court appeared to rely only on Rule 11, the award 
of fees and costs must be vacated and the issue remanded to the district court for consideration 
of alternative bases for such an award. 
 
IV 
 
The district court properly dismissed appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted and for failure to comply with court orders. Although the district court had 
ample grounds under Rule 16(f) for imposing sanctions on appellant's counsel, Rule 11 does 
not provide authority for sanctions in this case. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Should the circuit court have read Rule 11 this narrowly? 
2. If sanctions were permitted on a basis other than Rule 11, why didn’t the circuit court 
affirm on alternative grounds? 
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3. Should plaintiff’s failure to respond be sanctionable? What about defendant’s failure to 
respond? 
 
In re Sargent, 136 F. 3d 349 (4th Cir. 1998) 
 
Summary: Cox filed a complaint alleging that Saunders and others violated his 
constitutional rights by subjecting him to harmful prison conditions. The district court 
dismissed all but one of Cox’s claims, and informed him that the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act precluded prisoners who filed three frivolous complaints from filing any additional 
complaints, unless they were in danger of imminent harm. Assistant Attorney General 
Sargent filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Cox’s complaint was 
frivolous. The district court dismissed and then reinstated Cox’s complaint, at his 
request. The district court also imposed Rule 11 sanctions on Sargent for 
misrepresenting the PLRA and enjoined application of the PLRA to Cox. The circuit court 
reversed, holding that Sargent’s motion for summary judgment did not violate Rule 11 
and that precluding application of the PLRA to Cox was not an appropriate remedy for 
the alleged misconduct. 
 
WILKINS, Circuit Judge: 
 
Pamela A. Sargent, an Assistant Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia, appeals a 
sanction imposed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 enjoining application of the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act to inmate Richard Cox in any civil action in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Virginia. We reverse. 
 
I. 
 
Cox, a Virginia prisoner, filed an action against Warden Lonnie Saunders and other prison 
officials, alleging that they had violated his constitutional rights by, inter alia, intentionally 
subjecting him to harmful prison conditions. The prison officials filed a motion to dismiss Cox’s 
action, which was granted except as to one claim. Soon afterward, the district court issued a 
notice informing Cox of the passage and practical effects of the PLRA. The court correctly 
explained that under the PLRA 
 
A prisoner may not bring a civil action without prepayment of the appropriate filing fee if 
the prisoner has, on three or more prior occasions, brought an action or appeal in a 
federal court that was dismissed as frivolous, as malicious, or for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of 
serious physical injury. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Sargent filed a motion for summary judgment on behalf of the prison officials. 
In the penultimate paragraph of the accompanying memorandum, she asserted: 
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Cox has already had two cases dismissed for being frivolous or for failure to state a 
claim. Pursuant to the newly enacted Prison Litigation Reform Act, Cox will forfeit the 
right to file future cases if a third case is found to be frivolous, malicious or fails to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted. The prison officials submit that this is that third 
case and that an Order should be entered dismissing the case with prejudice, awarding 
them costs and attorney's fees, and barring Cox from future filings. 
 
Approximately one week later, Cox requested that his action be dismissed without prejudice, 
and the district court granted the dismissal. Thereafter, however, the district court granted Cox’s 
motion to reinstate the action. In ruling on that motion, the district court found that Sargent’s 
contentions were “a blatant misrepresentation of the content of that provision and its application 
to this case” because a portion of Cox’s complaint had already survived a motion to dismiss. 
The district court also noted that Sargent had misstated the law regarding the filing of future 
cases because § 1915(g) of the PLRA provides that an inmate who has three qualifying 
dismissed cases is not barred from all future filings but only from filing actions in forma pauperis 
when he does not face an imminent danger of serious physical injury. The district court directed 
Sargent to show cause why the memorandum in support of the motion for summary judgment 
did not violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b). After receiving Sargent’s response, the 
district court determined that sanctions were warranted and enjoined application of § 1915(g) to 
Cox until further order of the court. 
 
II. 
 
Sargent first argues that the sanction should be reversed because the district court abused its 
discretion in finding that the legal contentions contained in the memorandum in support of the 
motion for summary judgment violated Rule 11. We agree. 
 
The provisions of Rule 11 dictate that in presenting a motion to a court, an attorney represents 
that the “legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.” An 
assertion of law violates Rule 11(b)(2) when, applying a standard of objective reasonableness, it 
can be said that “a reasonable attorney in like circumstances could not have believed his 
actions to be legally justified.” A legal contention is unjustified when “a reasonable attorney 
would recognize it as frivolous.” Put differently, a legal position violates Rule 11 if it “has 
absolutely no chance of success under the existing precedent.” 
 
Here, the district court first took issue with Sargent's contention that the earlier dismissal of 
some of the claims in Cox’s present lawsuit should be considered his third strike for the purpose 
of § 1915(g). However, ten of the eleven claims in Cox's complaint had been dismissed for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and it was well within the bounds of 
fair adversarial argument for the Government to suggest that the remaining claim must also be 
dismissed as frivolous, causing the three-strike rule to apply. If the latter occurred, Cox’s 
underlying suit could indeed constitute the third strike against him. We cannot say that the 
position had no chance of success under existing law. 
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The district court next found fault with Sargent’s representation that pursuant to § 1915(g) a 
third dismissal for frivolity, malice, or failure to state a claim would bar Cox from future filings. 
Assuredly, Sargent’s legal contention was not a complete explanation of the consequences of a 
third strike. But, the consequences of a third strike in all future cases were not put into issue by 
the motion. And, Sargent explains that the statement was meant to convey only that Cox would 
be barred from filing cases pursuant to § 1915 — the statute at issue — which addresses only in 
forma pauperis filings. Thus, although Sargent’s statement of the consequences of obtaining a 
third strike perhaps was not completely thorough, it can plausibly be read as a mere shorthand 
reference to the statute and was not unwarranted under the circumstances. Accordingly, we find 
the decision of the district court to sanction Sargent under Rule 11 constituted an abuse of 
discretion. 
 
III. 
 
Sargent also maintains that even if her conduct warranted sanctions, the district court abused its 
discretion in choosing the particular sanction imposed. “A sanction imposed for violation of Rule 
11 shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition” of the objectionable conduct. This 
court has made “clear that the primary purpose of Rule 11 is to deter future litigation abuse.” 
Other objectives advanced by the imposition of a sanction are remediation of the harm caused 
by the Rule 11 violation, for example by compensating the victim for attorney’s fees expended in 
responding to the frivolous claim; punishment of the person or entity responsible for the 
violation; and enhancement of judicial administration. 
 
With these purposes in mind, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in ruling 
that the sanction imposed was limited to what was sufficient to deter Sargent’s conduct. The 
finding by the district court that Sargent violated Rule 11 by advancing an unsupported legal 
assertion essentially amounts to a public reprimand that, in and of itself, should be a significant 
deterrent to future violations. And, there is no serious suggestion that further sanction was 
necessary to curb future abuses by Sargent. Further, Cox was in no way prejudiced by 
Sargent’s legal assertion. Assuming that Cox moved to dismiss his action based upon Sargent’s 
legal representations, the district court permitted reinstatement of the action upon Cox’s 
request. Thus, the imposition of any sanction was unnecessary for purposes of remediating 
harm caused by the Rule 11 violation. Moreover, assuming that Cox was prejudiced in some 
way by Sargent’s statements, the sanction imposed by the district court failed to provide 
remediation because it had no potential to alleviate any type of harm that Cox could have 
suffered in the present litigation. Indeed, we can envision no circumstances in which such a 
sanction would be appropriate to remediate harm to a victim of a Rule 11 violation. Finally, there 
is no suggestion that an injunction on application of § 1915(g) to Cox was necessary to punish 
Sargent or to enhance judicial administration. For that matter, it is difficult to say that the 
sanction adversely impacted Sargent in the least. And, we fail to appreciate how the suspension 
of a statute specifically designed to reduce the amount of frivolous prisoner litigation could be 
thought to enhance the administration of justice. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court 
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abused its discretion in choosing a sanction to impose upon Sargent even if her conduct had 
violated Rule 11. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. When should an argument in a pleading be sanctionable under Rule 11? 
2. Should prosecutors and other government lawyers be held to a different standard than 
private attorneys or pro se litigants? 
3. What is the appropriate sanction for a Rule 11 violation? 
 
The Duty of Reasonable Investigation 
 
Cleveland Demolition Co., Inc. v. Azcon Scrap Corp., 827 F. 2d 984 (4th Cir. 1987) 
 
Summary: Paul Haddad represented himself as the President of Cleveland Demolition 
and sold scrap material to Azcon Scrap. But when Azcon tried to collect the scrap, 
Cleveland refused to provide it, arguing that Haddad was not its President and that he 
was not authorized to sell the scrap. Azcon filed a breach of contract action against 
Cleveland. At trial, Azcon Vice-President Richard Spine testified that he had requested a 
verbal Dun & Bradstreet report on Cleveland that listed Haddad as President. A later, 
printed report listed Haddad as President, and the district court granted summary 
judgment to Azcon. Cleveland filed a motion to vacate, arguing that Spine perjured 
himself, because Dun & Bradstreet had no record of a verbal report. The district court 
dismissed the motion and imposed Rule 11 sanctions on Cleveland, finding that its 
claims lacked a factual basis, and the circuit court affirmed. 
 
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Cleveland Demolition seeks to set aside an earlier jury verdict for Azcon Scrap on the basis that 
Azcon’s trial attorney conspired with a witness to present perjured testimony. The only evidence 
of this alleged conspiracy, however, is an evidentiary conflict between the witness’s testimony 
and statements made by a different party in a subsequent lawsuit. This routine evidentiary 
conflict does not justify an action for fraud on the court or the serious allegations of attorney 
misconduct leveled in this case. We therefore affirm the district court’s decision to grant 
summary judgment for Azcon and to impose Rule 11 sanctions on Cleveland and its attorneys. 
 
I. 
 
In 1983, Cleveland Demolition demolished a power plant for an electric company in West 
Virginia, leaving Cleveland with several tons of scrap material. In June 1983, Paul Haddad, who 
represented himself as the president of Cleveland, contacted Richard Spine, a vice-president of 
Azcon Scrap, to inquire whether Azcon was interested in buying the scrap. After inspecting the 
site and negotiating over terms, Spine and Haddad signed a contract on July 14th. When an 
Azcon crew arrived at the demolition site, however, it was prevented from removing the scrap by 
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Cleveland employees, who informed them that Haddad was not the president of Cleveland and 
had no authority to sign the contract with Azcon. Azcon sued Cleveland for breach of contract. 
 
A crucial issue at trial was whether Haddad had apparent authority to sell the scrap for 
Cleveland Demolition. Azcon presented a great deal of evidence to justify its belief that Haddad 
was the president of Cleveland. For example, Cleveland employees at the scrap site had 
treated Haddad as if he were the president and a representative of the electric company had 
told Spine that Haddad was the president of Cleveland. Haddad also testified that Phillip 
Schwab, the owner of Cleveland, had asked him to act as president in dealing with the West 
Virginia electric company because a different Schwab company had defaulted on an earlier 
contract with the same power company. 
 
During the trial, Spine testified that on July 5th, before signing the contract with Haddad, he 
requested a verbal Dun & Bradstreet report on Cleveland Demolition from Azcon’s Chicago 
office. According to Spine, Azcon’s Chicago office reported that Haddad was listed as the 
president of Cleveland Demolition. After learning that Haddad was not the actual president, 
Azcon requested a print-out of the Dun & Bradstreet report. This report, dated August 2nd and 
introduced at trial, indicated that Haddad was the president of Cleveland. Based on this 
evidence, the jury returned a $500,000 verdict for Azcon. This court affirmed in an unpublished 
opinion, concluding that “sufficient evidence exists to support the jury’s finding that Paul Haddad 
was acting as an agent of Cleveland Demolition.” 
 
Cleveland now claims that the earlier verdict should be vacated because Spine deliberately lied 
when he testified that he requested a Dun & Bradstreet report on July 5th. To support this 
charge of perjury, Cleveland claims that Spine’s pretrial deposition, in contrast to his specific 
trial testimony, was ambiguous and did not clearly reveal that he requested a July report. 
Moreover, Cleveland notes that Dun & Bradstreet has no internal record of a request by Azcon 
for information on July 5th. Cleveland concludes that Spine lied about the July request to help 
Azcon's case. 
 
Cleveland does not stop at alleging perjury by Spine. It claims that Azcon’s trial attorney, 
Lawrence Demase, conspired with Spine to present this perjured testimony. In an attempt to 
prove Demase’s involvement, Cleveland notes that he prepared two affidavits for Spine, but 
neither affidavit mentioned a July 5th request for a Dun & Bradstreet report. Nonetheless, 
Demase questioned Spine about the July 5th report at the trial and used this testimony in his 
opening and closing statements. Cleveland cites as further evidence of Demase’s participation 
his acknowledgement that he and Spine reviewed Spine’s deposition statements and concluded 
that they did not completely reflect what Spine had intended to say. Finally, Cleveland claims 
that Demase should have known that Spine did not request a report on July 5th because Dun & 
Bradstreet has no record of this request. 
 
In sum, Cleveland believes that Spine must have perjured himself because his deposition is 
unclear and his trial testimony conflicts with Dun & Bradstreet’s records. Cleveland concludes 
that Demase must have actively participated in this perjury because he was Azcon’s trial 
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attorney. Relying on such conclusory allegations, Cleveland brought this independent action to 
set aside the earlier verdict, claiming that it was obtained by a fraud on the court. The district 
court granted Azcon’s motion for summary judgment, finding that there was “no evidence here 
that either Spine gave false testimony or that Demase participated.” The district court noted that 
Cleveland had produced no “smoking gun”, nor even so much as a “singed paperclip.” Because 
Cleveland’s attorneys did not adequately investigate the factual or legal basis for this lawsuit, 
the district court also assessed attorney fees and costs under Rule 11. 
 
II. 
 
A verdict may be set aside for fraud on the court if an attorney and a witness have conspired to 
present perjured testimony. The only evidence that Spine committed perjury, however, is the 
conflict between his trial testimony and Dun & Bradstreet’s version of the July 5th report; the 
only evidence of Demase’s involvement is that he was Azcon’s trial attorney. This meager 
evidence falls woefully short of proving a fraud on the court. More importantly, if a losing party 
could attack a verdict whenever two witnesses disagreed and an attorney was involved, no 
verdict would be final. The district court properly granted summary judgment for Azcon. 
 
District courts may entertain an independent action in equity to set aside a judgment for fraud on 
the court. Fraud on the court is a serious allegation, however, involving “corruption of the judicial 
process itself.” A verdict will be vacated only in the “most egregious cases in which the integrity 
of the court and its ability to function impartially is directly impinged.” Although perjury by a 
witness will not suffice, the “involvement of an attorney, as an officer of the court, in a scheme to 
suborn perjury should certainly be considered fraud on the court.” Thus, if Spine deliberately lied 
and Demase participated in the fraud, the earlier verdict for Azcon should be set aside. 
 
According to Cleveland, Spine must have committed perjury because his deposition is vague 
and Dun & Bradstreet has no record of a July 5th request. Cleveland, however, overestimates 
the ambiguity of the deposition. Although not a model of clarity, Spine’s deposition does state 
that he requested a verbal Dun & Bradstreet report when the Azcon employees inspected the 
demolition site, which was in late June or early July. The deposition also shows that Spine 
claimed that Azcon’s Chicago office reported that Haddad was listed as the president on the 
Dun & Bradstreet report. The deposition is not inconsistent with Spine’s subsequent testimony; 
the trial testimony is simply more specific. 
 
The lack of a Dun & Bradstreet record also fails to show that Spine committed perjury. 
Cleveland did not learn that there was no record until it sued Dun & Bradstreet for negligently 
informing Azcon that Haddad was the president. Thus, the statements by Dun & Bradstreet 
employees that they have no internal record actually amount to nothing more than unverified, 
exculpatory claims by an interested party. This evidence does not show that Spine never 
requested a report from the Chicago office or that Spine deliberately lied on the stand. It simply 
shows that Spine and Dun & Bradstreet disagree over whether Azcon made a request on July 
5th. Although Cleveland could certainly have used this evidence to impeach Spine during the 
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initial trial, it cannot use this routine evidentiary conflict to support an action for fraud on the 
court. 
 
Cleveland has produced even less evidence of Demase’s involvement in this alleged 
conspiracy. Demase acted only as Azcon’s trial attorney, performing such typical activities as 
preparing affidavits and questioning witnesses. Cleveland apparently argues for a virtually 
automatic rule that, whenever a witness lies on the stand, his attorney must have known about 
and actively participated in the perjury. In addition to being unjustified, this rule would allow 
parties to circumvent the Rule 60(b)(3) one-year time limitation on motions to set aside a 
judgment for fraud or misrepresentation. Losing parties could transform a perjury case into an 
action for fraud on the court simply by alleging that an attorney was present. 
 
In essence, Cleveland asks this court to vacate the earlier verdict because Spine’s testimony 
conflicts with the Dun & Bradstreet statements and Demase participated in the trial. Not only 
does this argument fail to establish any evidence of a fraud on the court, but it seriously 
undermines the principle of finality. If a routine evidentiary dispute, which occurs in virtually all 
trials, could justify an action for fraud on the court, then any losing party could bring an 
independent action to set aside the verdict, forcing extended proceedings in almost every case. 
Because Rule 60(b) imposes no time limit on these independent actions, they could be brought 
at any time. Thus, under Cleveland’s version of the doctrine, no verdict would ever be final until 
a second proceeding was held to determine if there was a fraud on the court. 
 
Rather than unravel the finality of judgments through the abuse of Rule 60(b), we adhere to the 
well-established rule that evidentiary conflicts must be resolved during the initial trial. Cleveland 
should have been aware of the conflict between Spine’s testimony and Dun & Bradstreet’s 
records; Spine’s deposition was specific enough to put Cleveland on notice. Having failed to 
depose Dun & Bradstreet in time for the trial, Cleveland cannot avoid the verdict by leveling a 
charge of fraud on the court. Because Cleveland has produced no evidence of a conspiracy 
between Spine and Demase, Azcon was entitled to summary judgment. 
 
III. 
 
After granting summary judgment, the district court imposed Rule 11 sanctions on Cleveland 
and its attorneys for filing this action. A decision to impose sanctions will be reversed only for an 
abuse of discretion. Because Cleveland did not conduct a reasonable investigation of the factual 
and legal basis for this claim, we think the district court acted well within its discretion in 
imposing sanctions. 
 
When an attorney signs a complaint, he certifies that “to the best of his knowledge, information, 
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, the complaint is well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law.” Under this rule, Cleveland’s attorneys were required to investigate 
the factual and legal basis for the claim before filing this lawsuit. The 1972 amendments 
underscored this duty by eliminating the subjective “good faith” harbor and requiring an attorney 
to conduct an objectively reasonable investigation. If an attorney signs a complaint without 
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undertaking the necessary investigation, Rule 11 provides that the district court “shall” impose 
sanctions. 
 
The district court found that Cleveland did not conduct a reasonable factual or legal 
investigation. We agree. Although Cleveland discovered a conflict between the Spine and Dun 
& Bradstreet versions, this discovery should have been only the beginning of the inquiry into 
whether Spine committed perjury. Rather than continuing its investigation, however, Cleveland 
was apparently satisfied with a few interviews with a Dun & Bradstreet employee. 
 
A complaint of this nature has a potentially devastating impact upon professional reputations. 
Even if Cleveland had found evidence of perjury, it had an obligation to investigate whether 
attorney Demase was involved. Cleveland’s inquiry never produced any evidence that Demase 
participated in Spine’s alleged perjury. As the district court noted, “this part of Cleveland’s case 
has always been nothing more than speculative and conclusory.” Instead of conducting a 
reasonable factual investigation, Cleveland apparently chose to build its case on the 
unsupported assumption that Spine must have been lying and that Demase must have been 
participating. This speculative basis for a Rule 60(b) action alleging attorney misconduct of the 
most serious nature does not satisfy Rule 11 standards. 
 
Cleveland also failed to conduct a reasonable legal investigation to determine if the complaint 
was “warranted by existing law.” Cleveland limited its inquiry to a brief reading of Rule 60, a 
portion of American Jurisprudence, a Federal Procedure Guide, and Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. 
Hartford-Empire Co. (1944). If Cleveland had conducted even a minimal investigation into 
Fourth Circuit precedent, it would have discovered Great Coastal Express v. International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters. Although Great Coastal suggests that a conspiracy by a witness and 
an attorney to commit perjury will amount to a fraud on the court, the case specifically notes that 
other sanctions exist to punish perjury and that “perjury or fabricated evidence are not grounds 
for relief as a fraud on the court.” Thus, even if Cleveland had evidence of perjury by Spine, it 
was still required to show that Demase participated. Because Cleveland had absolutely no 
evidence of involvement by Demase, a quick reading of Great Coastal would have revealed that 
Cleveland’s complaint had “absolutely no chance of success under the existing precedent.” 
 
In sum, Rule 11 “explicitly and unambiguously imposes an affirmative duty on each attorney to 
conduct a reasonable inquiry into the validity of a pleading before it is signed.” The Rule does 
not seek to stifle the exuberant spirit of skilled advocacy or to require that a claim be proven 
before a complaint can be filed. The Rule attempts to discourage the needless filing of 
groundless lawsuits. To fulfill his duty, an attorney must investigate the facts, examine the law, 
and then decide whether the complaint is justified. Cleveland failed to discharge this duty; it 
conducted only a minimal factual inquiry and a cursory legal investigation. The district court 
properly imposed sanctions. 
 
In determining the specific amount of the sanctions, the district court reduced Azcon’s legal fees 
by 10%, finding that the case was slightly over-lawyered and did not require a trial. The hourly 
fees of several attorneys were lowered to reflect the prevailing local rate, while the fees of 
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attorneys from out of state were reduced by 10% because they failed to provide the district court 
with sufficient information about their professional backgrounds. These adjustments are 
consistent with the twelve factors listed in Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., and we therefore affirm the 
amount of the award in this case. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. What was the basis for Cleveland’s claim that Spine perjured himself? 
2. What investigation should Cleveland have done before filing its motion to vacate? 
3. Is it possible that Spine did not request a verbal report from Dun & Bradstreet? Does it 
matter? 
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William Kunstler (1989) 
 
 
Eddie Hatcher & Timothy Jacobs 
 
In re Kunstler, 914 F. 2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990) 
 
Summary: Eddie Hatcher and Timothy Jacobs hijacked the offices of the Robeson, 
North Carolina newspaper The Robesonian and took its employees hostage. They 
eventually surrendered, in exchange for a promise that the governor would investigate 
their claims of government corruption. The federal government prosecuted Hatcher and 
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Jacobs, but they were acquitted. Then, North Carolina prosecuted Hatcher and Jacobs. 
Barry Nakell, Lewis Pitts, and William Kunstler filed a § 1983 against the Governor of 
North Carolina and other state officials, for improper prosecution. The district court 
dismissed the action and imposed Rule 11 sanctions on Nakell, Pitts, and Kunstler. The 
circuit court affirmed, but remanded for reconsideration of the sanctions. 
 
CHAPMAN, Circuit Judge: 
 
Three attorneys appeal the award of Rule 11 sanctions against them in the amount of 
$122,834.28. Appellants were sanctioned following the dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, 
in which they represented certain plaintiffs seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief from 
the Governor of North Carolina, a number of North Carolina district attorneys, a sheriff, certain 
State Bureau of Investigation officers, the State Attorney General and others for an allegedly 
improper state criminal prosecution and harassment. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and 
remand with instructions. 
 
I 
 
The appellant attorneys are Barry Nakell, a professor at the University of North Carolina School 
of Law; Lewis Pitts, Director of the Christic Institute South, a public interest law firm in Carrboro, 
North Carolina; and William Kunstler, a nationally known civil rights attorney. The § 1983 action 
was connected with the appellants’ earlier representation of two American Indians, Eddie 
Hatcher and Timothy Jacobs, in a federal criminal case. 
 
On February 1, 1988, Hatcher and Jacobs staged an armed takeover of The Robesonian, a 
local newspaper in Robeson County, North Carolina. Hatcher and Jacobs held twenty hostages 
and charged the State District Attorney and the Sheriff’s Office with corruption and criminal 
misconduct. Hatcher and Jacobs surrendered to federal authorities in exchange for a promise 
that a Governor’s Task Force would investigate their complaints. The Task Force ultimately 
announced that it had found no evidence to support Hatcher’s and Jacobs’ charges. 
 
Hatcher and Jacobs were acquitted of federal criminal charges on October 14, 1988, but North 
Carolina District Attorney Joe Freeman Britt announced that Hatcher and Jacobs might face 
state indictments. Soon after that announcement, Hatcher began a petition drive seeking to 
have Hubert and Kevin Stone removed from the Sheriff’s Office. The Robeson Defense 
Committee, which had supported Hatcher in his federal trial, supported the petition drive. In 
November 1988, newspaper reports indicated that the State Bureau of Investigation was 
investigating whether there had been a conspiracy in the takeover of The Robesonian. 
 
Appellants Barry Nakell and Lewis Pitts contacted the Attorney General’s office to express their 
concern that SBI agents would intimidate citizens who were working with Hatcher in the petition 
drive. The Attorney General responded that no action would be taken by his office because he 
did not believe that the SBI was engaged in any abuse of process. Attorney Nakell alleges that 
the Deputy Attorney General orally admitted that the decision was political. 
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Attorney Pitts volunteered legal assistance to anyone on the Robeson Defense Committee 
subjected to harassment because of their participation in the petition drive. Appellants allege 
that six members of the Defense Committee contacted Attorneys Pitts and Nakell with claims of 
harassment by SBI agents and the Sheriff's Department, primarily involving surveillance and 
questioning. 
 
On December 6, 1988, Hatcher and Jacobs were indicted on state charges. After the 
indictment, Jacobs fought extradition from New York. Hatcher was in federal custody in 
California. 
 
By late December 1988, appellants contend that they believed that Jacobs’ extradition, the 
pending state prosecutions, and an alleged pattern of activity by the District Attorney and his 
staff, members of the Sheriff's Department, and the SBI raised constitutional concerns which 
could only be resolved by a civil suit, because public officials were unresponsive. Appellants 
contend that they also believed that there was an illegal campaign to split Jacobs from Hatcher, 
and to interfere with Jacobs' right to counsel by persuading him to hire local counsel. 
 
Attorneys Pitts and Nakell contend that they initially refrained from filing the complaint in hopes 
of enhancing Jacobs’ plea bargaining opportunities, but Mr. Nakell filed the complaint on 
January 31, 1989, the eve of the one-year anniversary of the armed takeover of The 
Robesonian, and he called a press conference to announce the filing. An amended complaint, 
signed by all three appellants, was filed on March 16, 1989. 
 
The suit named eight plaintiffs, including various members of the Robeson Defense Committee, 
and Jacobs and Hatcher. The thirty-page amended complaint names nineteen defendants, 
including two district attorneys and members of their staffs, five SBI agents, the SBI Director, 
the Sheriff of Robeson County and five Deputy Sheriffs, the Attorney General of North Carolina, 
and the Governor of North Carolina. The complaint alleges First Amendment and Sixth 
Amendment violations concerning an alleged campaign of intimidation of political activity, and 
efforts to induce Jacobs to testify against Hatcher. All defendants were sued in their official and 
individual capacities, except the Governor, who was named only in his official capacity in a 
count seeking an injunction against extradition. The complaint also sought injunctions against 
the pending state criminal prosecutions, and against the defendants’ harassment and 
interference with the attorney-client relationship established by Jacobs. The complaint sought 
damages against all individually named defendants and Robeson County. 
 
After the case was filed, appellants sought expedited discovery to depose defendant SBI agent 
Bowman, who was the case agent in the state’s pending criminal action against Jacobs and 
Hatcher. The defendants moved for a protective order claiming that discovery was improperly 
sought to obtain information concerning the state criminal proceedings, which plaintiffs could not 
otherwise obtain. The district court did not rule on this motion prior to the dismissal of the case. 
In late March 1989, Jacobs, having failed in resisting extradition, was returned to North 
Carolina. In April, Jacobs agreed to a plea bargain. Appellants contend that a variety of events 
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then caused them to reevaluate the viability of their civil suit, and to conclude that dismissal was 
appropriate. 
 
On April 20, Mr. Nakell called Joan Byers, a Special Deputy Attorney General, seeking 
defendants’ approval to a stipulated dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(ii). Byers would not stipulate 
to a dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1), but authorized appellants to state that defendants did not 
object to a dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2). Appellants proceeded under Rule 41(a)(2), and the 
order dismissing the case was entered on May 2, 1989. 
 
On June 13, 1989, the state defendants filed their Rule 11 motion, and the county defendants 
filed a similar motion for sanctions on July 5. On August 8, appellants responded to the Rule 11 
motions and requested an evidentiary hearing. On September 5, appellants filed a Rule 11 
motion seeking sanctions against the appellees. On September 8, the court heard arguments of 
counsel and shortly thereafter requested submissions by defendants’ counsel of their fees and 
expenses. On September 29, the district court imposed Rule 11 sanctions upon appellants, and 
dismissed appellants' Rule 11 motion. Sanctions against appellants included full fees and costs 
of $92,834.28 and $10,000 additional sanctions against each appellant based upon the 
baseless claims which appellants had taken care to publicize. We affirm the district court's 
findings that appellants violated all three prongs of Rule 11, but vacate and remand for 
reconsideration of the appropriate sanction. 
 
II 
 
SANCTIONS AFTER DISMISSAL 
 
Initially, we must determine whether the defendants' failure to notify the plaintiffs or the court 
prior to dismissal that defendants intended to file a Rule 11 motion should have precluded 
consideration of the Rule 11 motion. Appellants cite Barr Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., where the 
Second Circuit affirmed the denial of a Rule 11 motion filed after a stipulated dismissal under 
Rule 41(a)(1)(ii). There, the defendant’s attorney did not indicate an intention to seek Rule 11 
sanctions prior to dismissal and implied in a letter to plaintiff's counsel, prior to the dismissal, 
that sanctions would not be sought if the case were voluntarily dismissed. The Barr court 
enunciated a rule “prohibiting a motion for Rule 11 sanctions after the execution of a stipulation 
of dismissal without a reservation of the right to move for such relief.” 
 
The present case is different from Barr because it does not involve a stipulated dismissal, which 
requires opposing counsel to sign the dismissal order. We have a dismissal under Rule 
41(a)(2), which does not require a stipulation by the defendants. No court has adopted a rule 
prohibiting a motion for Rule 11 sanctions after a dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2). 
In addition, unlike Barr, there is no evidence that defendants indicated that they would not 
pursue Rule 11 sanctions. We decline to extend Barr to dismissals under Rule 41(a)(2). 
 
Appellants also argue that since Rule 41(a)(2) specifies that dismissal is subject to such “terms 
and conditions as the court deems proper,” the potential for Rule 11 sanctions should be stated 
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by a defendant as a condition to a dismissal. We disagree. Rule 41(a)(2) does not require the 
defendant or a court to indicate the possibility of Rule 11 sanctions as a “term or condition” of a 
plaintiff’s dismissal. Recently, in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., the Supreme Court 
hypothesized that even a Rule 11 sanction which prohibited refiling a complaint dismissed 
without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1) would not be a “term or condition” placed upon the 
dismissal. Waiver of a Rule 11 motion may not be a condition to dismissal because a decision 
not to dismiss may not prevent the imposition of sanctions for an improvidently filed complaint. 
“As the ‘violation of Rule 11 is complete when the paper is filed,’ a voluntary dismissal does not 
expunge the Rule 11 violation.” 
 
There may be circumstances under which Rule 11 sanctions should not be granted after the 
voluntary dismissal of a case, i.e., a defendant has indicated an intent not to pursue sanctions, 
or the motion is filed an inordinately long time after the dismissal. “Although Rule 11 does not 
establish a deadline for the imposition of sanctions, the Advisory Committee did not contemplate 
there would be a lengthy delay prior to their imposition.” However, these considerations are 
equitable, and must be resolved on a case by case analysis. The party seeking sanctions may 
avoid such problems by notifying his opponent and the court of his intention to pursue sanctions 
at the earliest possible date. 
 
As the Supreme Court has recently confirmed, there is no jurisdictional bar to the imposition of 
sanctions after a voluntary dismissal. 
 
In order to comply with Rule 11's requirement that a court “shall” impose sanctions “if a 
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule,” a court must have the 
authority to consider whether there has been a violation of the signing requirement 
regardless of the dismissal of the underlying action. 
 
“The only time limitation in filing Rule 11 arises out of equitable considerations.” The defendants 
filed their motion six weeks after the Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal, the appellants were not prejudiced 
by appellees’ delay in filing, and the district court’s consideration of the motion was proper. 
 
III VIOLATIONS OF RULE 11 
 
Rule 11 states, in relevant part: 
 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer 
has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a 
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion 
or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented 
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other 
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party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of 
the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. 
 
The district court found that the three appellants violated all three prongs of Rule 11 by failing to 
make a reasonable inquiry to determine that the complaint stood well grounded in fact and 
warranted by existing law, and by filing the complaint for an improper purpose. We review all 
aspects of the district court’s Rule 11 determinations under an abuse-of-discretion standard. 
 
A. Mr. Kunstler’s Liability 
 
Before reviewing the specific violations of Rule 11 found by the district court, we note that Mr. 
Kunstler’s affidavit states that he “did not actively participate in the instant litigation, relying on 
Prof. Barry Nakell, who was on the scene, to prepare and file it.” The district court stated that “in 
light of the serious allegations in the complaint, Mr. Kunstler's total reliance on other counsel is 
itself a violation of Rule 11.” This finding is supported by a recent pronouncement of the 
Supreme Court. Mr. Kunstler’s reliance on others was indeed an improper delegation of his 
responsibility under Rule 11 to certify that the pleading filed over his name was well grounded in 
fact and in law. 
 
The signing attorney cannot leave it to some trusted subordinate, or to one of his 
partners, to satisfy himself that the filed paper is factually and legally responsible; by 
signing he represents not merely the fact that it is so, but also the fact that he personally 
has applied his own judgment. 
 
“The purpose of Rule 11 as a whole is to bring home to the individual signer his personal, 
nondelegable responsibility.” Having failed in his responsibility, Mr. Kunstler may not now be 
heard to protest that he does not share in any violations of Rule 11 which are evident on the 
face of the complaint. 
 
B. Well Grounded in Fact 
 
The district court based sanctions in part on a violation of the first prong of Rule 11 — finding 
that the complaint was not well grounded in fact. An objective test is used “to determine the 
reasonableness of a lawyer’s prefiling investigation.” “Blind reliance on the client is seldom a 
sufficient inquiry.” Mr. Nakell and Mr. Pitts have argued that they had “an intimate knowledge of 
the county and its people; factors which made them professionally capable of assimilating and 
weighing the facts gathered prior to filing the civil suit.” In light of that knowledge, the factual 
inaccuracies in the complaint are even more egregious. 
 
The district court noted numerous misstatements of fact, such as the assertion that the district 
attorney “serves as the criminal prosecution arm of Defendant Robeson County and as such 
makes policy in police investigation and criminal prosecution matters for Defendant Robeson 
County.” In fact, the District Attorney is an officer of the state, not an agent nor an employee of 
the county. Contrary to the complaint, defendants Britt, Townsend, and Sampson, and the 
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District Attorney’s staff, are state officers, not agents or employees of Robeson County. The 
complaint alleges that District Attorney Britt refused and failed to discipline, train and supervise 
the Sheriff’s deputies “under their control and supervision.” District Attorneys possess no such 
power or responsibility. 
 
Appellants acknowledge some errors, but contend they are “isolated” and thus do not warrant 
sanctions. We do not agree with this characterization. The errors pervade the complaint and 
concern information which either was or should have been known to appellants. The errors 
provide a false foundation for appellants’ allegation of a county-wide “conspiracy,” and are 
central to the complaint. Appellants also suggest that, under Pembaur v. Cincinnati (1986), state 
officials can sometimes establish county policy for purposes of § 1983 liability. Unlike Pembaur, 
there is no provision of North Carolina law which suggests that the state officials in this case 
either could or did act to establish county policy. 
 
Other causes of action were founded on allegations which utterly lacked any basis in fact. For 
example, the complaint alleged that the Governor, the Attorney General and District Attorney 
entered into a “no state prosecution” agreement, and this agreement was breached when the 
state prosecution commenced. The district court found that prior to filing their complaint, 
appellants 
 
had access to the transcript of the negotiations leading to the hostage release 
agreement as well as a copy of the written agreement. Nothing in the agreement or in 
any of the negotiations, suggests an agreement that Hatcher and Jacobs would not face 
North Carolina charges, and none of the negotiators had the authority to so agree. 
 
Moreover, North Carolina law does not grant the Governor or the State Attorney General the 
power to bind the state not to prosecute. Neither the Attorney General nor District Attorney Britt 
played any role in the hostage negotiations, but appellants now argue that unspecified 
evidence, obtainable through discovery, “could show” that a no prosecution agreement was 
made. While a lawyer may rely on discovery to reveal additional facts to support claims which 
are well grounded in fact, Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate when a lawyer attempts to use 
discovery to support outrageous and frivolous claims for which there is no factual support. 
Unsubstantiated claims such as these constitute an abuse of the judicial process for which Rule 
11 sanctions were designed. 
 
Appellants appear to have relied entirely upon discovery in the hope of finding some factual 
support for many of their claims. In their Memorandum and Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for 
a Protective Order, appellants wrote: 
 
Plaintiffs anticipate that as a result of deposing SBI defendant Bowman they will be in a 
position to apply to the Court for temporary injunctive relief and make the showing 
required by Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Appellants requested a temporary restraining order in their complaint. Rule 65(b) makes clear 
that a temporary restraining order may be granted only if 
 
it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that 
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the 
adverse party or his attorney can be heard in opposition. 
 
Rule 65(b) does not authorize counsel to request relief and then search through discovery for 
facts to support the relief already requested. The rule requires that “specific facts” be “shown” to 
the court with the request for relief. We agree with the district court that the appellants’ request 
for relief and their indication that they were not “in a position to make the showing required by 
Rule 65(b)” without later discovery indicates an unacceptable level of pre-filing investigation. 
 
We affirm the district court's findings that many of the allegations against state and local officials 
“have nothing to do with this case and are factually unsubstantiated.” Allegations which suggest 
that the Sheriff is engaged in drug trafficking and that a black inmate died while in the Sheriff’s 
custody are irrelevant. These allegations involve no injury to the plaintiffs, and the report of drug 
trafficking by the Sheriff’s Office is wholly unsupported in fact. Appellants protest that these 
allegations were represented in the complaint only as beliefs of their clients, but this does not 
make them relevant to the complaint or less scandalous in nature. While irrelevant allegations, 
standing alone, may not be cause for Rule 11 sanctions, the existence of numerous irrelevant, 
unsubstantiated, and sensational allegations is an appropriate factor for a district court to 
consider in determining whether the pleading as a whole lacks adequate factual foundation. 
 
In this case, the complaint was filled with irrelevant allegations not tied to specific injuries to 
plaintiffs, i.e., general allegations of abusive behavior against blacks and Indians, and 
allegations that Robeson County is beleaguered by poverty, illiteracy, and violence. There was 
little basis for the allegation that Britt, Townsend, Thornburg and Morgan conspired to appoint 
Townsend as District Attorney and to use SBI agents as political police to discredit the 
Republican candidate, and that allegation was again irrelevant. Hatcher and Jacobs had been 
indicted prior to Townsend’s appointment, and none of the other candidates for District Attorney 
suggested that they would not continue the prosecution. Appellants’ arguments as to the 
relevance of such allegations are tangential at best and often strain credulity. 
 
Although Mr. Nakell and Mr. Pitts filed lengthy affidavits detailing their factual inquiry, such 
affidavits do not provide factual or legal support for the inaccuracies noted by the district court. 
The number of hours allegedly spent by counsel in prefiling investigation does not dissuade us 
from affirming the district court’s findings of Rule 11 violations. Given the adequate time to 
prepare and hours allegedly spent in preparation of the complaint, appellants have presented no 
excuse for the many clear factual errors in this pleading. 
 
Appellants have argued that, despite the lack of pre-filing foundation for their claims, it was 
appropriate to include the claims because support for them could only be obtained through 
discovery. In Kraemer v. Grant County, the court held that sanctions were not warranted where 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 560	
an attorney relied on client information to support a cause of action based on a theory of 
conspiracy, even though additional facts were needed to prove the claim. “If discovery is 
necessary to establish a claim, then it is not unreasonable to file a complaint so as to obtain the 
right to conduct that discovery.” Despite this sweeping statement, there were in Kraemer a 
number of factors cautioning against sanctions which are not present here. In Kraemer, the 
attorney was a recent law school graduate, and had hired a private investigator to look into his 
client’s allegations. The investigator’s report did not discredit any part of the client’s story and 
the prospective defendants refused to cooperate with the investigator. Only a single portion of 
the complaint — that dealing with the proof of state action — was ultimately found to be without 
support. 
 
In the present case, appellants are experienced attorneys with both the time and the means to 
conduct a responsible factual investigation. The complaint contains myriad inaccuracies rather 
than a single error. Many of the factual inaccuracies could have been discovered by the most 
cursory investigation. The irrelevances are inexcusable considering the attorneys’ experience. 
Indeed, it is remarkable that so many errors could have been undetected by appellants. The 
number of claims without factual foundation warrants sanctions, whether the errors stem from 
incompetency or wilful misconduct. 
 
The need for discovery to complete the factual basis for alleged claims is not an excuse to 
allege claims with no factual basis. While we do not disagree with the result obtained in 
Kraemer, we find that it is not applicable to the present case. A lawyer is an officer of the court, 
and he should never file a lawsuit without confidence that it has a reasonable basis in fact and is 
well grounded in law. For the purposes of Rule 11, the factual inquiry necessary to file a 
complaint is generally satisfied if all of the information which can be obtained prior to suit 
supports the allegations made, even though further facts must be obtained through discovery to 
finally prove the claim. However, a complaint containing allegations unsupported by any 
information obtained prior to filing, or allegations based on information which minimal factual 
inquiry would disprove, will subject the author to sanctions. 
 
C. Well Grounded In Law 
 
The district court found that the complaint was not well grounded in law. We agree. Appellants 
contend that the strength of the legal basis of the complaint is demonstrated by their opponent’s 
lengthy response to them, and the approval of a civil rights attorney, who reviewed and 
approved of, but did not sign, the complaint. The length of an opponent’s response to a 
complaint does not validate the otherwise insubstantial claims therein, because a lengthy 
response may reveal less the merit of particular claims than the number of valid defenses to 
them. An opponent may have employed “scorched earth” tactics in composing a response far 
beyond what is required to oppose frivolous claims. Nor is the Rule 11 standard of whether a 
“reasonable attorney in like circumstances would believe his actions to be factually and legally 
justified” satisfied merely by having another attorney review a complaint. The reviewing attorney 
may be unfamiliar with the true facts of the case, the factual and legal investigation conducted, 
or the law relevant to the complaint. 
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The district court enumerated several substantial claims without legal foundation. The court 
found no factual or legal basis for the double jeopardy claim to the state prosecution of Hatcher 
and Jacobs following the federal prosecution, because a subsequent prosecution by a different 
sovereign plainly does not constitute double jeopardy. Although a “tool of the same authorities” 
exception is possible in some circumstances, that exception may only be established by proof 
that State officials had little or no independent volition in their proceedings. In this case, 
however, the complaint alleged that the state officials instituted and controlled the state 
proceeding, which precludes the establishment of that exception. The district court also 
considered a quotation attributed to Mr. Pitts in a newspaper article that the state charges did 
not constitute double jeopardy. Although we caution the court against relying too heavily on 
press reports, we do not fault the district court for considering the statement. 
 
The district court found without legal foundation the plaintiffs’ claim that Hatcher’s Fifth 
Amendment rights were damaged when the state tried to extract testimony from Jacobs. Fifth 
Amendment protection is personal to the individual whose testimony is being compelled and 
appellants as experienced attorneys should have been well aware of this. Appellants make no 
attempt to explain away this glaring blunder. 
 
Appellants sought to enjoin state criminal proceedings, but the district court found that the 
Younger v. Harris abstention doctrine clearly barred such relief. The court also found that 
Hatcher and Jacobs could have presented their federal constitutional claims to the state court. 
We agree that plaintiffs had no factual basis for claiming that the state prosecution was brought 
in bad faith, or without a reasonable expectation of conviction, because Hatcher and Jacobs had 
never denied taking hostages. Although appellants cite an Eighth Circuit case which suggests 
that the Younger abstention doctrine does not apply if “a prosecution was brought in retaliation 
for or to discourage the exercise of constitutional rights ‘regardless of whether valid convictions 
conceivably could be obtained,’” that proposition has been rejected by this court. In Suggs v. 
Brannon, we upheld the use of the Younger abstention doctrine when plaintiffs claimed that their 
prosecution under obscenity laws chilled their First Amendment rights. 
 
The district court also noted “serious standing problems with many of the plaintiffs’ claims.” For 
example, on the claim that the prosecution chilled Hatcher and Jacobs’ First Amendment 
expression, the complaint presented no facts showing specific harm or threat of harm. 
Appellants respond that they did show concrete and specific harm insofar as plaintiffs’ 
participation in the petition drive was curtailed. However, Hatcher and Jacob’s participation was 
not curtailed, and the district court’s observation on their standing problem with respect to that 
claim is valid. 
 
We therefore affirm the court's findings that the complaint on the whole was not well grounded 
in law. 
 
D. Improper Purpose 
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Sanctions could have been imposed for the violations already discussed, but the district court 
also based the award of sanctions on appellants’ improper purpose in filing the complaint. The 
type and number of Rule 11 violations are considered in determining the appropriate sanction, 
and it was proper for the district court to consider appellants’ purpose. Although the district court 
first discussed “improper purpose” under Rule 11, whether or not a pleading has a foundation in 
fact or is well grounded in law will often influence the determination of the signer’s purpose, and 
we suggest that a district court should consider the first two prongs of Rule 11 before making a 
determination of improper purpose. 
 
Appellants argue that the district court’s conclusions as to their purpose are clearly erroneous, 
because there is no evidence in the record to support the court’s findings, or the findings are 
based on factual conclusions which were contested by affidavit. The district court concluded that 
sanctions would be appropriate based on the improper purpose of the lawsuit “even if the 
complaint had a proper legal and factual basis.” Since we have affirmed the court’s findings that 
the complaint in the instant case was not well grounded in law or in fact, we need not decide 
whether a complaint which is well grounded in law and in fact can be sanctioned solely on the 
basis that it was filed for an improper purpose. Rather, we look only to whether the court abused 
its discretion in finding that the complaint was filed for an improper purpose. 
 
Rule 11 defines the term “improper purpose” to include factors “such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the costs of litigation.” The factors mentioned in the 
rule are not exclusive. If a complaint is not filed to vindicate rights in court, its purpose must be 
improper. However, if a complaint is filed to vindicate rights in court, and also for some other 
purpose, a court should not sanction counsel for an intention that the court does not approve, so 
long as the added purpose is not undertaken in bad faith and is not so excessive as to eliminate 
a proper purpose. Thus, the purpose to vindicate rights in court must be central and sincere. 
Filing of excessive motions may sometimes constitute “harassment” under the rule even if the 
motions are well grounded. Likewise, filing a motion or pleading without a sincere intent to 
pursue it will garner sanctions. 
 
We have previously stated that in order to determine “improper purpose,” a district court must 
judge the conduct of counsel under an objective standard of reasonableness rather than 
assessing subjective intent. This test was derived from Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, where it 
was stated that “harrassment under Rule 11 focuses upon the improper purpose of the signer, 
objectively tested, rather than the consequences of the signer’s act, subjectively viewed by the 
signer’s opponent.” In other words, it is not enough that the injured party subjectively believes 
that a lawsuit was brought to harass, or to focus negative publicity on the injured party; instead, 
such improper purposes must be derived from the motive of the signer in pursuing the suit. An 
opponent in a lawsuit, particularly a defendant, will nearly always subjectively feel that the 
lawsuit was brought for less than proper purposes; plaintiffs and defendants are not often on 
congenial terms at the time a suit is brought. However, a court must ignore evidence of the 
injured party’s subjective beliefs and look for more objective evidence of the signer’s purpose. 
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There is some paradox involved in this analysis, because it is appropriate to consider the 
signer’s subjective beliefs to determine the signer’s purpose in filing suit, if such beliefs are 
revealed through an admission that the signer knew that the motion or pleading was baseless 
but filed it nonetheless. This evidence may be said to be “objective” in the sense that it can be 
viewed by a court without fear of misinterpretation; it does not involve difficult determinations of 
credibility. Circumstantial facts surrounding the filing may also be considered as evidence of the 
signer’s purpose. Repeated filings, the outrageous nature of the claims made, or a signer’s 
experience in a particular area of law, under which baseless claims have been made, are all 
appropriate indicators of an improper purpose. 
 
The district court concluded that plaintiffs’ counsel never intended to litigate this § 1983 action 
and that counsel filed it for publicity, to embarrass state and county officials, to use as leverage 
in criminal proceedings, to obtain discovery for use in criminal proceedings, and to intimidate 
those involved in the prosecution of Hatcher and Jacobs. 
 
The court drew its conclusions without the aid of an evidentiary hearing, but relied upon the 
evidence before it. The court’s first conclusion, that counsel never intended to litigate the action, 
is the one which most clearly supports sanctions based on a finding of improper purpose. The 
fact that so many allegations in the complaint lacked a basis in law or in fact strongly supports 
the court’s finding of improper purpose. The existence of baseless allegations does not alone 
require a finding of improper purpose, because inexperience or incompetence may have caused 
their inclusion in a pleading, rather than or in addition to willfulness or deliberate choice. 
However, in this case counsel are clearly not inexperienced, and the number and magnitude of 
claims without foundation suggests that incompetence is not the cause for such allegations in 
the complaint. This court is left with the conclusion, drawn by the district court, that counsel 
wilfully included the baseless claims. If counsel wilfully files a baseless complaint, a court may 
properly infer that it was filed either for purposes of harassment, or some purpose other than to 
vindicate rights through the judicial process. We therefore affirm the district court’s finding that 
appellants violated the improper purpose prong of Rule 11. 
 
In addition to relying upon the complaint itself, the district court inferred an improper purpose 
from the timing of the filing of the complaint, on the eve of the anniversary of the takeover of The 
Robesonian, and some time after the alleged constitutional violations began. The court also 
viewed with suspicion the timing and nature of the dismissal of the complaint, which occurred 
after Jacobs lost his extradition fight in the criminal case, and before any significant discovery 
might have given notice to the plaintiffs that their claims were not valid. The district court 
dismissed as incredible appellants’ explanations for dismissal, which contended that many of 
the claims had become moot through a series of events. The district court found it “absurd” to 
think that the wide-spread conspiracy involving high-level state and public officials had suddenly 
become unimportant by May 2, 1989. The court noted that the basis of the complaint — the 
breach of the alleged no-prosecution agreement — still existed even after Hatcher’s and 
Jacobs’ guilty pleas to the state charges. The court stated that the double jeopardy claims, 
damage claims, and other requests for equitable relief, if ever valid, did not cease being valid. In 
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finding improper purpose, the district court was also influenced by the outrageous nature of the 
claims made. 
 
The affidavits submitted by counsel strongly disputed the court’s conclusions as to the timing of 
the filing and of the dismissal of the suit, and claimed that no improper motive influenced the 
timing of events. As to the decision to dismiss, appellants argued that it was based solely on 
financial considerations and the necessity of devoting professional resources elsewhere. 
Appellants argue that many equitable claims had become moot, and that the prospect for 
damages on the remaining claims did not warrant the expense of continuing the suit. However, 
the district court’s determination that these explanations are not reasonable or believable, in 
light of all of the evidence surrounding the filing of the complaint and the frivolous nature of the 
allegations made, is not clearly erroneous. 
 
The district court noted other evidence which suggested that appellants’ purpose in filing the 
complaint was not to vindicate plaintiffs’ rights, such as appellants sending a copy of the 
complaint to the state judge who likely would have tried Hatcher and Jacobs in the criminal 
case. The court also noted a quotation reported by the media, in which Mr. Pitts allegedly 
suggested that the suit was dropped after the Attorney General’s office showed strong 
opposition to the suit. The court further considered an affidavit by New York attorney Neal Rose 
concerning Mr. Pitts’ alleged admission that the suit was commenced as leverage and lacked a 
factual basis, although that affidavit was contradicted by an affidavit by attorney Alan Rosenthal. 
In light of other evidence which supports the court's finding of improper purpose, we cannot say 
that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to consider these matters as additional support, 
even though determinations of credibility are best made after an evidentiary hearing. 
 
In concluding that appellants had never intended to litigate their suit, the district court also 
concluded that circumstances surrounding the case, when viewed as a whole, supported the 
conclusion that appellants’ primary motives in filing the complaint were to gain publicity, to 
embarrass state and county officials, to gain leverage in criminal proceedings, to obtain 
discovery for use in criminal proceedings, and to intimidate those involved in the prosecution of 
Hatcher and Jacobs. At least some of these motives would not warrant sanctions under the 
improper purpose portion of Rule 11, if appellants’ central purpose in bringing suit had been to 
vindicate rights of the plaintiffs. Holding a press conference to announce a lawsuit, while 
perhaps in poor taste, is not grounds for a Rule 11 sanction, nor is a subjective hope by a 
plaintiff that a lawsuit will embarrass or upset a defendant, so long as there is evidence that a 
plaintiff’s central purpose in filing a complaint was to vindicate rights through the judicial 
process. In this case, however, there was no proper purpose for appellants’ filing of the suit, and 
the district court’s consideration of other possible motives for the suit based on the evidence 
available was proper. 
 
We have affirmed the district court’s conclusion that sanctions were warranted based on the 
improper purpose prong of Rule 11 because it is not clearly erroneous and is supported by facts 
such as the baseless allegations made, appellants’ legal experience, and the cumulative nature 
of the evidence. However, we urge district courts to exercise special caution when evaluating a 
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signer’s purpose under Rule 11. When there are issues of credibility, disputed questions of fact, 
and rational explanations of purpose given, an evidentiary hearing may well be necessary to 
resolve the issues. This is particularly true when large sanctions are being considered on the 
ground of improper purpose as well as failure to comply with the first two prongs of Rule 11. We 
do not find that the court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing in this case, because the 
cumulative nature of the evidence, as well as our earlier findings on the frivolousness of the 
allegations made in the complaint and the lack of a legal or factual basis, convinces us that the 
court’s finding of improper purpose is not clearly erroneous and would not have been altered by 
an evidentiary hearing. 
 
IV DUE PROCESS 
 
Appellants argue that the district court should not have found a violation of the “improper 
purpose” prong of Rule 11 without holding an evidentiary hearing. We disagree. Due process 
does not require an evidentiary hearing before sanctions are imposed, even when sanctions are 
imposed in part under the improper purpose prong of Rule 11. The Advisory Committee Note on 
Rule 11, indicates that satellite litigation over sanctions and separate hearings should be limited 
to the extent possible. “The court must to the extent possible limit the scope of the sanction 
proceedings to the record.” 
 
In determining whether and to what extent a hearing is required prior to the imposition of 
sanctions, we are guided by the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 11 and the reasoning of 
Donaldson v. Clark: 
 
The Advisory Committee Note indicates some of the matters to be considered: (1) the 
circumstances in general; (2) the type and severity of the sanction under consideration; 
and (3) the judge’s participation in the proceedings, the judge’s knowledge of the facts, 
and whether there is need for further inquiry. The Advisory Committee Note observes 
that “in many situations the judge’s participation in the proceedings provides him with full 
knowledge of the relevant facts and little further inquiry will be necessary.” 
 
When an attorney has failed to present necessary factual support for claims despite 
several opportunities to do so, for example, further hearing on the sanctions issue may 
well be not only unnecessary but also a waste of judicial resources. On the other hand, 
when a court is asked to resolve an issue of credibility or to determine whether a good 
faith argument can be made for the legal position taken, the risk of an erroneous 
imposition of sanctions under limited procedures and the probable value of additional 
hearing are likely to be greater. Prior opportunities to respond to Rule 11 charges will 
also influence the extent to which further hearing is necessary. 
 
As mentioned by the Advisory Committee, the type and severity of the sanction are 
necessary elements in the calculus. The more serious the possible sanction both in 
absolute size and in relation to actual expenditures, the more process that will be due. 
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Even if an evidentiary hearing is not required in every “improper purpose” case, appellants 
argue that such hearing was required in this case. Although the number of credibility 
determinations which the court made without an evidentiary hearing should have suggested to 
the court that an evidentiary hearing would have been of value, we affirm the court's findings 
that appellants violated all three prongs of Rule 11 because the findings are not clearly 
erroneous even excluding some evidence of “improper motive” which appellants contested. 
 
The district judge’s participation in the proceedings was adequate to give him full knowledge of 
the relevant facts without the necessity of an evidentiary hearing. The district court had before it 
the pleadings, the summary judgment motions of the state defendants and the 12(b) motion of 
the county defendants. We also find that counsel were given an adequate opportunity to contest 
the court’s determinations that Rule 11 was violated. The district court allowed appellants to 
submit affidavits, and voluminous written legal arguments. The district judge also heard oral 
argument. We find that due process requirements were satisfied by the opportunities appellants 
were given to respond to the charges that their complaint violated Rule 11. 
 
However, although we find that counsel had an adequate opportunity to contest the court’s 
finding that Rule 11 was violated, we find that appellants were not given an adequate 
opportunity to respond to the type and amount of sanction imposed, particularly in light of the 
large monetary sanction. Appellants were given no opportunity to contest the fee statements 
submitted, and the amount of the sanction was largely the result of those statements. Under the 
facts of this case, particularly the amount of the sanction, due process requires that appellants 
have some opportunity to contest the amount of the sanction imposed. We therefore vacate the 
sanction imposed. As discussed below, we vacate the type and amount of sanction chosen by 
the district court for certain additional reasons. On remand, under the guidelines set forth below 
the appellants will be given an appropriate opportunity to respond to the type and the amount of 
the sanction. 
 
V AMOUNT OF SANCTION 
 
A. Attorney Fees Portion 
 
Rule 11 requires that “an appropriate sanction” be imposed upon those who violate its 
requirements. Appellants argue that the amount of sanctions was inappropriate, in part because 
the district court used the Rule to shift fees and compensate the defendants, rather than to deter 
improper litigation. We agree and vacate the amount of the monetary sanction. 
 
We have previously held that the least severe sanction adequate to serve the purposes of Rule 
11 should be imposed. It is clear that Rule 11 should not blindly be used to shift fees. In this 
instance, it appears that the district court erred in assuming that “the first purpose of sanctions 
under Rule 11 is to compensate the offended parties.” In establishing the amount of the 
sanction, the district court improperly focused on providing “compensatory sanctions.” The 
amount of expense borne by opposing counsel in combatting frivolous claims may well be an 
appropriate factor for a district court to consider in determining whether a monetary sanction 
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should issue and if so, in what amount. However, it is clear that the primary, or “first” purpose of 
Rule 11 is to deter future litigation abuse. A district court can and should bear in mind that other 
purposes of the rule include compensating the victims of the Rule 11 violation, as well as 
punishing present litigation abuse, streamlining court dockets and facilitating court 
management. But the amount of a monetary sanction should always reflect the primary purpose 
of deterrence. 
 
When a monetary award is issued, a district court should explain the basis for the sanction so a 
reviewing court may have a basis to determine whether the chosen sanction is appropriate. A 
district court should consider the four factors recently enumerated by the Tenth Circuit in White 
v. General Motors Corp.: (1) the reasonableness of the opposing party’s attorney’s fees; (2) the 
minimum to deter; (3) the ability to pay; and (4) factors related to the severity of the Rule 11 
violation. 
 
1) Reasonableness (lodestar) calculation. Because the sanction is generally to pay the 
opposing party’s “reasonable expenses including a reasonable attorney’s fee,” incurred 
because of the improper behavior, determination of this amount is the usual first step. 
The plain language of the rule requires that the court independently analyze the 
reasonableness of the requested fees and expenses. The injured party has a duty to 
mitigate costs by not overstaffing, overresearching or overdiscovering clearly meritless 
claims. In evaluating the reasonableness of the fee request, the district court should 
consider that the very frivolousness of the claim is what justifies the sanctions. 
 
Attorney time which is attributed to responding to the media, or to claims within a pleading which 
do not merit sanctions, should be excluded from consideration. Only attorney time which is in 
response to that which has been sanctioned should be evaluated. In this case, it is appropriate 
for the court to consider on remand whether the large amount of time devoted to the pursuit of 
sanctions was warranted, and whether the injured parties failed to mitigate their costs by 
delaying their pursuit of sanctions until after the dismissal. It would also be appropriate for the 
district court to reduce the amount of any fees awarded based on appellees’ failure to give 
earlier notice to appellants that their conduct warranted Rule 11 sanctions. While the analysis of 
the reasonableness of costs may call for fairly detailed affidavits, this requirement is not 
intended to require evidentiary hearings. 
 
Although amici curiae for appellants argue that sanctions based in whole or in part on attorney's 
fees require the same procedures of discovery, briefing, and argument allowed in attorney’s 
fees cases, we have already stated that sanctions, unlike attorney’s fees, are not primarily 
intended to compensate the prevailing party. Because the purposes of sanctions differ from 
those of attorney’s fees, the amount of process due the offending party differs. 
 
The determination of the type or amount of the sanction imposed comes only after the offending 
party has had an opportunity to defend against the imposition of any sanction. Presumably, a 
party’s interest in the kind and amount of a sanction is of less import than his or her interest in 
the decision to impose any sanction. As stated, a district court is required to choose the least 
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severe sanction adequate to accomplish the purpose of Rule 11. Thus, a monetary sanction 
should never be based solely on the amount of attorney’s fees claimed by the injured party, 
even where a court determines that the amount of the sanction should equal the fees claimed 
by the injured party. As we have previously stated, “reasonable” attorney’s fees in the context of 
Rule 11 “does not necessarily mean actual expenses and attorney’s fees.” Because the amount 
of a monetary sanction is not based solely on any claimed amount of attorney's fees, but rather 
on all of the factors listed herein, the risk of an erroneous calculation based on fee statements is 
less troublesome in the context of a Rule 11 sanction than in attorney's fees cases. We also 
bear in mind the interest in avoiding additional hearings for purposes of calculating the amount 
of fees in the context of Rule 11. Given these considerations, we hold that a sanctioned party is 
not entitled to an evidentiary hearing or to all of the procedural safeguards available in the 
context of attorney's fees actions. Instead, a district court may permit a sanctioned party to 
respond to an opposing party's fee statements in its discretion. Of course, such discretion must 
be exercised with proper considerations of due process. Where a court determines that a large 
monetary sanction should issue, and the amount is heavily influenced by an injured party's fee 
statements, as was the case here, the court should permit the sanctioned party to examine and 
contest the injured party's fee statements as an aid to the court's own independent analysis of 
the reasonableness of the claimed fees. 
 
2) Minimum to deter. As we have already stated, the primary purpose of sanctions is to 
deter attorney and litigant misconduct, not to compensate the opposing party for its costs 
in defending a frivolous suit. It is particularly inappropriate to use sanctions as a means 
of driving certain attorneys out of practice. Such decisions are properly made by those 
charged with handling attorney disbarment and are generally accompanied by specific 
due process provisions to protect the rights of the attorney in question. The amount of 
sanctions is appropriate only when it is the “minimum that will serve to adequately deter 
the undesirable behavior.” Thus, the limit of any sanction award should be that amount 
reasonably necessary to deter the wrongdoer. 
 
A district court must constantly bear in mind the limited purposes of Rule 11, particularly in a 
case such as this, where a court may disagree with aspects of counsel's conduct which fall 
outside of the scope of Rule 11. Of course, a court must also constantly bear in mind that the 
rule is not to chill the bringing of facially valid lawsuits, or a lawyer's creativity in introducing 
novel theories of recovery. 
 
3. Ability to pay. The offender’s ability to pay must also be considered, not because it 
affects the egregiousness of the violation, but because the purpose of monetary 
sanctions is to deter attorney and litigant misconduct. Because of their deterrent 
purpose, Rule 11 sanctions are analogous to punitive damages. It is hornbook law that 
the financial condition of the offender is an appropriate consideration in the 
determination of punitive damages. Inability to pay what the court would otherwise 
regard as an appropriate sanction should be treated as reasonably akin to an affirmative 
defense, with the burden upon the parties being sanctioned to come forward with 
evidence of their financial status. 
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Although the burden is upon the parties being sanctioned to come forward with evidence of their 
financial status, a monetary sanction imposed without any consideration of ability to pay would 
constitute an abuse of discretion. A court should refrain from imposing a monetary award so 
great that it will bankrupt the offending parties or force them from the future practice of law. 
Generally, the smaller the amount of the monetary sanction imposed, the greater the likelihood 
that a court’s consideration of the ability to pay will not want for lack of the formal submission of 
evidence on a sanctioned party’s financial status. When the monetary sanction is large, 
however, the parties should generally be given the opportunity to submit affidavits on their 
financial status, or to submit such other evidence as the court’s discretion permits. In this case, 
the amount of the monetary sanction originally imposed was substantial, and the parties should 
have been afforded the opportunity to submit evidence on the issue of whether the amount 
imposed was so great as to unfairly restrict their access to the courts or to otherwise curtail their 
ability to practice law or to cause them great financial distress. 
 
4. Other factors. In addition, the court may consider factors such as the offending party’s 
history, experience, and ability, the severity of the violation, the degree to which malice 
or bad faith contributed to the violation, the risk of chilling the type of litigation involved, 
and other factors as deemed appropriate in individual circumstances. 
 
In this case, it is appropriate for the court to consider counsel’s vast experience, the outrageous 
and scandalous nature of the claims made, and the improper purpose of the lawsuit. A court 
might also increase a sanction if one attorney has been previously sanctioned, because such 
conduct might indicate that the previous sanction was not enough to deter the repetition of the 
offense. 
 
In addition to the four factors just stated, a district court must sometimes consider whether joint 
and several liability is appropriate, such as where sanctions are to be imposed against both a 
client and his counsel. In this case, joint and several liability among attorneys, who each signed 
a complaint in violation of Rule 11, was not inappropriate. Each attorney has a duty to ensure 
that the pleading he has signed comports with Rule 11. Issues of individual culpability do not 
arise where each sanctioned party has committed the same Rule 11 violations. 
 
B. Additional Sanctions 
 
In addition to imposing sanctions in the amount of attorney's fees claimed by the defendants, 
the district court imposed sanctions in the amount of $10,000 upon each appellant based on his 
conduct in wilfully filing outrageous claims and appellants’ “pains to publicize the allegations 
through the media.” We believe this sanction was error. Rule 11 does not confine courts to any 
maximum monetary sanction, nor does it even require courts to restrict themselves to monetary 
penalties. However, Rule 11 must be accorded its plain meaning. The text of the Rule clearly 
pertains only to a “pleading, motion, or other paper.” Rule 11 does not encompass all conduct 
within judicial proceedings, and it clearly does not reach conduct outside of the judicial process. 
In this case, it appears the court imposed sanctions in part based on appellants’ publication of 
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their baseless claims through the media. While such publication may not be actionable as libel 
or slander, and is reprehensible, Rule 11 was clearly not designed to encompass such conduct. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, we affirm the findings of the district court which led to the imposition of Rule 11 
sanctions in this case against plaintiffs’ attorneys. However, we vacate the sanction imposed, 
because it was based on improper considerations and the size of the sanction required the 
district court to allow sanctioned counsel an opportunity to respond, at least to the fee 
statements on which the sanction was based. On remand, the district court should consider the 
factors which we have adopted prior to determining the sanction which should be imposed. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Do you agree with the district court’s conclusion that Nakell, Pitts, and Kunstler violated 
Rule 11? Do you find Kunstler’s defense compelling? 
2. Should courts impose Rule 11 sanctions on attorneys representing clients pro bono? 
Should they be more reluctant to impose sanctions? 
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Pro Se Litigants 
 
Typically, courts exempt pro se litigants from the requirements of Rule 11. While many pro se 
complaints are frivolous, some pro se complaints are meritorious, and some have even caused 
dramatic changes in the law. For example, in 1962, Clarence Earl Gideon filed a handwritten 
pro se petition for certiorari alleging that Florida had violated his civil rights by denying him legal 
representation. The Supreme Court granted his petition and held in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963) that the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to 
representation. 
 
By contrast, Jonathan Lee Riches filed more than 2600 complaints while he was incarcerated at 
the Federal Medical Center in Lexington, Kentucky, none of which were successful. His 
complaints alleged improbable harms and requested unusual forms of relief. For example, 
Riches filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, tort claims against Michael Vick for stealing his dogs 
and using them for dogfighting, then selling the dogs and using the proceeds to purchase 
missiles from Iran. Among other things, Riches asked the court to order Vick “to stop physically 
hurting my feelings and dashing my hopes.” Eventually, the court prohibited Riches from filing 
any more complaints in forma pauperis, meaning that he would have to pay filing fees. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. How should courts evaluate pro se filings? 
2. Should courts apply Rule 11 to pro se plaintiffs? 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 577	
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 578	
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 579	
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 580	
6.2: Improper Advocacy 
 
Here’s the last toast of the evening, here’s to those who still believe. All the losers will be 
winners, all the givers shall receive. Here’s to trouble-free tomorrows, may your sorrows all be 
small. Here’s to the losers, bless them all.92 
 
The head on my shoulders is sorta loose, and I ain’t got the sense God gave a goose. Lord, I 
ain’t crazy, but I'm a nut.93 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 prohibits frivolous pleadings. But Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 3.1 goes farther, prohibiting frivolous argument and abusive litigation tactics as well. In 
other words, under Rule 3.1, litigants must not only ensure that their pleadings are meritorious, 
but also that their litigation tactics are reasonable. Unsurprisingly, this rule is enforced almost 
entirely in the breach. Courts are reluctant to sanction attorneys for improper tactics, and when 
they do, the sanctions are often reversed as improperly imposed. 
 
Nevertheless, good attorneys realize that the court is always watching. And they know that 
judges tend to reward good behavior and punish bad behavior. Sometimes, those rewards and 
punishments are explicit. But more often they are implicit, and come in the form of motions 
granted or denied. 
 
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1: Meritorious Claims & Contentions 
 
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless 
there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith 
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in 
a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may 
nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be 
established. 
 
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1: Meritorious Claims & Contentions, Comments 
[1]-[3] 
 
1. The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's 
cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and 
substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed. However, the 
law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope 
of advocacy, account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change. 
 
2. The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous 
merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer 
																																																								
92 Robert Wells & Jack Segal, Here’s to the Losers (1963). 
93 Leroy Pullins, I’m a Nut (1966). 
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expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. What is required of lawyers, 
however, is that they inform themselves about the facts of their clients' cases and the 
applicable law and determine that they can make good faith arguments in support of 
their clients' positions. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that 
the client's position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the 
lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken 
or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or 
reversal of existing law. 
 
3. The lawyer's obligations under this Rule are subordinate to federal or state constitutional 
law that entitles a defendant in a criminal matter to the assistance of counsel in 
presenting a claim or contention that otherwise would be prohibited by this Rule. 
 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 7: A Lawyer Should Represent 
a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law (1969) 
 
EC 7-1 The duty of a lawyer, both to his client1 and to the legal system, is to represent his client 
zealously within the bounds of the law, which includes Disciplinary Rules and enforceable 
professional regulations. The professional responsibility of a lawyer derives from his 
membership in a profession which has the duty of assisting members of the public to secure 
and protect available legal rights and benefits. In our government of laws and not of men, each 
member of our society is entitled to have his conduct judged and regulated in accordance with 
the law; to seek any lawful objective through legally permissible means; and to present for 
adjudication any lawful claim, issue, or defense. 
 
EC 7-2 The bounds of the law in a given case are often difficult to ascertain. The language of 
legislative enactments and judicial opinions may be uncertain as applied to varying factual 
situations. The limits and specific meaning of apparently relevant law may be made doubtful by 
changing or developing constitutional interpretations, inadequately expressed statutes or judicial 
opinions, and changing public and judicial attitudes. Certainty of law ranges from well-settled 
rules through areas of conflicting authority to areas without precedent. 
 
EC 7-3 Where the bounds of law are uncertain, the action of a lawyer may depend on whether 
he is serving as advocate or adviser. A lawyer may serve simultaneously as both advocate and 
adviser, but the two roles are essentially different. In asserting a position on behalf of his client, 
an advocate for the most part deals with past conduct and must take the facts as he finds them. 
By contrast, a lawyer serving as adviser primarily assists his client in determining the course of 
future conduct and relationships. While serving as advocate, a lawyer should resolve in favor of 
his client doubts as to the bounds of the law. In serving a client as adviser, a lawyer in 
appropriate circumstances should give his professional opinion as to what the ultimate decisions 
of the courts would likely be as to the applicable law. 
 
Duty of the Lawyer to a Client 
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EC 7-4 The advocate may urge any permissible construction of the law favorable to his client, 
without regard to his professional opinion as to the likelihood that the construction will ultimately 
prevail. His conduct is within the bounds of the law, and therefore permissible, if the position 
taken is supported by the law or is supportable by a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification, or reversal of the law. However, a lawyer is not justified in asserting a position in 
litigation that is frivolous. 
 
EC 7-5 A lawyer as adviser furthers the interest of his client by giving his professional opinion as 
to what he believes would likely be the ultimate decision of the courts on the matter at hand and 
by informing his client of the practical effect of such decision. He may continue in the 
representation of his client even though his client has elected to pursue a course of conduct 
contrary to the advice of the lawyer so long as he does not thereby knowingly assist the client to 
engage in illegal conduct or to take a frivolous legal position. A lawyer should never encourage 
or aid his client to commit criminal acts or counsel his client on how to violate the law and avoid 
punishment therefor. 
 
In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985) 
 
Summary: Snyder objected to the United States District Court for the District of North 
Dakota’s treatment of attorneys representing indigent criminal defendants, and refused 
to apologize for the tone of his objection. The Chief Judge of the district court suspended 
Snyder for one year for disrespecting the court and the circuit court affirmed. The 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that Snyder’s conduct was not sanctionable. 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
We granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals suspending petitioner from 
practice in all courts of the Eighth Circuit for six months. 
 
I 
 
In March 1983, petitioner Robert Snyder was appointed by the Federal District Court for the 
District of North Dakota to represent a defendant under the Criminal Justice Act. After petitioner 
completed the assignment, he submitted a claim for $1,898.55 for services and expenses. The 
claim was reduced by the District Court of $1,796.05. 
 
Under the Criminal Justice Act, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals was required to review 
and approve expenditures for compensation in excess of $1,000. Chief Judge Lay found the 
claim insufficiently documented, and he returned it with a request for additional information. 
Because of technical problems with his computer software, petitioner could not readily provide 
the information in the form requested by the Chief Judge. He did, however, file a supplemental 
application. 
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The secretary of the Chief Judge of the Circuit again returned the application, stating that the 
proffered documentation was unacceptable. Petitioner then discussed the matter with Helen 
Monteith, the District Court Judge’s secretary, who suggested he write a letter expressing his 
view. Petitioner then wrote the letter that led to this case. The letter, addressed to Ms. Monteith, 
read in part: 
 
In the first place, I am appalled by the amount of money which the federal court pays for 
indigent criminal defense work. The reason that so few attorneys in Bismarck accept this 
work is for that exact reason. We have, up to this point, still accepted the indigent 
appointments, because of a duty to our profession, and the fact that nobody else will do 
it. 
 
Now, however, not only are we paid an amount of money which does not even cover our 
overhead, but we have to go through extreme gymnastics even to receive the puny 
amounts which the federal courts authorize for this work. We have sent you everything 
we have concerning our representation, and I am not sending you anything else. You 
can take it or leave it. 
 
Further, I am extremely disgusted by the treatment of us by the Eighth Circuit in this 
case, and you are instructed to remove my name from the list of attorneys who will 
accept criminal indigent defense work. I have simply had it. 
 
Thank you for your time and attention. 
 
The District Court Judge viewed this letter as one seeking changes in the process for providing 
fees, and discussed these concerns with petitioner. The District Court Judge then forwarded the 
letter to the Chief Judge of the Circuit. The Chief Judge in turn wrote to the District Judge, 
stating that he considered petitioner’s letter: 
 
totally disrespectful to the federal courts and to the judicial system. It demonstrates a 
total lack of respect for the legal process and the courts. 
 
The Chief Judge expressed concern both about petitioner’s failure to “follow the guidelines and 
refusal to cooperate with the court,” and questioned whether, “in view of the letter” petitioner 
was “worthy of practicing law in the federal courts on any matter.” He stated his intention to 
issue an order to show cause why petitioner should not be suspended from practicing in any 
federal court in the Circuit for a period of one year. Subsequently, the Chief Judge wrote to the 
District Court again, stating that if petitioner apologized the matter would be dropped. At this 
time, the Chief Judge approved a reduced fee for petitioner’s work of $1,000 plus expenses of 
$23.25. 
 
After talking with petitioner, the District Court Judge responded to the Chief Judge as follows: 
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He sees his letter as an expression of an honest opinion, and an exercise of his right of 
freedom of speech. I, of course, see it as a youthful and exuberant expression of 
annoyance which has now risen to the level of a cause. 
 
He has decided not to apologize, although he assured me he did not intend the letter as 
you interpreted it. 
 
The Chief Judge then issued an order for petitioner to show cause why he should not be 
suspended for his “refusal to carry out his obligations as a practicing lawyer and officer of the 
court” because of his refusal to accept assignments under the Criminal Justice Act. Nowhere in 
the order was there any reference to any disrespect in petitioner’s letter of October 6, 1983. 
 
Petitioner requested a hearing on the show cause order. In his response to the order, petitioner 
focused exclusively on whether he was required to represent indigents under the Criminal 
Justice Act. He contended that the Act did not compel lawyers to represent indigents, and he 
noted that many of the lawyers in his District had declined to serve. He also informed the court 
that prior to his withdrawal from the Criminal Justice Act panel, he and his two partners had 
taken 15 percent of all the Criminal Justice Act cases in their district. 
 
At the hearing, the Court of Appeals focused on whether petitioner’s letter of October 6, 1983, 
was disrespectful, an issue not mentioned in the show cause order. At one point, Judge Arnold 
asked: “I am asking you, sir, if you are prepared to apologize to the court for the tone of your 
letter?” Petitioner answered: “That is not the basis that I am being brought forth before the court 
today.” When the issue again arose, petitioner protested: “But, it seems to me we’re getting far 
afield here. The question is, can I be suspended from this court for my request to be removed 
from the panel of attorneys.” 
 
Petitioner was again offered an opportunity to apologize for his letter, but he declined. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the Chief Judge stated: 
 
I want to make it clear to Mr. Snyder what it is the court is allowing you ten days lapse 
here, a period for you to consider. One is, that, assuming there is a general requirement 
for all competent lawyers to do pro bono work that you stand willing and ready to 
perform such work and will comply with the guidelines of the statute. And secondly, to 
reconsider your position as Judge Arnold has requested, concerning the tone of your 
letter of October 6. 
 
Following the hearing, petitioner wrote a letter to the court, agreeing to “enthusiastically obey 
the mandates” of any new plan for the implementation of the Criminal Justice Act in North 
Dakota, and to “make every good faith effort possible” to comply with the court’s guidelines 
regarding compensation under the Act. Petitioner’s letter, however, made no mention of the 
October 6, 1983, letter. 
 
The Chief Judge then wrote to Snyder, stating among other things: 
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The court expressed its opinion at the time of the oral hearing that interrelated with our 
concern and the issuance of the order to show cause was the disrespect that you 
displayed to the court by way of your letter addressed to Helen Montieth, Judge Van 
Sickle’s secretary, of October 6, 1983. The court expressly asked if you would be willing 
to apologize for the tone of the letter and the disrespect displayed. You serve as an 
officer of the court and, as such, the Canons of Ethics require every lawyer to maintain a 
respect for the court as an institution. 
 
Before circulating your letter of February 23, I would appreciate your response to Judge 
Arnold’s specific request, and the court’s request, for you to apologize for the letter that 
you wrote. 
 
Please let me hear from you by return mail. I am confident that if such a letter is 
forthcoming that the court will dissolve the order. 
 
Petitioner responded to the Chief Judge: 
 
I cannot, and will never, in justice to my conscience, apologize for what I consider to be 
telling the truth, albeit in harsh terms. 
 
It is unfortunate that the respective positions in the proceeding have so hardened. 
However, I consider this to be a matter of principle, and if one stands on a principle, one 
must be willing to accept the consequences. 
 
After receipt of this letter, petitioner was suspended from the practice of law in the federal courts 
in the Eighth Circuit for six months. The opinion stated that petitioner “contumaciously refused to 
retract his previous remarks or apologize to the court.” It continued: 
 
Petitioner’s refusal to show continuing respect for the court and his refusal to 
demonstrate a sincere retraction of his admittedly “harsh” statements are sufficient to 
demonstrate to this court that he is not presently fit to practice law in the federal courts. 
All courts depend on the highest level of integrity and respect not only from the judiciary 
but from the lawyers who serve in the court as well. Without public display of respect for 
the judicial branch of government as an institution by lawyers, the law cannot survive. 
Without hesitation we find Snyder’s disrespectful statements as to this court’s 
administration of CJA contumacious conduct. We deem this unfortunate. 
 
We find that Robert Snyder shall be suspended from the practice of law in the federal 
courts of the Eighth Circuit for a period of six months; thereafter, Snyder should make 
application to both this court and the federal district court of North Dakota to be 
readmitted. 
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The opinion specifically stated that petitioner’s offer to serve in Criminal Justice Act cases in the 
future if the panel was equitably structured had “considerable merit.” 
 
Petitioner moved for rehearing en banc. In support of his motion, he presented an affidavit from 
the District Judge’s secretary — the addressee of the October 6 letter — stating that she had 
encouraged him to send the letter. He also submitted an affidavit from the District Judge, which 
read in part: 
 
I did not view the letter as one of disrespect for the Court, but rather one of somewhat 
frustrated lawyer hoping that his comments might be viewed as a basis for some 
changes in the process. 
 
Mr. Snyder has appeared before me on a number of occasions and has always 
competently represented his client, and has shown the highest respect to the court 
system and to me. 
 
The petition for rehearing en banc was denied. An opinion for the en banc court stated: 
 
The gravamen of the situation is that Snyder in his letter of October 6, 1983 became 
harsh and disrespectful to the Court. It is one thing for a lawyer to complain factually to 
the Court, it is another for counsel to be disrespectful in doing so. 
 
Snyder states that his letter is not disrespectful. We disagree. In our view, the letter 
speaks for itself. 
 
The en banc court opinion stayed the order of suspension for 10 days, but provided that the stay 
would be lifted if petitioner failed to apologize. He did not apologize, and the order of suspension 
took effect. 
 
We granted certiorari. We reverse. 
 
II 
 
A 
 
Petitioner challenges his suspension from practice on the grounds (a) that his October 6, 1983, 
letter to the District Judge's secretary was protected by the First Amendment, (b) that he was 
denied due process with respect to the notice of the charge on which he was suspended, and 
(c) that his challenged letter was not disrespectful or contemptuous. We avoid constitutional 
issues when resolution of such issues is not necessary for disposition of a case. Accordingly, 
we consider first whether petitioner’s conduct and expressions warranted his suspension from 
practice; if they did not, there is no occasion to reach petitioner’s constitutional claims. 
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Courts have long recognized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers. This inherent 
power derives from the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court which granted admission. The 
standard for disciplining attorneys practicing before the courts of appeals is set forth in Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 46: 
 
(b) Suspension or Disbarment. When it is shown to the court that any member of its bar 
has been suspended or disbarred from practice in any other court of record, or has been 
guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the bar of the court, he will be subject to 
suspension or disbarment by the court. The member shall be afforded an opportunity to 
show good cause, within such time as the court shall prescribe, why he should not be 
suspended or disbarred. Upon his response to the rule to show cause, and after hearing, 
if requested, or upon expiration of the time prescribed for a response if no response is 
made, the court shall enter an appropriate order. 
 
The phrase “conduct unbecoming a member of the bar” must be read in light of the “complex 
code of behavior” to which attorneys are subject. Essentially, this reflects the burdens inherent 
in the attorney's dual obligations to clients and to the system of justice. Justice Cardozo once 
observed: 
 
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. An attorney is received 
into that ancient fellowship for something more than private gain. He becomes an officer 
of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of 
justice. 
 
As an officer of the court, a member of the bar enjoys singular powers that others do not 
possess; by virtue of admission, members of the bar share a kind of monopoly granted only to 
lawyers. Admission creates a license not only to advise and counsel clients but also to appear in 
court and try cases; as an officer of the court, a lawyer can cause persons to drop their private 
affairs and be called as witnesses in court, and for depositions and other pretrial processes that, 
while subject to the ultimate control of the court, may be conducted outside courtrooms. The 
license granted by the court requires members of the bar to conduct themselves in a manner 
compatible with the role of courts in the administration of justice. 
 
Read in light of the traditional duties imposed on an attorney, it is clear that “conduct 
unbecoming a member of the bar” is conduct contrary to professional standards that shows an 
unfitness to discharge continuing obligations to clients or the courts, or conduct inimical to the 
administration of justice. More specific guidance is provided by case law, applicable court rules, 
and “the lore of the profession,” as embodied in codes of professional conduct. 
 
B 
 
Apparently relying on an attorney’s obligation to avoid conduct that is “prejudicial to the 
administration of justice,” the Court of Appeals held that the letter of October 6, 1983, and an 
unspecified “refusal to show continuing respect for the court” demonstrated that petitioner was 
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“not presently fit to practice law in the federal courts.” Its holding was predicated on a specific 
finding that petitioner’s “disrespectful statements in his letter of October 6, 1983 as to this 
court's administration of the CJA constituted contumacious conduct.” 
 
We must examine the record in light of Rule 46 to determine whether the Court of Appeals’ 
action is supported by the evidence. In the letter, petitioner declined to submit further 
documentation in support of his fee request, refused to accept further assignments under the 
Criminal Justice Act, and criticized the administration of the Act. Petitioner’s refusal to submit 
further documentation in support of his fee request could afford a basis for declining to award a 
fee; however, the submission of adequate documentation was only a prerequisite to the 
collection of his fee, not an affirmative obligation required by his duties to a client or the court. 
Nor, as the Court of Appeals ultimately concluded, was petitioner legally obligated under the 
terms of the local plan to accept Criminal Justice Act cases. 
 
We do not consider a lawyer’s criticism of the administration of the Act or criticism of inequities 
in assignments under the Act as cause for discipline or suspension. The letter was addressed to 
a court employee charged with administrative responsibilities, and concerned a practical matter 
in the administration of the Act. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that petitioner brought to 
light concerns about the administration of the plan that had “merit,” and the court instituted a 
study of the administration of the Criminal Justice Act as a result of petitioner’s complaint. 
Officers of the court may appropriately express criticism on such matters. 
 
The record indicates the Court of Appeals was concerned about the tone of the letter; petitioner 
concedes that the tone of his letter was “harsh,” and, indeed it can be read as illmannered. All 
persons involved in the judicial process — judges, litigants, witnesses, and court officers — owe 
a duty of courtesy to all other participants. The necessity for civility in the inherently contentious 
setting of the adversary process suggests that members of the bar cast criticisms of the system 
in a professional and civil tone. However, even assuming that the letter exhibited an 
unlawyerlike rudeness, a single incident of rudeness or lack of professional courtesy — in this 
context — does not support a finding of contemptuous or contumacious conduct, or a finding 
that a lawyer is “not presently fit to practice law in the federal courts.” Nor does it rise to the level 
of “conduct unbecoming a member of the bar” warranting suspension from practice. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did the district court sanction Snyder? Why did the circuit court affirm? And why did 
the Supreme Court reverse? 
2. When should courts be able to sanction attorneys for disrespectful behavior? When 
should the discretion of the court be limited? 
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Gadda v. Ashcroft, 377 F. 3d 934 (9th Cir. 2004) 
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Summary: The California Bar disbarred Gadda for incompetence, based on his failure to 
provide competent legal representation to clients in immigration court. The Ninth Circuit 
also disbarred Gadda, based on the California Bar’s decision. Gadda objected to his 
disbarment by the 9th Circuit, arguing that the California Bar lacked authority to 
discipline him for incompetent representation in immigration court. The 9th Circuit 
disagreed, holding that both the California Bar and the 9th Circuit had the authority to 
discipline him.  
 
BEEZER, Circuit Judge. 
 
On July 30, 2001, the California State Bar Court found that Miguel Gadda, Esq. repeatedly 
failed to perform legal services competently. It placed Gadda on involuntary inactive status and 
recommended that Gadda be disbarred. 
 
This opinion and order relate to two federal proceedings resulting from the State Bar Court’s 
recommendation. In the first, Gadda appeals an order of the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California, which denies Gadda's motion to preliminarily enjoin the Board of 
Immigration Appeals decision to suspend him from practice based on his suspension by the 
State Bar Court. Gadda asserts that the State Bar Court cannot affect his right to practice before 
the BIA. The other proceeding is a disciplinary action initiated by this court after we received 
notice of Gadda’s suspension from practice by the State Bar Court. 
 
Gadda argues that any reciprocal discipline imposed by the BIA or by this court based on the 
State Bar Court’s suspension order is invalid because the Supreme Court of California lacked 
jurisdiction to discipline him. He claims that federal law preempts the states’ authority to regulate 
attorneys, like him, who practice only in the administration of immigration law and in the federal 
courts, but not in the state courts. Because both of these proceedings involve the same 
underlying preemption issue, we consolidate them for opinion purposes only. 
 
We conclude that federal law does not preempt the Supreme Court of California’s authority to 
suspend or disbar attorneys admitted to practice in California state courts. The Supreme Court 
of California’s discipline orders may serve as the basis for reciprocal disbarment actions by both 
the BIA and this court. 
 
We disbar Gadda from the practice of law before the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit. 
 
I 
 
Gadda was admitted to the California State Bar in 1975. Thereafter, he was admitted to practice 
law and became a member of the bar of the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of California, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court of 
the United States. He was also admitted to practice before the Board of Immigration Appeals 
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and was authorized to appear for clients before the BIA and in all Immigration Courts throughout 
the United States. 
 
A. California State Court Disciplinary Proceedings 
 
On August 26, 2002, the Review Department of the California State Bar Court affirmed the State 
Bar Court’s decision recommending Gadda's disbarment and placing him on involuntary inactive 
status. On January 22, 2003, the Supreme Court of California ordered that Gadda be disbarred 
from the practice of law in California, effective February 21, 2003. 
 
The Review Department’s opinion surveyed Gadda's history of federal immigration practice, 
concluding that “disbarment is warranted under the circumstances for the protection of the 
public, the courts, and the legal profession.” The Review Department cited seventeen acts of 
misconduct extending over six years and involving eight federal immigration client matters and 
one client trust account matter. This misconduct included Gadda’s failure to appear at 
scheduled court conferences and to keep clients apprised of the proceedings and relevant court 
dates. Five of Gadda's clients were ordered deported in absentia and at least six courts found 
Gadda to have provided ineffective assistance. The Review Department concluded that Gadda 
failed “to perform legal services competently, demonstrated indifference toward rectification of 
or atonement for the consequences of his misconduct, and significantly harmed clients.” The 
Review Department determined that aggravating factors, including prior discipline for similar 
misconduct in 1990, outweighed any mitigating factors Gadda presented. 
 
We incorporate by reference that portion of the Review Board’s opinion which inventories 
Gadda’s incompetence between 1994 and 1999. Of the eight federal immigration client matters 
which the Review Board describes, that of the Saba family is especially egregious. 
 
The four minor Saba children applied for political asylum. After the INS denied their application, 
the children retained Gadda to represent them. Gadda advised the children to withdraw their 
asylum claim; the Immigration Judge ordered that they voluntarily depart from the United States. 
 
Thereafter, the children’s parents became naturalized citizens. The children were eligible for 
priority consideration of their application for adjustment of status to legal residency or citizenship 
based on their parents’ naturalization. However, as a result of Gadda’s neglect and 
incompetence, the children were deprived of an adjustment of their immigration status, and 
ultimately were placed in deportation proceedings. 
 
Gadda moved for a stay of the children’s deportation. In the course of a hearing on that motion, 
Gadda left the Saba family unrepresented before an immigration officer. Gadda also directed 
the children to sign a statement promising they would voluntarily depart once the stay expired. 
The immigration court granted the stay but the children did not depart as promised. Gadda 
assured the children that he was appealing the earlier BIA decision. 
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Because Gadda negligently allowed the time for an appeal from the BIA to this court to lapse, 
he was forced to seek habeas corpus relief before the district court. Gadda directed William 
Gardner, an attorney Gadda employed on a contract basis but did not supervise, to file the 
habeas petition. Before Gardner filed the habeas petition, the IJ ordered the Saba children to be 
deported on account of their refusal to depart voluntarily at the expiration of the stay. Gadda 
once again advised the children not to comply with the court's order. 
 
Gardner subsequently filed the habeas petition and the district court ordered a hearing. The 
district court made a sua sponte finding of ineffective assistance by Gadda and remanded the 
matter to the immigration court to reopen the deportation hearing. By the time the case was 
heard, two of the Saba children were no longer minors. Gadda has not refunded the $3,000 the 
Saba children paid him. 
 
Regarding the Saba matter, the Review Department agreed with the State Bar that Gadda 
“recklessly and repeatedly failed to perform legal services” and “failed to refund unearned fees 
promptly upon termination.” Specifically, the Review Department found Gadda’s performance 
incompetent in the following ways: 
 
(1) by leaving the children alone, unrepresented, in the middle of a hearing before an 
immigration officer and advising them to sign a voluntary departure form; (2) by failing to 
advise the Saba children to depart on or before the deadline; (2) by failing to timely 
move to reopen deportation proceedings; (4) by failing to file a petition for review with 
the Ninth Circuit; (5) by failing to file for adjustment of status after Mrs. Saba became a 
naturalized citizen and instead filing for adjustment of status on the children’s last day to 
depart voluntarily, approximately three months later; and (6) by failing to supervise 
Gardner in filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
 
B. Gadda v. Ashcroft — appeal from BIA disciplinary proceedings 
 
Based on the State Bar Court's order, on October 2, 2001, the BIA suspended Gadda from 
practice before the BIA, the Immigration Courts, and the Department of Homeland Security. 
Gadda unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction of the BIA’s action in the district court. 
Gadda appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction to this court. We deferred submission 
pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings before the BIA. 
 
Meanwhile, the Office of General Counsel for the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
initiated disciplinary proceedings and an adjudicatory official suspended Gadda indefinitely from 
practice on August 22, 2002. On July 8, 2003, the BIA dismissed Gadda’s appeal and ordered 
him expelled from practice before the BIA, the Immigration Courts, and the DHS. 
 
C. Ninth Circuit Disciplinary Proceedings 
 
On May 29, 2002, we ordered Gadda to resign from the Ninth Circuit’s bar or show cause why 
he should not be suspended or disbarred based on the California State Bar Court’s order 
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placing him on involuntary inactive status and recommending that he be disbarred. Gadda 
responded and we referred the case to the Appellate Commissioner. On September 25, 2002, 
the Appellate Commissioner stayed the disciplinary proceedings pending a decision by the 
Supreme Court of California on the State Bar Court’s recommendation or a decision by us. 
 
Following the Supreme Court of California’s January 22, 2003 order disbarring Gadda, the 
Appellate Commissioner again ordered Gadda to resign from the bar of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit or show cause why he should not be suspended or disbarred. 
Gadda requested a stay, claiming that the Supreme Court of California’s disbarment order was 
not final and that we should first resolve Gadda v. Ashcroft. 
 
The Appellate Commissioner conducted a hearing on March 27, 2003 and filed a report and 
recommendation on May 22, 2003. The Appellate Commissioner recommends that Gadda be 
disbarred from the practice of law before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit. 
 
II 
 
“Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. An attorney is received into that 
ancient fellowship for something more than private gain. He becomes an officer of the court, 
and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice.” We have both 
statutory and inherent power to suspend or disbar an attorney who has been admitted to this 
court’s bar. 
 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46 regulates attorney conduct, including admission to the 
bar of the Ninth Circuit and the conditions for suspension and disbarment. FRAP 46 provides 
that a member of this court's bar is subject to suspension or disbarment if the member either (1) 
“has been suspended or disbarred from practice in any other court”; or (2) “is guilty of conduct 
unbecoming a member of the court's bar.” 
 
A. Reciprocal Discipline 
 
In this case, Gadda’s suspension and disbarment from the practice of law in California forms the 
basis for his disbarment from the BIA and this court. 
 
B. Conduct Unbecoming 
 
Even if the California courts had not acted to disbar Gadda, we have independent authority to 
suspend or disbar him from practice. Conduct unbecoming a member of the bar of the Ninth 
Circuit is sufficient cause for disbarment. Unlike some of our sister circuits, the Ninth Circuit has 
not adopted local rules elaborating on FRAP 46’s “conduct unbecoming” standard. The 
Supreme Court has held that “conduct unbecoming” is conduct “contrary to professional 
standards that show an unfitness to discharge continuing obligations to clients or courts, or 
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conduct inimical to the administration of justice.” We have consistently found conduct 
unbecoming where an attorney failed to prosecute an appeal with due diligence. 
 
Because we have jurisdiction over appeals from the immigration courts, the quality of the 
practice by attorneys appearing before the immigration courts is crucial to our ability to 
administer justice and function effectively. The quality of our review is heavily dependent on the 
record established in administrative immigration hearings, which in turn is dependent on the 
competence of the attorneys creating that record. Gadda’s incompetence impedes our 
operations and endangers the rights of his clients. 
 
In the course of one immigration matter, for example, Gadda neglected to introduce crucial 
documents relating to changed country conditions. Although his client was in possession of 
such documents, Gadda failed to have the documents translated and offered as evidence. In 
that same matter, the Review Department found that Gadda failed to elicit persuasive testimony 
in support of his client's contention of fear of future persecution. Gadda currently represents 
petitioners in approximately 50 matters pending before this court. We hold that conduct such as 
his before the immigration courts is sufficient to constitute "conduct unbecoming" a member of 
the bar of this court. 
 
C. Inherent Power 
 
We hold that we also have inherent authority respecting the suspension and disbarment of 
attorneys who perform incompetently in federal immigration proceedings. This power derives 
from an attorney’s role as an officer of the court which granted the attorney admission to the 
bar; it is necessary to maintain the respectability and harmony of the bar, as well as to protect 
the public. We exercise this power with restraint and discretion. 
 
“The behavior for which an attorney is disciplined pursuant to our inherent power must have 
some nexus with the conduct of the litigation before the court.” Such a connection exists in the 
context of immigration proceedings because, as noted above, we have jurisdiction over appeals 
from the immigration courts and rely on the records established in those courts. 
 
III 
 
It is ORDERED that Miguel Gadda, Esq. should be and hereby is disbarred from the practice of 
law before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and his name shall be 
stricken from the roll of attorneys. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. When should the courts discipline attorneys like Gadda? What kind of discipline should 
they impose? 
2. Why was Gadda disbarred? Is it possible that he provided some of his clients with 
competent representation? 
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Avista Management vs. Wausau Underwriters Insurance Co. (M.D. Fl. 2006) 
 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to designate location of a Rule 30(b)(6) 
deposition. Upon consideration of the Motion ñ the latest in a series of Gordian knots that the 
parties have been unable to untangle without enlisting the assistance of the federal courts ñ it is 
 
ORDERED that said Motion is DENIED. Instead, the Court will fashion a new form of alternative 
dispute resolution, to wit: at 4:00 P.M. on Friday, June 30, 2006, counsel shall convene at a 
neutral site agreeable to both parties. If counsel cannot agree on a neutral site, they shall meet 
on the front steps of the Sam M. Gibbons U.S. Courthouse, 801 North Florida Ave., Tampa, 
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Florida 33602. Each lawyer shall be entitled to be accompanied by one paralegal who shall act 
as an attendant and witness. At that time and location, counsel shall engage in one (1) game of 
“rock, paper, scissors.” The winner of this engagement shall be entitled to select the location for 
the 30(b)(6) deposition to be held somewhere in Hillsborough County during the period July 11-
12, 2006. If either party disputes the outcome of this engagement, an appeal may be filed and a 
hearing will be held at 8:30 A.M. on Friday, July 7, 2006 before the undersigned in Courtroom 3, 
George C. Young United States Courthouse and Federal Building, 80 North Hughey Avenue, 
Orlando, Florida 32801. 
 
Jan Pudlow, ‘Rock, paper, scissors’ order garners worldwide attention, Florida Bar News 
(July 1, 2006) 
 
Dutifully following a playful, but pointed, federal court order, Tampa lawyers David Pettinato, of 
the Merlin Law Group, and D. Lee Craig, of Butler Pappas, will meet June 20 and engage in one 
game of “rock, paper, scissors” to solve a dispute in the midst of heated litigation. 
 
“We will do it quickly, humbly, and go on about our business,” said a contrite Pettinato, who is 
amazed about “getting bombarded from news media from all over the country.” 
 
CNN, ABC, The Wall Street Journal, and The New York Times, to name a few. 
 
Make that international news, as London’s The Guardian also did its version of the everybody’s-
talking-about-it June 6 order issued by U.S. Middle District Judge Gregory Presnell, who was a 
member of The Florida Bar Board of Governors from 1989-93. 
 
At issue was the childlike squabbling between the attorneys in Avista Management, Inc., vs. 
Wausau Underwriters Insurance Co., in litigation over an insurance settlement stemming from 
2004’s Hurricane Charley. 
 
Even though the sparring lawyers’ offices are only four floors apart in the same building at 777 
S. Harbor Island Blvd. in Tampa, they could not agree on where to hold a deposition. Craig, 
representing Wausau, wanted to question a witness in his office. Pettinato, representing Avista, 
was not willing to let Craig have the home-court advantage, and insisted on a neutral setting of 
a court reporter’s office down the street. 
 
When they took the matter to the court, Presnell let them have it, fed up with “the latest series of 
Gordian knots that the parties have been unable to untangle without enlisting the assistance of 
the federal courts.” 
 
In what the judge called “a new form of alternative dispute resolution,” Presnell ordered that 
each attorney will be “accompanied by one paralegal who shall act as an attendant and 
witness,” and “the winner of this engagement shall be entitled to select the location for the 
30(b)(6) deposition to be held somewhere in Hillsborough County during the period July 11-12, 
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2006. If either party disputes the outcome of this engagement, an appeal may be filed and a 
hearing will be held at 8:30 a.m. on Friday, July 7, before the undersigned in Courtroom 3.” 
 
That creative order compelled St. Petersburg Times columnist Sue Carlton to nominate Presnell 
for “Jurist of the Year.” 
 
NO NEED FOR AN APPEAL 
 
On June 8, Pettinato said that he and Craig have resolved the issue. Pettinato said both sides 
agreed to play rock, paper, scissors, at “an undisclosed location.” Whoever wins will get to hold 
the deposition in his office. 
 
“We want to do it out of respect for the judge’s order,” said Pettinato, who added, “I have to say I 
am a little disappointed that we couldn’t resolve our differences without this court order. But it 
provided us with an eye-opener to resolve our differences in a more amicable way. Since the 
hurricanes, we have been having huge battles trying to get insurance companies to pay.. . . If 
you get a little too passionate advocating for your client, it helps to rethink your strategy.” 
 
The matter has been zinging across the state, around the country, and across the ocean, on 
news Web sites, lawyers’ e-mails, and law blogs. 
 
Orlando lawyer Lynn James Hinson, who called Presnell an excellent lawyer and judge, posted 
this comment on The Wall Street Journal’s Law Blog: “Many lawyers act like they are in 
kindergarten, and this order treats them appropriately.” 
 
Craig, who did not return the News ’ request for an interview, may be at a disadvantage. 
Pettinato has a kindergartner in the house, as the father of a 5-year-old and 9-year-old. 
 
“I play it all the time with them. I can’t say I’m an expert, but I know the rules,” Pettinato said. 
“Now, my 5-year-old keeps throwing her hand out, saying, ‘Dad, let’s practice.’” 
 
Pettinato said his kids have advised him to open with rock, which he thought was apropos 
“because my case is solid as a rock.” 
 
But Matti Leshem, co-commissioner of the USA Rock Paper Scissors League, told The New 
York Times, “I guarantee you right now that both lawyers will open with paper. Lawyers open 
with paper 67 percent of the time, because they deal with so much paper.” 
 
Leshem agreed to officiate, saying, “What I don’t want is some rogue element of rock-paper-
scissors coming down from the bench. When the law takes rock-paper-scissors into its own 
hands, mayhem can occur.” 
 
While Pettinato said he has greatest respect for the judge and “got the message,” he is willing to 
laugh at himself, “or else I’ll grow despondent.” 
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Taking it somewhat seriously is the World Rock Paper Scissors Society. 
 
“This is a landmark case of how RPS should be used to keep the wheels of justice moving 
forward when dealing with lawyer engaging in posturing tactics,” Doug Walker, managing 
director of the World RPS Society, told the News. 
 
“Although we take issue with RPS being labeled as a ‘new’ form of dispute resolution, we 
understand it is not commonly used in courtrooms and applaud Judge Presnell’s wisdom in the 
matter.” 
 
Noting that Rock, Paper, Scissors dates back to at least the 18th century in Japan, it was used 
to settle an auction-house dispute in April when “an $18 million art portfolio was acquired by 
Christie’s due to a cleverly executed throw of paper,” over Sotheby’s rock. 
 
The World Rock Paper Scissors Society, Walker said, plans to invite Judge Presnell to attend 
the International Rock Paper Scissors Championships in Toronto on September 30, as “chief 
consultant to Head Referee Brad Fox.” 
 
No word yet on whether the judge will accept the invitation. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did the court order Pettinato and Craig to resolve their dispute via a game of 
Roshambo? 
2. Was the judge’s decision justified and appropriate under the circumstances? 
 
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Summit Park Townhome, 886 F. 3d 863 (10th Cir. 2018) 
 
Summary: Harris and Pettinato represented Summit Park in an action against Auto-
Owners. Summit Park was damaged by hail, but the parties disagreed about the amount 
of damage. The district court ordered them both to obtain independent appraisals. Harris 
and Pettinato retained Keys as their appraiser, but did not disclose their previous 
relationship with him. When the district court learned that Keys was not impartial, it 
sanctioned Harris and Pettinato. They appealed, but the circuit court affirmed.  
 
BACHARACH, Circuit Judge. 
 
Mr. William Harris and Mr. David Pettinato are two attorneys who represented Summit Park 
Townhome Association. While representing Summit Park against its insurer, the two attorneys 
were sanctioned for failing to disclose information. In this appeal, the attorneys challenge the 
sanctions based on five arguments: 
 
1. The district court lacked authority to require the disclosure requirements. 
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2. The attorneys did not violate the court’s disclosure requirements. 
3. The district court awarded attorneys’ fees beyond the scope of an earlier sanctions 
order. 
4. The district court's award of attorneys’ fees resulted in a deprivation of due process. 
5. The amount of attorneys’ fees awarded was unreasonable. 
 
We affirm. Regardless of whether the district court had authority to require the disclosures, the 
attorneys were obligated to comply. They did not, and the district court acted reasonably in 
issuing sanctions, determining the scope of the sanctions, and calculating the amount of the 
sanctions. 
 
I. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato were sanctioned for failing to comply with the disclosure order. 
 
This appeal grew out of an insurance dispute. Summit Park sustained hail damage and filed a 
claim with its insurer, Auto-Owners Insurance Company. The parties agreed that damage had 
occurred but disagreed on the dollar amount of the damage. Auto-Owners sued for a 
declaratory judgment to decide the value. 
 
Summit Park retained Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato, who successfully moved to compel an 
appraisal based on the insurance policy. In the event of an appraisal, the insurance policy 
required: 
 
Each party will select a competent and impartial appraiser. The two appraisers will select 
an umpire. If they cannot agree, either may request that selection be made by a judge of 
a court having jurisdiction. The appraisers will state separately the value of the property 
and amount of loss. If they fail to agree, they will submit their differences to the umpire. 
A decision agreed to by any two will be binding. 
 
Based on continuing disputes between the parties, Auto-Owners asked the district court to 
resolve these disputes by ordering an “appraisal agreement.” The court did so and ordered 
disclosure of facts potentially bearing on the appraisers' impartiality: 
 
An individual who has a known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of the 
appraisal proceeding or a known, existing, and substantial relationship with a party may 
not serve as an appraiser. Each appraiser must, after making a reasonable inquiry, 
disclose to all parties and any other appraiser any known facts that a reasonable person 
would consider likely to affect his or her impartiality, including (a) a financial or personal 
interest in the outcome of the appraisal; and (b) a current or previous relationship with 
any of the parties (including their counsel or representatives) or with any of the 
participants in the appraisal proceeding. Each appraiser shall have a continuing 
obligation to disclose to the parties and to any other appraiser any facts that he or she 
learns after accepting appointment that a reasonable person would consider likely to 
affect his or her impartiality. 
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The court warned: “Notice is given that, if the court finds that the parties and/or their counsel 
have not complied with this order, the court will impose sanctions against the parties and/or their 
counsel pursuant to the court's inherent authority.” 
 
Before the court imposed these requirements, Summit Park selected Mr. George Keys as its 
appraiser. This selection led Auto-Owners to express doubt about Mr. Keys’s impartiality. But 
Auto-Owners did not object to Mr. Keys or move to compel further disclosures. 
 
Mr. Keys and the court-appointed umpire agreed on an appraisal award of over $10 million, 
which was 47% higher than Summit Park’s own public adjuster had determined. Auto-Owners 
then launched an investigation, which culminated in an objection to Mr. Keys. In the objection, 
Auto-Owners argued that Mr. Keys was not impartial and that Summit Park had failed to 
disclose evidence bearing on his impartiality. The district court credited these arguments, 
disqualifying Mr. Keys and vacating the appraisal award. 
 
With vacatur of the appraisal award, Auto-Owners moved for sanctions against Mr. Harris and 
Mr. Pettinato, seeking attorneys’ fees and expenses based on violation of the disclosure order. 
The district court granted the motion, assessing sanctions against Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato 
for $354,350.65 in attorneys' fees and expenses. 
 
II. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato were bound by the court’s disclosure order. 
 
Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato challenge the district court’s authority to enter the disclosure order. 
But even if the court had exceeded its authority, Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato would still have 
needed to comply with the disclosure order. If the two attorneys believed that the order had 
been unauthorized, they could have sought reconsideration or a writ; but they could not violate 
the order. 
 
There is “impressive authority for the proposition that an order issued by a court with jurisdiction 
over the subject matter and person must be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly 
and proper proceedings.” The parties agree that the district court had jurisdiction over the 
subject matter and parties; thus, the attorneys and parties bore an obligation to comply in the 
absence of an appellate challenge. In light of the duty to comply, violation of the order could 
trigger sanctions. 
 
Regardless of whether the district court had authority to issue the disclosure order, Mr. Harris 
and Mr. Pettinato: 
 
● bore an obligation to comply in the absence of an appellate challenge and 
● could be sanctioned for noncompliance. 
 
III. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato violated the disclosure order. 
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The district court concluded that the two attorneys had violated the disclosure order. 
Challenging this conclusion, Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato make two arguments: 
 
1. The district court misinterpreted the term “impartial.” 
2. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato disclosed sufficient information about Mr. Keys. 
 
Both arguments fail. 
 
B. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato failed to disclose information specified in the disclosure order. 
 
The district court required disclosure of: 
 
● the appraiser’s “financial or personal interest in the outcome of the appraisal,” 
● Any “current or previous relationship” between the appraiser and Summit Park’s counsel, 
and 
● any other facts subsequently learned that “a reasonable person would consider likely to 
affect” the appraiser's impartiality. 
 
1. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato did not disclose the extent of their relationships with Mr. Keys. 
Regardless of whether the district court had correctly defined “impartial,” the disclosure order 
itself was clear in what was required. For example, the order expressly required disclosure of 
the attorneys’ current or previous relationships with the appraiser. The failure to disclose this 
information constituted a sanctionable violation regardless of the court's interpretation of the 
word “impartial.” 
 
The district court could reasonably find that the two attorneys had failed to disclose the extent of 
their relationships with Mr. Keys. For example, the attorneys failed to disclose that 
 
● other attorneys in their law firm (the Merlin Law Group) had worked with Mr. Keys on 
appraisals for at least 33 clients, 
● Merlin attorneys had represented Mr. Keys on various matters for over a decade, 
● Merlin’s founder and Mr. Keys had co-founded a Florida lobbying operation, whose 
“number one goal was to protect policyholders and the public adjusting profession,” and 
● Merlin attorneys had served as the incorporator and registered agent for one of Mr. 
Keys’s companies. 
 
Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato argue that their disclosures were sufficient. They made two 
disclosures: 
 
1. “Mr. Keys does not have any significant prior business relationship with Merlin, Summit 
Park, or C3 Group. Mr. Keys has acted as a public adjuster and/or appraiser on behalf of 
policyholders that Merlin has represented in the past, however, this obviously does not 
affect his ability to act as an appraiser in this matter.” 
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2. “Mr. Keys has acted as a public adjuster and/or appraiser on behalf of policyholders that 
Merlin has represented in the past. Mr. Keys has no financial interest in the claim, and 
has no previous relationship with the policyholder in this matter.” 
 
In addition, Mr. Keys disclosed: 
 
I do not have a material interest in the outcome of the Award and have never acted 
either for or against Summit Park Townhome Association. My fee agreement is based 
upon hourly rates plus expenses. I do not have any substantial business relationship or 
financial interest in Merlin. There have been cases where both Merlin and Keys Claims 
Consultants acted for the same insured but under separate contracts. 
 
Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato make two defenses of their disclosures: 
 
1. They disclosed enough information about Mr. Keys’s impartiality. 
2. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato lacked personal knowledge about the undisclosed facts. 
 
These arguments fail. 
 
First, the district court acted within its discretion in concluding that Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato 
had failed to disclose the extent of their relationships with Mr. Keys. The two attorneys disclosed 
only that Mr. Keys had worked as an appraiser on behalf of Merlin’s clients, and Mr. Keys stated 
that he lacked a substantial business relationship with Merlin. The district court could 
reasonably find that these disclosures had failed to provide meaningful information about the 
extent of the relationships between the two attorneys and Mr. Keys. 
 
Second, Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato cannot avoid sanctions based on their asserted lack of 
knowledge about Mr. Keys’s contacts with other Merlin attorneys. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato 
knew about some of the contacts, as reflected in Mr. Pettinato's description of his firm’s 
connection with Mr. Keys: “Both Mr. Keys and his staff have assisted me as well as my firm in 
resolving an untold number of large multi-million dollar losses to an amicable resolution and 
settlement to the policyholders’ benefit and satisfaction.” In addition, however, Mr. Harris and 
Mr. Pettinato bore an obligation to make “a reasonable inquiry.” In light of this obligation, Mr. 
Harris and Mr. Pettinato could not profess ignorance while failing to inquire about contacts with 
other Merlin attorneys. 
 
In these circumstances, the district court acted within its discretion in finding a failure to disclose 
the extent of the relationships between the two attorneys and Mr. Keys. 
 
2. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato distort the effect of the district court’s definition of “impartial.” 
 
The district court required disclosure not only of the appraiser’s relationship with counsel but 
also of known facts that a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the appraiser's 
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impartiality. This part of the disclosure requirement was tied to the court's definition of the term 
“impartial.” 
 
Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato focus on the court’s definition of “impartial,” arguing that it was 
wrong and that the court failed to adequately inform Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato of the scope of 
their obligations. But in the disclosure order itself, the court stated what it meant by “impartial”: 
“An individual who has a known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of the appraisal 
proceeding or a known, existing, and substantial relationship with a party may not serve as an 
appraiser.” Because the court stated precisely what it meant by “impartial,” Mr. Harris and Mr. 
Pettinato knew what was required. And as we have discussed, Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato 
could not disobey the order even if the court had based the disclosure requirements on a 
misguided definition of “impartial.” 
 
3. The district court reasonably found a violation of the disclosure order tied to this test of 
“impartial.” 
 
Based on this definition, the district court required disclosure of any facts that a reasonable 
person would view as likely to affect the appraiser’s impartiality. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato 
argue that evidence of an appraiser’s advocacy was unlikely to affect the appraiser’s 
impartiality. For the sake of argument, let’s assume that Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato are right. 
Still, the district court could reasonably view Mr. Keys’s undisclosed prior statements as likely to 
affect his impartiality based on a known, direct, and material interest in the outcome. 
 
For example, in a presentation to a group of public adjusters in Florida, Mr. Keys taught 
participants how to “harvest the claim money” from an insurer during an appraisal. And one of 
Mr. Keys’s companies maintains a website stating: “Our purpose is simple: To shift the balance 
of power from the insurer to the policy holder.” The district court could reasonably view these 
undisclosed statements as proof of a material interest in an outcome favoring the policyholder 
over the insured. 
 
Evidence also suggests that Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato were aware of Mr. Keys’s bias. For 
example, in an advertisement on Mr. Keys’s website, Mr. Pettinato endorsed Mr. Keys, saying: 
“Both Mr. Keys and his staff have assisted me as well as my firm in resolving an untold number 
of large multi-million dollar losses to an amicable resolution and settlement to the policyholders’ 
benefit and satisfaction.” And a profile on Merlin's website reported that Mr. Keys “had 
dedicated his professional life to being a voice for policyholders in property insurance claims.” In 
this profile, Mr. Keys stated: “I was taught to always handle a claim as if my momma was the 
insured.” 
 
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato 
had violated the disclosure order. 
 
C. Waiver 
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Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato contend that Auto-Owners waived its objection to the sufficiency of 
the disclosures by failing to object despite knowledge of Mr. Keys’s relationship with Merlin and 
past expressions of bias toward policyholders. We disagree. Auto-Owners had some knowledge 
about Mr. Keys’s bias but did not know much of what had been withheld. Without full knowledge 
of the undisclosed information, Auto-Owners did not waive its right to seek sanctions for 
nondisclosure. 
 
IV. The district court reasonably interpreted the scope of its sanctions order. 
 
In sanctioning the two attorneys, the court invoked 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Under § 1927, an attorney 
“who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required 
by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably 
incurred because of such conduct.” Applying this statute in the sanctions order, the court found 
that Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato had unreasonably prolonged the proceedings: 
 
I note that Section 1927 indicates a purpose to compensate victims of abusive litigation 
practices, not to deter and punish offenders. With this purpose in mind, I reject Auto-
Owners’ request for fees for proceedings in this Court that relate to conducting the 
appraisal process and conducting the appraisal process itself because Auto-Owners 
would have incurred these fees regardless of Harris' and Pettinato's misconduct. I grant 
the request, however, as to Auto-Owners’ investigation into George Keys and its 
objections to his participation in the appraisal, as this work would not have taken place in 
the absence of Harris’ and Pettinato’s misconduct. The award shall be assessed against 
Harris and Pettinato jointly and severally. 
 
Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato challenge the scope of this order. They concede that the award 
covered Auto-Owners’ objection to Mr. Keys ($186,705.50) and investigation of Mr. Keys 
($33,805). But the attorneys disagree with the inclusion of attorneys’ fees for 
 
● Auto-Owners’ preparation of the motion for sanctions ($51,309.50), 
● Auto-Owners’ preparation of the application for attorneys’ fees and expenses 
($16,960.50), and 
● Auto-Owners' other related work ($61,662.50). 
 
According to Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato, these activities fell outside of the initial sanctions 
order. We disagree. 
 
In setting attorneys’ fees following the sanctions order, the district court explained: 
 
Thus, viewed properly in its context, my award encompasses any fees incurred as a 
result of Harris’ and Pettinato’s misconduct. The fees requested by Auto-Owners for 
work on the third amended petition, the reservation of rights letter, and other matters 
described in the detailed billing records would not have been incurred but for Harris’ and 
Pettinato’s misconduct. I therefore conclude they are within the scope of the award. 
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We give deference to the district court’s interpretation of its own order. 
 
With such deference, we conclude that the district court reasonably interpreted its prior 
sanctions order. The sanctions order had noted that § 1927 was designed “to compensate 
victims of abusive litigation practices.” In light of this purpose, the court interpreted its sanctions 
order against Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato as encompassing all of the attorneys’ fees and 
expenses resulting from violation of the disclosure order. This interpretation was reasonable. 
 
The sanctions order expressly included the investigation of and objection to Mr. Keys. But the 
district court could reasonably interpret the sanctions order to go beyond the investigation and 
objection. If Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato had not violated the disclosure order, Auto-Owners 
would not have had to move for sanctions, seek attorneys’ fees and expenses, and complete 
other work. As a result, the district court could reasonably consider these litigation expenses as 
the product of the two attorneys’ misconduct. In these circumstances, it was reasonable for the 
district court to conclude that the earlier sanctions order had encompassed attorneys’ fees and 
expenses from the motion for sanctions, application for attorneys’ fees and expenses, and 
related work involving the motion and application. 
 
V. The district court did not deprive the two attorneys of due process. 
 
Alternatively, Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato assert a deprivation of due process based on an 
inability to respond to the district court’s inclusion of litigation activities outside of the initial 
sanctions order. We disagree. Auto-Owners filed an application for attorneys’ fees, and Mr. 
Harris and Mr. Pettinato had an opportunity to respond. In the response, they could have 
objected to any of the attorneys’ fees being sought. This opportunity supplied due process. 
 
VI. The amount of attorneys' fees awarded was reasonable. 
 
Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato also argue that the court awarded an unreasonable amount of 
attorneys’ fees. We disagree. 
 
The district court closely reviewed the information in Auto-Owners’ request for fees, determining 
that most of the fee requests were reasonable given 
 
● the circumstances of the case, 
● the hourly rates prevailing in the community, and 
● the use of billing judgment. 
 
First, the district court concluded that it was reasonable for Auto-Owners’ counsel to spend long 
hours because “Auto-Owners had over $30 million at stake” and the issues were complex. This 
conclusion was reasonable. 
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Second, the court considered the local market, the qualifications of the attorneys, and the 
contentiousness of the litigation. These considerations led the district court to find that the billing 
rates had been reasonable. In our view, this finding was permissible under the record. 
 
Third, the court considered the use of billing judgment by Auto-Owners’ counsel through 
concessions such as staffing with lower-billing attorneys, declining to charge for all hours 
worked, and discounting hours worked by paralegals and secretaries. The district court acted 
reasonably in considering these concessions. 
 
For these three reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
calculating the amount of the sanction ($354,350.65). 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
The district court did not err in sanctioning Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato. Regardless of the 
validity of the disclosure order, compliance was required in the absence of an appellate 
challenge. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato violated the order by failing to disclose information 
bearing on Mr. Keys's impartiality. In light of this violation, the district court had the discretion to 
sanction Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato and set a reasonable amount. We therefore affirm the 
assessment of sanctions. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why was it improper for Harris and Pettinato not to disclose their previous relationship 
with Keys? 
2. Could Harris and Pettinato have hired Keys as their expert, if they made the proper 
disclosures? 
 
Further Reading: 
 
● Benjamin Edwards, The Professional Prospectus: A Call for Effective Professional 
Disclosure, W&L L. Rev. (forthcoming) 
 
 
Further Listening: 
 
● Benjamin Edwards on Improving the Market for Professional Services, Ipse Dixit, March 
19, 2019 
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6.3: Attorney Misconduct 
 
Walking the line, you were a marksman. Told me that law, like wine, is ageless. Public defender, 
you had to admit, you wanted the love of a sex offender.94 
 
In addition to their disciplinary authority under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and Model 
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1, courts have the “inherent authority” to regulate the conduct of 
attorneys and punish attorney misconduct. This inherent authority is recognized by both state 
and federal courts, and is not derived from any particular state or rule. Rather, it is a function of 
the need for courts to “manage their own affairs.” As the Supreme Court observed in Chambers 
v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991): 
 
It has long been understood that certain implied powers must necessarily result to our 
Courts of justice from the nature of their institution, powers which cannot be dispensed 
with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others. For this reason, 
Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with 
power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to 
their lawful mandates. These powers are governed not by rule or statute but by the 
control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the 
orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. 
 
The inherent authority of a court is non-exclusive of any statutes or rules that prohibit the same 
or similar conduct, and courts may use their inherent authority to punish conduct that would fall 
outside the scope of otherwise applicable statutes of rules. Among other things, courts can use 
their inherent authority to punish attorneys for conduct that is abusive, vexatious or in bad faith. 
For example, as the Supreme Court observed in Chambers: 
 
A court may assess attorney’s fees when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, 
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. In this regard, if a court finds that fraud has been 
practiced upon it, or that the very temple of justice has been defiled, it may assess 
attorney’s fees against the responsible party, as it may when a party shows bad faith by 
delaying or disrupting the litigation or by hampering enforcement of a court order. The 
imposition of sanctions in this instance transcends a court’s equitable power concerning 
relations between the parties and reaches a court’s inherent power to police itself, thus 
serving the dual purpose of vindicating judicial authority without resort to the more 
drastic sanctions available for contempt of court and making the prevailing party whole 
for expenses caused by his opponent's obstinacy. 
 
The Inherent Authority of the Court 
 
																																																								
94 Blondie, X Offender, Blondie (1976). 
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Marvin Kurzban & Ira J. Kurzban 
 
Lee v. American Eagle Airlines, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (S.D. Fla. 2000) 
 
MIDDLEBROOKS, District Judge. 
 
Summary: Marvin and Ira Kurzban represented Anthony Lee in an employment 
discrimination action against American Eagle Airlines, alleging racial discrimination. The 
found for Lee on his hostile work environment claim and awarded him $300,000 in 
compensatory damages and $650,000 in punitive damages, but denied Lee’s claim for 
termination on account of his race. The Kurzbans filed motion seeking $1,611,910.50 in 
attorney’s fees and costs. The district court criticized their conduct during the trial, and 
relied on its inherent authority to award only $312,324.63 in attorney’s fees and costs. In 
addition, it reported their conduct to the Florida Bar. 
 
This Cause came before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Amended Verified Motion for Attorney’s Fees 
and Costs. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
“Let's kick some ass,” Marvin Kurzban said loudly to his client, Anthony Lee, and his co-counsel, 
Ira Kurzban. I had taken the bench, and Court was in session. Opposing counsel and their client 
representatives were seated across the aisle. The jury was waiting to be called into the 
courtroom. Mr. Kurzban’s comment was suited more to a locker room than a courtroom of the 
United States, and the conduct of Plaintiff’s counsel that followed disrupted the adversary 
system and interfered with the resolution of a civil dispute. 
 
The trial of this case lasted approximately fourteen days. The jury found that American Eagle 
Airlines had subjected Mr. Lee to a racially hostile work environment. As compensation, the jury 
awarded Mr. Lee $300,000. In addition, the jury awarded Mr. Lee $650,000 in punitive 
damages. The jury denied Mr. Lee’s other claim, finding that Mr. Lee had not been terminated 
because of his race. This motion seeking attorney’s fees and costs followed. 
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As the prevailing party in a Title VII action, the Plaintiff now seeks $1,611,910.50 in attorney’s 
fees. This request presents the question of whether unprofessional and disruptive conduct of 
counsel which prolongs the proceedings and creates animosity which interferes with the 
resolution of a cause can be considered in determining an award of attorney’s fees. 
 
In their post-trial motions, counsel for the parties filed opposing affidavits concerning additional 
misconduct that was not directly observed by the Court. Since these affidavits presented vastly 
different versions of events, an evidentiary hearing was held; counsel and other witnesses 
testified. 
 
These issues have been distasteful and time consuming. There is a great temptation to simply 
move on and ignore the issue. It is unpleasant to hear lawyers accusing each other of lies and 
misrepresentations. Unprofessionalism on the part of lawyers is a distraction and takes time 
away from other pending cases; it also embroils the Court in charges and counter charges. 
However, the functioning of our adversary system depends upon being able to rely upon what a 
lawyer says. So, confronted by affidavits of counsel that were directly contradictory, I decided to 
hear testimony and make credibility findings. These findings are based upon direct observations 
by the Court, the transcript of the trial, and the evidentiary hearing. 
 
In addition, we contacted the Florida Bar to determine whether counsel had been the subject of 
complaints regarding unprofessional conduct. The Florida Bar forwarded a record of a previous 
complaint by a state court judge concerning the conduct of Marvin Kurzban. In response to that 
complaint, and immediately before the trial in this cause, the Florida Bar had directed Mr. 
Kurzban to attend an ethics class and pay a fine. 
 
II. Findings of Fact Pertaining to Misconduct by Counsel 
 
Discovery in this case was rancorous from the beginning. As is often the case, counsel for both 
sides contributed to the lack of civility. The tone of depositions was harsh, witnesses were 
treated with discourtesy, and discovery disputes were abundant. The transcripts of the 
depositions in this case are weighted down with bitter exchanges between the lawyers. 
 
Testimony at the evidentiary hearing reflected that this uncivil conduct also continued during 
conversations between counsel. The testimony of a young lawyer formerly with the Defendant's 
counsel’s law firm was particularly poignant. This lawyer testified that during telephone 
conversations with Ira Kurzban, she was hung up on, told that she had only been assigned to 
work on the case because she was African-American, and wrongly accused of 
misrepresentations. She testified that her experience with opposing counsel in this case was a 
factor in her decision to leave her litigation practice. 
 
This testimony was not only powerful and credible, but it also reflects the corrosive impact this 
type of unprofessional behavior can have upon the bar itself. A litigation practice is stressful and 
often exhausting. Unprofessional litigation tactics affect everyone exposed to such behavior and 
the ripple effect of incivility is spread throughout the bar. 
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The trial began. Testimony at the evidentiary hearing reveals that Mr. Kurzban’s “Let’s kick 
some ass” comment was not an aberration. A client representative of the Defendant, a lawyer 
for American Airlines, testified that she and others were subjected to a barrage of comments out 
of the hearing of the Court and jury which she likened to trash talk at a sporting event. Local 
counsel for the Defendant was called a “Second Rate Loser” by Marvin Kurzban. She testified 
that each day as court began, Marvin Kurzban would say, “Let the pounding begin.” In front of 
defense counsel’s client, Mr. Kurzban would ask, “How are you going to feel when I take all of 
your client's money?” When walking out of the courtroom, Marvin Kurzban would exclaim, 
“Yuppies out of the way.” 
 
Other than Mr. Kurzban’s opening comment, I was unaware of this conduct towards opposing 
counsel and their client’s representatives, although counsel for the Defendants alluded to it 
during the trial. However, I observed continuing misconduct during the trial itself. 
 
Early in the trial, an episode occurred when defense counsel brought to the Court’s attention 
that after an instruction to a witness not to discuss his testimony during a break in his testimony 
for lunch, Ira and Marvin Kurzban had approached the witness and had a discussion — with an 
open deposition transcript in hand. Marvin Kurzban responded, “That's a lie.” The Kurzbans 
then explained that they had the transcript open because they were looking at it, but that they 
were not talking with the witness about it. Their explanation was that they were talking about 
where they were going for lunch. I accepted the explanation, but with the observation that it was 
an exercise of poor judgment. (Tr. 324-325). 
 
Shortly afterward, Marvin Kurzban objected to a question, and I overruled his objection. He 
continued to argue his point, then he visibly expressed his dismay with the ruling. I asked 
counsel to approach for a sidebar conference, wherein I advised him that for the third time he 
had made visible displays of disagreement with rulings by nodding his head or looking upward 
at the ceiling. I told him to stop that conduct and to cease making speaking objections. 
 
Subsequently, I warned both counsel again; once before the jury, and again at the close of the 
mornings testimony. Ira Kurzban responded that he was way beyond acrimony with opposing 
counsel. 
 
After this warning, defense counsel followed the Court’s admonition and refused to respond to 
provocations from opposing counsel. Later than day, Marvin Kurzban interrupted an appropriate 
cross-examination and requested a sidebar to accuse counsel of intentionally delaying the 
examination so that he could not reach a witness. 
 
Despite repeated warnings, Plaintiff’s counsel continued to address comments to opposing 
counsel rather than to the Court and interject inappropriate comments before the jury. 
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The belligerence of Plaintiff'’s counsel, particularly Marvin Kurzban, spread like a contagion 
through the courtroom. On September 22, 1999, I returned to the bench after a luncheon break. 
Marvin Kurzban wanted to raise a matter prior to the jury’s return. 
 
Mr. Kurzban stated: 
 
I am concerned about the record, Your Honor. I went over to the ... Mr. Reporter there, 
when we took the first break, and asked him about the ability to get a page typed. And 
instead I ended up having names called at me and a confrontation. I only bring it to the 
Court’s attention because I am concerned about the record being clear. I feel this Court 
Reporter for whatever reason ... I don't know the gentlemen, never met him before — is 
either unstable based on his reaction and not competent to be reporting or has some 
bias. 
 
At the next recess, I asked the Court Reporter what had happened. He indicated that at the 
break, which was a brief break for him inasmuch as we had a calendar call scheduled during 
that luncheon break, Marvin Kurzban asked him for a portion of transcript. The reporter 
responded that he could not produce those pages over the break (because he had to report the 
calendar call). Marvin Kurzban responded, “What are you here for, just to look pretty?” The 
Court Reporter responded with an epithet, at which point Marvin Kurzban remarked, “We’re not 
talking about your family.” Then Mr. Kurzban said, “I guess money talks,” suggesting that since 
the Defendant was ordering daily copy, the reporter was biased in their favor. At that point, the 
Court Security Officer intervened. 
 
I required the Court Reporter to apologize for his behavior. Because of the accusation of bias, I 
arranged for other Court Reporters to cover the remainder of the trial. 
 
I learned that accusations of bias followed any disagreement with positions espoused by 
Plaintiff’s counsel: “There's no question that he's entitled to it, so it's no — if I understand what 
Your Honor’s saying, you don’t want it to go in front of the jury for whatever reason.” “Your 
Honor, I know you’re angry at me, but I hope you’re not taking it out on my client.” “In fact, I 
think that the Court has exhibited extreme bias in this case and your rulings on objections.” 
“Well, Your Honor, I respectfully disagree with you, that's for a court of appeals ultimately to 
decide, but to put a motive on it I think it exhibits a substantial amount of bias on behalf of Your 
Honor.” “And I concur with what my brother has said. There's been clear animus by this Court to 
this side.” “I’ve practiced 26 years and I’ve tried over 50 cases, and I’ve won multimillion dollar 
verdicts on more than a dozen cases. I don’t need for this Court to allow a witness to have his 
wife introduced. I can’t think of any reason or purpose, other than prejudice, that this Court 
would allow such an act to occur.” 
 
Disturbing behavior by both Marvin Kurzban and Ira Kurzban occurred repeatedly during the 
trial. When confronted about their conduct, they would deny that which I had just observed and 
then lash out in a personal attack. For instance, after I overruled an objection made by Ira 
Kurzban, Marvin Kurzban laughed. Other examples of their conduct following rulings include 
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Marvin Kurzban tossing a pen; Ira Kurzban exclaiming, “This is outrageous”; the rolling of eyes; 
exasperated looks at the ceiling; and flailing of arms. I warned counsel about this behavior. 
 
After the episode of Marvin Kurzban laughing at my ruling, I asked counsel to approach the 
bench. Marvin Kurzban responded: “I didn’t laugh. What I started doing was writing a note, 
saying to my brother ... I didn't realize I was saying it out loud — we’re not trying his case. That's 
what the objection was, because he's telling about his problems.” Ira Kurzban then interjected: 
“I’d like to add, Your Honor, there’s a continuing pattern of conduct we believe shows enormous 
bias and has turned this trial into a circus-like atmosphere.” 
 
Ira Kurzban then listed a litany of complaints about rulings which he stated should result in a 
mistrial. (When offered a mistrial, the Plaintiff declined.) Defense counsel and the Court Security 
officer also heard a laugh. 
 
Shortly thereafter, during a discussion between the Court, Marvin Kurzban, and defense 
counsel about the admissibility of an exhibit a witness had allegedly drawn during a videotaped 
deposition but which was not on the Plaintiff’s exhibit list, Ira Kurzban walked to the video 
machine and begin playing the videotape of the deposition in front of the jury. I directed that the 
machine be turned off and we took a fifteen minute break. 
 
After the break, defense counsel raised the issue and requested some sanction. I asked Ira 
Kurzban for an explanation. He responded: 
 
Mr. Kurzban: Yes, Your Honor. First, Mr. Connor asked me not to tamper with the tape 
now, because you were going to come out and rule. I assume he didn't have any ex 
parte communication with you. I’m a little perturbed about the fact that somehow he 
knew you were coming out to make a ruling, which I was totally unaware. 
The Court: I think he knew that I was coming back after a 15 minute break. There has 
been absolutely no contact between me and Mr. Connor or any other lawyer in this case 
between the time I left the bench 15 minutes ago and when I returned now. Now, is there 
some reason why you would make that accusation? 
Ira Kurzban: Yes, Your Honor. 
The Court: All right. What was it? 
Ira Kurzban: Mr. Connor said the Judge is going to come out here, he’s going to impose 
some sanction. That's what Mr. Connor said, Your Honor, you are not here. 
I'm simply saying that's what Mr. Connor did. I’m not accusing you of anything. We can 
have the marshal testify that I should not touch the tape because you were going to 
impose sanctions. 
The Deputy: No, no. 
The Court: The marshal is nodding no. Mr. Marshal? 
The Deputy: No mention of sanctions was ever made. 
 
Mr. Kurzban then stated that he had put the tape into the machine so that it would be ready if 
needed and that the tape began playing accidentally. I accepted his explanation but stated: 
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If I can’t rely on lawyers being able to respect each other and be respected and accept 
what other people say in the courtroom, this system can’t work. It’s as important to me 
as whether or not you have a law degree. I’m beginning to really have a problem with 
what you are telling me is happening, based on what I’m seeing and what others in the 
courtroom are seeing. So you all really need to think about that. 
 
During a cross-examination concerning how much time the witness spent on various shifts, 
Marvin Kurzban held a file towards the witness and asked: 
 
Marvin Kurzban: I have your personnel file (indicating). How many times did you have to 
work between 1992 and 1994, sir? Do you think it was more than a handful of times? 
 
After an objection, and out of the presence of the jury, I asked Mr. Kurzban for the witness’s 
personnel file. He responded: 
 
Marvin Kuzban: Actually, we do have Mr. Blades’s personnel file, when it was produced 
among all the other personnel files in Miami of the people. I don’t know if that box is here 
or I left it in the office. I think the personnel files that we were given by counsel is in the 
office. 
The Court: So it wasn’t in the folder that you picked up and carried to the stand? 
Marvin Kurzban: No it wasn’t, Your Honor. 
The Court: You said, :Mr. Blades, we have your personnel file here!” You believe it is 
permissible to pick up a file from your desk, carry it to the witness stand and tell the 
witness “Mr. Blades, we have your personnel file,” and then begin questioning him? You 
believe that’s appropriate court examination? 
Marvin Kurzban: I do, on hostile witnesses; on cross-examination, I believe that I’m 
entitled to have that witness believe I’m going to question him on something whether or 
not I have that in my hand or not. Yes, I do. 
The Court: I believe, frankly, that it is inappropriate to make a deliberate 
misrepresentation to a witness or to ask, implying in your questioning something that is 
not true. 
Marvin Kurzban: Neither was I implying something that wasn’t true, nor was I making a 
misrepresentation. The question was about how many times he worked, Your Honor. 
The question wasn’t: In your personnel file it says something. I didn't make any such 
misrepresentation. 
 
Mr. Kurzban insisted that he had the personnel file back at his office. He was asked to produce 
it and he responded that he would the following day. The file was never produced. 
 
At the end of the trial, defense counsel Connor approached Ira Kurzban and offered his hand in 
congratulations. Mr. Kurzban refused to shake his hand. The trial ended much like it had begun. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 614	
At the evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff's counsel were unrepentent, attacking opposing counsel and 
accepting no responsibility for their own actions. They argued that the perceived misconduct 
was only a matter of style and the exercise of first amendment rights. In keeping with that 
“style,” Marvin Kurzban ended the hearing with the proclamation that he had called his opponent 
a loser, but not a second-rate loser because, “I don't rate losers.” Mr. Kurzban's testimony 
reflects that he has no clue about what it means to be a lawyer. 
 
III. Analysis 
 
Courts presiding over civil rights actions may, in their discretion, award the prevailing party a 
“reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees)” as part of its costs. Although the presiding 
court has discretion, a prevailing plaintiff is to be awarded attorney’s fees “in all but special 
circumstances.” This presumption in favor of awarding attorney’s fees is a reflection of 
Congress’ clear intent to “cast the Title VII plaintiff in the role of ‘a private attorney general,’ 
vindicating a policy of the highest priority.” By awarding prevailing plaintiffs their attorney’s fees, 
the section “makes it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious suit.” 
 
Courts determining attorney’s fee awards begin by determining the “lodestar”: the product of the 
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation and a reasonable hourly rate for the 
attorney’s services. This lodestar may then be adjusted for the results obtained. 
 
1. The reasonable hourly rate 
 
“A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar 
services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” The party 
seeking attorney’s fees, in this case Mr. Lee, bears the burden of producing “satisfactory 
evidence that the requested rate is in line with prevailing market rates.” To be satisfactory, 
evidence must consist of “more than the affidavit of the attorney performing the work.” 
 
Prior to adoption of the lodestar formula, the so-called “Johnson factors” governed fee awards. 
Although the lodestar formula has since displaced the “Johnson factors,” the Eleventh Circuit 
has permitted district courts to consider the factors in establishing a reasonable hourly rate. 
Among those factors is the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly. As explained more fully in the findings of 
misconduct, the conduct of Ira Kurzban and Marvin Kurzban both during and prior to trial was 
very troubling. In my estimation, the manner in which a lawyer interacts with opposing counsel 
and conducts himself before the Court is as indicative of the lawyer’s ability and skill as is 
mastery of the rules of evidence. Upon review of the trial transcripts and the evidence presented 
during the evidentiary hearing on attorney conduct and based on observations at trial, I find that 
the conduct of Ira Kurzban and Marvin Kurzban in the litigation of this case fell far below 
acceptable standards, especially in light of the $300 hourly rate the attorneys claim. 
Accordingly, I find “special circumstances” justifying a departure from counsels’ requested rates: 
Ira Kurzban shall be awarded $150 per hour for his pretrial work and $0 for his trial work; Marvin 
Kurzban’s rate for this action is $0. 
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For further support of the above rate reductions, we rely upon our “inherent power” to sanction 
attorney misconduct. “It is well-established that ‘certain implied powers must necessarily result 
to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution,’ powers ‘which cannot be dispensed 
with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.’ For this reason, 
‘Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power 
to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful 
mandates.’ These powers are ‘governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily 
vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious 
disposition of cases.’” 
 
Among these powers is the contempt sanction, “which a judge must have and exercise in 
protecting the due and orderly administration of justice and in maintaining the authority and 
dignity of the court.” “The inherent power of a court to manage its affairs necessarily includes 
the authority to impose reasonable and appropriate sanctions upon errant lawyers practicing 
before it.” 
 
A finding that counsels’ conduct “constituted or was tantamount to bad faith” must precede any 
sanction levied pursuant to a court’s inherent powers. The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit requires that bad faith be shown by (1) “clear evidence” or (2) “harassment or delay or 
other improper purposes.” Where imposed for the purpose of deterring misconduct rather than 
remedying some prejudice, as here, the District of Columbia Circuit has held that sanctions 
must be supported by “clear and convincing evidence” of “flagrant or egregious misconduct.” 
Before imposing a severe sanction based on principles of deterrence, a district court must 
consider whether a lesser sanction is more proportionate to the misconduct. 
 
In this case, we are imposing a lesser sanction. We did not dismiss this case, but rather 
permitted it to go the jury. Moreover, although counsel were warned during the trial that further 
disruptive conduct would be a basis for criminal contempt, that sanction was not employed. We 
have also elected not to deny Plaintiff’s fee request altogether, though we are reducing it 
significantly. Additionally, our sanction is supported by “clear and convincing” evidence of 
“flagrant or egregious” misconduct demonstrating counsels’ “bad faith.” In assessing attorney 
misconduct, the Court had the benefit of an exhaustive evidentiary hearing concerning attorney 
misconduct and trial transcripts replete with examples of unprofessional behavior. Most 
significantly, much of the misconduct in this matter occurred before the Court. Plaintiff’s 
counsels’ continued misbehavior in the face of repeated verbal reprimands and warnings that 
the Court intended to revisit counsels' misconduct at a later date demonstrated counsels’ “bad 
faith.” 
 
There is precedent for denying a party attorney’s fees to which it was otherwise statutorily 
entitled as a sanction for attorney misconduct. In Litton Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees to a 
prevailing plaintiff in an antitrust suit. The plaintiff was entitled to its costs and fees under, 
among other provisions, the Clayton Act. Though the Litton court based its decision on its power 
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to sanction disobedience of court orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b), it noted 
that “given the court’s express findings of bad faith, it could also have imposed sanctions on the 
plaintiff as an exercise of its inherent powers.” 
 
In addition, the Court reduces the rates sought by Plaintiff for associate work. Magistrate Judge 
Barry L. Garber recently found, by order dated May 5, 1999, that $125 was a reasonable hourly 
rate for associates. Magistrate Judge Stephen T. Brown, in a recommendation dated August 17, 
1999, noted that the parties agreed to an hourly rate of $125 for associates. Accordingly, the 
Court finds that $125 is the prevailing hourly rate in the Southern District for associate work. 
Thus, the work of Brian Torres, Raquel Libman, Jed Kurzban, and Florence Zolin shall be billed 
at a rate of $125 per hour. Peter Hoffer, who has eight years of civil rights litigation experience, 
shall be billed at $175. 
 
2. The number of hours reasonably expended 
 
Defendant argues that not all of the 3,269.54 hours claimed by Plaintiff were "reasonably 
expended." Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiff claims hours from another case, 
which are not compensable in this matter, and that Plaintiff did not exercise proper billing 
judgment. 
 
i. Hours spent on another case 
 
Defendant points out that although Plaintiff initiated the action before this Court on March 21, 
1997, Plaintiff has submitted time records with dates as early as August 1994. Defendant 
surmises that many of these entries are for work done on other cases and thus are not 
compensable. Plaintiff replies that the Kurzban firm had begun representing Mr. Lee in 1994, 
before the firm’s formal retention by Mr. Lee and commencement of this action, and that the 
work underlying these entries was the basis for Plaintiff’s hostile environment claim. Initially, Ira 
Kurzban represents that he advised Mr. Lee and other black mechanics at American Eagle who 
complained of racism at American Eagle, then Flagship Airlines. Thereafter, Mr. Kurzban 
assisted Plaintiff in his negotiations with American Eagle and in his claims before the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission. 
 
Kurzban, Kurzban et al. may collect fees for legal services it provided Mr. Lee prior to 
commencement of this action or its formal retention by Mr. Lee. Defendant does not seem to 
contest this, but rather asks the Court to strike those hours it claims were clearly not spent on 
matters related to this case. 
 
We begin by striking those entries, dated prior to the commencement of this action, that appear 
to relate to motions practice and other matters in a pending lawsuit or which do not seem 
sufficiently related to this action. These entries add up to 137.15 hours. In addition, the Court 
reduces by 50% the remaining hours claimed between August 10, 1994 and January 2, 1997. 
We find Plaintiff’s documentation to be inadequate for purposes of demonstrating that these 
hours were reasonably expended in the litigation of this matter. While the information gathered 
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at this stage was likely helpful in the eventual litigation of Mr. Lee’s claims, the information was 
being gathered for other purposes. Accordingly, the Court is not convinced that all the time 
claimed, or even most of it, was reasonably expended in the pursuit of Mr. Lee’s claims. 
 
ii Billing judgment 
 
Fee applicants must exercise “billing judgment.” That means that they must exclude from their 
fee applications “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours,” which are hours “that 
would be reasonable to bill to a client and therefore to one’s adversary irrespective of the skill, 
reputation or experience of counsel.” Defendant maintains that further reductions are warranted 
based on Plaintiff's counsels’ time and record keeping practices. Vague entries, according to 
Defendant, preclude the Court from determining that hours were reasonably expended, and 
cannot be cured by Plaintiff’s counsel’s post hoc, hand-written notes. Defendant also contests 
counsels’ repetitious charges, claims for hours spent by attorneys “getting up to speed,” and 
excessive time spent on certain activities. 
 
While wary of counsels’ after-the-fact, clarifying notes, the Court does not ignore the added 
detail and takes counsel at their word that the additions are supported by reference to red 
books, pertinent files, and their own memories. The Court is more concerned about the 
excessive number of hours billed in this case in light of its nature. This case involved racial 
harassment endured by a single plaintiff at a single site of employment. Although this matter 
was hotly contested, due in large part to overzealousness on both sides, the $1,611,910.50 in 
fees sought by Plaintiff's counsel based on 3,269.54 hours is clearly excessive. This view is 
supported by a review of recent awards in employment discrimination cases in the Southern 
District, which the Court may consider under Johnson. This case was not so much more lengthy 
or complex than these cases to justify such a grossly disproportionate award. Indeed, Judge 
Hurley, following a eight-day trial, awarded $191,524.75 in attorneys’ fees. The award followed 
a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff on her sexually hostile work environment and retaliation 
claims. 
 
To account for the excessive number of hours claimed in this case, we reduce Plaintiff’s 
counsels’ hours by 40% across-the-board. In addition, the Court reduces by one-third Ira 
Kurzban’s non-contemporaneous October 8, 1998 entry, allotting 30 hours to the reading of “all 
new 11th Circuit cases on employment discrimination related to case” over the past six months. 
 
3. The lodestar figure 
 
i. Reasonable hours 
 
For the period August 10, 1994 to January 2, 1997, after deleting hours unrelated to this 
litigation, the Court recognizes 106.4 hours. We then reduce that figure by 50%, as explained 
above, for Plaintiff's failure to establish that those hours were spent on matters sufficiently 
related to this litigation, leaving 53.2 hours. All but one of these hours was billed to Brian Torres 
or Raquel Libman; the other hour was billed to Ira Kurzban. For the period January 2, 1997 to 
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September 14, 1999, the date the trial began, we recognize the following hours: 1,879.85 hours 
for Ira Kurzban; 682.24 hours for Raquel Libman; 669.2 hours for Peter Hoffer; 28.6 hours for 
Jed Kurzban; and 12 hours for Florence Zolin. Finally, for the trial period, we credit 81.7 hours to 
Jed Kurzban. 
 
Next the Court cuts counsels’ hours by 40% across-the-board for the period January 2, 1997 
through trial, having found, upon review of counsels’ billing records and other employment 
discrimination cases in the District, counsels’ claimed hours to be excessive: 
 
● Ira Kurzban:      1,879.85 × .6 = 1,127.91 hours 
● Raquel Libman:    682.24 × .6 = 409.34 hours 
● Peter Hoffer:     669.2 × .6 = 401.52 hours 
● Jed Kurzban:      (28.6 + 81.7) × .6 = 66.18 hours 
● Florence Zolin:   12 × .6 = 7.2 hours 
 
ii. Multiplied by the reasonable hourly rates 
 
Associates:              534.92[13] × $125 = $66,865 
Peter Hoffer:            401.52 × $175 = $70,266 
Ira Kurzban:             1,128.91[14] × $150 = $169,336.50 
Final lodestar:          $306,467.50 
 
4. The results obtained 
 
As noted above, the lodestar may then be adjusted for the results obtained. This factor is 
particularly important where, as here, Plaintiff is deemed “prevailing” even though he succeeded 
on only one of his claims for relief. 
 
The Court finds that as in many civil rights cases, Plaintiff’s claims involve a common core of 
facts and related legal theories. Accordingly, the Court does not treat Plaintiff’s suit as a series 
of discrete claims, readily separated for purposes of apportioning hours between prevailing and 
non-prevailing claims. Rather, the Court focuses on the overall results achieved by Plaintiff in 
relation to the hours reasonably expended by Plaintiff’s counsel on the litigation. Having done 
this, the Court finds that Plaintiff achieved only limited success, rendering the product of the 
hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole and the reasonable hourly rates an 
excessive fee recovery. While Plaintiff’s recovery on his hostile environment claim was 
significant, he was unable to convince the jury that he had been discharged based on his race. 
Moreover, the Court dismissed on summary judgment Plaintiff’s claims for intentional and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, as well as his state civil rights claims. At trial, the Court 
granted Defendant’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law on Plaintiff’s claims of negligent 
training, retention, and supervision. Even though Plaintiff’s claims were “interrelated, 
nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith,” we may reduce the lodestar to account for his limited 
success. 
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For guidance in reducing the lodestar, we turn to Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, a case involving 
similar facts: plaintiff prevailed on her sexual harassment claim, but failed on her discriminatory 
discharge claim. Judge Easterbrook, sitting by designation, reduced the plaintiff’s fees to 
account for her limited success, but did so only by 10% across-the-board. He noted that the 
same witnesses dealt with both aspects of the case and that since the claimed harassment was 
extensive, it would have been necessary to examine the plaintiff’s whole period of employment 
even without the discharge claim. Noting that at least some time was spent solely on the 
discharge claim, though he could not say precisely how much, Judge Easterbrook concluded 
that the plaintiff’s counsel would have spent about 90% of the time it did had there been no 
discharge claim. The same reasoning applies here. However, the Court awards Plaintiff 80% of 
the lodestar, estimating that 20% of Plaintiff's counsels’ time was devoted exclusively to the 
discharge claim. Specifically, the Court finds that significant time was spent by Plaintiff 
examining Defendant’s alleged early release program, which was only tangentially related to the 
hostile environment claim. 
 
Final lodestar figure adjusted for results obtained: $306,467.50 × .8 = $245,174 
 
IV. Costs 
 
The Court recognizes that the traditional limits on what costs may be taxed,do not apply to 
requests submitted under § 1988 and that the Eleventh Circuit traditionally takes a liberal 
approach when reimbursing attorney expenses. However, Plaintiff still bears the burden of 
submitting a request for expenses that would enable the Court to determine what expenses 
were incurred and whether Plaintiff is entitled to them. Plaintiff's entries for photocopy, 
telephone, and fax charges are wholly devoid of explanation. The Court has no way of knowing 
whether the rates paid for the photocopies were reasonable or even whether these expenses 
were related to this action. Therefore, the Court will not tax these costs or others that lack 
description. Moreover, the Court finds that the costs incurred prior to commencement of the 
action are not taxable. 
 
Having deleted expenses associated with the above-described entries, we tax $67,150.63 as 
costs. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
As I considered this issue, I reflected upon a letter recently received from a trial lawyer following 
a discussion on civility and professionalism with the Miami Chapter of the American Board of 
Trial Advocates. This lawyer stated: 
 
It seems to me that the courts are basically facing this issue as one of education. Hence 
we have seminars, guidelines and articles from both that state and federal bench 
explaining what lawyers should do to be civil and professional to each other. However, I 
do not think that problem is that lawyers do not know how to act in a civil manner. 
Rather, I think some lawyers will simply do that with which they can get away. 
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Special masters, grievance committees and educational seminars are not as effective as 
a sanction for uncivil behavior. 
 
I know our federal court is quite busy and that the time it takes to consider uncivil 
behavior may have to be taken from some other pending case. However, I would submit 
that eliminating uncivil behavior not only helps that case, but every other case in which 
that lawyer is involved. Moreover, as the word spreads as to the price to be paid for 
unprofessionalism, other lawyers and other cases will be implicated. 
 
I believe that this reduction in attorney fees is an appropriate response to the conduct by 
Plaintiff’s counsel in this case, but I am not convinced it will deter future misconduct. I frankly 
considered denying fees altogether but while I have reviewed many of the depositions, I did not 
observe everything that happened during the pretrial phase of the case. The reduction in 
attorneys’ fees based upon misconduct of counsel is therefore approximately $358,423.20. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff's Amended 
Verified Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs is GRANTED. Based on the foregoing we award 
Plaintiff $312,324.63 in fees and costs. 
 
Furthermore, because of the misconduct of counsel which occurred in this case, a copy of this 
order shall be sent to the Florida Bar and the Peer Review Committee for the Southern District 
of Florida for any action deemed appropriate. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. This article from the New York Post provides some additional information about the case 
and the judge. Marvin Kurzban and Ira J. Kurzban were partners in a Florida law firm. 
Marvin Kurzban was disciplined by the Florida Bar for his conduct in this action. In 2019, 
another disciplinary complaint was filed against him, for violating an evidentiary ruling 
and insulting the judge and opposing counsel. He petitioned for disciplinary revocation 
without leave for readmission, and is currently disbarred in Florida. Ira Kurzban is still 
practicing, teaches immigration law at the University of Miami School of Law as an 
adjunct professor, and is the author of Kurzban’s Immigration Law Sourcebook. 
2. Was the court justified in criticizing the conduct of Marvin and Ira Kurzban? Does it 
matter that they won? Does it matter that the jury imposed substantial punitive damages 
on the defendant? 
3. Was the court justified in reducing the attorney’s fees and costs award? If so, did it go 
too far or not far enough? Could the court have denied attorney’s fees and costs 
altogether? 
 
Limitations on Inherent Authority 
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Ophelia F. Camiña 
 
Positive Software Solutions v. New Century Mortg., 619 F. 3d 458 (5th Cir. 2010) 
 
Summary: Positive Software filed an infringement action against New Century, which 
was represented by Camiña. The district court sent the action to arbitration, then 
vacated the award, because the arbitrator failed to disclose a previous relationship with 
Camiña. The circuit court reversed and remanded, at which point New Century declared 
bankruptcy, and the parties settled. As part of the settlement, New Century assigned its 
attorney-client privilege and work product rights to Positive Software, which moved for 
sanctions against Camiña, based on her actions in the arbitration. The district court 
exercised its inherent authority and imposed a $10,000 sanction for acting in bad faith, 
but the circuit court reversed, holding that actions in arbitration are outside the inherent 
authority of the court. 
 
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Ophelia Camiña appeals the district court’s imposition of sanctions for her conduct during 
arbitration. Because that court lacked inherent authority to impose those sanctions, we reverse 
and remand. 
 
I. 
 
In 2003, Positive Software Solutions, Inc., sued New Century Mortgage Corporation for 
allegedly infringing telemarketing software licensed to New Century. Ophelia Camiña, a partner 
at Susman Godfrey LLP, appeared as attorney for New Century. Over Positive Software’s 
objection, the district court ordered the case to arbitration in accordance with the parties’ 
contract. 
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During arbitration, Camiña advised New Century on various discovery matters. In September 
2004, the district court vacated the award because the arbitrator had failed to disclose his 
previous professional relationship with Camiña. This court reversed the vacatur and remanded. 
 
After remand, New Century declared bankruptcy. In the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, 
Positive Software settled its claims against New Century, and the case was administratively 
closed. Under the settlement, New Century waived and assigned to Positive Software its 
attorney-client and work-product rights. The district court granted Positive Software’s demand 
that Susman Godfrey LLP turn over its files for use by Positive Software in pursuing sanctions. 
 
In March 2008, Positive Software moved for sanctions against Camiña, Barry Barnett, and 
Susman Godfrey LLP under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the 
court’s inherent authority. In February 2009, using its purported inherent authority, the court 
sanctioned Camiña $10,000, representing a portion of Positive Software's attorneys’ fees. 
Camiña appeals the sanction. 
 
III. 
 
Camiña claims that the district court lacked inherent authority to impose sanctions for her 
conduct during arbitration. In the alternative, she argues that the court employed the wrong 
standard of proof in finding that she acted in bad faith, and that the sanctions were not 
supported by the evidence. Because the court lacked inherent authority to sanction Camiña for 
her actions during arbitration, we need not address her alternative claims. 
 
A. 
 
A district court has the inherent authority to impose sanctions “in order to control the litigation 
before it.” The court may also use that power to sanction conduct, if it is “in direct defiance of the 
sanctioning court,” or constitutes “disobedience to the orders of the Judiciary,” Inherent power, 
however, “may be exercised only if essential to preserve the authority of the court.” 
 
In Maxxam, we confirmed the limited reach of the court’s inherent authority. There the FDIC 
sued Charles Hurwitz, alleging that he was responsible for the failure of a savings and loan 
association. The FDIC also encouraged the Office of Thrift Supervision to pursue similar claims 
in an administrative proceeding. The FDIC moved that the district court stay its case pending 
completion of the OTS proceeding. When the district court denied that motion, the FDIC 
continued to support the administrative action. Invoking its inherent powers, the court 
sanctioned the FDIC for Hurwitz’s expenses in defending the OTS action. We reversed part of 
those sanctions on the ground that the inherent power does not extend to collateral proceedings 
that “do not threaten the court’s own judicial authority or proceedings.” Inherent authority “is not 
a broad reservoir of power, ready at an imperial hand, but a limited source; an implied power 
squeezed from the need to make the court function.” 
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Here the district court distinguished Maxxam, positing that arbitration is not a collateral 
proceeding but instead an “annex” to litigation. It reasoned that because the court ordered the 
parties to arbitrate, it retained the authority to impose sanctions for conduct committed in 
arbitration. That approach is puzzling. To begin with, arbitration is not an annex to litigation, but 
an alternative method for dispute resolution. Treating arbitration as if it were an appendage to 
adjudication is a mistake that would undermine the very purpose of arbitration — “the provision 
of a relatively quick, efficient and informal means of private dispute settlement.” Parties agree to 
arbitration to avoid litigation; they voluntarily surrender judicial remedies in favor of an 
extrajudicial process. 
 
Furthermore, the notion that the court’s inherent authority turns on whether the arbitration was 
“court-ordered” is untenable. Positive Software claims that the district court retained significant 
supervisory authority by virtue of ordering the parties to arbitrate. When asked, in oral argument, 
whether the court would have had inherent authority to sanction Camiña if the parties had 
chosen to enter arbitration at the outset, Positive Software’s counsel candidly stated, “of course 
not — that’s Maxxam.” Positive Software’s distinction, then, would allow trial courts to oversee 
arbitrations in which one party had to be compelled to arbitrate but not those in which both 
parties complied with their arbitration agreement. Such a significant and perverse asymmetry 
cannot be justified, and Positive Software’s efforts to distinguish this case from Maxxam are 
unavailing. 
 
In an attempt to rescue the sanctions order, Positive Software additionally claims that the 
sanctions are based on Camiña’s direct defiance of the preliminary injunction and protective 
order. That assertion, however, is belied by the court’s own explicit explanation that the 
sanctioned conduct “took place in connection with the arbitration, not in connection with 
discovery under the Court's supervision.” In other words, the court imposed sanctions not on 
account of any direct violation of a court order, but only because it found that Camiña had 
exhibited four particular instances of bad faith during arbitration. 
 
Positive Software’s argument, therefore, fails according to the court’s own findings. Because 
Camiña’s conduct was neither before the district court nor in direct defiance of its orders, the 
conduct is beyond the reach of the court’s inherent authority to sanction. 
 
B. 
 
Not only are the sanctions at odds with our caselaw on inherent authority, but they also are in 
serious tension with the Federal Arbitration Act. Under the FAA, the district court has the 
authority to determine (1) whether arbitration should be compelled, and (2) whether an 
arbitration award should be confirmed, vacated, or modified. Beyond those narrowly defined 
procedural powers, the court has no authority to interfere with an arbitration proceeding. 
Because both parties agree that their contract gave the arbitrator authority to sanction Camiña 
for bad-faith conduct, the FAA counsels against the district court’s assigning itself that task. 
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Positive Software cites LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., to resolve the apparent tension 
between the sanction order and the FAA. In LaPrade, the district court stayed an action brought 
by Linda LaPrade against her former employer because the dispute was covered by a valid 
arbitration agreement. While the arbitration was pending, LaPrade’s attorney went into state 
court and obtained an ex parte order staying the arbitration without informing that court of the 
district court’s previous order. On the employer’s motion, the district court lifted the state court’s 
stay and imposed sanctions against LaPrade’s attorneys under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for their 
“vexatious and dilatory tactics.” On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the sanctions, 
concluding that the FAA did not divest the district court of jurisdiction to enter the sanctions 
order. 
 
LaPrade, however, does not support the district court's exercise of inherent power against 
Camiña. First, LaPrade held only that the FAA does not affect the district court’s jurisdiction over 
a case stayed pending arbitration. But jurisdiction alone does not create the inherent power to 
sanction arbitration conduct. That power must be grounded in some threat to the court’s 
authority or its ability to function and must not be contrary to statute. Unlike the court in 
LaPrade, which involved sanctions under a specific statutory provision, the district court here 
relied only on its inherent authority, which, as noted, was not up to the task. 
 
Furthermore, it is misleading to suggest that LaPrade’s attorneys were sanctioned for conduct in 
arbitration. Instead, the court imposed sanctions for the direct violation of its order. In staying 
the federal suit, the court mandated that LaPrade seek redress of her employment-related 
grievances only through arbitration. By obtaining a stay of arbitration in state court, her 
attorneys disregarded that order, thereby posing a threat to the federal district court’s authority. 
That conduct might have been analogous to what happened here if Camiña’s sanctions had 
rested on her violation of the preliminary injunction or the protective order. But as already 
discussed, the district court found no such violation. 
 
C. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the sanctions order threatens unduly to inflate the 
judiciary’s role in arbitration. The FAA provides for minimal judicial involvement in resolving an 
arbitrable dispute; the court is limited to only a few narrowly defined, largely procedural tasks. 
But by using its power to sanction, a court could seize control over substantive aspects of 
arbitration. The court would, in effect, become a roving commission to supervise a private 
method of dispute resolution and exert authority that is reserved, by statute, caselaw, and long-
standing practice, to the arbitrator. That supervision is inconsistent with the scope of inherent 
authority and with federal arbitration policy, which aims to prevent courts from delaying the 
resolution of disputes through alternative means. 
 
In response, Positive Software claims that expansion of district court authority is necessary 
here, because Positive Software did not discover some of Camiña’s alleged misdeeds until after 
the case had been settled and administratively closed. Positive Software argues that without the 
district court’s assertion of inherent authority, there would have been no means to redress 
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Camiña's supposed wrongdoing. That argument, however, ignores at least two other 
procedures that were available to Positive Software. 
 
First, it could have asked the American Arbitration Association to re-open the proceedings so it 
could request sanctions from the arbitrator. Second, it could have relied on the grievance 
process. In fact, it did: Its counsel filed a grievance against Camiña, which was dismissed as 
lacking just cause. Contrary to Positive Software’s contentions, then, there was no particular 
need for the district court to expand its inherent authority to prevent misdeeds from falling 
through the cracks. 
 
IV. 
 
In sum, the district court lacked inherent authority to sanction Camiña for her conduct during 
arbitration. That conduct was neither before the district court nor in direct defiance of its orders. 
If inherent authority were expanded to cover Camiña’s conduct, there would be nothing to 
prevent courts from inserting themselves into the thicket of arbitrable issues — precisely where 
they do not belong. Such an expansion would also threaten the integrity of federal arbitration 
law in the name of filling a gap that does not exist. We therefore REVERSE the sanctions95 and 
REMAND for any further proceedings that may be needed. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did the circuit court hold that Camiña’s conduct was outside the scope of the district 
court’s inherent authority? Why didn’t it matter that the district court had sent the action 
to arbitration? 
2. The district court had the authority to review at least some aspects of the arbitration. 
Why didn’t that place Camiña’s conduct during the arbitration within the scope of its 
inherent authority? 
3. Notably, New Century was a subsidiary of New Century Financial Corporation, a real 
estate investment trust, and one of the largest issuers of subprime mortgages. When 
New Century filed for bankruptcy in 2007, it signaled the beginning of the subprime 
mortgage crisis. 
 
Candor to the Court 
 
																																																								
95 We do not condone Camiña’s complained-of actions as they are alleged to have occurred. The clerk is 
directed to send a copy of this opinion to the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Texas. We 
are mindful that the State Bar declined to act on this matter in response to Positive Software’s request, 
and we express no view on whether the State Bar should consider this matter further or, if it does, on 
what action it should take. We opine only that the federal courts are without power to issue sanctions 
under these particular facts. 
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The Orlando Sentinel (Orlando, Florida), Tues., Dec. 3, 1985, at 45 
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The Orlando Sentinel (Orlando, Florida), Fri., Jan. 10, 1986, at 149 
 
Jorgenson v. Volusia County, 846 F. 2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1988) 
 
Summary: Porky’s was a topless bar outside of DeLand, Florida. When Volusia County 
passed an ordinance prohibiting topless bars, Porky’s challenged the constitutionality of 
the ordinance, represented by Latinsky and Fendt. The standard of review of the 
ordinance depended on whether Florida had delegated its powers under the 21st 
Amendment to counties and municipalities. In City of Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, the 
Florida Supreme Court held that it had, but Latinsky and Fendt argued that it hadn’t, and 
did not cite Del Percio. The district court sanctioned them under Rule 11 for intentionally 
failing to cite controlling adverse precedent and the circuit court affirmed. 
 
PER CURIAM: 
 
The appellants, attorneys Eric Latinsky and Fred Fendt, were sanctioned by the district court 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 for failing to cite adverse, controlling precedent in a memorandum 
filed in support of an application for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. In 
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the appellants’ initial appeal to this court, the case was remanded to the district court because 
the court had failed to notify the attorneys in advance that it was considering sanctions, and did 
not give them an opportunity to respond. On remand, the district court reaffirmed the imposition 
of sanctions, and the attorneys appeal. We affirm. 
 
Appellants filed an application in the district court for a temporary restraining order and a 
preliminary injunction on behalf of their clients, who own and operate a lounge known as 
“Porky’s.” In support of the application, appellants filed a memorandum of law which challenged 
the validity of a Volusia County ordinance prohibiting nude or semi-nude entertainment in 
commercial establishments at which alcoholic beverages are offered for sale or consumption. 
The memorandum failed to discuss or cite two clearly relevant cases: City of Daytona Beach v. 
Del Percio and New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca. We find that this failure supports 
the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions in the circumstances of this case. 
 
The field of law concerning the regulation of the sale and consumption of alcohol in connection 
with nude entertainment is a narrow and somewhat specialized field. Prior to the opinion of the 
Supreme Court of Florida in Del Percio, the critical question of whether the state of Florida had 
delegated its powers under the Twenty-First Amendment to counties and municipalities had 
gone unanswered. In some circles, that decision was long-awaited. If the state had delegated 
the authority, local ordinances regulating the sale or consumption of alcohol would be entitled to 
a presumption in favor of their validity which is conferred by the Twenty-First Amendment. If the 
state had not delegated the authority, the ordinances would be subject to the stricter review 
applicable to exercises of the general police power. 
 
The question regarding Florida’s delegation of its powers under the Twenty-First Amendment 
was answered by the Supreme court of Florida in Del Percio, a case in which one of the 
appellants, Latinsky, participated. The court held that the powers had been delegated. Less 
than one year later, on or about January 13, 1986, Latinsky and an associate brought the 
instant suit seeking a declaration that a similar ordinance was unconstitutional and requesting a 
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. In their presentation to the court, the 
appellants cited a number of cases describing the limits on the exercise of the general police 
power. However, they did not advise the court in any way that Del Percio had been decided, 
despite the fact that Del Percio required that the validity of the ordinance be judged in light of 
powers retained under the Twenty-First Amendment rather than the general police power. 
 
The appellants purported to describe the law to the district court in the hope that the description 
would guide and inform the court’s decision. With apparently studied care, however, they 
withheld the fact that the long-awaited decision by the Supreme Court of Florida had been 
handed down. This will not do. The appellants are not redeemed by the fact that opposing 
counsel subsequently cited the controlling precedent. The appellants had a duty to refrain from 
affirmatively misleading the court as to the state of the law. They were not relieved of this duty 
by the possibility that opposing counsel might find and cite the controlling precedent, particularly 
where, as here, a temporary restraining order might have been issued ex parte. 
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In this court, appellants argue that the cases were not cited because they are not controlling. 
We certainly acknowledge that attorneys are legitimately entitled to press their own 
interpretations of precedent, including interpretations which render particular cases inapplicable. 
It is clear, however, that appellants’ attempts to show that Del Percio and Bellanca are not 
controlling are simply post hoc efforts to evade the imposition of sanctions. Neither the original 
complaint nor the memorandum of law filed by appellants in the district court reflect or support 
the arguments they now raise. Indeed, it is likely that the arguments were not raised previously 
because they are completely without merit. In the circumstances of this case, the imposition of 
Rule 11 sanctions by the district court was warranted. The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. You can read newspaper articles about Porky’s here and here. After the court’s ruling in 
1986, the bar changed to a “bottle club,” where patrons purchased alcohol elsewhere 
and mixed their own drinks, in order to avoid the ordinance, but soon closed. You can 
read a newspaper article about the disciplinary case against Latinsky and Fendt case 
here. The district court accused them of “reprehensible” conduct and imposed a $500 
fine. Do you think that is adequate?  
2. Model Rule 3.3(a)(2) provides: “A lawyer shall not knowingly fail to disclose to the 
tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly 
adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.” Latinsky 
and Fendt argued that the action challenging the ordinance was in federal court, so the 
decision of the Florida Supreme Court was not controlling. Should that have excused 
their failure to cite it? What if the district court had to independently determine whether 
Florida had delegated its authority? 
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Board of Ethics & Conduct v. Lane, 642 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa 2002) 
 
Summary: Lane represented Sicard in an employment discrimination action. Among 
other things he filed a post-trial brief, the entire contents of which were plagiarized from 
a treatise. Lane won the trial, and submitted a bill for attorney’s fees, requesting $16,000 
for 80 hours drafting the post-trial brief. When the court requested documentation of the 
drafting of the brief, Lane eventually submitted a list of 200 sources, from which the court 
discovered his plagiarism. The court sanctioned Lane’s conduct and suspended his 
license for 6 months. 
 
STREIT, Justice. 
 
An Iowa attorney passed someone else’s writing as his own and claimed he spent almost two 
weeks writing that which he used. The Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and 
Conduct filed a complaint with our Grievance Commission against respondent, William J. Lane, 
alleging he violated several ethical rules and recommended we suspend Lane’s license to 
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practice law for three months. We agree with the Commission's findings of misconduct but 
suspend Lane’s license for six months. 
 
I. Background Facts and Proceedings 
 
After the conclusion of a trial in federal court in which Daniel Sicard claimed a violation of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, attorney Lane submitted a post-trial brief to the court. The legal 
portion of the brief was in great part plagiarized from a treatise written by Barbara Lindemann 
and Paul Grossman. Lane later applied to the court for attorney fees. Among other charges, 
Lane requested compensation for eighty hours of work spent to prepare the questioned brief. 
Charging $200 per hour, Lane asked for $16,000 to write the brief that was largely copied from 
an uncredited source. In total, Lane requested $104,127 in attorney fees plus $13,363.29 in 
costs for his representation of Sicard. 
 
On May 5, 1998, there was a hearing on Lane’s attorney fee application. The United States 
magistrate judge stated it did not appear to him that Lane wrote the legal portions of the brief. 
Lane responded, “I borrowed liberally from other sources. Yes, your Honor.” The court noted, 
 
Because of the consistency of style and the sequence of footnotes, the court assumes 
that the brief is from a particular source. If the source is a published treatise, it can 
simply be identified by name, author, and publisher. 
 
To address this suspicion, the judge ordered Lane to explain or identify the sources cited in his 
brief within ten days. At the end of the ten days, Lane did nothing to comply with the court’s 
order. On June 4, 1998, a member of the judge’s staff asked Lane if he intended to respond to 
the order. Only days later, a fire at Lane’s home destroyed many of his files and records in the 
Sicard matter. In July 1998, Lane closed his office, but continued to practice out of his home. 
 
Four months passed and Lane still did not respond to the judge’s order. On September 30, 
1998, the judge entered an order awarding Lane $20,000 in fees in the Sicard case. The judge 
stated “there were many serious problems with plaintiff’s fees and cost claim.” The court was 
particularly concerned because Lane did not support his contention he was entitled to receive 
compensation at the rate of $200 per hour for his services. Lane also requested $9000 as 
compensation for the time he spent preparing his bill. The judge stated Lane requested $16,000 
for the lifted brief but failed to comply with the court’s order to “disclose the sources from which 
counsel ‘borrowed liberally.’” Lane also requested compensation for fifty-nine hours of legal 
research preceding the trial. The court concluded 
 
It is not reasonable to bill 59 hours of legal research in the two weeks prior to trial. If 
counsel spent this amount for time performing research, it is further evidence that he 
does not possess the skill and experience of those who charge $200 per hour. 
 
The court further explained its reduction of the attorney fees awarded by citing to Lane’s 
charges of $5.00 per telephone call, $1.00 per page of facsimile transmissions, $191 for long 
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distance transmission, and $.50 per photocopy. Finally, the court stated Lane did not cite 
authority for the ability to charge for estimated pretrial travel expenses. Lane did not appeal the 
$20,000 award of attorney fees. 
 
On October 30, 1998, Lane filed a compliance with the judge’s order to document his sources 
but the judge was not made aware of the compliance until March 1999. When the judge read 
Lane’s compliance he did not notice any reference to the primary source of the legal portion of 
Lane’s brief. Lane’s compliance constituted four pages of single-spaced lists of authorities. 
Among them was the Grossman treatise. However, no particular attention was drawn to this 
source. Consequently, the judge undertook his own investigation and discovered Lane took the 
legal portion of his brief verbatim from the Grossman treatise. 
 
This complaint also involves Lane’s representation in two separate and unrelated bankruptcy 
cases. The Ethics Board charged Lane with, among other violations, neglect of clients’ legal 
matters, withdrawal from employment without taking reasonable steps to avoid prejudice to his 
clients and without promptly refunding unearned fees, and failure to seek the lawful objectives of 
his clients. The Commission found, and we agree, the Ethics Board failed to satisfy its burden to 
prove Lane violated any ethical rules in representing his clients in the bankruptcy matters. 
Therefore, we will only address the charges relevant to the Sicard case. 
 
III. Complaint 
 
The Ethics Board alleges violations of DR 1-102(A)(1), (3), (4), (5), and (6). This rule provides in 
part, a lawyer shall not: 
● Violate a disciplinary rule; 
● Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude; 
● Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; 
● Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and 
● Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the fitness to practice law. 
 
The Ethics Board also charges Lane with a violation of DR 2-106(A) which states, “a lawyer 
shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee.” The 
Commission found Lane violated DR 1-102(A)(1), (3), (4), (5), and (6) and DR 2-106(A) by his 
handling of the Sicard case. 
 
IV. Ethical Violations 
 
Lane plagiarized from a treatise and submitted his plagiarized work to the court as his own. This 
plagiarism constituted, among other things, a misrepresentation to the court. An attorney may 
not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. This issue is 
akin to the matter of ghost-writing attorneys who “author pleadings and necessarily guide the 
course of the litigation with unseen hand.” In this situation, an attorney authors court documents 
for a pro se litigant who, in turn, submits the court document as his or her own writing. This 
practice is widely condemned as unethical and a “deliberate evasion of the responsibilities 
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imposed on attorneys.” Just as ghost writing constitutes a misrepresentation on the court, so 
does plagiarism of the type we have before us. 
 
Plagiarism itself is unethical. “Plagiarism, the adoption of the work of others as one’s own, does 
involve an element of deceit, which reflects on an individual's honesty.” Use of “appropriated 
material cannot go undisciplined, especially because honesty is so fundamental to the 
functioning of the legal profession.” Undoubtedly, Lane’s plagiarism reflects poorly on both his 
professional ethics and judgment. 
 
It was not difficult to find similarity between Lane’s post-trial brief and the Grossman treatise. 
The legal argument of Lane’s post-trial brief consisted of eighteen pages of plagiarized material, 
including both text and footnotes, from the treatise. In copying this material, Lane cherry-picked 
the relevant portions and renumbered the footnotes to reflect the altered text. Examination of 
Lane’s brief does not reveal any independent labor or thought in the legal argument. 
 
On the first occasion plagiarism became an issue, Lane appeared to be forthcoming with the 
court and admitted “he borrowed liberally from other sources.” It also appears Lane attempted to 
identify the source of his writing before the court but was unable to recall the exact title of the 
treatise. Lane later had the chance to identify his source to the court, but when he responded to 
the court's order, he failed to specifically draw the court's attention to the Grossman treatise. 
Instead, Lane buried the title within a list of over 200 other sources. Though a technical 
compliance with the court’s order, Lane’s continued lack of candor indicates he hoped, by 
concealing the treatise among 200 other titles, the judge would not recognize the extent of 
Lane’s plagiarism. 
 
We do recognize Lane’s personal circumstances shortly after the time of the court’s order were 
not ideal. Lane’s home was nearly destroyed by the fire forcing him and his family to live in a 
motel for two months. However, this does not excuse his failure to comply with the court's order 
in a timely fashion. We will not excuse the seriousness of passing off another’s work as one’s 
own. We find the record shows Lane knowingly plagiarized and intended to deceive the court. 
 
Equally troubling is Lane’s application for attorney fees. Lane copied the entire portion of his 
legal argument out of a book and then claimed it took him eighty hours to write the brief 
containing the copied material. He requested attorney fees for this work at the rate of $200 per 
hour. Other than Lane’s assertions that perhaps he works less efficiently than other lawyers, 
there is little in the record to indicate Lane actually spent this amount of time writing the brief. 
Because he plagiarized the entire legal argument, the chances are remote that it took Lane 
eighty hours to write the argument. Rather, the facts show Lane stole all eighteen pages of his 
legal argument from a single source. Then to justify his request for attorney fees for the eighty 
hours it took to “write” the brief, Lane submitted a list of over 200 legal sources to the court. In 
doing so, Lane attempted to have the court believe he researched and relied on each of these 
sources in writing the brief. These circumstances only support the conclusion Lane endeavored 
to deceive the court. 
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The Ethics Board argues Lane's plagiarism was part of a larger scheme to defraud the court by 
means of inflated time and expense billings. When Lane requested compensation for time he 
did not spend working on the case, he violated the professional rule forbidding a lawyer from 
entering into an agreement for, charging, or collecting an illegal or clearly excessive fee. Even 
after the plagiarism issue arose, Lane continued to assert he was entitled to receive $200 for 
the eighty hours it took him to copy the material in his brief. He did not at any time admit that it 
did not take, nor could it have taken him that long to simply copy his legal argument out of a 
treatise. Charging such a clearly excessive bill brings Lane’s integrity into question and the 
entire legal profession into disrepute. 
 
It is important to note that Lane’s request for attorney fees in this case is not similar to cases 
where the attorney is simply not awarded the fee requested. Lane relies on one particular case 
in which the district court reduced the attorney's fee application of over $171,000 to $95,000. 
The dispute in Lynch involved the attorney’s expenditure of time, effort, and money in 
representing her client. There, the trial court properly considered several factors in reducing the 
award of attorney fees. These factors included: the time necessarily spent; the difficulty of 
handling and importance of the issues; the responsibility assumed and results obtained; the 
standing and experience of the attorney in the profession; and the customary charges for similar 
service. In Lynch, there was no suggestion of impropriety or intent to deceive the court on the 
part of the attorney who submitted the fee application. Moreover, the record contained no 
evidence to contradict the evidence supporting the fee application. 
 
In many cases a fee application may not necessarily be a precise measure of the time an 
attorney spent on a particular case. Ethics concerns are not unavoidably raised where the court 
reduces the attorney fee award merely reflecting considerations that do not bring into question 
the attorney’s honesty or integrity in submitting the fee application. On the other hand, although 
ethics is not a matter of degree of misstatement—any knowing misstatement to the court being 
unethical—the nature and depth of Lane’s misrepresentation speaks of knowing deception. 
 
The record before us amply supports the conclusion Lane’s conduct rises to the level of intent to 
deceive. Action based in the hopes of deceiving the court are not the same as those arising 
from simple negligence or even recklessness. A lawyer who knowingly submits a fee application 
to the court and thereby attempts to misrepresent the amount of time he or she spent working 
on a case has committed serious ethical violations. Accordingly, we will not treat all of the cases 
the same. When the fee application involves culpable conduct, the seriousness of the offense 
will be considered in fashioning the appropriate sanction. We conclude the record supports the 
Commission’s findings that Lane charged a clearly excessive fee in the Sicard case. 
 
V. Discipline 
 
In determining the proper sanction, we consider the particular facts and circumstances of each 
case. Among the factors we give weight to are the need for deterrence, protection of the public, 
maintenance of the reputation of the Bar as a whole, and the violator's fitness to continue to 
practice law. We also consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 
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One such aggravating circumstance is a lawyer’s prior disciplinary history. Lane has once 
before faced attorney disciplinary proceedings. In 1997, the Commission sanctioned Lane for 
failing to respond to an inquiry. He was publicly reprimanded for conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice and conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law. 
 
A mitigating factor to consider is Lane’s recognition of some wrongdoing. Lane filed 
“Respondent’s Statement” with this court. Although not evidence, we will treat this statement as 
a supplemental brief. Lane stated, 
 
I can accept that my behavior was the result of bad judgment, ignorance, even stupidity 
or carelessness, or sloppiness, or any number of things, such as laziness, negligence, 
arrogance, indolence, pettiness, or just plain old incompetence. 
 
Lane asserted he did not intend to deceive the court and cited his reputation for honesty. In 
support of this contention, several character witnesses testified on Lane’s behalf at the hearing 
before the Commission. Despite Lane’s statements to the court, he still does not appear to 
comprehend the wrongfulness of his actions. In requesting excessive and unreasonable 
attorney fees for a brief he did not write, Lane was not negligent, or even reckless. Rather, more 
seriously, he intended to deceive. Lane’s purported acknowledgment of misconduct fails to 
recognize the full extent of his wrongdoing. 
 
Mitigating factors alone do not overcome our responsibility to the public and to the legal 
profession. Though Lane offered evidence of difficult personal circumstances, this does not 
excuse his unethical conduct. Taking all of the above factors into consideration, we conclude in 
cases of this type, fairness and justice require discipline be imposed to deter future misconduct, 
protect the public, and maintain the reputation of the Bar as a whole. Lane’s excessive billing for 
writing a largely plagiarized brief cannot go undisciplined. Honesty is fundamental to the 
functioning of the legal profession, and Lane’s conduct in this case has compromised that 
honesty. Moreover, Lane has jeopardized the integrity of the Bar and the public’s trust in the 
legal profession. We conclude a six-month license suspension is warranted. We therefore 
suspend Lane’s license to practice law in the State of Iowa, with no possibility of reinstatement 
for a period of six months from the date of the filing of this opinion. Upon application for 
reinstatement, Lane shall have the burden to prove he has not practiced law during the period of 
suspension and that he meets the requirements of Iowa Court Rule 35.13. Any hearing on 
application for reinstatement shall be at least sixty days after the filing of such application. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Did the court sanction Lane for plagiarizing the contents of the brief, billing for hours he 
didn’t work, or lack of candor to the court? 
2. The court stated that “plagiarism itself is unethical.” Do you agree? Does it depend on 
the context? The court relied on cases involving law students who plagiarized in 
coursework. Is that an appropriate comparison? 
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3. Lane’s plagiarized brief was apparently effective, as he won the case. As Lane’s client, 
would you have been upset to learn that he plagiarized the brief, if he only billed you for 
the number of hours he actually spent drafting the brief? Should the court have censured 
Lane for plagiarism, if he had only billed for the number of hours he actually spent 
drafting the brief? 
4. Why did Lane plagiarize the treatise rather than quoting it? Would citing the treatise 
have made Lane’s argument weaker or stronger? 
 
Further Reading: 
 
● Brian L. Frye, Plagiarism is Not a Crime, 54 Duq. L. Rev. 133 (2016) 
	  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 637	
6.4: Client Perjury 
 
If the truth will hurt someone you love, tell a lie.96 
 
Under the Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3, attorneys may not permit their clients to 
testify falsely or introduce false evidence. And under Model Rule 4.1, attorneys may be required 
to withdraw from representation, if they knows that their client has or will introduce false 
evidence. As the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 120 observes, “A lawyer may 
not knowingly counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely or otherwise to offer false evidence.” 
 
What should attorneys do, if they know that their client or a witness has or will introduce false 
evidence? In many cases, they can simply refuse to introduce the evidence in question. If their 
client plans to lie, they can refuse to call their client, and they can counsel their client not to lie. If 
their client does lie, they can ask the client to retract the false evidence. And if the client refuses, 
the attorney may withdraw from representation. If the false evidence could materially affect the 
outcome, the attorney must also disclose it to the court. 
 
Criminal cases are more complicated, because criminal defendants have a constitutional right to 
testify under the Sixth Amendment. Attorneys should still advise criminal defendants not to lie. 
But if they know that their client intends to lie, some jurisdiction permit the client to testify in 
narrative form, so long as the attorney does not rely on the perjured testimony. 
 
Some legal scholars, most notably the late Monroe Freedman, argue that an attorney’s duty of 
loyalty to the client must trump the attorney’s duty of candor to the court. Accordingly, attorneys 
should put criminal clients on the stand without notifying the court, even if they know the client 
will testify falsely. A few scholars argue that attorneys should simply refuse to call their client at 
all, if they know the client plans to lie. 
 
Each time I was wrong or each time that I lied or somebody made me scared, I would simply 
report them to Rosemary Woods, and she would make them disappear.97 
 
Model Rule 3.3: Candor Toward the Tribunal 
 
a. A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
1. make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false 
statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; 
2. fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to 
the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by 
opposing counsel; or 
3. offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, 
or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer 
																																																								
96 The Chromatics, Tell a Lie (1956). 
97 Bill Horwitz, If I Had a Friend Like Rosemary Woods, Lies, Lies, Lies (1975). 
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comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, 
including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer 
evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the 
lawyer reasonably believes is false. 
b. A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a 
person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct 
related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if 
necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. 
c. The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, 
and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by 
Rule 1.6. 
d. In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to 
the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the 
facts are adverse. 
 
Model Rule 3.3: Comments 
 
5. Paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer knows 
to be false, regardless of the client’s wishes. This duty is premised on the lawyer’s 
obligation as an officer of the court to prevent the trier of fact from being misled by false 
evidence. A lawyer does not violate this Rule if the lawyer offers the evidence for the 
purpose of establishing its falsity. 
6. If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce 
false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should 
not be offered. If the persuasion is ineffective and the lawyer continues to represent the 
client, the lawyer must refuse to offer the false evidence. If only a portion of a witness's 
testimony will be false, the lawyer may call the witness to testify but may not elicit or 
otherwise permit the witness to present the testimony that the lawyer knows is false. 
7. The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) apply to all lawyers, including defense 
counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions, however, courts have required counsel 
to present the accused as a witness or to give a narrative statement if the accused so 
desires, even if counsel knows that the testimony or statement will be false. The 
obligation of the advocate under the Rules of Professional Conduct is subordinate to 
such requirements. 
8. The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the 
evidence is false. A lawyer’s reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude 
its presentation to the trier of fact. A lawyer’s knowledge that evidence is false, however, 
can be inferred from the circumstances. Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts 
about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot 
ignore an obvious falsehood. 
9. Although paragraph (a)(3) only prohibits a lawyer from offering evidence the lawyer 
knows to be false, it permits the lawyer to refuse to offer testimony or other proof that the 
lawyer reasonably believes is false. Offering such proof may reflect adversely on the 
lawyer's ability to discriminate in the quality of evidence and thus impair the lawyer's 
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effectiveness as an advocate. Because of the special protections historically provided 
criminal defendants, however, this Rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the 
testimony of such a client where the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know that 
the testimony will be false. Unless the lawyer knows the testimony will be false, the 
lawyer must honor the client’s decision to testify. 
 
Model Rule 4.1: Truthfulness in Statements to Others 
 
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: 
 
a. make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or 
b. fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid 
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited. 
 
Model Rule 4.1: Comments 
 
Crime or Fraud by Client 
 
1. Under Rule 1.2(d), a lawyer is prohibited from counseling or assisting a client in conduct 
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. Paragraph (b) states a specific 
application of the principle set forth in Rule 1.2(d) and addresses the situation where a 
client’s crime or fraud takes the form of a lie or misrepresentation. Ordinarily, a lawyer 
can avoid assisting a client’s crime or fraud by withdrawing from the representation. 
Sometimes it may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal 
and to disaffirm an opinion, document, affirmation or the like. In extreme cases, 
substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the 
representation to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client’s crime or fraud. If the 
lawyer can avoid assisting a client’s crime or fraud only by disclosing this information, 
then under paragraph (b) the lawyer is required to do so, unless the disclosure is 
prohibited by Rule 1.6. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 120 (2000): False Testimony or 
Evidence 
 
1. A lawyer may not: 
a. knowingly counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely or otherwise to offer false 
evidence; 
b. knowingly make a false statement of fact to the tribunal; 
c. offer testimony or other evidence as to an issue of fact known by the lawyer to be 
false. 
2. If a lawyer has offered testimony or other evidence as to a material issue of fact and 
comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures and 
may disclose confidential client information when necessary to take such a measure. 
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3. A lawyer may refuse to offer testimony or other evidence that the lawyer reasonably 
believes is false, even if the lawyer does not know it to be false. 
 
Further Reading: 
 
● Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent 
Harm, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 1091 (1985) 
● H. Lowell Brown, The Dilemma of Corporate Counsel Faced with Client Misconduct: 
Disclosure of Client Confidences or Constructive Discharge, 44 Buffalo L. Rev. 777 
(1996) 
● Thomas L. Shaffer, On Lying for Clients, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 195 (1995-1996) 
● Richard H. Underwood, Perjury! The Charges and the Defenses, 36 Duq. L. Rev. 715 
(1998) 
● Barry Adler, The Ethics of Perjury, 71 ABA Journal 76 (November 1985) 
● Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The 
Three Hardest Questions, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1469 (1966) 
● Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest About Client Perjury, 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 133 
(2008) 
● Ray McKoski, Prospective Perjury by a Criminal Defendant: It’s All about the Lawyer, 44 
Ariz. St. L.J. 1575 (2012) 
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Nix v. Whiteside Courtroom Drawing 
 
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) 
  
Summary: Emmanuel Charles Whiteside was charged with the murder of Calvin Love, 
and was represented by Gary L. Robinson and Donna Paulsen. Whiteside pleaded self-
defense. Initially, he told Robinson that he believed Love had a gun, but had not actually 
seen one. Later, he told Robinson that he had seen “something metallic.” Robinson 
advised Whiteside that this testimony would be perjury, and that he would inform the 
court and withdraw from representation if Whiteside committed perjury. Whiteside did not 
testify that he had seen “something metallic,” and was convicted of second-degree 
murder. The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the conviction. Whiteside filed a federal 
habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the 
writ, but the circuit court reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, 
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holding that criminal defendant does not have a right to commit perjury, so Whiteside’s 
right to counsel was not infringed. 
 
We granted certiorari to decide whether the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to 
assistance of counsel is violated when an attorney refuses to cooperate with the defendant in 
presenting perjured testimony at his trial. 
  
Whiteside was convicted of second-degree murder by a jury verdict which was affirmed by the 
Iowa courts. The killing took place on February 8, 1977, in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Whiteside and 
two others went to one Calvin Love’s apartment late that night, seeking marihuana. Love was in 
bed when Whiteside and his companions arrived; an argument between Whiteside and Love 
over the marihuana ensued. At one point, Love directed his girlfriend to get his “piece,” and at 
another point got up, then returned to his bed. According to Whiteside’s testimony, Love then 
started to reach under his pillow and moved toward Whiteside. Whiteside stabbed Love in the 
chest, inflicting a fatal wound. 
  
Whiteside was charged with murder, and when counsel was appointed he objected to the 
lawyer initially appointed, claiming that he felt uncomfortable with a lawyer who had formerly 
been a prosecutor. Gary L. Robinson was then appointed and immediately began an 
investigation. Whiteside gave him a statement that he had stabbed Love as the latter “was 
pulling a pistol from underneath the pillow on the bed.” Upon questioning by Robinson, however, 
Whiteside indicated that he had not actually seen a gun, but that he was convinced that Love 
had a gun. No pistol was found on the premises; shortly after the police search following the 
stabbing, which had revealed no weapon, the victim’s family had removed all of the victim’s 
possessions from the apartment. Robinson interviewed Whiteside’s companions who were 
present during the stabbing, and none had seen a gun during the incident. Robinson advised 
Whiteside that the existence of a gun was not necessary to establish the claim of self-defense, 
and that only a reasonable belief that the victim had a gun nearby was necessary even though 
no gun was actually present. 
 
Until shortly before trial, Whiteside consistently stated to Robinson that he had not actually seen 
a gun, but that he was convinced that Love had a gun in his hand. About a week before trial, 
during preparation for direct examination, Whiteside for the first time told Robinson and his 
associate Donna Paulsen that he had seen something “metallic” in Love's hand. When asked 
about this, Whiteside responded: 
  
In Howard Cook’s case there was a gun. If I don’t say I saw a gun, I’m dead. 
  
Robinson told Whiteside that such testimony would be perjury and repeated that it was not 
necessary to prove that a gun was available but only that Whiteside reasonably believed that he 
was in danger. On Whiteside’s insisting that he would testify that he saw “something metallic” 
Robinson told him, according to Robinson's testimony: 
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We could not allow him to testify falsely because that would be perjury, and as officers of 
the court we would be suborning perjury if we allowed him to do it. I advised him that if 
he did do that it would be my duty to advise the Court of what he was doing and that I 
felt he was committing perjury; also, that I probably would be allowed to attempt to 
impeach that particular testimony. 
  
Robinson also indicated he would seek to withdraw from the representation if Whiteside insisted 
on committing perjury. 
  
Whiteside testified in his own defense at trial and stated that he “knew” that Love had a gun and 
that he believed Love was reaching for a gun and he had acted swiftly in self-defense. On 
cross-examination, he admitted that he had not actually seen a gun in Love’s hand. Robinson 
presented evidence that Love had been seen with a sawed-off shotgun on other occasions, that 
the police search of the apartment may have been careless, and that the victim’s family had 
removed everything from the apartment shortly after the crime. Robinson presented this 
evidence to show a basis for Whiteside’s asserted fear that Love had a gun. 
 
The jury returned a verdict of second-degree murder, and Whiteside moved for a new trial, 
claiming that he had been deprived of a fair trial by Robinson’s admonitions not to state that he 
saw a gun or “something metallic.” The trial court held a hearing, heard testimony by Whiteside 
and Robinson, and denied the motion. The trial court made specific findings that the facts were 
as related by Robinson. 
 
The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed respondent’s conviction. That court held that the right to 
have counsel present all appropriate defenses does not extend to using perjury, and that an 
attorney’s duty to a client does not extend to assisting a client in committing perjury. Relying on 
the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, which expressly prohibits an attorney 
from using perjured testimony, and the Iowa Code, which criminalizes subornation of perjury, 
the Iowa court concluded that not only were Robinson’s actions permissible, but were required. 
The court commended “both Mr. Robinson and Ms. Paulsen for the high ethical manner in which 
this matter was handled.” 
 
Whiteside then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Iowa. In that petition Whiteside alleged that he had been denied effective 
assistance of counsel and of his right to present a defense by Robinson’s refusal to allow him to 
testify as he had proposed. The District Court denied the writ. Accepting the state trial court’s 
factual finding that Whiteside’s intended testimony would have been perjurious, it concluded that 
there could be no  grounds for habeas relief since there is no constitutional right to present a 
perjured defense. 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and directed that the writ of 
habeas corpus be granted. The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the trial judge, 
affirmed by the Iowa Supreme Court, that trial counsel believed with good cause that Whiteside 
would testify falsely and acknowledged that under Harris v. New York, a criminal defendant's 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 644	
privilege to testify in his own behalf does not include a right to commit perjury. Nevertheless, the 
court reasoned that an intent to commit perjury, communicated to counsel, does not alter a 
defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel and that Robinson’s admonition to Whiteside 
that he would inform the court of Whiteside’s perjury constituted a threat to violate the attorney’s 
duty to preserve client confidences. According to the Court of Appeals, this threatened violation 
of client confidences breached the standards of effective representation set down in Strickland 
v. Washington. The court also concluded that Strickland’s prejudice requirement was satisfied 
by an implication of prejudice from the conflict between Robinson’s duty of loyalty to his client 
and his ethical duties. A petition for rehearing en banc was denied. We granted certiorari and 
we reverse. 
 
A 
 
The right of an accused to testify in his defense is of relatively recent origin. Until the latter part 
of the preceding century, criminal defendants in this country, as at common law, were 
considered to be disqualified from giving sworn testimony at their own trial by reason of their 
interest as a party to the case. Iowa was among the states that adhered to this rule of 
disqualification. 
 
By the end of the 19th century, however, the disqualification was finally abolished by statute in 
most states and in the federal courts. Although this Court has never explicitly held that a 
criminal defendant has a due process right to testify in his own behalf, cases in several Circuits 
have so held, and the right has long been assumed. We have also suggested that such a right 
exists as a corollary to the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled testimony. 
 
B. 
 
We turn next to the question presented: the definition of the range of “reasonable professional” 
responses to a criminal defendant client who informs counsel that he will perjure himself on the 
stand. We must determine whether, in this setting, Robinson’s conduct fell within the wide range 
of professional responses to threatened client perjury acceptable under the Sixth Amendment. 
In Strickland, we recognized counsel’s duty of loyalty and his “overarching duty to advocate the 
defendant’s cause.” Plainly, that duty is limited to legitimate, lawful conduct compatible with the 
very nature of a trial as a search for truth. Although counsel must take all reasonable lawful 
means to attain the objectives of the client, counsel is precluded from taking steps or in any way 
assisting the client in presenting false evidence or otherwise violating the law. This principle has 
consistently been recognized in most unequivocal terms by expositors of the norms of 
professional conduct since the first Canons of Professional Ethics were adopted by the 
American Bar Association in 1908. The 1908 Canon 32 provided: 
  
No client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause, civil or political, 
however important, is entitled to receive nor should any lawyer render any service or 
advice involving disloyalty to the law whose ministers we are, or disrespect of the judicial 
office, which we are bound to uphold, or corruption of any person or persons exercising 
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a public office or private trust, or deception or betrayal of the public. He must observe 
and advise his client to observe the statute law. 
 
Of course, this Canon did no more than articulate centuries of accepted standards of conduct. 
Similarly, Canon 37, adopted in 1928, explicitly acknowledges as an exception to the attorney’s 
duty of confidentiality a client's announced intention to commit a crime: 
 
The announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the 
confidences which the attorney is bound to respect. 
These principles have been carried through to contemporary codifications of an attorney’s 
professional responsibility. Disciplinary Rule 7-102 of the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility (1980), entitled “Representing a Client Within the Bounds of the Law,” provides: 
 
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: 
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence. 
(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or 
fraudulent. 
 
This provision has been adopted by Iowa, and is binding on all lawyers who appear in its courts. 
 
The more recent Model Rules of  Professional Conduct (1983) similarly admonish attorneys to 
obey all laws in the course of representing a client: 
 
RULE 1.2 Scope of Representation 
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the 
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. 
  
Both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct also adopt the specific exception from the attorney-client privilege for disclosure of 
perjury that his client intends to commit or has committed. Indeed, both the Model Code and the 
Model Rules do not merely authorize disclosure by counsel of client perjury; they require such 
disclosure.  
 
These standards confirm that the legal profession has accepted that an attorney’s ethical duty to 
advance the interests of his client is limited by an equally solemn duty to comply with the law 
and standards of professional conduct; it specifically ensures that the client may not use false 
evidence. This special duty of an attorney to prevent and disclose  frauds upon the court derives 
from the recognition that perjury is as much a crime as tampering with witnesses or jurors by 
way of promises and threats, and undermines the administration of justice. The offense of 
perjury was a crime recognized at common law, and has been made a felony in most states by 
statute, including Iowa. An attorney who aids false testimony by questioning a witness when 
perjurious responses can be anticipated risks prosecution for subornation of perjury. 
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It is universally agreed that at a minimum the attorney’s first duty when confronted with a 
proposal for perjurious testimony is to attempt to dissuade the client from the unlawful course of 
conduct. Withdrawal of counsel when this situation arises at trial gives rise to many difficult 
questions including possible mistrial and claims of double jeopardy. 
 
The essence of the brief amicus of the American Bar Association reviewing practices long 
accepted by ethical lawyers is that under no circumstance may a lawyer either advocate or 
passively tolerate a client's giving false testimony. This, of course, is consistent with the 
governance of trial conduct in what we have long called “a search for truth.” The suggestion 
sometimes made that “a lawyer must believe his client, not judge him” in no sense means a 
lawyer can honorably be a party to or in any way give aid to presenting known perjury. 
 
Considering Robinson’s representation of respondent in light of these accepted norms of 
professional conduct, we discern no failure to adhere to reasonable professional standards that 
would in any sense make out a deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Whether 
Robinson’s conduct is seen as a successful attempt to dissuade his client from committing the 
crime of perjury, or whether seen as a “threat” to withdraw from representation and disclose the 
illegal scheme, Robinson’s representation of Whiteside falls well within accepted standards of 
professional conduct and the range of reasonable professional conduct  acceptable under 
Strickland. 
 
The Court of Appeals assumed for the purpose of the decision that Whiteside would have given 
false testimony had counsel not intervened; its opinion denying a rehearing en banc states: 
 
We presume that appellant would have testified falsely. Counsel’s actions prevented 
Whiteside from testifying falsely. We hold that counsel’s action deprived appellant of due 
process and effective assistance of counsel. Counsel's actions also impermissibly 
compromised appellant’s right to testify in his own defense by conditioning continued 
representation by counsel and confidentiality upon appellant's restricted testimony. 
 
While purporting to follow Iowa’s highest court “on all questions of state law,” the Court of 
Appeals reached its conclusions on the basis of federal constitutional due process and right to 
counsel. 
 
The Court of Appeals’ holding that Robinson’s “action deprived Whiteside of due process and 
effective assistance of counsel” is not supported by the record since Robinson’s action, at most, 
deprived Whiteside of his contemplated perjury. Nothing counsel did in any way undermined 
Whiteside’s claim that he believed the victim was reaching for a gun. Similarly, the record gives 
no support for holding that Robinson’s action “also impermissibly compromised Whiteside’s right 
to testify in his own defense by conditioning continued representation and confidentiality upon 
Whiteside’s restricted testimony.” The record in fact shows the contrary: (a) that Whiteside did 
testify, and (b) he was “restricted” or restrained only from testifying falsely and was aided by 
Robinson in developing the basis for the fear that Love was reaching for a gun. Robinson 
divulged no client communications until he was compelled to do so in response to Whiteside’s 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 647	
post-trial challenge to the quality of his performance. We see this as a case in which the 
attorney successfully dissuaded the client from committing the crime of perjury. 
 
Paradoxically, even while accepting the conclusion of the Iowa trial court that Whiteside’s 
proposed testimony would have been a criminal act, the Court of Appeals held that Robinson’s 
efforts to persuade Whiteside not to commit that crime were improper, first, as forcing an 
impermissible choice between the right to counsel and the right to testify; and, second, as 
compromising client confidences because of Robinson’s threat to disclose the contemplated 
perjury. Whatever the scope of a constitutional right to testify, it is elementary that such a right 
does not extend to testifying falsely. In Harris v. New York, we assumed the right of an accused 
to testify “in his own defense, or to refuse to do so” and went on to hold: 
  
That privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury. Having 
voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully. 
 
In Harris we held the defendant could be impeached by prior contrary statements which had 
been ruled inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona. Harris and other cases make it crystal clear 
that there is no right whatever -- constitutional or otherwise -- for a defendant to use false 
evidence.  
 
The paucity of authority on the subject of any such “right” may be explained by the fact that such 
a notion has never been responsibly advanced; the right to counsel includes no right to have a 
lawyer who will cooperate with planned perjury. A lawyer who would so cooperate would be at 
risk of prosecution for suborning perjury, and disciplinary proceedings, including suspension or 
disbarment.  
 
Robinson’s admonitions to his client can in no sense be said to have forced respondent into an 
impermissible choice between his right to counsel and his right to testify as he proposed for 
there was no permissible choice to testify falsely. For defense counsel to take steps to persuade 
a criminal defendant to testify truthfully, or to withdraw, deprives the defendant of neither his 
right to counsel nor the right to testify truthfully. In United States v. Havens, we made clear that 
“when defendants testify, they must testify truthfully or suffer the consequences.” When an 
accused proposes to resort to perjury or to produce false evidence, one consequence is the risk 
of withdrawal of counsel. 
 
On this record, the accused enjoyed continued representation within the bounds of reasonable 
professional conduct and did in fact exercise his right to testify; at most he was denied the right 
to have the assistance of counsel in the presentation of false testimony. Similarly, we can 
discern no breach of professional duty in Robinson’s admonition to respondent that he would 
disclose respondent’s perjury to the court. The crime of perjury in this setting is indistinguishable 
in substance from the crime of threatening or tampering with a witness or a juror. A defendant 
who informed his counsel that he was arranging to bribe or threaten witnesses or members of 
the jury would have no “right” to insist on counsel’s assistance or silence. Counsel would not be 
limited to advising against that conduct. An attorney's duty of confidentiality, which totally covers 
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the client’s admission of guilt, does not extend to a client’s announced plans to engage in future 
criminal conduct. In short, the responsibility of an ethical lawyer, as an officer of the court and a 
key component of a system of justice, dedicated to a search for truth, is essentially the same 
whether the client announces an intention to bribe or threaten witnesses or jurors or to commit 
or procure perjury. No system of justice worthy of the name can tolerate a lesser standard.  
 
The rule adopted by the Court of Appeals, which seemingly would require an attorney to remain 
silent while his client committed perjury, is wholly incompatible with the established standards of 
ethical conduct and the laws of Iowa and contrary to professional standards promulgated by that 
State. The position advocated by petitioner, on the contrary, is wholly consistent with the Iowa 
standards of professional conduct and law, with the overwhelming majority of courts, and with 
codes of professional ethics. Since there has been no breach of any recognized professional 
duty, it follows that there can be no deprivation of the right to assistance of counsel under the 
Strickland standard. 
  
Conclusion 
  
Whiteside’s attorney treated Whiteside’s proposed perjury in accord with professional 
standards, and since Whiteside’s truthful testimony could not have prejudiced the result of his 
trial, the Court of Appeals was in error to direct the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and 
must be reversed. 
 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the judgment. 
 
This Court has no constitutional authority to establish rules of ethical conduct for lawyers 
practicing in the state courts. Nor does the Court enjoy any statutory grant of jurisdiction over 
legal ethics. 
 
Accordingly, it is not surprising that the Court emphasizes that it “must be careful not to narrow 
the wide range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth Amendment so restrictively as to 
constitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct and thereby intrude into the state’s 
proper authority to define and apply the standards of professional conduct applicable to those it 
admits to practice in its courts.” I read this as saying in another way that the Court cannot tell 
the States or the lawyers in the States how to behave in their courts, unless and until federal 
rights are violated. 
 
Unfortunately, the Court seems unable to resist the temptation of sharing with the legal 
community its vision of ethical conduct. But let there be no mistake: the Court’s essay regarding 
what constitutes the correct response to a criminal client’s suggestion that he will perjure himself 
is pure discourse without force of law. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN observes, that issue is a thorny 
one, but it is not an issue presented by this case. Lawyers, judges, bar associations, students, 
and others should understand that the problem has not now been “decided.” 
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I join JUSTICE BLACKMUN’s concurrence because I agree that respondent has failed to prove 
the kind of prejudice necessary to make out a claim under Strickland v. Washington. 
 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE 
STEVENS join, concurring in the judgment. 
 
How a defense attorney ought to act when faced with a client who intends to commit perjury at 
trial has long been a controversial issue. But I do not believe that a federal habeas corpus case 
challenging a state criminal conviction is an appropriate vehicle for attempting to resolve this 
thorny problem. When a defendant argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel 
because his lawyer dissuaded him from committing perjury, the only question properly 
presented to this Court is whether the lawyer’s actions deprived the defendant of the fair trial 
which the Sixth Amendment is meant to guarantee. Since I believe that the respondent in this 
case suffered no injury justifying federal habeas relief, I concur in the Court's judgment. 
 
I 
 
On February 7, 1977, Emmanual Charles Whiteside stabbed Calvin Love to death. At trial, 
Whiteside claimed self-defense. On direct examination, he testified that Love’s bedroom, where 
the stabbing had occurred, was “very much dark, and that he had stabbed Love during an 
argument because he believed that Love was about to attack him with a weapon: 
 
Q. Did you think that Calvin had a gun? 
A. Most definitely I thought that. 
Q. Why did you think that? 
A. Because of Calvin's reputation, his brother’s reputation, because of the prior 
conversation that Calvin and I had, I didn’t have no other choice but to think he had a 
gun. And when he told his girlfriend to give him his piece, I couldn’t retreat. 
 
Whiteside’s testimony was consistent with that of other witnesses who testified that the room 
was dark, and that Love had asked his girlfriend to get his “piece” (which they all believed 
referred to a weapon). No gun, however, was ever found. 
 
Whiteside, who had been charged with first-degree murder, was convicted of second-degree 
murder, and sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment. He moved for a new trial, contending that his 
court-appointed attorneys, Gary Robinson and Donna Paulsen, had improperly coerced his 
testimony. Whiteside now claimed that he had seen a gun, but had been prevented from 
testifying to this fact. 
 
At an evidentiary hearing on this motion, Whiteside testified that he had told Robinson at their 
first meeting that he had seen a weapon in Love’s hand. Some weeks later, Robinson informed 
Whiteside that the weapon could not be found and, according to Whiteside, told him to say only 
that he thought he had seen a gun, rather than that he in fact had seen one. Whiteside “got the 
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impression at one time that maybe if I didn’t go along with — with what was happening, that it 
was no gun being involved, maybe that he will pull out of my trial.” 
 
Robinson’s testimony contradicted Whiteside’s. According to Robinson, Whiteside did not 
initially claim to have seen a gun, but rather claimed only that he was convinced Love had had 
one. Roughly a week before the trial, however, in the course of reviewing Whiteside’s testimony, 
Whiteside “made reference to seeing something ‘metallic’ I don't think he ever did say a gun”: 
 
And at the end Donna asked him about that, because that was the first time it had ever 
been mentioned either to her or to myself. His response to that was, “in Howard Cook's 
case there was a gun. If I don’t say I saw a gun, I’m dead.” I explained to him at that time 
that it was not necessary that the gun be physically present for self-defense, one; two, 
that to say that would be perjury on his part because he had never at any time indicated 
that there was a gun; three, that we could not allow him to do that; four, I advised him 
that if he did do that it would be my duty to advise the Court of what he was doing; also, 
that I probably would be allowed to attempt to impeach that particular testimony. I told 
him that there was no need for him to lie about what had happened, that he had a good 
and valid defense on the facts as he had related them to us, and we felt we could 
present a good self-defense case on the facts he had stated to us. 
 
Robinson acknowledged that Whiteside’s claim of self-defense would have been stronger had 
the gun been found, but explained that at trial “we tried to create a gun,” through testimony from 
people who had seen Love carrying a gun on other occasions, through a stipulation that Love 
had been convicted of possession of a weapon, and through suggestions made during cross-
examination of the State’s witnesses that the initial police search had been too cursory to 
discover the weapon and that Love’s girlfriend had removed it from the apartment prior to a 
second, more thorough, search. 
 
The trial court rejected Whiteside’s motion for a new trial, “finding the facts to be as testified to 
by Ms. Paulsen and Mr. Robinson.” The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. 
 
Whiteside then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Iowa. The parties agreed to rest on the record made in the state-court proceedings. 
Chief Judge Stuart held that the trial judge’s factual finding that Whiteside would have 
committed perjury had he testified at trial actually to having seen a gun was fairly supported by 
the record and thus entitled to a presumption of correctness. Since Whiteside had no 
constitutional right to perjure himself, he had been denied neither a fair trial nor effective 
assistance of counsel. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. The court recognized that the issue before 
it was not whether Robinson had behaved ethically,98 but rather whether Whiteside had been 
																																																								
98 The court stated: 
That question is governed solely by the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility, as it was in 
effect at the time of the trial in this case, and as it has been authoritatively interpreted by the 
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deprived of effective assistance of counsel. In the Court of Appeals’ view, Robinson had 
breached the obligations of confidentiality and zealous advocacy imposed on defense counsel 
by the Sixth Amendment. In addition, the Court of Appeals concluded that Robinson’s actions 
impermissibly compromised Whiteside's constitutional right to testify in his own behalf by 
conditioning continued representation and confidentiality on Whiteside’s limiting his testimony. 
 
The court recognized that, under Strickland v. Washington, a defendant must normally 
demonstrate both that his attorney’s behavior was professionally unreasonable and that he was 
prejudiced by his attorney’s unprofessional behavior. But it noted that Strickland v. Washington 
had recognized a “limited” presumption of prejudice when counsel is burdened by an actual 
conflict of interest that adversely affects his performance. Here, Whiteside had shown that 
Robinson’s obligations under the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility conflicted with his 
client’s wishes, and his threat to testify against Whiteside had adversely affected Whiteside by 
“undermining the fundamental trust between lawyer and client” necessary for effective 
representation. 
 
Petitioner’s motion for rehearing en banc was denied by a vote of 5 to 4. In dissent, Judge John 
R. Gibson, joined by Judges Ross, Fagg, and Bowman, argued that Whiteside had failed to 
show cognizable prejudice. Cuyler v. Sullivan was inapposite, both because finding a conflict of 
interest required making the untenable assumption that Whiteside possessed the right to testify 
falsely and because Robinson’s threat had had no adverse effect on the trial since Whiteside 
testified fully in his defense. Moreover, the result of the proceeding should not have been 
different had Whiteside been permitted to testify as he wished. 
 
A separate dissent by Judge Fagg, joined by Judges Ross, John R. Gibson, and Bowman, 
addressed the performance prong of Strickland. Robinson’s admonition to Whiteside to testify 
truthfully simply could not be viewed as creating a conflict of interest; Robinson presented a full 
and zealous defense at trial; and, although Robinson’s warning to Whiteside may have been 
“strident,” he had communicated with his client in a manner the client understood. 
 
II 
 
A 
 
The District Court found that the trial judge’s statement that “I find the facts to be as testified to 
by Ms. Paulsen and Mr. Robinson” was a factual finding that Whiteside “would have perjured 
himself if he had testified at trial that he actually saw a gun in his victim's hand.” This factual 
finding by the state court is entitled to a presumption of correctness, which Whiteside has not 
overcome. 
 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Supreme Court of Iowa. The Supreme Court of Iowa is the last word on all questions of state law, 
and the Code of Professional Responsibility is a species of state law. 
Thus, the court declined to address the question whether Robinson's actions were either compelled or 
condoned by Iowa law. 
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Respondent has never attempted to rebut the presumption by claiming that the factfinding 
procedure employed by Iowa in considering new trial motions in any sense deprived him of a full 
and fair hearing or failed to provide a sufficient basis for denying his motion. Although 
respondent’s argument to this Court in large part assumes that the precluded testimony would 
have been false, he contends, first, that the record does not fairly support the conclusion that he 
intended to perjure himself because he claimed in his first written statement that Love had been 
pulling a pistol from under a pillow at the time of the stabbing, and, second, that whether 
Robinson had sufficient knowledge to conclude he was going to commit perjury was a mixed 
question of law and fact to which the presumption of correctness does not apply. 
 
Neither contention overcomes the presumption of correctness due the state court’s finding. 
First, the trial judge's implicit decision not to credit the written statement is fairly supported by 
Robinson's testimony that the written statement had not been prepared by Whiteside alone and 
that, from the time of their initial meeting until the week before trial, Whiteside never again 
claimed to have seen a gun. Second, the finding properly accorded a presumption of 
correctness by the courts below was that Whiteside’s “proposed testimony would have been 
deliberately untruthful.” The lower courts did not purport to presume the correctness of the Iowa 
Supreme Court’s holding concerning the mixed question respondent identifies — whether 
Robinson’s response to Whiteside’s proposed testimony deprived Whiteside of effective 
representation. 
 
B 
 
The Court approaches this case as if the performance-and-prejudice standard requires us in 
every case to determine “the perimeters of the range of reasonable professional assistance, but 
Strickland v. Washington explicitly contemplates a different course: 
 
Although we have discussed the performance component of an ineffectiveness claim 
prior to the prejudice component, there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective 
assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both 
components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. In 
particular, a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient 
before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged 
deficiencies. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 
sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed. 
 
In this case, respondent has failed to show any legally cognizable prejudice. Nor, as is 
discussed below, is this a case in which prejudice should be presumed. 
 
The touchstone of a claim of prejudice is an allegation that counsel’s behavior did something “to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” The only effect Robinson’s 
threat had on Whiteside’s trial is that Whiteside did not testify, falsely, that he saw a gun in 
Love’s hand. Thus, this Court must ask whether its confidence in the outcome of Whiteside’s 
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trial is in any way undermined by the knowledge that he refrained from presenting false 
testimony. 
 
This Court long ago noted: “All perjured relevant testimony is at war with justice, since it may 
produce a judgment not resting on truth. Therefore it cannot be denied that it tends to defeat the 
sole ultimate objective of a trial.” When the Court has been faced with a claim by a defendant 
concerning prosecutorial use of such evidence, it has “consistently held that a conviction 
obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and must be set 
aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the 
judgment of the jury.” Similarly, the Court has viewed a defendant’s use of such testimony as so 
antithetical to our system of justice that it has permitted the prosecution to introduce otherwise 
inadmissible evidence to combat it. The proposition that presenting false evidence could 
contribute to (or that withholding such evidence could detract from) the reliability of a criminal 
trial is simply untenable. 
 
It is no doubt true that juries sometimes have acquitted defendants who should have been 
convicted, and sometimes have based their decisions to acquit on the testimony of defendants 
who lied on the witness stand. It is also true that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the 
reprosecution of such acquitted defendants, although on occasion they can be prosecuted for 
perjury. But the privilege every criminal defendant has to testify in his own defense “cannot be 
construed to include the right to commit perjury.” To the extent that Whiteside’s claim rests on 
the assertion that he would have been acquitted had he been able to testify falsely, Whiteside 
claims a right the law simply does not recognize. “A defendant has no entitlement to the luck of 
a lawless decisionmaker, even if a lawless decision cannot be reviewed.” Since Whiteside was 
deprived of neither a fair trial nor any of the specific constitutional rights designed to guarantee 
a fair trial, he has suffered no prejudice. 
 
The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that prejudice should have been presumed. Strickland 
v. Washington found such a presumption appropriate in a case where an attorney labored under 
“an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his performance.” In this case, however, no 
actual conflict existed. I have already discussed why Whiteside had no right to Robinson’s help 
in presenting perjured testimony. Moreover, Whiteside has identified no right to insist that 
Robinson keep confidential a plan to commit perjury. The prior cases where this Court has 
reversed convictions involved conflicts that infringed a defendant’s legitimate interest in vigorous 
protection of his constitutional rights. Here, Whiteside had no legitimate interest that conflicted 
with Robinson’s obligations not to suborn perjury and to adhere to the Iowa Code of 
Professional Responsibility. 
 
In addition, the lawyer’s interest in not presenting perjured testimony was entirely consistent 
with Whiteside’s best interest. If Whiteside had lied on the stand, he would have risked a future 
perjury prosecution. Moreover, his testimony would have been contradicted by the testimony of 
other eyewitnesses and by the fact that no gun was ever found. In light of that impeachment, the 
jury might have concluded that Whiteside lied as well about his lack of premeditation and thus 
might have convicted him of first-degree murder. And if the judge believed that Whiteside had 
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lied, he could have taken Whiteside’s perjury into account in setting the sentence. In the face of 
these dangers, an attorney could reasonably conclude that dissuading his client from 
committing perjury was in the client’s best interest and comported with standards of professional 
responsibility. In short, Whiteside failed to show the kind of conflict that poses a danger to the 
values of zealous and loyal representation embodied in the Sixth Amendment. A presumption of 
prejudice is therefore unwarranted. 
 
C 
 
In light of respondent’s failure to show any cognizable prejudice, I see no need to “grade 
counsel’s performance.” The only federal issue in this case is whether Robinson’s behavior 
deprived Whiteside of the effective assistance of counsel; it is not whether Robinson’s behavior 
conformed to any particular code of legal ethics. 
 
Whether an attorney’s response to what he sees as a client's plan to commit perjury violates a 
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights may depend on many factors: how certain the attorney is 
that the proposed testimony is false, the stage of the proceedings at which the attorney 
discovers the plan, or the ways in which the attorney may be able to dissuade his client, to 
name just three. The complex interaction of factors, which is likely to vary from case to case, 
makes inappropriate a blanket rule that defense attorneys must reveal, or threaten to reveal, a 
client's anticipated perjury to the court. Except in the rarest of cases, attorneys who adopt “the 
role of the judge or jury to determine the facts,” pose a danger of depriving their clients of the 
zealous and loyal advocacy required by the Sixth Amendment. 
 
I therefore am troubled by the Court’s implicit adoption of a set of standards of professional 
responsibility for attorneys in state criminal proceedings. The States, of course, do have a 
compelling interest in the integrity of their criminal trials that can justify regulating the length to 
which an attorney may go in seeking his client's acquittal. But the American Bar Association’s 
implicit suggestion in its brief amicus curiae that the Court find that the Association's Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct should govern an attorney’s responsibilities is addressed to the 
wrong audience. It is for the States to decide how attorneys should conduct themselves in state 
criminal proceedings, and this Court’s responsibility extends only to ensuring that the 
restrictions a State enacts do not infringe a defendant’s federal constitutional rights. Thus, I 
would follow the suggestion made in the joint brief amici curiae filed by 37 States at the 
certiorari stage that we allow the States to maintain their “differing approaches” to a complex 
ethical question. The signal merit of asking first whether a defendant has shown any adverse 
prejudicial effect before inquiring into his attorney’s performance is that it avoids unnecessary 
federal interference in a State’s regulation of its bar. Because I conclude that the respondent in 
this case failed to show such an effect, I join the Court’s judgment that he is not entitled to 
federal habeas relief. 
 
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 655	
Justice Holmes taught us that a word is but the skin of a living thought. A “fact” may also have a 
life of its own. From the perspective of an appellate judge, after a case has been tried and the 
evidence has been sifted by another judge, a particular fact may be as clear and certain as a 
piece of crystal or a small diamond. A trial lawyer, however, must often deal with mixtures of 
sand and clay. Even a pebble that seems clear enough at first glance may take on a different 
hue in a handful of gravel. 
 
As we view this case, it appears perfectly clear that respondent intended to commit perjury, that 
his lawyer knew it, and that the lawyer had a duty — both to the court and to his client, for 
perjured testimony can ruin an otherwise meritorious case — to take extreme measures to 
prevent the perjury from occurring. The lawyer was successful and, from our unanimous and 
remote perspective, it is now pellucidly clear that the client suffered no “legally cognizable 
prejudice.” 
 
Nevertheless, beneath the surface of this case there are areas of uncertainty that cannot be 
resolved today. A lawyer’s certainty that a change in his client’s recollection is a harbinger of 
intended perjury — as well as judicial review of such apparent certainty — should be tempered 
by the realization that, after reflection, the most honest witness may recall (or sincerely believe 
he recalls) details that he previously overlooked. Similarly, the post-trial review of a lawyer’s 
pretrial threat to expose perjury that had not yet been committed — and, indeed, may have 
been prevented by the threat — is by no means the same as review of the way in which such a 
threat may actually have been carried out. Thus, one can be convinced — as I am — that this 
lawyer’s actions were a proper way to provide his client with effective representation without 
confronting the much more difficult questions of what a lawyer must, should, or may do after his 
client has given testimony that the lawyer does not believe. The answer to such questions may 
well be colored by the particular circumstances attending the actual event and its aftermath. 
 
Because JUSTICE BLACKMUN has preserved such questions for another day, and because I 
do not understand him to imply any adverse criticism of this lawyer’s representation of his client, 
I join his opinion concurring in the judgment. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why did the majority conclude that Whiteside was planning to commit perjury? Is it 
possible that he recollected something new about the incident? Is it appropriate to rely 
on the trial court’s finding of fact about what Whiteside saw? 
2. Why do the concurring justices disagree with the majority opinion? How do they think 
attorneys should evaluate the truthfulness of client testimony? 
 
People v. DePallo, 754 N.E.2d 751 (NY 2001) 
 
Summary: Michael DePallo was charged with the murder of an elderly man. Initially, 
DePallo told his attorney that he had participated in the murder, but then insisted on 
testifying that he had been at home the entire night. In an ex parte meeting, DePallo’s 
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attorney informed the court that his client was planning to commit perjury. The court 
permitted DePallo to testify in a narrative form, and his attorney did not use his testimony 
in summation. DePallo was convicted and appealed. The Appellate Division and Court of 
Appeals affirmed, holding that DePallo had no right to commit perjury, and his attorney’s 
disclosure to the court did not violate attorney-client confidentiality. 
 
WESLEY, J. 
 
This case calls upon us to clarify a defense attorney’s responsibilities when confronted with the 
dilemma that a client intends to commit perjury. 
 
Defendant and his accomplices executed a calculated attack on a 71-year-old man, ransacking 
his home, stabbing him repeatedly with a knife and scissors, and finally bludgeoning him to 
death with a shovel. Defendant’s blood was found at the scene and on the victim’s clothing. 
Defendant’s fingerprint was also discovered in the home and, upon arrest, he made several 
incriminating statements placing him at the scene of the crime. Defendant also insisted on 
making a statement during pre-trial proceedings in which he admitted that he had forced one of 
his accomplices to participate in the crime under threat of death. 
 
At trial, defense counsel noted at a sidebar that he had advised defendant that he did not have 
to testify and should not testify, but if he did, he should do so truthfully. Defendant confirmed 
counsel’s statements to the court but insisted on testifying. Defense counsel elicited defendant’s 
direct testimony in narrative form. Defendant testified that he was home the entire evening of 
the crime, and that his contrary statements to the police were induced by promises that he could 
return home. During the prosecutor’s cross-examination, defense counsel made numerous 
objections. 
 
After both sides rested, defense counsel addressed the court in Chambers, outside the 
presence of defendant and the prosecutor. Counsel stated: 
 
Prior to the defendant’s testimony, I informed the Court that the defendant was going to 
take the witness stand, and that he had previously told me he was involved in this 
homicide. Although I did not get into details with him, I don’t know exactly what his 
involvement was, but he had stated to me that he was there that night, he had gotten at 
least that far. 
 
Knowing that, I told the defendant I cannot participate in any kind of perjury, and you 
really shouldn’t perjure yourself. But, he, you know, dealing with him is kind of difficult 
and he was insistent upon taking the stand. He never told me what he was going to say, 
but I knew it was not going to be the truth, at least to the extent of him denying 
participation. 
 
The court then noted that counsel had complied with the procedures for such circumstances as 
outlined in People v. Salquerro. During summations, defense counsel did not refer to 
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defendant’s trial testimony. Defendant was convicted of two counts of second degree murder, 
two counts of first degree robbery, two counts of first degree burglary, and one count of second 
degree robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed, rejecting defendant’s claims that he was 
denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney disclosed the perjured testimony to the 
court and that the ex parte conference was a material stage of trial. A Judge of this Court 
granted leave to appeal, and we now affirm. 
 
The ethical dilemma presented by this case is not new. Defense attorneys have confronted the 
problem of client perjury since the latter part of the 19th century when the disqualification of 
criminal defendants to testify in their own defense was abolished by statute in federal courts and 
in most states, including New York in 1869. A lawyer with a perjurious client must contend with 
competing considerations—duties of zealous advocacy, confidentiality and loyalty to the client 
on the one hand, and a responsibility to the courts and our truth-seeking system of justice on 
the other. Courts, bar associations and commentators have struggled to define the most 
appropriate role for counsel caught in such situations. 
 
Notwithstanding these ethical concerns, a defendant’s right to testify at trial does not include a 
right to commit perjury, and the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel does not 
compel counsel to assist or participate in the presentation of perjured testimony. In light of these 
limitations, an attorney’s duty to zealously represent a client is circumscribed by an “equally 
solemn duty to comply with the law and standards of professional conduct to prevent and 
disclose frauds upon the court.” The United States Supreme Court has noted that counsel must 
first attempt to persuade the client not to pursue the unlawful course of conduct. If unsuccessful, 
withdrawal from representation may be an appropriate response, but when confronted with the 
problem during trial, as here, an “attorney’s revelation of his client's perjury to the court is a 
professionally responsible and acceptable response.” 
 
This approach is consistent with the ethical obligations of attorneys under New York’s Code of 
Professional Responsibility. DR 7-102 expressly prohibits an attorney, under penalty of 
sanctions, from knowingly using perjured testimony or false evidence; knowingly making a false 
statement of fact; participating in the creation or preservation of evidence when the attorney 
knows, or it is obvious, that the evidence is false; counseling or assisting the client in conduct 
the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent; and knowingly engaging in other illegal conduct. 
Additionally, DR 7-102(b)(1) mandates that “a lawyer who receives information clearly 
establishing that the client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a 
tribunal shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and if the client refuses or is 
unable to do so, the lawyer shall reveal the fraud to the affected tribunal, except when the 
information is protected as a confidence or secret.” 
 
In accordance with these responsibilities, defense counsel first sought to dissuade defendant 
from testifying falsely, and indeed from testifying at all. Defendant insisted on proceeding to give 
the perjured testimony and, thereafter, counsel properly notified the court. 
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The intent to commit a crime is not a protected confidence or secret, Moreover, in this case 
defense counsel did not reveal the substance of any client confidence as defendant had already 
admitted at a pre-trial hearing that he had forced one of his accomplices to participate in the 
crime under threat of death. 
 
Finally, defendant contends that his counsel should have sought to withdraw from the case. 
However, substitution of counsel would do little to resolve the problem and might, in fact, have 
facilitated any fraud defendant wished to perpetrate upon the court. We agree with Salquerro 
that withdrawal of counsel could present other unsatisfactory scenarios which ultimately could 
lead to introduction of the perjured testimony in any event or further delay the proceedings. 
 
In this case, defendant was allowed to present his testimony in narrative form to the jury. The 
remainder of defense counsel’s representation throughout the trial was more than competent. 
The lawyer’s actions properly balanced the duties he owed to his client and to the court and 
criminal justice system; “since there has been no breach of any recognized professional duty, it 
follows that there can be no deprivation of the right to assistance of counsel.” 
 
We also reject defendant’s contention that his right to be present during a material stage of trial 
was violated by his absence from the ex parte communication between the court and his 
attorney. Although a defendant has a constitutional and statutory right to be present at all 
material stages of a trial, and at ancillary proceedings when he or she may have something 
valuable to contribute or when presence would have a substantial effect on a defendant's ability 
to defend against the charges, this right does not extend to circumstances involving matters of 
law or procedure that have no potential for meaningful input from a defendant. 
 
The purpose of this ancillary proceeding was simply to place on the record matters which had 
already occurred regarding defendant’s perjury and his attorney's response. The conference 
memorialized counsel’s dilemma for appellate review and possible analysis of counsel’s 
professional ethical obligations. Thus, defendant’s presence was not mandated; it had no 
bearing on his ability to defend against the charges or on the outcome of this jury trial. The 
situation here is akin to People v. Keen. In Keen, we held that the defendant had no right to be 
present at two ex parte conferences held at defense counsel's behest which involved 
discussions regarding the testimony and anticipated perjury of a key witness—matters which we 
characterized as simply procedural. 
 
In sum, because the subject matter of the ex parte communication here was merely procedural, 
and there was no hearing or other factual inquiry beyond that which had transpired earlier in the 
proceedings, defendant had no right to be present. 
 
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. 
 
Questions: 
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1. The New York Times reported on this murder here. Michael DePallo and his two friends 
were 15-16 years old and living in a foster-care group home on Staten Island, when they 
broke into the home of 71 year old Gus Ferrera and murdered him. How should an 
attorney evaluate the truthfulness of a teenager’s testimony? 
2. Should DePallo’s attorney have disclosed his belief that DePallo planned to commit 
perjury? Would nondisclosure have affected the outcome? Should the attorney have 
prevented DePallo from testifying? Could it have improved the outcome? 
 
Knowledge of Falsehood 
 
Oh don’t you lie to me, because it makes me mad, and I’ll get evil as a man can be.99 
 
Attorneys are obligated to prevent or cure client perjury only if they “actually know” that their 
client probably will commit perjury or has committed perjury. Under Model Rule 3.3, a 
“reasonable belief” of perjury does not constitute actual knowledge. And in general, courts have 
adopted very high standards for “actual knowledge” of perjury.  
 
All courts require a knowledge of perjury based on specific, actual facts, rather than a mere 
belief. The fact that a client’s account is internally inconsistent, has changed over time, or 
conflicts with other evidence is insufficient to create a knowledge of perjury. Defendants may 
even present testimony that appears to be manifestly incredible or absurd, so long as it is not 
demonstrably perjury. 
 
However, different courts have adopted different interpretations of the “actual knowledge” test. 
Some courts require a “firm factual basis that the testimony will be false.” Others require either 
“good cause to believe the defendant’s proposed testimony would be deliberately untruthful” or 
a good faith determination of falsehood “based on objective circumstances firmly rooted in fact.” 
 
Some courts have even rejected the “actual knowledge” test entirely. Illinois gives attorneys 
“great discretion” in determining whether their clients will commit perjury. Some jurisdictions 
require that counsel possess proof of perjury beyond a reasonable doubt. And others require 
“compelling support” for the expectation of perjury. 
 
I was taught to never tell a lie, to look you in the eye and tell it like it is. Always thought that you 
would be the same. It’s such a shame that’s not the way it is.100 
 
State v. Hischke, 639 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 2002) 
 
Summary: The police found marijuana in Hischke’s jacket pocket and charged him with 
possession. Bishop represented Hischke. Initially, Hischke told Bishop the marijuana 
was his, but when he learned that a third possession offense would cause an enhanced 
																																																								
99 Hudson “Tampa Red” Whitaker, Don’t You Lie to Me (1940). 
100 Joan Jett and the Blackhearts, Little Liar, Up Your Alley (1988). 
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sentence, he denied ownership. Bishop informed the court that Hischke planned to 
commit perjury, and the court prohibited Hischke from testifying about the ownership of 
the marijuana. Hischke was convicted and appealed, claiming ineffective assistance of 
counsel. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hischke had no right to commit 
perjury, and Bishop acted reasonably under the circumstances. The concurrence argued 
that criminal defense attorneys should never inform the court that their client intends to 
commit perjury. 
 
STREIT, Justice. 
 
Mark Hischke made an eleventh-hour decision to deny possession of marijuana after previously 
admitting to the police and his lawyer the marijuana belonged to him. Hischke’s trial counsel, 
John Bishop, informed the court Hischke intended to commit perjury. After a jury trial, the court 
convicted Hischke of possession of marijuana. Hischke appeals contending he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel when his trial lawyer alerted the court to his “personal belief” 
Hischke planned to present perjured testimony. Because we find Bishop had good cause to 
believe Hischke’s proposed testimony would be deliberately untruthful, we affirm. 
 
I. Facts 
 
On December 5, 1999, Waterloo police officers executed an arrest warrant on Eric Twesme at 
his apartment. When the officers arrived, Twesme and Mark Hischke were present in the 
apartment. Twesme answered the door and permitted the officers to enter. In the apartment, the 
officers saw syringes, spoons, and cotton. The officers asked Hischke to wait in the hallway 
where he consented to a search of his person. The officer discovered a syringe in Hischke’s 
shirt pocket. Before going to the police station, Twesme asked the officers for a jacket. One of 
the officers saw a leather jacket in the apartment draped over the back of the chair where 
Hischke had been sitting. The officer asked Twesme if the jacket was his and Twesme said it 
did not belong to him. Hischke admitted ownership of the jacket but said he was not responsible 
for anything in the pockets. During a consent search, the police officer found a small bag of 
marijuana in the jacket. 
 
Mark Hischke was charged with possession of marijuana. On the day the trial was scheduled to 
begin, Hischke's attorney, John Bishop, moved to withdraw from the case. Bishop stated his 
client initially claimed ownership of the marijuana but shortly before the trial Hischke denied 
ownership. Bishop explained to the court, 
 
It's my personal belief that Mr. Hischke’s original statements to me that the marijuana 
was his was the truth, and if Mr. Hischke requires me to present evidence otherwise I 
think I would be presenting perjured testimony, and so I don’t feel I can ethically be 
permitted to do that. But Mr. Hischke wishes to present that defense and that’s, I guess, 
the dilemma we have here. 
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The district court informed Hischke he would not be permitted to testify as to the ownership of 
the marijuana. Hischke declined to testify and the jury found him guilty as charged. 
 
On appeal, Hischke contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel when Bishop 
informed the court he believed his client was going to present perjured testimony. Hischke 
argues it is not sufficient for an attorney to merely “believe” a client intends to commit perjury. 
Hischke asks us to adopt a standard that requires an attorney to have “actual knowledge” the 
client's testimony will be false. Hischke argues prejudice should be presumed. 
 
The State contends an attorney need only have a “firm factual basis” for believing a client plans 
to lie before taking any measures designed to prevent such perjury. The State argues Bishop 
satisfied this standard. 
 
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Hischke must demonstrate both 
ineffective assistance and prejudice. Both elements must be proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence. If a claim lacks one of the elements of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it is 
not necessary for us to address the other element. 
 
Hischke must first prove Bishop’s performance was not within the normal range of competence. 
We measure the attorney’s performance by standards of reasonableness consistent with 
“prevailing professional norms.” We begin our analysis with the presumption Bishop performed 
competently. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are more likely to be found where 
counsel lacked diligence as opposed to the exercise of judgment. 
 
Bishop believed his client planned on committing perjury. Trial counsel may not knowingly 
present perjured testimony. When counsel knows a client has committed perjury or plans on 
doing so, counsel may reveal the perjury to the court. On this appeal, we must determine 
whether Bishop performed competently and reasonably in deciding to inform the court his client 
intended to present perjured testimony. 
 
The central issue before us is what standard of knowledge is required before a lawyer may 
inform the court of his or her client's plan to commit perjury. There are several factors to 
consider in making this determination: (1) how certain counsel was the proposed testimony was 
false; (2) at what stage of the proceedings counsel discovered the plan; and (3) the ways in 
which the attorney may be able to dissuade his or her client from committing perjury. 
 
Other jurisdictions have addressed the standard to be applied when a lawyer informs the court 
his or her client intends to commit perjury. Some courts require a lawyer to have knowledge 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” before disclosing to the court the belief a client is planning on 
committing perjury. Other courts have adopted the “firm factual basis” standard. Another court 
requires a “good faith determination” by counsel the defendant will commit perjury when he 
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testifies. Certain other courts require counsel to engage in an independent investigation of the 
facts before determining the defendant’s anticipated testimony will constitute perjury. 
 
We have not addressed this particular issue in Iowa since 1978. At that time, we addressed this 
issue within the context of a case with factual circumstances very similar to the case before us. 
In Whiteside, the lawyer relied on the defendant’s pronouncement shortly before trial that was 
inconsistent with his story during the initial phases of the proceedings. In asserting self-defense 
the defendant initially claimed he “thought” the victim had a gun but he did not actually see the 
gun. Then, before trial, the defendant told counsel he intended to testify he did see a gun 
because without such testimony he was “dead.” We concluded a lawyer is required to be 
convinced with good cause to believe the defendant's proposed testimony would be deliberately 
untruthful. Moreover, the lawyer was not required to conduct an independent investigation of the 
facts before determining his client planned to commit perjury. We reaffirm our holding in 
Whiteside. 
 
We now turn to the facts before us to determine whether Hischke was denied effective 
assistance when Bishop alerted the court to Hischke’s plan to testify falsely. These are the 
relevant facts as they occurred before Hischke’s change in story. Immediately before Hischke’s 
arrest, he told the police officers he owned the leather jacket but was not responsible for 
anything inside the pockets. This statement indicates Hischke was aware the officers would find 
something illegal in the jacket. Consistent with Hischke’s declaration of ownership, Twesme told 
the police officers the leather jacket did not belong to him. Hischke then wore the leather jacket 
to the police station. During his initial contact with Bishop, Hischke stated the jacket belonged to 
him. 
 
Shortly before the trial was scheduled to begin, Hischke learned of the enhanced sentence that 
would accompany his third conviction on a charge of possession of marijuana. At this time 
Hischke changed his testimony and told Bishop the jacket did not belong to him. Hischke claims 
he had only been taking “the rap” for his friend Twesme but would no longer do so because of 
the enhanced punishment Hischke faced. This statement is questionable because of its 
lateness. 
 
In addition to the facts above, other factors contributed to Bishop's objectively reasonable basis 
for believing Hischke intended to commit perjury. The police officers found a syringe in 
Hischke’s shirt pocket when they patted him down outside of the apartment. Hischke was 
visiting a friend who had an outstanding warrant for selling morphine and who lives in an 
apartment openly littered with drug paraphernalia. As stated above, this was not Hischke’s first 
brush with the law. He has two prior marijuana convictions. 
 
Given these facts, we find Bishop performed competently and reasonably in deciding to inform 
the court of Hischke’s recent change in testimony. Bishop’s belief was reasonable under these 
circumstances. He did not merely suspect or guess Hischke would commit perjury. The facts do 
not support a finding it was simply Bishop’s “gut-level belief” Hischke planned to commit perjury. 
Moreover, his decision to act on this personal belief is entirely consistent with “prevailing 
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professional norms.” Bishop was “convinced with good cause to believe defendant's proposed 
testimony would be deliberately untruthful.” Further, it was not necessary for Bishop to conduct 
an independent investigation of the facts. 
 
We decline to adopt the standard of “actual knowledge” suggested by Hischke. Such a standard 
would be virtually impossible to satisfy unless the lawyer had a direct confession from his or her 
client or personally witnessed the event in question. Consequently, the standard of actual 
knowledge would eviscerate the rules of professional responsibility forbidding a lawyer from 
presenting perjured testimony. 
 
In finding Bishop’s performance was within the normal range of competence we are not stating 
Bishop was required to take the particular course of action he chose to pursue. This has not 
been presented to us. We recognize when counsel is faced with the situation of client perjury, 
he or she has competing interests at stake. Counsel must contend with duties of zealous 
advocacy, confidentiality, and loyalty to the client. On the other hand, these interests are 
counter-balanced by duties of accountability to the courts and justice. In order to accommodate 
these competing interests, there are various appropriate options a lawyer may choose among to 
decide how to handle such a situation. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
We conclude Hischke’s trial counsel acted reasonably when he informed the court his client 
intended to commit perjury. Hischke satisfied the requisite standard that a lawyer must be 
“convinced with good cause to believe the defendant's proposed testimony would be 
deliberately untruthful.” Because we find Hischke was not denied effective assistance of 
counsel, we do not address whether Hischke has demonstrated prejudice. We affirm. 
 
CARTER, Justice (concurring specially). 
 
I concur in affirming defendant's conviction. 
 
This case vividly illustrates the difficulty in determining whether a lawyer has a sufficiently 
convincing reason to believe a client is about to commit perjury. I have no disagreement with the 
test, which the opinion of the court employs for making such determinations consistent with the 
lawyer's ethical obligation. Nor do I question the conclusion of defendant’s counsel in the 
present case in the face of that test. The decision could have gone either way on these facts. 
 
This case does not discuss, because the issue is not raised, whether the action that defendant's 
counsel took upon becoming convinced of the impending perjury was proper. I am convinced 
that it was not. My disagreement with defense counsel’s action flows from a belief that it is never 
proper for counsel to advise the court that counsel believes a client will testify falsely. Such 
conduct will inevitably damage the client's case beyond repair. 
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Counsel who reach the conclusion that a client is about to testify falsely should first attempt to 
dissuade the client from giving the offending testimony. If unsuccessful, counsel should attempt 
a quiet withdrawal from the representation. The reasons set forth in the application to withdraw 
should only identify the existence of an unspecified attorney-client disagreement that might 
compromise the attorney’s ethical responsibilities. At no time should the matter of impending 
perjury be disclosed. If the attempt to withdraw fails, then counsel should proceed with the case 
and conduct any questioning of the witness so as not to invite the suspected perjury. If the 
suspected perjury nonetheless occurs, counsel should make no reference of it in arguing the 
case to the trier of fact. I believe that if a lawyer proceeds in this manner, he or she may fully 
satisfy the lawyer’s ethical obligation to prevent perjury without the necessity of advising the 
court as to the client’s intent to testify falsely. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Is it possible that Hischke’s proposed testimony was truthful? Did his attorney actually 
know it was false? 
2. What standard should criminal defense attorneys adopt in determining whether their 
client will commit or has committed perjury? 
 
Further Reading: 
 
● Ellen Henak, When the Interests of Self, Clients, and Colleagues Collide: The Ethics of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 33 Am. J. Trial Adv. 347 (2009) 
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6.5: Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 
You never give me your money. You only give me your funny paper. And in the middle of 
negotiations, you break down.101 
 
Attorneys have a duty to inform their clients about all of the options available to them. 
Accordingly, in relation to potential civil litigation, attorneys must inform their clients about 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, when available and appropriate under the 
circumstances. Among other things, attorneys should advise their clients about the possibility of 
negotiating a settlement, entering mediation, or pursuing arbitration. 
 
The overwhelming majority of civil actions never go to trial. While settlement rates depend on 
the jurisdiction, about 95% of civil actions end in a settlement. More often than not, settlement 
produces a better outcome for all parties. Litigation is expensive, time-consuming, and risky. It 
can result in a large award, or it can result in nothing. Settlement allows the parties to arrive at a 
compromise that reflects their mutual assessment of the value of the claims and the likelihood of 
success. 
 
In addition, settlements can be more flexible than litigation, allowing the parties to negotiate an 
outcome that litigation could not produce. Of course, there are limits on negotiation and 
settlement. For example, the parties cannot agree on an illegal settlement. And settlement 
requires a meeting of the minds, which may not always be possible, especially if the parties 
have different assessments of the value of the claims and the likelihood of success. 
 
Mediation is a form of negotiation that involves a neutral third-party mediator, who helps the 
parties reach a resolution. Mediators typically do not decide the outcome of the mediation. But 
in some cases, they may give the parties their own assessment of the value of the claims and 
their likelihood of success. The mediator’s third-party opinion may help the parties reach a 
meeting of the minds and settle. 
 
Arbitration resembles mediation, in that it involves a neutral third-party arbitrator. But unlike in 
mediation, the arbitrator typically provides a binding decision on the merits. Parties must agree 
to arbitration and agree to be bound by the arbitrator’s decision. While judicial review of the 
arbitrator’s decision is possible in some circumstances, it is very deferential, in order to preserve 
the finality of the arbitration. Typically, judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision is limited to 
arbitrator bias and misconduct. Even a manifest error of law is usually not grounds for review. 
 
Notably, parties can agree to arbitration in advance, and it is an increasingly common feature of 
many contracts. Many people worry that these arbitration agreements result in people 
unwittingly signing away their right to litigate. Some states have resisted enforcing arbitration 
agreements, but those state laws are often preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. 
 
Model Rule 4.1: Comments 
 
Misrepresentation 
 
1. A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client’s behalf, but 
generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts. A 
misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another 
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person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by partially true 
but misleading statements or omissions that are the equivalent of affirmative false 
statements. For dishonest conduct that does not amount to a false statement or for 
misrepresentations by a lawyer other than in the course of representing a client, see 
Rule 8.4. 
 
Statements of Fact 
 
2. This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be 
regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted 
conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as 
statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a 
transaction and a party’s intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are 
ordinarily in this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except 
where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud. Lawyers should be mindful 
of their obligations under applicable law to avoid criminal and tortious misrepresentation. 
 
Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Geisler, 938 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1997) 
 
Summary: Milton McNealy was injured by a car in Louisville, Kentucky. Maria Geisler 
represented McNealy in an action against the driver. Defendant’s counsel Kevin Ford 
asked to depose McNealy, but Geisler postponed because he was too sick. When 
McNealy died, Geisler contacted Ford and told him her client wanted to settle, but didn’t 
tell him McNealy was dead. Geisler and Ford agreed on a settlement, which McNealy’s 
son signed, and Ford learned McNealy was dead. Ford paid the settlement, but filed a 
bar complaint against Geisler for failing to disclose McNealy’s death. The Kentucky 
Supreme Court held that attorneys must notify opposing counsel if their client dies and 
reprimanded Geisler.   
 
The Board of Governors of the Kentucky Bar Association, as a result of charges instigated 
against respondent, Maria T. Geisler of Louisville, found her guilty of violating SCR 3.130-4.1 by 
failing to divulge the fact of her client’s death to opposing counsel prior to entering into and 
consummating settlement negotiations. Neither the KBA nor the respondent requested review of 
this case. However, this Court, on its own motion, elected to review the question of whether the 
respondent’s actions were within the scope of SCR 3.130-4.1. 
 
The critical facts in the present case involve respondent’s filing of a civil action on behalf of 
Milton F. McNealy for injuries he sustained when he was struck by an automobile while walking 
along a street in Louisville, Kentucky on November 26, 1993. Subsequent to the filing of the 
initial complaint, defendant’s counsel, P. Kevin Ford, filed a notice to take the deposition of 
McNealy. Respondent contacted Ford and told him that McNealy was physically unable to give 
a deposition since he was in very poor health. Consequently, the deposition of McNealy was 
never taken. 
 
McNealy died on January 26, 1995. Shortly thereafter respondent contacted Ford and stated 
that her client wanted to settle the case and asked him to forward an offer of a settlement. After 
an exchange of offers and counter-offers, a settlement was reached on February 9, 1995. On 
February 23, 1995, McNealy’s son, Joe, was duly appointed as the administrator of his father’s 
estate. Ford eventually forwarded the settlement documents along with a settlement check to 
respondent on March 13, 1995. On March 22, 1995, Ford received back the settlement 
documents which had been executed by Joe. Upon receipt of the signed documents, Ford 
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learned for the first time of McNealy’s death. Ford took no further action to bring the court’s 
attention to the settlement documents that were signed by the Administrator, but instead, sent 
the agreed order of dismissal to the circuit court which was signed and entered by the court. No 
appeal was taken. 
 
Thereafter, Ford filed a bar complaint against respondent on May 5, 1995 due to her failure to 
advise Ford that her client, McNealy, had passed away during the settlement negotiation period 
of January 26, 1995 through February 9, 1995. The chair of the inquiry tribunal of the KBA 
charged respondent with violating SCR 3.130-4.1 for failing to divulge the fact of her client’s 
death to opposing counsel prior to entering into and consummating settlement negotiations. 
After submission to the Board of Governors, the Board determined that respondent was guilty of 
the charge and recommended to this Court that it issue a private reprimand and a public opinion 
against an unnamed attorney for the benefit of other members of the KBA. 
 
In its recommendation to this Court, the KBA noted that there is no KBA Ethics Opinion on point 
with this matter and no Kentucky case law dealing directly with this issue. However, the 
American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
hereinafter ABA, squarely addressed this issue when it issued Formal Opinion 95-397 entitled, 
“Duty to Disclose Death of Client.” 
 
Deciding that counsel has the duty to disclose the death of her client to opposing counsel and to 
the court when the counsel next communicates with either, the ABA specifically stated in its 
opinion: 
 
When a lawyer’s client dies in the midst of the settlement negotiations of a pending 
lawsuit in which the client was the claimant, the lawyer has a duty to inform opposing 
counsel and the Court in the lawyer's first communications with either after the lawyer 
has learned of the fact. 
 
The ABA’s opinion further addressed the question of whether an attorney even has authority to 
act when her client dies. The opinion determined that prior to death, a lawyer acts on behalf of 
an identified client. When the death occurs, however, the lawyer ceases to represent that 
identified client. The ABA maintained that any subsequent communication to opposing counsel 
with respect to the matter would be the equivalent of a knowing, affirmative misrepresentation 
should the lawyer fail to disclose the fact that she no longer represents the previously identified 
client. 
 
Basically, the ABA determined that a lawyer must inform her adversary of the death of her client 
in her first communication with the adversary after she has learned of that fact. Likewise, the 
lawyer must also inform her adversary, in the same communication, that the personal 
representative, if one has been appointed, of her former client is accepting the outstanding 
settlement offer. Thus, the ABA concluded that a failure to disclose the death of a client is 
tantamount to making a false statement of material fact within the meaning of Model Rule 
4.1(a). 
 
Respondent argues that the ABA’s opinion should not apply to her as it was issued on 
September 18, 1995, many months after the relevant facts in this disciplinary proceeding. She 
further maintains that ABA Opinion 95-397 is subject to conflicting conclusions and, thus, should 
not be followed. 
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Relying on the additional comments to SCR 3.130-4.1, respondent contends that she did have a 
duty to disclose “facts” or “evidence.” Respondent asserts, however, that an attorney is typically 
not required to affirmatively reveal evidence that is unknown and potentially helpful to the 
adverse party. Respondent further maintains that McNealy’s death had no significant bearing on 
the ultimate settlement that was achieved, and that Ford did not oppose the settlement even 
after it was revealed that McNealy was dead. Finally, respondent contends that Ford knew 
McNealy had been in poor health and that McNealy’s death was a matter of public record 
reported in the daily newspaper. Respondent argues that she felt she had an ethical duty not to 
volunteer information about her client’s passing. Thus, respondent maintains that it was Ford’s 
own fault to have mistakenly believed that McNealy was alive at the time the settlement was 
negotiated, because if Ford had wanted to know whether McNealy was dead, all he had to do 
was ask respondent about it. 
 
Kentucky’s SCR 3.130-4.1 specifically provides: “In the course of representing a client a lawyer 
shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person.” This Court 
recently considered the application of that rule in Mitchell v. Kentucky Bar Assoc. That case 
involved a public administrator of an estate who admitted that he had lied to two heirs by falsely 
stating that an action to determine ownership of some property had been filed, when in fact, no 
such action had been taken. The respondent in Mitchell, after offering extensive mitigating 
evidence, including the fact that the heirs’ interest had not been impaired, received a public 
reprimand. 
 
Moreover, in Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., the federal district court, 
relying on Model Rule 4.1 held that a plaintiff’s attorney had a duty to disclose the death of her 
client. The circumstances in that case are strikingly similar to the case at bar in that: 
 
Here, plaintiff’s attorney did not make a false statement regarding the death of the 
plaintiff. He was never placed in a position to do so because during the two weeks of 
settlement negotiations defendants’ attorney never thought to ask if plaintiff was still 
alive. Instead, in hopes of inducing settlement, plaintiff’s attorney chose not to disclose 
plaintiff’s death. 
 
Ultimately, the Virzi court came down on the side of disclosure stating: 
 
This Court feels that candor and honesty necessarily require disclosure of such a 
significant fact as the death of one's client. Opposing counsel does not have to deal with 
his adversary as he would deal in the marketplace. Standards of ethics require greater 
honesty, greater candor, and greater disclosure, even though it might not be in the 
interest of the client or his estate. 
 
Thus, we hold that the respondent’s failure to disclose her client's death to opposing counsel 
amounted to an affirmative misrepresentation in violation of our SCR 3.130-4.1. While the 
comments to SCR 3.130-4.1 do indicate that there is no duty to disclose “relevant facts,” those 
same comments go on to state that: 
 
A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of 
another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by 
failure to act. 
 
Consequently, respondent cannot reasonably argue that her failure to reveal this critical piece of 
information constituted ethical conduct within the framework of SCR 3.130-4.1. 
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Furthermore, respondent’s argument that the burden of correcting the mistaken belief that her 
client was alive should be placed on Ford, is incorrect. Attorneys in circumstances similar to 
those at bar operate under a reasonable assumption that the other attorney’s client, whether a 
legal fiction or in actual flesh, actually exists and, consequently, that opposing counsel has 
authority to act on their behalf. Here, respondent obtained authority to act on the behalf of Joe, 
the administrator, but not McNealy, once he passed away. Basically, when the offer was made 
after McNealy's death, respondent had no authority to act on his behalf. Despite this fact, 
respondent proceeded to settle the case under the guise that she still had the authority to do so 
on behalf of McNealy. Her letters to Ford clearly imply this. Accordingly, this Court cannot go so 
far as to say that such conduct was ethical under the circumstances and within SCR 3.130-4.1. 
 
It should be noted, that this Court fails to understand why guidelines are needed for an attorney 
to understand that when their client dies, they are under an obligation to tell opposing counsel 
such information. This seems to be a matter of common ethics and just plain sense. However, 
because attorneys such as respondent cannot discern such matters and require written 
guidelines so as to figure out their ethical convictions, this Court adopts the ruling of ABA 
Opinion 95-397. 
 
Thus, upon our careful review of the record, we find that the evidence does not support the 
recommendation of the KBA and consequently we adopt the following order. 
 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
 
That respondent, Maria T. Geisler, be, and hereby is, publicly reprimanded for failing to notify 
her opposing counsel that her client had died during settlement negotiations. The respondent is 
further ordered to pay the costs of this action pursuant to SCR 3.450. 
 
JOHNSTONE, J., dissents and would concur with the recommendation of the Board of 
Governors by issuing a private reprimand against an unnamed attorney. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Why would it be material to Ford and Ford’s client whether McNealy was alive at the 
time of the settlement? Is it possible that it could have affected their decision whether to 
settle or the amount of the settlement? 
2. The court assumes that Geisler should have known that she had a duty to disclose 
McNealy’s death. Do you agree? Could she have reasonably believed that she had a 
duty to McNealy’s estate not to disclose? 
 
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Opinion 06-
439, Lawyer’s Obligation of Truthfulness When Representing a Client in Negotiation: 
Application to Caucused Mediation (April 12, 2006) 
 
Under Model Rule 4.1, in the context of a negotiation, including a caucused mediation, a lawyer 
representing a client may not make a false statement of material fact to a third person. 
However, statements regarding a party’s negotiating goals or its willingness to compromise, as 
well as statements that can fairly be characterized as negotiation “puffing,” ordinarily are not 
considered ‘‘false statements of material fact” within the meaning of the Model Rules. 
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In this opinion, we discuss the obligation of a lawyer to be truthful when making statements on 
behalf of clients in negotiations, including the specialized form of negotiation known as 
caucused mediation. 
 
It is not unusual in a negotiation for a party, directly or through counsel, to make a statement in 
the course of communicating its position that is less than entirely forthcoming. For example, 
parties to a settlement negotiation often understate their willingness to make concessions to 
resolve the dispute. A plaintiff might insist that it will not agree to resolve a dispute for less than 
$200, when, in reality, it is willing to accept as little as $150 to put an end to the matter. 
Similarly, a defendant manufacturer in patent infringement litigation might repeatedly reject the 
plaintiffs demand that a license be part of any settlement agreement, when in reality, the 
manufacturer has no genuine interest in the patented product and, once a new patent is issued, 
intends to introduce a new product that will render the old one obsolete. In the criminal law 
context, a prosecutor might not reveal an ultimate willingness to grant immunity as part of a 
cooperation agreement in order to retain influence over the witness. 
 
A party in a negotiation also might exaggerate or emphasize the strengths, and minimize or 
deemphasize the weaknesses, of its factual or legal position. A buyer of products or services, 
for example, might overstate its confidence in the availability of alternate sources of supply to 
reduce the appearance of dependence upon the supplier with which it is negotiating. Such 
remarks, often characterized as “posturing” or “puffing,” are statements upon which parties to a 
negotiation ordinarily would not be expected justifiably to rely, and must be distinguished from 
false statements of material fact. An example of a false statement of material fact would be a 
lawyer representing an employer in labor negotiations stating to union lawyers that adding a 
particular employee benefit will cost the company an additional $100 per employee, when the 
lawyer knows that it actually will cost only $20 per employee. Similarly, it cannot be considered 
“posturing” for a lawyer representing a defendant to declare that documentary evidence will be 
submitted at trial in support of a defense when the lawyer knows that such documents do not 
exist or will be inadmissible. In the same vein, neither a prosecutor nor a criminal defense 
lawyer can tell the other party during a plea negotiation that they are aware of an eyewitness to 
the alleged crime when that is not the case. 
 
Applicable Provision of the Model Rules 
 
The issues addressed herein are governed by Rule 4.1(a). That rule prohibits a lawyer, “In the 
course of representing a client,” from knowingly making “a false statement of material fact or law 
to a third person.” As to what constitutes a “statement of fact,” Comment [2] to Rule 4.1 provides 
additional explanation:  
 
This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be 
regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted 
conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as 
statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a 
transaction and a party’s intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are 
ordinarily in this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except 
where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute bud. Lawyers should be mindful of 
their obligations under applicable law to avoid criminal and tortious misrepresentation. 
 
Truthfulness in Negotiation 
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It has been suggested by some commentators that lawyers must act honestly and in good faith 
and should not accept results that are unconscionably unfair, even when they would be to the 
advantage of the lawyer’s own client. Others have embraced the position that deception is 
inherent in the negotiation process and that a zealous advocate should take advantage of every 
opportunity to advance the cause of the client through such tactics within the bounds of the law. 
Still others have suggested that lawyers should strive to balance the apparent need to be less 
than wholly forthcoming in negotiation against the desirability of adhering to personal ethical and 
moral standards. Rule 4.1(a) applies only to statements of material fact that the lawyer knows to 
be false, and thus does not cover false statements that are made unknowingly, that concern 
immaterial matters, or that relate to neither fact nor law. Various proposals also have been 
advanced to change the applicable ethics rules, either by amending Rule 4.1 and its Comments, 
or by extending Rule 3.3 to negotiation, or by creating a parallel set of ethics rules for 
negotiating lawyers.  
 
Although this Committee has not addressed the precise question posed herein, we previously 
have opined on issues relating to lawyer candor in negotiations. For example, we stated in 
Formal Opinion 93-370 that, although a lawyer may in some circumstances ethically decline to 
answer a judge’s questions concerning the limits of the lawyer’s settlement authority in a civil 
matter; the lawyer is not justified in lying or engaging in misrepresentations in response to such 
an inquiry. We observed that: 
 
While a certain amount of posturing or puffery in settlement negotiations may be an 
acceptable convention between opposing counsel, a party’s actual bottom line or the 
settlement authority given to a lawyer is a material fact. A deliberate misrepresentation 
or lie to a judge in pretrial negotiations would be improper under Rule 4.1. Model Rule 
8.4(c) also prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation, and Rule 3.3 provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly 
make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal. The proper response by a 
lawyer to improper questions from a judge is to decline to answer, not to lie or 
misrepresent. 
 
Similarly, in Formal Opinion 94-387, we expressed the view that a lawyer representing a 
claimant in a negotiation has no obligation to inform the other party that the statute of limitations 
has run on the client's claim, but cannot make any affirmative misrepresentations about the 
facts. In contrast, we stated in Formal Opinion 95-397 that a lawyer engaged in settlement 
negotiations of a pending personal injury lawsuit in which the client was the plaintiff cannot 
conceal the client’s death, and must promptly notify opposing counsel and the court of that fact. 
Underlying this conclusion was the concept that the death of the client was a material fact, and 
that any continued communication with opposing counsel or the court would constitute an 
implicit misrepresentation that the client still was alive. Such a misrepresentation would be 
prohibited under Rule 4.1 and, with respect to the court, Rule 3.3. Opinions of the few state and 
local ethics committees that have addressed these issues are to the same effect. 
 
False statements of material fact by lawyers in negotiation, as well as implicit 
misrepresentations created by a lawyer's failure to make truthful statements, have in some 
cases also led to professional discipline. For example, in reliance on Formal Opinion 95-397, a 
Kentucky lawyer was disciplined under Rule 4.1 for settling a personal injury case without 
disclosing that her client had died. Similarly, in a situation raising issues like those presented in 
Formal Opinion 93-370, a New York lawyer was disciplined for stating to opposing counsel that, 
to the best of his knowledge, his client’s insurance coverage was limited to $200,000, when 
documents in his files showed that the client had $1,000,000 in coverage. Affirmative 
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misrepresentations by lawyers in negotiation also have been the basis for the imposition of 
litigation sanctions, and the setting aside of settlement agreements, as well as civil lawsuits 
against the lawyers themselves. 
 
In contrast, statements regarding negotiating goals or willingness to compromise, whether in the 
civil or criminal context, ordinarily are not considered statements of material fact within the 
meaning of the Rules. Thus, a lawyer may downplay a client’s willingness to compromise, or 
present a client’s bargaining position without disclosing the client’s “bottom line” position, in an 
effort to reach a more favorable resolution. Of the same nature are overstatements or 
understatements of the strengths or weaknesses of a client’s position in litigation or otherwise, 
or expressions of opinion as to the value or worth of the subject matter of the negotiation. Such 
statements generally are not considered material facts subject to Rule 4.1 
 
Application of the Governing Principles to Caucused Mediation 
 
Having delineated the requisite standard of truthfulness for a lawyer engaged in the negotiation 
process, we proceed to consider whether a different standard should apply to a lawyer 
representing a client in a caucused mediation. 
 
Mediation is a consensual process in which a neutral third party, without any power to impose a 
resolution, works with the disputants to help them reach agreement as to some or all of the 
issues in controversy. Mediators assist the parties by attempting to fashion creative and 
integrative solutions to their problems. In the most basic form of mediation, a neutral individual 
meets with all of the parties simultaneously and attempts to moderate and direct their 
discussions and negotiations. Whatever is communicated to the mediator by a party or its 
counsel is heard by all other participants in the mediation. In contrast, the mediator in a 
caucused mediation meets privately with the parties, either individually or in aligned groups. 
These caucuses are confidential, and the flow of information among the parties and their 
counsel is controlled by the mediator subject to the agreement of the respective parties. 
 
It has been argued that lawyers involved in caucused mediation should be held to a more 
exacting standard of truthfulness because a neutral is involved. The theory underlying this 
position is that, as in a game of “telephone,” the accuracy of communication deteriorates on 
successive transmissions between individuals, and those distortions tend to become magnified 
on continued retransmission. Mediators, in turn, may from time to time reframe information as 
part of their efforts to achieve a resolution of the dispute. To address this phenomenon, which 
has been called “deception synergy,” proponents of this view suggest that greater accuracy is 
required in statements made by the parties and their counsel in a caucused mediation than is 
required in face-to-face negotiations. 
 
It has also been asserted that, to the contrary, less attention need be paid to the accuracy of 
information being communicated in a mediation - particularly in a caucused mediation - 
precisely because consensual deception is intrinsic to the process. Information is imparted in 
confidence to the mediator, who controls the flow of information between the parties in terms of 
the content of the communications as well as how and when in the process it is conveyed. 
Supporters of this view argue that this dynamic creates a constant and agreed upon 
environment of imperfect information that ultimately helps the mediator assist the parties in 
resolving their disputes. 
 
Whatever the validity may be of these competing viewpoints, the ethical principles governing 
lawyer truthfulness do not permit a distinction to be drawn between the caucused mediation 
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context and other negotiation settings. The Model Rules do not require a higher standard of 
truthfulness in any particular negotiation contexts. Except for Rule 3.3, which is applicable only 
to statements before a “tribunal,” the ethical prohibitions against lawyer misrepresentations 
apply equally in all environments. Nor is a lower standard of truthfulness warranted because of 
the consensual nature of mediation. Parties otherwise protected against lawyer 
misrepresentation by Rule 4.1 are not permitted to waive that protection, whether explicitly 
through informed consent, or implicitly by agreeing to engage in a process in which it is 
somehow “understood that false statements will be made. Thus, the same standards that apply 
to lawyers engaged in negotiations must apply to them in the context of caucused mediation. 
 
We emphasize that, whether in a direct negotiation or in a caucused mediation, care must be 
taken by the lawyer to ensure that communications regarding the client’s position, which 
otherwise would not be considered statements “of fact,” are not conveyed in language that 
converts them, even inadvertently, into false factual representations. For example, even though 
a client’s Board of Directors has authorized a higher settlement figure, a lawyer may state in a 
negotiation that the client does not wish to settle for more than $50. However, it would not be 
permissible for the lawyer to state that the Board of Directors had formally disapproved any 
settlement in excess of $50, when authority had in fact been granted to settle for a higher sum. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Under Model Rule 4.1, in the context of a negotiation, including a caucused mediation, a lawyer 
representing a party may not make a false statement of material fact to a third person. However, 
statements regarding a party’s negotiating goals or its willingness to compromise, as well as 
statements that can fairly be characterized as negotiation “puffing,” are ordinarily not considered 
“false statements of material fact” within the meaning of the Model Rules. 
 
In re Fee, 898 P.2d 975 (Ariz. 1995) 
 
ZLAKET, Justice. 
 
Respondents’ client gave birth to a severely brain-damaged boy. In 1987, after unsuccessfully 
seeking representation from three other attorneys, she retained respondents on a 40% 
contingent fee. They filed a medical malpractice suit against the State of Arizona and Pima 
County on behalf of both mother and son. The child’s claim was dismissed, as was a pending 
conservatorship, after the trial court determined that Pizano ex rel. Walker v. Mart precluded all 
but the mother’s action for losses and expenses relating to the boy’s condition. 
 
The medical negligence claim was admittedly weak. Respondents’ success in developing a 
colorable racketeering theory, however, prompted negotiations. After an unproductive initial 
settlement conference, a second was scheduled for January 21, 1991, the day before trial. On 
Friday the 18th, the defense offered a structured settlement consisting of a cash lump sum 
followed by periodic payments. This proposal designated a separate amount for attorneys’ fees. 
After consulting an annuities expert, respondents and their client decided that her needs would 
likely be greater than those contemplated by the offer. 
 
The following Monday at 3:30 P.M., the parties, attorneys, and annuities experts met with the 
settlement judge. In a private conference with respondents’ group, the judge brought up the 
latest proposal. This prompted a discussion about the “common defense tactic” of making 
separate offers of attorneys’ fees. Respondents and the judge agreed that such a move 
frequently had the effect of “driving a wedge” between a plaintiff’s lawyer and his or her client by 
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causing fees to become a source of discomfort, disagreement, and potential conflict.102 Despite 
his recognition of this strategy, however, and respondents’ argument that the reasonableness of 
their fee was an issue for the trial court at the conclusion of the case, the settlement judge 
indicated that, in his opinion, the contingent fee being charged here was excessive. Testimony 
before the disciplinary hearing committee shows that the relationship between the court and 
respondents deteriorated from that point and became progressively antagonistic over this issue. 
The judge allegedly raised his voice and cursed at respondents. He threatened that if the case 
did not settle, he would advise the trial judge the failure was because of respondents’ greed. All 
of these statements were made in the presence of the client. 
 
Respondents asserted at the disciplinary hearing that during these negotiations they spoke with 
their client about the insufficiency of the attorneys’ fees being offered by the defense. They 
claimed that she authorized them to demand more money for the care of her son, thereby 
possibly securing an increase in fees as well. Although he was not technically a party to these 
proceedings, the record shows that the son’s interests were important to all participants, 
particularly the court. Consequently, following respondents’ pleas, the judge agreed to seek 
more money from the defendants. 
 
Late in the day, the settlement judge called both sides into the courtroom to discuss a new offer, 
consisting of $175,000 in cash, annuities for both mother and son, $400,000 in attorneys’ fees, 
and $55,000 in costs. According to the judge, this offer was higher than the previous one 
because of respondents’ representations that the client needed, among other things, better 
housing and “specially equipped transportation” for her son, as well as additional funds for his 
possible future surgeries. 
 
After conferring briefly, respondents met privately with the client and proposed that she pay 
them an additional $85,000 in attorney’s fees from her share of the cash proceeds.103 During 
this discussion, the judge approached the trio and asked if they needed his help. Respondent 
Fee testified that he felt pressured by the judge’s presence and told him, “I don’t want you here.” 
Fee also told the client that she should not allow herself to feel coerced by her attorneys or the 
judge and that she could refuse the offer or take additional time to consider it. 
 
After repeatedly advising the client of her right to seek independent advice and obtaining 
numerous assurances from her that she was satisfied with the arrangement, Fee prepared a 
handwritten agreement concerning the additional fees. This document included a “confidentiality 
provision,” which the committee found was for the client’s protection and “to maintain the 
confidential nature of the settlement conference.” 
 
The three then returned to the courtroom where respondents informed their annuities expert 
about the new agreement. They asked the expert to review the proposed settlement with the 
client one final time to ensure that the available funds would be sufficient to meet her needs and 
that the overall agreement was fair. After meeting for approximately ten minutes outside 
respondents’ presence, the expert became satisfied that the client understood and agreed to the 
																																																								
102 Indeed, the defense here has since acknowledged that this was its purpose in making a separate offer 
of fees. 
103 Respondents testified that according to their calculations at the time, receipt of these additional funds 
would have left them with a total fee amounting to only 34% of the structured package’s present value. 
We have calculated that the final fee percentage was higher than that, but still slightly less than the 40% 
originally agreed upon by the client. In any event, neither the committee nor the commission found that 
the fee charged was excessive. 
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terms. The client then signed the additional fee agreement and returned to the judge's 
chambers with her attorneys. 
 
Respondent Fee announced that they agreed “in principle” to the settlement. However, when 
the judge repeated the terms previously discussed, nobody disclosed the existence of the 
newly-enacted fee agreement. Both the committee and the commission found that respondents, 
not wanting to upset the settlement and believing it was not this judge’s role to determine 
reasonableness of fees, planned to reveal the separate agreement to the trial judge in 
connection with the formal approval of attorneys’ fees required by Rule 3, Uniform Medical 
Malpractice Rules.104 The lawyers never got the chance to do so. 
 
Ten days after the conference, the client telephoned the settlement judge, informed him of the 
separate agreement, and asked whether she was required to comply with it. The judge obtained 
a copy of the agreement, held a hearing during which he removed respondents from the case, 
appointed pro bono counsel to complete the settlement, and provided for the proceeds to be 
relayed through the clerk of the court for “proper” distribution. He then initiated these disciplinary 
proceedings. 
 
The hearing committee found that respondents violated ER 3.3(a)(1) (candor toward a tribunal) 
and ER 8.4(c) (conduct involving a knowing misrepresentation and causing an adverse or 
potentially adverse effect on a legal proceeding). It recommended 30-day suspensions. A 
majority of the disciplinary commission found an additional violation of ER 8.4(d) (conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice) and recommended 60-day suspensions. The state 
bar asks this court to disregard both recommendations and impose six-month suspensions. 
 
We agree that respondents breached ER 3.3(a)(1), which states: “A lawyer shall not knowingly 
make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal.” The comments to ER 3.3 state that 
“there are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative 
misrepresentation.” Respondents knowingly failed to disclose the separate agreement to the 
settlement judge in violation of this rule. At the same time, they engaged in “conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” in violation of ER 8.4(c). 
 
There are remarkably few cases applying the rules of professional conduct in a settlement 
context and none that we find directly on point. The bulk of ethical rules seem to have been 
designed with litigation scenarios in mind. Nevertheless, the scope of their applicability to 
settlement discussions has been the subject of frequent scholarly debate. 
 
A few commentators have even gone so far as to question the wisdom of demanding 
truthfulness in settlement conferences, suggesting that a certain amount of gamesmanship is 
considered acceptable. As one author notes, “the operational necessities of the bargaining 
process yield an ethical ‘functionalism’ that results in the minimal truthfulness and fairness 
necessary for an agreement.” Although this court is by no means naive to the realities of the 
marketplace, we are unwilling to accept or endorse such a flimsy ethical standard. It is not 
unreasonable to expect more from members of the bar, and we do. 
 
Early drafts of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct contained a separate section devoted 
to settlement negotiations. It was, however, deleted from the final version. There also appear to 
																																																								
104 The record also shows that, within hours of the conference, respondents discussed what they had 
done with other practitioners and retired judges, all of whom reportedly agreed that their conduct had 
been proper. 
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be few formal guidelines for judicial officers acting as mediators, which may serve to explain 
their occasional use of inappropriate techniques. “Because of a ‘judicial zeal for settlement,’ the 
increased opportunity for abuse may lead to judges punishing parties and lawyers who fail to 
cooperate in settlement.” 
 
Thus, misguided strategies believed to be endemic to the bargaining process and the lack of 
clearly-defined roles for settlement judges may, regrettably, combine to create an environment 
ripe for occurrences such as this.105 The commission found that ambiguities in these areas 
played a significant role in the misconduct at issue. Also contributing were circumstances 
peculiar to this case. The hour was late, and trial was scheduled to begin the following morning. 
The judge, although deservedly recognized as a seasoned and fair mediator, became 
somewhat adversarial on this particular day. He not only allowed defense counsel to “drive a 
wedge” but may unwittingly have assisted them in doing so. Respondents did not want to lose a 
favorable settlement for their client. At the same time, they neither wished to permit the defense 
to dictate the amount of their fees, nor felt comfortable with pressure from the judge to reduce 
them. Moreover, respondents clearly attempted to ensure that their client fully understood and 
concurred in the separate agreement. Both the committee and commission specifically found 
that the modification was fair and that the client understood it. The uncontradicted evidence also 
suggests that respondents thought they were not obligated to disclose the arrangement to the 
settlement judge. 
 
Nevertheless, we cannot condone their conduct. In our judgment, respondents should have 
either disclosed the complete arrangement or politely declined any discussion of fees. Fear that 
this might have jeopardized the settlement, while understandable, does not excuse their lack of 
candor with the tribunal. The system cannot function as intended if attorneys, sworn officers of 
the court, can lie to or mislead judges in the guise of serving their clients. “Zealous advocacy” 
has limits. It clearly does not justify ethical breaches. 
 
We note that neither the committee nor the commission found any aggravating factors. Both, 
however, cited numerous mitigating circumstances, including the absence of prior disciplinary 
records, lack of dishonest or selfish motives, full and free disclosures to the disciplinary 
authorities, and cooperative attitudes throughout these proceedings. The committee also found 
that respondents “demonstrated a high level of competence in their representation” of this 
plaintiff. 
 
Although we adopt the factual findings of both the committee and the commission, we are 
compelled to agree with the dissenting commissioners that the recommended sanction 
“exceeds the misconduct.”106 The goal of discipline is to protect the public, not to punish 
lawyers. Nothing in the record suggests that respondents pose any threat to the public. 
Moreover, they already have suffered a considerable penalty by virtue of the extensive negative 
publicity surrounding this case. 
 
																																																								
105 Although the conduct of defense counsel is not at issue here, respondents point out that they also 
were not forthcoming about their ultimate settlement authority when questioned by the judge. 
106 A majority of the commission concluded that suspension was necessary because the additional 
hearing and the judge’s removal of respondents from this case caused “an adverse or potentially adverse 
effect on the legal proceeding.” Both actions, however, were initiated by the offended settlement judge, 
who believed that respondents had engaged in severe professional, and possibly criminal, misconduct. 
We also note the absence of any finding that respondents’ actions caused “injury or potential injury to a 
party to the legal proceeding.” Thus, under these specific facts, we disagree that suspension is required. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 677	
We wish to discourage the previously-described tactic of “driving a wedge” between lawyer and 
client in negotiations. Although nothing in our ethical rules expressly prohibits separate offers of 
attorneys’ fees, we agree with the New York City Bar ethics committee that they frequently pose 
a serious dilemma for lawyers. Quite simply, such offers are often intended to place attorneys in 
the uncomfortable position where they may be caught between their own need to be 
compensated for legal services and what might otherwise be in their clients’ best interests. We 
therefore urge judges to carefully scrutinize attempts to employ this practice. 
 
Moreover, although it is certainly not forbidden for a judge to raise the topic of attorneys’ fees 
during settlement discussions, we believe it unwise and unfair to focus on the fees of one party 
without corresponding inquiry into those of the other. With such a selective approach, the judge 
may easily overstep his or her bounds. An attorney on the receiving end of this type of treatment 
should be entitled to some measure of self-protection. We have indicated that a more 
appropriate reply here was for respondents to have politely but firmly declined to discuss their 
fees. We concede that, considering the level of tension evident in this conference, such a 
response may have destroyed any chance of settlement. Nevertheless, a good end does not 
justify deceitful means. 
 
The dissent deserves a brief response. First, it reaches factual conclusions that are 
diametrically opposed to those of the committee, the commission, and the majority of this court. 
Second, in positing “4 things that might have happened” if respondents had later “disclosed their 
side fee agreement to the trial judge and opposing counsel,” the dissent completely ignores the 
possibility that the trial judge might have approved the fees after reviewing the matter in detail 
and applying the factors set out in ER 1.5(a). Neither the committee nor the commission 
concluded that the fees were unfair. Moreover, because the issue has not properly been 
presented to us and there are no findings made by a trial court, which is where the inquiry 
properly belongs in the first instance, see Rule 3, Uniform Medical Malpractice Rules, the record 
contains little information from which we can independently determine the overall 
reasonableness of the fees. 
 
Additionally, the dissent’s criticism of the “terms of respondents’ fee agreement” simply has 
nothing to do with the issues presently before us. We also note that it fails to even mention the 
fact that, according to both the committee and the commission, the client knowingly and 
voluntarily entered into the contract. 
 
In conclusion, we hold that respondents violated their duties of candor and truthfulness pursuant 
to ER 3.3(a)(1) and ER 8.4(c) and censure them for their conduct. We emphasize that a judge 
acting as mediator is still a judge to whom the ethical duty of candor is owed. 
 
Each respondent is assessed costs in the amount of $1,922.91. 
 
CORCORAN, Justice, dissenting: 
 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
I view the facts in this case differently from the majority. The respondents Fee and Montijo lied 
to the settlement judge so that they would get more money and their client would get less 
money. It is especially egregious for a lawyer to lie to a judge for the purpose of increasing his 
own fees at the direct expense of his client. I cannot agree with the committee, the commission, 
and the majority that respondents lacked dishonest or selfish motives. Res ipsa loquitur. Such 
conduct warrants at least a suspension and not a mere censure. 
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Respondents allege that they intended to reveal their side fee agreement to the trial judge. 
However, this assertion does not ring true. If respondents had disclosed their side fee 
agreement to the trial judge and opposing counsel, which would have required admitting that 
they had lied to the settlement judge, 4 things might have happened: (1) the trial judge could 
have refused to honor the side agreement; (2) the trial judge could have referred the matter 
back to the settlement judge who possessed the most information about the case; (3) 
defendants’ attorneys could have sought to enforce the settlement agreement as communicated 
to the settlement judge; or (4) defendants’ attorneys could have sought to withdraw their 
settlement offer. Any one of these events would have ruined respondents’ scheme to collect 
attorneys’ fees in excess of those communicated to the settlement judge. In addition, all parties 
who became aware of the secret fee agreement would have been required to report 
respondents’ misconduct to the state bar. In fact, when the settlement judge learned of 
respondents’ misconduct, he filed a complaint with the state bar. 
 
I agree with the majority that: (1) “the bulk of ethical rules seem to have been designed with 
litigation scenarios in mind,” and (2) there are “few formal guidelines for judicial officers acting 
as mediators.” That, however, does not excuse the misconduct here. For lawyers dealing with 
judges, whether they be trial or settlement judges, the guiding rule is never lie to or mislead a 
judge. Respondents claim that they were lying in order to secure the best settlement agreement 
for their client. Nonetheless, it is often the case that lawyers who lie for the client will also lie to 
the client. 
 
I also emphasize that the terms of respondents’ fee agreement in conjunction with the secret 
side agreement would have resulted in respondents receiving an overwhelmingly 
disproportionate share of the client’s up-front cash payment. The client signed three fee 
agreements dated October 29, 1986, January 29, 1987, and December 19, 1989. Only the last 
fee agreement addressed the possibility of a structured settlement. It provided that “in the event 
this case is settled by way of a structured settlement the attorney’s fees will be computed on the 
basis of a percentage of the present value of the settlement. The attorney’s fees will be paid out 
of the initial cash payment(s).” If respondents had successfully recovered $485,000 in attorneys’ 
fees payable from the initial cash payment, as contemplated by the side fee agreement, they 
would have received 84% of the client’s up-front cash recovery (excluding the $55,000 
designated as costs). Furthermore, by collecting their fees from the up-front cash payment, 
respondents left the client to bear all the risk that the annuity provider would become insolvent. 
A less onerous fee agreement is one in which the plaintiff’s attorney collects his fees only if, as, 
and when the plaintiff receives the funds. Under an “if, as, and when received” fee arrangement, 
respondents would only have been entitled to 40% of the client’s up-front cash recovery, or 
$230,000. 
 
For the above reasons, I agree with the hearing committee, the disciplinary commission, and 
state bar counsel that respondents Fee and Montijo should be suspended. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. The parties agreed to a settlement. After the settlement conference, the plaintiff’s 
attorneys privately convinced their client to pay them an additional $85,000 from her 
cash settlement, and did not disclose that additional fee agreement to the judge. The 
majority suggests that the arrangement was ultimately fair to the client, but the dissent 
disagrees. What do you think? 
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2. Did the client provide informed consent to the additional attorney’s fees? Is the problem 
that the respondents convinced their client to pay them an additional $85,000 or that 
they didn’t disclose it to the judge? 
3. Do you think the punishment was adequate under the circumstances? 
 
Further Readings: 
 
● Thomas F. Guernsey, Truthfulness in Negotiation, 17 U. Rich. L. Rev. 99 (1982) 
● Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., The Lawyer's Obligation to be Trustworthy When Dealing with 
Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. Rev. 181 (1981) 
● Charles B. Craver, Negotiation Ethics: How to Be Deceptive without Being 
Dishonest/How to Be Assertive without Being Offensive, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 713 (1997) 
● Geoffrey M. Peters, The Use of Lies in Negotiation, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 1 (1987) 
● Eleanor H. Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 493 (1989) 
● Daisy H. Floyd, Can the Judge Do That? — The Need for a Clearer Judicial Role in 
Settlement, 26 Ariz. St. L.J. 45 (1994) 
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Section 7: The Regulation of the Legal Profession 
 
7.1: Bar Admission 
 
It's nice to be liked, but it's better by far to get paid. I know that most of the friends that I have 
don't really see it that way. But if you can give 'em each one wish, how much do you want to bet 
they'd wish success for themselves and their friends, and that would include lots of money.107 
 
In the United States, admission to the bar and the regulation of attorneys is governed primarily 
by state law. Specifically, the highest court of each state establishes the standards for 
admission to the state’s bar and the rules of professional responsibility regulating the conduct of 
the members of the state’s bar. Courts uniformly delegate those responsibilities to 
administrative organizations. Typically, courts delegate admission to the bar to a board of bar 
examiners and delegate the regulation of the bar to a disciplinary board. But the court always 
retains the ultimate authority over both admission to the bar and regulation of the bar. 
 
Historically, the practice of law was primarily local. The overwhelming majority of attorneys and 
law firms practiced law only in one state and were members of only one state bar. But as the 
practice of law has become increasingly national and international and law firms open offices in 
multiple states and even foreign countries, the localized regulation of the bar has come into 
tension with the non-local practice of law. Members of the state bar may have an incentive to 
discourage non-members from joining their bar or practicing in their state. While the desire to 
reduce competition is understandable, it can harm the consumers of legal services, by reducing 
their options and increasing the price. 
 
Admission to the Bar 
 
Originally, the qualifications for bar membership were quite relaxed. In 18th and 19th centuries, 
there were few law schools, and few attorneys attended or graduated from them. The majority of 
attorneys qualified for the bar by apprenticing or “reading law” in a law office. Examination for 
admission was typically oral and often cursory. But legal education and admission to the bar 
gradually became more formalized in the 20th century. 
 
Today, most states have adopted similar requirements for admission to the state bar. The 
overwhelming majority of states require applicants to the state bar to have graduated from a law 
school accredited by the American Bar Association, passed the state’s bar examination and 
professional responsibility examination, and demonstrated good moral character. But there are 
exceptions. Some states offer independent accreditation of law schools. Some states still allow 
applicants to qualify for the bar by “reading law” for prescribed period of time, rather than 
attending law school. Some states allow the graduates of certain law schools to qualify for the 
bar without taking a bar exam. And some states do not require a professional responsibility 
exam. But all states require a showing of good moral character. 
																																																								
107 Liz Phair, Shitloads of Money, whitechocolatespaceegg (1998). 
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Residency Requirements 
 
Until relatively recently, many states imposed explicit residency requirements for bar 
membership. This enables the members of the state bar to limit or prevent competition, by 
preventing attorneys from practicing in multiple states. But in Supreme Court of NH v. Piper, 470 
U.S. 274 (1985), the Supreme Court invalidated many of those residency requirements, holding 
that they violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution, unless a state can 
show “substantial” reasons for discriminating against nonresidents. 
 
Notably, the federal courts have their own bars. The Supreme Court, each federal circuit and 
district court, and the District of Columbia, all maintain their own independent federal bars. Their 
bars have different requirements. District court bars typically requirement membership in the bar 
of the state in which the district court sits, and circuit courts typically require membership in any 
state bar. Some have even had residency requirements, but the Supreme Court invalidated 
those residency requirements in Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987). 
 
An attorney who is not a member of the bar of a court but wishes to represent a client in that 
court may petition to appear pro hac vice or “for this turn only.” The court is not required to grant 
a motion to appear pro hac vice and each new action requires a separate application. In many 
jurisdictions, an attorney may appear pro hac vice only if they affiliate with a member of the 
court’s bar as co-counsel. In theory, this requirement ensures compliance with local rules, but it 
also provides employment to the members of the bar. 
 
Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546 (1989) 
 
Summary: The Bar of the District Court of the Virgin Islands has a residency 
requirement for admission, providing that applicants must have resided in the Virgin 
Island for one year and intend to continue residing in the Virgin Islands. Thorstenn and 
DeVos of New York applied for the bar examination, but were rejected for failure to 
satisfy the residency requirement. The District Court allowed them to take the bar 
examination, which they passed, but upheld the residency requirement. The Third Circuit 
reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the District Court provided no 
substantial or legitimate reason for excluding nonresidents. 
 
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
In order to be admitted to the Bar of the District Court of the Virgin Islands, an otherwise 
qualified attorney must demonstrate that he or she has resided in the Virgin Islands for at least 
one year and that, if admitted, the attorney intends to continue to reside and practice in the 
Virgin Islands. The question before us is whether these residency requirements are lawful. 
 
I 
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Local Rule 56(b) of the District Court of the Virgin Islands provides that before an otherwise 
qualified attorney is admitted to the Virgin Islands Bar, he must “allege and prove to the 
satisfaction” of the Committee of Bar Examiners that he has “resided in the Virgin Islands for at 
least one year immediately preceding his proposed admission to the Virgin Islands Bar,” and 
that, “if admitted to practice, he intends to continue to reside in and to practice law in the Virgin 
Islands.” The rule applies not only to practice before the District Court, but also to practice 
before the local territorial courts. 
 
Respondents Susan Esposito Thorstenn and Lloyd DeVos are attorneys who are members in 
good standing of the Bars of the States of New York and New Jersey, and who practice law in 
New York City. Neither respondent resides in the Virgin Islands. In the spring of 1985, 
respondents applied to take the Virgin Islands bar examination, but their applications were 
rejected by the Committee of Bar Examiners because they did not satisfy the residency 
requirements of Local Rule 56(b). Respondents filed this suit in the District Court against 
petitioner Geoffrey W. Barnard, the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners, seeking a 
declaration that the residency requirements of Rule 56(b) violate the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV of the Constitution, as interpreted by our decision in Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire v. Piper. Respondents also sought to enjoin the enforcement of Rule 56(b) against 
them. 
 
On June 21, 1985, while reserving a decision on the merits, the District Court ordered that 
respondents be allowed to take the bar examination. They took the examination and passed. 
Petitioner Virgin Islands Bar Association intervened, and all parties submitted motions for 
summary judgment with supporting affidavits. The District Court granted summary judgment for 
petitioners, concluding that the reasons offered for Rule 56(b)’s residency requirements, 
grounded in the unique conditions in the Virgin Islands, were substantial enough to justify the 
discrimination against nonresidents. 
 
While the District Court’s decision was pending on appeal in the Third Circuit, we decided 
Frazier v. Heebe, where we invoked our supervisory power to invalidate certain residency 
requirements contained in the local rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Louisiana. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s 
judgment for petitioners, concluding that the reasons given for Rule 56(b) were in essence the 
same as those we rejected in Heebe. The case was reheard en banc, and a majority of the full 
Court of Appeals agreed with the original panel decision that the residency requirements of Rule 
56(b) were invalid under Heebe. The en banc court emphasized that alternative and less 
restrictive means, short of a residency requirement, were available to the District Court to 
assure that nonresident bar members would bear professional responsibilities comparable to 
those imposed on resident attorneys. In view of its determination that Heebe controlled the 
case, the Court of Appeals did not address respondents’ claim under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. 
 
We granted certiorari and now affirm. 
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II 
 
In Heebe, we invoked supervisory power over district courts of the United States to invalidate 
discriminatory residency requirements for admission to the Bar of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The Court of Appeals in the case now before us 
expressed “no doubt” that our supervisory power extends to the bar requirements of the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands. 
 
Without attempting to define the limits of our supervisory power, we decline to apply it in this 
case. Both the nature of the District Court of the Virgin Islands and the reach of its residency 
requirements implicate interests beyond the federal system. As to the former, the District Court, 
which was given its current form and jurisdiction by Congress in the Revised Organic Act of 
1954, is not a United States district court, but an institution with attributes of both a federal and a 
territorial court. Although it is vested with the jurisdiction of a United States district court, the 
District Court also has original jurisdiction over certain matters of local law not vested in the 
local courts of the Virgin Islands, as well as concurrent jurisdiction with the local courts over 
certain criminal matters. It also serves as an appellate court for decisions rendered by the local 
courts. In fact, Congress provides in the Revised Organic Act that, for certain purposes, the 
District Court “shall be considered a court established by local law.” The application of Rule 
56(b) itself similarly extends beyond practice in the federal system. Unlike the rule in Heebe, 
which was confined to practice before the United States District Court, Rule 56(b) applies to 
admission to the Bar of the Virgin Islands, and so governs practice before the territorial courts. 
 
Because these territorial interests are intertwined with the operation of Rule 56, we decline to 
examine this case as an issue of supervisory power. 
 
III 
 
Respondents also contend that Rule 56(b) violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV of the Constitution, which Congress has made applicable to the Virgin Islands in the 
Revised Organic Act. Petitioners concede that the District Court is an instrumentality of the 
Government of the Virgin Islands and is subject to the Privileges and Immunities Clause through 
the Revised Organic Act. 
 
Article IV, § 2, of the Constitution provides that the “Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” When a challenged restriction 
deprives nonresidents of a privilege or immunity protected by this Clause, it is invalid unless “(i) 
there is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced 
against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State’s objective.” In deciding 
whether the discrimination bears a substantial relation to the State’s objectives, we consider, 
among other things, whether less restrictive means of regulation are available. 
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It is by now well settled that the practice of law is a privilege protected by Article IV, § 2, and that 
a nonresident who passes a state bar examination and otherwise qualifies for practice has an 
interest protected by the Clause. We need consider here only whether there are substantial 
reasons to support treating qualified nonresident attorneys differently, and whether the means 
chosen by the District Court, total exclusion from the Bar, bear a close or substantial relation to 
the Territory’s legitimate objectives. 
 
Petitioners offer five justifications for the residency requirements of Rule 56(b), which track the 
reasons recited by the District Court. First, petitioners contend that the geographical isolation of 
the Virgin Islands, together with irregular airline and telephone service with the mainland United 
States, will make it difficult for nonresidents to attend court proceedings held with little advance 
notice. Second, petitioners cite the District Court’s finding that the delay caused by trying to 
accommodate the schedules of nonresident attorneys would increase the massive caseload 
under which that court suffers. Third, petitioners contend that delays in publication and lack of 
access to local statutes, regulations, and court opinions will prevent nonresident attorneys from 
maintaining an adequate level of competence in local law. Fourth, petitioners argue that the 
Virgin Islands Bar does not have the resources for adequate supervision of a nationwide bar 
membership. Finally, petitioners exert much energy arguing that the residency requirements of 
Rule 56(b) are necessary to apply Local Rule 16 in a strict and fair manner. That Rule requires 
all active members of the Bar to represent indigent criminal defendants on a regular basis. We 
find none of these justifications sufficient to meet the Virgin Island’s burden of demonstrating 
that the discrimination against nonresidents by Rule 56(b) is warranted by a substantial 
objective and bears a close or substantial relation to that objective. 
 
The answer to petitioners’ first justification, based on the geographical isolation of the Virgin 
Islands and the unreliable airline and telephone service, is found in Piper. In that case, as here, 
the Bar argued that “even the most conscientious lawyer residing in a distant State may find 
himself unable to appear in court for an unscheduled hearing or proceeding.” We did not find 
this a sufficient justification for a residency requirement for two reasons. First, we found it likely 
that a high percentage of nonresidents who took the trouble to take the state bar examination 
and to pay the annual dues would reside in a place convenient to New Hampshire. Although 
that observation is not applicable here, we went on to hold in Piper that, for lawyers who reside 
a great distance from New Hampshire, the State could protect its interests by requiring the 
lawyer to retain a local attorney who will be available for unscheduled meetings and hearings. 
The same solution is available to the Virgin Islands. The exclusion of nonresidents from the bar 
is not substantially related to the District Court’s interest in assuring that counsel will be 
available on short notice for unscheduled proceedings. 
 
Petitioners’ second proffered justification is similar to their first. The District Court found that 
because of its unusually large and increasing caseload, it could not countenance interruptions 
caused by nonresident lawyers attempting to reach the Virgin Islands from the mainland, or 
conflicts with their appearances on the mainland. To the extent this justification reiterates the 
point we have addressed above, the same response applies. Any burden on the Virgin Islands 
court system to accommodate travel schedules of nonresidents can be relieved in substantial 
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part by requiring nonresidents to associate with local counsel. The large caseload of the Virgin 
Islands District Court does not alter the analysis. Quite aside from the paradox in citing extreme 
caseload as the reason to exclude more attorneys, it is clear that a State, or a Territory to which 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause applies, may not solve the problem of congested court 
dockets by discriminating against nonresidents. Nor do we see the problem of conflicting court 
appearances as justifying the exclusion of nonresidents from the bar. The problem is not unique 
to the Virgin Islands. A court in New Jersey may be inconvenienced to some extent by a request 
to accommodate the conflicting court appearances of a nonresident attorney in New York. But 
that does not justify closing the New Jersey Bar to New York residents. Further, the District 
Court may make appropriate orders for prompt appearances and speedy trials. 
 
Nor are we persuaded by petitioners’ claim that the delay in publication of local law requires 
exclusion of nonresidents because they will be unable to maintain an adequate level of 
professional competence. As we said in Piper, we will not assume that “a nonresident lawyer — 
any more than a resident — would disserve his clients by failing to familiarize himself with the 
local law.” We can assume that a lawyer who anticipates sufficient practice in the Virgin Islands 
to justify taking the bar examination and paying the annual dues will inform himself of the laws 
of the Territory. And although petitioners allege that the most recent legal materials, such as 
District Court opinions and local statutes and regulations, are not available on a current basis, 
this does not justify exclusion of nonresidents. If legal materials are not published on a current 
basis, we do not see how this is more of a problem for nonresidents than residents. All that 
petitioners allege on this point is that residents can review slip opinions by visiting the offices of 
the law clerks for the District Court judges. We do not think it either realistic or practical to 
assume that residents resort to this practice with regularity, or that nonresidents, faced with the 
occasional need to do so, cannot find some adequate means to review unpublished materials. 
We note, moreover, that the record discloses that after the initial affidavits were submitted by 
petitioners in this case, the Virgin Islands Bar Association Committee on Continuing Legal 
Education began a subscription service for all opinions of the District Court and the territorial 
courts, available to all members of the bar.In short, we do not think the alleged difficulties in 
maintaining knowledge of local law can justify the drastic measure of excluding all nonresidents 
as a class. 
 
Petitioners’ fourth contention, that the Virgin Islands Bar Association does not have the 
resources and personnel for adequate supervision of the ethics of a nationwide bar 
membership, is not a justification for the discrimination imposed here. Increased bar 
membership brings increased revenue through dues. Each lawyer admitted to practice in the 
Virgin Islands pays an initial fee of $200 to take the bar examination, annual bar association 
dues of $100, and an annual license fee of $500. There is no reason to believe that the 
additional moneys received from nonresident members will not be adequate to pay for any 
additional administrative burden. To the extent petitioners fear that the Bar will be unable to 
monitor the ethical conduct of nonresident practitioners, respondents note that petitioners can, 
and do, rely on character information compiled by the National Conference of Bar Examiners. In 
this regard, the monitoring problems faced by the Virgin Islands Bar are no greater than those 
faced by any mainland State with limited resources. 
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The final reason offered by petitioners for Rule 56(b)’s residency requirements is somewhat 
more substantial, though ultimately unavailing. Under District Court Rule 16, each active 
member of the Virgin Islands Bar must remain available to accept appointments to appear on 
behalf of indigent criminal defendants. According to the affidavit of the President of the Virgin 
Islands Bar Association, each member can expect to receive appointments about four times per 
year. Once appointed, it is the duty of the lawyer “to communicate with the defendant at his 
place of incarceration as promptly as possible and not later than five days from the date of the 
clerk’s mailing of the order of appointment.” Although the statute does not specifically so 
provide, the District Court interprets Rule 16 to require that only the appointed attorney may 
appear on behalf of the criminal defendant. The District Court found that, in light of this 
individual appearance requirement and the strict time constraints imposed by the Speedy Trial 
Act, it would be virtually impossible for this system of appointed counsel to work with 
nonresident attorneys. 
 
In Piper, we recognized that a State can require nonresidents to share in the burden of 
representing indigent criminal defendants as a condition for practice before the Bar. That, 
however, is not quite what is at issue here. The question in this case is whether bar admission 
can be denied to a nonresident because at times it may not be feasible for him to appear 
personally to represent his share of indigent defendants. We determine that this requirement is 
too heavy a burden on the privileges of nonresidents and bears no substantial relation to the 
District Court’s objective. Petitioners offer no persuasive reason why the strong interests in 
securing representation for indigent criminal defendants cannot be protected by allowing an 
appointed nonresident attorney to substitute a colleague in the event he is unable to attend a 
particular appearance. Further, contrary to the District Court’s characterization of the personal 
appearance requirement as a hard and fast rule, we must assume that in some circumstances it 
would in fact be detrimental to the goal of competent representation for criminal defendants to 
require the appointed attorney, whether a resident or nonresident, to appear personally. For 
instance, where the bar member is an expert in trusts and estates, but has no prior experience 
in criminal procedure, it would seem counterproductive to the interests that Rule 16 is designed 
to serve to require the appointed attorney to make an individual appearance. The text of Rule 16 
appears to recognize as much in its explicit provision that, where the interests of justice so 
require, the District Court may substitute one appointed counsel for another. 
 
Petitioners’ only effort to explain why this seemingly more sensible and less intrusive alternative 
would not work is to predict that resident attorneys would not be willing to make the additional 
appearances required where nonresidents are unavailable. Such speculation, however, is 
insufficient to justify discrimination against nonresidents. As respondents point out, if handling 
indigent criminal cases is a requirement of admission to the Bar, a nonresident knows that he 
must either appear himself or arrange with a resident lawyer to handle the case when he is 
unavailable. If the nonresident fails to make all arrangements necessary to protect the rights of 
the defendant, the District Court may take appropriate action. This possibility does not, however, 
justify a blanket exclusion of nonresidents. 
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IV 
 
In sum, we hold that petitioners neither advance a substantial reason for the exclusion of 
nonresidents from the Bar, nor demonstrate that discrimination against nonresidents bears a 
close or substantial relation to the legitimate objectives of the court’s Rule. When the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause was made part of our Constitution, commercial and legal exchange 
between the distant States of the Union was at least as unsophisticated as that which exists 
today between the Virgin Islands and the mainland United States. Nevertheless, our Founders, 
in their wisdom, thought it important to our sense of nationhood that each State be required to 
make a genuine effort to treat nonresidents on an equal basis with residents. By extending the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause to the Virgin Islands, Congress has made the same decision 
with respect to that Territory. 
 
The residency requirements of Rule 56(b) violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, as 
extended to the Virgin Islands. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, 
dissenting. 
 
In Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, the Court held that a rule of the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court which limited bar admission to state residents violated the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. Today the Court extends the reasoning of Piper to invalidate a Virgin Islands 
rule limiting bar admission to attorneys who demonstrate that they have resided in the Virgin 
Islands for at least one year and will, if admitted, continue to reside and practice there. I agree 
that the durational residency requirement is invalid under our prior cases dealing with the “right” 
of interstate travel. But I cannot agree with the Court’s conclusion that the simple residency 
requirement is invalid under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Accepting Piper's view of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, I think the unique circumstances of legal practice in the Virgin 
Islands, as compared to the mainland States, could justify upholding this simple residency 
requirement even under that view. Because the record reveals the existence of genuine factual 
disputes about the nature of these circumstances and their relationship to the challenged 
residency requirement, I would reverse the judgment below and remand for trial on those 
issues. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. The majority held that the District Court Bar’s residency requirement was 
unconstitutional because it demonstrated neither a substantial reason for discriminating 
against nonresidents, nor a substantial relationship to any legitimate purpose. The 
dissent argued that the might be a legitimate purpose for the restriction. Do any of the 
reasons provided by the District Court Bar seem legitimate to you? 
2. Are residency restrictions ever legitimate? When and why should a state bar be able to 
limit the membership of non-resident attorneys, if ever? What standard should courts 
apply in evaluating residency requirements? 
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3. Could requirements for state bar membership that do not explicitly require residency 
effectively discriminate against out-of-state attorneys? When are such requirements 
legitimate, if ever? How should courts review those requirements, if at all? 
 
 
Reginald Dwayne Betts & Shon Hopwood 
 
Character and Fitness 
 
All states limit bar admission to candidates of “good moral character,” but the contours of the 
requirement can vary widely from state to state and examiner to examiner. The substance of the 
good moral character requirement are vague - perhaps deliberately vague? - but typically 
include honestly, respect for the law, and respect for the rights of others. Typically, applicants 
are rejected for failing to satisfy the requirement on the basis of failure to disclose material facts 
on the bar exam application, criminal conduct or convictions, and fraudulent or dishonest 
behavior. 
 
In theory, applicants who have engaged in past disqualifying conduct may qualify for admission 
by proving their rehabilitation. But historically, many bar examiners have rejected applicants 
based on criminal convictions, irrespective of any evidence of rehabilitation. In recent years, this 
tendency has begun to change. Among other things, the Washington Bar Association approved 
the admission of Shon Hopwood, who pled guilty to bank robbery in 1998 and served 10 years 
in federal prison, where he taught himself the law and drafted a successful petition for certiorati 
to the Supreme Court for one of his fellow inmates, in Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 
(2004). After his release from prison, Hopwood graduated from the University of Washington 
School of Law and clerked on the D.C. Circuit. He is currently an Associate Professor of Law at 
Georgetown University Law Center. You can read more about Hopwood’s story in his book Law 
Man: My Story of Robbing Banks, Winning Supreme Court Cases, and Finding Redemption 
(2012). 
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In 1996, when he was 16 years old, Reginald Dwayne Betts participated in a carjacking. He was 
convicted and served 8 years in prison, where he finish high school and began writing poetry. 
Betts was released from prison in 2005, and immediately enrolled in community college. Two 
years later he received a full scholarship from the University of Maryland. After graduating, he 
received a poetry fellowship from Harvard’s Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, before 
enrolling in Yale Law School. After graduation, he passed the Connecticut bar examination, but 
was initially denied admission to the Connecticut bar because of his criminal record. On appeal, 
the Connecticut Bar Examining Committee reversed itself and granted Betts’s application for 
admission. He is currently completing a Ph.D. in Law at Yale and plans to become a law 
professor. 
 
Other formerly incarcerated people have also rehabilitated themselves and become lawyers, 
including Cleodis Floyd, Allan P. Haber, and Tarra Simmons. Jarrett M. Adams was wrongfully 
convicted of sexual assault at 17 and served 10 years in prison before he was exonerated. He 
graduated from the Loyola University Chicago School of Law and is currently practicing law in 
Chicago. 
 
Other formerly incarcerated people have graduated from law school, but been denied bar 
admission for poor moral character, based on their conviction. Bruce Reilly pled guilty to 
second-degree murder in 1993, when he was 20, and served 12 years in prison, where he 
became a jailhouse lawyer. Upon release, he applied to 30 law schools before being admitted at 
Tulane Law School. But after graduation, the bar refused to admit him, based on his conviction. 
Similarly, Guy Hamilton-Smith pled guilty to possession of child pornography in 2006, when he 
was 22, and was placed on the Kentucky Sex Offender Registry. He graduated from the 
University of Kentucky College of Law, but was denied admission to the Kentucky bar, based on 
his conviction and registration status. He is currently a legal fellow at the Mitchell-Hamline 
School of Law Sex Offense Litigation and Policy Resource Center. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. When should state bar associations be permitted to refuse admission based on an 
applicant’s moral character? What factors should they be permitted to consider in 
evaluating an applicant’s moral character? 
2. Should state bar associations be permitted to refuse admission based on criminal 
convictions, if the applicant has shown compelling evidence of rehabilitation? 
3. Why do state bar examiners refuse admission to applicants with criminal records who 
have demonstrated compelling evidence of rehabilitation? Are they trying to protect the 
integrity of the profession, or the appearance of the integrity of the profession? 
4. Courts routinely readmit attorneys who have been disbarred for crimes like tax evasion 
and defrauding their clients. Should state bar associations evaluate applications for 
readmission more or less strictly than initial applications for admission? 
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Stephen Randall Glass (2014) 
 
In re Glass, 316 P. 3d 1199 (Cal. 2014) 
 
Summary: Stephen Glass was a journalist for several national magazines, including the 
New Republic. Between 1996 and 1998, he wrote dozens of articles that consisted in 
part or whole of fabrications. He also fabricated evidence to substantiate his reporting. At 
the same time, he was a student at Georgetown University Law Center. After graduation, 
he applied for membership in the New York bar, but his application was rejected for poor 
moral character. In 2006, he applied for membership in the California bar. The State Bar 
Court ultimately recommended admission, but the California Supreme Court reversed, 
based on poor moral character. 
 
Stephen Randall Glass made himself infamous as a dishonest journalist by fabricating material 
for more than 40 articles for The New Republic magazine and other publications. He also 
carefully fabricated supporting materials to delude The New Republic’s fact checkers. The 
articles appeared between June 1996 and May 1998, and included falsehoods that reflected 
negatively on individuals, political groups, and ethnic minorities. During the same period, 
starting in September 1997, he was also an evening law student at Georgetown University’s law 
school. Glass made every effort to avoid detection once suspicions were aroused, lobbied 
strenuously to keep his job at The New Republic, and, in the aftermath of his exposure, did not 
fully cooperate with the publications to identify his fabrications. 
 
Glass applied to become a member of the New York bar in 2002, but withdrew his application 
after he was informally notified in 2004 that his moral character application would be rejected. In 
the New York bar application materials, he exaggerated his cooperation with the journals that 
had published his work and failed to supply a complete list of the fabricated articles that had 
injured others. 
 
Glass passed the California Bar examination in 2006 and filed an application for determination 
of moral character in 2007. It was not until the California State Bar moral character proceedings 
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that Glass reviewed all of his articles, as well as the editorials The New Republic and other 
journals published to identify his fabrications, and ultimately identified fabrications that he 
previously had denied or failed to disclose. In the California proceedings, Glass was not 
forthright in acknowledging the defects in his New York bar application. 
 
At the 2010 State Bar Court hearing resulting in the decision under review, Glass presented 
many character witnesses and introduced evidence regarding his lengthy course of 
psychotherapy, along with his own testimony and other evidence. Many of his efforts from the 
time of his exposure in 1998 until the 2010 hearing, however, seem to have been directed 
primarily at advancing his own well-being rather than returning something to the community. His 
evidence did not establish that he engaged in truly exemplary conduct over an extended period. 
We conclude that on this record he has not sustained his heavy burden of demonstrating 
rehabilitation and fitness for the practice of law. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
A. Committee of Bar Examiners’s evidence 
 
Stephen Glass was born in September 1972, in a suburb of Chicago, Illinois. After early success 
as a journalist in college and a developing interest in the law, in 1994 Glass was admitted to 
New York University School of Law but deferred his intended legal training to accept a position 
in Washington, D.C., with Policy Review magazine. 
 
In September 1995 Glass accepted a position at The New Republic magazine. In early June 
1996 he began fabricating material for publication. The fabrications continued and became 
bolder and more comprehensive until he was exposed and fired in May 1998. 
 
Glass’s fabrications began when an article entitled The Hall Monitor was published containing a 
fabricated quotation from an unnamed source disparaging United States Representative Pete 
Hoekstra for behaving in Congress like an elementary school “super hall monitor.” He started by 
fabricating quotations or sources, and ended by publishing wholesale fictions. He testified that 
“all but a handful” of the 42 articles he published in The New Republic contained fabrications or 
were entirely fabricated. He also routinely prepared elaborate reporter’s notes and supporting 
materials to give the false impression to the magazine’s fact checkers that he had done all the 
background work for each article and that his informants had spoken words he falsely attributed 
to them. 
 
Glass testified at the State Bar Court hearing that he “wrote nasty, mean-spirited, horrible” 
things about people: “My articles hurt, and they were cruel.” He testified that the fabrications 
gave him “A-plus” stories that afforded him status in staff meetings and also gave particular 
enjoyment to his colleagues. He said: “Overwhelmingly, what everyone remembers about my 
pieces are the fake things.” 
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A notable 1996 article was entitled Taxis and the Meaning of Work. It was Glass’s first cover 
article and one he viewed as “key” to his successful period of writing for The New Republic. Its 
theme was that Americans, and in particular, African-Americans, were no longer willing to work 
hard or to take on employment they consider menial. The article falsely recounted as factual 
supposed encounters between Glass and three entirely fabricated characters, one a limousine 
driver, one a taxicab driver, and one a criminal. The limousine driver was depicted as an 
African-American man who had driven a cab at one time, but now drove a limousine instead 
because he was “sick of those curry people” and found that limousines attracted beautiful 
women, or, in the purported words of the driver, gave him “the woo quotient.” The author went 
on to say that he had been permitted to ride along for journalistic purposes with a taxi driver of 
Middle Eastern descent. The article recounted that the driver stopped for a young African-
American passenger—”the type of fare Imran would normally refuse” but felt he had to accept 
because of nearby police observation. The article describes the pounding music audible from 
the young fare’s headphones, and claims that as they neared his destination, the young African-
American man threatened the driver with a knife, hurled coarse abuse at him, and took his 
wallet. According to the article: “‘These things happen,’ Imran said coldly on the drive back 
downtown. ‘I give them whatever they want. I just want my life.’” 
 
Spring Breakdown, published in March 1997, was another example of Glass’s fabrications. The 
theme of the article was that young, conservative Republicans had given up on electoral politics 
and had turned to drugs and sex. Glass invented a fictional group of male college students 
attending the Conservative Political Action Conference. To convey the young men’s view that 
conservatives had lost their direction, he attributed to one of them the comment that 
conservatives were “like a guy who has to pee lost in the desert, searching for a tree.” Glass 
described the young men using marijuana for an hour, then embarking on a search for a young 
woman to humiliate. The plan was “to choose the ugliest and loneliest they can find,” a person 
the young men described as “a real heifer, the fatter the better, bad acne,” for a few of them to 
lure to their hotel room and persuade to undress. At that point, the remaining men would 
emerge from under the bed, shout “we’re beaching. Whale spotted!” and photograph the 
woman. After turning to a discussion of asserted losses in popularity experienced by the 
conservative movement, the article went on to recount the execution of the plot described 
above. It asserted that a woman in fact emerged from the young men’s room unclothed and in 
tears, while the perpetrators congratulated each other. The article went on: “This repellent 
scene was only a little beyond the norm of the conference. A wash of despair and alcohol and 
brutishness hung over the whole thing.” More examples of drug use ensued, along with 
examples of shameless sexual behavior. All of this was fabricated. 
 
In another article, entitled Deliverance, published in November 1996, Glass recounted receiving 
unsatisfactory service from a named computer company, and claimed that his complaints to a 
telephone customer service representative were met with an anti-Semitic slur. In truth, no such 
slur ever was uttered. Glass also wrote a letter to the president of the company, repeating the 
accusation, and sent a copy to the Anti-Defamation League. 
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Glass also engaged in fabrications in freelance articles published by other magazines. An 
example was Prophets and Losses, an article published in Harper’s Magazine in February 1998, 
at which time Glass was also a law student. In that article, Glass represented that he had 
worked for a telephone psychic service for a time, and recounted fabricated conversations with 
management, represented as mercenary and either stupid or cynical, and also fabricated 
conversations with callers, who were depicted as ignorant and desperate. In one case a caller, a 
fabricated character to whom Glass had attributed an African-American dialect, could not be 
persuaded to use his money to feed and clothe his seven children by five different mothers 
instead of buying VCRs and calling telephone psychics for advice on lottery numbers. The 
article was almost entirely a fabrication. Glass explained at the hearing that his intent was to 
expose “how the telephone psychic industry preys on minorities. It uses minority celebrities to 
advertise and shows that are watched predominantly by minorities to lure them into paying 
insane amounts of money. I was angry about that, and I wanted to attack that, and I used 
terrible, horrible stereotypes to create, essentially, straw men to knock down.” 
 
In another example, Glass wrote an article entitled The Vernon Question for George magazine. 
The lengthy article, published in April 1998, concerned Vernon Jordan, an advisor to then 
President Clinton during the then emerging Monica Lewinsky scandal. In two paragraphs, Glass 
used nonexistent sources to describe Jordan’s supposed reputation as a “boor” and attributed 
various fictitious statements to “political operatives,” “socialites,” “political hostesses” and 
officials. These persons assertedly stated that Jordan was well known for sexually explicit 
comments, unwanted sexual advances, and crude stares, and added that he was known in their 
circles as “Vern the Worm” or “Pussyman,” and that young women needed protection against 
him. Another paragraph attributed to a fictional “watchdog” group contained certain claims about 
Jordan’s asserted conflicts of interest and questionable corporate ethics along with statements 
attributed to fictional “senior officials” at companies on whose boards Jordan sat, saying that 
Jordan is “totally unaware of the issues” but “we get what we want, access, and he gets what he 
wants, cash.” These were all fabrications. 
 
Charles Lane, who was the editor of The New Republic at the time of Glass’s exposure, testified 
for the Committee of Bar Examiners that he had received an early complaint about Glass 
concerning an article entitled Boys on the Bus, depicting the actor Alec Baldwin and his brother 
as silly celebrities whose efforts during a bus tour to campaign on the issue of campaign finance 
reform were based on ignorance. A representative of Baldwin’s disputed the assertion in the 
article that the actor had been giving out autographs during the bus tour, but Glass repudiated 
the accusation in print in The New Republic. It was not until Glass prepared his application to 
the California State Bar that he acknowledged that this article contained fabricated evidence to 
the effect that interest in the bus tour came from movie fans seeking autographs and referred to 
a fabricated person who opined that Baldwin lacked real understanding of campaign finance 
reform. 
 
Although at the time, the Boys on the Bus incident seemingly was resolved in Glass’s favor, 
Lane’s suspicions were aroused in May 1998 when a journalist employed by Forbes Digital Tool 
telephoned to warn him that factual assertions in Glass’s recent article for The New Republic 
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magazine, Hack Heaven, did not seem to be true. The article had described a teenager hacking 
a California software company and extorting money to stop the intrusion. The article described a 
convention in Bethesda, Maryland, where some of the events occurred, and when Lane 
challenged Glass, the latter journeyed with Lane to Bethesda, purporting to identify the building 
where the convention had been held. A person working in the building denied such a convention 
had occurred, and Lane became persuaded that Glass was lying. Lane pressed Glass about the 
factual basis for the article, and although Glass was evasive, he insisted the article was 
accurate. Glass spent the night at home fabricating what he would assert were his reporter’s 
notes from interviews, fake business cards, a voicemail box, a website, and newsletters. He 
also induced his brother to impersonate a source. 
 
Upon their return to the office from Bethesda, Glass lobbied the executive editor and others to 
intervene on his behalf with Lane, urging that he was being treated unfairly. Lane, now 
suspecting that other fabrications may have occurred, wanted to fire him, but in response to the 
lobbying, suspended him. The next day, a Saturday, Lane was surprised to discover Glass at 
the office. Thinking Glass had been told not to return, Lane suspected he had altered his 
computer files. He confronted Glass with evidence that Glass had used his brother as a false 
source in the Hack Heaven piece. Ultimately, during this exchange Glass admitted the article 
was fabricated, and Lane fired him. Lane found on Glass’s desk a letter Glass had written to his 
landlord, falsely stating he had been transferred by The New Republic to New York and needed 
his security deposit refunded. Lane also found the letter Glass had written to the chief executive 
of Gateway computers, again stating the falsehood that a customer service employee had used 
an anti-Semitic slur against Glass. 
 
Lane reviewed all of Glass’s articles over the course of the following three or four weeks. He 
received a letter from Glass apologizing and saying he had instructed his lawyers to cooperate 
with The New Republic. Lane compiled a summary of the material in Glass’s articles that he 
found suspicious and submitted the summary to Glass’s counsel, who it was agreed would 
stipulate to those findings of Lane’s that Glass believed to be correct. At the time, Lane 
concluded that 27 of the 42 articles Glass had written for the magazine contained fabrications, 
and Lane wrote two editorial articles informing the magazine’s readership to this effect. 
 
Lane was very surprised to learn for the first time in the California State Bar proceeding that 
there were four articles Glass identified in his California Bar application as fabrications that he, 
Lane, had not even suspected were flawed. Lane was also surprised that four of the articles he 
had identified to Glass’s counsel as suspicious, but which Glass had declined to stipulate 
contained fabrications, were now admitted in the California State Bar application to involve 
fabrications—including the disturbing Taxis and the Meaning of Work, along with Deliverance, 
with its false claim of anti-Semitism, and Boys on the Bus, which had involved the magazine in a 
dispute over authenticity even before Glass’s exposure. 
 
Lane testified that he thought Glass had perpetrated an elaborate hoax on readers and was 
engaged in a con game, not journalism. He testified that Glass’s case had been highlighted at 
the Newseum, a Washington, D.C., museum of journalism, as one of the worst examples of 
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misconduct in journalistic history. Lane noted that The New Republic was put to the expense of 
hiring a private investigator to analyze Glass’s articles and incurred legal fees in the tens of 
thousands of dollars. He testified that Glass had not offered him reimbursement for the 
magazine’s expenses, nor did he offer to refund any portion of the salary he had been paid. 
Lane added that the fabrications hurt the magazine’s reputation, relationships between 
employees, and of course hurt those maligned in the articles. Lane was not mollified by a letter 
of apology he received from Glass in August 2003, around the time Glass’s novel, The Fabulist, 
was published. Lane considered the letter fawning. Lane considered Glass “flagrantly incapable 
of producing honest journalism,” and concluded that his record of systematic deception and lack 
of thorough confession made him unemployable as a journalist. 
 
Richard Bradley, who was Washington affairs editor for George magazine and Glass’s editor for 
his freelance articles for that magazine, testified on behalf of the Committee. Bradley stated that 
when he learned of the scandal involving Glass at The New Republic, he investigated the 
background for the three freelance articles Glass had published, as well as a fourth article that 
Glass had submitted and that was being edited. On investigation, the article on Vernon Jordan 
“blew apart like a dandelion in a strong wind.” Assertions in the other articles were difficult to 
substantiate. When, within a week of learning there were problems with Glass’s work, Bradley 
contacted Glass for help in identifying problems in the articles, Glass responded that he was 
psychologically incapable of doing so and that he was suicidal, and hung up. The magazine 
published an editorial indicating that significant portions of the Vernon Jordan article appeared 
to be false, and that the fabrications were woven into reliable reporting so that it was difficult to 
distinguish them. Glass never contacted Bradley to tell him what was true or false in his articles 
in George magazine, nor was Bradley contacted by Glass’s lawyer. (Glass did send a letter of 
apology to the magazine’s editor-in-chief.) Bradley believed that Glass had discredited 
journalism, contributing to the misconception that journalists are “craven and dishonest.” 
Bradley commented that Glass’s articles “caricatured and mocked their subjects and I felt that 
the perceptions promoted by Glass’s fabrications, in these examples of African-American 
people and conservatives, could not be corrected as easily as a factual mistake could be.” 
Because he would not be credible, Bradley would not hire Glass as a journalist. 
 
Joseph Landau, who later became a law professor at Fordham University Law School, was a 
fact checker at The New Republic while Glass worked there. He testified that Glass had a 
superior reputation for accuracy among fact checkers because his notes were so thorough and 
he was apparently so forthcoming, but he tended to push the fact-checking process to the last 
minute so that it was rushed and could not be done face-to-face. At times Glass could not verify 
certain facts but would promise Landau to telephone the source. Glass would soon return with 
confirmation and updated material, a process that reaffirmed the witness’s sense that the fact 
checking was working. Landau had trusted him. Landau received a letter of apology from Glass 
in the summer of 2004, some six years after Glass had been exposed, and found it to be 
general and vague. 
 
Louis Miller, a lawyer and chairperson of the board of D.A.R.E., testified that Glass published 
falsehoods in articles in The New Republic in March 1997 and Rolling Stone in March 1998 that 
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impaired the organization’s reputation, because the articles claimed D.A.R.E. was ineffective. 
According to Miller, the articles contained fabricated “evidence” that the organization had 
engaged in a widespread campaign of heavyhanded and even violent criminal tactics to counter 
academic and journalistic criticism of the program. D.A.R.E. sued Glass for libel and settled 
after Glass agreed the challenged information was fabricated, issued a retraction, and paid the 
organization’s legal expenses of between $25,000 and $50,000. D.A.R.E. did not receive a 
letter of apology from Glass before it filed suit. D.A.R.E. sued Rolling Stone for defamation but 
lost on the ground that D.A.R.E. had failed to establish actual malice. 
 
Glass graduated from law school in 2000, when he also took and passed the New York bar 
examination. He applied to become a member of the New York bar in 2002. After an evidentiary 
hearing before a subcommittee of a committee on character and fitness, and pursuant to 
apparent custom, in September 2004, a representative of that committee informed Glass 
informally that his application would be rejected, so he withdrew it. The record does not disclose 
the reason for the tentative decision. 
 
In his application to the New York bar, Glass described his misconduct and firing. His 
application and supporting materials included only 20 articles containing fabrications. Glass 
wrote that he had apologized to the editor of The New Republic, saying, “I also worked with all 
three magazines (referring to The New Republic, Harper’s, and George magazines) and other 
publications where I had written freelance articles to identify which facts were true and which 
were false in all of my stories, so they could publish clarifications for their readers.” 
 
At the hearing, Lane challenged the quoted statement as untrue. Lane believed that Glass had 
failed to come forward to actively assist The New Republic in identifying his fabrications, and 
instead had placed the entire burden of identifying his errors on Lane. Lane testified: “Well, he 
didn’t work with us. The effort we went through, over the course of nearly a month, to investigate 
all those stories would have been unnecessary if he had worked with us, and simply come 
forward and laid bare everything that was untrue in his stories. Instead, he sought legal counsel 
and, in effect, clammed up. When I read the statement that he’s laid out in this proceeding, I 
discovered that, even to this day, he has not—or had not—come clean about everything. So I'm 
a little amazed to see that he was representing to somebody that he worked with The New 
Republic to separate fact from fiction in his articles. That was definitely not my experience.” 
 
B. Applicant’s evidence 
 
According to Glass, during his childhood and young adulthood his parents exerted extremely 
intense and cruel pressure upon him to succeed academically and socially. Glass felt that The 
New Republic offered an extremely competitive atmosphere and that his journalistic efforts there 
failed to make a mark sufficient to ensure his retention after his year term had elapsed. It was 
after a visit to the family home, when his parents berated him for his apparent failure even in 
what they considered the worthless career of journalism, that he began fabricating material for 
publication. He also fabricated reporter’s notes and supporting materials for his articles. His aim 
was to impress his parents and colleagues. 
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Once he was fired from The New Republic, Glass was distraught, suicidal, and unable to focus, 
almost immediately entering therapy. He nonetheless hired counsel whom he directed to “work 
with The New Republic.” Glass testified that he believed that The New Republic wanted to 
conduct its own investigation because it did not trust him and testified that “I came to 
understand that they were going to provide me with a list of fabricated articles, and that I was to 
affirm whether or not the article was fabricated that they showed me or that they listed.” He had 
fabricated more than The New Republic had discovered in its investigation, although he testified 
that due to his distress he did not realize this when he reviewed the list or later when he glanced 
at The New Republic’s editorials listing his fabrications. Four of his articles containing 
fabrications were not on the list and he had erroneously denied there were fabrications in four 
articles that were on the list, including Boys on the Bus, Deliverance, and Taxis and the 
Meaning of Work. He did not read the editorials—incomplete, as it turned out—that Lane 
published listing his fabricated articles. In fact, he closely read those articles for the first time 
when the California State Bar asked him to list all of his fabricated articles. Glass testified that 
he had “no information” indicating that his lawyers had failed to convey information to The New 
Republic. 
 
Glass did well in law school. Within a few days of his firing, he rescheduled an exam and within 
a week, managed to earn a B-plus grade on an exam. He explained, however, that this was a 
poor grade for him. 
 
Members of Georgetown University’s law school faculty testified on his behalf at the hearing. 
Professor Susan Bloch telephoned him when the scandal first broke and asked if he needed 
someone to talk to. She appointed him as her research assistant, praising him as one of the 
brightest and best workers she ever had encountered. She found him to be honest and 
developed complete trust in him. She recommended him for a judicial internship during law 
school and a clerkship after graduation. Bloch maintained friendly contact with Glass over the 
years, including after he moved to California, and testified on his behalf when Glass applied for 
admission to the New York bar. She testified that she believed Glass had learned from his 
wrongdoing, that the trauma of his exposure would keep him from ever repeating such behavior, 
and that she had never observed any dishonesty on his part. She did not read his fabricated 
articles but was generally aware of their content. 
 
Professor Stephen Cohen, also of the Georgetown law school, testified that Glass took full 
responsibility for his misconduct. They became friends and Glass was a welcome visitor with 
Cohen’s family. Cohen believed Glass would be honest and ethical as an attorney; in sum, he 
believed Glass to be fully rehabilitated. Cohen deemed it “presumptuous” and “offensive” when 
counsel for the Committee of Bar Examiners asked him whether the Georgetown law school 
application should be read to have required Glass to notify the school that the journalistic 
honors he listed in his application may have been based in part on fabricated journalism. 
 
In 2001, at the end of his clerkship, Glass moved to New York to be with his girlfriend, and 
underwent psychoanalysis on a four-day-a-week basis. In June 2001 Glass entered into a 
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contract to write a novel based on his experiences at The New Republic, testifying that his 
psychiatrists advised him that it would be therapeutic to write the book, which he hoped would 
serve as a warning to young journalists. He was paid an advance of $175,000 and sold 
subsidiary rights for $15,000. He wrote the novel, The Fabulist, and appeared on the television 
program 60 Minutes in May 2003 (just prior to the date of publication) to discuss his 
experiences. He claimed that it was not his intent to use the appearance to sell his book, but 
rather to offer a public apology. 
 
During his residence in New York, and mostly between 2001 and 2004, Glass also undertook to 
handwrite approximately 100 letters of apology to journalists affected by his fabrications, as well 
as to the persons who were injured by his articles. He also spoke at a journalism forum at 
George Washington University in 2003, where he was loudly berated by other journalists. He 
spoke at a journalism class at Columbia and to a civics organization for high school students. In 
addition, he worked at a senior center on a regular basis for approximately one year in New 
York. 
 
Concerning the questions that had arisen about the accuracy of his New York bar application, 
specifically his assertion that he had “worked with” the affected magazines “to identify which 
facts were true and which were false in all [his] stories, so they could publish clarifications,” 
Glass testified that perhaps he should have written that he “offered to work with all three 
magazines,” or in fact, that he “offered to work through counsel,” but added that he did not 
intend to make any misrepresentation or exaggeration. He testified that he assumed his lawyer 
had contacted George magazine, as Glass had instructed him to do, and that he did not prepare 
a list of fabrications for George magazine. He explained that he attached to his New York bar 
application the editorials The New Republic had published incompletely listing his fabrications, 
but he did not read them, or at least did not read them carefully at that time. He also attached 
the notice that George magazine had published about his work—an article that did not refer to 
two of his three articles for George that contained fabrications. He reviewed these carefully for 
the first time in preparation for the California State Bar hearing. 
 
When asked at the hearing in the present matter whether it would be accurate to say that he 
offered to work with The New Republic to identify which facts were true and which were false in 
all of his stories, he answered, “I believe that was my intention at the time, yes, and I believe I 
tried to do that.” He explained that what he meant by this was that he asked his counsel to offer 
to go through the articles to identify fabrications, and then a “joint defense agreement was 
entered into, proposed by The New Republic, and we entered into a joint defense agreement 
that constructed this system.” 
 
Similarly, Glass explained, he did not actually undertake any work with Harper’s Magazine to 
identify what was true and what was false in his articles, but “offered to work with them, or 
asked counsel to offer.” He did not “have a memory of asking” his attorney whether counsel had 
contacted Harper’s. When asked whether, when he prepared his New York bar application, he 
noticed or was troubled by the absence of any article from Harper’s about his fabrications, he 
testified that he still assumed counsel had offered to exchange information or to enter into an 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 699	
agreement with Harper’s. When pressed on his failure to confirm counsel’s contact with 
Harper’s, he testified: “I confirmed—well in my head I asked counsel to do something and he 
didn’t tell me otherwise, I believed it to have occurred.” 
 
Concerning his decision to list only 20 articles containing fabrications in his New York bar 
application materials, Glass emphasized that he had not been asked for a complete list of 
articles containing fabrications, but rather in a telephone conversation, an employee of the 
committee on character and fitness asked for “a list of articles that contained a statement about 
a real person or real entity, as opposed to a fake person or a fake entity, that reflected 
something negative upon that real person or real entity.” He wrote a letter to that committee 
memorializing this telephone conversation, saying he had been asked to list instances in which 
his fabrications “had a harmful impact on real persons. In response, I’ve gone back through all 
of my articles to identify those in which potentially harmful false statements were made about 
actual persons and actual organizations,” and also warning that there might be inadvertent 
omissions. He did not list Deliverance, Boys on the Bus, or an article concerning Ted Turner 
entitled Gift of the Magnate, although these contained fabrications. He explained at the 
California hearing that the customer service agent to whom he attributed the anti-Semitic slur in 
Deliverance was a “made-up character,” and so, he insisted, the article did not harm a real 
person. When pressed, he admitted that the article could have caused harm to the customer 
service agent the company determined had assisted him, and to the company. 
 
Similarly, he did not include the Boys on the Bus article in his New York bar materials because 
the person to whom he attributed the statement that Alec Baldwin did not know much about 
campaign finance reform was fake, and he had created some “fake fans.” When asked whether 
the article harmed Alec Baldwin, a real person, he responded that “Alec Baldwin, truth be told, 
did not know much about campaign finance reform.” When pressed, he conceded that there 
was a potential for injury to Baldwin. 
 
Glass testified that he moved to California in the fall of 2004. He was hired by the Carpenter, 
Zuckerman and Rowley law firm as a law clerk. The firm has many homeless clients, and in 
addition to the legal work he does on their cases, he has helped them with their personal 
problems, even with regard to matters of personal hygiene. 
 
Originally Glass undertook volunteer work in Los Angeles, but because his law firm encouraged 
him to stop taking time off during the workday, he arranged to work extra hours for deserving 
clients on matters for which his firm had no expectation of collecting fees. 
 
California Attorney Paul Zuckerman testified that he decided to give Glass a chance as a law 
clerk. After initially assigning Glass minor projects and exercising close oversight, Zuckerman 
became convinced that Glass was one of the best employees in the firm, with a fine intellect, a 
good work ethic, and reliable commitment to honesty. Glass exhibited great compassion, 
assisting at a personal level with difficult clients and helping to find resources and social 
services for some of the firm's many homeless clients. Other lawyers who had worked for or 
with the firm confirmed Zuckerman’s view of Glass as an employee who conducted excellent 
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legal research, was assiduous and hyperscrupulous about honesty, and stopped to think about 
ethical issues. 
 
Also offered in support of Glass’s application were affidavits that had been submitted in support 
of his New York bar application from the judges for whom Glass had worked during and 
immediately after completing law school. Both found him highly competent and honest at that 
time. Additional declarations from attorneys and friends that had been submitted with the New 
York bar application were offered in support. 
 
Dr. Richard Friedman, a psychiatrist, testified that he had treated Glass since 2005, and 
believed he had developed good judgment, scrupulous honesty, and the ability to handle difficult 
situations well. Dr. Friedman reported that he would be astonished if Glass committed 
misconduct as he had in the past, both because of the growth of character and moral sense the 
doctor had observed, but also because of a strong instinct to protect himself from the traumatic 
results of his prior misconduct. He reported that Glass had no sociopathic personality traits. 
 
Dr. Richard Rosenthal, a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst who is known for treating gamblers and 
those with impulse control disorders, was approached by Glass’s attorney in 2005. Rosenthal 
had an evaluative as well as therapeutic relationship with Glass that began in 2005 and 
continued with meetings once or twice a month until the time of the hearing. 
 
Dr. Rosenthal identified Glass’s underlying psychological issues as a need for approval, a need 
to impress others, and a need for attention, and pointed also to Glass’s fear of inadequacy, 
rejection, and abandonment. Rosenthal testified that when they met in 2005, Glass needed to 
overcome enormous shame and learn to forgive himself. Through therapy, Glass learned to be 
realistic about family issues and to set boundaries. Rosenthal believed that Glass had grown up 
in a family that exerted tremendous pressure on him to succeed yet always made him feel like a 
failure. In Rosenthal’s opinion, Glass was rehabilitated, meaning that he was extremely 
conscientious and honest, avoided the appearance of impropriety, had reasonable goals and 
expectations, had gained empathy and tolerance, and would not allow himself to be 
overwhelmed by stress. The doctor saw no evidence that Glass was a sociopath. 
 
Glass himself described his therapy, which had commenced very shortly after his exposure and 
continued to the time of the 2010 hearing, that is, for 12 years. Through therapy he had learned 
to separate his feelings about his family from the work environment and to “set boundaries 
within my family.” He testified that he believed the most important thing he could do to make 
amends was to change himself. 
 
Martin Peretz, who owned and managed The New Republic at the time of the fabrications, 
testified on Glass’s behalf and had developed a charitable view of his misconduct by the time of 
the California State Bar hearing. He blamed himself and, even more, the magazine’s editors for 
encouraging Glass to write zany, shocking articles and for failing to recognize the improbability 
of some of Glass’s stories. He found the harm of the scandal to the magazine to be minimal. He 
had renewed social contact with Glass in the past few years and believed that Glass had been 
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harshly treated. He would not rule out hiring Glass again as a journalist. He explained that in his 
experience as a professor “the most brilliant students plagiarize,” complaining to the 
Committee’s counsel, “I actually find your pursuing him an act of stalking.” 
 
Additional character witnesses included Melanie Thernstrom, a journalist, memoirist, and friend 
who testified that she had known Glass for more than a decade because she was a close friend 
of his girlfriend, Julie Hilden. Her initial skepticism about him dissolved soon after she met him 
and she believed he had become kind, generous, loyal, responsible, empathetic and above all, 
honest. Thernstrom witnessed Glass during the period he wrote letters of apology and said that 
each letter required considerable work and caused him anguish. She found him to be very sorry 
for the deceptions, and believed that he had taken responsibility for his past acts and would 
never deceive again. She had observed that Glass was intelligent, hardworking, and empathetic 
with clients who were injured. She thought the Committee was “picking on” irrelevant issues—
that is, the exact number of Glass’s deceptive articles and whether or when he had disclosed 
them all. She believed the Committee’s position was “sophistic.” In her view, it was enough that 
he had admitted his misconduct and apologized for it, and she believed that there was no 
current, ongoing damage from his fabricated articles because Glass’s work had been entirely 
discredited. 
 
Lawrence Berger, a friend, testified on Glass’s behalf, saying that Glass immediately told him 
about the scandal when they met. He testified that Glass is especially committed to being a 
good person now, being remarkably ethical and a devoted friend. According to Berger, Glass’s 
efforts during the period he wrote the letters of apology were never perfunctory. 
 
Julie Hilden, a freelance lawyer and aspiring scriptwriter and Glass’s longtime live-in girlfriend, 
also testified on his behalf. He took good care of her during a prolonged, serious illness, even 
though she lived in New York and he was completing law school and doing his clerkship in 
Washington, D.C., at the time. She testified that he immediately demonstrated that he was very 
serious about being completely honest in every detail, and honesty is still an overriding concern. 
She observed the great effort he put into writing letters of apology during a prolonged period 
between 2002 and 2004. She explained that he takes a personal interest in clients, works very 
hard for them, and accepts their telephone calls at all hours, including nights and weekends. 
 
C. California State Bar proceedings 
 
Glass took and passed the California Bar examination in 2006 and in July 2007 filed an 
application for determination of moral character as part of his bar application. The Committee of 
Bar Examiners denied the application, but on Glass’s request a moral character hearing was 
conducted in the State Bar Court in April and May of 2010. 
 
The State Bar Court’s hearing judge found that Glass had established good moral character. 
The Committee sought review. The State Bar Court Review Department independently 
reviewed the record, and a majority of the three-judge panel agreed with the hearing judge that 
Glass had established good moral character. 
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The Review Department majority acknowledged that Glass’s misconduct had been “appalling” 
and “egregious,” but believed that Glass had satisfied his “heavy burden of proof” and 
established his rehabilitation. The majority stated that Glass’s burden of proof as a first-time 
applicant was “substantially less rigorous” than it would have been for an attorney seeking 
reinstatement after disbarment. Moreover, the majority declared, its “task here is not to dwell on 
his past misdeeds, but to determine his present moral fitness.” It added that because the “policy 
of the state favors admission of applicants who have achieved reformation,” the majority 
resolved any reasonable doubt concerning Glass’s rehabilitation in his favor and “gave him the 
benefit of any conflicting but equally reasonable inferences flowing from the evidence.” The 
majority concluded that “cumulatively, Glass’s legal employment history, community service, 
character witnesses, progress in therapy, remorse and acceptance of responsibility” provided a 
more accurate picture of his moral character than his misconduct of many years ago. 
 
The majority acknowledged that Glass had not fully identified his fabrications until the California 
Bar proceedings, but observed that Glass had not asked the bar to excuse that failure. The 
majority also expressed some concern regarding Glass’s New York bar application, observing 
that he had “mischaracterized the degree to which he cooperated with the magazines to identify 
the fabricated articles.” On the other hand, in the majority’s view, Glass’s careful review of his 
prior articles in connection with the California State Bar proceedings indicated that he had fully 
acknowledged his wrongdoing, an “essential step towards rehabilitation.” In addition, the 
majority concluded that Glass had left it to his attorneys to work with the magazines because of 
his emotional turmoil, and “the State Bar did not prove whether Glass’s attorney failed to ‘work 
with’ some of the publishers and neither did Glass establish that his attorney had completed the 
task as requested.” 
 
The majority commented upon Glass’s excellent reputation with law professors and judicial 
employers, and observed that Glass’s rehabilitation seemed to have occurred over a number of 
years. The majority recounted the course of Glass’s therapy and his therapists’ testimony on his 
behalf in support of the view that he was rehabilitated. The majority further referred to Glass’s 
community service in New York and commented that his work commitments rendered him 
unable to continue non-work-related community service in Los Angeles, where he had resided 
since 2004. 
 
The majority placed great emphasis on Glass’s character witnesses, saying: “We afford great 
weight to Glass’s character witnesses, who were community leaders, employers, judges, and 
attorneys, and all of whom spoke with the utmost confidence in Glass's good moral character 
and rehabilitation.” 
 
The majority declined to believe restitution was required of Glass. “We consider his present 
character in light of his previous moral shortcomings citation, and we are at a loss to understand 
how monetary restitution would mitigate the reputational harm that Glass had caused.” The 
majority found more significant evidence that he has made amends both to the journalistic 
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community in his public admissions concerning his fabrications and to his victims in the letters 
he sent them. 
 
The majority concluded that “even those who have committed serious, indeed egregious, 
misconduct, are capable of overcoming their past misdeeds” and that persons who had 
reformed should be rewarded with an opportunity to serve as lawyers. 
 
The Review Department panel’s dissenting opinion concluded that Glass had not proven full 
rehabilitation, pointing to his “staggering” two-year period of “multi-layered, complex and harmful 
course of public dishonesty.” The dissenting judge found especially troubling Glass’s omissions 
and misstatements in his application to the New York bar. “To gain admission to practice law in 
New York, Glass understated the number of articles he had fabricated and exaggerated his 
efforts to help the magazines identify those articles. At a time when he should have been 
scrupulously honest, he presented an inaccurate application because it benefitted him—the 
same behavior as his earlier misconduct.” The dissenting opinion concluded: “Given the 
magnitude of his misconduct and his subsequent misrepresentations on his New York bar 
application, Glass has not shown proof of reform by a lengthy period of exemplary conduct 
which ‘we could with confidence lay before the world’ to justify his admission.” 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Applicable Law 
 
(1) To be qualified to practice law in this state, a person must be of good moral character. Good 
moral character includes “qualities of honesty, fairness, candor, trustworthiness, observance of 
fiduciary responsibility, respect for and obedience to the law, and respect for the rights of others 
and the judicial process.” “Persons of good character do not commit acts or crimes involving 
moral turpitude—a concept that embraces a wide range of deceitful and depraved behavior.” A 
lawyer’s good moral character is essential for the protection of clients and for the proper 
functioning of the judicial system itself. 
 
(2) When the applicant has presented evidence that is sufficient to establish a prima facie case 
of his or her good moral character, the burden shifts to the State Bar to rebut that case with 
evidence of poor moral character. Once the State Bar has presented evidence of moral 
turpitude, the burden “falls squarely upon the applicant to demonstrate his or her rehabilitation.” 
 
Of particular significance for the present case is the principle that “the more serious the 
misconduct and the bad character evidence, the stronger the applicant's showing of 
rehabilitation must be.” “Cases authorizing admission on the basis of rehabilitation commonly 
involve a substantial period of exemplary conduct following the applicant’s misdeeds.” 
Moreover, “truly exemplary” conduct ordinarily includes service to the community. 
 
(3) We independently weigh the evidence that was before the State Bar Court, recognizing that 
the applicant bears the burden of establishing good moral character. We ask whether the 
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applicant is fit to practice law, paying particular attention to acts of moral turpitude and prior 
misconduct that bears particularly upon fitness to practice law. 
 
In reviewing moral fitness findings made by the State Bar, we accord significant weight to the 
State Bar Court hearing judge’s findings of fact to the extent they are based on witness 
demeanor and credibility. Although “the moral character determinations of the Committee and 
the State Bar Court play an integral role in the admissions decision, and both bear substantial 
weight within their respective spheres,” we are not bound by the determinations of the 
Committee or the State Bar Court. Rather, we “independently examine and weigh the evidence” 
to decide whether the applicant is qualified for admission. 
 
(4) Contrary to the Review Department majority’s view that Glass’s burden was significantly 
lighter than it would be for an attorney seeking readmission because he was a first-time 
applicant, in many respects the difference between admission and disciplinary proceedings is 
“more apparent than real.” “Because both admission and disciplinary proceedings concern 
fitness to practice law as evidenced by acts of moral turpitude, this court routinely consults its 
disciplinary cases in deciding whether applicants for admission possess, at the outset, the 
requisite moral character.” At both admission and disciplinary proceedings, “the common issue 
is whether the applicant for admission or the attorney sought to be disciplined ‘is a fit and proper 
person to be permitted to practice law, and that usually turns upon whether he has committed or 
is likely to continue to commit acts of moral turpitude,” particularly misconduct that bears upon 
the applicant’s fitness to practice law. 
 
“However, unlike in disciplinary proceedings, where the State Bar must show that an already 
admitted attorney is unfit to practice law and deserves professional sanction, the burden rests 
upon the candidate for admission to prove his own moral fitness.” 
 
B. Analysis 
 
(5) The Review Department majority believed it was reasonable to draw all inferences in favor of 
Glass, failing to be constrained by our discussion in Gossage, as we shall explain. Although an 
applicant ordinarily receives the benefit of the doubt as to “conflicting, equally reasonable 
inferences” concerning moral fitness, the State Bar Court majority failed to recognize that this 
rule does not materially assist applicants who have engaged in serious misconduct. This is 
because “where serious or criminal misconduct is involved, positive inferences about the 
applicant's moral character are more difficult to draw, and negative character inferences are 
stronger and more reasonable.” When there have been very serious acts of moral turpitude, we 
must be convinced that the applicant “is no longer the same person who behaved so poorly in 
the past,” and will find moral fitness “only if he or she has since behaved in exemplary fashion 
over a meaningful period of time.” 
 
Applying the Gossage standard in this case of egregious malfeasance, we begin our own 
independent review of the record with a focus on Glass’s many acts of dishonesty and 
professional misconduct, and then ask whether he has established a compelling showing of 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 705	
rehabilitation and truly exemplary conduct over an extended period that would suffice to 
demonstrate his fitness for the practice of law. 
 
Glass’s conduct as a journalist exhibited moral turpitude sustained over an extended period. As 
the Review Department dissent emphasized, he engaged in “fraud of staggering proportions” 
and he “used his exceptional writing skills to publicly and falsely malign people and 
organizations for actions they did not do and faults they did not have.” As the dissent further 
commented, for two years he “engaged in a multi-layered, complex and harmful course of public 
dishonesty.” Glass’s journalistic dishonesty was not a single lapse of judgment, which we have 
sometimes excused, but involved significant deceit sustained unremittingly for a period of years. 
Glass’s deceit also was motivated by professional ambition, betrayed a vicious, mean spirit and 
a complete lack of compassion for others, along with arrogance and prejudice against various 
ethnic groups. In all these respects, his misconduct bore directly on his character in matters that 
are critical to the practice of law. 
 
Glass not only spent two years producing damaging articles containing or entirely made up of 
fabrications, thereby deluding the public, maligning individuals, and disparaging ethnic 
minorities, he also routinely expended considerable efforts to fabricate background materials to 
dupe the fact checkers assigned to vet his work. When exposure threatened, he redoubled his 
efforts to hide his misconduct, going so far as to create a phony website and business cards 
and to recruit his brother to pose as a source. In addition, to retain his position, he engaged in a 
spirited campaign among the leadership at The New Republic to characterize Lane’s obviously 
well-founded concerns as unfair and to retain his position. 
 
Glass’s conduct during this two-year period violated ethical strictures governing his profession. 
Believing that “public enlightenment is the forerunner of justice and the foundation of 
democracy,” the Code of Ethics of the Society of Professional Journalists provides that “the duty 
of the journalist is to further those ends by seeking truth and providing a fair and comprehensive 
account of events and issues, striving to serve the public with thoroughness and honesty. 
Deliberate distortion is never permissible.” Glass’s behavior fell so far short of this standard that 
Lane recounted seeing Glass featured in an exhibit in the Newseum, a Washington, D.C., 
museum dedicated to journalism, as embodying one of the worst episodes of deceit in 
journalistic history. 
 
Glass’s misconduct was also reprehensible because it took place while he was pursuing a law 
degree and license to practice law, when the importance of honesty should have gained new 
meaning and significance for him. 
 
Moreover, Glass’s lack of integrity and forthrightness continued beyond the time he was 
engaged in journalism. Once he was exposed, Glass’s response was to protect himself, not to 
freely and fully admit and catalogue all of his fabrications. He never fully cooperated with his 
employers to clarify the record, failed to carefully review the editorials they published to describe 
the fabrications to their readership, made misrepresentations to The New Republic regarding 
some of his work during the period he purported to be cooperating with that magazine, and 
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indeed some of his fabrications did not come to light until the California State Bar proceedings. 
He refused to speak to his editor at George magazine when the latter called to ask for help in 
identifying fabrications in the articles Glass wrote for that magazine. 
 
(6) The record also discloses instances of dishonesty and disingenuousness occurring after 
Glass’s exposure, up to and including the State Bar evidentiary hearing in 2010. In the New 
York bar proceedings that ended in 2004, as even the State Bar Court majority acknowledged, 
he made misrepresentations concerning his cooperation with The New Republic and other 
publications and efforts to aid them identify all of his fabrications. He also submitted an 
incomplete list of articles that injured others. We have previously said about omissions on bar 
applications: “Whether it is caused by intentional concealment, reckless disregard for the truth, 
or an unreasonable refusal to perceive the need for disclosure, such an omission is itself strong 
evidence that the applicant lacks the ‘integrity’ and/or ‘intellectual discernment’ required to be an 
attorney.” 
 
Our review of the record indicates hypocrisy and evasiveness in Glass’s testimony at the 
California State Bar hearing, as well. We find it particularly disturbing that at the hearing Glass 
persisted in claiming that he had made a good faith effort to work with the magazines that 
published his works. He went through many verbal twists and turns at the hearing to avoid 
acknowledging the obvious fact that in his New York bar application he exaggerated his level of 
assistance to the magazines that had published his fabrications, and that he omitted from his 
New York bar list of fabrications some that actually could have injured real persons. He also 
testified that he told his lawyer to work with Harper’s Magazine to identify his fabrications, yet 
evaded questions concerning whether his lawyer had done so, while insisting that he took 
responsibility for an inferred failure to follow what obviously were significant instructions. He 
asserted that he had been too distraught to recognize that the list of fabrications The New 
Republic gave his lawyer was incomplete—or that in his response he had denied that articles 
including the egregious Taxis and the Meaning of Work were in fact fabricated—while 
acknowledging that within a few days of his firing he made arrangements to reschedule a final 
examination for the end of the exam period and did well on the exam he took within a week of 
his exposure. Indeed, despite his many statements concerning taking personal responsibility, 
and contrary to what he suggested in his New York bar application, it was not until the California 
Bar proceedings that he shouldered the responsibility of reviewing the editorials his employers 
published disclosing his fabrications, thus failing to ensure that all his very public lies had been 
corrected publically and in a timely manner. He has “not acted with the ‘high degree of 
frankness and truthfulness’ and the ‘high standard of integrity’ required by this process.” 
 
(7) Honesty is absolutely fundamental in the practice of law; without it, “the profession is worse 
than valueless in the place it holds in the administration of justice.” “Manifest dishonesty 
provides a reasonable basis for the conclusion that the applicant or attorney cannot be relied 
upon to fulfill the moral obligations incumbent upon members of the legal profession.” As the 
dissent in the Review Department pointed out, “if Glass were to fabricate evidence in legal 
matters as readily and effectively as he falsified material for magazine articles, the harm to the 
public and profession would be immeasurable.” 
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We also observe that instead of directing his efforts at serving others in the community, much of 
Glass’s energy since the end of his journalistic career seems to have been directed at 
advancing his own career and financial and emotional well-being. 
 
(8) As Justice Kennard did in her concurring opinion in Kwasnik, we do well to repeat Justice 
Felix Frankfurter’s “eloquent description” of the moral character required of lawyers: “It is a fair 
characterization of the lawyer’s responsibility in our society that he or she stands “as a shield” in 
defense of right and to ward off wrong. From a profession charged with such responsibilities 
there must be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite 
discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the 
centuries, been compendiously described as “moral character.” 
 
(9) As for Glass’s case for admission, although he points to his youth at the time of his 
employment as a journalist and an asserted period of rehabilitation of 12 years (measured 
between the time he was fired and the hearing in the State Bar Court), we have outlined 
instances of dishonesty and disingenuousness persisting throughout that period, including at the 
California State Bar evidentiary hearing. In addition, Glass’s behavior was under the scrutiny of 
first the New York bar from 2002 to 2004, and then the California Bar from 2007 to 2010, 
reducing the probative value of the evidence of his good conduct during those periods. “Good 
conduct generally is expected from someone who has applied for admission with, and whose 
character is under scrutiny by, the State Bar.” 
 
(10) The Review Department majority relied heavily on the testimony of Glass’s character 
witnesses, but the testimony of character witnesses will not suffice by itself to establish 
rehabilitation. Moreover, stressing that Glass’s reputation as a journalist had been exploded and 
that so many years had passed, some of the character witnesses did not sufficiently focus on 
the seriousness of the misconduct, incorrectly viewing it as of little current significance despite 
its lingering impact on its victims and on public perceptions concerning issues of race and 
politics. They also did not take into account, as we do, that the misconduct reflected poorly on 
the particular commitment to honesty that Glass might have been expected to have had as a 
law student. For these reasons we believe the Review Department majority accorded too much 
probative value to the testimony of Glass’s character witnesses. 
 
(11) Glass emphasized the remorse he expressed through his letters to victims, and 
characterized his novel and his appearance on 60 Minutes as efforts to make amends. Remorse 
does not establish rehabilitation, however, and in any event, the weight of this evidence is 
diminished because the letters were not written near the time of his misconduct and exposure, 
when they might have been most meaningful to the victims, but rather seemed timed to coincide 
with his effort to become a member of the New York bar. The novel served Glass’s own 
purposes, producing notoriety and a fee of $175,000, and the appearance on 60 Minutes was 
timed to coincide with the release of the novel. Glass did not offer any restitution to Lane or 
Bradley. It was not until approximately 2008 that he made an offer to the then friendly Peretz—
who roundly disclaimed any interest in restitution—to repay his salary. This offer was made after 
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Glass applied to the California Bar and was another oddly belated and, we believe, 
disingenuous effort at making his victims whole. 
 
The record of Glass’s therapy does not represent “truly exemplary conduct in the sense of 
returning something to the community.” To be sure, through therapy he seems to have gained a 
deep understanding of the psychological sources of his misconduct, as well as tools to help him 
avoid succumbing to the same pressures again. His treating psychiatrists are plainly highly 
competent and well regarded in their field, and they are convinced that he has no remaining 
psychological flaws tending to cause him to act dishonestly. Glass believed that he could best 
make amends by changing himself. But his 12 years of therapy primarily conferred a personal 
benefit on Glass himself. 
 
(12) Glass points to the pro bono legal work he does for clients of his firm as evidence of 
sustained efforts on behalf of the community, but we observe that pro bono work is not truly 
exemplary for attorneys, but rather is expected of them. 
 
(13) Glass and the witnesses who supported his application stress his talent in the law and his 
commitment to the profession, and they argue that he has already paid a high enough price for 
his misdeeds to warrant admission to the bar. They emphasize his personal redemption, but we 
must recall that what is at stake is not compassion for Glass, who wishes to advance from being 
a supervised law clerk to enjoying a license to engage in the practice of law on an independent 
basis. Given our duty to protect the public and maintain the integrity and high standards of the 
profession, our focus is on the applicant’s moral fitness to practice law. On this record, the 
applicant failed to carry his heavy burden of establishing his rehabilitation and current fitness. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reject the State Bar Court majority's recommendation and decline 
to admit Glass to the practice of law. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Stephen Randall Glass (1972-) is currently working at a Beverly Hills law firm as a 
paralegal. He was the subject of the motion picture Shattered Glass (2003). Excellent 
journalistic accounts of the Glass affair are available from Vanity Fair, Forbes, The Los 
Angeles Times, and The New Republic. The New Republic’s original corrections are 
available here and here. Links to several of Glass’s fabricated articles are available on 
his Wikipedia page. 
2. Did the court provide a fair assessment of Glass’s fitness to practice law? Do you agree 
with the court’s conclusion that he failed to rehabilitate himself? Do you agree with the 
courts assessment of his disclosures in his applications for bar membership in New York 
and California? 
3. The court described Glass’s fabrications as acts of moral turpitude. “Moral turpitude” is 
generally defined as “an act or behavior that gravely violates the sentiment or accepted 
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standard of the community.” More specifically, the California Supreme Court has 
observed, “The concept of moral turpitude escapes precise definition. Moral turpitude 
has been described as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social 
duties which a man owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the 
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. It has been 
described as any crime or misconduct without excuse or any dishonest or immoral act. 
The meaning and test is the same whether the dishonest or immoral act is a felony, 
misdemeanor, or no crime at all.” Chadwick v. State Bar, 776 P.2d 240 (Cal. 1989). Is 
this a helpful definition? Do you agree with the court that Glass committed acts of moral 
turpitude? 
4. Was the problem with Glass’s articles the fabrications, the content, or both? If Glass had 
not fabricated any of the facts reported in the articles, would they reflect on his moral 
character? 
5. Was it proper for the court to reverse the State Bar Court’s assessment of Glass’s 
rehabilitation, moral character, and fitness to practice? 
6. What standard of proof did the court apply to Glass’s claim of rehabilitation? Was it 
higher, lower, or the same as the standard applied to attorneys applying for 
readmission? What standard should courts apply to new applicants for bar admission, as 
opposed to applicants for readmission? 
7. Many prominent people testified in favor of Glass and his rehabilitation, including some 
of the people he directly harmed. Should that count in his favor? How seriously did the 
court take their testimony? 
8. If the court granted Glass’s application for admission to practice, do you think it is likely 
that he would engage in fraudulent or misleading conduct? 
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7.2: Advertising 
 
Call me on the line. Call me, call me any, anytime. Call me, I'll arrive. You can call me any day 
or night. Call me.108 
 
Attorneys are “professionals” and the bar is a “professional organization.” But how, if at all, 
should the professional status of attorneys affect their commercial behavior? Attorneys have 
fiduciary duties to their clients and professional duties as officers of the court. But do they have 
professional duties of decorum to the public as a whole? And how should the bar regulate the 
commercial activities of attorneys? When do professional norms justify regulation? And in 
whose interests should the bar regulate the commercial activities of attorneys: the public or its 
members? 
 
Advertising 
 
In the 19th century, attorneys regularly advertised their services in newspapers and magazines. 
Among other things, patent attorneys solicited patent applications from inventors nationwide. 
But in the early 20th century, state bar associations began to frown on advertising. And in 1908, 
Canon 27 of the American Bar Association’s original Canons of Professional Ethics explicitly 
discouraged advertisement and solicitation as “unprofessional.” 
 
Gradually, the “ethical principles” motivating Canon 27 were refined by state and national bar 
associations to provide increasingly detailed norms governing what kinds of attorney advertising 
were permissible, from signage on a law office, to attorney directories, to business card and 
letterhead design. With the exception of patent and trademark attorneys and proctors in 
admiralty, most attorneys could not even publicly claim a specific area of practice. 
 
Unsurprisingly, these limitations on attorney advertising were observed substantially in the 
breach. State bar associations were hard-pressed to enforce them and enterprising attorneys 
were wont to avoid them. Pressure for relaxation of the norms gradually mounted, but did not 
come to a head until 1977, when the Supreme Court finally weighed in. 
 
Model Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services 
 
Information About Legal Services 
 
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's 
services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material misrepresentation of 
fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not 
materially misleading. 
 
Model Rule 7.1: Comments 
 
																																																								
108 Blondie, Call Me (1980). 
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1. This Rule governs all communications about a lawyer’s services, including advertising. 
Whatever means are used to make known a lawyer’s services, statements about them 
must be truthful. 
2. Misleading truthful statements are prohibited by this Rule. A truthful statement is 
misleading if it omits a fact necessary to make the lawyer’s communication considered 
as a whole not materially misleading. A truthful statement is misleading if a substantial 
likelihood exists that it will lead a reasonable person to formulate a specific conclusion 
about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services for which there is no reasonable factual 
foundation. A truthful statement is also misleading if presented in a way that creates a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would believe the lawyer’s 
communication requires that person to take further action when, in fact, no action is 
required. 
3. A communication that truthfully reports a lawyer’s achievements on behalf of clients or 
former clients may be misleading if presented so as to lead a reasonable person to form 
an unjustified expectation that the same results could be obtained for other clients in 
similar matters without reference to the specific factual and legal circumstances of each 
client’s case. Similarly, an unsubstantiated claim about a lawyer’s or law firm’s services 
or fees, or an unsubstantiated comparison of the lawyer’s or law firm’s services or fees 
with those of other lawyers or law firms, may be misleading if presented with such 
specificity as would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the comparison or claim 
can be substantiated. The inclusion of an appropriate disclaimer or qualifying language 
may preclude a finding that a statement is likely to create unjustified expectations or 
otherwise mislead the public. 
 
Model Rule 7.2: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services: Specific Rules 
 
a. A lawyer may communicate information regarding the lawyer’s services through any 
media. 
b. A lawyer shall not compensate, give or promise anything of value to a person for 
recommending the lawyer’s services except that a lawyer may: 
1. pay the reasonable costs of advertisements or communications permitted by this 
Rule 
c. A lawyer shall not state or imply that a lawyer is certified as a specialist in a particular 
field of law, unless: 
1. the lawyer has been certified as a specialist by an organization that has been 
approved by an appropriate authority of the state or the District of Columbia or a 
U.S. Territory or that has been accredited by the American Bar Association; and 
2. the name of the certifying organization is clearly identified in the communication. 
d. Any communication made under this Rule must include the name and contact 
information of at least one lawyer or law firm responsible for its content. 
 
Model Rule 7.2: Comments 
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1. This Rule permits public dissemination of information concerning a lawyer’s or law firm’s 
name, address, email address, website, and telephone number; the kinds of services the 
lawyer will undertake; the basis on which the lawyer’s fees are determined, including 
prices for specific services and payment and credit arrangements; a lawyer’s foreign 
language ability; names of references and, with their consent, names of clients regularly 
represented; and other information that might invite the attention of those seeking legal 
assistance. 
9. Paragraph (c) of this Rule permits a lawyer to communicate that the lawyer does or does 
not practice in particular areas of law. A lawyer is generally permitted to state that the 
lawyer “concentrates in” or is a “specialist,” practices a “specialty,” or “specializes in” 
particular fields based on the lawyer’s experience, specialized training or education, but 
such communications are subject to the “false and misleading” standard applied in Rule 
7.1 to communications concerning a lawyer’s services. 
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Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) 
 
Summary: Bates and O’Steen were members of the Arizona bar. In 1974, they opened 
a law office in Phoenix, and published a newspaper advertisement, offering basic legal 
services at fixed rates. The Arizona bar rules prohibited advertisements, and the Arizona 
Supreme Court ultimately censured Bates and O’Steen. The Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that the Arizona bar rule violated the 1st Amendment, because it unreasonably 
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prohibited the dissemination of truthful information to the public. The dissent argued that 
the 1st Amendment should not prohibit the regulation of attorney advertising. 
 
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
As part of its regulation of the Arizona Bar, the Supreme Court of that State has imposed and 
enforces a disciplinary rule that restricts advertising by attorneys. This case presents two 
issues: whether §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1 and 2, forbid such state 
regulation, and whether the operation of the rule violates the First Amendment, made applicable 
to the States through the Fourteenth. 
 
I 
 
Appellants John R. Bates and Van O’Steen are attorneys licensed to practice law in the State of 
Arizona. As such, they are members of the appellee, the State Bar of Arizona. After admission 
to the bar in 1972, appellants worked as attorneys with the Maricopa County Legal Aid Society. 
 
In March 1974, appellants left the Society and opened a law office, which they call a “legal 
clinic,” in Phoenix. Their aim was to provide legal services at modest fees to persons of 
moderate income who did not qualify for governmental legal aid. In order to achieve this end, 
they would accept only routine matters, such as uncontested divorces, uncontested adoptions, 
simple personal bankruptcies, and changes of name, for which costs could be kept down by 
extensive use of paralegals, automatic typewriting equipment, and standardized forms and 
office procedures. More complicated cases, such as contested divorces, would not be accepted. 
Because appellants set their prices so as to have a relatively low return on each case they 
handled, they depended on substantial volume. 
 
After conducting their practice in this manner for two years, appellants concluded that their 
practice and clinical concept could not survive unless the availability of legal services at low cost 
was advertised and, in particular, fees were advertised. Consequently, in order to generate the 
necessary flow of business, that is, “to attract clients,” appellants on February 22, 1976, placed 
an advertisement in the Arizona Republic, a daily newspaper of general circulation in the 
Phoenix metropolitan area. As may be seen, the advertisement stated that appellants were 
offering “legal services at very reasonable fees,” and listed their fees for certain services. 
 
Appellants concede that the advertisement constituted a clear violation of Disciplinary Rule 2-
101(B). The disciplinary rule provides in part: 
 
(B) A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other lawyer 
affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine 
advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in the city or 
telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or 
permit others to do so in his behalf. 
 
Upon the filing of a complaint initiated by the president of the State Bar, a hearing was held 
before a three member Special Local Administrative Committee. Although the committee took 
the position that it could not consider an attack on the validity of the rule, it allowed the parties to 
develop a record on which such a challenge could be based. The committee recommended that 
each of the appellants be suspended from the practice of law for not less than six months. Upon 
further review by the Board of Governors of the State Bar, the Board recommended only a one-
week suspension for each appellant, the weeks to run consecutively. 
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Appellants then sought review in the Supreme Court of Arizona, arguing, among other things, 
that the disciplinary rule violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act because of its tendency to limit 
competition, and that the rule infringed their First Amendment rights. The court rejected both 
claims. The plurality may have viewed with some skepticism the claim that a restraint on 
advertising might have an adverse effect on competition. But, even if the rule might otherwise 
violate the Act, the plurality concluded that the regulation was exempt from Sherman Act attack 
because the rule “is an activity of the State of Arizona acting as sovereign.” The regulation thus 
was held to be shielded from the Sherman Act by the state-action exemption. 
 
Turning to the First Amendment issue, the plurality noted that restrictions on professional 
advertising have survived constitutional challenge in the past. Although recognizing that Virginia 
Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council and Bigelow v. Virginia held that commercial 
speech was entitled to certain protection under the First Amendment, the plurality focused on 
passages in those opinions acknowledging that special considerations might bear on the 
advertising of professional services by lawyers. The plurality apparently was of the view that the 
older decisions dealing with professional advertising survived these recent cases unscathed, 
and held that Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) passed First Amendment muster. Because the court, in 
agreement with the Board of Governors, felt that appellants’ advertising “was done in good faith 
to test the constitutionality of DR 2-101(B),” it reduced the sanction to censure only. 
 
Of particular interest here is the opinion of Mr. Justice Holohan in dissent. In his view, the case 
should have been framed in terms of “the right of the public as consumers and citizens to know 
about the activities of the legal profession,” rather than as one involving merely the regulation of 
a profession. Observed in this light, he felt that the rule performed a substantial disservice to the 
public: 
 
Obviously the information of what lawyers charge is important for private economic 
decisions by those in need of legal services. Such information is also helpful, perhaps 
indispensable, to the formation of an intelligent opinion by the public on how well the 
legal system is working and whether it should be regulated or even altered. The rule at 
issue prevents access to such information by the public. 
 
Although the dissenter acknowledged that some types of advertising might cause confusion and 
deception, he felt that the remedy was to ban that form, rather than all advertising. Thus, despite 
his “personal dislike of the concept of advertising by attorneys,” he found the ban 
unconstitutional. 
 
II The Sherman Act 
 
We conclude that the Arizona Supreme Court's determination that appellants' Sherman Act 
claim is barred by the Parker v. Brown exemption must be affirmed. 
 
III The First Amendment 
 
B 
 
The issue presently before us is a narrow one. First, we need not address the peculiar problems 
associated with advertising claims relating to the quality of legal services. Such claims probably 
are not susceptible of precise measurement or verification and, under some circumstances, 
might well be deceptive or misleading to the public, or even false. Appellee does not suggest, 
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nor do we perceive, that appellants’ advertisement contained claims, extravagant or otherwise, 
as to the quality of services. Accordingly, we leave that issue for another day. Second, we also 
need not resolve the problems associated with in-person solicitation of clients—at the hospital 
room or the accident site, or in any other situation that breeds undue influence—by attorneys or 
their agents or “runners.” Activity of that kind might well pose dangers of overreaching and 
misrepresentation not encountered in newspaper announcement advertising. Hence, this issue 
also is not before us. Third, we note that appellee’s criticism of advertising by attorneys does not 
apply with much force to some of the basic factual content of advertising: information as to the 
attorney’s name, address, and telephone number, office hours, and the like. The American Bar 
Association itself has a provision in its current Code of Professional Responsibility that would 
allow the disclosure of such information, and more, in the classified section of the telephone 
directory. We recognize, however, that an advertising diet limited to such spartan fare would 
provide scant nourishment. 
 
The heart of the dispute before us today is whether lawyers also may constitutionally advertise 
the prices at which certain routine services will be performed. Numerous justifications are 
proffered for the restriction of such price advertising. We consider each in turn: 
 
1. The Adverse Effect on Professionalism. Appellee places particular emphasis on the adverse 
effects that it feels price advertising will have on the legal profession. The key to 
professionalism, it is argued, is the sense of pride that involvement in the discipline generates. It 
is claimed that price advertising will bring about commercialization, which will undermine the 
attorney's sense of dignity and self-worth. The hustle of the marketplace will adversely affect the 
profession’s service orientation, and irreparably damage the delicate balance between the 
lawyer's need to earn and his obligation selflessly to serve. Advertising is also said to erode the 
client’s trust in his attorney: Once the client perceives that the lawyer is motivated by profit, his 
confidence that the attorney is acting out of a commitment to the client’s welfare is jeopardized. 
And advertising is said to tarnish the dignified public image of the profession. 
 
We recognize, of course, and commend the spirit of public service with which the profession of 
law is practiced and to which it is dedicated. The present Members of this Court, licensed 
attorneys all, could not feel otherwise. And we would have reason to pause if we felt that our 
decision today would undercut that spirit. But we find the postulated connection between 
advertising and the erosion of true professionalism to be severely strained. At its core, the 
argument presumes that attorneys must conceal from themselves and from their clients the real-
life fact that lawyers earn their livelihood at the bar. We suspect that few attorneys engage in 
such self-deception. And rare is the client, moreover, even one of modest means, who enlists 
the aid of an attorney with the expectation that his services will be rendered free of charge. In 
fact, the American Bar Association advises that an attorney should reach “a clear agreement 
with his client as to the basis of the fee charges to be made,” and that this is to be done “as 
soon as feasible after a lawyer has been employed.” If the commercial basis of the relationship 
is to be promptly disclosed on ethical grounds, once the client is in the office, it seems 
inconsistent to condemn the candid revelation of the same information before he arrives at that 
office. 
 
Moreover, the assertion that advertising will diminish the attorney's reputation in the community 
is open to question. Bankers and engineers advertise, and yet these professions are not 
regarded as undignified. In fact, it has been suggested that the failure of lawyers to advertise 
creates public disillusionment with the profession. The absence of advertising may be seen to 
reflect the profession’s failure to reach out and serve the community: Studies reveal that many 
persons do not obtain counsel even when they perceive a need because of the feared price of 
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services or because of an inability to locate a competent attorney. Indeed, cynicism with regard 
to the profession may be created by the fact that it long has publicly eschewed advertising, 
while condoning the actions of the attorney who structures his social or civic associations so as 
to provide contacts with potential clients. 
 
It appears that the ban on advertising originated as a rule of etiquette and not as a rule of ethics. 
Early lawyers in Great Britain viewed the law as a form of public service, rather than as a means 
of earning a living, and they looked down on “trade” as unseemly. Eventually, the attitude 
toward advertising fostered by this view evolved into an aspect of the ethics of the profession. 
But habit and tradition are not in themselves an adequate answer to a constitutional challenge. 
In this day, we do not belittle the person who earns his living by the strength of his arm or the 
force of his mind. Since the belief that lawyers are somehow “above” trade has become an 
anachronism, the historical foundation for the advertising restraint has crumbled. 
 
2. The Inherently Misleading Nature of Attorney Advertising. It is argued that advertising of legal 
services inevitably will be misleading (a) because such services are so individualized with 
regard to content and quality as to prevent informed comparison on the basis of an 
advertisement, (b) because the consumer of legal services is unable to determine in advance 
just what services he needs, and (c) because advertising by attorneys will highlight irrelevant 
factors and fail to show the relevant factor of skill. 
 
We are not persuaded that restrained professional advertising by lawyers inevitably will be 
misleading. Although many services performed by attorneys are indeed unique, it is doubtful 
that any attorney would or could advertise fixed prices for services of that type. The only 
services that lend themselves to advertising are the routine ones: the uncontested divorce, the 
simple adoption, the uncontested personal bankruptcy, the change of name, and the like—the 
very services advertised by appellants. Although the precise service demanded in each task 
may vary slightly, and although legal services are not fungible, these facts do not make 
advertising misleading so long as the attorney does the necessary work at the advertised price. 
The argument that legal services are so unique that fixed rates cannot meaningfully be 
established is refuted by the record in this case: The appellee State Bar itself sponsors a Legal 
Services Program in which the participating attorneys agree to perform services like those 
advertised by the appellants at standardized rates. Indeed, until the decision of this Court in 
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, the Maricopa County Bar Association apparently had a schedule 
of suggested minimum fees for standard legal tasks. We thus find of little force the assertion 
that advertising is misleading because of an inherent lack of standardization in legal services. 
 
The second component of the argument—that advertising ignores the diagnostic role—fares 
little better. It is unlikely that many people go to an attorney merely to ascertain if they have a 
clean bill of legal health. Rather, attorneys are likely to be employed to perform specific tasks. 
Although the client may not know the detail involved in performing the task, he no doubt is able 
to identify the service he desires at the level of generality to which advertising lends itself. 
 
The third component is not without merit: Advertising does not provide a complete foundation on 
which to select an attorney. But it seems peculiar to deny the consumer, on the ground that the 
information is incomplete, at least some of the relevant information needed to reach an informed 
decision. The alternative—the prohibition of advertising—serves only to restrict the information 
that flows to consumers. Moreover, the argument assumes that the public is not sophisticated 
enough to realize the limitations of advertising, and that the public is better kept in ignorance 
than trusted with correct but incomplete information. We suspect the argument rests on an 
underestimation of the public. In any event, we view as dubious any justification that is based on 
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the benefits of public ignorance. Although, of course, the bar retains the power to correct 
omissions that have the effect of presenting an inaccurate picture, the preferred remedy is more 
disclosure, rather than less. If the naiveté of the public will cause advertising by attorneys to be 
misleading, then it is the bar’s role to assure that the populace is sufficiently informed as to 
enable it to place advertising in its proper perspective. 
 
3. The Adverse Effect on the Administration of Justice. Advertising is said to have the 
undesirable effect of stirring up litigation. The judicial machinery is designed to serve those who 
feel sufficiently aggrieved to bring forward their claims. Advertising, it is argued, serves to 
encourage the assertion of legal rights in the courts, thereby undesirably unsettling societal 
repose. There is even a suggestion of barratry. 
 
But advertising by attorneys is not an unmitigated source of harm to the administration of 
justice. It may offer great benefits. Although advertising might increase the use of the judicial 
machinery, we cannot accept the notion that it is always better for a person to suffer a wrong 
silently than to redress it by legal action. As the bar acknowledges, “the middle 70% of our 
population is not being reached or served adequately by the legal profession.” Among the 
reasons for this underutilization is fear of the cost, and an inability to locate a suitable lawyer. 
Advertising can help to solve this acknowledged problem: Advertising is the traditional 
mechanism in a free-market economy for a supplier to inform a potential purchaser of the 
availability and terms of exchange. The disciplinary rule at issue likely has served to burden 
access to legal services, particularly for the not-quite-poor and the unknowledgeable. A rule 
allowing restrained advertising would be in accord with the bar’s obligation to “facilitate the 
process of intelligent selection of lawyers, and to assist in making legal services fully available.” 
 
4. The Undesirable Economic Effects of Advertising. It is claimed that advertising will increase 
the overhead costs of the profession, and that these costs then will be passed along to 
consumers in the form of increased fees. Moreover, it is claimed that the additional cost of 
practice will create a substantial entry barrier, deterring or preventing young attorneys from 
penetrating the market and entrenching the position of the bar's established members. 
 
These two arguments seem dubious at best. Neither distinguishes lawyers from others, and 
neither appears relevant to the First Amendment. The ban on advertising serves to increase the 
difficulty of discovering the lowest cost seller of acceptable ability. As a result, to this extent 
attorneys are isolated from competition, and the incentive to price competitively is reduced. 
Although it is true that the effect of advertising on the price of services has not been 
demonstrated, there is revealing evidence with regard to products; where consumers have the 
benefit of price advertising, retail prices often are dramatically lower than they would be without 
advertising. It is entirely possible that advertising will serve to reduce, not advance, the cost of 
legal services to the consumer. 
 
The entry-barrier argument is equally unpersuasive. In the absence of advertising, an attorney 
must rely on his contacts with the community to generate a flow of business. In view of the time 
necessary to develop such contacts, the ban in fact serves to perpetuate the market position of 
established attorneys. Consideration of entry-barrier problems would urge that advertising be 
allowed so as to aid the new competitor in penetrating the market. 
 
5. The Adverse Effect of Advertising on the Quality of Service. It is argued that the attorney may 
advertise a given “package” of service at a set price, and will be inclined to provide, by 
indiscriminate use, the standard package regardless of whether it fits the client's needs. 
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Restraints on advertising, however, are an ineffective way of deterring shoddy work. An attorney 
who is inclined to cut quality will do so regardless of the rule on advertising. And the 
advertisement of a standardized fee does not necessarily mean that the services offered are 
undesirably standardized. Indeed, the assertion that an attorney who advertises a standard fee 
will cut quality is substantially undermined by the fixed-fee schedule of appellee’s own prepaid 
Legal Services Program. Even if advertising leads to the creation of “legal clinics” like that of 
appellants’—clinics that emphasize standardized procedures for routine problems—it is possible 
that such clinics will improve service by reducing the likelihood of error. 
 
6. The Difficulties of Enforcement. Finally, it is argued that the wholesale restriction is justified 
by the problems of enforcement if any other course is taken. Because the public lacks 
sophistication in legal matters, it may be particularly susceptible to misleading or deceptive 
advertising by lawyers. After-the-fact action by the consumer lured by such advertising may not 
provide a realistic restraint because of the inability of the layman to assess whether the service 
he has received meets professional standards. Thus, the vigilance of a regulatory agency will be 
required. But because of the numerous purveyors of services, the overseeing of advertising will 
be burdensome. 
 
It is at least somewhat incongruous for the opponents of advertising to extol the virtues and 
altruism of the legal profession at one point, and, at another, to assert that its members will 
seize the opportunity to mislead and distort. We suspect that, with advertising, most lawyers will 
behave as they always have: They will abide by their solemn oaths to uphold the integrity and 
honor of their profession and of the legal system. For every attorney who overreaches through 
advertising, there will be thousands of others who will be candid and honest and straightforward. 
And, of course, it will be in the latter's interest, as in other cases of misconduct at the bar, to 
assist in weeding out those few who abuse their trust. 
 
In sum, we are not persuaded that any of the proffered justifications rise to the level of an 
acceptable reason for the suppression of all advertising by attorneys. 
 
IV 
 
In holding that advertising by attorneys may not be subjected to blanket suppression, and that 
the advertisement at issue is protected, we, of course, do not hold that advertising by attorneys 
may not be regulated in any way. We mention some of the clearly permissible limitations on 
advertising not foreclosed by our holding. 
 
Advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading of course is subject to restraint. Since the 
advertiser knows his product and has a commercial interest in its dissemination, we have little 
worry that regulation to assure truthfulness will discourage protected speech. And any concern 
that strict requirements for truthfulness will undesirably inhibit spontaneity seems inapplicable 
because commercial speech generally is calculated. Indeed, the public and private benefits from 
commercial speech derive from confidence in its accuracy and reliability. Thus, the leeway for 
untruthful or misleading expression that has been allowed in other contexts has little force in the 
commercial arena. In fact, because the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services, 
misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other advertising may be 
found quite inappropriate in legal advertising. For example, advertising claims as to the quality 
of services—a matter we do not address today—are not susceptible of measurement or 
verification; accordingly, such claims may be so likely to be misleading as to warrant restriction. 
Similar objections might justify restraints on in-person solicitation. We do not foreclose the 
possibility that some limited supplementation, by way of warning or disclaimer or the like, might 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 720	
be required of even an advertisement of the kind ruled upon today so as to assure that the 
consumer is not misled. In sum, we recognize that many of the problems in defining the 
boundary between deceptive and nondeceptive advertising remain to be resolved, and we 
expect that the bar will have a special role to play in assuring that advertising by attorneys flows 
both freely and cleanly. 
 
The constitutional issue in this case is only whether the State may prevent the publication in a 
newspaper of appellants’ truthful advertisement concerning the availability and terms of routine 
legal services. We rule simply that the flow of such information may not be restrained, and we 
therefore hold the present application of the disciplinary rule against appellants to be violative of 
the First Amendment. 
 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
 
I cannot join the Court’s holding that under the First Amendment “truthful” newspaper 
advertising of a lawyer’s prices for “routine legal services” may not be restrained. Although the 
Court appears to note some reservations, it is clear that within undefined limits today’s decision 
will effect profound changes in the practice of law, viewed for centuries as a learned profession. 
The supervisory power of the courts over members of the bar, as officers of the courts, and the 
authority of the respective States to oversee the regulation of the profession have been 
weakened. Although the Court's opinion professes to be framed narrowly, and its reach is 
subject to future clarification, the holding is explicit and expansive with respect to the advertising 
of undefined “routine legal services.” In my view, this result is neither required by the First 
Amendment, nor in the public interest. 
 
I 
 
A 
 
It has long been thought that price advertising of legal services inevitably will be misleading 
because such services are individualized with respect to content and quality and because the 
lay consumer of legal services usually does not know in advance the precise nature and scope 
of the services he requires. Although the Court finds some force in this reasoning and 
recognizes that “many services performed by attorneys are indeed unique,” its first answer is 
the optimistic expression of hope that few lawyers “would or could advertise fixed prices for 
services of that type.” But the Court's basic response in view of the acknowledged potential for 
deceptive advertising of “unique” services is to divide the immense range of the professional 
product of lawyers into two categories: “unique” and “routine.” The only insight afforded by the 
opinion as to how one draws this line is the finding that services similar to those in appellants’ 
advertisement are routine: “the uncontested divorce, the simple adoption, the uncontested 
personal bankruptcy, the change of name, and the like.” What the phrase “the like” embraces is 
not indicated. But the advertising of such services must, in the Court's words, flow “both freely 
and cleanly.” 
 
Even the briefest reflection on the tasks for which lawyers are trained and the variation among 
the services they perform should caution against facile assumptions that legal services can be 
classified into the routine and the unique. In most situations it is impossible—both for the client 
and the lawyer—to identify with reasonable accuracy in advance the nature and scope of 
problems that may be encountered even when handling a matter that at the outset seems 
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routine. Neither quantitative nor qualitative measurement of the service actually needed is likely 
to be feasible in advance. 
 
This definitional problem is well illustrated by appellants’ advertised willingness to obtain 
uncontested divorces for $195 each. A potential client can be grievously misled if he reads the 
advertised service as embracing all of his possible needs. A host of problems are implicated by 
divorce. They include alimony; support and maintenance for children; child custody; visitation 
rights; interests in life insurance, community property, tax refunds, and tax liabilities; and the 
disposition of other property rights. The processing of court papers—apparently the only service 
appellants provide for $100—is usually the most straightforward and least demanding aspect of 
the lawyer’s responsibility in a divorce case. More important from the viewpoint of the client is 
the diagnostic and advisory function: the pursuit of relevant inquiries of which the client would 
otherwise be unaware, and advice with respect to alternative arrangements that might prevent 
irreparable dissolution of the marriage or otherwise resolve the client's problem. Although those 
professional functions are not included within appellants’ packaged routine divorce, they 
frequently fall within the concept of “advice” with which the lay person properly is concerned 
when he or she seeks legal counsel. The average lay person simply has no feeling for which 
services are included in the packaged divorce, and thus no capacity to judge the nature of the 
advertised product. As a result, the type of advertisement before us inescapably will mislead 
many who respond to it. In the end, it will promote distrust of lawyers and disrespect for our own 
system of justice. 
 
The advertising of specified services at a fixed price is not the only infirmity of the advertisement 
at issue. Appellants also assert that these services are offered at “very reasonable fees.” That 
Court finds this to be an accurate statement since the advertised fee fell at the lower end of the 
range of customary charges. But the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services 
has never been considered the sole determinant of the reasonableness of a fee. This is 
because reasonableness reflects both the quantity and quality of the service. A $195 fee may 
be reasonable for one divorce and unreasonable for another; and a $195 fee may be 
reasonable when charged by an experienced divorce lawyer and unreasonable when charged 
by a recent law school graduate. For reasons that are not readily apparent, the Court today 
discards the more discriminating approach which the profession long has used to judge the 
reasonableness of a fee, and substitutes an approach based on market averages. Whether a 
fee is “very reasonable” is a matter of opinion, and not a matter of verifiable fact as the Court 
suggests. One unfortunate result of today’s decision is that lawyers may feel free to use a wide 
variety of adjectives—such as “fair,” “moderate,” “low-cost,” or “lowest in town”—to describe the 
bargain they offer to the public. 
 
B 
 
Even if one were to accept the view that some legal services are sufficiently routine to minimize 
the possibility of deception, there nonetheless remains a serious enforcement problem. The 
Court does recognize some problems. It notes that misstatements that may be immaterial in 
“other advertising may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising” precisely because “the 
public lacks sophistication concerning legal services.” It also recognizes that “advertising claims 
as to the quality of services are not susceptible of measurement or verification” and therefore 
“may be so likely to be misleading as to warrant restriction.” After recognizing that problems 
remain in defining the boundary between deceptive and nondeceptive advertising, the Court 
then observes that the bar may be expected to have “a special role to play in assuring that 
advertising by attorneys flows both freely and cleanly.” 
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The Court seriously understates the difficulties, and overestimates the capabilities of the bar—or 
indeed of any agency public or private—to assure with a reasonable degree of effectiveness 
that price advertising can at the same time be both unrestrained and truthful. There are some 
400,000 lawyers in this country. They have been licensed by the States, and the organized bars 
within the States—operating under codes approved by the highest courts acting pursuant to 
statutory authority—have had the primary responsibility for assuring compliance with 
professional ethics and standards. The traditional means have been disciplinary proceedings 
conducted initially by voluntary bar committees subject to judicial review. In view of the sheer 
size of the profession, the existence of a multiplicity of jurisdictions, and the problems inherent 
in the maintenance of ethical standards even of a profession with established traditions, the 
problem of disciplinary enforcement in this country has proved to be extremely difficult. 
 
The Court’s almost casual assumption that its authorization of price advertising can be policed 
effectively by the bar reflects a striking underappreciation of the nature and magnitude of the 
disciplinary problem. The very reasons that tend to make price advertising of services inherently 
deceptive make its policing wholly impractical. With respect to commercial advertising, MR. 
JUSTICE STEWART, concurring in Virginia Pharmacy, noted that since “the factual claims 
contained in commercial price or product advertisements relate to tangible goods or services, 
they may be tested empirically and corrected to reflect the truth.” But there simply is no way to 
test “empirically” the claims made in appellants’ advertisement of legal services. There are 
serious difficulties in determining whether the advertised services fall within the Court's 
undefined category of “routine services”; whether they are described accurately and 
understandably; and whether appellants' claim as to reasonableness of the fees is accurate. 
These are not factual questions for which there are “truthful” answers; in most instances, the 
answers would turn on relatively subjective judgments as to which there could be wide 
differences of opinion. These difficulties with appellants’ advertisement will inhere in any 
comparable price advertisement of specific legal services. Even if public agencies were 
established to oversee professional price advertising, adequate protection of the public from 
deception, and of ethical lawyers from unfair competition, could prove to be a wholly intractable 
problem. 
 
II 
 
The Court emphasizes the need for information that will assist persons desiring legal services to 
choose lawyers. Under our economic system, advertising is the most commonly used and 
useful means of providing information as to goods and other services, but it generally has not 
been used with respect to legal and certain other professional services. Until today, controlling 
weight has been given to the danger that general advertising of such services too often would 
tend to mislead rather than inform. Moreover, there has been the further concern that the 
characteristics of the legal profession thought beneficial to society—a code of professional 
ethics, an imbued sense of professional and public responsibility, a tradition of self-discipline, 
and duties as officers of the courts—would suffer if the restraints on advertising were 
significantly diluted. 
 
Pressures toward some relaxation of the proscription against general advertising have gained 
force in recent years with the increased recognition of the difficulty that low- and middle-income 
citizens experience in finding counsel willing to serve at reasonable prices. The seriousness of 
this problem has not been overlooked by the organized bar. 
 
The Court observes, and I agree, that there is nothing inherently misleading in the 
advertisement of the cost of an initial consultation. Indeed, I would not limit the fee information 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 723	
to the initial conference. Although the skill and experience of lawyers vary so widely as to 
negate any equivalence between hours of service by different lawyers, variations in quality of 
service by duly licensed lawyers are inevitable. Lawyers operate, at least for the purpose of 
internal control and accounting, on the basis of specified hourly rates, and upon request—or in 
an appropriate case—most lawyers are willing to undertake employment at such rates. The 
advertisement of these rates, in an appropriate medium, duly designated, would not necessarily 
be misleading if this fee information also made clear that the total charge for the representation 
would depend on the number of hours devoted to the client’s problem—a variable difficult to 
predict. Where the price content of the advertisement is limited to the finite item of rate per hour 
devoted to the client’s problem, the likelihood of deceiving or misleading is considerably less 
than when specific services are advertised at a fixed price. 
 
III 
 
Although I disagree strongly with the Court’s holding as to price advertisements of undefined—
and I believe undefinable—routine legal services, there are reservations in its opinion worthy of 
emphasis since they may serve to narrow its ultimate reach. First, the Court notes that it has not 
addressed “the peculiar problems associated with advertising claims relating to the quality of 
legal services.” There are inherent questions of quality in almost any type of price advertising by 
lawyers, and I do not view appellants’ advertisement as entirely free from quality implications. 
Nevertheless the Court's reservation in this respect could be a limiting factor. 
 
Second, the Court notes that there may be reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and 
manner of commercial price advertising. In my view, such restrictions should have a significantly 
broader reach with respect to professional services than as to standardized products. This Court 
long has recognized the important state interests in the regulation of professional advertising. 
And as to lawyers, the Court recently has noted that “the interest of the States in regulating 
lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of 
administering justice, and have historically been ‘officers of the courts.’” Although the opinion 
today finds these interests insufficient to justify prohibition of all price advertising, the state 
interests recognized in these cases should be weighed carefully in any future consideration of 
time, place, and manner restrictions. 
 
Finally, the Court’s opinion does not “foreclose the possibility that some limited 
supplementation, by way of warning or disclaimer or the like, might be required of even an 
advertisement of the kind ruled upon today so as to assure that the consumer is not misled.” I 
view this as at least some recognition of the potential for deception inherent in fixed-price 
advertising of specific legal services. This recognition, though ambiguous in light of other 
statements in the opinion, may be viewed as encouragement to those who believe—as I do—
that if we are to have price advertisement of legal services, the public interest will require the 
most particularized regulation. 
 
IV 
 
The area into which the Court now ventures has, until today, largely been left to self-regulation 
by the profession within the framework of canons or standards of conduct prescribed by the 
respective States and enforced where necessary by the courts. The problem of bringing clients 
and lawyers together on a mutually fair basis, consistent with the public interest, is as old as the 
profession itself. It is one of considerable complexity, especially in view of the constantly 
evolving nature of the need for legal services. The problem has not been resolved with complete 
satisfaction despite diligent and thoughtful efforts by the organized bar and others over a period 
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of many years, and there is no reason to believe that today’s best answers will be responsive to 
future needs. 
 
I am apprehensive, despite the Court’s expressed intent to proceed cautiously, that today’s 
holding will be viewed by tens of thousands of lawyers as an invitation—by the public-spirited 
and the selfish lawyers alike—to engage in competitive advertising on an escalating basis. 
Some lawyers may gain temporary advantages; others will suffer from the economic power of 
stronger lawyers, or by the subtle deceit of less scrupulous lawyers. Some members of the 
public may benefit marginally, but the risk is that many others will be victimized by simplistic 
price advertising of professional services “almost infinite in variety and nature.” Until today, in 
the long history of the legal profession, it was not thought that this risk of public deception was 
required by the marginal First Amendment interests asserted by the Court. 
 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting in part. 
 
I continue to believe that the First Amendment speech provision, long regarded by this Court as 
a sanctuary for expressions of public importance or intellectual interest, is demeaned by 
invocation to protect advertisements of goods and services. I would hold quite simply that the 
appellants’ advertisement, however truthful or reasonable it may be, is not the sort of expression 
that the Amendment was adopted to protect. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. What is the objection to attorney advertising? Is the concern that it will harm the public, 
harm the profession, or both? 
2. The majority opinion considers the objections to attorney advertising, which include 
harming the profession, misleading the public, encouraging litigation, increasing the cost 
of legal services, lowering the quality of legal services, and unenforceability, and finds all 
of them wanting. Do you agree? 
3. The dissent argues that attorney advertising will mislead the public, and that state bar 
associations can adopt reforms in a slower and more measured fashion, which will be 
better for the profession. Do you agree with its concerns? 
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The Florida Bar v. Pape, 918 So.2d 240 (Fla. 2005) 
 
Summary: Pape and Chandler advertised their law firm on television, using an image of 
a pitbull and the the telephone number 1-800-PIT-BULL. The Florida Bar filed a 
complaint against them, alleging that their advertisement improperly described the 
quality of their services and used irrelevant and misleading elements. The referee found 
no violation, concluding that the advertisement described qualities of the attorneys, not 
their services, and that the pitbull element was informational. The Florida Supreme Court 
disagreed, holding that the pitbull motif made claims about the quality of their services, 
was not informational, and was in poor taste, and therefore was not protected by the 1st 
Amendment. 
 
PARIENTE, C.J. 
 
In this case we impose discipline on two attorneys for their use of television advertising devices 
that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. These devices, which invoke the breed of dog 
known as the pit bull, demean all lawyers and thereby harm both the legal profession and the 
public's trust and confidence in our system of justice. 
 
We conclude that attorneys Pape and Chandler violated the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar by 
using the image of a pit bull and displaying the term “pit bull” as part of their firm’s phone 
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number in their commercial. Further, because the use of an image of a pit bull and the phrase 
“pit bull” in the firm's advertisement and logo does not assist the public in ensuring that an 
informed decision is made prior to the selection of the attorney, we conclude that the First 
Amendment does not prevent this Court from sanctioning the attorneys based on the rule 
violations. We determine that the appropriate sanctions for the attorneys’ misconduct are public 
reprimands and required attendance at the Florida Bar Advertising Workshop. 
 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On January 12, 2004, The Florida Bar filed complaints against the attorneys, alleging that their 
law firm’s television advertisement was an improper communication concerning the services 
provided, in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The advertisement included a logo 
that featured an image of a pit bull wearing a spiked collar and prominently displayed the firm’s 
phone number, 1-800-PIT-BULL. The Bar asserted that this advertisement violated the 2004 
version of Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 4-7.2(b)(3) and 4-7.2(b)(4), which state: 
 
(3) Descriptive Statements. A lawyer shall not make statements describing or 
characterizing the quality of the lawyer’s services in advertisements and written 
communications; provided that this provision shall not apply to information furnished to a 
prospective client at that person’s request or to information supplied to existing clients. 
(4) Prohibited Visual and Verbal Portrayals. Visual or verbal descriptions, depictions, or 
portrayals of persons, things, or events must be objectively relevant to the selection of 
an attorney and shall not be deceptive, misleading, or manipulative. 
 
The referee found that the attorneys did not violate rule 4-7.2(b)(3), relying on the distinction 
that the logo and telephone number “describe qualities of the respondent attorneys” but do not 
describe or characterize “the quality of the lawyer services.” The referee also rejected the Bar’s 
assertion that the ad violated rule 4-7.2(b)(4). After noting that pit bulls are perceived as “loyal, 
persistent, tenacious, and aggressive,” the referee found these qualities 
 
objectively relevant to the selection of an attorney as they are informational, because 
these are qualities that a consuming public would want in a trial lawyer and the ad is not 
improperly manipulative. The advertisement is tastefully done, the logo is not unduly 
conspicuous in its replacement of an ampersand between respondents’ names atop the 
TV screen, and the large print 1-800 number is an effective mnemonic device tailored to 
maximize responses from potential clients. 
 
The referee also concluded that the ad was protected speech and therefore that an 
interpretation of rules to prohibit the ad would render the rules unconstitutional as applied. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
A. Violation of Attorney Advertising Rules 
 
As a preliminary matter, the pit bull logo and 1-800-PIT-BULL telephone number in the ad by the 
attorneys do not comport with the general criteria for permissible attorney advertisements set 
forth in the comments to section 4-7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The rules contained 
in section 4-7 are designed to permit lawyer advertisements that provide objective information 
about the cost of legal services, the experience and qualifications of the lawyer and law firm, 
and the types of cases the lawyer handles. The comment to rule 4-7.1 provides that “a lawyer’s 
advertisement should provide only useful, factual information presented in a nonsensational 
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manner. Advertisements using slogans fail to meet these standards and diminish public 
confidence in the legal system.” The television commercial at issue here uses both a 
sensationalistic image and a slogan, contrary to the purpose of section 4-7. 
 
More specifically, the attorneys’ ad violated rule 4-7.2(b)(3), which prohibits the use of 
statements describing or characterizing the quality of the lawyer’s services. In Florida Bar v. 
Lange, we approved the referee’s finding that an advertisement that stated “When the Best is 
Simply Essential” violated the predecessor provision to rule 4-7.2(b)(3) because it was self-
laudatory and purported to describe the quality of the lawyer’s services. In this case, the 
simultaneous display of the pit bull logo and the 1-800-PIT-BULL phone number conveys both 
the characteristics of the attorneys and the quality of the services they purport to provide. At the 
very least, the printed words and the image of a pitbull in the television commercial could 
certainly be perceived by prospective clients as characterizing the quality of the lawyers’ 
services. 
 
On this question we disagree with the referee, who distinguished the “quality of the lawyer's 
services” from the qualities (i.e., traits or characteristics) of the lawyer. We conclude that this is 
an artificial distinction which unduly limits the scope of the rule by interpreting “quality of the 
lawyer’s services” in the narrowest sense. From the perspective of a prospective client 
unfamiliar with the legal system and in need of counsel, a lawyer’s character and personality 
traits are indistinguishable from the quality of the services that the lawyer provides. A courteous 
lawyer can be expected to be well mannered in court, a hard-working lawyer well prepared, and 
a “pit bull” lawyer vicious to the opposition. In the attorneys’ advertisement, the pit bull image 
appears in place of an ampersand between the attorneys’ names, and the ad includes the use 
of the words “pit bull” in the attorneys’ telephone number in large capital letters. The combined 
effect of these devices is to lead a reasonable consumer to conclude that the attorneys are 
advertising themselves as providers of “pit bull”-style representation. We consider this a 
characterization of the quality of the lawyers’ services in violation of rule 4-7.2(b)(3). 
 
We also conclude that the ad violates rule 4-7.2(b)(4), which requires that visual or verbal 
depictions be “objectively relevant” to the selection of an attorney, and prohibits depictions that 
are “deceptive, misleading, or manipulative.” The comment to this rule explains that it 
 
prohibits visual or verbal descriptions, depictions, or portrayals in any advertisement 
which create suspense, or contain exaggerations or appeals to the emotions, call for 
legal services, or create consumer problems through characterization and dialogue 
ending with the lawyer solving the problem. Illustrations permitted are informational and 
not misleading, and are therefore permissible. As an example, a drawing of a fist, to 
suggest the lawyer’s ability to achieve results, would be barred. Examples of permissible 
illustrations would include a graphic rendering of the scales of justice to indicate that the 
advertising attorney practices law, a picture of the lawyer, or a map of the office location. 
 
The logo of the pit bull wearing a spiked collar and the prominent display of the phone number 
1-800-PIT-BULL are more manipulative and misleading than a drawing of a fist. These 
advertising devices would suggest to many persons not only that the lawyers can achieve 
results but also that they engage in a combative style of advocacy. The suggestion is inherently 
deceptive because there is no way to measure whether the attorneys in fact conduct 
themselves like pit bulls so as to ascertain whether this logo and phone number convey 
accurate information. 
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In addition, the image of a pit bull and the on-screen display of the words “PIT-BULL” as part of 
the firm’s phone number are not objectively relevant to the selection of an attorney. The referee 
found that the qualities of a pit bull as depicted by the logo are loyalty, persistence, tenacity, and 
aggressiveness. We consider this a charitable set of associations that ignores the darker side of 
the qualities often also associated with pit bulls: malevolence, viciousness, and unpredictability. 
Further, although some may associate pit bulls with loyalty to their owners,109 the manner in 
which the pit bull is depicted in the attorneys' ad in this case certainly does not emphasize this 
association. The dog, which is wearing a spiked collar, directly faces the viewer and is shown 
alone, with no indication that it is fulfilling its traditional role as “man's best friend.” 
 
Pit bulls have a reputation for vicious behavior that is borne of experience. According to a study 
published in the Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association in 2000, pit bulls 
caused the greatest number of dog-bite-related fatalities between 1979 and 1998. The 
dangerousness of pit bulls has also been recognized in a number of court decisions. 
 
In State v. Peters, the Third District Court of Appeal upheld a City of North Miami ordinance 
imposing substantial insurance, registration, and confinement obligations on owners of pit bulls. 
The City of North Miami ordinance contained findings that pit bulls have a greater propensity to 
bite humans than all other breeds, are extremely aggressive towards other animals, and have a 
natural tendency to refuse to terminate an attack once it has begun. The current Miami-Dade 
County ordinance provides that it is illegal to own a pit bull. 
 
This Court would not condone an advertisement that stated that a lawyer will get results through 
combative and vicious tactics that will maim, scar, or harm the opposing party, conduct that 
would violate our Rules of Professional Conduct. Yet this is precisely the type of unethical and 
unprofessional conduct that is conveyed by the image of a pit bull and the display of the 1-800-
PIT-BULL phone number. We construe the prohibitions on advertising statements that 
characterize the quality of lawyer services and depictions that are false or misleading to prohibit 
a lawyer from advertising his or her services by suggesting behavior, conduct, or tactics that are 
contrary to our Rules of Professional Conduct. 
 
Further, we reject the referee’s finding that the use of the words “pit bull” in the phone number is 
merely a mnemonic device to help potential clients remember the attorneys’ number. Phrase-
based phone numbers are memorable because of the images and associations they evoke. The 
“1-800-PIT-BULL” phone number sticks in the memory precisely because of the image of the pit 
bull also featured in the ad, the association of pit bulls with the characteristics discussed herein, 
and the “go for the jugular” style of advocacy that some persons attribute to lawyers. In short, 
this is a manipulative and misleading use of what would otherwise be content-neutral 
information to create a nefarious association. 
 
Indeed, permitting this type of advertisement would make a mockery of our dedication to 
promoting public trust and confidence in our system of justice. Prohibiting advertisements such 
as the one in this case is one step we can take to maintain the dignity of lawyers, as well as the 
integrity of, and public confidence in, the legal system. Were we to approve the referee’s finding, 
images of sharks, wolves, crocodiles, and piranhas could follow. For the good of the legal 
profession and the justice system, and consistent with our Rules of Professional Conduct, this 
																																																								
109 Even the perception of loyalty may be unwarranted. In June, a twelve-year old boy was mauled to 
death in San Francisco by his family’s two pit bulls. That same month a Bay Area woman suffered severe 
injuries in an attack by her nine-year-old pit bull. A St. Louis man was killed in May by his two pit bulls that 
had “no apparent history of aggression and were described as well-kept.” 
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type of non-factual advertising cannot be permitted. We therefore conclude that the 1-800-PIT-
BULL ad aired by the attorneys violates rules 4-7.2(b)(3) and 4-7.2(b)(4). 
 
B. First Amendment Protection of Lawyer Advertising 
 
We also disagree with the referee’s conclusion that the application of rules 4-7.2(b)(3) and 4-
7.2(b)(4) to prohibit this advertisement violates the First Amendment. Lawyer advertising enjoys 
First Amendment protection only to the extent that it provides accurate factual information that 
can be objectively verified. This thread runs throughout the pertinent United State Supreme 
Court precedent. 
 
The seminal lawyer advertising case is Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, which involved the 
advertising of fees for low cost legal services. In Bates, the Supreme Court held generally that 
attorney advertising “may not be subjected to blanket suppression,” and more specifically that 
attorneys have the constitutional right to advertise their availability and fees for performing 
routine services. The cost of legal services, the Supreme Court concluded, would be “relevant 
information needed to reach an informed decision.” 
 
After Bates, in R.M.J. the Supreme Court considered a Missouri rule that restricted lawyer 
advertising to newspapers, periodicals, and the yellow pages, and limited the content of these 
advertisements to ten categories of information (name, address and telephone number, areas of 
practice, date and place of birth, schools attended, foreign language ability, office hours, fee for 
an initial consultation, availability of a schedule of fees, credit arrangements, and the fixed fee 
charged for specified “routine” services). Even the manner of listing areas of practice was 
restricted to a prescribed nomenclature. In violation of the state restrictions, the lawyer 
advertised areas of practice that did not use the prescribed terminology, listed the states in 
which the lawyer was licensed, specified that he was admitted to practice before the United 
States Supreme Court, and did not restrict the recipients of announcement cards to lawyers, 
clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives. 
 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Powell summarized the commercial speech doctrine in 
the context of advertising for professional services: 
 
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the First 
Amendment. But when the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that 
it is inherently misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such advertising is 
subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restrictions. Misleading advertising 
may be prohibited entirely. But the States may not place an absolute prohibition on 
certain types of potentially misleading information, e.g., a listing of areas of practice, if 
the information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive. 
 
In holding the Missouri restrictions per se invalid as applied to the lawyer, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the state had no substantial interest in prohibiting a lawyer from identifying the 
jurisdictions in which he or she was licensed to practice. The Court noted that this “is factual and 
highly relevant information.” Although the Court found the lawyer’s listing in large capital letters 
that he was a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States to be “somewhat 
more troubling” and in “bad taste,” this alone could not be prohibited without a finding by the 
Missouri Supreme Court that “such a statement could be misleading to the general public 
unfamiliar with the requirements of admission to the Bar of this Court.” 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 730	
In Zauderer, the Supreme Court addressed whether a state could discipline a lawyer who ran 
newspaper advertisements containing nondeceptive illustrations and legal advice. One 
advertisement published the lawyer’s willingness to represent women injured from the use of the 
Dalkon Shield intrauterine device. The parties had stipulated that the advertisement was entirely 
accurate. 
 
In holding that the lawyer could not be disciplined on the basis of the content of his 
advertisement, the Supreme Court observed that the advertisement did not promise results or 
suggest any special expertise but merely conveyed that the lawyer was representing women in 
Dalkon Shield litigation and was willing to represent other women with similar claims. Turning to 
the lawyer’s use of an illustration of the Dalkon Shield, the Court first held that illustrations are 
entitled to the same First Amendment protection as that afforded to verbal commercial speech. 
The Court then concluded that “because the illustration for which appellant was disciplined is an 
accurate representation of the Dalkon Shield and has no features that are likely to deceive, 
mislead, or confuse the reader, the burden is on the State to present a substantial governmental 
interest justifying the restriction.” 
 
The most recent United States Supreme Court decision to address restrictions on the content of 
lawyer advertising involved an attorney who held himself out as certified by the National Board 
of Trial Advocacy. The state supreme court had concluded that the claim of NBTA certification 
was “misleading because it tacitly attests to the qualifications of petitioner as a civil trial 
advocate.” The state court had not addressed “whether NBTA certification constituted reliable, 
verifiable evidence of petitioner's experience as a civil trial advocate.” After applauding the 
development of state and national certification programs, a plurality of the Supreme Court 
concluded that the facts as to NBTA certification were “true and verifiable.” The plurality pointed 
out the important “distinction between statements of opinion or quality and statements of 
objective facts that may support an inference of quality.” A majority of the Court concluded that 
the letterhead was not actually or inherently misleading, and thus that the attorney could not be 
prohibited from holding himself out as a civil trial specialist certified by the NBTA. 
 
The pit bull logo and “1-800-PIT-BULL” phone number are in marked contrast to the illustration 
of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device at issue in Zauderer, which the United States Supreme 
Court found to be “an accurate representation and have no features that are likely to deceive, 
mislead, or confuse the reader.” The Dalkon Shield illustration informed the public that the 
lawyer represented clients in cases involving this device. The “pit bull” commercial produced by 
the attorneys in this case contains no indication that they specialize in either dog bite cases 
generally or in litigation arising from attacks by pit bulls specifically. Consequently, the logo and 
phone number do not convey objectively relevant information about the attorneys’ practice. 
Instead, the image and words “pit bull” are intended to convey an image about the nature of the 
lawyers’ litigation tactics. We conclude that an advertising device that connotes combativeness 
and viciousness without providing accurate and objectively verifiable factual information falls 
outside the protections of the First Amendment. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We disapprove the referee’s finding that the television commercial at issue is constitutionally 
protected speech that does not violate our attorney advertising rules. We find John Robert Pape 
and Marc Andrew Chandler guilty of violating the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. We order 
that each attorney receive a public reprimand, which shall be administered by the Board of 
Governors of The Florida Bar upon proper notice to appear. We also direct Pape and Chandler 
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to attend and complete the Florida Bar Advertising Workshop within six months of the date of 
this opinion. 
 
 
 
Questions: 
 
1. This disciplinary action prompted a great deal of discussion, much of it critical of the 
Florida Supreme Court’s decision. You can read more about the case in Legal Affairs, 
the Sun-Sentinel, the Florida Bar News, and the Broward-Palm Beach New Times, 
among other places. 
2. You can watch the television advertisements for Pape & Chandler here and here. Do 
you find them misleading? Do you find them in poor taste? Do you think the Florida Bar 
and the Florida Supreme Court objected to the advertisements primarily because they 
made misleading claims about the quality of the legal services provided, because they 
found the advertisements in poor taste, or because the advertisements criticize other 
attorneys? 
3. Are the Pape & Chandler advertisements primarily claims about the quality of the legal 
services they provide or an effort to establish a brand identity for their legal practice? 
Should attorneys be permitted to use branding to promote their businesses? 
4. The oldest and largest law firms in the United States rely on the recognition and goodwill 
associated with their firm names to communicate quality to the consumers of legal 
services. Should newer and smaller law firms also be required to rely only on their firm 
names or should they be permitted to pursue other branding strategies? If branding is 
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permissible, should state bars limit what kinds of branding are permissible? Are 
limitations on law firm branding consistent with the First Amendment? 
5. In Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744 (2017), the Supreme Court held that the Trademark 
Office’s refusal to register a trademark on the ground that the mark was disparaging 
violated the First Amendment. Can state-imposed limits on law firm branding survive 
Tam? 
6. Kentucky attorney Darryl Isaacs refers to himself as “The Hammer” and is well-known for 
his advertisements, which feature him in parodies of popular television shows and 
movies like Captain America, Game of Thrones, and Transformers. You can watch the 
commercials on his website. Is this branding and advertising consistent with the Florida 
Supreme Court’s decision in Pape? Do you find them misleading? Do you find them 
distasteful? Should the Kentucky Bar be able to prohibit branding and advertisement of 
this kind? 
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7.3: Solicitation 
 
Sweet cream ladies, forward march, the world owes you a living. Sweet cream ladies, do your 
part, think of what you’re giving, to the lost and lonely people of the night.110 
 
In addition to prohibiting advertising, bar associations historically also prohibited attorneys from 
“soliciting” clients, or approaching potential clients directly, rather than as members of the 
general public. For example, Canon 28 of the 1908 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics 
specifically proscribed attorneys from volunteering legal advice to a stranger or seeking out 
injured parties in the hope of providing legal advice. 
 
Indeed, bar associations typically monitored and punished solicitation considerably more 
aggressively than advertisement. The stated objection to solicitation was the concern that 
unscrupulous attorneys might take advantage of unsophisticated members of the public, who 
lacked the capacity to evaluate the quality of their legal services or the fairness of their fees. Of 
course, the bar associations were also dominated by successful attorneys at large firms, who 
tended to represent corporate defendants, rather than injured plaintiffs. 
 
Model Rule 7.3: Solicitation of Clients 
 
a. “Solicitation” or “solicit” denotes a communication initiated by or on behalf of a lawyer or 
law firm that is directed to a specific person the lawyer knows or reasonably should know 
needs legal services in a particular matter and that offers to provide, or reasonably can 
be understood as offering to provide, legal services for that matter. 
b. A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment by live person-to-person contact when 
a significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the lawyer’s or law firm’s pecuniary gain, 
unless the contact is with a: 
1. Lawyer; 
2. person who has a family, close personal, or prior business or professional 
relationship with the lawyer or law firm; or 
3. person who routinely uses for business purposes the type of legal services 
offered by the lawyer. 
c. A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment even when not otherwise prohibited 
by paragraph (b), if: 
1. the target of the solicitation has made known to the lawyer a desire not to be 
solicited by the lawyer; or 
2. the solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment. 
d. This Rule does not prohibit communications authorized by law or ordered by a court or 
other tribunal. 
 
Model Rule 7.3: Comments 
 
1. Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from soliciting professional employment by live person-
to-person contact when a significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the lawyer’s or 
the law firm’s pecuniary gain. A lawyer’s communication is not a solicitation if it is 
directed to the general public, such as through a billboard, an Internet banner 
advertisement, a website or a television commercial, or if it is in response to a request 
for information or is automatically generated in response to electronic searches. 
																																																								
110 The Box Tops, Sweet Cream Ladies Forward March, Dimensions (1969). 
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2. “Live person-to-person contact” means in-person, face-to-face, live telephone and other 
real-time visual or auditory person-to-person communications where the person is 
subject to a direct personal encounter without time for reflection. Such person-to-person 
contact does not include chat rooms, text messages or other written communications 
that recipients may easily disregard. A potential for overreaching exists when a lawyer, 
seeking pecuniary gain, solicits a person known to be in need of legal services. This 
form of contact subjects a person to the private importuning of the trained advocate in a 
direct interpersonal encounter. The person, who may already feel overwhelmed by the 
circumstances giving rise to the need for legal services, may find it difficult to fully 
evaluate all available alternatives with reasoned judgment and appropriate self interest 
in the face of the lawyer’s presence and insistence upon an immediate response. The 
situation is fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation, and overreaching. 
8. Communications authorized by law or ordered by a court or tribunal include a notice to 
potential members of a class in class action litigation. 
 
 
 
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assn., 486 U.S. 466 (1988) 
 
Summary: Shapero submitted wanted to send a letter advertising his legal services to 
people with foreclosure actions filed against them. The Kentucky Supreme Court held 
that Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3 prohibited direct mail solicitation. The 
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Supreme Court reversed, holding that a direct mail solicitation was no different from an 
advertisement, and was protected by the 1st Amendment. The dissent argued that the 
court had gone too far in limiting regulation of attorney advertising and solicitation, and 
that advertising would harm the profession.  
 
JUSTICE BRENNAN announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the 
Court as to Parts I and II and an opinion as to Part III in which JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE 
BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE KENNEDY join. 
 
This case presents the issue whether a State may, consistent with the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, categorically prohibit lawyers from soliciting legal business for pecuniary gain by 
sending truthful and nondeceptive letters to potential clients known to face particular legal 
problems. 
 
I 
 
In 1985, petitioner, a member of Kentucky’s integrated Bar Association, applied to the Kentucky 
Attorneys Advertising Commission for approval of a letter that he proposed to send “to potential 
clients who have had a foreclosure suit filed against them.” The proposed letter read as follows: 
 
It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on. If this is true, you may 
be about to lose your home. Federal law may allow you to keep your home by 
ORDERING your creditor to STOP and give you more time to pay them. 
You may call my office anytime from 8:30 a. m. to 5:00 p. m. for FREE information on 
how you can keep your home. 
Call NOW, don't wait. It may surprise you what I may be able to do for you. Just call and 
tell me that you got this letter. Remember it is FREE, there is NO charge for calling. 
 
The Commission did not find the letter false or misleading. Nevertheless, it declined to approve 
petitioner's proposal on the ground that a then-existing Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 
prohibited the mailing or delivery of written advertisements “precipitated by a specific event or 
occurrence involving or relating to the addressee or addressees as distinct from the general 
public.” The Commission registered its view that Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i)’s ban on targeted, direct-
mail advertising violated the First Amendment — specifically the principles enunciated in 
Zauderer — and recommended that the Kentucky Supreme Court amend its Rules. Pursuing 
the Commission's suggestion, petitioner petitioned the Committee on Legal Ethics of the 
Kentucky Bar Association for an advisory opinion as to the Rule’s validity. Like the Commission, 
the Ethics Committee, in an opinion formally adopted by the Board of Governors of the Bar 
Association, did not find the proposed letter false or misleading, but nonetheless upheld Rule 
3.135(5)(b) (i) on the ground that it was consistent with Rule 7.3 of the American Bar 
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
 
On review of the Ethics Committee’s advisory opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court felt 
“compelled by the decision in Zauderer to order Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) deleted,” and replaced it with 
the ABA’s Rule 7.3. 
 
The court did not specify either the precise infirmity in Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) or how Rule 7.3 cured 
it. Rule 7.3, like its predecessor, prohibits targeted, direct-mail solicitation by lawyers for 
pecuniary gain, without a particularized finding that the solicitation is false or misleading. We 
granted certiorari to resolve whether such a blanket prohibition is consistent with the First 
Amendment and now reverse. 
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II 
 
Lawyer advertising is in the category of constitutionally protected commercial speech. The First 
Amendment principles governing state regulation of lawyer solicitations for pecuniary gain are 
by now familiar: “Commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and does not concern 
unlawful activities may be restricted only in the service of a substantial governmental interest, 
and only through means that directly advance that interest.” Since state regulation of 
commercial speech “may extend only as far as the interest it serves,” state rules that are 
designed to prevent the “potential for deception and confusion may be no broader than 
reasonably necessary to prevent the” perceived evil. 
 
Our lawyer advertising cases have never distinguished among various modes of written 
advertising to the general public. Thus, Ohio could no more prevent Zauderer from mass-
mailing to a general population his offer to represent women injured by the Dalkon Shield than it 
could prohibit his publication of the advertisement in local newspapers. Similarly, if petitioner’s 
letter is neither false nor deceptive, Kentucky could not constitutionally prohibit him from 
sending at large an identical letter opening with the query, “Is your home being foreclosed on?,” 
rather than his observation to the targeted individuals that “It has come to my attention that your 
home is being foreclosed on.” The drafters of Rule 7.3 apparently appreciated as much, for the 
Rule exempts from the ban “letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed generally to 
persons who are so situated that they might in general find such services useful.” 
 
The court below disapproved petitioner’s proposed letter solely because it targeted only persons 
who were “known to need the legal services” offered in his letter, rather than the broader group 
of persons “so situated that they might in general find such services useful.” Generally, unless 
the advertiser is inept, the latter group would include members of the former. The only reason to 
disseminate an advertisement of particular legal services among those persons who are “so 
situated that they might in general find such services useful” is to reach individuals who actually 
“need legal services of the kind provided and advertised by the lawyer.” But the First 
Amendment does not permit a ban on certain speech merely because it is more efficient; the 
State may not constitutionally ban a particular letter on the theory that to mail it only to those 
whom it would most interest is somehow inherently objectionable. 
 
The court below did not rely on any such theory. Rather, it concluded that the State’s blanket 
ban on all targeted, direct-mail solicitation was permissible because of the “serious potential for 
abuse inherent in direct solicitation by lawyers of potential clients known to need specific legal 
services.” The court observed: 
 
Such solicitation subjects the prospective client to pressure from a trained lawyer in a 
direct personal way. It is entirely possible that the potential client may feel overwhelmed 
by the basic situation which caused the need for the specific legal services and may 
have seriously impaired capacity for good judgment, sound reason and a natural 
protective self-interest. Such a condition is full of the possibility of undue influence, 
overreaching and intimidation. 
 
Of course, a particular potential client will feel equally “overwhelmed” by his legal troubles and 
will have the same “impaired capacity for good judgment” regardless of whether a lawyer mails 
him an untargeted letter or exposes him to a newspaper advertisement — concededly 
constitutionally protected activities — or instead mails a targeted letter. The relevant inquiry is 
not whether there exist potential clients whose “condition” makes them susceptible to undue 
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influence, but whether the mode of communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will 
exploit any such susceptibility. 
 
In assessing the potential for overreaching and undue influence, the mode of communication 
makes all the difference. Our decision in Ohralik that a State could categorically ban all in-
person solicitation turned on two factors. First was our characterization of face-to-face 
solicitation as “a practice rife with possibilities for overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise 
of undue influence, and outright fraud.” Second, “unique difficulties” would frustrate any attempt 
at state regulation of in-person solicitation short of an absolute ban because such solicitation is 
“not visible or otherwise open to public scrutiny.” Targeted, direct-mail solicitation is 
distinguishable from the in-person solicitation in each respect. 
 
Like print advertising, petitioner’s letter — and targeted, direct-mail solicitation generally — 
“poses much less risk of overreaching or undue influence” than does in-person solicitation. 
Neither mode of written communication involves “the coercive force of the personal presence of 
a trained advocate” or the “pressure on the potential client for an immediate yes-or-no answer to 
the offer of representation.” Unlike the potential client with a badgering advocate breathing down 
his neck, the recipient of a letter and the “reader of an advertisement can effectively avoid 
further bombardment of his sensibilities simply by averting his eyes.” A letter, like a printed 
advertisement (but unlike a lawyer), can readily be put in a drawer to be considered later, 
ignored, or discarded. In short, both types of written solicitation “convey information about legal 
services by means that are more conducive to reflection and the exercise of choice on the part 
of the consumer than is personal solicitation by an attorney.” Nor does a targeted letter invade 
the recipient’s privacy any more than does a substantively identical letter mailed at large. The 
invasion, if any, occurs when the lawyer discovers the recipient’s legal affairs, not when he 
confronts the recipient with the discovery. 
 
Admittedly, a letter that is personalized (not merely targeted) to the recipient presents an 
increased risk of deception, intentional or inadvertent. It could, in certain circumstances, lead 
the recipient to overestimate the lawyer's familiarity with the case or could implicitly suggest that 
the recipient’s legal problem is more dire than it really is. Similarly, an inaccurately targeted 
letter could lead the recipient to believe she has a legal problem that she does not actually have 
or, worse yet, could offer erroneous legal advice. 
 
But merely because targeted, direct-mail solicitation presents lawyers with opportunities for 
isolated abuses or mistakes does not justify a total ban on that mode of protected commercial 
speech. The State can regulate such abuses and minimize mistakes through far less restrictive 
and more precise means, the most obvious of which is to require the lawyer to file any 
solicitation letter with a state agency, giving the State ample opportunity to supervise mailings 
and penalize actual abuses. The “regulatory difficulties” that are “unique” to in-person lawyer 
solicitation — solicitation that is “not visible or otherwise open to public scrutiny” and for which it 
is “difficult or impossible to obtain reliable proof of what actually took place” — do not apply to 
written solicitations. The court below offered no basis for its “belief that submission of a blank 
form letter to the Advertising Commission does not provide a suitable protection to the public 
from overreaching, intimidation or misleading private targeted mail solicitation.” Its concerns 
were presumably those expressed by the ABA House of Delegates in its comment to Rule 7.3: 
 
State lawyer discipline agencies struggle for resources to investigate specific complaints, 
much less for those necessary to screen lawyers’ mail solicitation material. Even if they 
could examine such materials, agency staff members are unlikely to know anything 
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about the lawyer or about the prospective client's underlying problem. Without such 
knowledge they cannot determine whether the lawyer's representations are misleading. 
 
The record before us furnishes no evidence that scrutiny of targeted solicitation letters will be 
appreciably more burdensome or less reliable than scrutiny of advertisements. As a general 
matter, evaluating a targeted advertisement does not require specific information about the 
recipient's identity and legal problems any more than evaluating a newspaper advertisement 
requires like information about all readers. If the targeted letter specifies facts that relate to 
particular recipients, the reviewing agency has innumerable options to minimize mistakes. It 
might, for example, require the lawyer to prove the truth of the fact stated; it could require the 
lawyer to explain briefly how he or she discovered the fact and verified its accuracy; or it could 
require the letter to bear a label identifying it as an advertisement, or directing the recipient how 
to report inaccurate or misleading letters. To be sure, a state agency or bar association that 
reviews solicitation letters might have more work than one that does not. But “our recent 
decisions involving commercial speech have been grounded in the faith that the free flow of 
commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regulators the costs 
of distinguishing the truthful from the false, the helpful from the misleading, and the harmless 
from the harmful.” 
 
III 
 
The validity of Rule 7.3 does not turn on whether petitioner’s letter itself exhibited any of the 
evils at which Rule 7.3 was directed. Since, however, the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine 
does not apply to professional advertising, we address respondent’s contentions that petitioner’s 
letter is particularly overreaching, and therefore unworthy of First Amendment protection. In that 
regard, respondent identifies two features of the letter before us that, in its view, coalesce to 
convert the proposed letter into “high pressure solicitation, overbearing solicitation,” which is not 
protected. First, respondent asserts that the letter’s liberal use of underscored, uppercase 
letters “fairly shouts at the recipient that he should employ Shapero.” Second, respondent 
objects that the letter contains assertions that “state no affirmative or objective fact,” but 
constitute “pure salesman puffery, enticement for the unsophisticated, which commits Shapero 
to nothing.” 
 
The pitch or style of a letter's type and its inclusion of subjective predictions of client satisfaction 
might catch the recipient’s attention more than would a bland statement of purely objective facts 
in small type. But a truthful and non-deceptive letter, no matter how big its type and how much it 
speculates can never “shout at the recipient” or “grasp him by the lapels,” as can a lawyer 
engaging in face-to-face solicitation. The letter simply presents no comparable risk of 
overreaching. And so long as the First Amendment protects the right to solicit legal business, 
the State may claim no substantial interest in restricting truthful and nondeceptive lawyer 
solicitations to those least likely to be read by the recipient. Moreover, the First Amendment 
limits the State’s authority to dictate what information an attorney may convey in soliciting legal 
business. “The States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially 
misleading information if the information may also be presented in a way that is not deceptive,” 
unless the State “asserts a substantial interest” that such a restriction would directly advance. 
Nor may a State impose a more particularized restriction without a similar showing. Aside from 
the interests that we have already rejected, respondent offers none. 
 
To be sure, a letter may be misleading if it unduly emphasizes trivial or “relatively uninformative 
facts,” or offers overblown assurances of client satisfaction. Respondent does not argue before 
us that petitioner’s letter was misleading in those respects. Nor does respondent contend that 
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the letter is false or misleading in any other respect. Of course, respondent is free to raise, and 
the Kentucky courts are free to consider, any such argument on remand. 
 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Kentucky is reversed, and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting. 
 
I agree with the Court that the reasoning in Zauderer supports the conclusion reached today. 
That decision, however, was itself the culmination of a line of cases built on defective premises 
and flawed reasoning. As today's decision illustrates, the Court has been unable or unwilling to 
restrain the logic of the underlying analysis within reasonable bounds. The resulting interference 
with important and valid public policies is so destructive that I believe the analytical framework 
itself should now be reexamined. 
 
I 
 
Zauderer held that the First Amendment was violated by a state rule that forbade attorneys to 
solicit or accept employment through advertisements containing information or advice regarding 
a specific legal problem. I dissented from this holding because I believed that our precedents 
permitted, and good judgment required, that we give greater deference to the State’s legitimate 
efforts to regulate advertising by their attorneys. Emphasizing the important differences between 
professional services and standardized consumer products, I concluded that unsolicited legal 
advice was not analogous to the free samples that are often used to promote sales in other 
contexts. First, the quality of legal services is typically more difficult for most laypersons to 
evaluate, and the consequences of a mistaken evaluation of the “free sample” may be much 
more serious. For that reason, the practice of offering unsolicited legal advice as a means of 
enticing potential clients into a professional relationship is much more likely to be misleading 
than superficially similar practices in the sale of ordinary consumer goods. Second, and more 
important, an attorney has an obligation to provide clients with complete and disinterested 
advice. The advice contained in unsolicited “free samples” is likely to be colored by the lawyer's 
own interest in drumming up business, a result that is sure to undermine the professional 
standards that States have a substantial interest in maintaining. 
 
III 
 
The roots of the error in our attorney advertising cases are a defective analogy between 
professional services and standardized consumer products and a correspondingly inappropriate 
skepticism about the States’ justifications for their regulations. 
 
Even if I agreed that this Court should take upon itself the task of deciding what forms of 
attorney advertising are in the public interest, I would not agree with what it has done. The best 
arguments in favor of rules permitting attorneys to advertise are founded in elementary 
economic principles. Restrictions on truthful advertising, which artificially interfere with the ability 
of suppliers to transmit price information to consumers, presumably reduce the efficiency of the 
mechanisms of supply and demand. Other factors being equal, this should cause or enable 
suppliers (in this case attorneys) to maintain a price/quality ratio in some of their services that is 
higher than would otherwise prevail. Although one could probably not test this hypothesis 
empirically, it is inherently plausible. Nor is it implausible to imagine that one effect of 
restrictions on lawyer advertising, and perhaps sometimes an intended effect, is to enable 
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attorneys to charge their clients more for some services (of a given quality) than they would be 
able to charge absent the restrictions. 
 
Assuming, arguendo, that the removal of advertising restrictions should lead in the short run to 
increased efficiency in the provision of legal services, I would not agree that we can safely 
assume the same effect in the long run. The economic argument against these restrictions 
ignores the delicate role they may play in preserving the norms of the legal profession. While it 
may be difficult to defend this role with precise economic logic, I believe there is a powerful 
argument in favor of restricting lawyer advertising and that this argument is at the very least not 
easily refuted by economic analysis. 
 
One distinguishing feature of any profession, unlike other occupations that may be equally 
respectable, is that membership entails an ethical obligation to temper one’s selfish pursuit of 
economic success by adhering to standards of conduct that could not be enforced either by 
legal fiat or through the discipline of the market. There are sound reasons to continue pursuing 
the goal that is implicit in the traditional view of professional life. Both the special privileges 
incident to membership in the profession and the advantages those privileges give in the 
necessary task of earning a living are means to a goal that transcends the accumulation of 
wealth. That goal is public service, which in the legal profession can take a variety of familiar 
forms. This view of the legal profession need not be rooted in romanticism or self-serving 
sanctimony, though of course it can be. Rather, special ethical standards for lawyers are 
properly understood as an appropriate means of restraining lawyers in the exercise of the 
unique power that they inevitably wield in a political system like ours. 
 
It is worth recalling why lawyers are regulated at all, or to a greater degree than most other 
occupations, and why history is littered with failed attempts to extinguish lawyers as a special 
class. Operating a legal system that is both reasonably efficient and tolerably fair cannot be 
accomplished, at least under modern social conditions, without a trained and specialized body 
of experts. This training is one element of what we mean when we refer to the law as a “learned 
profession.” Such knowledge by its nature cannot be made generally available, and it therefore 
confers the power and the temptation to manipulate the system of justice for one's own ends. 
Such manipulation can occur in at least two obvious ways. One results from overly zealous 
representation of the client’s interests; abuse of the discovery process is one example whose 
causes and effects (if not its cure) is apparent. The second, and for present purposes the more 
relevant, problem is abuse of the client for the lawyer’s benefit. Precisely because lawyers must 
be provided with expertise that is both esoteric and extremely powerful, it would be unrealistic to 
demand that clients bargain for their services in the same arm’s-length manner that may be 
appropriate when buying an automobile or choosing a dry cleaner. Like physicians, lawyers are 
subjected to heightened ethical demands on their conduct towards those they serve. These 
demands are needed because market forces, and the ordinary legal prohibitions against force 
and fraud, are simply insufficient to protect the consumers of their necessary services from the 
peculiar power of the specialized knowledge that these professionals possess. 
 
Imbuing the legal profession with the necessary ethical standards is a task that involves a 
constant struggle with the relentless natural force of economic self-interest. It cannot be 
accomplished directly by legal rules, and it certainly will not succeed if sermonizing is the 
strongest tool that may be employed. Tradition and experiment have suggested a number of 
formal and informal mechanisms, none of which is adequate by itself and many of which may 
serve to reduce competition (in the narrow economic sense) among members of the profession. 
A few examples include the great efforts made during this century to improve the quality and 
breadth of the legal education that is required for admission to the bar; the concomitant attempt 
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to cultivate a subclass of genuine scholars within the profession; the development of bar 
associations that aspire to be more than trade groups; strict disciplinary rules about conflicts of 
interest and client abandonment; and promotion of the expectation that an attorney's history of 
voluntary public service is a relevant factor in selecting judicial candidates. 
 
Restrictions on advertising and solicitation by lawyers properly and significantly serve the same 
goal. Such restrictions act as a concrete, day-to-day reminder to the practicing attorney of why it 
is improper for any member of this profession to regard it as a trade or occupation like any 
other. There is no guarantee, of course, that the restrictions will always have the desired effect, 
and they are surely not a sufficient means to their proper goal. Given their inevitable 
anticompetitive effects, moreover, they should not be thoughtlessly retained or insulated from 
skeptical criticism. Appropriate modifications have been made in the light of reason and 
experience, and other changes may be suggested in the future. 
 
In my judgment, however, fairly severe constraints on attorney advertising can continue to play 
an important role in preserving the legal profession as a genuine profession. Whatever may be 
the exactly appropriate scope of these restrictions at a given time and place, this Court’s recent 
decisions reflect a myopic belief that “consumers,” and thus our Nation, will benefit from a 
constitutional theory that refuses to recognize either the essence of professionalism or its fragile 
and necessary foundations. In one way or another, time will uncover the folly of this approach. I 
can only hope that the Court will recognize the danger before it is too late to effect a worthwhile 
cure. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Richard D. Shapero died at his home in Louisville, Kentucky on December 31, 2006, at 
63. According to his obituary, “Richard was an attorney and Pin Ball Wizard. Richard’s 
U.S. Supreme Court Case, Shapero vs. Kentucky Bar Association established laws 
regarding lawyer advertising in the United States.” His colleagues also remembered him 
fondly, “As we were pondering our past and setting goals for our future, Richard D. 
Shapero died yesterday at age 63. He will always be remembered for taking the 
Kentucky Bar Association to the United States Supreme Court, which resulted in a 
significant opinion striking down bar restrictions on lawyer advertising. A gutsy guy, 
lightyears ahead of his time, he enjoyed the business side of law much more than the 
actual practice of law. His forte was bringing in P.I. cases and then farming them out to 
other attorneys. His trademark, long before other lawfirms thought of tag lines or 
trademarks, was ‘I Know The Experts.’ His early TV ads made traditional lawyers cringe, 
but he spoke a language lay people understood and they hired him.” 
2. The majority found a direct mail solicitation indistinguishable from an advertisement to 
the public. Do you agree? Is it reasonable to be more concerned about solicitation of 
potential clients who appear to need legal assistance than advertisements directed at 
the general public? Or perhaps we should encourage attorneys to offer legal services to 
potential clients who are most in need of them? 
3. The dissent argues that advertisements and solicitation are debasing the profession and 
its ethical standards. Have its concerns borne fruit? 
 
Further Reading: 
 
● David O. Stewart & Scott Nelson, Hawking Legal Services, ABA Journal, August 1, 
1988, at 44 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 742	
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) 
 
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
Rules of the Florida Bar prohibit personal injury lawyers from sending targeted direct-mail 
solicitations to victims and their relatives for 30 days following an accident or disaster. This case 
asks us to consider whether such Rules violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
Constitution. We hold that in the circumstances presented here, they do not. 
 
I 
 
In 1989, the Florida Bar completed a 2-year study of the effects of lawyer advertising on public 
opinion. After conducting hearings, commissioning surveys, and reviewing extensive public 
commentary, the Bar determined that several changes to its advertising rules were in order. In 
late 1990, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the Bar’s proposed amendments with some 
modifications. Two of these amendments are at issue in this case. Rule 4-7.4(b)(1) provides that 
“a lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, a written communication to a 
prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if: (A) the written 
communication concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to 
an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the communication is addressed or a 
relative of that person, unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the 
mailing of the communication." Rule 4-7.8(a) states that “a lawyer shall not accept referrals from 
a lawyer referral service unless the service: (1) engages in no communication with the public 
and in no direct contact with prospective clients in a manner that would violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct if the communication or contact were made by the lawyer.” Together, 
these Rules create a brief 30-day blackout period after an accident during which lawyers may 
not, directly or indirectly, single out accident victims or their relatives in order to solicit their 
business. 
 
In March 1992, G. Stewart McHenry and his wholly owned lawyer referral service, Went For It, 
Inc., filed this action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Florida challenging Rules 4-7.4(b)(1) and 4-7.8(a) as violative of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. McHenry alleged that he routinely sent targeted 
solicitations to accident victims or their survivors within 30 days after accidents and that he 
wished to continue doing so in the future. Went For It, Inc., represented that it wished to contact 
accident victims or their survivors within 30 days of accidents and to refer potential clients to 
participating Florida lawyers. In October 1992, McHenry was disbarred for reasons unrelated to 
this suit. Another Florida lawyer, John T. Blakely, was substituted in his stead. 
 
The District Court referred the parties’ competing summary judgment motions to a Magistrate 
Judge, who concluded that the Bar had substantial government interests, predicated on a 
concern for professionalism, both in protecting the personal privacy and tranquility of recent 
accident victims and their relatives and in ensuring that these individuals do not fall prey to 
undue influence or overreaching. Citing the Bar’s extensive study, the Magistrate Judge found 
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that the Rules directly serve those interests and sweep no further than reasonably necessary. 
The Magistrate recommended that the District Court grant the Bar’s motion for summary 
judgment on the ground that the Rules pass constitutional muster. 
 
The District Court rejected the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendations and entered 
summary judgment for the plaintiffs, relying on Bates v. State Bar of Ariz. and subsequent 
cases. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on similar grounds. The panel noted, in its conclusion, that 
it was “disturbed that Bates and its progeny require the decision” that it reached. We granted 
certiorari, and now reverse. 
 
II 
A 
 
Nearly two decades of cases have built upon the foundation laid by Bates. It is now well 
established that lawyer advertising is commercial speech and, as such, is accorded a measure 
of First Amendment protection. Such First Amendment protection, of course, is not absolute. We 
have always been careful to distinguish commercial speech from speech at the First 
Amendment's core. “Commercial speech enjoys a limited measure of protection, commensurate 
with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, and is subject to modes of 
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.” We have 
observed that “to require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial 
speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment’s 
guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech.” 
 
Mindful of these concerns, we engage in “intermediate” scrutiny of restrictions on commercial 
speech, analyzing them under the framework set forth in Central Hudson. Under Central 
Hudson, the government may freely regulate commercial speech that concerns unlawful activity 
or is misleading. Commercial speech that falls into neither of those categories, like the 
advertising at issue here, may be regulated if the government satisfies a test consisting of three 
related prongs: First, the government must assert a substantial interest in support of its 
regulation; second, the government must demonstrate that the restriction on commercial speech 
directly and materially advances that interest; and third, the regulation must be “narrowly 
drawn.” 
 
B 
 
The Bar asserts that it has a substantial interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of 
personal injury victims and their loved ones against intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers. 
This interest obviously factors into the Bar’s paramount (and repeatedly professed) objective of 
curbing activities that “negatively affect the administration of justice.” Because direct-mail 
solicitations in the wake of accidents are perceived by the public as intrusive, the Bar argues, 
the reputation of the legal profession in the eyes of Floridians has suffered commensurately. 
The regulation, then, is an effort to protect the flagging reputations of Florida lawyers by 
preventing them from engaging in conduct that, the Bar maintains, “is universally regarded as 
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deplorable and beneath common decency because of its intrusion upon the special vulnerability 
and private grief of victims or their families.” 
 
We have little trouble crediting the Bar’s interest as substantial. On various occasions we have 
accepted the proposition that “States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions 
within their boundaries, and as part of their power to protect the public health, safety, and other 
valid interests they have broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and 
regulating the practice of professions.” Our precedents also leave no room for doubt that “the 
protection of potential clients’ privacy is a substantial state interest.” In other contexts, we have 
consistently recognized that “the State’s interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and 
privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.” Indeed, we 
have noted that “a special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their own walls, which 
the State may legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid intrusions.” 
 
Under Central Hudson’s second prong, the State must demonstrate that the challenged 
regulation “advances the Government’s interest in a direct and material way.” That burden, we 
have explained, “is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body 
seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it 
recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”  
 
The Bar submitted a 106-page summary of its 2-year study of lawyer advertising and solicitation 
to the District Court. That summary contains data—both statistical and anecdotal—supporting 
the Bar’s contentions that the Florida public views direct-mail solicitations in the immediate wake 
of accidents as an intrusion on privacy that reflects poorly upon the profession. As of June 1989, 
lawyers mailed 700,000 direct solicitations in Florida annually, 40% of which were aimed at 
accident victims or their survivors. A survey of Florida adults commissioned by the Bar indicated 
that Floridians “have negative feelings about those attorneys who use direct mail advertising.” 
Fifty-four percent of the general population surveyed said that contacting persons concerning 
accidents or similar events is a violation of privacy. A random sampling of persons who received 
direct-mail advertising from lawyers in 1987 revealed that 45% believed that directmail 
solicitation is “designed to take advantage of gullible or unstable people”; 34% found such 
tactics “annoying or irritating”; 26% found it “an invasion of your privacy”; and 24% reported that 
it “made you angry.” Significantly, 27% of direct-mail recipients reported that their regard for the 
legal profession and for the judicial process as a whole was “lower” as a result of receiving the 
direct mail. 
 
The anecdotal record mustered by the Bar is noteworthy for its breadth and detail. With titles 
like “Scavenger Lawyers” and “Solicitors Out of Bounds,” newspaper editorial pages in Florida 
have burgeoned with criticism of Florida lawyers who send targeted direct mail to victims shortly 
after accidents. The study summary also includes page upon page of excerpts from complaints 
of direct-mail recipients. For example, a Florida citizen described how he was “appalled and 
angered by the brazen attempt” of a law firm to solicit him by letter shortly after he was injured 
and his fiancee was killed in an auto accident. Another found it “despicable and inexcusable” 
that a Pensacola lawyer wrote to his mother three days after his father’s funeral. Another 
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described how she was “astounded” and then “very angry” when she received a solicitation 
following a minor accident. Still another described as “beyond comprehension” a letter his 
nephew’s family received the day of the nephew’s funeral. One citizen wrote, “I consider the 
unsolicited contact from you after my child’s accident to be of the rankest form of ambulance 
chasing and in incredibly poor taste. I cannot begin to express with my limited vocabulary the 
utter contempt in which I hold you and your kind.” 
 
In light of this showing—which respondents at no time refuted, save by the conclusory assertion 
that the Rule lacked “any factual basis”—we conclude that the Bar has satisfied the second 
prong of the Central Hudson test. In dissent, Justice Kennedy complains that we have before us 
few indications of the sample size or selection procedures employed by Magid Associates (a 
nationally renowned consulting firm) and no copies of the actual surveys employed. As stated, 
we believe the evidence adduced by the Bar is sufficient. In any event, we do not read our case 
law to require that empirical data come to us accompanied by a surfeit of background 
information. Indeed, in other First Amendment contexts, we have permitted litigants to justify 
speech restrictions by reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales 
altogether, or even, in a case applying strict scrutiny, to justify restrictions based solely on 
history, consensus, and “simple common sense.” After scouring the record, we are satisfied that 
the ban on directmail solicitation in the immediate aftermath of accidents targets a concrete, 
nonspeculative harm. 
 
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals determined that this case was governed 
squarely by Shapero. Making no mention of the Bar’s study, the court concluded that “a targeted 
letter does not invade the recipient’s privacy any more than does a substantively identical letter 
mailed at large. The invasion, if any, occurs when the lawyer discovers the recipient’s legal 
affairs, not when he confronts the recipient with the discovery.” In many cases, the Court of 
Appeals explained, “this invasion of privacy will involve no more than reading the newspaper.” 
 
While some of Shapero’s language might be read to support the Court of Appeals’ 
interpretation, Shapero differs in several fundamental respects from the case before us. First 
and foremost, Shapero’s treatment of privacy was casual. Contrary to the dissent’s suggestions, 
the State in Shapero did not seek to justify its regulation as a measure undertaken to prevent 
lawyers’ invasions of privacy interests. Rather, the State focused exclusively on the special 
dangers of overreaching inhering in targeted solicitations. Second, in contrast to this case, 
Shapero dealt with a broad ban on all direct-mail solicitations, whatever the time frame and 
whoever the recipient. Finally, the State in Shapero assembled no evidence attempting to 
demonstrate any actual harm caused by targeted direct mail. The Court rejected the State’s 
effort to justify a prophylactic ban on the basis of blanket, untested assertions of undue 
influence and overreaching. Because the State did not make a privacy-based argument at all, its 
empirical showing on that issue was similarly infirm. 
 
We find the Court’s perfunctory treatment of privacy in Shapero to be of little utility in assessing 
this ban on targeted solicitation of victims in the immediate aftermath of accidents. While it is 
undoubtedly true that many people find the image of lawyers sifting through accident and police 
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reports in pursuit of prospective clients unpalatable and invasive, this case targets a different 
kind of intrusion. The Bar has argued, and the record reflects, that a principal purpose of the 
ban is “protecting the personal privacy and tranquility of Florida’s citizens from crass commercial 
intrusion by attorneys upon their personal grief in times of trauma.” The intrusion targeted by the 
Bar’s regulation stems not from the fact that a lawyer has learned about an accident or disaster, 
but from the lawyer’s confrontation of victims or relatives with such information, while wounds 
are still open, in order to solicit their business. In this respect, an untargeted letter mailed to 
society at large is different in kind from a targeted solicitation; the untargeted letter involves no 
willful or knowing affront to or invasion of the tranquility of bereaved or injured individuals and 
simply does not cause the same kind of reputational harm to the profession unearthed by the 
Bar’s study. 
 
The purpose of the 30-day targeted direct-mail ban is to forestall the outrage and irritation with 
the state-licensed legal profession that the practice of direct solicitation only days after 
accidents has engendered. The Bar is concerned not with citizens’ “offense” in the abstract, but 
with the demonstrable detrimental effects that such “offense” has on the profession it regulates. 
Moreover, the harm posited by the Bar is as much a function of simple receipt of targeted 
solicitations within days of accidents as it is a function of the letters’ contents. Throwing the 
letter away shortly after opening it may minimize the latter intrusion, but it does little to combat 
the former. 
 
Passing to Central Hudson’s third prong, we examine the relationship between the Bar’s 
interests and the means chosen to serve them. With respect to this prong, the differences 
between commercial speech and noncommercial speech are manifest. The “least restrictive 
means” test has no role in the commercial speech context. “What our decisions require,” 
instead, “is a fit between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those 
ends, a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the 
single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served, that employs 
not necessarily the least restrictive means, but a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired 
objective.” Of course, we do not equate this test with the less rigorous obstacles of rational 
basis review; in Cincinnati v. Discovery, for example, we observed that the existence of 
“numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech is 
certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the fit between ends and means is 
reasonable.” 
 
Respondents levy a great deal of criticism, at the scope of the Bar’s restriction on targeted mail. 
“By prohibiting written communications to all people, whatever their state of mind,” respondents 
charge, the Rule “keeps useful information from those accident victims who are ready, willing 
and able to utilize a lawyer’s advice.” This criticism may be parsed into two components. First, 
the Rule does not distinguish between victims in terms of the severity of their injuries. According 
to respondents, the Rule is unconstitutionally overinclusive insofar as it bans targeted mailings 
even to citizens whose injuries or grief are relatively minor. Second, the Rule may prevent 
citizens from learning about their legal options, particularly at a time when other actors—
opposing counsel and insurance adjusters—may be clamoring for victims’ attentions. Any 
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benefit arising from the Bar’s regulation, respondents implicitly contend, is outweighed by these 
costs. 
 
We are not persuaded by respondents’ allegations of constitutional infirmity. We find little 
deficiency in the ban’s failure to distinguish among injured Floridians by the severity of their pain 
or the intensity of their grief. Indeed, it is hard to imagine the contours of a regulation that might 
satisfy respondents on this score. Rather than drawing difficult lines on the basis that some 
injuries are “severe” and some situations appropriate (and others, presumably, inappropriate) 
for grief, anger, or emotion, the Bar has crafted a ban applicable to all postaccident or disaster 
solicitations for a brief 30-day period. Unlike respondents, we do not see “numerous and 
obvious less-burdensome alternatives” to Florida’s short temporal ban. The Bar’s rule is 
reasonably well tailored to its stated objective of eliminating targeted mailings whose type and 
timing are a source of distress to Floridians, distress that has caused many of them to lose 
respect for the legal profession. 
 
Respondents’ second point would have force if the Bar’s Rule were not limited to a brief period 
and if there were not many other ways for injured Floridians to learn about the availability of 
legal representation during that time. Our lawyer advertising cases have afforded lawyers a 
great deal of leeway to devise innovative ways to attract new business. Florida permits lawyers 
to advertise on prime-time television and radio as well as in newspapers and other media. They 
may rent space on billboards. They may send untargeted letters to the general population, or to 
discrete segments thereof. There are, of course, pages upon pages devoted to lawyers in the 
Yellow Pages of Florida telephone directories. These listings are organized alphabetically and 
by area of specialty. These ample alternative channels for receipt of information about the 
availability of legal representation during the 30-day period following accidents may explain why, 
despite the ample evidence, testimony, and commentary submitted by those favoring (as well as 
opposing) unrestricted direct-mail solicitation, respondents have not pointed to—and we have 
not independently found—a single example of an individual case in which immediate solicitation 
helped to avoid, or failure to solicit within 30 days brought about, the harms that concern the 
dissent. In fact, the record contains considerable empirical survey information suggesting that 
Floridians have little difficulty finding a lawyer when they need one. Finding no basis to question 
the commonsense conclusion that the many alternative channels for communicating necessary 
information about attorneys are sufficient, we see no defect in Florida’s regulation. 
 
III 
 
Speech by professionals obviously has many dimensions. There are circumstances in which we 
will accord speech by attorneys on public issues and matters of legal representation the 
strongest protection our Constitution has to offer. This case, however, concerns pure 
commercial advertising, for which we have always reserved a lesser degree of protection under 
the First Amendment. Particularly because the standards and conduct of state-licensed lawyers 
have traditionally been subject to extensive regulation by the States, it is all the more 
appropriate that we limit our scrutiny of state regulations to a level commensurate with the 
“subordinate position” of commercial speech in the scale of First Amendment values. 
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We believe that the Bar’s 30-day restriction on targeted direct-mail solicitation of accident 
victims and their relatives withstands scrutiny under the three-pronged Central Hudson test that 
we have devised for this context. The Bar has substantial interest both in protecting injured 
Floridians from invasive conduct by lawyers and in preventing the erosion of confidence in the 
profession that such repeated invasions have engendered. The Bar’s proffered study, 
unrebutted by respondents below, provides evidence indicating that the harms it targets are far 
from illusory. The palliative devised by the Bar to address these harms is narrow both in scope 
and in duration. The Constitution, in our view, requires nothing more. 
 
Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg join, 
dissenting. 
 
Attorneys who communicate their willingness to assist potential clients are engaged in speech 
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court today undercuts this guarantee 
in an important class of cases and unsettles leading First Amendment precedents, at the 
expense of those victims most in need of legal assistance. With all respect for the Court, in my 
view its solicitude for the privacy of victims and its concern for our profession are misplaced and 
self-defeating, even upon the Court’s own premises. 
 
I take it to be uncontroverted that when an accident results in death or injury, it is often urgent at 
once to investigate the occurrence, identify witnesses, and preserve evidence. Vital interests in 
speech and expression are, therefore, at stake when by law an attorney cannot direct a letter to 
the victim or the family explaining this simple fact and offering competent legal assistance. 
Meanwhile, represented and better informed parties, or parties who have been solicited in ways 
more sophisticated and indirect, may be at work. Indeed, these parties, either themselves or by 
their attorneys, investigators, and adjusters, are free to contact the unrepresented persons to 
gather evidence or offer settlement. This scheme makes little sense. As is often true when the 
law makes little sense, it is not first principles but their interpretation and application that have 
gone awry. 
 
Although I agree with the Court that the case can be resolved by following the three-part inquiry 
we have identified to assess restrictions on commercial speech, a preliminary observation is in 
order. Speech has the capacity to convey complex substance, yielding various insights and 
interpretations depending upon the identity of the listener or the reader and the context of its 
transmission. It would oversimplify to say that what we consider here is commercial speech and 
nothing more, for in many instances the banned communications may be vital to the recipients’ 
right to petition the courts for redress of grievances. The complex nature of expression is one 
reason why even so-called commercial speech has become an essential part of the public 
discourse the First Amendment secures. If our commercial speech rules are to control this case, 
then, it is imperative to apply them with exacting care and fidelity to our precedents, for what is 
at stake is the suppression of information and knowledge that transcends the financial self-
interests of the speaker. 
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I 
 
As the Court notes, the first of the Central Hudson factors to be considered is whether the 
interest the State pursues in enacting the speech restriction is a substantial one. The State says 
two different interests meet this standard. The first is the interest “in protecting the personal 
privacy and tranquility” of the victim and his or her family. As the Court notes, that interest has 
recognition in our decisions as a general matter; but it does not follow that the privacy interest in 
the cases the majority cites is applicable here. The problem the Court confronts, and cannot 
overcome, is our recent decision in Shapero. In assessing the importance of the interest in that 
solicitation case, we made an explicit distinction between direct, in-person solicitations and 
direct-mail solicitations. Shapero, like this case, involved a direct-mail solicitation, and there the 
State recited its fears of “overreaching and undue influence.” We found, however, no such 
dangers presented by direct-mail advertising. We reasoned that “a letter, like a printed 
advertisement (but unlike a lawyer), can readily be put in a drawer to be considered later, 
ignored, or discarded. We pointed out that “the relevant inquiry is not whether there exist 
potential clients whose ‘condition’ makes them susceptible to undue influence, but whether the 
mode of communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit any such 
susceptibility.” In assessing the substantiality of the evils to be prevented, we concluded that 
“the mode of communication makes all the difference.” The direct mail in Shapero did not 
present the justification for regulation of speech presented in Ohralik. 
 
To avoid the controlling effect of Shapero in the case before us, the Court seeks to declare that 
a different privacy interest is implicated. As it sees the matter, the substantial concern is that 
victims or their families will be offended by receiving a solicitation during their grief and trauma. 
But we do not allow restrictions on speech to be justified on the ground that the expression 
might offend the listener. On the contrary, we have said that these “are classically not 
justifications validating the suppression of expression protected by the First Amendment.” And 
in Zauderer, where we struck down a ban on attorney advertising, we held that “the mere 
possibility that some members of the population might find advertising offensive cannot justify 
suppressing it. The same must hold true for advertising that some members of the bar might 
find beneath their dignity.” 
 
We have applied this principle to direct-mail cases as well as with respect to general 
advertising, noting that the right to use the mails is protected by the First Amendment. In Bolger, 
we held that a statute designed to “shield recipients of mail from materials that they are likely to 
find offensive” furthered an interest of “little weight,” noting that “we have consistently held that 
the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppression.” It is 
only where an audience is captive that we will assure its protection from some offensive speech. 
Outside that context, “we have never held that the Government itself can shut off the flow of 
mailings to protect those recipients who might potentially be offended.” The occupants of a 
household receiving mailings are not a captive audience, and the asserted interest in preventing 
their offense should be no more controlling here than in our prior cases. All the recipient of 
objectionable mailings need do is to take “the short, though regular, journey from mail box to 
trash can.” As we have observed, this is “an acceptable burden, at least so far as the 
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Constitution is concerned.” If these cases forbidding restrictions on speech that might be 
offensive are to be overruled, the Court should say so. 
 
In the face of these difficulties of logic and precedent, the State and the opinion of the Court turn 
to a second interest: protecting the reputation and dignity of the legal profession. The argument 
is, it seems fair to say, that all are demeaned by the crass behavior of a few. The argument 
takes a further step in the amicus brief filed by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America. 
There it is said that disrespect for the profession from this sort of solicitation (but presumably 
from no other sort of solicitation) results in lower jury verdicts. In a sense, of course, these 
arguments are circular. While disrespect will arise from an unethical or improper practice, the 
majority begs a most critical question by assuming that direct-mail solicitations constitute such a 
practice. The fact is, however, that direct solicitation may serve vital purposes and promote the 
administration of justice, and to the extent the bar seeks to protect lawyers’ reputations by 
preventing them from engaging in speech some deem offensive, the State is doing nothing 
more (as amicus the Association of Trial Lawyers of America is at least candid enough to admit) 
than manipulating the public’s opinion by suppressing speech that informs us how the legal 
system works. The disrespect argument thus proceeds from the very assumption it tries to 
prove, which is to say that solicitations within 30 days serve no legitimate purpose. This, of 
course, is censorship pure and simple; and censorship is antithetical to the first principles of free 
expression. 
 
II 
 
Even were the interests asserted substantial, the regulation here fails the second part of the 
Central Hudson test, which requires that the dangers the State seeks to eliminate be real and 
that a speech restriction or ban advance that asserted state interest in a direct and material 
way. The burden of demonstrating the reality of the asserted harm rests on the State. Slight 
evidence in this regard does not mean there is sufficient evidence to support the claims. Here, 
what the State has offered falls well short of demonstrating that the harms it is trying to redress 
are real, let alone that the regulation directly and materially advances the State’s interests. The 
parties and the Court have used the term “Summary of Record” to describe a document 
prepared by the Florida Bar (Bar), one of the adverse parties, and submitted to the District Court 
in this case. This document includes no actual surveys, few indications of sample size or 
selection procedures, no explanations of methodology, and no discussion of excluded results. 
There is no description of the statistical universe or scientific framework that permits any 
productive use of the information the so-called Summary of Record contains. The majority 
describes this anecdotal matter as “noteworthy for its breadth and detail,” but when examined, it 
is noteworthy for its incompetence. The selective synopses of unvalidated studies deal, for the 
most part, with television advertising and phone book listings, and not direct-mail solicitations. 
Although there may be issues common to various kinds of attorney advertising and solicitation, 
it is not clear what would follow from that limited premise, unless the Court means by its 
decision to call into question all forms of attorney advertising. The most generous reading of this 
document permits identification of 34 pages on which direct-mail solicitation is arguably 
discussed. Of these, only two are even a synopsis of a study of the attitudes of Floridians 
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towards such solicitations. The bulk of the remaining pages include comments by lawyers about 
direct mail (some of them favorable), excerpts from citizen complaints about such solicitation, 
and a few excerpts from newspaper articles on the topic. Our cases require something more 
than a few pages of self-serving and unsupported statements by the State to demonstrate that a 
regulation directly and materially advances the elimination of a real harm when the State seeks 
to suppress truthful and nondeceptive speech. 
 
It is telling that the essential thrust of all the material adduced to justify the State’s interest is 
devoted to the reputational concerns of the Bar. It is not at all clear that this regulation advances 
the interest of protecting persons who are suffering trauma and grief, and we are cited to no 
material in the record for that claim. Indeed, when asked at oral argument what a “typical injured 
plaintiff gets in the mail,” the Bar’s lawyer replied: “That's not in the record, and I don't know the 
answer to that question.” Having declared that the privacy interest is one both substantial and 
served by the regulation, the Court ought not to be excused from justifying its conclusion. 
 
III 
 
The insufficiency of the regulation to advance the State’s interest is reinforced by the third 
inquiry necessary in this analysis. Were it appropriate to reach the third part of the Central 
Hudson test, it would be clear that the relationship between the Bar’s interests and the means 
chosen to serve them is not a reasonable fit. The Bar’s rule creates a flat ban that prohibits far 
more speech than necessary to serve the purported state interest. Even assuming that interest 
were legitimate, there is a wild disproportion between the harm supposed and the speech ban 
enforced. It is a disproportion the Court does not bother to discuss, but our speech 
jurisprudence requires that it do so. 
 
To begin with, the ban applies with respect to all accidental injuries, whatever their gravity. The 
Court’s purported justification for the excess of regulation in this respect is the difficulty of 
drawing lines between severe and less serious injuries, but making such distinctions is not 
important in this analysis. Even were it significant, the Court’s assertion is unconvincing. After 
all, the criminal law routinely distinguishes degrees of bodily harm, and if that delineation is 
permissible and workable in the criminal context, it should not be “hard to imagine the contours 
of a regulation” that satisfies the reasonable fit requirement. 
 
There is, moreover, simply no justification for assuming that in all or most cases an attorney’s 
advice would be unwelcome or unnecessary when the survivors or the victim must at once 
begin assessing their legal and financial position in a rational manner. With regard to lesser 
injuries, there is little chance that for any period, much less 30 days, the victims will become 
distraught upon hearing from an attorney. It is, in fact, more likely a real risk that some victims 
might think no attorney will be interested enough to help them. It is at this precise time that 
sound legal advice may be necessary and most urgent. 
 
Even as to more serious injuries, the State's argument fails, since it must be conceded that 
prompt legal representation is essential where death or injury results from accidents. The only 
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seeming justification for the State's restriction is the one the Court itself offers, which is that 
attorneys can and do resort to other ways of communicating important legal information to 
potential clients. Quite aside from the latent protectionism for the established bar that the 
argument discloses, it fails for the more fundamental reason that it concedes the necessity for 
the very representation the attorneys solicit and the State seeks to ban. The accident victims 
who are prejudiced to vindicate the State’s purported desire for more dignity in the legal 
profession will be the very persons who most need legal advice, for they are the victims who, 
because they lack education, linguistic ability, or familiarity with the legal system, are unable to 
seek out legal services. 
 
The reasonableness of the State’s chosen methods for redressing perceived evils can be 
evaluated, in part, by a commonsense consideration of other possible means of regulation that 
have not been tried. Here, the Court neglects the fact that this problem is largely self-policing: 
Potential clients will not hire lawyers who offend them. And even if a person enters into a 
contract with an attorney and later regrets it, Florida, like some other States, allows clients to 
rescind certain contracts with attorneys within a stated time after they are executed. The State’s 
restriction deprives accident victims of information which may be critical to their right to make a 
claim for compensation for injuries. The telephone book and general advertisements may serve 
this purpose in part; but the direct solicitation ban will fall on those who most need legal 
representation: for those with minor injuries, the victims too ill informed to know an attorney may 
be interested in their cases; for those with serious injuries, the victims too ill informed to know 
that time is of the essence if counsel is to assemble evidence and warn them not to enter into 
settlement negotiations or evidentiary discussions with investigators for opposing parties. One 
survey reports that over a recent 5-year period, 68% of the American population consulted a 
lawyer. The use of modern communication methods in a timely way is essential if clients who 
make up this vast demand are to be advised and informed of all of their choices and rights in 
selecting an attorney. The very fact that some 280,000 direct-mail solicitations are sent to 
accident victims and their survivors in Florida each year is some indication of the efficacy of this 
device. Nothing in the Court’s opinion demonstrates that these efforts do not serve some 
beneficial role. A solicitation letter is not a contract. Nothing in the record shows that these 
communications do not at the least serve the purpose of informing the prospective client that he 
or she has a number of different attorneys from whom to choose, so that the decision to select 
counsel, after an interview with one or more interested attorneys, can be deliberate and 
informed. And if these communications reveal the social costs of the tort system as a whole, 
then efforts can be directed to reforming the operation of that system, not to suppressing 
information about how the system works. The Court’s approach, however, does not seem to be 
the proper way to begin elevating the honor of the profession. 
 
IV 
 
It is most ironic that, for the first time since Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court now orders a 
major retreat from the constitutional guarantees for commercial speech in order to shield its own 
profession from public criticism. Obscuring the financial aspect of the legal profession from 
public discussion through direct-mail solicitation, at the expense of the least sophisticated 
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members of society, is not a laudable constitutional goal. There is no authority for the 
proposition that the Constitution permits the State to promote the public image of the legal 
profession by suppressing information about the profession’s business aspects. If public respect 
for the profession erodes because solicitation distorts the idea of the law as most lawyers see it, 
it must be remembered that real progress begins with more rational speech, not less. I agree 
that if this amounts to mere “sermonizing,” the attempt may be futile. The guiding principle, 
however, is that full and rational discussion furthers sound regulation and necessary reform. 
The image of the profession cannot be enhanced without improving the substance of its 
practice. The objective of the profession is to ensure that “the ethical standards of lawyers are 
linked to the service and protection of clients.” 
 
Today’s opinion is a serious departure, not only from our prior decisions involving attorney 
advertising, but also from the principles that govern the transmission of commercial speech. The 
Court’s opinion reflects a new-found and illegitimate confidence that it, along with the Supreme 
Court of Florida, knows what is best for the Bar and its clients. Self-assurance has always been 
the hallmark of a censor. That is why under the First Amendment the public, not the State, has 
the right and the power to decide what ideas and information are deserving of their adherence. 
“The general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the value of 
the information presented.” By validating Florida’s rule, today’s majority is complicit in the Bar's 
censorship. For these reasons, I dissent from the opinion of the Court and from its judgment. 
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Illustration for Linda Greenhouse, In the longtime war over lawyer advertising, the latest shot 
leaves as many wounds as ever, New York Times, June 23, 1995, at A23 
 
Questions: 
 
1. G. Stewart McHenry was disbarred in 1992 for masturbating in front of one female client 
and fondling another. He was also disciplined by the bar in 1985 and 1988, for 
brandishing a gun in his office, hitting a paralegal with a file and refusing to pay her 
when she quit, improperly withdrawing funds from his client trust account, and drunk 
driving, among other things. 
2. Opponents of bar association rules limiting attorney advertisements and solicitation 
argue that the rules are motivated by the fear of increased competition and intended to 
protect the interests of established attorneys. Supporters of those rules argue that they 
reflect philosophical principles, including an aversion to “ambulance chasing.” Which 
argument do you find more compelling? Can both be true? 
3. Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion relied on empirical evidence submitted by the bar 
showing that attorney solicitations sent to people after they or a family member suffered 
an injury caused harm and were unwanted. Justice Kennedy’s dissent questioned the 
credibility of the empirical evidence and argued that attorney solicitations could help 
consumers, who didn’t realize they had a potential claim or didn’t know who to contact. 
Did you find O’Connor’s empirical claims convincing? Do you think they provided 
adequate evidence of harm to overcome Justice Kennedy’s 1st Amendment objections? 
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Tampa Bay Times (St. Petersburg, Florida), Wed., Oct. 7, 1987, at 24 
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The Tampa Tribune (Tampa, Florida), Tues., Oct 31, 1989, at 8 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 757	
7.4: Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
Is a dream a lie if it don’t come true, or is it something worse?111 
 
Prosecutors are responsible for enforcing criminal law. Indeed, for better or worse, prosecutors 
probably have the most important role in our modern criminal justice system. Among many other 
things, prosecutors decide who to charge with crimes, which crimes to charge, and whether to 
offer a plea bargain. And they exercise immense discretion in all of those areas. 
 
In practice, prosecutors play a much more important role in the administration of criminal justice 
than judges, because only about 3% of criminal prosecutions go to trial. The overwhelming 
majority of criminal defendants plead guilty, and the prosecutors determine what sentence the 
defendant will receive, with limited oversight from the judge. And prosecutors strongly 
encourage defendants to plead guilty, rather than go to trial. If a defendant refuses to plead 
guilty, prosecutors typically charge aggressively and request the longest possible sentence. 
 
At least in theory, the paramount duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not a conviction. As 
Justice Sutherland observed in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), a prosecutor 
 
is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty 
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; 
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but 
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant 
of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He 
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor – indeed, he should do so. But, while he may 
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain 
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every 
legitimate means to bring about a just one. 
 
Accordingly, prosecutors should never employ improper means, even to achieve results they 
believe to be just. They should always be candid with the court and the defense, and should 
never suppress exculpatory evidence or make improper statements. As Justice Jackson 
observed: 
 
The qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and as impossible to define as those 
which make a gentleman. And those who need to be told would not understand it 
anyway. A sensitiveness to fair play and sportsmanship is perhaps the best protection 
against the abuse of power, and the citizens safety lies in the prosecutor who tempers 
zeal with human kindness, who seeks truth and not victims, who serves the law and not 
factional purposes, and who approaches his task with humility. 
 
																																																								
111 Bruce Springsteen, The River, The River (1980). 
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The American Bar Association has described the duties of a prosecutor in Model Rule of 
Professional Responsibility 3.8 and in a separate set of model rules governing the prosecution 
function. Most jurisdiction have adopted some version of these rules. But their effectiveness is 
limited by the discretion and immunity of prosecutors. For one thing, it is often difficult or 
impossible to know when prosecutors have violated their professional duties. Even if they have, 
they are usually protected by absolute immunity. And historically, courts have been reluctant to 
impose meaningful sanctions on prosecutors, even for egregious misconduct. 
 
Prosecution Function Standard 3-1.2: The Function of the Prosecutor 
 
a. The office of prosecutor is charged with responsibility for prosecutions in its jurisdiction. 
b. The prosecutor is an administrator of justice, an advocate, and an officer of the court; the 
prosecutor must exercise sound discretion in the performance of his or her functions. 
c. The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict. 
d. It is an important function of the prosecutor to seek to reform and improve the 
administration of criminal justice. When inadequacies or injustices in the substantive or 
procedural law come to the prosecutor's attention, he or she should stimulate efforts for 
remedial action. 
e. It is the duty of the prosecutor to know and be guided by the standards of professional 
conduct as defined by applicable professional traditions, ethical codes, and law in the 
prosecutor’s jurisdiction. The prosecutor should make use of the guidance afforded by 
an advisory council. 
 
Model Rule 3.8: Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor    
 
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: 
 
a. refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by 
probable cause; 
b. make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and 
the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to 
obtain counsel; 
c. not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights, 
such as the right to a preliminary hearing; 
d. make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the 
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in 
connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged 
mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of 
this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal; 
e. not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence 
about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes: 
1. the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable 
privilege; 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 759	
2. the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing 
investigation or prosecution; and 
3. there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information; 
f. except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of 
the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from 
making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public 
condemnation of the accused and exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law 
enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the 
prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor 
would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6 or this Rule. 
g. When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable 
likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant 
was convicted, the prosecutor shall: 
1. promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority, and 
2. if the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, 
i. promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court 
authorizes delay, and 
ii. undertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an 
investigation, to determine whether the defendant was convicted of an 
offense that the defendant did not commit. 
h. When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a 
defendant in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the defendant 
did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction. 
 
Model Rule 3.8: Comments 
 
1. A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an 
advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant 
is accorded procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, 
and that special precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent 
persons. The extent of mandated remedial action is a matter of debate and varies in 
different jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have adopted the ABA Standards of Criminal 
Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function, which are the product of prolonged and 
careful deliberation by lawyers experienced in both criminal prosecution and defense. 
Competent representation of the sovereignty may require a prosecutor to undertake 
some procedural and remedial measures as a matter of obligation. Applicable law may 
require other measures by the prosecutor and knowing disregard of those obligations or 
a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4. 
7. When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable 
likelihood that a person outside the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of a crime 
that the person did not commit, paragraph (g) requires prompt disclosure to the court or 
other appropriate authority, such as the chief prosecutor of the jurisdiction where the 
conviction occurred. If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, 
paragraph (g) requires the prosecutor to examine the evidence and undertake further 
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investigation to determine whether the defendant is in fact innocent or make reasonable 
efforts to cause another appropriate authority to undertake the necessary investigation, 
and to promptly disclose the evidence to the court and, absent court-authorized delay, to 
the defendant. Consistent with the objectives of Rules 4.2 and 4.3, disclosure to a 
represented defendant must be made through the defendant’s counsel, and, in the case 
of an unrepresented defendant, would ordinarily be accompanied by a request to a court 
for the appointment of counsel to assist the defendant in taking such legal measures as 
may be appropriate. 
8. Under paragraph (h), once the prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence that 
the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the 
prosecutor must seek to remedy the conviction. Necessary steps may include disclosure 
of the evidence to the defendant, requesting that the court appoint counsel for an 
unrepresented indigent defendant and, where appropriate, notifying the court that the 
prosecutor has knowledge that the defendant did not commit the offense of which the 
defendant was convicted. 
9. A prosecutor’s independent judgment, made in good faith, that the new evidence is not 
of such nature as to trigger the obligations of sections (g) and (h), though subsequently 
determined to have been erroneous, does not constitute a violation of this Rule. 
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The Evening Sun (Baltimore, Maryland), July 10, 1958, at 28 
 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) 
 
Summary: John Leo Brady and Charles Donald Boblit were charged with the murder of 
William Brooks and tried separately. Brady confessed to participating in the murder, but 
claimed that Boblit actually killed Brooks. The prosecutor suppressed a confession in 
which Boblit admitted killing Brooks, and Brady was sentenced to death. The Supreme 
Court reversed Brady’s sentence, holding that the Due Process Clause of the 14th 
Amendment requires prosecutors to disclose all exculpatory evidence. 
 
Opinion of the Court by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, announced by MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN. 
 
Petitioner and a companion, Boblit, were found guilty of murder in the first degree and were 
sentenced to death, their convictions being affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Their 
trials were separate, petitioner being tried first. At his trial Brady took the stand and admitted his 
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participation in the crime, but he claimed that Boblit did the actual killing. And, in his summation 
to the jury, Brady’s counsel conceded that Brady was guilty of murder in the first degree, asking 
only that the jury return that verdict “without capital punishment.” Prior to the trial petitioner’s 
counsel had requested the prosecution to allow him to examine Boblit’s extrajudicial statements. 
Several of those statements were shown to him; but one dated July 9, 1958, in which Boblit 
admitted the actual homicide, was withheld by the prosecution and did not come to petitioner’s 
notice until after he had been tried, convicted, and sentenced, and after his conviction had been 
affirmed. 
 
Petitioner moved the trial court for a new trial based on the newly discovered evidence that had 
been suppressed by the prosecution. Petitioner’s appeal from a denial of that motion was 
dismissed by the Court of Appeals without prejudice to relief under the Maryland Post 
Conviction Procedure Act. The petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed by the trial court; 
and on appeal the Court of Appeals held that suppression of the evidence by the prosecution 
denied petitioner due process of law and remanded the case for a retrial of the question of 
punishment, not the question of guilt. The case is here on certiorari. 
 
The crime in question was murder committed in the perpetration of a robbery. Punishment for 
that crime in Maryland is life imprisonment or death, the jury being empowered to restrict the 
punishment to life by addition of the words “without capital punishment.” In Maryland, by reason 
of the state constitution, the jury in a criminal case are “the Judges of Law, as well as of fact.” 
The question presented is whether petitioner was denied a federal right when the Court of 
Appeals restricted the new trial to the question of punishment. 
 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that suppression of this confession was a violation of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
This ruling is an extension of Mooney v. Holohan, where the Court ruled on what nondisclosure 
by a prosecutor violates due process: 
 
It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a 
State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used 
as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court 
and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a 
State to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with 
the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation. 
 
In Pyle v. Kansas, we phrased the rule in broader terms: 
 
Petitioner’s papers are inexpertly drawn, but they do set forth allegations that his 
imprisonment resulted from perjured testimony, knowingly used by the State authorities 
to obtain his conviction, and from the deliberate suppression by those same authorities 
of evidence favorable to him. These allegations sufficiently charge a deprivation of rights 
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guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and, if proven, would entitle petitioner to release 
from his present custody. 
 
The Third Circuit in the Baldi case construed that statement in Pyle v. Kansas to mean that the 
“suppression of evidence favorable” to the accused was itself sufficient to amount to a denial of 
due process. In Napue v. Illinois, we extended the test formulated in Mooney v. Holohan when 
we said: “The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows 
it to go uncorrected when it appears.” 
 
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 
 
The principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor 
but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Society wins not only when the guilty are 
convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers 
when any accused is treated unfairly. An inscription on the walls of the Department of Justice 
states the proposition candidly for the federal domain: “The United States wins its point 
whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.”112 A prosecution that withholds evidence on 
demand of an accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the 
penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the 
role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice, even 
though, as in the present case, his action is not “the result of guile.” 
 
Questions: 
 
1. The story behind Brady v. Maryland is peculiar and sad. A thorough narrative account is 
available here. Essentially, in 1958, John Leo Brady and his friend Charles Donald Boblit 
decided to rob a bank, because Brady was in love with Boblit’s married sister Nancy, 
and had promised her $35,000. They needed a getaway car, so they tried to steal one 
from Brady’s friend William Brooks, a disabled factory worker. The plan was to kidnap 
Brooks and release him after the bank robbery, but in the heat of the moment, Boblit 
strangled him. They split the $255.30 in Brooks wallet, and Brady fled to Cuba. In the 
meantime, the police soon found Brooks’s body and went looking for Brady and Boblit. 
They arrested Boblit, who took them to the body, and accused Brady of the murder. 
Brady turned himself in at the United States Embassy and was extradited back to 
																																																								
112 Judge Simon E. Sobeloff when Solicitor General put the idea as follows in an address before the 
Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit on June 29, 1954: 
 
The Solicitor General is not a neutral, he is an advocate; but an advocate for a client whose 
business is not merely to prevail in the instant case. My client’s chief business is not to achieve 
victory but to establish justice. We are constantly reminded of the now classic words penned by 
one of my illustrious predecessors, Frederick William Lehmann, that the Government wins its 
point when justice is done in its courts. 
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Maryland. Both Brady and Boblit confessed and were charged with first-degree murder. 
The only question was who actually killed Brooks. Boblit gave five confessions. In the 
first four, he accused Brady of the murder. But in the fifth, he admitted that he was the 
murderer. Brady and Boblit were tried separately, and the prosecutor in Brady’s case 
suppressed Boblit’s fifth confession. Brady was sentenced to death, but Brady v. 
Maryland overturned the sentence, on the basis of the suppressed fifth confession. 
Afterward, Maryland had to resentence Brady, but never did. In 1974, the Governor of 
Maryland granted Brady clemency and he was paroled. He lived a quiet life, and died in 
2009. 
2. Brady’s attorney, E. Clinton Bamberger, Jr., was a Baltimore corporate lawyer who 
represented criminal defendants pro bono. In 1965, he quit his firm and became the first 
director of the the Office of Economic Opportunity Legal Services Program, which 
became the Legal Services Corporation. You can read Bamberger’s account here and 
find a history of the Legal Services Corporation here. 
 
 
Sargent Shriver & Clint Bamberger (1966) 
 
Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F. 2d 450 (2d Cir. 1981) 
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Summary: In 1974, Rodney Taylor was arrested and indicted for burglary, and in 1975 
he was arrested again for burglary. Assistant District Attorney Michael Kavanagh told 
Taylor the grand jury had returned an indictment on the 1975 charge, so Taylor pleaded 
guilty to both charges, in exchange for Kavanagh’s promise not to recommend a 
sentence. But Taylor later tried to withdraw his plea, because he was never indicted on 
the 1975 charge and Kavanagh withdrew his promise. The trial court denied Taylor’s 
motion, Kavanagh recommended the maximum sentence, and the court imposed a 6 
year sentence. The appellate court reversed and remanded for resentencing because 
Kavanagh failed to honor his promise, but Taylor received the same sentence. 
Accordingly, Taylor filed a § 1983 action against Kavanagh. The district court granted 
Kavanagh’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and the circuit court affirmed, holding 
that he was protected by absolute immunity. 
 
IRVING R. KAUFMAN, Circuit Judge: 
 
Plaintiff Rodney Taylor, pro se, instituted this action against Michael Kavanagh, an Assistant 
District Attorney for Ulster County, New York. Claiming that Kavanagh lied to him during plea 
negotiations and violated the terms of the negotiated plea agreement, Taylor seeks to set aside 
a criminal conviction resulting from his guilty plea. He also requests compensatory and punitive 
damages amounting to $5.5 million. 
 
I. 
 
Taylor was arrested in Kingston, New York, in October 1974, and on December 20, 1974, he 
was indicted and charged with third degree burglary and attempted grand larceny. He was taken 
into custody again on August 14, 1975, and charged with third degree burglary and criminal 
possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree. 
 
On June 9, 1976, Taylor, represented by counsel, pleaded guilty in the Ulster County Court to 
the third degree burglary charge contained in the December 1974 indictment. This plea was in 
full satisfaction of the charges resulting from both the October 1974 and the August 1975 
arrests, although no indictment concerning the events of August 1975 had ever been returned. 
The court was advised that Taylor and Assistant District Attorney Kavanagh had agreed that no 
recommendation or statement would be made relating to the sentence to be imposed. 
 
On June 7, 1977, Taylor moved in the state court to vacate his guilty plea, claiming that 1) 
during plea negotiations and at the time he entered his plea, the Assistant District Attorney had 
misrepresented to him and the court that a grand jury had returned an indictment on the 
charges relating to the August 1975 arrest; and 2) Kavanagh had indicated he would not abide 
by his promise not to recommend any sentence. This motion was denied. 
 
At the sentencing proceeding in February 1978, Kavanagh made a lengthy and detailed 
statement concerning Taylor’s prior criminal record and recommended that he receive the 
maximum punishment. The court then sentenced Taylor to an indeterminate term of six years, 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 766	
with a minimum term of two years. Taylor appealed the judgment of conviction, but the 
Appellate Division affirmed, ordering, however, that Taylor be resentenced. The court stated 
that although the misrepresentation by the prosecutor concerning the existence of the second 
indictment was harmless error, resentencing was necessary because the prosecutor failed to 
honor his promise. Taylor eventually was resentenced to the same term he had previously 
received. 
 
Taylor filed the instant action in October 1978, claiming he was induced to plead guilty by the 
Assistant District Attorney’s misrepresentations concerning the alleged second indictment. He 
also asserted that he should be awarded damages for Kavanagh’s breach of the plea bargain. 
 
The defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, which Judge Griesa granted in July 1980. 
He reasoned that because a prosecutor does not have custody over a convicted prisoner, 
Kavanagh was not a proper defendant in the suit to set aside Taylor’s conviction. Extending the 
doctrine of absolute immunity to a prosecutor’s plea bargaining activities. Judge Griesa also 
held that Kavanagh was immune from liability, and dismissed the action. We affirm. 
 
II. 
 
We note at the outset that when a prisoner is challenging his imprisonment in state facilities, his 
sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. Taylor followed this approach in September 
1979, seeking a writ in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. 
Judge Port dismissed the petition and denied a certificate of probable cause. Taylor did not 
appeal this order. Accordingly, we hold that he cannot raise this request to be set free in the 
instant civil rights action. 
 
Taylor’s damages claim also fails because the Assistant District Attorney’s conduct in the plea 
bargaining negotiations and the sentencing proceeding in state court is protected by the 
doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Imbler 
provided the basis for the development of a functional approach to the immunity question. The 
Court held that absolute immunity from § 1983 liability exists for those prosecutorial activities 
“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” These protected “quasi-
judicial” activities include the initiation of a prosecution and the presentation of the 
Government’s case. 
 
Absolute protection does not extend, however, to a prosecutor’s investigative or administrative 
acts. Accordingly, we have recognized that where prosecutors act in this capacity, only the 
qualified “good faith” immunity that protects, for example, police officers, is available. 
 
The task of determining whether a particular activity is better characterized as “quasi-judicial” 
and subject to absolute immunity, or “investigative” and subject to only qualified “good faith” 
immunity requires more than the mechanical application of labels. An examination of the 
functional nature of prosecutorial behavior, rather than the status of the person performing the 
act, is determinative. Thus, a prosecutor is insulated from liability where his actions directly 
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concern the pre-trial or trial phases of a case. For example, the swearing of warrants to insure a 
witness’s attendance at trial, the falsification of evidence and the coercion of witnesses, or the 
failure to drop charges until immediately before trial, have been held to be prosecutorial 
activities for which absolute immunity applies. Similarly, because a prosecutor is acting as an 
advocate in a judicial proceeding, the solicitation and subornation of perjured testimony, the 
withholding of evidence, or the introduction of illegally-seized evidence at trial does not create 
liability in damages. The rationale for this approach is sound, for these protected activities, while 
deplorable, involve decisions of judgment affecting the course of a prosecution. The efficient, 
and just, performance of the prosecutorial function would be chilled if Government attorneys 
were forced to worry that their choice of trial strategy and tactics could subject them to monetary 
liability, or at best, the inconvenience of proving a “good faith” defense to a § 1983 action. 
 
In contrast, activities in which a prosecutor engages that are independent of prosecution are not 
protected by the doctrine of absolute immunity. For example, only a “good faith” immunity is 
available where a prosecutor testifies falsely as a witness, distributes extraneous statements to 
the press designed to harm a suspect’s reputation, or participates in an illegal search that 
violates a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
 
Decisions to engage in conduct of this character are not directly related to the delicate 
judgments prosecutors must make concerning the development of the Government’s case. The 
“investigatory” and “administrative” work involved in testifying before a grand jury, accumulating 
evidence, and disseminating information to the press is analogous to the tasks performed by the 
police, and therefore only the same qualified “good faith” immunity is available. 
 
This functional approach requires us to evaluate plea bargaining in light of the general purpose 
of the absolute immunity doctrine. Judge Griesa properly recognized that the purpose of the 
doctrine “is to insure that a prosecutor will perform his difficult function with complete vigor and 
independence, undeterred by the spectre of liability for damages with respect to his activities.” 
Learned Hand has told us that the doctrine we apply today supports the just administration of 
the criminal law, for we all would suffer if prosecutors “who try to do their duty were subject to 
the constant dread of retaliation.” The threat of § 1983 liability would inhibit prosecutors from 
exercising independent judgment and would divert their attention from the immediate matters at 
hand. 
 
III. 
 
We are satisfied that a prosecutor’s activities in the plea bargaining context merit the protection 
of absolute immunity. The plea negotiation is an “essential component” of our system of criminal 
justice. It is at this stage that the prosecutor evaluates the evidence before him, determines the 
strength of the Government’s case, and considers the societal interest in disposing of the case 
by a negotiated guilty plea. The effective negotiation of guilty pleas would be severely chilled if a 
prosecutor were constantly concerned with the possibility of ruinous personal liability for 
judgments and decisions made at this critical stage of the criminal process. 
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Moreover, reference to the type of harm suffered from the alleged misconduct during a plea 
negotiation demonstrates that defendant Kavanagh should be afforded absolute immunity in this 
case. We recently noted that there can be no monetary liability for injuries related solely to the 
prosecution itself. Thus, if as a result of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant is compelled to 
face prosecution, or to suffer imprisonment or pretrial detention, the harm cannot be redressed 
via a § 1983 civil rights suit. But, where the alleged harm is inflicted independently from the 
prosecution — for example, the damage to reputation caused by a prosecutor’s dissemination of 
false information to the press or the violation of Fourth Amendment privacy rights resulting from 
a prosecutor's authorization of an illegal search — the prosecutor cannot rely on the blanket 
protection of absolute immunity. In this case, the only harm caused by Kavanagh’s purported 
misrepresentations and his failure to abide by a promise was imprisonment, an injury for which 
the Imbler doctrine of immunity protects the prosecutor. 
 
Finally, we note that by extending the doctrine of absolute immunity to a prosecutor’s plea 
bargaining activities, we do not condone Kavanagh’s alleged misconduct. Prosecutorial abuses 
can and should be remedied at the trial and appellate levels, as well as by state and federal 
post-conviction collateral procedures. Relief for misconduct committed during a plea negotiation 
includes the setting aside of the plea or ordering specific performance of the agreement.113 In 
this case, Taylor raised vigorous objections to Kavanagh’s conduct in state court. He also 
employed the federal habeas corpus procedure, without success. His failure to prevail in both 
the state and federal forums cannot justify the creation of another remedy, one which would 
impose a tremendous burden on society by severely undercutting prosecutorial independence 
and morale. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. The New York Times reported on Taylor v. Kavanagh here. 
2. In Imbler v. Pachtman, the Supreme Court held that prosecutors are protected by 
absolute immunity from tort liability under § 1983 for the exercise of their prosecutorial 
powers. Accordingly, even manifest abuse of those powers cannot create tort liability for 
the prosecutor or the government, although it can be the basis for discipline. The 
Supreme Court held that absolute immunity is necessary in order to protect prosecutorial 
independence. Do you agree? 
 
																																																								
113 Prosecutors are also subject to professional discipline for their misconduct. 
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Shareef Cousin (~1999) 
 
In re Jordan, 913 So. 2d 775 (La. 2005) 
 
Summary: Shareef Cousin was convicted of the murder of Michael Gerardi and 
sentenced to death, based on the eyewitness testimony of Connie Babin. However, 
prosecutor Roger Jordan suppressed Babin’s testimony that she was not wearing 
contact lenses during the murder. Cousin was exonerated and the Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel pursued charges against Jordan. The Louisiana Supreme Court eventually 
concluded that Jordan had violated Rule 3.8(d) and imposed a three-month suspension, 
deferred. 
 
TRAYLOR, J. 
 
This attorney disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel against respondent, Roger W. Jordan, Jr., a former Orleans Parish prosecutor. 
 
UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
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On April 22, 2003, the ODC filed one count of formal charges against respondent, alleging that 
he violated Rules 3.8(d)114 and 8.4(a)115 of the Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to timely 
disclose to the defense evidence tending to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the 
offense. The formal charges against respondent arise from the capital prosecution of Shareef 
Cousin and respondent's undisputed failure to turn over an eyewitness's statement to the 
defense. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF STATE V. COUSIN: 
 
Before addressing the merits of the case, it is necessary to discuss, in some detail, the 
underlying facts and procedural history of Shareef Cousin’s criminal case. 
 
On March 2, 1995, Michael Gerardi was shot at point-blank range during an armed robbery 
attempt outside the Port of Call restaurant in New Orleans. Connie Ann Babin, Mr. Gerardi’s 
date that evening and the only eyewitness to the murder, gave three separate statements to the 
New Orleans Police Department during the homicide investigation. When questioned on the 
night of the murder, a “visibly shaken” Ms. Babin told the police that she “did not get a good look 
at the perpetrators and probably could not identify them.” In the second statement, which was 
tape recorded by police at Ms. Babin’s home on March 5, 1995, three days after the murder, 
Ms. Babin was asked by a New Orleans Police Department detective whether she could 
“describe the person who did the shooting, his clothing?” In response, Ms. Babin said that she 
remembered the shooter was wearing an oversized denim jacket. She continued: 
 
I don't know, it was dark and I did not have my contacts nor my glasses so I'm coming at 
this at a disadvantage. I ... you know you could see outlines and shapes and things that 
stick out, but er … the socks, I remember the colorful socks, because he kept drawing 
my attention to it when he kept fidgeting at his ankle area. 
 
Ms. Babin went on to describe the shooter's hair and to say that the shooter was in his late 
teens and five feet seven or eight inches tall. After providing this description, Ms. Babin stated: 
 
As he looked to me ... I keep getting this vision of a young man with, with an older man’s 
face ... er I don’t know that if this is coming … er somewhere, or if I really did see this 
person … if this is just coming from my imagination or what, but I … every time I go over 
																																																								
114 Rule 3.8 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides in pertinent part as follows: 
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: 
(d) Make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor 
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, except when the prosecutor 
is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal. 
 
115 Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides, in pertinent part: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce 
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another. 
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it and close my eyes er … I remember thinking that he had an older man’s face or a 
young body, on a young person … how I visualize that, I don’t know. 
 
On March 25, 1995, three weeks after the murder, Ms. Babin viewed a photographic lineup 
presented by the police and positively identified sixteen-year old Shareef Cousin as the shooter. 
Mr. Cousin was arrested a short time later and indicted for the first degree murder of Mr. 
Gerardi. 
 
In the summer of 1995, the criminal case was assigned to respondent, then an assistant district 
attorney in Orleans Parish. When respondent was first assigned the case, he recalls that there 
were three identification witnesses. However, Ms. Babin was the only witness to positively 
identify Mr. Cousin. 
 
In preparing for trial, respondent interviewed Ms. Babin. She informed him that she is 
nearsighted and only needs her contacts or glasses for nighttime driving, but not to see at close 
distances. Considering this information, respondent unilaterally determined that the absence of 
contacts or glasses on the night of the murder did not affect Ms. Babin’s identification of Mr. 
Cousin as the shooter. 
 
Respondent testified at his disciplinary hearing that he believed Ms. Babin’s second statement 
provided significant additional details that tended to corroborate her identification of Mr. Cousin, 
especially the observation of the killer as having “an old man’s face” on “a young person's 
body.” Respondent therefore concluded that, in his judgment, Ms. Babin’s second statement 
was not material exculpatory evidence to which the defense would be entitled under Brady v. 
Maryland. Accordingly, he did not produce that statement to Mr. Cousin’s attorneys in response 
to their motion for the production of exculpatory evidence. Respondent has never maintained 
that he was unaware of his obligation as a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence pursuant 
to Brady. 
 
Prior to the trial, Mr. Cousin’s defense team filed a motion to suppress Ms. Babin’s identification 
of Mr. Cousin. Ms. Babin testified at the suppression hearing, and, in response to questions by 
respondent, explained the manner by which she came to identify Mr. Cousin in the photographic 
lineup conducted by the NOPD. On cross-examination, Mr. Cousin’s attorney questioned Ms. 
Babin as to whether she had given a description of the perpetrator to the police “when they 
questioned you about this case.” Ms. Babin testified she described the perpetrator as youthful, 
slim, slightly shorter than Mr. Gerardi, with short cropped hair and a very distinctive “unusual” or 
“evil-looking” face. Mr. Cousin’s attorney also asked whether Ms. Babin told the police “about 
any characteristics that you felt were outstanding.” Ms. Babin said that she could only recall 
stating “that he had an older-looking face on a younger body.” While Mr. Cousin’s attorney 
attempted to discover whether or not Ms. Babin had given any additional descriptions to anyone 
else prior to the photographic lineup, respondent objected, and the question was rephrased. 
Eventually, Mr. Cousin’s attorney questioned Ms. Babin as to whether she had provided any 
additional statements to the police other than the night of the murder and the photographic 
lineup. Ms. Babin testified that her description had been consistent throughout. Thus, the only 
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way that the defense could have known about Statement 2 would have been disclosure by 
respondent. 
 
Ms. Babin testified at trial and repeated her positive identification of Mr. Cousin. Mr. Cousin was 
convicted of first degree murder. The same jury subsequently sentenced him to death in a 
bifurcated penalty phase. 
 
Several days after the completion of the guilt phase of the trial but before the penalty phase, a 
copy of Statement 2 was delivered anonymously to defense counsel. On appeal, the defense 
raised as error respondent’s failure to produce Statement 2 prior to trial. This Court did not 
reach that issue. Instead, a unanimous Court reversed Mr. Cousin’s conviction and death 
sentence based on the erroneous admission of a witness’ testimony as impeachment evidence 
and respondent’s improper use of that evidence in closing argument. Nevertheless, the Court 
commented in footnotes that Ms. Babin’s second statement was “obviously” exculpatory, 
material to the issue of guilt, and “clearly” should have been produced to the defense under 
Brady and Kyles v. Whitley. 
 
Following this court's decision in Cousin, the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office elected 
not to retry Mr. Cousin for the murder of Michael Gerardi. 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 
 
DISCIPLINARY COMPLAINT 
 
In May 1998, Mr. Cousin and his sister, Tonya Cropper, filed a complaint against respondent 
with the ODC, alleging, among other things, that respondent wrongfully suppressed Brady 
evidence by failing to disclose Ms. Babin’s second statement. In his July 1998 response to the 
complaint, respondent asserted his belief that the witness’s statement at issue was more 
inculpatory than exculpatory, and his determination that disclosure of the statement was not 
required by Brady. Respondent reiterated this assertion in his sworn statement taken by the 
ODC on June 16, 1999. 
 
Following its investigation, the ODC dismissed the complaint against respondent. Ms. Cropper 
appealed the dismissal, but the hearing committee found that the ODC did not abuse its 
discretion in dismissing the complaint. Subsequently, the disciplinary board remanded the 
matter to the ODC with instructions to file formal charges against respondent. 
 
FORMAL HEARING 
 
The hearing committee conducted a formal hearing on the charges. ODC called several 
witnesses in its case in chief, including respondent, Shareef Cousin’s defense attorney, and the 
complainant, Tonya Cropper. Respondent presented character testimony from several members 
of the bench and bar. 
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Hearing Committee Recommendation 
 
In a split decision, the chair and the public member of the committee found that the ODC did not 
prove a violation of Rules 3.8(d) and 8.4(a) as charged, and recommended that the formal 
charges against respondent be dismissed. In a nineteen page report, the majority found 
respondent’s testimony credible regarding the nature of the Brady material. The committee 
acknowledged that respondent was in possession of the statement yet failed to disclose the 
second statement to the defense. However, the committee found no violation of Rule 3.8, as the 
committee determined that respondent reasonably believed that Ms. Babin’s statement was 
inculpatory rather than exculpatory. The committee concluded that the defense was aware of 
the second statement and that it did not believe that the prosecution had an obligation “to help 
out the defense” by providing the statement. Based on these factual determinations, the majority 
of the committee concluded that respondent did not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
 
The lawyer member of the committee dissented, noting her objection to the majority’s 
interpretation of a prosecutor’s duty under Brady. She commented that she did not believe that 
the prosecutor has the discretion to determine whether to disclose exculpatory evidence to the 
defense. Rather, she interpreted Brady as imposing an affirmative duty on the prosecutor to 
disclose material exculpatory evidence, irrespective of whether a request was made by the 
defense. 
 
The ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee's report and recommendation. 
 
Ruling of the Disciplinary Board 
 
The disciplinary board determined that respondent technically violated the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, but found that no discipline was appropriate and dismissed the formal charges against 
respondent. While the board adopted the hearing committee's factual findings, it rejected the 
committee’s legal conclusions and application of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The board 
determined that the committee erred in its finding that respondent did not violate either Brady or 
Rule 3.8(d) when he failed to produce Ms. Babin’s second statement. The board concluded that 
respondent was ethically bound to voluntarily disclose Statement 2, which tended to negate the 
guilt of the accused by calling into question Ms. Babin’s positive identification of Cousin as the 
perpetrator of the crime. By failing to do so, respondent violated Rule 3.8(d). 
 
The board found no aggravating factors present in this case, but found “numerous and weighty” 
mitigating factors, including the absence of a prior disciplinary record, absence of a dishonest or 
selfish motive, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward 
the proceedings, character and reputation, and remorse. The board concluded: 
 
While the board finds that respondent’s actions constitute a technical violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, considering all of the factors, particularly respondent’s 
good faith and lack of intent, the lack of any actual injury, respondent’s excellent 
reputation among judges and colleagues and his unblemished disciplinary record, and 
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considering the purpose of lawyer discipline, the board finds that no formal discipline is 
warranted. 
 
Based on this reasoning, the formal charges against respondent were dismissed. 
 
The ODC sought review of the board's ruling in this Court. We ordered the parties to submit 
briefs addressing the issue of whether the record supports the disciplinary board’s report. After 
reviewing the briefs filed by both parties, we docketed the matter for oral argument. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In our system of justice, we entrust vast discretion to a prosecutor. Because a prosecutor is 
given such great power and discretion, he is also charged with a high ethical standard. A 
prosecutor stands as the representative of the people of the State of Louisiana. He is entrusted 
with upholding the integrity of the criminal justice system by ensuring that justice is served for 
both the victims of crimes and the accused. “Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted 
but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any 
accused is treated unfairly.” The actions, or inactions in this case, of the prosecutor are 
paramount to a fair administration of justice; and the people of this state must have confidence 
in a prosecutor’s integrity in performing his duty to disclose exculpatory evidence in order for the 
system to be just. Any intentional deviation from the principle of the fair administration of justice 
will be dealt with harshly by this Court. 
 
This is a case of first impression in the State of Louisiana. Never before have we been 
confronted with the issue of disciplining a prosecutor for failing to disclose “evidence or 
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates 
the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all 
unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor.” The language of Rule 3.8(d) is 
recognizably similar to the prosecutor’s duty set forth in Brady and its progeny. Moreover, the 
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure likewise imposes a corresponding statutory duty on a 
prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant. 
 
The duty of a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence is embedded in the principle that a 
criminal defendant is deprived of a fair trial when the state withholds exculpatory evidence that 
is material to guilt or punishment. The state’s failure to disclose material evidence favorable to a 
criminal defendant implicates more than the defendant’s discovery rights; the prosecutor has an 
affirmative duty to disclose such evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause. Failure to reveal this evidence implicates the defendant’s right to a fair trial. 
 
Whether the questioned evidence is material under Brady has been explained by this Court in 
Marshall: 
 
The issue is whether the exculpatory evidence is material under the Brady-Bagley-Kyles 
line of cases. Evidence is material only if it is reasonably probable that the result of the 
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proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed to the defense. 
A reasonable probability is one which is sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome. This Court must provide a cumulative evaluation of the suppressed evidence, 
keeping in mind that Marshall does not have to show that, with the addition of the 
suppressed evidence, his trial would have resulted in acquittal or that there would be an 
insufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. Marshall need only show that 
“disclosure of the suppressed evidence to competent counsel would have made a 
different result reasonably probable.” 
 
During his testimony before the hearing committee, respondent testified that he did not believe 
Ms. Babin’s second statement was material and did not qualify as the type of evidence to be 
disclosed under Brady. Specifically, respondent stated that he thought the evidence was 
inculpatory rather than exculpatory as Ms. Babin recounted specific details regarding the 
defendant’s clothing and colorful socks. While the definition of materiality set forth in Kyles and 
its progeny may be seen as leaving a prosecutor with a degree of discretion, it does not. 
 
Exculpatory evidence includes evidence which impeaches the testimony of a witness whose 
credibility or reliability may determine guilt or innocence. Additionally, United States v. Bagley 
reiterates the principle that there is no distinction between exculpatory evidence and 
impeachment evidence under Brady. Clearly, Ms. Babin’s second statement negates her ability 
to positively identify the defendant in a lineup. The statement should have been disclosed to the 
defense. As we noted in our decision overruling Mr. Cousin’s conviction, citing Justice Souter’s 
eloquent statement in Kyles, a prosecutor anxious about “tacking too close to the wind will 
disclose a favorable piece of evidence” and “will resolve doubtful questions in favor of 
disclosure.” Respondent failed to produce evidence which was clearly exculpatory and should 
have resolved this issue in favor of disclosure. 
 
Accordingly, we agree with the factual findings of the disciplinary board that respondent violated 
Rule 3.8(d) by failing to disclose the second statement of Ms. Babin to the defendant. 
 
SANCTIONS 
 
In considering the issue of sanctions, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed 
to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the 
profession, and deter future misconduct. The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts 
of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Thus, we must consider the facts as they are 
presented herein in deciding the type of discipline to impose on respondent. 
 
The violation of Rule 3.8(d) by a prosecutor raises a great deal of concern to this Court. Rule 
3.8(d) exists to ensure that the integrity of the prosecutorial arm of our criminal justice system is 
maintained. Moreover, prosecutors are in a unique position from other members of the bar as 
they are immune from civil liability under Imbler v. Pachtman. Neither are they realistically 
subject to criminal sanctions. Our research reveals only one instance in which a judge held a 
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prosecutor in contempt of court for failing to disclose evidence. Thus, absent consequences 
being imposed by this Court under its authority over disciplinary matters, prosecutors face no 
realistic consequences for Brady violations. 
 
In deciding the appropriate sanction, we begin our analysis with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 
10(C), which sets forth the following considerations in imposing discipline: 
 
1. Whether the lawyer has violated a duty owed to a client, to the public, to the legal 
system, or to the profession; 
2. Whether the lawyer acted intentionally, knowingly, or negligently; 
3. The amount of the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and 
4. The existence of any aggravating or mitigating factors. 
 
By withholding material exculpatory evidence from a criminal defendant, respondent violated a 
duty owed to the public. As a prosecutor, respondent is charged with a high ethical standard 
and may not carelessly skirt his obligation. Although neither Brady nor Rule 3.8 incorporates a 
mental element, Rule XIX, § 10(C) does. Based on the testimony of respondent and the 
character evidence discussed below, we find that respondent knowingly withheld Brady 
evidence.116 As to the element regarding actual injury, this Court reversed Shareef Cousin’s 
conviction on other grounds and granted him a new trial. However, this Court’s actions in 
reversing the conviction does not vitiate the potential injury to the criminal justice system, or to 
Cousin, caused by respondent's actions, and warrants serious consideration and discipline by 
this Court. 
 
As to the issue of aggravating and mitigating factors, we find the only aggravating factor present 
in this case is respondent’s substantial experience as a prosecutor. However, on the issue of 
mitigation, we find a host of factors present. Specifically, we find the absence of any prior 
disciplinary record, absence of a dishonest motive, full and free disclosure to the board, a 
cooperative attitude towards the proceedings, and good character and reputation in the legal 
community. 
 
As stated above, the issue of discipline against a prosecutor for his violation of Rule 3.8 is res 
nova in the State of Louisiana. While this Court has the benefit of Rule XIX considerations, we 
have no prior case law on the issue. However, Louisiana is not the first jurisdiction to address 
the issue of a prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence to a defendant. Our brethren in North 
Carolina, Kansas, South Carolina, Ohio and Iowa have imposed discipline against an attorney 
who fails to disclose evidence pursuant to Brady. Thus, we find some guidance in their 
decisions. The sanctions imposed in other jurisdictions range from public reprimand or censure 
to a six-month suspension from the practice of law. Based upon the facts of this case, we 
conclude the appropriate baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is a three-month 
																																																								
116 The ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, defines “knowledge” as: 
The conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the 
conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result. 
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suspension from the practice of law. However, in light of the mitigating factors, we will defer this 
suspension in its entirety, subject to the condition that any misconduct during a one-year period 
following the finality of this judgment may be grounds for making the deferred suspension 
executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate. 
 
JOHNSON, J. concurs in part, dissents in part, for the reasons that follow. 
 
I concur in the majority’s opinion that respondent knowingly withheld Brady evidence, that 
respondent’s experience as a prosecutor was an aggravating factor, that the Court’s actions in 
reversing defendant’s conviction failed to invalidate the potential injury to the criminal justice 
system, or to defendant, and that respondent’s behavior warrants discipline by this Court. 
However, because of the actual injury caused by respondent’s prosecutorial misconduct, I 
dissent from the majority’s conclusion that respondent's suspension should be deferred. 
 
As cited in the majority opinion, Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10(c) sets forth four 
factors to be considered when imposing lawyer discipline. The third factor in this analysis is the 
“amount of the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct.” Regarding actual 
injury, the majority opinion states that “this Court reversed Shareef Cousin’s conviction on other 
grounds and granted him a new trial.” Thus, the majority opinion adopts the reasoning, stated 
explicitly by the disciplinary board in the lower proceedings, that no injury resulted from 
respondent’s conduct since the defendant's conviction was reversed. Although reversal of 
defendant’s sentence of death by lethal injection amends the wrongful sentence, it fails to 
negate the actual injury caused by respondent’s misconduct. 
 
Pursuant to Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10(c), this court has held that an attorney 
caused an actual injury because the attorney’s failure to pay a client’s medical bill resulted in a 
negative report to a credit agency. In another matter, we determined that an attorney caused an 
actual injury when he abandoned his legal practice and failed to return a $750 fee to a client and 
delayed the client’s legal proceedings. In my view, the taking of a liberty interest is an even 
greater injury. As one legal commentator noted, “liberty is absolute and the loss of it is the 
greatest of all human injustices.” Indeed, how can we ignore the injury caused by the wrongful 
taking of freedom, or the despair that inevitably follows as a defendant sits on death row and 
prepares for execution by lethal injection. “The execution of a legally and factually innocent 
person would be a constitutionally intolerable event,” wrote Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in 
Herrera v. Collins. It is noteworthy that Shareef Cousin faced this predicament at the age of 
sixteen. The United States Supreme Court has since determined that execution of individuals 
who were under the age of 18 at the time of their capital crimes is unconstitutional. 
 
Wrongful conviction constitutes an actual injury. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court 
has held that a wrongful conviction “has continuing collateral consequences.” Michael Anthony 
Williams, who was recently freed from Angola State Penitentiary after serving 24 years for a 
crime he did not commit, and who, like Shareef Cousin, was convicted at the age of sixteen, 
described his time in prison as “a living hell.” He stated that “a lot of terrible things happened to 
me while I was in there.” Williams confessed that when he was younger, he was sexually 
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abused “while guards turned their backs.” Persons wrongfully convicted lose time during 
incarceration that cannot be retrieved. Furthermore, inmates, generally, leave prison with no 
savings, dismal employment prospects, and oftentimes medical and mental issues. Wrongful 
conviction can also cause significant stress on family relationships including the financial 
pressure that may have been created by legal fees associated with the wrongful conviction. 
 
In the present case, disciplinary charges were filed against respondent by Shareef Cousin and 
his sister, Tonya Cropper. Tonya Cropper’s testimony at the Hearing Committee describes the 
emotional turmoil that the Cousin family endured as a result of defendant's wrongful 
conviction.117 
 
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court held that individual prosecutors have absolute 
immunity under common law tort claims as well as section 1983 suits. This court adopted the 
																																																								
117 Cropper now resides in Boston, Massachusetts but at the time of the conviction and sentencing, she 
resided in Plano, Texas. During the trial Cropper drove from Plano and stayed through the duration of the 
trial. Cropper testified that after the conviction and sentencing she was numbed by the whole procedure. 
She couldn't believe that her brother was going to die. During this time her family was bitter with the 
justice system; they still hold resentment towards the courts. 
 
Cropper said that Roger Jordan’s insistence on the guilt of her brother infuriated her. On the Geraldo talk 
show, it was Jordan’s face that represented her brother's conviction and death sentence. Even after the 
dismissal of the charges, she stated that Jordan continued to insist on the guilt of her brother. 
 
Cropper expressed how she was too angry, hurt, and confused to testify during the penalty phase of the 
trial. She told how her brother had an outburst of emotion in court during Jordan's closing statement. The 
same emotional fury flowed through her veins. After the denial of a new trial, she, her four sisters, and her 
mother had an emotional, tear-filled prayer with Cousin before he was sent to Angola State Penitentiary. 
As he was taken away from his family, Cousin cried for the first time since the ordeal began. 
 
She tells how she hated to see her brother in jail, and how she had only visited him once since he was 
initially arrested for the murder. She spent a lot of time dwelling on the fact that her brother was going to 
die of lethal injection. She finally decided to subject herself to seeing her brother behind bars. 
 
Cropper goes on to tell of the travel accommodations that had to be made so the whole family would have 
an opportunity to see her brother in jail. She drove eight hours from Texas to pick her sisters and mom 
up; none of them had a car. The family would then travel two and a half hours to Angola. After the visit 
she would transport her family back to New Orleans. She would then rest for several hours and then drive 
back to Texas. This was all in one day. She made the trip faithfully every month until Cousin was 
removed from death row. Her daughter also had to endure seeing her uncle in jail. She never wanted her 
child to think her uncle was a murderer. 
 
She felt Jordan had no regard for her family or for her brothers rights because her brother was arrested 
for four separate counts of armed robbery. She believes Jordan thought no one cared about her brother 
and he could do anything to win at all cost, regardless of her brother's due process rights. Her brother 
believed his attorney who told him that the robbery plea bargain was in his best interest because the 
judge was going to try him (and sentence him) on each count separately, and he would have to serve two 
times the sentence he is currently serving if found guilty of those robberies separately. Cropper did not 
understand why Jordan seemed to feel that her brother’s life was so disposable. 
 
Cropper explained that an injustice has been done not only to the Cousin family but also to the victim, 
Gerardi’s, family because that family has no closure in the death of their son. 
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Imbler court's reasoning in Knapper v. Connick, when we determined that “prosecutors are 
entitled to absolute immunity for conduct within the course and scope of their prosecutorial 
functions.” Thus, prosecutors have absolute immunity even in instances, such as the present 
case, where the prosecutor suppressed exculpatory information. However, the Imbler decision 
also identifies the legal community’s responsibility for maintaining the integrity of prosecutors 
and deterring prosecutors from violating standards of the legal profession. The court concluded 
that “a prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could deprive persons of 
constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by an association of his peers.” 
Therefore, our function in dispensing disciplinary action is critical both for upholding the highest 
ethical and professional standards among prosecutors and ensuring fundamental fairness for 
defendants. As expressed by the Honorable Calvin Johnson of Orleans Parish Criminal Court, 
in a letter contained in the record to then Orleans Parish District Attorney Harry Connick, Rule 
3.8 was established to ensure professional responsibility among lawyers as well as to guarantee 
the constitutional due process rights of criminal defendants.118 
 
In determining whether respondent caused an actual injury pursuant to Louisiana’s Supreme 
Court Rule XIX, § 10(c), our focus should be on the unnecessary and unlawful suffering of the 
wrongfully convicted as a result of the prosecutorial misconduct, not just the reversal of the 
wrongfully imposed sentence. Because, in my view, loss of a liberty interest is more valuable 
than financial loss or injury to one’s credit, I would impose an actual period of suspension. 
 
																																																								
118 In addition to the actual injury caused by respondent's violation of Rule 3.8, there are other allegations 
of misconduct cited in the complaint, though no formal charges were brought by the Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel. Specifically, during testimony at a motion for new trial, it was alleged that Jordan’s co-counsel, 
Assistant District Attorney Byron Berry, may have removed several of defendant's alibi witnesses from 
outside the courtroom to the District Attorney's office. Later, when the time came for those witnesses to 
be called, respondent failed to tell defense counsel where the witnesses were. 
 
Furthermore, there are some concerns with defendant’s guilty pleas to armed robbery. Cousin was 
arrested and charged with First Degree Murder on March 27, 1995. This is the arrest for the instant 
matter. The next day, March 28, 1995, Cousin was arrested and charged with four counts of armed 
robbery. Cousin pled guilty to the armed robberies before he was found guilty of murder, but after he had 
been arrested and charged with the crime. 
 
Cousin later petitioned this Court to grant supervisory writs and order post-conviction relief for the 
judgments entered against him in the armed robbery cases. In his writ application, Cousin argued that his 
guilty plea had been involuntary since he was never advised of the consequences of his plea. He claimed 
that he had not been apprised that his guilty plea would be used against him as four aggravating factors 
in the penalty phase of his capital trial. Additionally, he argued that he was not told that his guilty plea 
would prevent him from testifying in his capital trial, as the “prior” convictions would be used to impeach 
him if he got on the stand. This court denied defendant’s application for writ of certiorari. J. Johnson 
dissented, stating that she was “not convinced that Cousin understood the consequences of his guilty 
pleas.” 
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Questions: 
 
1. On May 2, 1995, at about 10:20 P.M., Michael Gerardi and Connie Babin left the Port of 
Call restaurant in the French Quarter of New Orleans. While they were walking to 
Gerardi’s truck, three men followed them, and one of the men shot and killed Gerardi. 
Shortly afterward, the New Orleans police arrested James Rowell on nine counts of 
armed robbery. In exchange for reduced charges, Rowell provided information to the 
police. Among other things, he claimed that Shareef Cousin had bragged about killing 
Gerardi. The police arrested Cousin, and Babin eventually identified him as the killer. In 
fact, Cousin was playing basketball when Gerardi was killed. The basketball game was 
videotaped, and a clock showed that it ended at about 10:00 P.M., after which coach 
Eric White drove Cousin and three other players home. At trial, Jordan not only 
suppressed Babin’s testimony that she was not wearing contact lenses during the 
murder, but also altered recorded statements made by White in order to suppress the 
videotape of the basketball game and prevented the other basketball players from 
testifying. On January 25, 1996, Cousin was convicted of first-degree murder and 
sentenced to death. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed Cousins’s murder 
conviction and death sentence in 1998. State v. Cousin, 710 So. 2d 1065 (La. 1998). But 
Cousin had also pleaded guilty to four counts of armed robbery, and was not released 
from prison until 2005. Cousins told his story in CNN, NPR, and TIME, among other 
publications. You can watch a short video of Cousins describing his experiences here. 
After his release from prison, Cousins began working for Stephen Bright at the Southern 
Center for Human Rights in Atlanta. Unfortunately, Cousins applied for credit cards in 
Bright’s name and charged $42,000. In 2008, he pleaded guilty to identity theft and 
credit card fraud and served three years in prison. He currently lives in New Orleans and 
is active in criminal justice reform advocacy. 
2. The New York Times reported on the Orleans Parish District Attorney Office’s long 
history of prosecutorial misconduct here. The Huffington Post reported on prosecutorial 
misconduct in New Orleans and elsewhere here. 
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3. In assessing Jordan’s culpability, the Louisiana Supreme Court found only one 
aggravating factor and many mitigating factors. How would you assess Jordan’s 
culpability? 
4. The Louisiana Supreme Court sanctioned Jordan by imposing a three-month 
suspension, deferred. The dissent argued that the suspension should not be deferred. 
What sanction would you have imposed, if any? 
 
 
Eric Hillman (2014) 
 
Hillman v. Nueces County (Tex. 2019) 
 
Summary: Eric Hillman was an assistant district attorney in Nueces County, Texas. In 
2014, he prosecuted a defendant for intoxicated assault and leaving the scene of an 
accident. In the course of investigating the case, Hillman interviewed a witness who 
stated the defendant was not intoxicated. The police report did not identify the witness, 
so Hillman informed his supervisor that he needed to disclose the witness to the 
defense, but his supervisor told him not to disclose. Hillman consulted with the State Bar 
Ethics Hotline and the Texas Center for Legal Ethics. Both told him to disclose, so he 
did, and he was fired. Hillman filed a wrongful termination action against Nueces County, 
but the trial court granted the county’s motion to dismiss and the appeals court affirmed. 
The Texas Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that sovereign immunity barred 
Hillman’s action. 
 
JEFFREY S. BOYD, Justice. 
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A former assistant district attorney filed this suit alleging that the county wrongfully terminated 
his employment because he refused his supervisor’s order to withhold exculpatory evidence 
from a criminal defendant. The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction, and the court 
of appeals affirmed. Because we agree with those courts that governmental immunity bars the 
suit, we also affirm. 
 
I. Background 
 
Eric Hillman served as an assistant district attorney in Nueces County for two years. While 
preparing to prosecute a defendant charged with intoxicated assault and leaving the scene of an 
accident, Hillman discovered and interviewed a witness who said she was with the defendant 
the night of the incident and he was not intoxicated. Because the police report did not identify 
this witness, Hillman told his supervisor that he needed to disclose the witness to the 
defendant’s attorney. The supervisor disagreed and instructed Hillman not to disclose the 
witness. Believing that he was legally required to disclose the witness, Hillman called the State 
Bar Ethics Hotline and the Texas Center for Legal Ethics for advice. Both told him he should 
disclose the information. 
 
Three days before the defendant’s trial, the victim confirmed to Hillman that the witness had 
been present at the scene. Hillman relayed this information to his supervisor and informed her 
that he had decided to disclose the witness to the defense attorney. On the day of trial, Hillman 
was fired for “failing to follow instructions.” He alleges he was fired solely for refusing to withhold 
exculpatory evidence. 
 
Hillman sued the County, the District Attorney’s Office, and then-District Attorney Mark Skurka, 
in his official capacity, seeking actual damages for lost wages and benefits, mental anguish, 
pain and suffering, and loss of earning capacity, and exemplary damages. The County moved to 
dismiss on the ground that governmental immunity bars Hillman’s claims. The trial court agreed 
and dismissed the case, and the court of appeals affirmed. 
 
II.Governmental Immunity 
 
Sovereign immunity—usually called governmental immunity when referring to political 
subdivisions—protects governmental entities against suits and legal liabilities. The County 
pleaded immunity from both suit and liability in this case, but only immunity from suit implicates 
the courts’ jurisdiction. Because the trial court dismissed this case for lack of jurisdiction, we 
focus here solely on governmental immunity from suit. Because Hillman filed suit seeking 
money damages against a county and its department and official, governmental immunity bars 
this suit unless immunity has been waived. 
 
Like every court of appeals that has addressed the issue, the court of appeals concluded here 
that governmental immunity applies to Hillman’s wrongful-termination claim and has not been 
waived. Presenting three alternative grounds for reversal, Hillman argues that (1) this Court 
abrogated or waived the County’s immunity from this type of suit in Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. 
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Hauck, in which we recognized a cause of action for wrongful termination of an at-will employee 
for refusal to perform an illegal act, (2) the Texas legislature waived the County’s immunity 
through the Michael Morton Act, or (3) we should abrogate or waive the County’s immunity from 
such suits today. Although Hillman and his supporting amici bolster these grounds with serious 
and important policy concerns, we ultimately find the grounds themselves unconvincing. 
 
A. Sabine Pilot 
 
Texas—“steadfastly an at-will employment state”—generally permits both employers and 
employees to terminate their relationship at any time for any reason unless they contractually 
agree otherwise. The law recognizes, however, a number of exceptions to this rule. One “very 
narrow exception to the employment-at-will doctrine,” which we adopted in Sabine Pilot, 
prohibits employers from terminating at-will employees “for the sole reason that the employee 
refused to perform an illegal act.” An employer who terminates an employee solely for that 
reason is liable to the employee for all resulting “reasonable tort damages, including punitive 
damages.” 
 
Sabine Pilot involved claims against a private-sector employer, and this Court’s very brief 
opinion never mentioned the duties or obligations of government employers. Noting that the 
Court did not expressly limit the exception to private employers or declare it inapplicable to 
government employers, Hillman argues that Sabine Pilot prohibits all employers—government 
as well as private—from terminating at-will employees solely for refusing to perform an illegal 
act. This argument reads too much into Sabine Pilot. Nothing in that opinion indicates anything 
regarding government employers. Because we simply did not consider or address whether the 
exception applies to government employers in Sabine Pilot, it provides no controlling principle 
on that issue here. 
 
Hillman suggests that even if Sabine Pilot did not resolve the issue, we can and should clarify 
today that the Sabine Pilot exception applies to government employers. We have no problem 
holding that the exception applies to all Texas employers, in the sense that they all have a 
common-law-tort duty not to terminate at-will employees solely because the employee refuses 
to perform an illegal act. But holding that the Sabine Pilot exception applies to government 
employers does not help Hillman. Hillman’s problem is not that the duty does not apply to 
government employers, but that immunity bars any suit for a government employer’s breach of 
that duty. 
 
Governmental immunity protects all governmental entities against suits and liabilities for their 
governmental actions, even when acting as employers. The legislature has provided a limited 
waiver of that immunity for certain tort and breach-of-contract actions. These statutes do not 
create tort or contractual duties or impose them on governmental entities. Those common-law 
duties preexist the statutes and apply to governmental entities as to anyone else, but immunity 
bars suits for breach of those duties. 
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Instead of creating or imposing duties, the statutes waive the immunity that would otherwise 
protect the government, removing the barrier that precludes suits or liability for breach of those 
preexisting common-law duties. So although we can say that the common-law-tort duty we 
recognized in Sabine Pilot applies to all Texas employers, Hillman still cannot pursue this suit 
for the County’s alleged breach of that duty unless the legislature has waived the County’s 
governmental immunity. Because Sabine Pilot did not involve a governmental defendant and did 
not address governmental immunity or its waiver, it does not support Hillman’s argument that 
the trial court had jurisdiction over his claim. 
 
B. The Michael Morton Act 
 
More than fifty-five years ago, the United States Supreme Court held that the Constitution’s due-
process clause prohibits criminal prosecutors from suppressing material evidence that is 
“favorable to an accused.” Just over five years ago, the Texas legislature statutorily addressed 
“Brady violations” by passing the Michael Morton Act. The Michael Morton Act expressly 
requires prosecutors to 
 
disclose to the defendant any exculpatory, impeachment, or mitigating document, item, 
or information in the possession, custody, or control of the state that tends to negate the 
guilt of the defendant or would tend to reduce the punishment for the offense charged. 
 
Prosecutors must disclose such information whenever they discover it, whether “before, during, 
or after trial.” 
 
Hillman contends that the Michael Morton Act required him to disclose the witness’s information 
in the case he was prosecuting, so the County wrongfully terminated him for refusing to perform 
an illegal act. But even accepting these assertions as true, the issue here is not whether Hillman 
has pleaded a valid Sabine Pilot claim, but whether the Act waives the County's governmental 
immunity against that claim. 
 
To waive governmental immunity, a statute must use “clear and unambiguous language” 
expressing that intent. When deciding whether a statute clearly and unambiguously waives 
governmental immunity, we 
 
1. consider “whether the statutory provisions, even if not a model of clarity, waive immunity 
without doubt”; 
2. resolve any “ambiguity as to waiver in favor of retaining immunity”; 
3. generally find waiver “if the Legislature requires that the governmental entity be joined in 
a lawsuit even though the entity would otherwise be immune from suit”; 
4. consider whether the legislature “provided an objective limitation on the governmental 
entity's potential liability”; and 
5. consider “whether the statutory provisions would serve any purpose absent a waiver of 
immunity.” 
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Like the Sabine Pilot opinion, the Michael Morton Act does not address governmental immunity 
or waiver at all. None of its language waives immunity “without doubt” or even creates any 
ambiguity on the point. The Act does not require that the government be joined in any lawsuit or 
impose any limitation on the government’s potential liability in such a suit. Implicating only the 
fifth consideration, Hillman argues that the Act necessarily must waive the County’s immunity 
from his wrongful-termination suit because the Act’s sole purpose is to require prosecutors to 
disclose exculpatory evidence. He contends that the Act would be “illusory” unless it waives 
immunity from Sabine Pilot claims, and finding no waiver “would defeat the sole purpose for 
passing the Michael Morton Act in the first place.” As Hillman puts it, “A law making it a crime for 
a prosecutor to withhold evidence from the defense, but at the same time allowing the 
prosecutor’s supervisor to fire him for refusing to do so is nonsensical and cannot possibly be 
what the legislature intended when it enacted the Michael Morton Act.” 
 
These arguments read too much into the Michael Morton Act. The Act serves obvious purposes 
separate and apart from addressing any wrongful-termination issues. It codifies and 
“supplements” prosecutors’ constitutional obligations under Brady. It requires production of 
several items that “previously were not discoverable” in criminal cases, including “written 
witness statements, written communications between the State and its agents, and work 
product.” And violations of the Act may constitute grounds for reversing a conviction. 
 
Of course, the legislature could always do more to ensure that prosecutors disclose exculpatory 
information. Presumably, at least, prosecutors would be more likely to disclose such information 
if the Act authorized civil-damages suits—and waived immunity for such suits— against those 
who violate its requirements or who terminate subordinates who refuse to violate them. Whether 
countervailing policy concerns outweigh such benefits, however, “is the very essence of 
legislative choice.” And the mere fact that a statute prohibits a government official from 
engaging in particular conduct does not establish that the statute also waives governmental 
immunity whenever a government employer terminates an employee for refusing to engage in 
that conduct. If that were true, every statutory prohibition would waive immunity from wrongful-
termination claims. 
 
Nothing in the Michael Morton Act indicates a legislative intent to waive governmental immunity 
from a wrongful-termination suit under Sabine Pilot. No explicit language or even ambiguous 
language indicates such an intent. We hold that the Michael Morton Act does not waive the 
County's governmental immunity from this suit. 
 
C. Judicial Abrogation of Immunity 
 
Alternatively, Hillman urges us to abolish the “ancient and antiquated” doctrine of governmental 
immunity altogether, or at least modify it to allow for Sabine Pilot claims against governmental 
entities. He notes that sovereign immunity developed and exists as a common-law doctrine, and 
“it remains the judiciary’s responsibility to define the boundaries of the common-law doctrine 
and to determine under what circumstances sovereign immunity exists in the first instance.” But 
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in fulfilling that responsibility, we must respect both our precedent and our limitations under the 
constitutional separation of powers. 
 
Having existed for more than six hundred years, the governmental-immunity doctrine is “an 
established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations.” We first recognized it as a principle 
of Texas law more than 170 years ago. Although the justifications for its existence have evolved 
through the years, we have steadfastly retained it in modern times precisely because it shields 
“the public from the costs and consequences of improvident actions of their governments,” and 
ensures that the taxes the public pays are used “for their intended purposes.” 
 
We are not blind to the truism that, “just as immunity is inherent to sovereignty, unfairness is 
inherent to immunity.” But as the Court’s majority explained in that case, we resolve that 
concern by deferring to the legislature, as the policy-making branch of government, “to decide 
whether and to what extent that immunity should be waived.” As important as Hillman’s and his 
supporting amici’s policy concerns may be, they do not justify discarding these fundamental 
principles of Texas law. 
 
We in no way discount the serious policy concerns that Hillman, his supporting amici, and 
today’s concurring opinion express. Governmental immunity from Sabine Pilot claims eliminates 
one means by which the law could ensure that prosecutors disclose exculpatory evidence as 
Brady and the Michael Morton Act require. As the amici note, the Act has enjoyed broad, 
bipartisan support in the legislature, the public, and the press, and the legislature has further 
strengthened the Act in more recent legislative sessions. But to hold that governmental 
immunity does not apply to Sabine Pilot claims, we must trespass across the boundary between 
defining immunity’s scope (a judicial task) and waiving it (a legislative task). The distinction 
between scope and waiver is “a fine one,” and we must “be very hesitant to declare immunity 
nonexistent in any particular case,” lest we use our authority to define the scope as “a ruse for 
avoiding the Legislature.” 
 
As we have repeatedly confirmed, “it is the Legislature's sole province to waive or abrogate 
sovereign immunity.” That the legislature has recently revised the Michael Morton Act to 
strengthen its protections illustrates its continuing awareness of the Act and its importance, as 
well as its willingness to take steps to improve it. Whether waiving immunity from Sabine Pilot 
claims should be the next step in that process is up to the legislature, and we must defer to it to 
“protect its policymaking function.” 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
“Sovereign immunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction.” When, as here, 
a claim falls within the realm of governmental immunity, courts have no jurisdiction to hear the 
case unless immunity has been waived. We hold that neither Sabine Pilot nor the Michael 
Morton Act waives the County’s governmental immunity from Hillman’s wrongful-termination 
claim, and we defer to the legislature to decide whether such a waiver would be appropriate as 
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a matter of public policy. We affirm the trial court’s judgment granting the County's plea to the 
jurisdiction and dismissing the case. 
 
Justice GUZMAN, joined by JUSTICE LEHRMANN and JUSTICE DEVINE, concurring. 
 
No tyranny is more cruel than the one practiced in the shadow of the laws and under 
color of justice.119 
 
Imagine being accused, charged, and convicted of bludgeoning your spouse to death. You are 
innocent but sentenced to life in prison, effectively orphaning your only child. Over the next 24 
years, you wage an uphill battle to prove your innocence, eventually discovering that the 
prosecution held the keys to your jail cell before you ever set foot in it. Eyewitness testimony 
pointing the finger at someone else and DNA evidence that was never tested would have 
exculpated you if the prosecutor had not secreted the evidence from those who were 
constitutionally charged with defending you. Ultimately exonerated after nearly a quarter century 
in confinement, you walk free. The prosecutor—now a judge—is found in contempt of court for 
suppressing this evidence. Small comfort. Justice delayed is justice denied. But more than that, 
justice delayed is life denied. 
 
While you were locked away for a crime you did not commit, you were denied your unalienable 
rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. You lost your constitutional right to parent 
your child. To have his love and companionship. To shape who he is and how he became that 
way. Instead, your beautiful toddler is now a man struggling to reconnect with a person he 
doesn't know, can't remember as a parent, and spent years thinking was a vicious monster. And 
worse, the actual perpetrator of this heinous crime continued to walk the streets. Free to kill 
again. 
 
Alas, this is not a hypothetical. This is the true story of Michael Morton. Husband. Father. 
Supermarket manager. An ordinary Texan whose young wife fell victim to a stranger’s brutality. 
And while Morton languished in jail, another young wife—Debra Baker—paid the ultimate price 
at the hands of the same killer, leaving yet another young child motherless. Foreseeable victims 
of overzealous prosecution. 
 
Unfortunately, this is not an isolated incident. Official misconduct has been a factor in more than 
half of the nationally reported exonerations since 1989—nearly four score of which have 
occurred in Texas. Wrongful convictions are anathema to our constitution. And suppression of 
evidence is anathema to the duty of a prosecutor to seek justice. Concealment of exculpatory 
evidence undermines the integrity of our criminal justice system, which is of vital importance to 
every one of us: “Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are 
fair. The administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.” 
 
																																																								
119 Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the 
Romans and Their Decline 130 (David Lowenthal trans., Hackett Pub. Co., 1999) (1965). 
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The tragic story of Michael Morton and Debra Baker compelled the Legislature to take 
affirmative steps to prevent wrongful convictions due to prosecutorial misconduct. In the 
legislative session following Morton’s exoneration, the Texas Legislature unanimously passed 
the Michael Morton Act. The Morton Act extends, but has not altered, prosecutors’ longstanding 
obligation under Brady to disclose exculpatory evidence in the prosecution’s possession. Before 
the Morton Act, prosecutors had a constitutional duty under Brady to disclose all evidence that 
might exonerate the defendant, but the defense had very limited pretrial discovery rights. Under 
the Morton Act, if the defense requests discovery, the prosecution is under a statutory duty to 
continually disclose exculpatory, mitigating, or impeachment evidence. The Act is an important 
legislative step towards ensuring Brady compliance and bolstering the integrity of the criminal 
justice system. 
 
As this case sadly demonstrates, however, unacceptable gaps remain. When one good man 
refuses to stay silent, refuses to “just follow orders,” and refuses to do the wrong thing under the 
misguided belief that it’s for the greater good, he should not lose his job. While Hillman might 
have had a viable ultra vires claim, had he chosen to pursue one, the limited remedies available 
under that theory are manifestly inadequate to ensure accountability in matters of the highest 
constitutional dimension. The law must—but currently does not—afford a remedy that advances 
the Legislature's calculated efforts to secure our constitutional guarantees. 
 
I 
 
Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.120 
 
In 2013, Eric Hillman, an assistant district attorney in Nueces County, was assigned to 
prosecute David Sims for intoxication assault and leaving the scene of an accident. Hillman 
performed a diligent independent investigation and located a witness who was not listed in the 
police report. The witness told Hillman she was with Sims the entire evening, he had only 
consumed two alcoholic beverages, and he was not intoxicated when the accident occurred. 
 
Hillman immediately informed his supervisor that a new witness with exculpatory testimony had 
been located and he would be releasing that information to Sims’s defense counsel. The 
supervisor demanded Hillman withhold the information, assuring him it was proper to do so. 
 
Unconvinced, Hillman conducted an independent investigation of his ethical obligations, 
consulting with both the Texas Center for Legal Ethics and the State Bar of Texas Ethics 
Hotline. Both admonished him to disclose the information to defense counsel. Hillman therefore 
reported to his supervisor that he intended to turn over the evidence to the defense because 
withholding it would be unethical. According to Hillman, his supervisor responded, “Eric, you 
need to decide if you want to be a prosecutor or a defense attorney.” A week after Hillman 
announced his intention to disclose the information, former District Attorney Mark Skurka 
summarily terminated Hillman's employment for refusing to “follow instructions.” 
																																																								
120 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963). 
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Hillman sued the County, District Attorney Skurka, and the District Attorney’s Office for wrongful 
termination, but his case was dismissed on a plea to the jurisdiction. 
 
I concur in today’s judgment and join in much of the Court’s reasoning. The gravamen of this 
case is governmental immunity: whether the County is immune from a wrongful-termination suit 
alleging a prosecutor was fired because he insisted on doing what the law requires. Under our 
immunity jurisprudence, this case is fairly straightforward, and the Court’s analysis is sound. 
First, we did not abrogate governmental immunity in Sabine Pilot. The employer in that case 
was not a governmental entity, so the issue of governmental immunity was not before us and 
cannot be inferred sub silentio. Second, immunity has not been waived. We defer to the 
Legislature to waive immunity, and I agree with the Court that the Morton Act contains no such 
waiver because no “clear and unambiguous language” expresses that intent. Third, we should 
not abrogate immunity here. Although we have the power to abrogate immunity, we have rarely 
done so, and even then we limited it to offset claims rather than allowing unlimited recovery of 
monetary damages. Sanctioning the recovery of monetary damages—without any legislatively 
considered limitations like those in the Texas Tort Claims Act—would have significant public-fisc 
implications that raise separation-of-powers concerns. Finally, though Hillman arguably has a 
viable ultra vires claim, he has disclaimed any intent to assert one. Accordingly, I agree with the 
Court that the County is immune from suit in this case and that remand is not appropriate. I write 
separately, however, to highlight a lacuna in the legislative scheme that neuters the 
Legislature’s efforts to forestall prosecutorial misconduct that could lead to wrongful convictions. 
 
II 
 
If impunity is not demolished, all efforts to bring an end to corruption are in vain.121 
 
Taking Hillman’s account as true, he was fired for endeavoring to fulfill constitutional and 
statutory obligations imposed on all prosecutors. By any measure of law and morality in a 
civilized country, that is wrongful termination. Those we entrust to pursue justice should not be 
put to the Hobson’s choice of earning a living or doing the right thing. Cloaking governmental 
employers with absolute immunity in such circumstances erodes public confidence in the 
criminal justice system and undermines concerted legislative efforts to reform that system. By 
and large, prosecutors are honorable public servants committed to fairness in the administration 
of justice, but when unlawful practices are tolerated, encouraged, or rewarded with career 
advantages, others may be enticed to cross the line or may be cowed by consequences visited 
on those who resist. It’s fair to assume that the Legislature did not envision such a consequence 
when enacting the Morton Act without adopting measures to ensure prosecutors could comply 
with the Act without losing their jobs. In light of the underbelly this case exposes, it would be 
appropriate for the Legislature to do so now. 
 
																																																								
121 Rigoberta Menchú Tum, The Plague of Corruption: Overcoming Impunity and Injustice, in GLOBAL 
CORRUPTION REPORT 2001, at 155 (Robin Hodess, Jessie Banfield & Toby Wolfe eds., Transparency 
Int'l 2001). 
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Both Brady and the Morton Act obligate prosecutors to disclose certain types of evidence to the 
defense as a function of due process and to stave off wrongful convictions by thwarting 
pernicious prosecutorial practices. Wrongful convictions, as numerous studies have shown, 
come at a significant cost to our society. Financial burdens on the taxpayers accumulate 
through “an appeal, an appellate reversal, a retrial, investigational efforts to trace the real 
offender, possible civil lawsuits, and compensatory payments.” While we can calculate 
economic losses from wrongful convictions—for example, the state has paid more than $93 
million in compensation to 101 men and women who were wrongfully sent to prison over the 
past 25 years—the true cost is immeasurable. There is simply no way to restore lost time, no 
reset button that erases the financial and emotional consequences to the wrongfully 
incarcerated and their families. 
 
On the other side of the coin, for every innocent person that sits in jail, a criminal roams free. 
Free to commit more crimes. If DNA-exoneration cases are any kind of indicator, the societal 
consequences of convicting the wrong person—however it happens—are devastating. For 
example, out of 325 DNA-exoneration cases from 1989 to 2014, 68 of the true perpetrators later 
committed an additional 142 violent crimes—including 77 rapes, 34 homicides, and 31 other 
violent crimes. 
 
With such grave consequences, the best defense is a good offense. The Morton Act is a strong 
foundation, but more is required to ensure that those wielding power use it as the founders 
intended. Prosecutors are on the forefront of avoiding wrongful convictions and ameliorating the 
ensuing societal costs. Based on data compiled by the National Registry of Exonerations, 
official misconduct ranks second among the top five factors contributing to exonerations, leading 
to over half of the 2,401 (and counting) exonerations since 1989. The most common type of 
official misconduct involves concealing exculpatory evidence. 
 
While multiple external forces are aimed at ensuring accountability for misconduct—including 
professional discipline, potential criminal charges, and loss of elected office—this case 
epitomizes the limits of existing accountability measures. Research shows professional 
discipline and criminal charges are rarely imposed for prosecutorial misconduct. Even in the 
rare instances when misconduct is uncovered, it usually does not surface until after an innocent 
person has stayed in prison for years, presenting time-based challenges to any investigation or 
prosecution of wrongdoing. The possibility of some adverse consequence in some future public 
election has even less force as a deterrent and, more importantly, does absolutely nothing to 
alleviate irreparable harm resulting from the wrong. 
 
Brady violations are difficult to uncover because, by definition, they involve concealment of 
evidence in the prosecution’s exclusive possession and control. Indeed, exposure of Brady 
violations generally requires the prosecution’s own admission, some “chance discovery” by the 
defense team, or “dumb luck.” The most effective way to combat prosecutorial misconduct is to 
provide a disincentive extrinsic to an individual prosecutor’s own moral compass. “Ironically, the 
only one who can act as a check on the prosecution is the prosecution itself.” This case places 
the internal dynamics within the prosecutor’s office under a microscope. Although many district 
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attorney’s offices have implemented internal guidance or best practices, when the pressure to 
withhold evidence comes from the top, internal guidelines are at best a window dressing. Under 
circumstances like those alleged here, it is imperative that honest prosecutors not be punished. 
 
Absent legislative action, the best someone in Hillman’s position could hope for is to seek 
prospective equitable relief under an ultra vires theory. An ultra vires claim can be brought 
against a state official if the officer “acted without legal authority.” Although a district attorney 
has discretion to fire subordinates, one could argue there is no discretion to undertake such an 
action if it “conflicts with the law.” If Hillman had not opposed consideration of his claims under 
an ultra vires theory, I would remand in the interest of justice to allow him to pursue that claim. 
 
However, as a policy matter, I am dubious that a remedy limited to prospective equitable relief is 
strong enough to deter the egregious conduct alleged here. To be effective, the remedy must be 
proportional to the wrong. To my mind, the threat of other consequences, including monetary 
relief, would provide the external pressure required to motivate vigilance and self-policing. The 
Legislature is better suited, and constitutionally constituted, to weigh the policy interests that 
bear on whether to waive immunity (and to what extent), but as to that matter, this case makes 
painfully clear that what’s past is prologue. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Hillman was the first prosecutor represented by the Innocence Project, in recognition of 
his commitment to doing justice. Hillman’s action was also covered by the ABA Journal, 
the Houston Chronicle, the Austin Statesman, the Associated Press, and the San 
Francisco Chronicle, among others. You can watch a video of the oral argument in 
Hillman v. Nueces County (2018) here. 
2. Do you agree with the court’s conclusion that sovereign immunity bars Hillman’s action? 
Should the court have construed sovereign immunity differently? Should Hillman have a 
claim against Skurka? Would absolute prosecutorial immunity bar any such claim? 
Should it? 
3. Under the circumstances, what should Hillman have done? Did he have any other 
options? 
 
Further Reading: 
 
● Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty of Silence, 79 Alb. L. Rev. 1183 (2016) 
 
Further Viewing & Listening: 
 
● Last Week Tonight With John Oliver: Prosecutors (2018) 
● Carissa Byrne Hessick on the Myth of Common Law Crimes, Ipse Dixit, January 9, 2019 
● Rachel Barkow on Criminal Justice Reform, February 4, 2019 
● Maybell Romero on Profit-Driven Prosecution, February 28, 2019 
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7.5: Judicial Recusal & Misconduct 
 
Good morning Judge, why do you look so mean? Sorry Mr. Judge, what can the charges be? If 
there’s been trouble I will plead not guilty. It must be someone else, you know it can’t be me.122 
 
“If I had me job to pick out,” said Mr. Dooley, “I’d be a judge. I’ve looked over all th’ others an’ 
that’s th’ on’y wan that suits. I have th’ judicyal timperamint. I hate wurruk.”123 
 
Judges must be neutral and impartial at all times. Or at least, they must appear to be neutral 
and impartial. Accordingly, judicial conduct is regulated by a congeries of constitutional, 
statutory, and administrative rules intended to ensure neutrality and impartiality. 
 
Among other things, due process requires judges to recuse themselves to avoid conflicts of 
interest, and may require disqualification if a judge fails to recuse. Federal law prohibits judges 
from accepting or soliciting bribes.124 But it also requires judges to recuse themselves whenever 
their impartiality could reasonably be questioned.125 The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 
1980 authorizes complaints alleging that a federal judge “has engaged in conduct prejudicial to 
the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts” or “is unable to 
discharge all the duties of office by reason of mental or physical disability.”126 And the Rules for 
Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings govern misconduct and disability 
proceedings against federal judges under the Act.127 States may have similar statutory and 
administrative provisions. 
 
Finally, federal and state judicial codes of conduct comprehensively regulate judges. In 1924, 
the ABA first created and approved its Canons of Judicial Conduct, which were revised in 1972, 
1990, and 2007. The ABA canons are currently titled the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, and 
consist of both aspirational principles and specific rules intended to realize those principles. The 
federal judiciary has adopted the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, which includes the 
ethical canons that apply to federal judges and provides guidance on their performance of 
official duties and engagement in a variety of outside activities. Most states also have judicial 
commissions, which are empowered to investigate violations of judicial ethics. 
 
Judicial Recusal 
 
Stop eatin’ that fudge, cause here comes the judge. Don’t nobody buzz, cause here comes the 
judge. Judge Shorty is presidin’ today, and he don't take no stuff from nobody, no kind of way.128 
																																																								
122 Wynonie Harris, Good Morning Judge (1952). 
123 Finley Peter Dunne, Observations by Mr. Dooley (1902). 
124 18 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1)(B). 
125 28 U.S.C. § 455. 
126 28 U.S. Code §§ 351-64. 
127 Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 2: Ethics and Judicial Conduct, Pt. E: Judicial Conduct and Disability 
Act and Related Materials, Ch. 3: Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings. 
128 Shorty Long, Here Comes the Judge (1968). 
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Model Code of Judicial Conduct: Canon 1 
 
A judge shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, 
and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. 
 
Model Rule 1.2: Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary 
    
A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, 
integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of 
impropriety. 
 
Model Rule 1.2: Comments 
    
1. Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by improper conduct and conduct that 
creates the appearance of impropriety. This principle applies to both the professional 
and personal conduct of a judge. 
2. A judge should expect to be the subject of public scrutiny that might be viewed as 
burdensome if applied to other citizens, and must accept the restrictions imposed by the 
Code. 
3. Conduct that compromises or appears to compromise the independence, integrity, and 
impartiality of a judge undermines public confidence in the judiciary. Because it is not 
practicable to list all such conduct, the Rule is necessarily cast in general terms. 
5. Actual improprieties include violations of law, court rules or provisions of this Code. The 
test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable 
minds a perception that the judge violated this Code or engaged in other conduct that 
reflects adversely on the judge’s honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve 
as a judge. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 794	
 
The Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 11, 1972, at 1 
 
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) 
 
Summary: Mayberry and two co-defendants were tried in state court for an attempted 
prison break. They were appointed counsel, but represented by Mayberry. During the 
trial, Mayberry repeatedly insulted the judge and questioned his impartiality. The jury 
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found the defendants guilty, but before imposing the sentence, the judge pronounced 
Mayberry guilty of 11 counts of criminal contempt, and sentenced him to 11 to 22 years. 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the contempt charges, but the Supreme 
Court granted Mayberry’s pro se petition for certiorari and reversed, holding that due 
process entitles a defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding to a trial before a 
different judge. 
 
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
Petitioner and two codefendants were tried in a state court for prison breach and holding 
hostages in a penal institution. While they had appointed counsel as advisers, they represented 
themselves. The trial ended with a jury verdict of guilty of both charges on the 21st day, which 
was a Friday. The defendants were brought in for sentencing on the following Monday. Before 
imposing sentence on the verdicts the judge pronounced them guilty of criminal contempt. He 
found that petitioner had committed one or more contempts on 11 of the 21 days of trial and 
sentenced him to not less than one nor more than two years for each of the 11 contempts or a 
total of 11 to 22 years. 
 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed by a divided vote. The case is here on a petition 
for writ of certiorari. 
 
Petitioner’s conduct at the trial comes as a shock to those raised in the Western tradition that 
considers a courtroom a hallowed place of quiet dignity as far removed as possible from the 
emotions of the street. 
 
On the first day of the trial petitioner came to the sidebar to make suggestions and obtain rulings 
on trial procedures. Petitioner said: “It seems like the court has the intentions of railroading us” 
and moved to disqualify the judge. The motion was denied. Petitioner’s other motions, including 
his request that the deputy sheriffs in the courtroom be dressed as civilians, were also denied. 
Then came the following colloquy: 
 
Mr. Mayberry: I would like to have a fair trial of this case and like to be granted a fair trial 
under the Sixth Amendment. 
The Court: You will get a fair trial. 
Mr. Mayberry: It doesn't appear that I am going to get one the way you are overruling all 
our motions and that, and being like a hatchet man for the State. 
The Court: This side bar is over. 
Mr. Mayberry: Wait a minute, Your Honor. 
The Court: It is over. 
Mr. Mayberry: You dirty sonofabitch." 
 
The second episode took place on the eighth day of the trial. A co-defendant was cross-
examining a prison guard and the court sustained objections to certain questions: 
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Mr. Codispoti: Are you trying to protect the prison authorities, Your Honor? Is that your 
reason? 
The Court: You are out of order, Mr. Codispoti. I don't want any outbursts like that again. 
This is a court of justice. You don’t know how to ask questions. 
Mr. Mayberry: Possibly Your Honor doesn't know how to rule on them. 
The Court: You keep quiet. 
Mr. Mayberry: You ought to be Gilbert and Sullivan the way you sustain the district 
attorney every time he objects to the questions. 
The Court: Are you through? When your time comes you can ask questions and not 
make speeches. 
 
The next charge stemmed from the examination of an inmate about a riot in prison in which 
petitioner apparently was implicated. There were many questions asked and many objections 
sustained. At one point the following outburst occurred: 
 
Mr. Mayberry: Now, I’m going to produce my defense in this case and not be railroaded 
into any life sentence by any dirty, tyrannical old dog like yourself. 
The Court: You may proceed with your questioning, Mr. Mayberry. 
 
The fourth charge grew out of an examination of another defense witness: 
 
By Mr. Mayberry: 
Q. I ask you, Mr. Nardi, is that area, the handball court, is it open to any prisoner who 
wants to play handball, who cares to go to that area to play handball? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you understand the prior question when I asked you if it was freely open and 
accessible area? 
The Court: He answered your question. Let’s go on. 
Mr. Mayberry: I am asking him now if he understands… 
The Court: He answered it. Now, let's go on. 
Mr. Mayberry: I ask Your Honor to keep your mouth shut while I’m questioning my own 
witness. Will you do that for me? 
The Court: I wish you would do the same. Proceed with your questioning. 
 
The fifth charge relates to a protest which the defendants made that at the end of each trial day 
they were denied access to their legal documents—a condition which the trial judge shortly 
remedied. The following ensued: 
 
Mr. Mayberry: You’re a judge first. What are you working for? The prison authorities, you 
bum? 
Mr. Livingston: I have a motion pending before Your Honor. 
The Court: I would suggest… 
Mr. Mayberry: Go to hell. I don’t give a good God damn what you suggest, you stumbling 
dog. 
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Meanwhile one defendant told the judge if he did not get access to his papers at night he’d 
“blow your head off.” Another defendant said he would not sit still and be “kowtowed and be 
railroaded into a life imprisonment.” Then the following transpired: 
 
Mr. Mayberry: You started all this bullshit in the beginning. 
The Court: You keep quiet. 
Mr. Mayberry: Wait a minute. 
The Court: You keep quiet. 
Mr. Mayberry: I am my own counsel. 
The Court: You keep quiet. 
Mr. Mayberry. Are you going to gag me? 
The Court: Take these prisoners out of here. We will take a ten minute recess, members 
of the jury. 
 
The sixth episode happened when two of the defendants wanted to have some time to talk to a 
witness whom they had called. The two of them had had a heated exchange with the judge 
when the following happened: 
 
Mr. Mayberry: Just one moment, Your Honor. 
The Court: This is not your witness, Mr. Mayberry. Keep quiet. 
Mr. Mayberry: Oh, yes, he is my witness, too. He is my witness, also. Now, we are at the 
penitentiary and in seclusion. We can’t talk to any of our witnesses prior to putting them 
on the stand like the District Attorney obviously has the opportunity, and as he obviously 
made use of the opportunity to talk to his witnesses. Now… 
The Court: Now, I have ruled, Mr. Mayberry. 
Mr. Mayberry: I don’t care what you ruled. That is unimportant. The fact is… 
The Court: You will remain quiet, sir, and finish the examination of this witness. 
Mr. Mayberry: No, I won’t be quiet while you try to deny me the right to a fair trial. The 
only way I will be quiet is if you have me gagged. Now, if you want to do that, that is up 
to you; but in the meantime I am going to say what I have to say. Now, we have the right 
to speak to our witnesses prior to putting them on the stand. This is an accepted fact of 
law. It is nothing new or unusual. Now, you are going to try to force us to have our 
witness testify to facts that he has only a hazy recollection of that happened back in 
1965. Now, I believe we have the right to confer with our witness prior to putting him on 
the stand. 
The Court: Are you finished? 
Mr. Mayberry: I am finished. 
The Court: Proceed with your examination. 
 
The seventh charge grew out of an examination of a codefendant by petitioner. The following 
outburst took place: 
 
By Mr. Mayberry: 
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Q. No. Don't state a conclusion because Gilbert is going to object and Sullivan will 
sustain. Give me facts. What leads you to say that? 
 
Later petitioner said: 
 
Mr. Mayberry: My witness isn’t being in an inquisition, you know. This isn’t the Spanish 
Inquisition. 
 
Following other exchanges with the court, petitioner said: 
 
Mr. Mayberry: Now, just what do you call proper? I have asked questions, numerous 
questions and everyone you said is improper. I have asked questions that my adviser 
has given me, and I have repeated these questions verbatim as they came out of my 
adviser’s mouth, and you said they are improper. Now just what do you consider proper? 
The Court: I am not here to educate you, Mr. Mayberry. 
Mr. Mayberry: No. I know you are not. But you're not here to railroad me into no life bit, 
either. 
Mr. Codispoti: To protect the record… 
The Court: Do you have any other questions to ask this witness? 
Mr. Mayberry: You need to have some kind of psychiatric treatment, I think. You're some 
kind of a nut. I know you're trying to do a good job for that Warden Maroney back there, 
but let's keep it looking decent anyway, you know. Don’t make it so obvious, Your Honor. 
 
A codefendant was removed from the courtroom and when he returned petitioner asked for a 
severance. 
 
Mr. Mayberry: I have to ask for a severance. 
The Court: I have heard that before. It is denied again. Let’s go on. 
 
(Exception noted.) 
 
Mr. Mayberry: This is the craziest trial I have ever seen. 
The Court: You may call your next witness, Mr. Mayberry. 
 
Petitioner wanted to call witnesses from the penitentiary whose names had not been submitted 
earlier and for whom no subpoenas were issued. The court restricted the witnesses to the list of 
those subpoenaed: 
 
Mr. Mayberry: Before I get to that I wish to have a ruling, and I don't care if it is contempt 
or whatever you want to call it, but I want a ruling for the record that I am being denied 
these witnesses that I asked for months before this trial ever began. 
 
The ninth charge arose out of a ruling by the court on a question concerning the availability of 
tools to prisoners in their cells. 
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The Court: I have ruled on that, Mr. Mayberry. Now proceed with your questioning, and 
don’t argue. 
Mr. Mayberry: You’re arguing. I’m not arguing, not arguing with fools. 
 
The court near the end of the trial had petitioner ejected from the courtroom several times. The 
contempt charge was phrased as follows by the court: 
 
On December 7, 1966, you have created a despicable scene in refusing to continue 
calling your witnesses and in creating such consternation and uproar as to cause a 
termination of the trial. 
 
As the court prepared to charge the jury, petitioner said: 
 
Before Your Honor begins the charge to the jury defendant Mayberry wishes to place his 
objection on the record to the charge and to the whole proceedings from now on, and he 
wishes to make it known to the Court now that he has no intention of remaining silent 
while the Court charges the jury, and that he is going to continually object to the charge 
of the Court to the jury throughout the entire charge, and he is not going to remain silent. 
He is going to disrupt the proceedings verbally throughout the entire charge of the Court, 
and also he is going to be objecting to being forced to terminate his defense before he 
was finished. 
 
The court thereupon had petitioner removed from the courtroom and later returned gagged. But 
petitioner caused such a commotion under gag that the court had him removed to an adjacent 
room where a loudspeaker system made the courtroom proceedings audible. The court phrased 
this contempt charge as follows: 
 
On December 9, 1966, you have constantly, boisterously, and insolently interrupted the 
Court during its attempts to charge the jury, thereby creating an atmosphere of utter 
confusion and chaos. 
 
These brazen efforts to denounce, insult, and slander the court and to paralyze the trial are at 
war with the concept of justice under law. Laymen, foolishly trying to defend themselves, may 
understandably create awkward and embarrassing scenes. Yet that is not the character of the 
record revealed here. We have here downright insults of a trial judge, and tactics taken from 
street brawls and transported to the courtroom. This is conduct not “befitting an American 
courtroom,” and criminal contempt is one appropriate remedy. 
 
As these separate acts or outbursts took place, the arsenal of authority described in Allen was 
available to the trial judge to keep order in the courtroom. He could, with propriety, have 
instantly acted, holding petitioner in contempt, or excluding him from the courtroom, or 
otherwise insulating his vulgarity from the courtroom. The Court noted in Sacher v. United 
States, that, while instant action may be taken against a lawyer who is guilty of contempt, to 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 800	
pronounce him guilty of contempt is “not unlikely to prejudice his client.” Those considerations 
are not pertinent here where petitioner undertook to represent himself. In Sacher the trial judge 
waited until the end of the trial to impose punishment for contempt, the Court saying: 
 
If we were to hold that summary punishment can be imposed only instantly upon the 
event, it would be an incentive to pronounce, while smarting under the irritation of the 
contemptuous act, what should be a well-considered judgment. We think it less likely 
that unfair condemnation of counsel will occur if the more deliberate course be 
permitted. 
 
Generalizations are difficult. Instant treatment of contempt where lawyers are involved may 
greatly prejudice their clients but it may be the only wise course where others are involved. 
Moreover, we do not say that the more vicious the attack on the judge the less qualified he is to 
act. A judge cannot be driven out of a case. Where, however, he does not act the instant the 
contempt is committed, but waits until the end of the trial, on balance, it is generally wise where 
the marks of the unseemly conduct have left personal stings to ask a fellow judge to take his 
place. What Chief Justice Taft said in Cooke v. United States is relevant here: 
 
The power of contempt which a judge must have and exercise in protecting the due and 
orderly administration of justice and in maintaining the authority and dignity of the court 
is most important and indispensable. But its exercise is a delicate one and care is 
needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions. This rule of caution is more 
mandatory where the contempt charged has in it the element of personal criticism or 
attack upon the judge. The judge must banish the slightest personal impulse to reprisal, 
but he should not bend backward and injure the authority of the court by too great 
leniency. The substitution of another judge would avoid either tendency but it is not 
always possible. Of course where acts of contempt are palpably aggravated by a 
personal attack upon the judge in order to drive the judge out of the case for ulterior 
reasons, the scheme should not be permitted to succeed. But attempts of this kind are 
rare. All of such cases, however, present difficult questions for the judge. All we can say 
upon the whole matter is that where conditions do not make it impracticable, or where 
the delay may not injure public or private right, a judge called upon to act in a case of 
contempt by personal attack upon him, may, without flinching from his duty, properly ask 
that one of his fellow judges take his place. 
 
We conclude that that course should have been followed here, as marked personal feelings 
were present on both sides. 
 
Whether the trial be federal or state, the concern of due process is with the fair administration of 
justice. At times a judge has not been the image of “the impersonal authority of law,” but has 
become so “personally embroiled” with a lawyer in the trial as to make the judge unfit to sit in 
judgment on the contempt charge. 
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“The vital point is that in sitting in judgment on such a misbehaving lawyer the judge should not 
himself give vent to personal spleen or respond to a personal grievance. These are subtle 
matters, for they concern the ingredients of what constitutes justice. Therefore, justice must 
satisfy the appearance of justice.” 
 
Offutt does not fit this case, for the state judge in the instant controversy was not an activist 
seeking combat. Rather, he was the target of petitioner’s insolence. Yet a judge, vilified as was 
this Pennsylvania judge, necessarily becomes embroiled in a running, bitter controversy. No 
one so cruelly slandered is likely to maintain that calm detachment necessary for fair 
adjudication. In re Murchison was a case where a judge acted under state law as a one-man 
grand jury and later tried witnesses for contempt who refused to answer questions propounded 
by the “judge-grand jury.” We held that since the judge who sat as a one-man grand jury was 
part of the accusatory process he “cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in 
the conviction or acquittal of those accused.” “Fair trials are too important a part of our free 
society to let prosecuting judges be trial judges of the charges they prefer.” 
 
It is, of course, not every attack on a judge that disqualifies him from sitting. In Ungar v. Sarafite, 
we ruled that a lawyer’s challenge, though “disruptive, recalcitrant and disagreeable 
commentary,” was still not “an insulting attack upon the integrity of the judge carrying such 
potential for bias as to require disqualification.” Many of the words leveled at the judge in the 
instant case were highly personal aspersions, even “fighting words”—”dirty sonofabitch,” “dirty 
tyrannical old dog,” “stumbling dog,” and “fool.” He was charged with running a Spanish 
Inquisition and told to “Go to hell” and “Keep your mouth shut.” Insults of that kind are apt to 
strike “at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge’s temperament.” 
 
Our conclusion is that by reason of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a 
defendant in criminal contempt proceedings should be given a public trial before a judge other 
than the one reviled by the contemnor. In the present case that requirement can be satisfied 
only if the judgment of contempt is vacated so that on remand another judge, not bearing the 
sting of these slanderous remarks and having the impersonal authority of the law, sits in 
judgment on the conduct of petitioner as shown by the record. 
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Oakland Tribune, Dec. 10, 1966, at 2 
 
Questions: 
 
1. On June 27, 1965, Richard O.J. Mayberry, Dominick Codispopi, and Herbert Langes 
tried to escape from Western State Penitentiary in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Mayberry 
was originally convicted of armed robbery in 1957, and was serving 3.5 to 10 years for a 
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previous escape attempt in 1961. Mayberry, Codispoti, and Langes armed themselves 
with zip guns and homemade bombs, and took two guards hostage in the prison 
hospital. They surrendered after 90 minutes, when the state police bombarded them with 
tear gas, and released their hostages unharmed. Mayberry’s hand was injured when one 
of the bombs exploded while he was throwing it. Mayberry became a legendary 
“jailhouse lawyer.” Two of his petitions for certiorari were accepted by the Supreme 
Court, and several of the actions he filed led to significant prison reform. Today, 
Mayberry is still incarcerated in the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at 
Huntingdon. 
2. Why did the Court hold that due process required the judge to recuse himself from 
deciding the criminal contempt charges? Did Mayberry receive any due process on 
those charges? 
3. Mayberry, Codispoti, and Langes were all charged with contempt. On remand, all three 
were convicted of criminal contempt of court in non-jury trials, and sentenced to multiple 
consecutive terms, amounting to about 3 years. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
affirmed, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that criminal 
defendants in a contempt proceeding are entitled to a jury trial if the cumulative sentence 
could exceed 6 months. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974). 
 
 
Richard Mayberry (2018) 
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Zip gun used in prison escape attempt 
 
Further Reading: 
 
● Steven R. Jenkins, Mayberry v. Pennsylvania: Due Process Limitation in Summary 
Punishments for Contempt of Court, 25 Sw L.J. 805 (1971) 
● Contempt: Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971), 62 J. Crim. L. Criminology & 
Police Sci. 525 (1971) 
 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) 
 
Summary: In 2002, Caperton won a business tort action against Massey and 
Blankenship, and received a $50 million damages award, which Massey and 
Blankenship appealed. In the meantime, Benjamin ran for a seat on the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of West Virginia. Blankenship spent about $3 million campaigning for 
Benjamin. When Benjamin won, Caperton filed a motion to disqualify Benjamin from the 
appeal, which Benjamin denied. The Supreme Court of Appeals granted the appeal and 
reversed. Benjamin also declined to recuse on rehearing, and the court once again 
reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that due process 
requires recusal when the facts create an objective appearance of impropriety. The 
dissent argued that the standard adopted by the majority was arbitrary and unworkable. 
 
Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
In this case the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed a trial court judgment, 
which had entered a jury verdict of $50 million. Five justices heard the case, and the vote to 
reverse was 3 to 2. The question presented is whether the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was violated when one of the justices in the majority denied a recusal 
motion. The basis for the motion was that the justice had received campaign contributions in an 
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extraordinary amount from, and through the efforts of, the board chairman and principal officer 
of the corporation found liable for the damages. 
 
Under our precedents there are objective standards that require recusal when “the probability of 
actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” 
Applying those precedents, we find that, in all the circumstances of this case, due process 
requires recusal. 
 
I 
 
In August 2002 a West Virginia jury returned a verdict that found respondents A.T. Massey Coal 
Co. and its affiliates liable for fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, and tortious 
interference with existing contractual relations. The jury awarded petitioners Hugh Caperton, 
Harman Development Corp., Harman Mining Corp., and Sovereign Coal Sales the sum of $50 
million in compensatory and punitive damages. 
 
In June 2004 the state trial court denied Massey’s post-trial motions challenging the verdict and 
the damages award, finding that Massey “intentionally acted in utter disregard of Caperton’s 
rights and ultimately destroyed Caperton’s businesses because, after conducting cost-benefit 
analyses, Massey concluded it was in its financial interest to do so.” In March 2005 the trial 
court denied Massey’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. 
 
Don Blankenship is Massey’s chairman, chief executive officer, and president. After the verdict 
but before the appeal, West Virginia held its 2004 judicial elections. Knowing the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of West Virginia would consider the appeal in the case, Blankenship decided to 
support an attorney who sought to replace Justice McGraw. Justice McGraw was a candidate 
for reelection to that court. The attorney who sought to replace him was Brent Benjamin. 
 
In addition to contributing the $1,000 statutory maximum to Benjamin’s campaign committee, 
Blankenship donated almost $2.5 million to “And For The Sake Of The Kids.” The § 527 
organization opposed McGraw and supported Benjamin. Blankenship’s donations accounted for 
more than two-thirds of the total funds it raised. This was not all. Blankenship spent, in addition, 
just over $500,000 on independent expenditures—for direct mailings and letters soliciting 
donations as well as television and newspaper advertisements—“to support Brent Benjamin.” 
 
To provide some perspective, Blankenship’s $3 million in contributions were more than the total 
amount spent by all other Benjamin supporters and three times the amount spent by Benjamin’s 
own committee. Caperton contends that Blankenship spent $1 million more than the total 
amount spent by the campaign committees of both candidates combined. 
 
Benjamin won. He received 382,036 votes (53.3%), and McGraw received 334,301 votes 
(46.7%). 
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In October 2005, before Massey filed its petition for appeal in West Virginia’s highest court, 
Caperton moved to disqualify now-Justice Benjamin under the Due Process Clause and the 
West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct, based on the conflict caused by Blankenship’s 
campaign involvement. Justice Benjamin denied the motion in April 2006. He indicated that he 
“carefully considered the bases and accompanying exhibits proffered by the movants.” But he 
found “no objective information to show that this Justice has a bias for or against any litigant, 
that this Justice has prejudged the matters which comprise this litigation, or that this Justice will 
be anything but fair and impartial.” In December 2006 Massey filed its petition for appeal to 
challenge the adverse jury verdict. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals granted review. 
 
In November 2007 that court reversed the $50 million verdict against Massey. The majority 
opinion, authored by then-Chief Justice Davis and joined by Justices Benjamin and Maynard, 
found that “Massey’s conduct warranted the type of judgment rendered in this case.” It reversed, 
nevertheless, based on two independent grounds — first, that a forum-selection clause 
contained in a contract to which Massey was not a party barred the suit in West Virginia, and, 
second, that res judicata barred the suit due to an out-of-state judgment to which Massey was 
not a party. Justice Starcher dissented, stating that the “majority’s opinion is morally and legally 
wrong.” Justice Albright also dissented, accusing the majority of “misapplying the law and 
introducing sweeping ‘new law’ into our jurisprudence that may well come back to haunt us.” 
 
Caperton sought rehearing, and the parties moved for disqualification of three of the five justices 
who decided the appeal. Photos had surfaced of Justice Maynard vacationing with Blankenship 
in the French Riviera while the case was pending. Justice Maynard granted Caperton’s recusal 
motion. On the other side Justice Starcher granted Massey’s recusal motion, apparently based 
on his public criticism of Blankenship’s role in the 2004 elections. In his recusal memorandum 
Justice Starcher urged Justice Benjamin to recuse himself as well. He noted that “Blankenship’s 
bestowal of his personal wealth, political tactics, and ‘friendship’ have created a cancer in the 
affairs of this Court.” Justice Benjamin declined Justice Starcher’s suggestion and denied 
Caperton’s recusal motion. 
 
The court granted rehearing. Justice Benjamin, now in the capacity of acting chief justice, 
selected Judges Cookman and Fox to replace the recused justices. Caperton moved a third 
time for disqualification, arguing that Justice Benjamin had failed to apply the correct standard 
under West Virginia law — i.e., whether “a reasonable and prudent person, knowing these 
objective facts, would harbor doubts about Justice Benjamin’s ability to be fair and impartial.” 
Caperton also included the results of a public opinion poll, which indicated that over 67% of 
West Virginians doubted Justice Benjamin would be fair and impartial. Justice Benjamin again 
refused to withdraw, noting that the “push poll” was “neither credible nor sufficiently reliable to 
serve as the basis for an elected judge’s disqualification.” 
 
In April 2008 a divided court again reversed the jury verdict, and again it was a 3-to-2 decision. 
Justice Davis filed a modified version of her prior opinion, repeating the two earlier holdings. 
She was joined by Justice Benjamin and Judge Fox. Justice Albright, joined by Judge 
Cookman, dissented: “Not only is the majority opinion unsupported by the facts and existing 
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case law, but it is also fundamentally unfair. Sadly, justice was neither honored nor served by 
the majority.” The dissent also noted “genuine due process implications arising under federal 
law” with respect to Justice Benjamin’s failure to recuse himself. 
 
Four months later — a month after the petition for writ of certiorari was filed in this Court — 
Justice Benjamin filed a concurring opinion. He defended the merits of the majority opinion as 
well as his decision not to recuse. He rejected Caperton’s challenge to his participation in the 
case under both the Due Process Clause and West Virginia law. Justice Benjamin reiterated 
that he had no “‘direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest’ in this case.” Adopting “a 
standard merely of ‘appearances,’” he concluded, “seems little more than an invitation to subject 
West Virginia’s justice system to the vagaries of the day — a framework in which predictability 
and stability yield to supposition, innuendo, half-truths, and partisan manipulations.” 
 
We granted certiorari. 
 
II 
 
It is axiomatic that “a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” As the 
Court has recognized, however, “most matters relating to judicial disqualification do not rise to a 
constitutional level.” The early and leading case on the subject is Tumey v. Ohio (1927). There, 
the Court stated that “matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest, 
would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion.” 
 
The Tumey Court concluded that the Due Process Clause incorporated the common-law rule 
that a judge must recuse himself when he has “a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary 
interest” in a case. This rule reflects the maxim that “no man is allowed to be a judge in his own 
cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his 
integrity.” Under this rule, “disqualification for bias or prejudice was not permitted”; those matters 
were left to statutes and judicial codes. Personal bias or prejudice “alone would not be sufficient 
basis for imposing a constitutional requirement under the Due Process Clause.” 
 
As new problems have emerged that were not discussed at common law, however, the Court 
has identified additional instances which, as an objective matter, require recusal. These are 
circumstances “in which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the 
judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” To place the present case in 
proper context, two instances where the Court has required recusal merit further discussion. 
 
A 
 
The first involved the emergence of local tribunals where a judge had a financial interest in the 
outcome of a case, although the interest was less than what would have been considered 
personal or direct at common law. 
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This was the problem addressed in Tumey. There, the mayor of a village had the authority to sit 
as a judge (with no jury) to try those accused of violating a state law prohibiting the possession 
of alcoholic beverages. Inherent in this structure were two potential conflicts. First, the mayor 
received a salary supplement for performing judicial duties, and the funds for that compensation 
derived from the fines assessed in a case. No fines were assessed upon acquittal. The mayor-
judge thus received a salary supplement only if he convicted the defendant. Second, sums from 
the criminal fines were deposited to the village’s general treasury fund for village improvements 
and repairs. 
 
The Court held that the Due Process Clause required disqualification “both because of the 
mayor-judge’s direct pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of his official motive to 
convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village.” It so held despite 
observing that “there are doubtless mayors who would not allow such a consideration as $12 
costs in each case to affect their judgment in it.” The Court articulated the controlling principle: 
 
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge 
to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him 
not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies 
the latter due process of law. 
 
The Court was thus concerned with more than the traditional common-law prohibition on direct 
pecuniary interest. It was also concerned with a more general concept of interests that tempt 
adjudicators to disregard neutrality. 
 
This concern with conflicts resulting from financial incentives was elaborated in Ward v. 
Monroeville (1972), which invalidated a conviction in another mayor’s court. In Monroeville, 
unlike in Tumey, the mayor received no money; instead, the fines the mayor assessed went to 
the town’s general fisc. The Court held that “the fact that the mayor in Tumey shared directly in 
the fees and costs did not define the limits of the principle.” The principle, instead, turned on the 
“possible temptation” the mayor might face; the mayor’s “executive responsibilities for village 
finances may make him partisan to maintain the high level of contribution to those finances from 
the mayor’s court.” As the Court reiterated in another case that Term, “the judge’s financial 
stake need not be as direct or positive as it appeared to be in Tumey.” 
 
The Court in Lavoie further clarified the reach of the Due Process Clause regarding a judge’s 
financial interest in a case. There, a justice had cast the deciding vote on the Alabama Supreme 
Court to uphold a punitive damages award against an insurance company for bad-faith refusal 
to pay a claim. At the time of his vote, the justice was the lead plaintiff in a nearly identical 
lawsuit pending in Alabama’s lower courts. His deciding vote, this Court surmised, “undoubtedly 
‘raised the stakes’” for the insurance defendant in the justice’s suit. 
 
The Court stressed that it was “not required to decide whether in fact the justice was 
influenced.” The proper constitutional inquiry is “whether sitting on the case then before the 
Supreme Court of Alabama “would offer a possible temptation to the average judge to lead him 
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not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.” The Court underscored that “what degree or kind of 
interest is sufficient to disqualify a judge from sitting cannot be defined with precision.” In the 
Court’s view, however, it was important that the test have an objective component. 
 
The Lavoie Court proceeded to distinguish the state-court justice's particular interest in the 
case, which required recusal, from interests that were not a constitutional concern. For instance, 
“while the other justices might conceivably have had a slight pecuniary interest” due to their 
potential membership in a class-action suit against their own insurance companies, that interest 
is “too remote and insubstantial to violate the constitutional constraints.” 
 
B 
 
The second instance requiring recusal that was not discussed at common law emerged in the 
criminal contempt context, where a judge had no pecuniary interest in the case but was 
challenged because of a conflict arising from his participation in an earlier proceeding. This 
Court characterized that first proceeding (perhaps pejoratively) as a “one-man grand jury.” 
 
In that first proceeding, and as provided by state law, a judge examined witnesses to determine 
whether criminal charges should be brought. The judge called the two petitioners before him. 
One petitioner answered questions, but the judge found him untruthful and charged him with 
perjury. The second declined to answer on the ground that he did not have counsel with him, as 
state law seemed to permit. The judge charged him with contempt. The judge proceeded to try 
and convict both petitioners. 
 
This Court set aside the convictions on grounds that the judge had a conflict of interest at the 
trial stage because of his earlier participation followed by his decision to charge them. The Due 
Process Clause required disqualification. The Court recited the general rule that “no man can be 
a judge in his own case,” adding that “no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest 
in the outcome.” It noted that the disqualifying criteria “cannot be defined with precision. 
Circumstances and relationships must be considered.” These circumstances and the prior 
relationship required recusal: “Having been a part of the one-man grand jury process a judge 
cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those 
accused.” That is because “as a practical matter it is difficult if not impossible for a judge to free 
himself from the influence of what took place in his ‘grand-jury’ secret session.” 
 
The Murchison Court was careful to distinguish the circumstances and the relationship from 
those where the Constitution would not require recusal. It noted that the single-judge grand jury 
is “more a part of the accusatory process than an ordinary lay grand juror,” and that 
“adjudication by a trial judge of a contempt committed in a judge’s presence in open court 
cannot be likened to the proceedings here.” The judge's prior relationship with the defendant, as 
well as the information acquired from the prior proceeding, was of critical import. 
 
Following Murchison the Court held in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania (1971), “that by reason of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a defendant in criminal contempt 
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proceedings should be given a public trial before a judge other than the one reviled by the 
contemnor.” The Court reiterated that this rule rests on the relationship between the judge and 
the defendant: “A judge, vilified as was this Pennsylvania judge, necessarily becomes embroiled 
in a running, bitter controversy. No one so cruelly slandered is likely to maintain that calm 
detachment necessary for fair adjudication.” 
Again, the Court considered the specific circumstances presented by the case. It noted that “not 
every attack on a judge disqualifies him from sitting.” The Court distinguished the case from 
Ungar v. Sarafite (1964), in which the Court had “ruled that a lawyer’s challenge, though 
‘disruptive, recalcitrant and disagreeable commentary,’ was still not ‘an insulting attack upon the 
integrity of the judge carrying such potential for bias as to require disqualification.’” The inquiry 
is an objective one. The Court asks not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but 
whether the average judge in his position is “likely” to be neutral, or whether there is an 
unconstitutional “potential for bias.” 
 
III 
 
Based on the principles described in these cases we turn to the issue before us. This problem 
arises in the context of judicial elections, a framework not presented in the precedents we have 
reviewed and discussed. 
 
Caperton contends that Blankenship’s pivotal role in getting Justice Benjamin elected created a 
constitutionally intolerable probability of actual bias. Though not a bribe or criminal influence, 
Justice Benjamin would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude to Blankenship for his 
extraordinary efforts to get him elected. That temptation, Caperton claims, is as strong and 
inherent in human nature as was the conflict the Court confronted in Tumey and Monroeville 
when a mayor-judge (or the city) benefited financially from a defendant's conviction, as well as 
the conflict identified in Murchison and Mayberry when a judge was the object of a defendant's 
contempt. 
 
Justice Benjamin was careful to address the recusal motions and explain his reasons why, on 
his view of the controlling standard, disqualification was not in order. In four separate opinions 
issued during the course of the appeal, he explained why no actual bias had been established. 
He found no basis for recusal because Caperton failed to provide “objective evidence” or 
“objective information,” but merely “subjective belief” of bias. Nor could anyone “point to any 
actual conduct or activity on his part which could be termed ‘improper.’” In other words, based 
on the facts presented by Caperton, Justice Benjamin conducted a probing search into his 
actual motives and inclinations; and he found none to be improper. We do not question his 
subjective findings of impartiality and propriety. Nor do we determine whether there was actual 
bias. 
 
Following accepted principles of our legal tradition respecting the proper performance of judicial 
functions, judges often inquire into their subjective motives and purposes in the ordinary course 
of deciding a case. This does not mean the inquiry is a simple one. “The work of deciding cases 
goes on every day in hundreds of courts throughout the land. Any judge, one might suppose, 
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would find it easy to describe the process which he had followed a thousand times and more. 
Nothing could be farther from the truth.” 
 
The judge inquires into reasons that seem to be leading to a particular result. Precedent and 
stare decisis and the text and purpose of the law and the Constitution; logic and scholarship and 
experience and common sense; and fairness and disinterest and neutrality are among the 
factors at work. To bring coherence to the process, and to seek respect for the resulting 
judgment, judges often explain the reasons for their conclusions and rulings. There are 
instances when the introspection that often attends this process may reveal that what the judge 
had assumed to be a proper, controlling factor is not the real one at work. If the judge discovers 
that some personal bias or improper consideration seems to be the actuating cause of the 
decision or to be an influence so difficult to dispel that there is a real possibility of undermining 
neutrality, the judge may think it necessary to consider withdrawing from the case. 
 
The difficulties of inquiring into actual bias, and the fact that the inquiry is often a private one, 
simply underscore the need for objective rules. Otherwise there may be no adequate protection 
against a judge who simply misreads or misapprehends the real motives at work in deciding the 
case. The judge’s own inquiry into actual bias, then, is not one that the law can easily 
superintend or review, though actual bias, if disclosed, no doubt would be grounds for 
appropriate relief. In lieu of exclusive reliance on that personal inquiry, or on appellate review of 
the judge's determination respecting actual bias, the Due Process Clause has been 
implemented by objective standards that do not require proof of actual bias. In defining these 
standards the Court has asked whether, “under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies 
and human weakness,” the interest “poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the 
practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.” 
 
We turn to the influence at issue in this case. Not every campaign contribution by a litigant or 
attorney creates a probability of bias that requires a judge’s recusal, but this is an exceptional 
case. We conclude that there is a serious risk of actual bias — based on objective and 
reasonable perceptions — when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a 
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or 
directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent. The inquiry 
centers on the contribution’s relative size in comparison to the total amount of money 
contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect such 
contribution had on the outcome of the election. 
 
Applying this principle, we conclude that Blankenship’s campaign efforts had a significant and 
disproportionate influence in placing Justice Benjamin on the case. Blankenship contributed 
some $3 million to unseat the incumbent and replace him with Benjamin. His contributions 
eclipsed the total amount spent by all other Benjamin supporters and exceeded by 300% the 
amount spent by Benjamin's campaign committee. Caperton claims Blankenship spent $1 
million more than the total amount spent by the campaign committees of both candidates 
combined. 
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Massey responds that Blankenship’s support, while significant, did not cause Benjamin’s victory. 
In the end the people of West Virginia elected him, and they did so based on many reasons 
other than Blankenship’s efforts. Massey points out that every major state newspaper, but one, 
endorsed Benjamin. It also contends that then-Justice McGraw cost himself the election by 
giving a speech during the campaign, a speech the opposition seized upon for its own 
advantage. 
 
Justice Benjamin raised similar arguments. He asserted that “the outcome of the 2004 election 
was due primarily to his own campaign’s message,” as well as McGraw’s “devastating” speech 
in which he “made a number of controversial claims which became a matter of statewide 
discussion in the media, on the internet, and elsewhere.” 
 
Whether Blankenship’s campaign contributions were a necessary and sufficient cause of 
Benjamin’s victory is not the proper inquiry. Much like determining whether a judge is actually 
biased, proving what ultimately drives the electorate to choose a particular candidate is a 
difficult endeavor, not likely to lend itself to a certain conclusion. This is particularly true where, 
as here, there is no procedure for judicial factfinding and the sole trier of fact is the one accused 
of bias. Due process requires an objective inquiry into whether the contributor’s influence on the 
election under all the circumstances “would offer a possible temptation to the average judge to 
lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.” In an election decided by fewer than 
50,000 votes (382,036 to 334,301), Blankenship’s campaign contributions — in comparison to 
the total amount contributed to the campaign, as well as the total amount spent in the election 
— had a significant and disproportionate influence on the electoral outcome. And the risk that 
Blankenship’s influence engendered actual bias is sufficiently substantial that it “must be 
forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.” 
 
The temporal relationship between the campaign contributions, the justice’s election, and the 
pendency of the case is also critical. It was reasonably foreseeable, when the campaign 
contributions were made, that the pending case would be before the newly elected justice. The 
$50 million adverse jury verdict had been entered before the election, and the Supreme Court of 
Appeals was the next step once the state trial court dealt with post-trial motions. So it became at 
once apparent that, absent recusal, Justice Benjamin would review a judgment that cost his 
biggest donor’s company $50 million. Although there is no allegation of a quid pro quo 
agreement, the fact remains that Blankenship’s extraordinary contributions were made at a time 
when he had a vested stake in the outcome. Just as no man is allowed to be a judge in his own 
cause, similar fears of bias can arise when — without the consent of the other parties — a man 
chooses the judge in his own cause. And applying this principle to the judicial election process, 
there was here a serious, objective risk of actual bias that required Justice Benjamin’s recusal. 
 
Justice Benjamin did undertake an extensive search for actual bias. But, as we have indicated, 
that is just one step in the judicial process; objective standards may also require recusal 
whether or not actual bias exists or can be proved. Due process “may sometimes bar trial by 
judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice 
equally between contending parties.” The failure to consider objective standards requiring 
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recusal is not consistent with the imperatives of due process. We find that Blankenship’s 
significant and disproportionate influence — coupled with the temporal relationship between the 
election and the pending case — “offers a possible temptation to the average judge to lead him 
not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.” On these extreme facts the probability of actual 
bias rises to an unconstitutional level. 
 
IV 
 
Our decision today addresses an extraordinary situation where the Constitution requires 
recusal. Massey and its amici predict that various adverse consequences will follow from 
recognizing a constitutional violation here — ranging from a flood of recusal motions to 
unnecessary interference with judicial elections. We disagree. The facts now before us are 
extreme by any measure. The parties point to no other instance involving judicial campaign 
contributions that presents a potential for bias comparable to the circumstances in this case. 
 
It is true that extreme cases often test the bounds of established legal principles, and 
sometimes no administrable standard may be available to address the perceived wrong. But it is 
also true that extreme cases are more likely to cross constitutional limits, requiring this Court’s 
intervention and formulation of objective standards. This is particularly true when due process is 
violated. 
 
This Court’s recusal cases are illustrative. In each case the Court dealt with extreme facts that 
created an unconstitutional probability of bias that “cannot be defined with precision.” Yet the 
Court articulated an objective standard to protect the parties’ basic right to a fair trial in a fair 
tribunal. The Court was careful to distinguish the extreme facts of the cases before it from those 
interests that would not rise to a constitutional level. In this case we do nothing more than what 
the Court has done before. 
 
As such, it is worth noting the effects, or lack thereof, of the Court’s prior decisions. Even though 
the standards announced in those cases raised questions similar to those that might be asked 
after our decision today, the Court was not flooded with Monroeville or Murchison motions. That 
is perhaps due in part to the extreme facts those standards sought to address. Courts proved 
quite capable of applying the standards to less extreme situations. 
 
One must also take into account the judicial reforms the States have implemented to eliminate 
even the appearance of partiality. Almost every State — West Virginia included — has adopted 
the American Bar Association’s objective standard: “A judge shall avoid impropriety and the 
appearance of impropriety.” The ABA Model Code’s test for appearance of impropriety is 
“whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge’s ability to 
carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.” 
 
The West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct also requires a judge to “disqualify himself or 
herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Under 
Canon 3E(1), “the question of disqualification focuses on whether an objective assessment of 
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the judge's conduct produces a reasonable question about impartiality, not on the judge’s 
subjective perception of the ability to act fairly.” Indeed, some States require recusal based on 
campaign contributions similar to those in this case. 
 
These codes of conduct serve to maintain the integrity of the judiciary and the rule of law. The 
Conference of the Chief Justices has underscored that the codes are “the principal safeguard 
against judicial campaign abuses” that threaten to imperil “public confidence in the fairness and 
integrity of the nation's elected judges.” This is a vital state interest: 
 
Courts, in our system, elaborate principles of law in the course of resolving disputes. The 
power and the prerogative of a court to perform this function rest, in the end, upon the 
respect accorded to its judgments. The citizen’s respect for judgments depends in turn 
upon the issuing court’s absolute probity. Judicial integrity is, in consequence, a state 
interest of the highest order. 
 
It is for this reason that States may choose to “adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due 
process requires.” 
 
“The Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications. 
Congress and the states, of course, remain free to impose more rigorous standards for judicial 
disqualification than those we find mandated here today.” Because the codes of judicial conduct 
provide more protection than due process requires, most disputes over disqualification will be 
resolved without resort to the Constitution. Application of the constitutional standard implicated 
in this case will thus be confined to rare instances. 
 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia is reversed, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
Chief Justice ROBERTS, with whom Justice SCALIA, Justice THOMAS, and Justice ALITO join, 
dissenting. 
 
I, of course, share the majority’s sincere concerns about the need to maintain a fair, 
independent, and impartial judiciary — and one that appears to be such. But I fear that the 
Court’s decision will undermine rather than promote these values. 
 
Until today, we have recognized exactly two situations in which the Federal Due Process Clause 
requires disqualification of a judge: when the judge has a financial interest in the outcome of the 
case, and when the judge is trying a defendant for certain criminal contempts. Vaguer notions of 
bias or the appearance of bias were never a basis for disqualification, either at common law or 
under our constitutional precedents. Those issues were instead addressed by legislation or 
court rules. 
 
Today, however, the Court enlists the Due Process Clause to overturn a judge's failure to 
recuse because of a “probability of bias.” Unlike the established grounds for disqualification, a 
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“probability of bias” cannot be defined in any limited way. The Court’s new “rule” provides no 
guidance to judges and litigants about when recusal will be constitutionally required. This will 
inevitably lead to an increase in allegations that judges are biased, however groundless those 
charges may be. The end result will do far more to erode public confidence in judicial impartiality 
than an isolated failure to recuse in a particular case. 
 
I 
 
There is a “presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.” All judges 
take an oath to uphold the Constitution and apply the law impartially, and we trust that they will 
live up to this promise. We have thus identified only two situations in which the Due Process 
Clause requires disqualification of a judge: when the judge has a financial interest in the 
outcome of the case, and when the judge is presiding over certain types of criminal contempt 
proceedings. 
 
It is well established that a judge may not preside over a case in which he has a “direct, 
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest.” This principle is relatively straightforward, and largely 
tracks the longstanding common-law rule regarding judicial recusal. For example, a defendant’s 
due process rights are violated when he is tried before a judge who is “paid for his service only 
when he convicts the defendant.” 
 
It may also violate due process when a judge presides over a criminal contempt case that 
resulted from the defendant’s hostility towards the judge. In Mayberry, the defendant directed a 
steady stream of expletives and ad hominem attacks at the judge throughout the trial. When that 
defendant was subsequently charged with criminal contempt, we concluded that he “should be 
given a public trial before a judge other than the one reviled by the contemnor.” 
 
Our decisions in this area have also emphasized when the Due Process Clause does not 
require recusal: 
 
All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus matters 
of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest, would seem generally to 
be matters merely of legislative discretion. 
 
Subject to the two well-established exceptions described above, questions of judicial recusal are 
regulated by “common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar.” 
 
In any given case, there are a number of factors that could give rise to a “probability” or 
“appearance” of bias: friendship with a party or lawyer, prior employment experience, 
membership in clubs or associations, prior speeches and writings, religious affiliation, and 
countless other considerations. We have never held that the Due Process Clause requires 
recusal for any of these reasons, even though they could be viewed as presenting a “probability 
of bias.” Many state statutes require recusal based on a probability or appearance of bias, but 
“that alone would not be sufficient basis for imposing a constitutional requirement under the Due 
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Process Clause.” States are, of course, free to adopt broader recusal rules than the Constitution 
requires — and every State has — but these developments are not continuously incorporated 
into the Due Process Clause. 
 
II 
 
In departing from this clear line between when recusal is constitutionally required and when it is 
not, the majority repeatedly emphasizes the need for an “objective” standard. The majority’s 
analysis is “objective” in that it does not inquire into Justice Benjamin’s motives or 
decisionmaking process. But the standard the majority articulates — “probability of bias” — fails 
to provide clear, workable guidance for future cases. At the most basic level, it is unclear 
whether the new probability of bias standard is somehow limited to financial support in judicial 
elections, or applies to judicial recusal questions more generally. 
 
But there are other fundamental questions as well. With little help from the majority, courts will 
now have to determine: 
 
1. How much money is too much money? What level of contribution or expenditure gives 
rise to a “probability of bias”? 
2. How do we determine whether a given expenditure is “disproportionate”? 
Disproportionate to what? 
3. Are independent, non-coordinated expenditures treated the same as direct contributions 
to a candidate's campaign? What about contributions to independent outside groups 
supporting a candidate? 
4. Does it matter whether the litigant has contributed to other candidates or made large 
expenditures in connection with other elections? 
5. Does the amount at issue in the case matter? What if this case were an employment 
dispute with only $10,000 at stake? What if the plaintiffs only sought non-monetary relief 
such as an injunction or declaratory judgment? 
6. Does the analysis change depending on whether the judge whose disqualification is 
sought sits on a trial court, appeals court, or state supreme court? 
7. How long does the probability of bias last? Does the probability of bias diminish over 
time as the election recedes? Does it matter whether the judge plans to run for 
reelection? 
8. What if the “disproportionately” large expenditure is made by an industry association, 
trade union, physicians’ group, or the plaintiffs’ bar? Must the judge recuse in all cases 
that affect the association's interests? Must the judge recuse in all cases in which a party 
or lawyer is a member of that group? Does it matter how much the litigant contributed to 
the association? 
9. What if the case involves a social or ideological issue rather than a financial one? Must a 
judge recuse from cases involving, say, abortion rights if he has received 
“disproportionate” support from individuals who feel strongly about either side of that 
issue? If the supporter wants to help elect judges who are “tough on crime,” must the 
judge recuse in all criminal cases? 
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10. What if the candidate draws “disproportionate” support from a particular racial, religious, 
ethnic, or other group, and the case involves an issue of particular importance to that 
group? 
11. What if the supporter is not a party to the pending or imminent case, but his interests will 
be affected by the decision? Does the Court’s analysis apply if the supporter “chooses 
the judge” not in his case, but in someone else’s? 
12. What if the case implicates a regulatory issue that is of great importance to the party 
making the expenditures, even though he has no direct financial interest in the outcome 
(e.g., a facial challenge to an agency rulemaking or a suit seeking to limit an agency’s 
jurisdiction)? 
13. Must the judge’s vote be outcome determinative in order for his non-recusal to constitute 
a due process violation? 
14. Does the due process analysis consider the underlying merits of the suit? Does it matter 
whether the decision is clearly right (or wrong) as a matter of state law? 
15. What if a lower court decision in favor of the supporter is affirmed on the merits on 
appeal, by a panel with no “debt of gratitude” to the supporter? Does that “moot” the due 
process claim? 
16. What if the judge voted against the supporter in many other cases? 
17. What if the judge disagrees with the supporter’s message or tactics? What if the judge 
expressly disclaims the support of this person? 
18. Should we assume that elected judges feel a “debt of hostility” towards major opponents 
of their candidacies? Must the judge recuse in cases involving individuals or groups who 
spent large amounts of money trying unsuccessfully to defeat him? 
19. If there is independent review of a judge’s recusal decision, e.g., by a panel of other 
judges, does this completely foreclose a due process claim? 
20. Does a debt of gratitude for endorsements by newspapers, interest groups, politicians, 
or celebrities also give rise to a constitutionally unacceptable probability of bias? How 
would we measure whether such support is disproportionate? 
21. Does close personal friendship between a judge and a party or lawyer now give rise to a 
probability of bias? 
22. Does it matter whether the campaign expenditures come from a party or the party’s 
attorney? If from a lawyer, must the judge recuse in every case involving that attorney? 
23. Does what is unconstitutional vary from State to State? What if particular States have a 
history of expensive judicial elections? 
24. Under the majority’s “objective” test, do we analyze the due process issue through the 
lens of a reasonable person, a reasonable lawyer, or a reasonable judge? 
25. What role does causation play in this analysis? The Court sends conflicting signals on 
this point. The majority asserts that “whether Blankenship’s campaign contributions were 
a necessary and sufficient cause of Benjamin's victory is not the proper inquiry.” But 
elsewhere in the opinion, the majority considers “the apparent effect such contribution 
had on the outcome of the election,” and whether the litigant has been able to “choose 
the judge in his own cause.” If causation is a pertinent factor, how do we know whether 
the contribution or expenditure had any effect on the outcome of the election? What if 
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the judge won in a landslide? What if the judge won primarily because of his opponent's 
missteps? 
26. Is the due process analysis less probing for incumbent judges — who typically have a 
great advantage in elections — than for challengers? 
27. How final must the pending case be with respect to the contributor’s interest? What if, for 
example, the only issue on appeal is whether the court should certify a class of 
plaintiffs? Is recusal required just as if the issue in the pending case were ultimate 
liability? 
28. Which cases are implicated by this doctrine? Must the case be pending at the time of the 
election? Reasonably likely to be brought? What about an important but unanticipated 
case filed shortly after the election? 
29. When do we impute a probability of bias from one party to another? Does a contribution 
from a corporation get imputed to its executives, and vice-versa? Does a contribution or 
expenditure by one family member get imputed to other family members? 
30. What if the election is nonpartisan? What if the election is just a yes-or-no vote about 
whether to retain an incumbent? 
31. What type of support is disqualifying? What if the supporter’s expenditures are used to 
fund voter registration or get-out-the-vote efforts rather than television advertisements? 
32. Are contributions or expenditures in connection with a primary aggregated with those in 
the general election? What if the contributor supported a different candidate in the 
primary? Does that dilute the debt of gratitude? 
33. What procedures must be followed to challenge a state judge’s failure to recuse? May 
Caperton claims only be raised on direct review? Or may such claims also be brought in 
federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows a person deprived of a federal 
right by a state official to sue for damages? If § 1983 claims are available, who are the 
proper defendants? The judge? The whole court? The clerk of court? 
34. What about state-court cases that are already closed? Can the losing parties in those 
cases now seek collateral relief in federal district court under § 1983? What statutes of 
limitation should be applied to such suits? 
35. What is the proper remedy? After a successful Caperton motion, must the parties start 
from scratch before the lower courts? Is any part of the lower court judgment retained? 
36. Does a litigant waive his due process claim if he waits until after decision to raise it? Or 
would the claim only be ripe after decision, when the judge's actions or vote suggest a 
probability of bias? 
37. Are the parties entitled to discovery with respect to the judge’s recusal decision? 
38. If a judge erroneously fails to recuse, do we apply harmless-error review? 
39. Does the judge get to respond to the allegation that he is probably biased, or is his 
reputation solely in the hands of the parties to the case? 
40. What if the parties settle a Caperton claim as part of a broader settlement of the case? 
Does that leave the judge with no way to salvage his reputation? 
 
These are only a few uncertainties that quickly come to mind. Judges and litigants will surely 
encounter others when they are forced to, or wish to, apply the majority’s decision in different 
circumstances. Today’s opinion requires state and federal judges simultaneously to act as 
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political scientists (why did candidate X win the election?), economists (was the financial 
support disproportionate?), and psychologists (is there likely to be a debt of gratitude?). 
 
The Court's inability to formulate a “judicially discernible and manageable standard” strongly 
counsels against the recognition of a novel constitutional right. The need to consider these and 
countless other questions helps explain why the common law and this Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence have never required disqualification on such vague grounds as “probability” or 
“appearance” of bias. 
 
III 
 
A 
 
To its credit, the Court seems to recognize that the inherently boundless nature of its new rule 
poses a problem. But the majority’s only answer is that the present case is an “extreme” one, so 
there is no need to worry about other cases. The Court repeats this point over and over. 
 
But this is just so much whistling past the graveyard. Claims that have little chance of success 
are nonetheless frequently filed. The success rate for certiorari petitions before this Court is 
approximately 1.1%, and yet the previous Term some 8,241 were filed. Every one of the 
“Caperton motions” or appeals or § 1983 actions will claim that the judge is biased, or probably 
biased, bringing the judge and the judicial system into disrepute. And all future litigants will 
assert that their case is really the most extreme thus far. 
 
Extreme cases often test the bounds of established legal principles. There is a cost to yielding 
to the desire to correct the extreme case, rather than adhering to the legal principle. That cost 
has been demonstrated so often that it is captured in a legal aphorism: “Hard cases make bad 
law.” 
 
Consider the cautionary tale of our decisions in United States v. Halper and Hudson v. United 
States. Historically, we have held that the Double Jeopardy Clause only applies to criminal 
penalties, not civil ones. But in Halper, the Court held that a civil penalty could violate the 
Clause if it were “overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages the defendant has caused” 
and resulted in a “clear injustice.” We acknowledged that this inquiry would not be an “exact 
pursuit,” but the Court assured litigants that it was only announcing “a rule for the rare case, the 
case such as the one before us.” 
 
Just eight years later, we granted certiorari in Hudson “because of concerns about the wide 
variety of novel double jeopardy claims spawned in the wake of Halper.” The novel claim that 
we had recognized in Halper turned out not to be so “rare” after all, and the test we adopted in 
that case — “overwhelmingly disproportionate” — had “proved unworkable.” We thus 
abandoned the Halper rule, ruing our “ill considered” “deviation from longstanding double 
jeopardy principles.” 
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The déjà vu is enough to make one swoon. Today, the majority again departs from a clear, 
longstanding constitutional rule to accommodate an “extreme” case involving “grossly 
disproportionate” amounts of money. I believe we will come to regret this decision as well, when 
courts are forced to deal with a wide variety of Caperton motions, each claiming the title of 
“most extreme” or “most disproportionate.” 
 
B 
 
And why is the Court so convinced that this is an extreme case? It is true that Don Blankenship 
spent a large amount of money in connection with this election. But this point cannot be 
emphasized strongly enough: Other than a $1,000 direct contribution from Blankenship, Justice 
Benjamin and his campaign had no control over how this money was spent. Campaigns go to 
great lengths to develop precise messages and strategies. An insensitive or ham-handed ad 
campaign by an independent third party might distort the campaign's message or cause a 
backlash against the candidate, even though the candidate was not responsible for the ads. The 
majority repeatedly characterizes Blankenship’s spending as “contributions” or “campaign 
contributions,” but it is more accurate to refer to them as “independent expenditures.” 
Blankenship only “contributed” $1,000 to the Benjamin campaign. 
 
Moreover, Blankenship’s independent expenditures do not appear “grossly disproportionate” 
compared to other such expenditures in this very election. “And for the Sake of the Kids” — an 
independent group that received approximately two-thirds of its funding from Blankenship — 
spent $3,623,500 in connection with the election. But large independent expenditures were also 
made in support of Justice Benjamin’s opponent. “Consumers for Justice” — an independent 
group that received large contributions from the plaintiffs’ bar — spent approximately $2 million 
in this race. And Blankenship has made large expenditures in connection with several previous 
West Virginia elections, which undercuts any notion that his involvement in this election was 
“intended to influence the outcome” of particular pending litigation. 
 
It is also far from clear that Blankenship’s expenditures affected the outcome of this election. 
Justice Benjamin won by a comfortable 7-point margin (53.3% to 46.7%). Many observers 
believed that Justice Benjamin’s opponent doomed his candidacy by giving a well-publicized 
speech that made several curious allegations; this speech was described in the local media as 
“deeply disturbing” and worse. Justice Benjamin’s opponent also refused to give interviews or 
participate in debates. All but one of the major West Virginia newspapers endorsed Justice 
Benjamin. Justice Benjamin just might have won because the voters of West Virginia thought he 
would be a better judge than his opponent. Unlike the majority, I cannot say with any degree of 
certainty that Blankenship “chose the judge in his own cause.” I would give the voters of West 
Virginia more credit than that. 
 
It is an old cliché, but sometimes the cure is worse than the disease. I am sure there are cases 
where a “probability of bias” should lead the prudent judge to step aside, but the judge fails to 
do so. Maybe this is one of them. But I believe that opening the door to recusal claims under the 
Due Process Clause, for an amorphous “probability of bias,” will itself bring our judicial system 
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into undeserved disrepute, and diminish the confidence of the American people in the fairness 
and integrity of their courts. I hope I am wrong. 
 
Justice SCALIA, dissenting. 
 
The principal purpose of this Court's exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction is to clarify the law. As 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s dissent makes painfully clear, the principal consequence of today’s 
decision is to create vast uncertainty with respect to a point of law that can be raised in all 
litigated cases in (at least) those 39 States that elect their judges. This course was urged upon 
us on grounds that it would preserve the public’s confidence in the judicial system. 
 
The decision will have the opposite effect. What above all else is eroding public confidence in 
the Nation’s judicial system is the perception that litigation is just a game, that the party with the 
most resourceful lawyer can play it to win, that our seemingly interminable legal proceedings are 
wonderfully self-perpetuating but incapable of delivering real-world justice. The Court’s opinion 
will reinforce that perception, adding to the vast arsenal of lawyerly gambits what will come to be 
known as the Caperton claim. The facts relevant to adjudicating it will have to be litigated — and 
likewise the law governing it, which will be indeterminate for years to come, if not forever. Many 
billable hours will be spent in poring through volumes of campaign finance reports, and many 
more in contesting nonrecusal decisions through every available means. 
 
A Talmudic maxim instructs with respect to the Scripture: “Turn it over, and turn it over, for all is 
therein.” Divinely inspired text may contain the answers to all earthly questions, but the Due 
Process Clause most assuredly does not. The Court today continues its quixotic quest to right 
all wrongs and repair all imperfections through the Constitution. Alas, the quest cannot succeed 
— which is why some wrongs and imperfections have been called nonjusticiable. In the best of 
all possible worlds, should judges sometimes recuse even where the clear commands of our 
prior due process law do not require it? Undoubtedly. The relevant question, however, is 
whether we do more good than harm by seeking to correct this imperfection through expansion 
of our constitutional mandate in a manner ungoverned by any discernable rule. The answer is 
obvious. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. You can watch some of the television advertisements that Don Blankenship and “And 
For the Sake of the Kids” ran opposing Justice Warren McGraw here, here, here, here, 
here, here, here, here, and here. In 2009, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia reheard the appeal, with Justice Benjamin recused, and once again overturned 
the lower court verdict, holding 4-1 that the contract required Caperton to file his action 
in Virginia. Caperton refiled his action in Virginia, where it is still pending. The  
2. On April 5, 2010, an explosion at Massey’s Upper Big Branch mine killed 29 miners. In 
the wake of the disaster, Blankenship resigned as CEO of Massey. On December 6, 
2011, Mine Safety and Health Administration concluded that flagrant safety violations 
contributed to a coal dust explosion, and imposed $10.8 million in penalties on Massey. 
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Blankenship was indicted on criminal charges, convicted of misdemeanor conspiracy to 
violate federal mine safety standards, and sentenced to one year in prison. Caperton’s 
action against Massey and the Upper Big Branch disaster were widely reported, 
including in the New York Times, the Daily Beast, Mother Jones, and elsewhere. 
3. After his release from prison, Blankenship became a Republican candidate for the 
United States Senate in West Virginia in 2018, but lost in the primary. You can see one 
of his campaign ads, in which he refers to Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell as 
“Cocaine Mitch” and makes other questionable comments here. When Blankenship lost, 
the McConnell campaign tweeted the following image. 
 
 
 
4. In Caperton v. Massey, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion held that due process 
requires recusal when the facts present a “serious, objective risk of actual bias.” The 
Roberts and Scalia dissents argued that the standard adopted by the majority is 
meaningless and unworkable, and would erode public confidence in the judiciary. Which 
argument do you find more compelling? 
 
Further Reading: 
 
● Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Disqualification: An Analysis of Federal Law, Federal 
Judicial Center (2010) 
● John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 Yale L.J. 605 (1947) 
● Hearing on Examining the State of Judicial Recusals after Caperton v. A.T. Massey, 
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) 
● Bruce A. Green, Fear of the Unknown: Judicial Ethics after Caperton, 60 Syracuse L. 
Rev. 229 (2010) 
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● Jeffrey W. Stempel, Playing Forty Questions: Responding to Justice Roberts’ Concerns 
in Caperton and Some Tentative Answers About Operationalizing Judicial Recusal and 
Due Process, 39 Southwestern L. Rev. 1 (2009) 
● Pamela S. Karlan, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons of Caperton, 
123 Harv. L. Rev. 80 (2009) 
● Kenneth L. Karst, Caperton's Amici, 33 Seattle U. L. Rev. 633 (2010) 
● Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Disqualification in the Aftermath of Caperton v. A.T. Massey 
Coal Co., 60 Syracuse L. Rev. 247 (2010) 
● Jed H. Shugerman, In Defense of Appearances: What Caperton v. Massey Should Have 
Said, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 529 (2010) 
 
Judicial Misconduct 
 
Order, now my court is in session, will you please stand? First, allow me to introduce myself, my 
name is Judge Hundredyears. Some people call me Judge Dread. Now, I have come here to 
whoop you, to try all you rudeboys for shooting black people. In my court only we talk, cause I’m 
vexed, and I am the rudeboy today.129 
 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct: Canon 2 
 
A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially, competently, and diligently. 
 
Model Rule 2.3: Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment 
 
A. A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office, including administrative duties, without 
bias or prejudice. 
B. A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest 
bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment, including but not limited to bias, prejudice, or 
harassment based upon race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, 
age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation, and 
shall not permit court staff, court officials, or others subject to the judge’s direction and 
control to do so. 
C. A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting 
bias or prejudice, or engaging in harassment, based upon attributes including but not 
limited to race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual 
orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation, against parties, 
witnesses, lawyers, or others. 
D. The restrictions of paragraphs (B) and (C) do not preclude judges or lawyers from 
making legitimate reference to the listed factors, or similar factors, when they are 
relevant to an issue in a proceeding. 
 
																																																								
129 Prince Buster (Cecil Bustamente Campbell / Muhammed Yusef Ali), Judge Dread (1967). 
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Judge Alvin D. Lichtenstein (1984) 
 
In re Inquiry Concerning Lichtenstein, 685 P. 2d 204 (Colo. 1984) 
 
Summary: Burns shot and killed his wife when he learned she was planning to leave 
him, and pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. At the sentencing hearing, Judge 
Lichtenstein observed, among other things, that Burns’s mental state was affected by 
“highly provoking acts on the part of the victim,” and imposed a two-year work release 
sentence. The Commission on Judicial Discipline found misconduct and recommended a 
public reprimand. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the recommendation and 
dismissed the complaint. 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Pursuant to Article VI, Section 23(3)(e) of the Colorado Constitution, the Commission on Judicial 
Discipline certified the record of these proceedings to this court and recommended that a public 
reprimand be issued to District Judge Alvin D. Lichtenstein because he violated Canon 2A of the 
Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct. Having reviewed the record of the proceedings, we 
conclude that the conduct of Judge Lichtenstein did not violate Canon 2A of the Code. We 
therefore reject the Commission’s recommendation of a public reprimand and return the case to 
the Commission with directions to dismiss the complaint. 
 
I. 
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On December 5, 1983, a formal complaint was filed with the Commission, alleging that on June 
22, 1983, while serving as a district judge in the Denver District Court and presiding over a 
criminal action, Judge Lichtenstein made remarks during a sentencing hearing which 
“undermined public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” and “tended to 
bring the judiciary into disrepute” in violation of Canon 2A of the Code.130 The facts are not in 
dispute. Judge Lichtenstein was appointed a district judge of the Second Judicial District on 
January 4, 1978. In November 1980 he was elected to serve a six year term and is currently 
serving that term of office. During the events in question he was assigned to the criminal 
division of the Denver District Court. As part of his judicial responsibilities, Judge Lichtenstein 
heard various motions in the case of People v. Clarence Burns, in which Burns was charged 
with the first degree murder of his wife on August 15, 1982. During the pendency of the case, 
the defendant filed a motion to suppress a confession, which was heard by Judge Lichtenstein 
on April 4, 1983. Various witnesses testified at the suppression hearing, including a clinical 
psychologist who described the defendant's condition on August 15, the day of the shooting, as 
one of severe and suicidal depression resulting from the fact that he and his wife had separated 
earlier in the month. The judge granted the motion, ruling that the defendant’s state of 
depression preexisted and continued after his arrest and “caused a cognitive impairment which 
prevented the Defendant from understanding his Miranda rights and from intelligently waiving 
them.” Thereafter, a plea agreement was reached between the defendant and the district 
attorney’s office and, on May 2, 1983, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to second degree 
murder in exchange for a dismissal of the first degree murder charge. The defendant’s guilty 
plea was accepted, and the case was continued for a sentencing hearing on June 22, 1983. 
 
During the sentencing hearing the judge received the stipulated testimony of one witness, 
considered the testimony of five additional witnesses, reviewed the videotaped deposition of the 
defendant’s and victim’s fifteen-year-old son, and considered the statements of counsel. Judge 
Lichtenstein began his remarks by stating that he had thoroughly reviewed the presentence 
report and had considered the matters presented by both sides during the sentencing hearing. 
Noting that Colorado case law required him to state on the record the reasons for the imposition 
of a sentence, the judge proceeded to describe the various degrees of homicide, the 
presumptive sentence of eight to twelve years for second degree murder, the statutory provision 
authorizing a sentence outside the presumptive range for extraordinary mitigating or 
aggravating circumstances, and concluded that extraordinary mitigating circumstances existed 
in this case. After stating that he was incorporating the specific findings of fact which he had 
previously made in ruling on the defendant’s motion to suppress, the judge found that the 
defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct was significantly impaired by 
a state of severe depression arising from his inability to understand why his wife had left him. 
																																																								
130 After the formal complaint was filed and during the preliminary investigation of this matter by the 
Commission, other complaints were filed alleging that Judge Lichtenstein exhibited a bias in favor of 
criminal defendants, particularly those who allegedly committed crimes against women, and that he had a 
bias against women. These charges were investigated by the Commission and found to be without 
substance or merit. We therefore limit our consideration to the sentencing remarks made by Judge 
Lichtenstein. 
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The judge then made the following remarks which formed the basis of the formal complaint filed 
against him: 
 
The Court finds that this mental state, his mental and emotional condition, combined with 
the sudden heat of passion caused by a series of highly provoking acts on the part of the 
victim of leaving him without any warning; in fact, based on the testimony that the Court 
has heard, in a sense deceiving him as to her intentions by being extremely loving and 
caring up to and through the morning that she left the family home with the full intention 
of obtaining a divorce and proceeding with a separation from him without even giving 
him any knowledge of her whereabouts or that of their son, the Court finds that this 
affected the Defendant sufficiently so that it excited an irresistible passion as it would in 
any reasonable person under the circumstances and, consequently, would warrant a 
sentence under the extraordinary mitigating terms of the statute. 
 
The judge imposed a sentence of four years plus one year of parole, suspended the sentence, 
and ordered the defendant to undergo supervision by the Probation Department under various 
conditions including a two-year work release sentence to the county jail and the successful 
completion of a program of psychotherapy.131 The sentencing comments of the judge and the 
four-year suspended sentence generated extensive publicity. The formal complaint was 
thereafter filed with the Commission. 
 
The Commission found that Judge Lichtenstein’s sentencing remarks “did not convey his 
intended meaning, and, as a direct result, the public questioned his impartiality on the bench 
and his ability and willingness to faithfully adhere to the law.” The Commission concluded that, 
although not constituting willful misconduct, the judge’s remarks nonetheless violated Canon 2A 
by bringing the judiciary into disrepute and undermining public confidence in the integrity and 
impartiality of the judiciary. The Commission, with three members dissenting, recommended a 
public reprimand. 
 
II. 
 
Because we have not previously addressed the matter of judicial discipline under Article VI, 
Section 23 of the Colorado Constitution, we take this occasion to delineate the constitutional 
basis of our responsibility in this matter. Article VI, Section 23(3), which became effective on 
July 1, 1983, states in pertinent part: 
 
																																																								
131 After the sentencing hearing, the judge on June 28, 1983, sua sponte, vacated the suspended 
sentence and imposed a sentence of four years imprisonment plus one year of parole. Thereafter, the 
defendant and the district attorney filed original proceedings in this court directed to the June 22 and June 
28 sentences. The defendant requested that the sentence of June 28 be vacated and that the original 
sentence of June 22 be reinstated. The district attorney, on the other hand, requested that both 
sentences be vacated and that the district judge be directed to impose a sentence within the aggravated 
range or at least a sentence within the presumptive range for second degree murder. We held that the 
sentence of June 22 was an illegal sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.  
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(d) A justice or judge of any court of record of this state, in accordance with the 
procedure set forth in this subsection (3), may be removed or disciplined for willful 
misconduct in office, willful or persistent failure to perform his duties, intemperance, or 
violation of any canon of the Colorado code of judicial conduct, or he may be retired for 
disability interfering with the performance of his duties which is, or is likely to become, of 
a permanent character. 
 
(e) The commission may, after such investigation as it deems necessary, order informal 
remedial action; order a formal hearing to be held before it concerning the removal, 
retirement, suspension, censure, reprimand, or other discipline of a justice or a judge; or 
request the supreme court to appoint three special masters, who shall be justices or 
judges of courts of record, to hear and take evidence in any such matter and to report 
thereon to the commission. After a formal hearing or after considering the record and 
report of the masters, if the commission finds good cause therefor, it may take informal 
remedial action, or it may recommend to the supreme court the removal, retirement, 
suspension, censure, reprimand, or discipline, as the case may be, of the justice or 
judge. The commission may also recommend that the costs of its investigation and 
hearing be assessed against such justice or judge. 
 
(f) Following receipt of a recommendation from the commission, the supreme court shall 
review the record of the proceedings on the law and facts and in its discretion may 
permit the introduction of additional evidence and shall order removal, retirement, 
suspension, censure, reprimand, or discipline, as it finds just and proper, or wholly reject 
the recommendation. Upon an order for retirement, the justice or judge shall thereby be 
retired with the same rights and privileges as if he retired pursuant to statute. Upon an 
order for removal, the justice or judge shall thereby be removed from office, and his 
salary shall cease from the date of such order. On the entry of an order for retirement or 
for removal of a judge, his office shall be deemed vacant. 
 
(g) Prior to the filing of a recommendation to the supreme court by the commission 
against any justice or judge, all papers filed with and proceedings before the commission 
on judicial discipline or masters appointed by the supreme court, pursuant to this 
subsection (3), shall be confidential, and the filing of papers with and the giving of 
testimony before the commission or the masters shall be privileged; but no other 
publication of such papers or proceedings shall be privileged in any action for 
defamation; except that the record filed by the commission in the supreme court 
continues privileged and a writing which was privileged prior to its filing with the 
commission or the masters does not lose such privilege by such filing. 
 
III. 
 
Canon 2A of the Code states that “a judge should respect and comply with the law and should 
conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and 
impartiality of the judiciary.” This canon includes within its scope statements made by a judge 
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during judicial proceedings. Judicial misconduct creating the need for discipline may thus arise 
from the same source as judicial conduct that is within the scope of appellate review. The 
former seeks to prevent potential prejudice to the judicial system itself, while the latter seeks to 
correct erroneous legal rulings prejudicial to a particular party. 
 
The question of whether Judge Lichtenstein's remarks were violative of Canon 2A must be 
evaluated in the context of the entire sentencing hearing. Section 18-1-105(7), which was 
applicable to the sentencing hearing in issue, requires a judge in imposing a sentence outside 
the presumptive range to “make specific findings on the record of the case, detailing the specific 
extraordinary circumstances which constitute the reasons for varying from the presumptive 
sentence.” Judge Lichtenstein’s remarks were made in an effort to place on record the 
extraordinary mitigating circumstances that he believed justified a sentence below the 
presumptive sentence of eight to twelve years applicable to second degree murder. The judge 
was attempting to describe how the victim’s conduct, as perceived and interpreted by the 
defendant, brought about an emotional state in the defendant similar to the “irresistible passion” 
required for voluntary manslaughter. Although the sentencing comments contain some 
phraseology which, when read in isolation, might have offended the sensibilities of others, the 
full context of the sentencing hearing indicates that the choice of words was no more than an 
awkwardly executed effort to place on record the confused and highly emotional state of the 
defendant at the time of the killing, which, in the judge’s opinion, constituted a mitigating 
circumstance justifying a sentence below the presumptive range. The judge’s comments were 
not intended to be disrespectful of the law, the victim, or anyone else; nor do they reasonably 
lend themselves to such a connotation in the full context of the hearing. We thus conclude that 
the judge’s remarks were not such as to bring the judiciary into disrepute or to undermine public 
confidence in the integrity or impartiality of the judicial system within the intendment of Canon 
2A. 
 
The recommendation of the Commission for a public reprimand is rejected and the case is 
returned to the Commission with directions to dismiss the formal complaint. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. On August 15, 1982, Clarence Burns shot and killed his estranged wife Patricia Ann 
Burns. Burns saw Patricia Ann’s car parked near her parents’ house, and climbed into 
the trunk. Eventually, she drove their son Darren to her new apartment. When they 
arrived, Burns emerged from the trunk and followed them into the apartment. An 
argument ensued, and Burns shot Patricia Ann five times in the face, killing her. 
Lichtenstein’s comments provoked considerable outrage and were widely reported, 
including in the New York Times. Burns was eventually sentenced to 10 years in prison, 
and served 6. You can watch a short video about the case here. After the misconduct 
investigation, Lichtenstein requested and received a transfer to civil court. However, he 
continued to hear criminal cases on occasion, and made some other controversial 
decisions. In 2000, the Colorado Criminal Defense Bar established the Alvin D. 
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Lichtenstein Award “for remarkable accomplishments over a lifetime of distinguished 
service.” 
2. Was the objection to Lichtenstein’s conduct the sentence he imposed, his explanation of 
the sentence, or both? Should judges be censured for imposing lenient sentences? 
3. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the Commission’s recommendation to reprimand 
Lichtenstein. Do you agree with its decision? Why or why not? 
 
Further Reading: 
 
● Cynthia Gray, The Line Between Legal Error and Judicial Misconduct: Balancing Judicial 
Independence and Accountability, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 1245 (2004) 
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Section 8: Justifying the Rules of Professional Responsibility 
 
8.1: Theories of Legal Ethics 
 
Me and Franky laughing and drinking, nothing feels better than blood on blood. Taking turns 
dancing with Maria, as the band played, “Night of the Johnstown Flood.” I catch him when he’s 
straying, like any brother would. Man turns his back on his family, he just ain’t no good.132 
 
In one form or another, lawyers have existed since time immemorial. The very formation of a 
system for dispensing justice seems to summon forth the need for advocates to represent those 
requesting it. And as long as lawyers have existed, we have debated the ethics of lawyering. On 
the one hand, we believe that people are entitled to zealous representation by counsel, in order 
to ensure that their rights and interests are respected. But on the other, we question the ethics 
of a profession that exists in order to set aside the morals of society in favor of a client. 
 
While philosophers have long struggled with legal ethics, the jurisprudential study of legal ethics 
is still in its infancy. The following excepts provide an eclectic selection of perspectives on 
modern philosophical legal ethics, beginning with a historical survey, and continuing with 
representative examples from canonical works. 
 
David Luban & W. Bradley Wendel, Philosophical Legal Ethics: An Affectionate History, 
30 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 337 (2017) 
 
We identify two “waves” of theoretical legal ethics scholarship, one that views the profession 
through the lens of moral philosophy, and a later wave that criticizes the moral philosophy 
orientation and approaches the profession through political philosophy. Roughly (but only 
roughly), the first wave focuses on the individual lawyer as a moral agent, and addresses the 
moral tension between ethical life and the lawyer’s role morality. The second wave focuses 
instead on legal representation as a political institution within a pluralist democracy, and links 
legal ethics to the requirements necessary for the profession to help sustain pluralist institutions. 
Chronologically, the first wave began in the 1970s and the second wave in the 2000s-but this 
too is very rough: the two schools of thought overlap in time more than the “two waves” 
metaphor suggests. 
 
The First Wave: Legal Ethics as a Problem of Moral Philosophy 
 
The first wave of scholarship and reflection grew out of the larger social and political ferment in 
the 1960s and 1970s. This was the time of the civil rights movement, the time of Martin Luther 
King Jr. and Malcolm X and the struggle for racial equality. It was also the beginning of the 
modern feminist movement. Importantly, it was also the time of the Vietnam War and the anti-
war movement. To a great many people, young and old but mostly young, the Vietnam War 
proved, once and for all, the moral bankruptcy of American Cold War liberalism, with its slow 
																																																								
132 Bruce Springsteen, Highway Patrolman, Nebraska (1982). 
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progress on equality at home and its aggressive interventions abroad. That led to powerful 
political mistrust of the Establishment. This was also the era of the counter-culture. Notably, the 
counter-culture rebelled against conformism and careerism, which they thought were soul-
deadening. Institutions became suspect, and that included legal institutions. Individual 
conscience, according to this world-view, must always trump institutional demands. 
 
The widespread attitude of all these movements, both the political and the cultural, was 
therefore anti-authoritarian and intensely moralistic. Looking back, we can say that perhaps the 
movements lacked a political vision-like many social movements, they knew what they were 
against without knowing exactly what they were for. No doubt the movements were also too 
moralistic and too self-righteous. The fact remains that in this time of turmoil, an anti-authority 
stance seemed to many people like the bare minimum that human decency required. 
 
The law schools were hardly immune to these larger currents in U.S. society. The New Left in 
the legal academy was active by the mid-1970s, and in 1977 the Conference on Critical Legal 
Studies held its first organizational meetings. Critical Legal Studies aimed at a radical critique of 
legal institutions based on the fundamentally moral ground that the law had become an enemy 
of an authentic and empathetic community. 
 
The Critique of the “Standard Neutral Partisanship Conception 
 
Notably, two of the founding scholars of theoretical legal ethics identified with the left social 
movements of the time. In 1975, Richard Wasserstrom published a paper, titled “Lawyers as 
Professionals: Some Moral Issues,” that launched philosophical legal ethics. Wasserstrom 
worried that the lawyer’s role “renders the lawyer at best systematically amoral and at worst 
more than occasionally immoral in his or her dealings with the rest of mankind,” and he 
questioned whether one-sided loyalty to clients can be reconciled with the universalism inherent 
in the moral point of view. Remember that Kant claimed that every human being, indeed every 
rational being, must be treated as an end in him- or herself, not merely a means to your own 
end. By contrast, the lawyer’s job is to treat the client as an end in himself, but nobody else. 
 
Three years later, William Simon, a young law professor associated with Critical Legal Studies, 
published a brilliant 100-page article, titled "The Ideology of Advocacy." It was a fierce critique of 
traditional advocacy ethics. He began by providing the first precise definition of what has been 
called the “neutral partisanship” model or the “standard conception” of legal ethics. The 
standard 
conception, which was the target of much of the critical attention by philosophers in the 
emerging legal ethics scholarship, generally lists three principles: (1) partisanship (zealously 
pursuing the client’s lawful interests); (2) neutrality (not taking sides regarding the moral merits 
of the client’s ends); and (3) nonaccountability (being exempt from moral criticism for having 
helped another act immorally). Simon reviewed the main positions in U.S. legal thought that 
tried to justify the standard conception - legal realism, legal process theory, and the defense of 
client autonomy - and argued that none of them succeeds. Furthermore, he warned that by 
surrounding the law with a fog of technicality and mystique that only legal experts can 
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understand, lawyers alienate their clients from the law. They substitute their own definitions of 
client problems for the subjective experiences of the client. In place of professionalized 
advocacy, Simon proposed a kind of deprofessionalization, where the lawyer’s personal 
moral convictions would play a central role in determining how far to go on the client’s behalf. 
 
There followed a veritable flood of writing on the themes that Wasserstrom, Simon, and a 
handful of others introduced. This was what we call the “First Wave” of legal ethics scholarship. 
It felt like a time of discovery - a time in which real intellectual progress was being made on 
some of the deepest questions in moral and legal philosophy. Instead of asking abstract 
conceptual questions, scholars were looking at the working lives of lawyers, and that seemed 
like exactly the right direction to go. It still seems that way. Stanford law professor Deborah L. 
Rhode, another influential First Wave scholar, combined theory and sophisticated 
multidisciplinary analysis of regulatory issues such as the bar’s moral character requirement and 
its prohibition on unauthorized practice. Moreover, she gave attention to the necessary 
institutional aspects of the emerging field, such as casebooks, professional centers, and 
mentoring junior scholars. Rhode and Carrie Menkel-Meadow were also among the first 
theorists to bring an explicitly feminist perspective to legal ethics. Harvard law professor 
David Wilkins situated legal ethics within American legal thought more generally, including the 
law and economics, legal process, and, importantly, legal realist traditions. Wilkins also raised 
crucial questions about the connections between race and role - asking, for example, whether a 
black lawyer could, as a moral matter, represent the Ku Klux Klan. 
 
Also during the First Wave of scholarship, religiously affiliated scholars, most prominently 
Thomas Shaffer, asked about how specifically Christian lawyers should act within their role. 
(Scholars writing from the Jewish tradition have posed similar questions.) A Christian lawyer 
may wonder, for example, whether it is possible to be a lawyer without being involved in the 
fallenness of all human institutions, including the law. 
 
Defenders of a (More or Less) Standard Conception 
 
Not everyone in the First Wave of philosophical legal ethics was a critic of the standard 
conception. Traditional advocacy also had its defenders. A first, and deeply original, defense 
was offered by Charles Fried, who coined the striking metaphor of the “Lawyer as Friend.” Fried 
argued that a lawyer is like a special-purpose friend of the client. Morality allows us to favor our 
friends over other people, as long as we don’t violate the rights of third parties. Relationships 
with certain individuals - paradigmatically, family and friends - become important, constitutive 
aspects of a person's life. It follows that morality permits us to favor the interests of those with 
whom we are in particularly close, personal relationships over the more abstract commitment to 
the well-being of humanity as a whole. As the client’s friend, the lawyer adopts the client’s 
interests as his own, for adopting your friend’s interests as your own is part of the classical 
definition of friendship. Furthermore, because the lawyer works within a legal system, she is not 
directly responsible for damaging outcomes the system produces - “the wrong is wholly 
institutional,” in Fried’s words. It is not a personal wrongdoing by the lawyer. As the saying goes, 
“don’t hate the player - hate the game.” 
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In response, Fried’s critics argued that he drew the wrong conclusion from his “lawyer as friend” 
analogy. One pointed out that if you adopt your friend’s interests as your own, that makes you 
morally responsible for them. Simon went even further in criticizing Fried. Emphasizing that 
normally the lawyer takes money for becoming the client’s friend, Simon complained that Fried 
had given the classical definition not of friendship, but of prostitution. Dauer and Leff believe that 
Fried’s conception of friendship - adopting the friend’s interests as your own - captures only a 
thin slice of what friendship is about, and the result is that “a lawyer is like a friend because, for 
Professor Fried, a friend is like a lawyer.” Despite these critiques, many lawyers today continue 
to see the attraction of Fried's vision, because it corresponds with an authentic experience 
of representing clients. 
 
A second powerful defense of the standard conception emphasizes that lawyers enhance their 
clients’ autonomy before the law. An autonomous person chooses her own ends. The lawyer’s 
role is to assist clients in doing what they have every right to do: pursue their ends to the limit 
set by the law, even if the lawyer thinks the client's ends are reprehensible. Assisting clients this 
way is an essential job in a rule of law regime, because the law is opaque and hard for 
laypeople to understand. All the lawyer is doing is helping clients do what they have 
autonomously chosen to do, and which the law permits them to do. That is clearly a good thing 
and a noble calling. 
 
The late Monroe Freedman gave the autonomy argument a distinctive grounding in the 
American Constitution, which may have limited the influence of his work internationally, but 
which resonates powerfully with lawyers, particularly the criminal defense bar. For Freedman, 
the criminal defender’s all-in ethic of adversarial zeal on behalf of the client is grounded in the 
Fifth Amendment right to due process and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel - and, 
ultimately, the individual’s autonomy rights against state force that these doctrines embody. In 
his famous paper on the “three hardest questions” for criminal defense lawyers, Freedman 
argued that the duties owed to clients - confidentiality and competent representation - should 
have priority over the duty of candor to the tribunal. Lawyers, therefore, should permit clients to 
testify perjuriously. This position was so scandalous that then D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
Chief Judge Warren Burger, along with two other federal judges, actually filed disciplinary 
grievances against him. But Freedman never wavered from the view that, if a lawyer’s 
obligations are in conflict, then the duty to protect her clients should take precedence. 
 
The First Wave highlighted a third defense of the standard conception, which has its origins in 
the adversarial structure of adjudication. Adversary argument seems like the best way to find 
the truth, and partisan advocacy seems like the best way to defend the individual’s rights - or so 
the argument goes. The search for truth and the defense of rights are social goods of enormous 
importance. If partisan advocates are essential instruments for finding truth and defending 
rights, shouldn’t that be enough to justify the lawyer’s role? 
 
The problem with the adversary system excuse is that it is only as good as the adversary 
system, which is an imperfect truth-seeker and rights-defender. Adversarial argument works 
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best when lawyers are arguing issues of law, not issues of fact. When judges decide questions 
of law, hearing both sides of the questions argued in their most forceful form will almost certainly 
help the judges decide more intelligently. In purely legal arguments there are no confidences or 
secrets to conceal and no witnesses to impeach - there is a relatively pure dialectic of 
arguments carried on in the open. 
 
It is different when lawyers argue about factual matters. There, the advocate’s job is to protect 
the client's secrets and cast doubt on the other side’s evidence - even if the advocate knows 
that the truth lies with the other side. Does a system with that design feature do a good job of 
finding truth? There are reasons to doubt that it does. 
 
To summarize the First Wave of theoretical scholarship in four sentences, it holds: 
 
1. Legal ethics is not only a matter of legal doctrine; at its most basic level, it is a subject in 
moral philosophy. 
2. The principal question it must answer is how to reconcile the lawyer’s professional role 
morality with “ordinary” or “common” morality, when they seemingly conflict. 
3. The role morality centrally involves a “standard” conception, according to which lawyers 
must zealously advance the client’s lawful ends, while maintaining moral neutrality 
toward those ends and the lawful means used to pursue them - and, furthermore, that 
lawyers are morally unaccountable for any “collateral damage” they inflict in their 
representation. 
4. The arguments about role morality circle around the moral importance of the client-
lawyer relationship, the value of client autonomy, and the moral significance of the 
adversary system. 
 
The Second Wave: From Moral to Political Philosophy 
 
Second Wave accounts begin with the political purpose of the legal system in a pluralist society. 
By a pluralist society, we mean a society of people with many different, sometimes competing, 
moral and religious beliefs. Concrete decisions must be made about a wide range of matters of 
importance to the community, yet citizens of that community disagree about what constitutes a 
good life, what ends are worth pursuing, and what facts bear on the resolution of these 
controversies. Such a society faces what Rawls calls the burdens of judgment. If pluralism 
means anything, it is that rational people’s judgments, even about very basic matters, cannot be 
expected to agree - hence the “burden” that judgment carries, namely that reason and rationality 
do not yield unique right answers on contested moral and political questions. 
 
Of course, a lawyer has a right to refuse a client on moral grounds. But refusal should be an 
exceptional event. Otherwise, lawyers are imposing their own moral views on their clients, and 
when they do that they are dishonoring the pluralism of society - the very same pluralism that 
democratic legal systems exist to preserve. Preserving pluralism provides a powerful reason for 
a lawyer not to engage in moral deliberation about the client’s ends or the lawful means used to 
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pursue it. In the language of legal theory, it is an “exclusionary reason” - a second-order reason 
not to engage in first-order moral deliberation. 
 
Less theoretically, respecting the institutional settlement is what practicing lawyers believe they 
are doing. Lawyers and practically-minded legal scholars have sometimes expressed 
annoyance at what they take to be philosophers’ broad-brush condemnation of advocacy as 
morally unjustified. One of the motivations behind Second Wave legal ethics scholarship was to 
take seriously the possibility that lawyers may be fully justified in doing what they do, even when 
it “looks nasty,” and then try to work out a philosophical explanation of how that could be the 
case. 
 
These are the fundamental arguments of the Second Wave of philosophical legal ethics, in 
three sentences: 
 
1. Legal ethics is a subject in political philosophy, not moral philosophy. 
2. The political function of legal institutions is to resolve disputes in a pluralist society. 
3. And that requires lawyers to abstain from moral judgment about their clients, understand 
their role of serving as agents of their clients, and follow the positive legal obligations in 
the code of ethics. 
 
These thinkers are very different from each other. And they do not all defend traditional 
advocacy. Wendel, in particular, argues that the fundamental value lawyers must serve is fidelity 
to law, not fidelity to clients’ goals. This is particularly important when we turn from the lawyer’s 
role as courtroom advocate to the role of confidential advisor. As an advisor, the lawyer’s duty is 
to give the client a candid, objective opinion about the law, even if it is not what the client wants 
to hear. Of course we know that business clients often want opinion letters from their lawyers 
telling them they can do whatever it is they want to do; but the lawyer must be faithful to the law 
even if it means the client cannot do the deal. 
 
Markovits shares the political premises of Wendel’s argument, including the view that law has “a 
distinctively political kind of authority” over citizens, which derives from the capacity of the law to 
sustain a stable framework for collective government, notwithstanding the incompatible 
interests, and plurality of reasonable moral commitments, of individuals. But Markovits places 
considerable additional emphasis on participation by citizens in the processes of democratic 
self-government, an affective sense of solidarity with other members of the political community, 
shared ownership of political outcomes, and the transformative potential of political 
engagement. 
 
Markovits argues that the primary lawyerly virtue is what he calls “negative capability.” This 
concept, which he borrows from the poet John Keats, suggests openness to others and the 
setting aside of one’s preconceptions. One might object that the world needs “negatively 
capable” lawyers like a hole in the head, if negative capability means pushing their own 
judgment out of the way. 
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Second Wave Responses to the Moralist Challenge 
 
One area of concern with Second Wave arguments is the extent to which they seem to require 
lawyers to abstain from moral deliberation, for the sake of preserving the institutional settlement 
of our pluralist society. This is an issue about which the two co-authors disagree, and we think 
our disagreement is symptomatic of the difference between First Wave and Second Wave 
theoretical legal ethics - the difference, as we have explained, between treating legal ethics as a 
subject within moral philosophy rather than political philosophy. The former approach, recall, 
asks whether, as a moral matter, a good lawyer can be a good person even when representing 
morally disagreeable ends in morally disagreeable ways. Luban is skeptical that the answer is 
yes, and proposes an alternative - “moral activism” - in which the lawyer leaves her moral 
judgment switch in the “on” position and engages actively with the client on issues of ends and 
means. The latter points to the importance of lawyers to a legal system that knits together a 
pluralist society, and argues that lawyers must suspend moral judgment of their clients' ends 
and the lawful means needed to pursue them. 
 
The argument for the moralist position is straightforward: fundamentally, our moral agency is 
always with us; it is inescapable. It is part of the human condition. Therefore an advocate can 
never ignore the damage her representation inflicts on innocent others. Human solidarity 
demands no less. Can any reason for side-stepping moral deliberation be truly exclusionary? 
 
One response is that, no, there is no reason that would be truly exclusionary, but the bar for 
opting out of the requirements of a role can be set at a high level. On one influential conception 
of role morality, the occupants of a social role may opt out if the best way to serve the ends of 
the role is to do something that is not permitted by the constitutive rules of the role. 
 
A second possible Second Wave response to the moralistic challenge is that First Wave 
moralists simply have no plausible moral psychology to back up the exacting demands they 
place on lawyers. You cannot lead a professional life in a constant state of moral arousal, any 
more than a physician can practice emergency room medicine in a constant state of 
sympathetic anguish for the patients. The traits of character the moralists call for are not 
functional, realistic, or desirable. They would make a lawyer a misfit in the teamwork-based 
setting of a law firm, and constant moral evaluation of client ends and means assumes cognitive 
capacities and moral virtue at an unrealistic level. 
 
Another possibility for dealing with the alarms and torments brought upon others by the law, with 
which both of us have some sympathy, is to emphasize that public ethics deals with a world 
characterized by the necessity of compromise. Dilemmas in political life, of which the practice of 
law is a part, are sometimes incapable of resolution without a sense that there is something 
disagreeable, even wrongful, about the resolution, even though the conclusion may be justified. 
 
Questions: 
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1. Luban and Wendel describe different theories of legal ethics that arose at different points 
in time. Which of those theories do you find most convincing and why? 
2. Did the theories advanced in this article affect the practice of law and the application of 
the rules of professional responsibility? Can you identify any ways in which theories of 
legal ethics may have affected how lawyers argued cases, judges decided cases, or 
organizations regulated lawyers?  
 
Further Listening: 
 
● W. Bradley Wendel on the History of Philosophical Legal Ethics, Ipse Dixit, January 23, 
2019 
 
Legal Ethics According to the Legal Profession 
 
Boswell: “But what do you think of supporting a cause which you know to be bad?” 
Johnson: “Sir, you do not know it to be good or bad till the Judge determines it.”133 
 
Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law (1905) 
 
The ethical question which laymen most frequently ask about the legal profession is this: How 
can a lawyer take a case which he does not believe in? The profession is regarded as 
necessarily somewhat immoral, because its members are supposed to be habitually taking 
cases of that character. As a practical matter, the lawyer is not often harassed by this problem; 
partly because he is apt to believe, at the time, in most of the cases that he actually tries; and 
partly because he either abandons or settles a large number of those he does not believe in. 
But the lawyer recognizes that in trying a case his prime duty is to present his side to the 
tribunal fairly and as well as he can, relying upon his adversary to present the other side fairly 
and as well as he can. Since the lawyers on the two sides are usually reasonably well matched, 
the judge or jury may ordinarily be trusted to make such a decision as justice demands. 
 
But when lawyers act upon the same principle in supporting the attempts of their private clients 
to secure or to oppose legislation, a very different condition is presented. In the first place, the 
counsel selected to represent important private interests possesses usually ability of a high 
order, while the public is often inadequately represented or wholly unrepresented. Great 
unfairness to the public is apt to result from this fact. Many bills pass in our legislatures which 
would not have become law, if the public interest had been fairly represented; and many good 
bills are defeated which if supported by able lawyers would have been enacted. Lawyers have, 
as a rule, failed to consider this distinction between practice in courts involving only private 
interests, and practice before the legislature or city council involving public interests. Some men 
of high professional standing have even endeavored to justify their course in advocating 
professionally legislation which in their character as citizens they would have voted against. 
 
																																																								
133 James Boswell, Life of Johnson (1791). 
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Furthermore, lawyers of high standing have often failed to apply in connection with professional 
work before the legislature or city council a rule of ethics which they would deem imperative in 
practice before the court. Lawyers who would indignantly retire from a court case in the justice 
of which they believed, if they had reason to think that a juror had been bribed or a witness had 
been suborned by their client, are content to serve their client by honest arguments before a 
legislative committee, although they have as great reason to believe that their client has bribed 
members of the legislature or corrupted public opinion. This confusion of ethical ideas is an 
important reason why the Bar does not now hold the position which it formerly did as a brake 
upon democracy, and which I believe it must take again if the serious questions now before us 
are to be properly solved. 
 
Here, consequently, is the great opportunity in the law. The next generation must witness a 
continuing and ever-increasing contest between those who have and those who have not. The 
people’s thought will take shape in action; and it lies with us, with you to whom in part the future 
belongs, to say on what lines the action is to be expressed; whether it is to be expressed wisely 
and temperately, or wildly and intemperately; whether it is to be expressed on lines of evolution 
or on lines of revolution. Nothing can better fit you for taking part in the solution of these 
problems, than the study and preeminently the practice of law. Those of you who feel drawn to 
that profession may rest assured that you will find in it an opportunity for usefulness which is 
probably unequalled. There is a call upon the legal profession to do a great work for this 
country. 
 
Woodrow Wilson, The Lawyer and the Community, 192 N. Am. Rev. 604 (1910) 
 
Lawyers are not a mere body of expert business advisers in the field of civil law or a mere body 
of expert advocates for those who get entangled in the meshes of the criminal law. They are 
servants of the public, of the State itself. They are under bonds to serve the general interest, the 
integrity and enlightenment of law itself, in the advice they give individuals. It is their duty also to 
advise those who make the laws?to advise them in the general interest, with a view to the 
amelioration of every undesirable condition that the law can reach, the removal of every 
obstacle to progress and fair dealing that the law can remove, the lightening of every burden the 
law can lift and the righting of every wrong the law can rectify. The services of the lawyer are 
indispensable not only in the application of the accepted processes of the law, the interpretation 
of existing rules in the daily operations of life and business. His services are indispensable also 
in keeping and in making the law clear with regard to responsibility, to organization, to liability 
and, above all, to the relation of private rights to the public interest. 
 
Whatever may be the cause, it is evident that he now regards himself as the counsel of 
individuals exclusively and not of communities. He may plead the new organization of politics, 
which seems to exclude all counsel except that of party success and personal control; he may 
argue that public questions have changed, have drifted away from his field, and that his advice 
is no longer asked; but, whatever his explanation or excuse, the fact is the same. He does not 
play the part he used to play. He does not show the spirit in affairs he used to show. He does 
not do what he ought to do. 
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Tom C. Clark, Teaching Professional Ethics, 12 San Diego L. Rev. 249 (1975) 
 
Traditionally, the organized bar has prided itself upon being a profession, based upon the well-
accepted view that the primacy of service over profit is the criterion which distinguishes a 
profession from a business. Now, though, strong voices have begun to challenge the bar’s 
complacent view of itself. For example, in a recent speech to a joint luncheon of the American 
Judicature Society and the National Conference of Bar Presidents, Senator John V. Tunney of 
California criticized what he perceived as the bar’s over-emphasis on pecuniary return and 
declared that “the profession is kidding itself if it views Watergate as the flaw in an otherwise 
heroic tapestry of public service.” 
 
In scholarly articles as well as in the popular press, lawyers are being condemned as valueless 
technicians who are more concerned with the tactical than with the ethical, and the blame for 
this general erosion in integrity is being attributed to the failure of the profession to discipline 
itself. Most of that criticism centers around enforcement of our canons of ethics-the tools by 
which the bar polices itself and the goals by which we judge ourselves. It is charged that our 
Code of Professional Responsibility does not in fact protect either the public or the recipients of 
professional services, but rather safeguards only the interests of an entrenched segment of the 
profession. Many would agree with Professor Waltz’s comment that: “By regulating ourselves 
and brooking no lay interference in the process, we too often avoid disciplining even the most 
venal and inept among us.” 
 
There is no doubt in my mind that the present state of our disciplinary machinery is deplorable 
and that we must perfect the professional system of disciplining and weeding out judges and 
lawyers who are inept, lazy, corrupt or dishonest. Happily, the organized bar has finally begun to 
move in this direction, but this is an effort which has a crucial prerequisite, the same prerequisite 
that Senator Ervin alluded to in his Honolulu speech: integrity. Unless the bar is uniformly 
imbued with that spirit of honesty and decency and unless it is inspired to insist upon the 
exercise of the highest ideals in the day-to-day practice of law, then no disciplinary system can 
be effective and no code of professional conduct will be anything more than a hypocritical farce. 
 
Warren E. Burger, The Role of the Law School in the Teaching of Legal Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility, 29 Clev. St. L. Rev. 377 (1980) 
 
To become a lawyer is to be more than being available as a “hired gun” or a “legal mechanic.” 
To be sure, one of our great tasks is to be effective advocates. The history of our profession is 
rich with accounts of lawyers who risked careers by asserting their independence in opposition 
to the government or to popular attitudes. Andrew Hamilton did that in defending John Peter 
Zenger; John Adams did that when he defended the soldiers accused of what history calls the 
“Boston Massacre;” that is what Luther Martin and others did when they defended Aaron Burr in 
his trial for treason. Defending their clients, these men advanced the liberties of all. An 
independent judiciary alone is not enough; it must be supported by a strong, independent, 
courageous and competent bar. This is an imperative for a free people. 
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But lawyers are not “licensed” to promote conflict; they must be more than skilled legal 
technicians. We should be that, but in a larger sense, we must be legal architects, engineers, 
builders, and from time to time, inventors as well. We have served, and must continue to see 
our role, as problem-solvers, harmonizers, and peacemakers, the healers - not the promoters - 
of conflict. Lawyers must reconcile and stabilize, for a democracy often functions best by 
compromise. For hundreds of years England and the United States have been able largely to 
avoid internecine conflict, vigilantism, and collective violence because lawyers have served as 
the indispensable “brokers” of social progress, providing the lubricant for acceptable resolution 
of controversies and for gradual change and evolution of the law. It bears repeating that we 
must see ourselves more clearly in the function of healers rather than as promoters of litigation. 
 
Our profession carries public and ethical burdens with its privileges. Daniel Webster spoke of 
justice as “the greatest interest of man on earth.” As a profession with a monopoly over the 
performance of certain services, we have special obligations to the consumers of justice to be 
energetic and imaginative in producing the best quality of justice at the lowest possible costs for 
those who use it, and with a minimum of delay. It was in these respects that my late colleague, 
Charles Fahy, hoped that we would think of a lawyer and the law as forces for moral good, “as a 
civilization of its own, enhancing the whole of our civilization.” 
 
Questions: 
 
1. How do Brandeis, Wilson, Clark, and Burger define legal ethics? Do they provide a basis 
for determining whether an action is ethical? 
2. How would you describe the ethical theories advanced by Brandeis, Wilson, Clark, and 
Burger in relation to the categories advanced by Luban and Wendel? 
 
The First Wave of Legal Ethics: Moral Theories 
 
Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Hum. Rts. 1 
(1975) 
 
Conventional wisdom has it that where the attorney-client relationship exists, the point of view of 
the attorney is properly different - and appreciably so - from that which would be appropriate in 
the absence of the attorney-client relationship. For where the attorney-client relationship exists, 
it is often appropriate and many times even obligatory for the attorney to do things that, all other 
things being equal, an ordinary person need not, and should not do. What is characteristic of 
this role of a lawyer is the lawyer’s required indifference to a wide variety of ends and 
consequences that in other contexts would be of undeniable moral significance. Once a lawyer 
represents a client, the lawyer has a duty to make his or her expertise fully available in the 
realization of the end sought by the client, irrespective, for the most part, of the moral worth to 
which the end will be put or the character of the client who seeks to utilize it. Provided that the 
end sought is not illegal, the lawyer is, in essence, an amoral technician whose peculiar skills 
and knowledge in respect to the law are available to those with whom the relationship of client is 
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established. The question, as I have indicated, is whether this particular and pervasive feature 
of professionalism is itself justifiable. At a minimum, I do not think any of the typical, simple 
answers will suffice. 
 
One such answer focuses upon and generalizes from the criminal defense lawyer. For what is 
probably the most familiar aspect of this role-differentiated character of the lawyer's activity is 
that of the defense of a client charged with a crime. The received view within the profession 
(and to a lesser degree within the society at large) is that having once agreed to represent the 
client, the lawyer is under an obligation to do his or her best to defend that person at trial, 
irrespective, for instance, even of the lawyer's belief in the client’s innocence. There are limits, 
of course, to what constitutes a defense: a lawyer cannot bribe or intimidate witnesses to 
increase the likelihood of securing an acquittal. And there are legitimate questions, in close 
cases, about how those limits are to be delineated. But, however these matters get resolved, it 
is at least clear that it is thought both appropriate and obligatory for the attorney to put on as 
vigorous and persuasive a defense of a client believed to be guilty as would have been mounted 
by the lawyer thoroughly convinced of the client’s innocence. I suspect that many persons find 
this an attractive and admirable feature of the life of a legal professional. I know that often I do. 
The justifications are varied and, as I shall argue below, probably convincing. 
 
But part of the difficulty is that the irrelevance of the guilt or innocence of an accused client by 
no means exhausts the altered perspective of the lawyer's conscience, even in criminal cases. 
For in the course of defending an accused, an attorney may have, as a part of his or her duty of 
representation, the obligation to invoke procedures and practices which are themselves morally 
objectionable and of which the lawyer in other contexts might thoroughly disapprove. And these 
situations, I think, are somewhat less comfortable to confront. 
 
Nor, it is important to point out, is this peculiar, strikingly amoral behavior limited to the lawyer 
involved with the workings of the criminal law. Most clients come to lawyers to get the lawyers 
to help them do things that they could not easily do without the assistance provided by the 
lawyer's special competence. And in each case, the role-differentiated character of the lawyer's 
way of being tends to render irrelevant what would otherwise be morally relevant 
considerations. 
 
The lawyer need not of course agree to represent the client (and that is equally true for the 
unpopular client accused of a heinous crime), but there is nothing wrong with representing a 
client whose aims and purposes are quite immoral. And having agreed to do so, the lawyer is 
required to provide the best possible assistance, without regard to his or her disapproval of the 
objective that is sought. The lesson, on this view, is clear. The job of the lawyer, so the 
argument typically concludes, is not to approve or disapprove of the character of his or her 
client, the cause for which the client seeks the lawyer’s assistance, or the avenues provided by 
the law 
to achieve that which the client wants to accomplish. The lawyer’s task is, instead, to provide 
that competence which the client lacks and the lawyer, as professional, possesses. In this way, 
the lawyer as professional comes to inhabit a simplified universe which is strikingly amoral - 
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which regards as morally irrelevant any number of factors which nonprofessional citizens might 
take to be important, if not decisive, in their everyday lives. And the difficulty I have with all of 
this is that the arguments for such a way of life seem to be not quite so convincing to me as they 
do to many lawyers. I am, that is, at best uncertain that it is a good thing for lawyers to be so 
professional-for them to embrace so completely this role-differentiated way of approaching 
matters. 
 
More specifically, if it is correct that this is the perspective of lawyers in particular and 
professionals in general, is it right that this should be their perspective? Is it right that the lawyer 
should be able so easily to put to one side otherwise difficult problems with the answer: but 
these are not and cannot be my concern as a lawyer? What do we gain and what do we lose 
from having a social universe in which there are professionals such as lawyers, who, as such, 
inhabit a universe of the sort I have been trying to describe? 
 
William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 
1978 Wis. L. Rev. 29 (1978) 
 
Conventional morality frowns at the ethics of advocacy. Public opinion disapproves of what it 
considers the lawyer’s most characteristic activities. Popular culture can reconcile itself to him 
only by pretending that all his clients are virtuous. The lawyer’s response takes the form of a 
dialectic of cynicism and naivete. On one hand, he sees his more degrading activities as 
licensed by a fundamental amorality lying beneath conventional morality. On the other hand, he 
sees his more heartening ones as serving an institutional justice higher than conventional 
morality. The two moods divide the profession as a whole, and the division can sometimes be 
seen in the professional lives of individual lawyers, as, for instance, when they turn from their 
paid efforts on behalf of what they admit to be private interests to their donated services on 
behalf of what they claim to be the public good. 
 
The formal, articulate expression of the lawyer’s response is the “Ideology of Advocacy.” The 
purpose of the Ideology of Advocacy is to rationalize the most salient aspect of the lawyer’s 
peculiar ethical orientation: his explicit refusal to be bound by personal and social norms which 
he considers binding on others. The most elaborate expressions of the Ideology of Advocacy 
occur in officially promulgated rules of ethics, in doctrinal writings on legal ethics, the attorney-
client evidentiary privilege, and the constitutional right to counsel, and in writings on the 
legal profession. 
 
Although this literature is voluminous, it is barren of any fundamental questioning of the ethical 
premises of legal professionalism. The profession has never been inclined to join issue on any 
but the most superficial level with the lay critique of these premises, and it presently seems less 
disposed toward reexamination of them than ever. 
 
Of course, there is a growing body of writing addressed to the profession which is critical of the 
conduct of lawyers and professional organizations. Yet, most of these discussions take place 
within the framework of the Ideology of Advocacy and do not involve criticism of its premises. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367936 
	 843	
The more prominent of these discussions have been of two types. First, doctrinal writings on 
legal ethics and judicial procedure often take the form of a debate between the partisans of a 
“battle” model and the partisans of a “truth” model of adjudication. These writings criticize 
certain kinds of conduct by lawyers as inconsistent with one or the other of these models. Yet, 
almost all of the distinctive ethical views of lawyers can be rationalized in terms of one or the 
other of the models, and the differences between them are greatly exaggerated in the debate. 
Both models accept the basic principles of the Ideology of Advocacy and are primarily 
concerned with defending those principles. 
 
Second, there is a substantial body of sociology and social criticism which focuses on the legal 
profession. Some of this literature argues that lawyers compromise their clients’ interests in 
order to advance their own interests. Other studies focus on an elite within the profession and 
argue that the elite has used professional ethics and organization to achieve prestige and 
economic privilege at the expense of the less powerful members of the profession and of the 
lower classes generally. Studies which emphasize the exploitation of clients explicitly accept the 
Ideology of Advocacy and criticize lawyers for failing to live up to it. Although studies which 
emphasize elite domination purport to criticize legal ethics and professionalism, they do not deal 
with the basic principles expressed by the Ideology of Advocacy. Instead, they focus on 
principles such as restrictions on membership in the profession and prohibitions on advertising 
and solicitation. Such studies are concerned less with the nature of legal services than with their 
distribution. In suggesting that the increased availability of legal services allegedly inhibited by 
professional ethics and organization would be desirable, these writings often rely on the 
Ideology of Advocacy. It is notable that writing from both perspectives often calls for reforms 
which would enlarge the size and power of the profession. 
 
Although the three versions of the Ideology of Advocacy all defend the same core of basic 
principles, each is based on different attitudes and commitments, and each describes and 
recommends a somewhat different style of law practice. Although all three versions exert 
influence today, each originated in a distinct historical situation and attained its greatest 
influence at a different time. The influence of the three versions has also varied significantly 
among different strata of the profession and in different areas of law practice. 
 
At the base of each version of the Ideology of Advocacy is an appeal to an aspect of the 
fundamental value of individuality: autonomy, responsibility, dignity. Yet, in each instance, the 
practices and attitudes of professional advocacy subvert the norms of individuality in the interest 
of a repressive conception of social stability. The essay will argue that to take the value of 
individuality seriously would require the abandonment of the Ideology of Advocacy and of legal 
professionalism. Indeed, it will also suggest that respect for the value of law itself may require 
the repudiation of legal professionalism. 
 
Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589 (1985) 
 
A more ethically reflective form of legal practice will require different ideological foundations. 
Lawyers must assume personal moral responsibility for the consequences of their professional 
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actions. At its most fundamental level, such a redefinition abandons Durkheim’s faith in the 
ability of insular occupational communities to generate adequate normative visions. Given the 
tendency of parochial interests to skew ethical judgment, the justification for conduct must be 
tested by conventional techniques of moral reasoning. The rationale for professional action 
cannot depend on a reflexive retreat to role, which denies the need for reflection at the very 
point when reflection becomes most essential. To be convincing, professional judgments must 
withstand scrutiny by individuals seeking consistent, disinterested, and generalizable 
foundations for conduct. Counsel should no longer categorically deflect responsibility to some 
governmental or private agent acting in a presumptively ideal regulatory system. Rather, 
attorneys must confront the consequences of their decisions against a realistic social backdrop, 
in which wealth, power, and information are unevenly distributed, and democratic, adversarial, 
and market processes function imperfectly. 
 
This reformulation of role in no sense contemplates that lawyers will become personally 
accountable for every adverse consequence that flows from client representation or collegial 
relationships. Under conventional ethical theories, moral responsibility depends on a variety of 
factors, including the significance of harm and the agent’s degree of involvement, knowledge, 
and capacity to .affect action. Nor does it follow that counsel must endorse a client’s every 
objective or course of conduct before providing representation. Whether particular forms of 
assistance are defensible depends not only on the specific acts involved but also on their social 
and economic contexts, and on the principles at issue. 
 
What distinguishes this framework is the insistence on an ethical predicate - on an attempt to 
justify systematically the consequences of professional action. That clients may have a “legal 
right” to engage in certain conduct or to invoke a particular procedure is conclusive neither of 
their moral right, nor of the appropriateness of counsel’s aid. Lawyers cannot simply retreat to 
role in the face of larger normative questions. To cite only the most obvious example, attorneys 
who delay safety standards they would privately endorse, or who knowingly assist the 
distribution of products with significant undisclosed risks, are implicated in the human suffering 
that may result. So too, in more common circumstances, counsel cannot continually resolve 
doubts in favor of those with a history of revising reality, misplacing discoverable documents, or 
operating on the fringes of fraud. In effect, the attorney can no longer avoid responsibility for 
allowing client interests to trump all competing concerns. 
 
Nor is the maxim “judge not” an adequate response to collegial misconduct. Participation in a 
common enterprise entails some accountability for the practices it tolerates and the values it 
engenders. Attorneys who blink at over-billing, misrepresentation, or procedural belligerence 
thereby legitimate forms of professional acculturation that are debilitating for practitioners as 
well as litigants. To argue for individual assumption of responsibility, however, only begins 
analysis. The more difficult issue, which remains a highly contextual determination, is what that 
responsibility entails. Relevant factors include not only the magnitude and likelihood of potential 
harm and the attorney’s capacity to affect it, but also the personal and social costs that 
corrective action would impose. Among those costs, the possible loss of client or collegial trust 
is entitled to weight. In some instances, an individual's dependency, or a lawyer’s limited 
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leverage and access to information, may make suspension of judgment the only practicable 
course. 
 
So too, some limits to self-sacrifice demand recognition. To suggest that individuals are morally 
obligated to respond to every harmful consequence that they could potentially influence would 
impose paralyzing burdens. Conventional ethical theories do not posit that all humanity should 
live as Trappist monks, devote every discretionary dollar to famine relief, or pontificate 
at every possible opportunity. Without some concept of supererogation, some “cut off for 
heroism,” no significant realm of individual autonomy would survive. If it is to provide useful 
normative guidance, a reformulation of professional role must remain sensitive to normal human 
capacities for altruism, as well as the psychological and economic pressures of legal practice. 
 
Yet while professional ideology need not mandate canonization, neither should it legitimate 
abdication. For lawyers to do for profit what they would deplore as decisionmakers cannot be 
justified simply by recourse to role. Under some circumstances, an attorney may be more able 
or inclined to make principled judgments than other individuals involved in the process. 
Depending on the context, the only acceptable course may be a refusal to aid, or an affirmative 
attempt to prevent asocial conduct.  
 
Such contexts cannot, of course, be identified in the abstract. Yet to concede that 
decisionmaking will necessarily prove situational is not to embrace a totally relativist 
perspective. Given the heterogeneity of the American legal profession, collective adherence to 
some codified standards remains essential. Deference to established precepts such as honesty, 
fair dealing, or procedural civility is a necessary means of minimizing temptation and keeping 
normative ambiguity within reasonable bounds. Exhaustive evaluation of every act would yield a 
numbing moral perplexity. Given the inevitable human tendency to skew ethical assessments in 
expedient directions, an a priori commitment to certain principles remains appropriate. What is 
critical, however, is that those precepts be themselves morally defensible in a world of 
regulatory imperfections and gross socioeconomic disparities. By that standard, as earlier 
discussion suggests, one cannot convincingly generate a principle that all clients are entitled to 
either unqualified confidentiality or the maximum neutral partisanship they can afford. 
 
That is by no means to imply that systematic reflection will yield determinate resolutions, or to 
overlook the limitations of moral methodology noted earlier. But this concession need not 
invite paralysis. There may be no uncontrovertible answers, but there are better and worse 
ways of thinking about the questions. Thus, the attempt must be to create more channels within 
which serious normative dialogue can occur. Individuals must have ongoing occasions to 
confront ethical issues, to test their perceptions openly, and to raise concerns about client or 
collegial practices without professional risk. For that purpose, far more is needed than bar 
association advisory opinions or law firm conflict-of-interest committees. Rather, the profession 
must fashion structures within and across employing institutions that can encourage collective 
support and a sense of responsibility for normative concerns. 
 
Thomas Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 963 (1987) 
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Paternalism, in most writing on the professions, is a bad word. But pater (father) is not a bad 
word. The Hebraic religious tradition chose and retains the word, if only as metaphor, to 
describe God, despite the difficulty of a theology of patriarchy. The description approximates 
with a family metaphor the understanding of the Hebrew prophets that the God of Israel is a 
God with feelings - the “divine pathos,” as Abraham Joshua Heschel called it. God’s pathos 
means that He feels as a father feels; the prophetic response to God is thus sympathy. Father, 
consequently, is not a bad word; it cannot be. Writers on professionalism erred in thinking 
otherwise. 
 
It is not a moral condemnation of standards of professional conduct, then, to call them “fatherly” 
(paternalistic); nor would it be a moral condemnation to call them “motherly” (maternalistic) or 
even parent-like (parentalistic). If we take our theological metaphors seriously, to analogize 
behavior to the parental is to fit it to our traditions. The retreat from parental metaphors in 
modern writing on professionalism is subject to two criticisms. First, the analysis has not 
proceeded deeply enough; writing on professionalism has been duped into announcing a moral 
principle when it should have been concerned with description - truthfulness - in the comparison 
of a professional person and a parent, and of the virtues of good parents and the failures of bad 
parents. Writing on professionalism should describe the moral reasons that we use family 
metaphors, in theology and in professional life and it then should turn those reasons into 
doctrine. Second, the condemnation of paternalism (parentalism) in modern writing on ethics in 
the professions is the product of the lonely-individual doctrine in philosophical ethics, and of the 
philosophical distinction between fact and value, particularly in its disposition to turn the parental 
metaphor into a moral principle. 
 
Radical individualism is the philosophy of an adolescent who wishes he had no parents. The 
school of moral philosophy that posits a parentless moral agent duped us into accepting an 
untruthful description of the world. I notice that untruthful description in The Case of the 
Unwanted Will, when legal-ethics commentators describe the woman making the will as a 
radical individual rather than as a wife, a mother, and a member of a family. The alternative is to 
understand enough about oneself and one’s client to know that family words describe more than 
a set of social roles that a woman puts on as she might put on a hat. 
 
The argument I make here is an argument from the Hebraic religious tradition. In Judaism, the 
family is not merely fundamental; it is ordained. God dealt with the family; He made a covenant 
with it. Israel is a family of families. This “master story” has innumerable implications, some 
obvious and some subtle, for Hebraic norms on sex, raising children, business and property, 
and inheritance. These implications turn on the moral teaching that a person alone is not 
complete; as the Midrash says, “He who lives without a wife lives without blessing, without life, 
without joy, without help, without good, and without peace.” 
 
In Christianity, marriage is, in the Hebraic ethics of Jesus, so fundamental that it is sinful to 
dissolve it. St. Paul’s metaphors equate family and church, and speak of the church as the body 
of Christ. The early Christian church was a patriarchy that tried to be open to notions of equality 
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and partnership within the metaphor of family. That aspiration was fundamentally Judaic: “Unity 
is a task, to endure means to be one.” 
 
There are two ways to take account of the religious tradition in American legal ethics. One way 
is to note that the cultural deposits of most American lawyers include the religious tradition. 
Failing to take account of the tradition therefore is failing to be truthful. As Peter Berger put it, 
“The very least that a knowledge of religious traditions has to offer is a catalogue of heresies for 
possible home use.” That is, the religious tradition, when we are conscious of it, helps to keep 
us from repeating obvious moral mistakes and, more profoundly, it influences our behavior 
when we are not conscious of it. Berger thought that these influences were appropriate: “In 
everyday life it is just as important that some things can silently be taken for granted as that 
some things are reaffirmed in so many words.” In that sense, law-office behavior probably rests 
on religious tradition in an ordinary and everyday way. The risk in Berger’s reassurance, as 
Robert Bellah and his colleagues recently demonstrated, is that we will lose or distort influences 
that we do not bring into the light and make sense of. The work of bringing moral influences into 
the light and making sense of them is the purpose of the discipline of ethics. 
 
Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client 
Relation, 85 Yale L.J. (1976) 
 
In this essay I will consider the moral status of the traditional conception of the professional. The 
two criticisms of this traditional conception, if left unanswered, will not put the lawyer in jail, but 
they will leave him without a moral basis for his acts. The real question is whether, in the face of 
these two criticisms, a decent and morally sensitive person can conduct himself according to the 
traditional conception of professional loyalty and still believe that what he is doing is morally 
worthwhile. 
 
It might be said that anyone whose conscience is so tender that he cannot fulfill the prescribed 
obligations of a professional should not undertake those obligations. He should not allow his 
moral scruples to operate as a trap for those who are told by the law that they may expect 
something more. But of course this suggestion merely pushes the inquiry back a step. We must 
ask then not how a decent lawyer may behave, but whether a decent, ethical person can ever 
be a lawyer. Are the assurances implicit in assuming the role of lawyer such that an honorable 
person would not give them and thus would not enter the profession? And, indeed, this is a 
general point about an argument from obligation: It may be that the internal logic of a particular 
obligation demands certain forms of conduct (e.g., honor among thieves), but the question 
remains whether it is just and moral to contract such obligations. 
 
I will argue in this essay that it is not only legally but also morally right that a lawyer adopt as his 
dominant purpose the furthering of his client's interests-that it is right that a professional put the 
interests of his client above some idea, however valid, of the collective interest. I maintain that 
the traditional conception of the professional role expresses a morally valid conception of 
human conduct and human relationships, that one who acts according to that conception is to 
that extent a good person. Indeed, it is my view that, far from being a mere creature of positive 
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law, the traditional conception is so far mandated by moral right that any advanced legal system 
which did not sanction this conception would be unjust. 
 
The general problem raised by the two criticisms is this: How can it be that it is not only 
permissible, but indeed morally right, to favor the interests of a particular person in a way which 
we can be fairly sure is either harmful to another particular individual or not maximally conducive 
to the welfare of society as a whole? 
 
The resolution of this problem is aided, I think, if set in a larger perspective. Charles Curtis 
made the perspicacious remark that a lawyer may be privileged to lie for his client in a way that 
one might lie to save one's friends or close relatives. I do not want to underwrite the notion that 
it is justifiable to lie even in those situations, but there is a great deal to the point that in those 
relations - friendship, kinship - we recognize an authorization to take the interests of particular 
concrete persons more seriously and to give them priority over the interests of the wider 
collectivity. One who provides an expensive education for his own children surely cannot be 
blamed because he does not use these resources to alleviate famine or to save lives in some 
distant land. Nor does he blame himself. Indeed, our intuition that an individual is authorized to 
prefer identified persons standing close to him over the abstract interests of humanity finds its 
sharpest expression in our sense that an individual is entitled to act with something less than 
impartiality to that person who stands closest to him - the person that he is. There is such a 
thing as selfishness to be sure, yet no reasonable morality asks us to look upon ourselves as 
merely plausible candidates for the distribution of the attention and resources which we 
command, plausible candidates whose entitlement to our own concern is no greater in principle 
than that of any other human being. Such a doctrine may seem edifying, but on reflection it 
strikes us as merely fanatical. 
 
This suggests an interesting way to look at the situation of the lawyer. As a professional person 
one has a special care for the interests of those accepted as clients, just as his friends, his 
family, and he himself have a very general claim to his special concern. But I concede this does 
no more than widen the problem. It merely shows that in claiming this authorization to have a 
special care for my clients I am doing something which I do in other contexts as well. 
 
The Second Wave of Legal Ethics: Political Theories 
 
Monroe H. Freedman, A Critique of Philosophizing About Lawyers’ Ethics, 25 Geo. J. 
Legal Ethics 91 (2012)  
 
In the world of real lawyers and real clients, “role differentiation” refers to a fiduciary relationship 
in which the lawyer promises to take all reasonable and lawful means to attain the objectives of 
the client. This promise is an inescapable part of any meaningful moral analysis. Also, lawyers 
function under ethical rules, many of which reflect ordinary morality, and violation of those rules 
can result in serious professional sanctions and malpractice liability. Those rules and that 
potential responsibility should not be ignored in proposals for radical changes in how lawyers 
serve their clients. In addition, lawyers in the United States are subject to a constitutionalized 
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adversary system, which defines and limits their professional responsibilities in fundamental 
respects. When moral philosophers ignore these practical concerns, they produce articles and 
books that have no significance in the world of real lawyers and real clients. As Chief Justice 
Roberts recently observed: “What the academy is doing is largely of no use or interest 
to people who actually practice law.” 
 
Structural engineers do not debate whether using skyhook cables that drop magically from the 
sky would be a better way of building bridges than the present suspension method. Nor do they 
publish reply articles about how air traffic would have to be rerouted to avoid the non-existent 
sky hook cables. In a similar sense, philosophical theorizing about lawyers’ ethics, based upon 
unrealistic facts and the omission of critical authorities, is irrelevant to the real-life concerns of 
lawyers and is a waste of scholarly effort. 
 
My point is not that the rules of lawyers’ ethics do not demand serious reform from a moral 
perspective. On the contrary, more practical moral criticism is badly needed. One of the reasons 
for my impatience with the work of the philosophical ethicists is that their moral sensitivity and 
keen intellects could be used to bring about much needed improvement in the ethics and 
practice of lawyers and judges. 
 
Finally, despite the ongoing need for reform of ethical rules and practices, I resent the 
irresponsible charge that the practice of law is inherently immoral or amoral. For more than half 
a century I have served as an associate, partner, supervisor, co-counsel, consultant, and 
mentor alongside countless lawyers who, like me, have found the practice of law to be an 
exhilarating, gratifying, and essentially moral profession of serving the dignity and autonomy of 
our fellow citizens and of maintaining the ideals of our constitutional democracy. This moral role 
of service to others, and to our society, would not be possible if lawyers were to view their 
relationship with their clients with a patronizing attitude of moral arrogance. 
 
Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking Glass of Ethics and the Wrong with Rights We 
Find There, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1 (1995) 
 
When we try to control the definition of rights by relying on our laws of obligation, we seem 
ridiculous, as if we were advocating that the tail wag the dog. The ethical obligations of lawyers, 
whether they be those articulated by the courts in ethics rules or enforced by the courts in tort 
actions, are simply too weak to drive the definition of right. The idea that a constitutional right 
should be contoured to reinforce the obligations set forth in secondary (obligation) law, like the 
rules of legal ethics, seems absurd and is rejected easily both by the Supreme Court in 
Strickland and by the federal courts deciding whether due process has been satisfied in a class 
action proceeding through the provision of adequate representation. 
 
Rights law is not only strong enough to overshadow obligation law, it is strong enough to stop 
obligation law altogether. The right having been satisfied, making state action appropriate, it 
seems at once unseemly and unnecessary to question whether obligations have been met. This 
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attitude accounts for the legal obstacles that prevent tort actions and the absence of disciplinary 
proceedings in both the class action and the criminal defense context. 
 
Unlike tax law, tort law or other sources of legal obligation in our normative world, ethics is not 
merely a source of obligation but the place where obligation is understood as dignifying and 
ennobling. Our normative structure thus allows for the possibility that obligation can be 
understood as something more akin to a blessing than a burden. But the fact that this idea is so 
central to ethics may account for the secondary status that ethics occupies in our world, 
culturally and legally. The idea basic to ethics - dignifying and ennobling obligation - is an idea 
adrift in an alien universe. It does not resonate with our basic normative structures and, thus, we 
cannot quite take the enterprise seriously. Our thought tends to get stuck in this circle: if the 
obligation were meant to be mandatory or binding in some strong sense, it would be legal; on 
the other hand, if the obligation were designed to be ennobling, it would not be a legal 
obligation, which we understand to be a burden visited on us by the state, not a gift. 
 
Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered 
Representation, 12 Clinical L. Rev. 501 (2006) 
 
Legal obligations in our world are not worthy of the name of ethics. By making that move we 
make ethics not just something more than law, more ennobling, but something also much less, 
less compelling. Ultimately, we conceive of ethics in terms of rights. We have the right to be 
ethical or not, which in terms of an ethic makes no sense at all. The inconsistency in our world 
between law and ennobling obligation is apparent when we start speaking of legal ethics, which 
claims to be both law and ethics, both mandatory and dignifying. It claims to occupy a place in 
our normative world that seems like it cannot exist, a place where rain falls up instead of down.  
 
Despite these problems, courts sometimes, however reluctantly, take the responsibilities of 
lawyers seriously, although not often and never with the passion that courts speak of rights. 
Blinded by rights rhetoric in the case of vulnerable clients, courts are easily persuaded that their 
job is done, that obligation will somehow take care of itself, that the petty matter of lawyer 
obligation cannot dictate the outcome of the struggle between individual and state or even be 
allowed to speak after the outcome of that struggle has been determined. That is how we get 
looking glass ethics. 
 
The solution is not to get rid of the rights the law provides these vulnerable clients. In our world, 
with its understanding of rights, such a move would signal precisely the wrong thing. The 
answer is to understand that rights are not a substitute for obligations, to reinstate the tort 
remedies, to enliven the disciplinary process, and to express commitment to obligations by 
using them to contour rights. For any of this to happen, we first need to realize how nonsensical 
a law our rights jurisprudence has created. It is a law that imposes fewer obligations where the 
need is greatest, that guarantees the least protection for the most vulnerable of clients. That end 
is inconsistent with what we set out to do when we confer a right and, thus, the result may be 
critiqued from within the rights framework itself.  
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An internal critique is, however, not enough. The inherent weakness of rights theory is an 
important and pervasive problem, not only in the little corner of concern that has served as the 
vehicle for this discussion, but also everywhere where basic needs remain unmet. For all those 
who believe that a just society provides more than freedom, the inherent weakness of rights 
theory presents a formidable obstacle to achieving justice. To address this weakness, we need 
more than an internal critique. We need a serious jurisprudence of obligation. 
 
Ethics, legal ethics and judicial ethics in particular, is the natural starting point for such an effort. 
In legal and judicial ethics we find the possibility of dignifying obligations that are enforceable as 
law. Adrift in a legal world obsessed with rights, these areas of study have long been and 
remain the step-children of American legal thought. They are considered soft, secondary 
subjects not worthy of the attention of our most serious scholars. They are law that is not quite 
law because how could dignifying obligation be mandatory like law? And ethics that is not quite 
ethics because how could mandatory obligation like law be worthy of the name of ethics? These 
subjects posit a possibility not found elsewhere in law, a possible normative understanding we 
need to nurture and explore, not ignore or mock. By treating legal obligations that dignify as 
important features in our jurisprudential vision, we may not only be able to walk back through 
the looking glass. We may be able to bring with us new possibilities of achieving a more 
just world. 
 
Alice Woolley & W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and Moral Character, 23 Geo. J.L. 
Ethics 
1065 (2010) 
 
The most familiar debate in legal ethics involves a critique of theories, such as those of Fried, 
Simon, and Luban, in terms of their attractiveness as maxims of action. Simon’s act 
prescriptions, for example, can be critiqued on the basis that they require a reasoning style that 
is at odds with the expectations of clients, and may result in the disregarding of client interests if 
they happen not to coincide with the discretionary judgment of the lawyer in question. Moreover, 
the act prescriptions of Simon’s theory give insufficient weight to the procedural norms and 
ideals which justice arguably constitutes. His theory is relentlessly focused on substantive 
justice. This position leaves little room to recognize the possibility that what we call justice, and 
what we as lawyers should aim for, is what results from the procedures of the legal system and 
is not a concept that identifiably exists outside of those procedures and constraints. On the 
other hand, Fried’s act prescriptions can be critiqued on the basis that they result in the 
perpetuation of distributive injustices, simply cementing existing social disparities. The critiques 
offered from a dispositional or psychological perspective are, however, of a different nature. The 
point here is not to ask whether the acts prescribed, if accomplished, would be desirable. But is 
to ask whether the type of lawyer who would be able to accomplish those acts in a given case is 
the type of lawyer we would want to have across every case, across the totality of the legal 
system as a whole. Further, it is to ask whether, even if desirable, the type of lawyer posited is 
realistic. Simon and Luban, for example, rely on lawyers to be relentlessly focused on justice or 
morality. This may be how we think lawyers should be, but is it the equivalent of wanting 
basketball players who are 12 feet tall? 
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Each theory faces some uncomfortable questions when analyzed in this way. For Simon, the 
major challenge for his theory is that the maverick nature of Simon’s lawyer has an obvious 
maladaptive version. In its (perhaps) best conception, it may simply make the lawyer more like a 
critic or academic and less like an advocate. In its worst conception it turns the lawyer into the 
equivalent of a whistleblower. As sociological studies of whistleblowers show, the maladaptive 
version of Simon’s lawyer is not the “hysterical malcontent” of stereotypes, but someone 
for whom individuality is a defining fact of life. The “unassimilated individual” is not necessarily 
the best building block for a stable and functional organizational culture. Research by business 
ethicists and social psychologists shows that organizational cultures may be much more 
important, as a determinant of behavior, than the personal characteristics of individuals within 
the organization. Individuals are susceptible to biases and other cognitive failings, which 
predictably cause certain kinds of dysfunctions within organizations. Organizational cultures can 
be designed to blunt the impact of some of these psychological processes. Assuming that it is 
possible to reform the cultures of law firms, government offices, and in-house legal 
departments, the last thing one would want in a lawyer is a disposition to regard established 
rules and procedures as optional guidelines, to be disregarded whenever the lawyer believed 
justice or morality would be better served. The whole point of rules and procedures is to 
supplant individual decision-making, presumably because we have reason to believe that 
following the procedures will do better in the long run, as compared with relying on the judgment 
of individuals. 
 
In addition, it is not obvious that adopting the personality of the whistleblower or outlier is 
something that people can do as an act of choice or will. Being willing to question and stand 
outside the institutional, cultural, and personal structures within which you work may require 
exceptional fearlessness as to the consequences of your actions, a willingness to fight instead 
of conciliate those with whom one spends a great deal of time, and a preference for autonomy 
in judgment over relationships with others. Particularly given the social stigmatization suffered 
by many whistleblowers, it is unlikely that most individuals within an organization would want to 
be mavericks. It seems odd to ground a general theory of ethical lawyering, intended to be 
applicable to all lawyers, on a complex of personal characteristics that occurs only infrequently 
in the form of exceptionally courageous and individualistic people.  
 
This critique is similarly applicable to Luban’s lawyer. As noted, discourses of morality are highly 
disfavored in legal practice. The ability to swim upstream against those norms either requires an 
agility in negotiating human relations, which may not be realistic to expect across the population 
as a whole, or an unwillingness to “go along and get along” which may be undesirable and 
dysfunctional in institutions which are generally good rather than generally corrupt. Luban 
worries a great deal about the possibility of organizations socializing individuals into acquiescing 
in great evils – what may be called the Eichmann problem. In response, he emphasizes relying 
on personal moral tripwires. Lawyers should establish in advance lines they will not cross, and 
be willing to walk away from a situation that seems to be pushing them to cross these lines. The 
experimental evidence showing how easily individuals may be socialized into corruption is both 
what pushes Luban to recommend this all-or-nothing solution and the grounds for criticizing his 
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reliance on integrity as a way of ensuring ethical conduct by lawyers. If organizations are indeed 
such a powerful socializing force, then it would appear futile to regulate organizational 
wrongdoing by insisting on right conduct by individuals. Instead, it would be more effective to 
regulate organizations directly to ensure that they maintain healthy ethical cultures. 
 
Yet another issue for Luban is his reliance on possession of moral character. This is where the 
critique of social psychology and the observation of the relationship between conduct and 
circumstances has the most bite. While psychological personality has, as noted, some ability to 
withstand the situationality critique, moral character has relatively little. Moral character seems 
neither identifiable nor predictive of conduct. That is to say, managers of an organization might 
do well to try to select employees on the basis of “Big Five” personality characteristics such as 
agreeableness, stability, or conscientiousness. It would be less helpful, and possibly even 
counterproductive, to choose on the basis of perceptions that a candidate is honest or loyal. 
One must consider the possibility of committing the fundamental attribution error, and confusing 
responses to situational pressures with cross-situationally stable moral dispositions. 
 
For Fried the issues are different, and relate to the problem of the maladaptive version of the 
morally skeptical lawyer, who loses her moral compass altogether, pursuing victory for her client 
at any cost. Fried’s ideal of being a special purpose friend is attractive on its face, but does not 
carry over completely to the lawyering context. As many of Fried’s critics have pointed out, 
friends are not privileged to do nasty things for each other merely because they are friends. 
Moreover, lawyers sometimes treat their clients in ways they would never treat their friends – for 
example, refusing to help a client once he runs out of money. Indeed, some lawyers learn to be 
hired guns rather than friends. An obviously extreme version of this is the New Jersey lawyer 
who (allegedly) arranged for the murder of witnesses to secure acquittal for his clients on the 
basis of “no witnesses, no case.” This is not to suggest that every lawyer who embraces 
zealous advocacy so loses his moral bearings as to view murder as an acceptable litigation 
strategy, but is to suggest the fine li that exists between reserving moral judgment and losing 
the capacity for it. Critics of Fried’s metaphor complain that he drained the morally attractive 
features out of friendship in order to make it work as an analogy for representing clients. By 
doing that, he made it difficult to find anything of real moral value in the lawyer-client 
relationship. Thus, as Postema suggests, a lawyer feels torn between her personal moral 
commitments and the requirements of role, and thus begins to identify with a stance of 
detachment from all normatively significant commitments. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. How do these different theories of legal ethics conceptualize the attorney “role morality” 
differently? 
2. Reflecting on the different subjects discussed in this casebook, do you think any of these 
concepts of legal ethics influenced the way lawyers and judges acted? 
3. How might adopting one of these theories of legal ethics affect legal decisionmaking? 
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When peace, like a river, attendeth my way, when sorrows like sea billows roll; whatever my lot, 
thou hast taught me to say, it is well, it is well with my soul.134 
																																																								
134 Horatio G. Spafford, It Is Well with My Soul (1873). 
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